are u.s. army capabilities for countering weapons of mass destruction at risk

8/20/2019 Are U.S. Army Capabilities for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at Risk

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No. 108 SEPTEMBER 2015

Are U.S. Army Capabilities for

Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction at Risk?

Thomas C. Westen


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The Institute of Land WarfareASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Are U.S. Army Capabilities for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction at Risk?

by

Thomas C. Westen


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AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoringscholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well asworkshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research

by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understandingof a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does

not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but doessuggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and othersconcerned about important defense issues.

Inquiries regarding this and future Land Warfare Papers should be directed to: Director, AUSA’s

Institute of Land Warfare, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington VA 22201, e-mail [email protected] or telephone (direct dial) 703-907-2627 or (toll free) 1-800-336-4570, ext. 2627.

This paper represents the opinions of the author and should not be taken to represent the viewsof the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States government, theInstitute of Land Warfare or the Association of the United States Army or its members.

© Copyright 2015 byThe Association of the United States Army

All rights reserved.

LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 108, September 2015

Are U.S. Army Capabilities for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at Risk?

by Thomas C. Westen

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Westen was commissioned in 1993 from the Virginia MilitaryInstitute (VMI) as an Infantry Ofcer; he has since held a variety of command and staff positions,

including leading Soldiers from the platoon to company level. In 2003, he commanded a headquar-

ters company from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division as part of Operation IraqiFreedom. He has also deployed to South Korea as part of the G-3 Staff, 2d Infantry Division.

In 2004, he was selected to join the Strategist Career Field and graduated from the Basic

Strategic Art Program at the Army War College (AWC). Over the next two years, he focused oncounterinsurgency and was a contributing author for the dual-service Army and Marine Corps eld

manual Counterinsurgency, published in 2006.

In 2007, he began working as a Strategic Analyst at Joint Forces Command. His focus areasincluded building partnership capacity and grand strategy, as well as supporting the Commander’s

Quadrennial Defense Review Red Team and Transformation Advisory Group. He was also selected

as a Fellow for the Service Chiefs Program at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.From 2011 to 2014, LTC Westen was assigned as a Strategic Planner, serving rst as a War

Plans Branch Chief and then as Strategic Plans/Concepts/Doctrine Branch Chief in the G-3/5 ofthe Army Headquarters. In this capacity he worked global posture and regional issues for both U.S.

Central Command and U.S. Pacic Command. His duties included completing the 2014 ArmyStrategic Planning Guidance for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army. He also

deployed to Afghanistan, where he led a team in developing the planning and execution order for

the retrograde of U.S. forces through 2014.LTC Westen holds a Master’s Degree in Security Studies from Kansas State University and a

Bachelor’s Degree in History from VMI. His military education includes the AWC, the Defense

Strategy Course, Joint Combined Warghter School, Basic Strategic Art Program and the ArmyCommand and General Staff Ofcers Course with “Strategist” and “Joint Planner” Additional Skill

Identiers.

From 2014 to 2015, LTC Westen served as an Army Fellow in the Association of the UnitedStates Army’s Institute of Land Warfare. He is currently assigned to the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.


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Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................................................. v

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

Background ............................................................................................................................. 1

Army Institutional Efforts ....................................................................................................... 5

Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 9

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 10

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................ 11


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Foreword

Among the many threats to the security of the United States and its allies, few loom larger

than existing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and the

nation-states and non-state actors who covet or already possess them. Add to that U.S. adver-

saries’ active pursuit of genetically engineered pathogens and other nontraditional agents and

this globalized and complex world appears to be fraught with danger.

Faced with that reality in this scally constrained environment, the Department of Defense

(DoD) recently created a new strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD).

However, that strategy is not without risk for the Army as the provider of specialized CBRN

units and general-purpose forces that must be able to conduct operations in a contaminated

environment.

This Land Warfare Paper, derived from the author’s U.S. Army War College Program

Research Project, provides a background for viewing the new DoD CWMD strategy. It

describes the risks posed by current and future CBRN threats, identies how the Army is in -

stitutionally meeting the DoD CWMD strategy and makes recommendations for the Army andDoD to mitigate the risks.

Gordon R. Sullivan

General, U.S. Army Retired

President, Association of the United States Army

21 September 2015


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Are U.S. Army Capabilities for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction at Risk?

Introduction

The modern advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) employment took place one

hundred years ago as chlorine gas drifted across the plains of Flanders Fields into the trenches

of the unsuspecting French Army. By the end of the day, 1,200 soldiers were dead from the

effects of the gas and the accompanying attack.1 Based on that success, most militaries viewed

chemical weapons as a potential means to gain advantage and used them for the remainder of

World War I. In the early 21st century, the threats from such WMD have only worsened and the

risks are much greater.

