ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY41 (Fall 2004): 71-86

ARGUING WITH GOD, TALMUDICDISCOURSE, AND THE JEWISH

COUNTERMODEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR THESTUDY OF ARGUMENTATION

David A. Frank

God may well slay me; I may have no hope/ Yet I will argue my case before God,Job 13:15 (Miles 324)

[To love the Torah more than God is] protection against the madness of a directcontact with the Sacred that is unmediated by reason,

Emmanuel Levinas [Difficult 144)

The relationship between Judaism and theclassical tradition, between Athens andJerusalem, the God of Israel and the God ofthe Christians, and Continental and Jewishthought has been and remains argumenta-tive. To some, this relationship rests on afundamental binary in which Judaism andclassical thought are conceptualized as antip-odes, mutually exclusive antagonists havinglittle or nothing in common. As HannahArendt [Origin^ and others have docu-mented. Hitler and the Third Reich trans-formed this binary into a vicious twentieth-century totalitarian movement that led to theShoah (Holocaust), The two traditions, oth-ers hold, share some beliefs and differ onothers, with economic, political, religiousand cultural contexts influencing the degreeto which difference and commonality arestressed (Levinas, Difficult 275; Handelman,Slayers 4), I believe the two traditions are aphilosophical pair (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 415-18), They are antinomies: twocoherent and relatively reasonable systemsof thought that sometimes contradict.

My hope is that a juxtaposition of classicaland Jewish understandings of argument and

David A. Frank, Robert D. Clark Honors College, University ofOregon. Correspondence concerning this article shouldbe addressed to David A, Frank, Robert D. Clark Hon-ors College, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon97403, E-mail: dfrank@uoregon,edu

argumentation will contribute to the contem-porary theory and practice of reasoned dis-course. Ultimately, I aspire to show how aphilosophy and pedagogy of argumentation,informed by normative Jewish patterns ofreasoning and the Jewish-inflected works ofEmmanuel Levinas and Chaim Perelman,can help to cultivate a more pluralistic andcivil society in the twenty-first century, onebased on disagreement expressed throughargument rather than on consensus enforcedthrough rules or secured through schism andpolarization, I do not suggest that Judaicthought is intrinsically better or is exclusivein its emphasis on pluralism and civility;doing so would betray the very impulse atthe heart of this system of thought. Jews candraw from their tradition doctrines of exclu-sion and incivility. Witness, for example,how the setders of the occupied West Bankdepict Palestinians as modern day"Amaleks" (ancient enemies of the Jews)with the Hebrew Bible (Rowland and Frank148), This reasoning deviates significantlyfrom that of normative Judaism, which I fea-ture in this study.

For the purposes of contrasting classicaland Jewish perspectives on argumentation, Iwill assume that the two can be distinguishedby their respective views on the followingphilosophical pairs: ontology and speech.

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the vita contemplativa and vita activa, philoso-phy and rhetoric, and apodictic logic andargumentative reasoning. Classical, West-em, Patristic (Christian), and Enlightenmentthought favors the first term over the secondin these pairs, often allowing the first term torule if not obliterate the second (Arendt, Hu-man; Perelman, "Reply"). I follow ChaimPerelman's definition of the classical tradi-tion, with the understanding that there aremajor exceptions to his generalizations (asthere are to my efforts to identify fundamen-tal patterns of Jewish thought):

[T]he tradition I called classical assigns but little im-portance, as far as achieving science and contempla-tion goes, either to practice or to the historical andsituated aspects of knowledge.. .. This viewpoint isheld in common by Plato and Aristotle, as well as bythinkers such as Descartes.. . . The tradition I callclassical includes all those who believe that by meansof self-evidence, intuitions—either rational or empir-ical—or supernatural revelation, the human being iscapable of acquiring knowledge of immutable andeternal truths, which are the perfect and imperfect-ible reflexion of an objective reality. ("Reply" 86)

In drawing upon the Jewish countermodel toclassical thought and on the works of Levi-nas and Perelman, we may chose to reversethe terms in the key philosophical pairs byfavoring speech over ontology, the vita activaover the vita contemplativa, rhetoric over phi-losophy, and argumentative reasoning overapodictic logic. Unlike the classical tradition,this reversal of terms in Jewish thought doesnot mean the elimination of or lack of re-spect for the second term, as philosophicalpairs nest opposites in the same system; phi-losophy and rhetoric can coexist, apodicticlogic and argumentation can complementone another.