Growing threats exist in our globalized and complex world from both nation-states andnon-state actors coveting or possessing existing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

(CBRN) capabilities. Even worse, potential U.S. adversaries are actively pursuing new ad-

vanced threats in the form of genetically engineered pathogens and nontraditional agents.2 The

United States is now facing these growing threats while also dealing with the impacts of the

recent recession, which has led to reduced funding for the military. In this scally constrained

environment, the Department of Defense (DoD) recently created a new strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).3

Has this new CWMD strategy created a dangerous resources shortfall in the U.S. Army’s

ability to mitigate the growing risks of current and new CBRN threats? For the Army as the

provider of Strategic Landpower for CWMD, this is a valid question. Many of the foundational

and sustaining capabilities needed by the joint force—including specialized CBRN units as

well as general-purpose forces (GPF) that must be able to operate in a contaminated environ-

ment to provide the required warghting functions—come from the Army.4 This monograph

provides a background for viewing the new DoD CWND strategy, describes the risks the Army

faces in current and future CBRN threats, identies how the institutional Army is meeting the

DoD CWMD strategy and makes recommendations for the Army and DoD to lower risks.

Background

By 2013, there was a growing perception with some in the Joint Staff—and in the Ofceof the Secretary of Defense (OSD)—that the United States had entered into a semblance of


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an interwar period where the demand for landpower forces would be smaller.5 Operation Iraqi

Freedom had ended, and a retrograde plan to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014 was already

established. In fact, OSD was already laying out plans to cut the Army Total Force to pre-World

War II levels.6 It was during this timeframe that hints of a new DoD CWMD strategy began to

appear.

In April 2013, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs— ASD(GSA)—addressed DoD’s changing approach to CWMD. As the DoD lead for CWMD,

the ASD(GSA)’s primary purpose for testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging

Threats and Capabilities was to address DoD’s CWMD progress over the past year. She also

took the opportunity to preview the changing emphasis of DoD efforts as a result of the new

scally constrained environment. DoD would now focus resources toward “preventing acquisi-

tion, countering the most likely threats” and “prioritizing capabilities that counter operationally

signicant risks.”7 The Secretary of Defense used this exact wording when he addressed strate-

gic CWMD changes the following year.8

In June 2014, DoD released the new scally constrained CWMD strategy. It laid out a

strategic framework that the U.S. Army is currently determining how to implement. This frame-

work consists of three end states and four priority objectives to address the WMD threat. The

intent is to shape the environment—while leveraging allies and partners—to address WMD

concerns before their use.9

The new CWMD strategy has established three lines of effort (LOEs) and one strategic

enabler for the Army—and the rest of DoD—to achieve the priority objectives. The rst LOE

is to prevent acquisition —to keep these capabilities out of the hands of anyone who does not

already possess them.11 The second LOE is to contain and reduce threats —specically the ones

that are already developed.12 The third LOE— to respond to crises —focuses on being able to

mitigate all potential WMD events from combat operations to attacks inside the homeland. 13

The strategic enabler to prepare —an ongoing process to ensure DoD is developing the needed

capabilities—backs all three of these LOEs.14 Since the majority of DoD CWMD occurs on

land, the Army Total Force will be responsible for using these lines of effort to achieve the majority of the DoD priority objectives that address the WMD challenge. This requires a common

Figure 1

Objectives and the WMD Challenge10

Minimization ofWMD Effects

No WMD Use Supply DemandNo New WMDPossession

AcquisitionIncentives

WMD Pathways

Vulnerable, lost orstolen WMD

Advances in WMD

Priority Objectives WMD Challenge

Reduce incentives to pursue,possess and employ WMDs

Increase barriers to the acquisition,proliferation and use of WMD

Manage WMD risks emanation from hostile,fragile or failed states and safe havens

Deny the effects of current and emerging WMDthreats through layered, integrated defenses


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understanding between DoD and the Army regarding current and future CBRN threats, as well

as when and where leaders will accept risks.

The new CWMD strategy leaves room for interpretation on where DoD is willing to accept

risk with CBRN threats in an operating environment. This has many implications for the Army

Total Force since the new scally-constrained strategy will resource capabilities to counter

only what are perceived to be valid, large-scale risks. The strategy says:

The Department will accept risk in areas where WMD use is implausible, infeasible or

would have limited effects, allowing DoD to prioritize capabilities that facilitate efforts

to preclude WMD acquisition and use.15

This statement begs the question of how DoD denes—and what are the inherent assump-

tions of—the terms “implausible,” “infeasible” and “limited effects.” Knowing that OSD

determined to drastically reduce resources and the Army Total Force in 2013—based in part

on invalid assumptions for force-sizing constructs—it is worth looking at what this implies for

the Army.16

For current threats, DoD’s acceptance of CBRN risks with “limited effects” in the CWMD

strategy raises concerns. Both chemical and radiological threats affect relatively small areas.17

This potentially means that the Army Total Force will face increased risks from adversary

usage of chemical and radiological threats, since the DoD CWMD strategy implies that efforts

will focus more toward biological and nuclear threats. However, chemical-weapon use is on the

rise—contrary to the direction of the CWMD strategy.

Current chemical threats. A look at the current environment shows that the nation-state norms

against current chemical weapons continue to deteriorate. In 2013, the Syrian regime used

Sarin gas but succeeded in eroding international will for removing it by signing the Chemical

Weapon Convention (CWC).18

In 2014, the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW) declared Syria chemical weapon-free. However, the Syrian regime con-

tinues to establish a new norm by employing dual-use chlorine gas against its people.19 The

non-state use of current chemical weapons is also now a norm in the globalized world.

The current environment enables non-state actors to have access to WMD capabilities that

once resided only with nation-states. This includes the ability to develop and obtain viable

chemical weapons—and other WMD capabilities—in both governed and ungoverned territo-

ries. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has likely used chemical weapons in the

ungoverned areas of northwestern Iraq, and they are continuing efforts to acquire additional

chemical weapons.20 Also, there are potentially thousands of ISIL sympathizers in the United

States.21 Such individuals or groups could present chemical threats in the homeland much as

the Aum Shinrikyo cult used Sarin gas in Tokyo subways 20 years ago.22 However, DoD’s po-

tential acceptance of risk with future threats is a greater concern for the Army.

Future chemical threats. DoD’s nonspecic acceptance of risk for CBRN threats it consid-

ers “implausible” or “infeasible” creates the potential for false assumptions that could greatly

increase the U.S. Army’s risks from future threats. The former ASD(GSA) admitted in con-

gressional testimony that assessing the proliferation capabilities of nation-states—such as Iran

and North Korea—as well as non-state actors is extremely difcult.23 Considering the U.S.

inability to truly understand what potential adversaries are doing in CBRN threat development,

it is worth looking at what today’s rapidly advancing technology is going to make plausible andfeasible for future threats—specically future chemical, biological and combination threats.


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Future chemical threats provide a number of plausible and feasible threats based on what

is available from open-source information. There is an ongoing globalization of chemical

manufacturing skills and technology.24 The ability to quickly test vast numbers of different

chemical compounds with chemical weapon (CW) potential has grown with the advent of

supercomputers.25 State and non-state actors will gain access to purer and more deadly CW

agents through the use of microreactors—small factories an individual could set up in a

basement.26 A major concern is with future chemical weapon threats that skirt around the

restrictions of the CWC.

Loopholes in the CWC create the potential for state actors to produce and maintain

stockpiles of future chemical threats that are outside the convention’s dened parameters.

One example of this is Russia’s creation, in the 1990s, of a nontraditional agent (NTA) de-

signed specically to comprise dual-purpose precursors that could just as commonly appear

in agriculture applications.27 Open-source documentation says that it could be resistant to

conventional antidotes and may be difcult for CW detection devices to discover.28 Another

example is Russia’s use, in 2002, of what they termed a “psycho-chemical gas.” Russia used

this previously unknown chemical agent to immediately incapacitate Chechen terrorists whoheld hostages in a Moscow theater.29 Described in articles as an incapacitant, this agent also

killed 130 hostages due to the dosage levels used.30 However, the CWC does not cover inca-

pacitating agents used by law enforcement, so there was little outcry when Russia announced

that they had used the chemical agent.31 Both of these examples show how future chemical

threats can bypass the intent of the CWC and allow continued development. In fact, Russian

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin noted in 2012 that the future will see a further development of

new weapons based on “psycho-physical” principles that will “provide entirely new instru-

ments for achieving political and strategic goals.”32 In fact, future CW threats will increase

as dispersion methods begin to incorporate nanotechnology and encapsulation—technologies

future biological threats will also employ.33

Future biological threats. Globalization and rapidly advancing technology are also increasing

what is feasible and plausible with future biological weapon (BW) threats. Bioengineering and

genetic modication capabilities are lowering the requirements for state and non-state actors

to create existing BW threats—such as smallpox—from scratch or potentially create entirely

new pathogens.34 As an example, researchers in 2001 were able to use available technology

to add the immune response gene interleukin-4 to a virus similar to smallpox to create a new

pathogen that killed animals previously vaccinated against the disease.35 Fifteen years of tech-

nological advancements have lowered the cost of entry for state and non-state actors who wish

to create future biological threats and are also creating the potential for combination threats at

this very moment.

Future combination threats. All of these new technologies are likely to contribute to the cre-

ation of combination threats—new and viable weapons that will consist of a variety of agents

in a single device.36 These new weapons could be mixtures of different chemical agents, dif-

ferent biological agents or even mixtures of both chemical and biological agents.37 Efforts

to identify such a wide variety of potential combination threats will be more challenging, as

will be the efforts to counter their multiple and simultaneous effects.38 Armed with a holistic

understanding of how rapidly advancing technology and CWC loopholes are increasing the

feasibility—and plausibility—of future CBRN threats, it is appropriate to analyze how the

institutional Army is adapting to the changing operational environment and the new directionof the 2014 DoD CWMD strategy.