These philosophical pairs have had signif-icant consequences for the study and prac-tice of argument in western culture. BruceKimball's comprehensive history places or-atory and public argument, which were clus-tered under the art of rhetoric, at the centerof ancient Greek and Roman education.

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This center was under constant attack byphilosophers who, by the twelfth and thir-teenth centuries, gained control of the newlyemergent universities and stressed "specula-tive thought" over public action, logic andmathematics over the more practical disci-plines. As a result, "rhetoric .. . droppedfrom sight or was transformed into a highlyformal" art (Kimball 207).

In the 1660s Peter Ramus removed logicand reason from the realm of rhetoric, plac-ing it instead in mathematics and sciences,thereby effectively demoting and degradingrhetoric (Ong). Although Ramus's direct re-sponsibility for the demise of rhetoric isquestionable (Conley 142-43), rhetoric didnot recover fully until the 1950s when Perel-man and the other "new rhetoricians" soughtto revive nonformal logic and argumentativereason (Hauser). "The struggle between phi-losophy and rhetoric in Greece ended inphilosophy's conquest" writes Susan Han-delman; in contrast "The Rabbis . . . neversuffered this schism . . . " {Slayers 11).

To understand how Jewish thought "neversuffered this schism" I will consider the birthof argument in the Hebrew Bible, the devel-opment of argumentative reason in the Tal-mud (which interprets the Hebrew Bible)and, finally, two important statements onJewish thought and argument, cast in re-sponse to the Holocaust. Accordingly, I willbegin with three founding illustrations ofJewish argument with God in ancient Juda-ism as recorded in the Hebrew Bible. Thesearguments, I believe, establish the funda-mental metaphysical, theological, axiologi-cal, and epistemological assumptions of He-braic patterns of thought. Then I will refiecton the form and function of Talmudic argu-ment as it struggled to illuminate this Bible inthe Diaspora. In conclusion, I yoke the ideasof Emmanuel Levinas and Chaim Perelman,important twentieth-century Jewish thinkerswho provide argumentation theorists with aJewish-influenced outlook on argumentative

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reason, one that can complement the morehumane impulses of classical thought.

This survey, of course, will operate at thesurface and must ignore the great complex-ity of the Jewish and classical traditions. Iwill use Robert Alter's new translation of theTorah and the Jewish Study Bible to considerthe arguments between and involving God,Abraham, and Moses. I will supplement theJewish Study Bible with translations by Milesand Mitchell for my analysis of argument inJob. I will follow Miles's lead and treat Godas an advocate who develops character andargumentative competence over time in theHebrew Bible. In addition, unlike the argu-ments in many Western texts, those in theHebrew Bible are often indeterminate, con-fused, and can yield a host of reasonable butincompatible interpretations. In the next sec-tion, I begin with the genesis of argument inthe Jewish tradition and consider as founda-tional to Jewish thought the arguments madeto God by Abraham, Moses, and Job, andGod's responses.

ARGUING WITH Gk)D

The field of argument has yet to penetratethe fields of Jewish studies or philosophy,although one will find some studies that useour scholarship for purposes of taxonomyand argument classification. Laytner's Argu-ing with God: A Jewish Tradition provides acomprehensive overview of the multiple in-stances of humans and God involved in ar-gumentation. However, Laytner does notdraw from our field to conceptualize andexplain the Bible's arguing-with-God pat-tern. His otherwise superb study collapsesthe arguing-with-God notion into the "law-court pattern" of prayer. This pattern revealsitself in a four-part structure: God is ad-dressed as judge, the facts of the case arepresented to God, a request is made to Godon the basis of the facts, and God, if per-suaded, responds. This pattern, with the keyexception of Job's argument with God, does

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describe an archetypal pattern of argumentbetween God and humans but, in reducingargument to prayer and the law-court pat-tern, Laytner often misses the deeper mean-ing of argument in the Hebrew Bible.