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Army Institutional Efforts

The institutional Army maintains an ongoing effort to fulll its Title 10 requirements and

support joint force commanders with needed CWMD forces and capabilities. In light of the

growing complexity and uncertainty in the operational environment, the Army has increased its

efforts toward addressing CBRN threats. Of note, the Chief of Staff, Army’s (CSA’s) personal

think tank—the Strategic Studies Group (SSG)—looked at the issue in earnest in 2013. Basedon this effort—and a review of the Army Total Force’s CWMD enterprise—the CSA directed

the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to look at ways to address institu-

tional shortfalls in CWMD.39 TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) took

the lead in this effort. By the summer of 2014, ARCIC had developed a white paper that was in

keeping with the new DoD CWMD strategy.

ARCIC’s CWMD white paper focused TRADOC’s effort across their Centers of Excellence

(CoEs). The white paper established a new baseline for TRADOC’s efforts in developing

the future force and looked at how the Army would conduct CWMD in the 2018–2030 time

frame.40 ARCIC leveraged a number of ongoing Army efforts to look at the CWMD problem,

such as the identication of CWMD as “the most prominent gap.”41 ARCIC discussed the need

for new capabilities to address shortfalls in executing CWMD, including counterproliferation.42

In keeping with joint and Army concepts, the ARCIC white paper made clear that the Army

must be able to counter CBRN threats and to operate within CBRN environments to support

joint force commanders and protect the homeland.43 Only by achieving both sets of capabilities

could the Army prevent, shape and win as described in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance

(ASPG).44 ARCIC’s CWMD report also looked at next steps for a total Army approach to de-

veloping the needed capabilities to address future CBRN threats.

Although the Mission Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) has the lead for CWMD in

TRADOC, ARCIC understood that addressing the requirements would take a holistic effortacross all the warghting functions. As an enduring mission for the Joint Force, CWMD also

became one of the Army Warghting Challenges in the new Army Operating Concept.45 In this

context, the ARCIC CWMD white paper addressed the need for a holistic institutional Army

analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, fa-

cilities and policies (DOTML-PF-P).46 The CWMD white paper concluded by noting that the

threats went beyond the current Army’s capabilities and capacities and that the Army needs a

true CWMD Strategy.47 However, this effort was already well underway.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) is currently conducting the arduous task

of developing a holistic service-level CWMD strategy to focus the institution to meet its Title

10 requirements and develop the capabilities and forces needed to support current and future

joint force commanders.48 In keeping with the DoD CWMD strategy, the Army sees the three

LOEs—prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats and respond to crises—as directed

toward the combatant commanders who operationally lead the joint force. The Army’s primary

role is in line with the strategic enabler prepare.49

Under the strategic enabler prepare, the Army’s CWMD strategy provides a framework

for continuing to holistically address how to mitigate the risks presented by current and future

WMD in the increasingly complex and uncertain global environment. As per the DoD CWMD

strategy, the Army’s strategy addresses the Title 10 aspects of training and equipping the Army

Total Force to conduct CWMD and to develop not only the needed capabilities to shape theenvironment to prevent the use of CWMD but also the capabilities that will enable Army


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forces to continue operating in the event of WMD employment.51 The current Army CWMD

vision says:

The Army will lead CWMD missions in the land domain. The Army provides the pre-

ponderance of forces to support DoD CWMD efforts in the homeland and [outside the

contiguous United States] as part of joint and interagency requirements. With agile and

adaptive conventional forces, special operations forces and technical CBRN forces, the

Army provides a unique mix of tailorable and scalable capabilities to support the full

spectrum of joint CWMD operations: from planning and regional support though all phases of combatant commanders’ Theater Campaign Plans.52

Understanding that the Army plays the largest role in CWMD, the strategy looks to develop

an Army Total Force with greater readiness to address (a) current and future threats posed by

traditional state actors and (b) threats posed by non-state actors who will leverage ungoverned

spaces and technology proliferation to gain CBRN capabilities.53 To focus Army efforts toward

achieving the Army CWMD vision—as well as on the DoD strategic enabler prepare —the

current Army CWMD strategy also presents a strategic framework.

This framework shows how the Army sees its CWMD vision being realized. The Department

of the Army is ensuring that it is in keeping with TRADOC’s ongoing effort to address futurecapability development through the Force 2025 and Beyond initiative.54 Focused on translating

the DoD CWMD strategy to Army institutional processes, the framework connects institutional

means to CWMD ends through the use of LOEs.

The rst LOE— synchronize —incorporates a number of the institutional Army’s ongoing

efforts. This includes Army Plan and Army Council for CWMD (ACCWMD) efforts to ensure

that Army leaders apply limited resources efciently to meet the DoD CWMD strategy and the

Title 10 requirements to support the joint force.55

The second LOE— develop CWMD capabilities —addresses more than just what is re-

quired by dedicated CBRN units. This line of effort—based on the understanding that the entireArmy Total Force has a role in CWMD—is directed toward development and prioritization

Figure 2

DoD and Army CWMD Strategy Relationships50

DoD Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

Prepare(strategic enabler)

Lines of Effort

Prevent Acquisition Contain/Reduce Threats Respond to Crises

Combatant Commands

Army CWMD Strategy

Army(Services)

Requirements

Forces


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of the capabilities needed to mitigate risks to conventional forces from feasible and plausible

emerging threats.57 Using the new Army Operating Concept (AOC) and other Army Functional

Concepts (AFCs), the Army will conduct Capability Portfolio Reviews and Capability-Based

Assessments to identify gaps and propose solutions.58 Ensuring these processes account for

emerging threats will enable the effective development of solutions and prioritization of

materiel capabilities for “threat detection, intelligence fusion, situational awareness, hazard

assessment, protective equipment, medical programs and WMD elimination.”59

The third LOE— equip the force for CWMD —is consistent with the Army Equipment

Modernization Strategy and addresses the process of putting the materiel resources into the

hands of Soldiers who must counter current and future CWMD threats.60 This includes the re-

sources Army units need to support the joint force commander’s counterproliferation efforts.61

The nal LOE— ensure readiness of the force for CWMD —applies to all efforts to increase

the combat effectiveness of Army Soldiers and units. Army units must be prepared to conduct

most of what is called for in the DoD CWMD Strategy; this applies to regionally aligned forces

conducting forward-deployed expeditionary operations as well as to those protecting the home-

land.62

For joint force commanders to properly execute the DoD CWMD strategy’s LOEs, theinstitutional Army must resource Soldiers and units so they are trained and ready. In addition

Figure 3

Army CWMD Strategic Framework 56

• ACCWMD workinggroups/chain ofcommand/general officersteering committee

• The Army Plan

• Capability-basedassessments

• Capability PortfolioReviews

• JCIDS

• Army EquipmentModernization Strategy

• Force Management

• Army Training Strategy

• Doctrine Development

• Force Management

• Leader DevelopmentPrograms

Synchronize ArmyCWMD efforts

Develop CWMD capabilities

Equip the force for CWMD

Ensure readiness of the forcefor CWMD

Correct CWMD capability/ capacity to most efficientlysupport joint requirements

Enhanced capability of Army

Forces to conduct CWMDmissions

Improved combat effectivenessconducting CWMD missionsand operating in chemical,biological, radiological andnuclear environments

Tools(Means)

Lines of Effort(Ways)

Objectives(Ends)

ACCWMD – Army Council for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

JCIDS – Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System


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to these four LOEs of the Army CWMD Strategic Framework, the current strategy also directs

the institutional Army—responsible for Title 10 requirements—to develop plans to implement

the guidance.63

In looking at DoD and Army CWMD strategies, the institutional Army is painfully aware

of the risks posed by reduced DoD funding for Army CWMD capabilities. The requirements for

Strategic Landpower are growing among joint force commanders. Simultaneously, Congresscontinues to question the funding the Army needs to maintain trained and ready forces capable

of maintaining overmatch against current and future CBRN threats. In looking at various

aspects of the institutional Army, a number of risks resulting from the ongoing lack of DoD

funding become apparent. The rst issue manifests in the reduction in force structure.

The Army Total Force is not properly sized to meet simultaneous CWMD events involving

feasible and plausible future threats—or even the current CBRN threats. Based on the lessons

learned from the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, there is a large CBRN

response force structure that works under the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to

protect the homeland.64 However, many other CBRN events could emerge simultaneously in

the United States and abroad, and the Army bears the responsibility for resourcing all the joint

force commanders with capabilities to address current and future CBRN threats. As an example,

to reect growing threats, OSD force planning constructs have recently changed, increasing

the demands for Strategic Landpower. To meet the new requirements, the Army Total Force

could be put into a situation where it would not only have to mobilize the National Guard but

would also have to deploy units for the duration without rotation.65 In fact, a recent RAND

study showed that the requirements for WMD elimination (WMD-E) in North Korea are so

large that it could take all of the Army’s ground maneuver forces and all of the assault aviation

forces.66 The requirement would be so substantial that RAND suggested DoD should start using

the WMD-E mission as a criterion to better understand the risks associated with reductions tothe Army force size.67 The Army Total Force may be facing greater risks as it gets smaller, but

analysis shows a different assessment of how dedicated CBRN forces are organized.