The God of the Hebrew Bible is, by na-ture, argumentative. Humans, made inGod's image, also are argumentative and, inthat famous description found in Exodus 32,are described by God as "thick-necked." Ag-onistic speech is the beginning of Jewish the-ology. Genesis I has God, in the words ofRobert Alter's translation, facing "welter andwaste" and then speaking the world and hu-manity into existence (17). Speaking, or da-var, is the touchstone notion in the HebrewBible, which Handelman defines as speechand thought, word and thing [SlayersJi-A). Inthis tradition, there is no distinction betweensymbol and reality: "for the Hebrew mind,the essential reality of the table was the wordof God, not any idea of the table as in thePlatonic view" (Handelman, Slayers 32). Incontrast, the classical tradition dissociates theword from the thing (the map is not theterritory) and privileges what Aristotletermed "First Being" [ousia). True knowledgeexists in this tradition beyond the symbol,and Being is grasped through a silent specu-lation that transcends speech and noise.There is no Hebrew word for Being because"[o]ne does not pass beyond the name as anarbitrary sign towards a non verbal vision ofthe thing, but rather ̂ om the thing to the word,which creates, characterizes, and sustains it.Hence davar is not simply thing but also ac-tion, efficacious fact, event, matter, procesf (Han-delman, Slayers 32). God's arguments be-come speech acts, creative interventions inthe world of experience. Indeed, as Katz hasdemonstrated, the very letters of the Jewishalphabet may reveal the "source of Jewishcultural and spiritual isolation, conscious-ness, and survival" (S. B. Katz 151).

The Hebrew God established speech {da-var) rather than Being {ousicij as the primaryterm. This God is both knowable and often

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inscrutable. Unlike the Greek gods, the Godof the Hebrews "presuppose [s] that God isgood and that creation (and the creation ofpeople) is good" (Laytner xix), Zeus does notassume a benevolent attitude toward hu-mans, nor does he appear to enter time. TheGod of the Hebrew Bible appears fallible,enters into and is constrained by humantime. In Greek myth, humans do not engagein genuine argument with Zeus, The Ghris-tian tradition submerges the arguing-with-God tradition in order to emphasize contri-tion. Where the Hebrew Bible has Jobdeclaring "[God] may well slay me; I mayhave no hope; Yet I will argue my casebefore Him," the Kingjames version bowd-lerizes the passage with this translation thateliminates argument: "Though he slay me,yet will I trust in him: but I will maintainmine own ways before him" (Miles 324),

Jack Miles believes the Hebrew Bible isconfigured diachronically and synchroni-cally around God's argument with Job, Iagree with Miles, as discussed below, thatJob defeats God in argument, producing asequence of action, speech, and silence inthe arrangement of the Hebrew Bible inwhich the book of Job is the climax. TheGhristian Bible reorganizes the books of the"Old" Testament to herald the coming ofJesus as Messiah, creating a sequence of ac-tion, silence, and speech in which the pro-phetic texts of Joshua, Judges, etc, comprisethe final third in which God acts and speaksin anticipation of the coming Christ, Thebooks of the prophets are moved to the endof the Old Testament in the Ghristian Biblein order to bridge the Old and New Testa-ments, In the Hebrew Bible, the prophetictexts are nested in the middle, and "from theend of the Book of Job to the end of theTanakh [the Hebrew Bible], God neverspeaks again" (Miles 329), The books follow-ing Job depict a silent God, a pattern re-peated in the Talmud and the works of Levi-nas and Perelman,

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God's choice to argue with Abraham,Moses, and Job unveils the essential qualitiesof the Hebrew God, and traces of these foun-dational arguments can be found in subse-quent Jewish thought. By arguing, God "en-ters time and is changed by experience.Were it not so, he could not be surprised;and he is endlessly and often most unpleas-antly surprised. God is constant; he is notimmutable" (Miles 12). God is surprised andchanged by the experience of argument, un-derscoring the risk that God and humansundertake when they engage in argumenta-tion. By arguing, rather than simply exercis-ing raw power, God relinquishes controlover and vests freedom to humans. WhenGod and humans argue, and also listen, theyrisk significant change to self, others, andworld; a wedge of consciousness and free-dom is placed between arguers; arguersadapt to each other through argumentum adhominem; and action in the world is a conse-quence of argumentation.