The Army is in the process of restructuring and resourcing CBRN units to better meet

the requirements of joint force commanders, in line with the Army’s efforts to meet the DoD

CWMD strategy. Older CBRN force structures were based on an understanding that they would

operate in rear support areas and did not need internal sustainment and other capabilities. In

fact, close to three-quarters of the current CBRN force is still dedicated to decontamination

efforts and biological agent detection.68 However, CBRN units now understand they may have

to operate forward on the battleeld as combat units seize objectives that are on a WMD site

list. Discussions with the Army Headquarters staff reveal that these concerns have already beenaddressed in approved force design updates.69 CBRN company units will now have their own

organic maintenance capability and battalion CBRN units will now have their own distribu-

tion sections to support CBRN resupply and dismounted reconnaissance.70 However, there is a

question as to whether the Army is sufciently funded to neutralize or eliminate CBRN threats.

Discussions with the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Ofce—in

the institutional Army’s G-8 (Deputy Chief of Staff, Programming, Materiel Integration and

Management)—shows that there are capability gaps for CWMD that will require funding to

address current and future threats. For instance, the Army was able to assist the joint force in

destroying Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles of Sarin gas by using the revolutionary eld-deployable hydrolysis system (FDHS). Such a eld-deployable capability does not currently exist


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to destroy biological weapons.71 It should also be noted that there is a capability gap in remediat-

ing contaminated human remains for nal interment.72 If the Army has to ght in a contaminated

environment, the need to address this issue and have an established plan in place is likely to

arise. There is also a need for a system to neutralize chemical and biological agents through

incineration.73 Capability gaps in regard to nuclear materials are also currently unfunded.

The Army has identied a number of capability gaps related to radioactive threats that must be addressed as part of the effort to prepare units to support joint force commanders as direct-

ed by the DoD CWMD strategy. There is a need for advanced radiation/isotope identication

equipment so units deployed in the eld can discriminate between the extremely dangerous

radioactive threats and other less dangerous isotopes in the eld.74 There is also a gap in nuclear

material containment that CWMD forces will need for a number of contingencies. Currently,

the Army does not have the ability to contain, package and remove nuclear material while

conducting operations in a nonpermissive environment.75 A third capability gap exists with the

inability to conduct standoff nuclear detection.76 To better detect nuclear weapon threats, the

Army needs to have this capability as well. There are also capability gaps for protecting the

homeland.

A number of Army capability gaps exist in the enduring mission protect the homeland . Of

note, there is a requirement to have a “real-time analytical platform” to detect chemical agents

at Army chemical depots to ensure there are no incidents.77 Currently the ability to do this at

the standards required by the Department of Health and Human Services does not exist. There

also does not seem to be a holistic funding plan to modernize the Army’s CBRN infrastructure.

Recent long-range planning shows only near-term efforts to build and upgrade the West Desert

Test Center at the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground in Utah.78 Without any other efforts on

the horizon until at least 2048, the aging infrastructure may be prone to increased risks over

time. There are a number of recommendations to resource the Army to mitigate all of these

problems—and meet the requirements of joint force commanders.

Recommendations

Create a common understanding of future CBRN threats. The U.S. Army Nuclear and

CWMD Agency (USANCA) must continue to engage OSD on the challenges of the future

threats posed by the proliferation of new technologies into the hands of state and non-state

actors. DoD must engage in detailed discussions regarding what is feasible and plausible for

future CBRN threats, to ensure continued funding for essential mitigation efforts. Faulty as-

sumptions by OSD on potential threats could have disastrous consequences. This common

understanding should also incorporate a reexamination of the classication of emerging CBRNthreat terminology. The maintaining of security classications may no longer have the same

utility if the emerging threats are already being widely discussed in open-source documentation.

Develop counters for emerging agent commonalities. Technological advances are going to

enable state and non-state actors to create multiple variants of different chemical and biological

threats. We will no longer be able to rely on one counter to one variant of a disease or chemical.

DoD must fund efforts to counter commonalities of threats, much as Tamiu is viable against

multiple inuenza strains.

Make the Chemical, Biological Defense Program Ofce the Executive Agent (EA) for

all CBRN Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) to enable funding synchroniza-tion. The HQDA G-8 is already the EA for the DoD CBDP. As scal resources are expected


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to continue to decline, it makes sense to have one EA that can visualize and synchronize

all—there are at least ten—of the different CBRN POMs across DoD. This action may help

prevent duplication of some efforts and enable the resourcing of needed capabilities such as the

eld-deployable biological agent destruction system.

Update force-sizing constructs to include the WMD-E mission and future CBRN threats.

As noted by RAND, the WMD-E mission in Korea is substantial enough that the Army shouldincorporate it fully into force-sizing constructs.79 In addition, a jointly agreed-upon under-

standing of future threats should inform development of scenarios to reect the true impacts,

including a reduction in operational tempo caused by the CBRN environment. This effort may

also provide impetus for DoD to revisit the drawdowns to the Army, since the need for Strategic

Landpower has not diminished and the interwar period did not materialize as some on the Joint

Staff projected. A better understanding of the true demands of WMD-E and emerging future

threats may change DoD’s current understanding of the growing CBRN risks.

Develop a comprehensive Army CBRN infrastructure modernization plan. As scal re-

sources continue to shrink, funding modernization will become increasingly difcult. The Armymust develop a CBRN infrastructure modernization plan so the requirements can compete

for resources. Since 2012, the Army has been using a Long-Range Investment Requirements

Analysis (LIRA) to help with the planning of sustainment strategies over a thirty-year period.80

Using the LIRA process, the Army must show DoD the requirements for upgrading aging

CBRN facilities to address future emerging threats.

Create requirement documentation for all Army CWMD capability gaps. The only way

to measure the gap between needed CWMD capabilities and required resources is to develop

requirement documents to compete for funding. TRADOC should complete a capability-based

assessment of operational requirements in an environment contaminated by emerging future

threats. The Army has not had to operate in such an environment since World War I, and thehazards presented by current and anticipated CBRN capabilities require a review. Only then

can DoD make informed decisions on how to resource capabilities that will mitigate emerging

CBRN threats.

Conclusion

The risks of WMD continue to rise as technology proliferation provides non-state actors

with the capabilities to access, produce and deliver existing and emerging WMD capabilities

against U.S. armed forces and U.S. interests at home and abroad. State actors still possess

the ability to employ dual-use precursors that avoid the restrictions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention to create new feasible and plausible CBRN threats. The ability to create capabili-

ties to counter these new CBRN threats cannot be developed quickly; long-term investment is

required to ensure the Army and the nation maintain overmatch against potential adversaries.

As the primary provider of CWMD capabilities for the joint force, the Department of Defense

must continue to fund the development, elding and modernization of Army capabilities to

counter feasible and plausible emerging chemical and biological threats as well as radiolog-

ical and nuclear WMD. DoD must also reassess its current plan to shrink the Army as well,

by looking at how emerging CBRN threats will impact force-planning scenarios. If state or

non-state actors use emerging CBRN threats in future conicts, the Army Total Force must be

prepared, as required by the DoD CWMD strategy,81

to operate in contaminated environments.DoD must resource the Army to do just that.


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Endnotes

1 Associated Press, “Gas! First WWI attack a century ago spread horror on Flanders Fields, changed

warfare forever,” Foxnews.com, 18 April 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/18/

gas-first-wwi-attack-century-ago-spread-horror-on-flanders-fields-changed.

2 Dr. Gerald Parker, “The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP): Advance Planning

Brieng for Industry (APBI),” DTIC.mil, 19 September 2012, p. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/ ndia/2012CBD/Parker.pdf.

3 Department of Defense (DoD), “Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” June 2014,

p.1, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Strategy_for_Countering_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_

dated_June_2014.pdf .

4 Elizabeth Felling and Keith Sloan, “CWMD is not CBRN: All WMD require CBRN, but CBRN

does not encompass all WMD,” Combating WMD journal , issue 11, 2014, p. 4, https://www.hdiac.

org/islandora/object/hdjournal%3A234/datastream/OBJ/view.

5 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “VCJCS Winnefeld Tells Army: Forget Long Land Wars,” Breakingdefense.

com, 13 September 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/vcjcs-winnefeld-tells-army-to-forget-

long-land-wars-congress-get-out-of-our-way.6 Colin Clark, “Hagel Outlines Bold, Painful Cuts to Army, Carriers, Pay, Benets to Cope with

Sequester,” Breakingdefense.com, 31 July 2013,http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/hagel-outlines-

bold-painful-pay-benefits-force-structure-cuts-to-meet-sequester.

7 Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, “Testimony before

the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,”

23 April 2013, p. 2, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Creedon_04-23-13.pdf.

8 DoD, “Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. iii.

9 Ibid ., p. 7.

10 Ibid .

11 Ibid ., p. 10.

12 Ibid .

13 Ibid ., p. 11.

14 Ibid ., p. 10.

15 Ibid ., p. 5.

16 Thomas C. Westen, “U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces: An Effective Way to Compensate for a

Strategy/Resources Mismatch,” Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare,

National Security Watch 15-1, 27 February 2015, p. 2, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/

DigitalPublications/Documents/nsw15-1/index.html.

17 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “CBRN 101–Weapons and Associated Concerns,” PowerPoint

Presentation, Spring 2015, p. 4.

18 John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature

and Role in 2030,“ Occasional Paper #10, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,

National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2014, pp. 10–14.

19 Eric Rosenbach, “Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee: Emerging Threats and

Capabilities Subcommittee,” Congressional Testimony, 25 March 2015, pp. 7–8.

20 Ibid ., p. 4.

21 Kevin Johnson, “FBI director says Islamic State inuence growing in U.S.,” USAtoday.com, 7 May

2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/07/isis-attacks-us/70945534.22 Caves and Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 13.