Henry W, Johnstone, in a neglected state-ment on the philosophical assumptions ofargument, writes that "[t]o argue is inher-endy to risk failure, just as to play a game isinherendy to risk defeat. An argument weare guaranteed to win is no more a realargument than a game we are guaranteed towin is a real game" ("Some Reflections" 1),God places God's moods and conclusions inplay during argument with Abraham,Moses, and Job, and not only risks but suf-fers defeat in argument with Job, To God'scredit, argumentation leads God to reducethe scope of God's claims in argument withAbraham, change mood and the decision toact in response to arguments posed byMoses, and acknowledge defeat in argumen-tative exchange with Job, By engaging inargument, God reveals an openmindedness,an openness I would extend to God's emo-tional state as well.

Johnstone captures the deepest functionserved by argument, which is to confront selfand other with the risk of change. When

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Miles suggests that God "enters time and ischanged by experience," and is "unpleas-antly surprised," God reveals the marks ofargumentative encounters (12). These en-counters change God, which is inconceiv-able to those who believe in an immutable,omniscient God. The risk entailed in argu-ment is a function of God's creation, a cre-ation that does not provide God or humanswith clear choices, sufficient information, orthe clarity necessary to command immacu-late perception.

The risk involved in argumentation, ac-cording to Johnstone, is attended by the free-dom of those who encounter arguments toresist, ignore, remain neutral, or agree."Power here is bilateral in the sense thatwhoever undertakes to correct or supple-ment what another asserts in the name ofknowledge must be willing to be instructedby that other person" (Johnstone, Philosophy134). The choice of argument rather thanphysical power to adjudicate conflict createswhat Johnstone calls a rhetorical "wedge"between arguers ("Rhetoric"). This wedgecreates a buffer of consciousness between theargument and its judgment. For example, ifGod did not choose to abide by the condi-tions of argument, God would issue com-mands that would pierce consciousness andproduce instant action. Instead, God's argu-ments with Abraham, Moses, and Job makeclaims open to conscious scrutiny and criti-cism; freedom reigns.

Freedom is denied in formal logic and theapodictic reasoning Arendt detected in total-itarian movements (Arendt, Onj^m 468-72;Perelman, "The Rational"). Abraham JoshuaHeschel eloquently depicts the freedom inJewish thought:

The most commanding idea that Judaism dares tothink is that freedom, not necessity, is the source ofall being. The universe was not caused, but created.Behind mind and matter, order and relations, thefreedom of God obtains. The inevitable is not eter-nal. All compulsion is a result of choice. A tinge of

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that exemption from necessity is hiding in the folds ofthe human spirit. (13)

Ghaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca describe a spiritual wedge in the useof argument, and put it this way:

One can indeed try to obtain a particular result eitherby the use of violence or by speech aimed at securingthe adherence of minds. It is in terms of this alterna-tive that the opposition between spiritual freedomand constraint is most clearly seen. The use of argu-mentation implies that one has renounced resortingto force alone, that value is attached to gaining theadherence of one's interlocutor by means of rea-soned persuasion, and that one is not regarding himas an object, but appealing to his free judgment.Recourse to argumentation assumes the establish-ment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts,excludes the use of violence. (55)

By resorting to argumentation, God re-nounces the use of force to gain adherenceand appeals to the free judgment of Abra-ham, Moses, and Job, and endorses the es-tablishment of a wedge of spiritual freedom.In addition, Johnstone maintains that genu-ine argument takes the form of ad hominem,which he rescues from the bin of fallacies[Philosophy 123-37).

Although it may be weak or strong giventhe structure, context, arguer and audienceof a particular argument, Johnstone notesthat the ad hominem is not, by nature, a fal-lacious expression of reason. Indeed, he lo-cates it at the core of philosophical reasoning[Philosophy). The ad hominem argumentmakes use of the audience's values and prin-ciples in reaching conclusions. At the centerof the ad hominem argument rest commit-ments to which the audience is expected toremain faithful.

I believe the ad hominem is at the core ofJudaic argument, and manifests as argumen-tum ad Deus (an argument asking God to beconsistent with God's stated values). As I willillustrate below, Abraham, Moses, and Jobassume that God is just, an assumption thatGod shares. This shared commitment to jus-tice, or Tsedek, constitutes the shared ground

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of argument for God and God's human in-terlocutors. In contrast to the Greek notionof justice, which stresses formal equality,Tsedek involves compassion for the other andan integration of equity with mercy, truthand peace, love and justice (Baruk, HebraicCivilization; Baruk, Tsedek; Cohn; Perelman,Idea of Justice). Divine and human justice, inthis vision, are yoked, as the Deuteronomistat 16:20 repeats the word twice, declaring'Justice, justice shall you pursue . . . " Thatjustice is something to be pursued highlightsthe role that argument plays in precipitatingaction in the Hebrew Bible.

The Hebraic tradition confuses the dis-tinction, clear in classical thought, betweenthe vita activa and the vita contemplativa.Arendt traces the vita contemplativa to biostheoretikos, the "ideal of contemplation[theoria)" [Human 14). Arendt observes: "Tra-ditionally and up to the beginning of themodem age, the term vita activa never lost itsnegative connotation of 'unquiet'..." [Hu-man 15). Argumentation, expressed on theplane of action, was at best a prelude to theauthentic birthplace of Truth, the silence ofcontemplation and speculation. Judaism re-verses the emphasis given to the vita contem-plativa. The human world, "like the world ofGod, is one of action," the world of the vitaactiva (Roth 52). At the end of the threeargumentative encounters involving God,Abraham, Moses, and Job, God takes action;the arguments have consequences.

To summarize, the Hebrew Bible depictsan argumentative God, one devoted to argu-ing with humans. This devotion cannot beconflated simply with a law-court prayer pat-tern, for these arguments cannot be con-tained by a preexisting structure or ritualisticpractice. As Laytner demonstrates, some sig-nificant patterns in the argumentative dis-course recur but they are surface character-istics of a much deeper, more profoundtheological and metaphysical expression ofGod, humans and the relationship betweenthe two. The Hebrew God is one who ar-

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gues, meaning this God is involved in livedtime, risks change, does not use an asymmet-rical power relationship to deny humansconsciousness and the freedom to judgeGod's arguments, is committed to using jus-tice consistently as a primary criterion forargument evaluation, and translates argu-ment into action.

The argumentative relationship betweenGod and humans that is displayed in theHebrew Bible echoes throughout the Jewishtradition, affecting both religious and secularthought. When God and humans engage inargument, they develop an expression ofreason at the center of normative Judaism.To understand the importance of this ex-pression of reason, I consider, in the follow-ing sections, three foundational argumentswith God.

Abraham and God: Changing the Criterion ofJustice

"[P]erhaps the most dramatic usage" of thearguing-with-God motif, Laytner writes, "isfound in the story of Abraham's argumentwith God over the fate of the people ofSodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18:23-32)"(3). God initially decides to destroy the twocities because the residents have sinned.However, God then argues internally andasks: "Shall I conceal from Abraham what Iam about to do?" (Alter 88). God answersGod's self that Abraham will be a "great andmighty nation" and he and his sons will"keep the way of the Lord to do righteous-ness and justice . . . " (Alter 88). These latterclaims appear to win the day as God shareswith Abraham the proposal to destroy thetwo cities and establishes action (Abraham'sand the two cities') and justice as the twostandards for judging both God's decisionand Sodom and Gomorrah. According toLaytner, by sharing with Abraham the pro-posal to wipe out the two cities, God "all butinvites Abraham to question His justice . . ."(5), establishing a bilateral sharing of power

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essential to the existence of genuine argu-mentation, Abraham accepts the invitation,and "stepped forward" to contest God's plan(Alter 89), In so doing. Alter sees an Abra-ham "who is surprisingly audacious in thecause of justice, a stance that could scarcelyhave been predicted from the obedient andpious Abraham of the preceding episodes"(89), This audacious advocate succeeds inchanging God's criterion of justice,

Abraham asks, "Will You really wipe outthe innocent with the guilty?" refusing God'simpulse to apply punishment indiscrimi-nately (Alter 89), "Far be it from You to dosuch a thing, to put to death the innocentwith the guilty, making innocent and guiltythe same. Far be it from You! Will not theJudge of all the earth do justice?" (Alter 89),By posing the preface and conclusion as rhe-torical questions, Abraham helps God de-velop the standard of justice to be used inthis dispute and then insists that God be trueto God's own principles of justice. The rhe-torical questions pressure God to performthe reasoning necessary to reach a just con-clusion. God then establishes the criterion of50: "Should I find" God responds, "in So-dom fifty innocent within the city, I willforgive the whole place for their sake" (Alter89), Here, Abraham provokes God to setforth a numerical criterion, Abraham ques-tions the number 50, and proposes 45, towhich God accedes, Abraham then proposes40, then 30, then 20, and God relents. Abra-ham's final offer of 10, which ends a bargain-ing session familiar to merchants and cus-tomers in Middle Eastern casbahs, fleshesout and then changes the criterion of justiceto be used.