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23 Creedon, Congressional Testimony: Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 23 April 2013, pp. 2–3.

24 Caves and Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 28.

25 Ibid .

26 Andrew Williams, “Chemical weapons convention fails to address key issues,” scidev.net, 26 April

2013, http://www.scidev.net/global/governance/news/chemical-weapons-convention-fails-to-

address-key-issues.html.27 Charles Edward Stewart, Weapons of Mass Casualties and Terrorism Response Handbook (Sudbury,

MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2006), p. 25; Amy Smithson, Vil Mirzayanov and Major General Roland

Lajoie, “Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects,” The Stimson Center,

13 October 1995, p. 24, http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/chemical-weapons-disarmament-

in-russia-problems-and-prospects.

28 Stewart, Weapons of Mass Casualties, pp. 25–26.

29 Scott Peterson, “Gas enters counterterror arsenal,” csmonitor.com, 29 October 2002, p.1,

http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1029/p01s03-woeu.html .

30 Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, “Russia Conrms Suspicions About Gas Used in Raid; Potent

Anesthetic Pumped into Theater; 2 More Hostages Die From Drug’s Effects,”Washington Post ,31 October 2002, p. A5, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/409331182.html.

31 Peterson, “Gas enters counterterror arsenal,” p. 1.


33 Ibid ., p. 28.

34 Ibid ., p. 27.

35 Richard Preston, “The Specter of a New and Deadlier Smallpox,” NYTimes.com, 14 October 2002,

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/14/opinion/the-specter-of-a-new-and-deadlier-smallpox.html.


37 Ibid .38 Ibid .

39 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

White Paper,” Fort Eustis, VA, 19 June 2014, p. 3.

40 Ibid ., p. 1.

41 Ibid ., pp. 3–4.

42 Ibid .

43 Ibid ., pp. 4–5.

44 John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, “The Army Strategic Planning Guidance” (Washington,

DC: Department of the Army, April 2014), pp. 9–10, http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/ resources/ASPG2014.pdf .

45 Department of the Army (DA), “Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World,” Training and

Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, Washington, DC, 31 October 2014, pp. 9, 32.

46 Ibid ., p. 14.

47 Ibid ., p. 16.

48 Department of the Army,” U.S. Army Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Strategy,”

Draft Version 5.0, 25 November 2014, p. 2.

49 Ibid ., p. 1.

50

Ibid ., p. 2.51 Ibid ., p. 1.


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52 Ibid ., p. 3.

53 John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, “The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex

World” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 11 May 2015), p. 5, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/

default/files/publications/TheArmyVision.pdf.

54 DA, “U.S. Army CWMD Strategy,” p. 3.

55

Ibid ., pp. 4–5.56 Ibid ., p. 4.

57 Ibid ., p. 5.

58 Department of the Army, “Capabilities Development and System Acquisition Management–2013

Executive Primer,” Army Force Management School, February 2013, p. 7,http://www.benning.army.

mil/Library/content/2013cdmd_executiveprimer_version18.0_February2013.pdf.

59 DA, “U.S. Army CWMD Strategy,” p. 5.

60 Ibid .

61 Ibid ., pp. 5–6.

62 Ibid ., p. 6.63 Ibid .

64 Association of the United States Army, “Defending the Homeland: The Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear Response Enterprise,” Torchbearer National Security Report, February

2014, p. 19.

65 Westen, “U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces,” p. 2.

66 Timothy M. Bonds, Eric B. Larson, Derek Eaton and Richard E. Darilek, “Closing the Strategy–

Policy Gap in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” RAND, 2014,http://www.rand.org/pubs/

research_briefs/RB9805.html.

67

Ibid .68 Department of the Army Military Operations–Force Management (DAMO-FM), “DAMO-FM

talking points: brief to Deputy G-3/5/7,” September 2014, p. 1.

69 U.S. Army Mission Support Center of Excellence, “CBRN Force Design Update Pony Blanket

(Final),” September 2014, p.1.

70 DA, “DAMO-FM talking points: brief to Deputy G-3/5/7,” p. 2.

71 Department of the Army (DA), Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, “Control, Defeat, Disable, Dispose

(CD3) brief to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army,” September 2013, p. 45.

72 Ibid .

73

Department of Defense (DoD), “Long-Range Investment Requirements Analysis (LIRA) 1 to NPrioritization,” Excel document, January 2015.

74 DA, CD3 brief to the VCSA, p. 45.

75 Ibid .

76 Ibid .

77 DoD, “LIRA 1 to N Prioritization.”

78 Ibid .

79 Bonds et al., “Closing the Strategy–Policy Gap,” p. 117.

80 Department of the Army, Ofce of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 Future Force Division, “Army

Equipment Program in Support of the President’s Budget,” Washington, DC, May 2014, p. 5,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf.


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