Alter observes that Abraham, who is"aware that he is walking a dangerous tightrope in reminding the Judge of all earth ofthe necessity to exercise justice, deploys awhole panoply of the abundant rhetoricaldevices of ancient Hebrew for expressingself-abasement before a powerful figure"(89-90), This may be true, but God still

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permits Abraham to know God's intentionsand to question the criterion of justice to beused in assessing the fate of Sodom andGomorrah, Abraham's argument pressuresGod to change the criterion in two ways inorder to bring it into alignment with Tsedek.First, the guilty must be separated from theinnocent; in God's initial proposal the twowere undifferentiated. Second, Abraham es-tablishes a numerical standard of 50 inno-cents, which in subsequent bargaining is re-duced five times to 10,

God acts on this new criterion, seeks evi-dence of the number of innocents in the twocities, finds only Lot and his family meetingthis standard, spares them, and then destroysthe guilty. Eventually, God turns away frommass slaying as a vehicle of justice. Yet, theGod-Abraham argumentative exchange isan important moment; through and with ar-gument, God shares power with Abraham,whose character evolves as he develops au-dacity and courage. This is the prototypicalargument with God, which "affirms the roleof justice as the key relational concept be-tween God and the world,,," (Laytner 7),Abraham's argument with God helps Goddevelop and define justice. Yet Abrahamdoes not challenge God's plan to destroySodom and Gomorrah if destruction is war-ranted by their agreed-upon standards. Incontrast, in his argument with God Mosessucceeds in changing God's mood and plans,

Moses and God: Argumentum ad Dem

Moses "lagged in coming down from themountain," where he and God were convers-ing (Alter 493), In Moses's absence, the peo-ple below lost faith, built a golden calf, andthen "rose up to play" (Alter 495), God cansee this turn of affairs and shares it withMoses, God is angry, and declares to Moses:"I see this people and, look, it is a stiff-necked people. And now leave Me be, thatMy wrath may flare against them, and I willput an end to them and I will make you a

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great nation" (Alter 495). Moses is quick withargumentum ad Deus, and uses a robust set ofprinciples to which God subscribes:

Why, O Lord, should your wrath flare against Yourpeople that You brought out from the land of Egyptwith great power and with a strong hand? Whyshould the Egyptians say, 'For evil He brought themout, to kill them in the mountains, to put an end tothem on the face of the earth'? Turn back from Yourflaring wrath and relent from the evil against Yourpeople. Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel Yourservants, to whom You swore by Yourself and spoketo them 'I will multiply your seed like the stars of theheavens, and all this land that I said, I will give toyour seed, and they will hold it in estate forever.'(Alter 495-96)

Like Abraham, Moses begins the argumentwith a rhetorical question; unlike Abraham,Moses ends his argument with two directclaims, suggesting that he was not on a "dan-gerous tight rope" (Alter 89) and, within theexpected constraints, could avoid self-de-basement and speak candidly. Moses's argu-mentum ad Deus calls God to be true to theprinciples of justice and reputation, and re-minds God of a significant loss of face shouldthe Egyptians witness God's destruction ofthe people.

This argumentation is better developedthan that between Abraham and God, re-flecting the full characteristics of genuine ar-gument. Here, God's arguments are ad homi-nem and when God states that God will"make [Moses] a great nation," God givesMoses a personal motive to accept God'sproposal. Moses also calls for a change inmood and quotes God's words, in which hereminds God of the promises of children andland, back to God. The response is startling.God does not bargain as in the argumentwith Abraham; rather God "relented fromthe evil that He had spoken to do to Hispeople" (Alter 496). Moses's argumentschange God's plan and mood.

In so doing, Moses helps God develop asense of Tsedek that encompasses compassionand careful thought. God, in this story, formsan opinion, shares it with Moses, subjects it

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to argumentative scrutiny and, through a bi-lateral exchange of reasons, changes affectand policy. The arguments between Godand Moses are, comparatively, more maturethan those between Abraham and God, butboth assume that God favors justice overpower. In the story of Job, this assumption ischallenged, and in the aftermath of the argu-ment between Job and God, God falls silent.

God and Job: Speaking Justice to Power

The argumentation between Job and God isquite different than the preceding encoun-ters. In Job, God violates all of the standardsof genuine argument followed when arguingwith Abraham and Moses. Unlike the resi-dents of Sodom and Gomorrah and the peo-ple who built the golden calf, Job had nobrief filed against him for immorality or sin.At the beginning of the book, the readerfinds Job to be a good man, with wealth,health, wife, seven sons and three daughters.Unbeknownst to Job, God and the Adver-sary (Satan) engage in a conversation aboutJob's virtue. God celebrates Job, declaringhim "a thoroughly good man, who fears Godand does nothing wrong" (Job 1:1; Mitchell12). The Adversary agrees with God, butattributes Job's just behavior to God's pro-tection and argues that Job "will curse" Godif he suffers (Job 1:11; Mitchell 12).

God accepts Satan's challenge withoutsharing it with Job, and permits Satan tocause Job great pain. Job loses his wealth andfamily. He weeps, shaves his head, but doesnot think ill of God. Then Satan ups the ante:without revealing this decision to Job, Godallows Satan to inflict great physical suffer-ing. "God damn the day I was born and thenight that pushed me from the womb," Joblaments (Job 3:3; Mitchell 19). God sharesGod's intemal arguments with Abraham andMoses; in contrast,Job knows neither that heis part of a cosmic bet nor why he is suffer-ing.

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As a prelude to his confrontation withGod, Job's friends try to comfort him. Theirefforts only add to Job's misery. There is notextual evidence that Job has done wrong,and even were he sinful his suffering seemsgrotesquely incommensurate to the unre-vealed evil for which he may be responsible.Job does not accept or find solace in hisfriends' attempts to make sense of his suffer-ing. Job refuses to accept rational explana-tions for his plight and, through it all, seeksjustice, not rationalization. It is Job, not God,who emerges as the character seeking Tsedek.It is Job who seeks an opportunity to argueand to know the charges against him: "Oh ifonly God would hear me, stated his caseagainst me, let me read his indictment... Iwould justify the least of my actions; I wouldstand before him like a prince" (Job 31:35-37; Mitchell 79). God's response, foundedon the argumentative touchstones developedby Job's friends, is one of pure power. "Fewspeeches in all of literature," Miles writes,"can more properly be called overpoweringthan the Lord's speeches to Job from thewhirlwind (Job 38-41)" (314). Thesespeeches turn the ad hominem principles ofargumentation on their head, as Job has notquestioned God's power, claimed greaterknowledge than God, or to have beenpresent at creation. He asks for justice. Inresponse, God proclaims God's might, butdoes not approach the question of justice:"Where were you when I planned the earth?Tell me, if you are wise" (Job 38:4; Mitchell83). And with words of great irony, God asksJob: "Do you know who took its dimensions,measuring its length with a cord?" (Job 38:5;Mitchell 83). God offers no explanation forJob's anguish, which appears to have no rea-son or redemptive purpose.

The arguments between Job and God donot clash: Job's arguments are about justicewhile God's reasoning is exclusively aboutpower. As translated by Miles, Job's re-sponse to God's power-arguments is anironic concession:

Look, I am of no account. What can I tell you?My hand is on my mouth.

I have already spoken once: I will not harp.Why go on? I have nothing to add. (Job 40:4-5;

Miles 317)

God insists on rehearsing the power theme,asking: "Have you an arm like God's? Ganyou thunder with a voice like His?" (Job40:9; Miles 313). Job's reply, which in thetradition has been read as a recantation,should be read as the trump argument in theexchange.

As noted previously, the tradition re-presses the notion of arguing with God; boththe Kingjames and Revised Standard ver-sions seek to establish an attitude of contri-tion and to highlight the need for the Mes-siah. As a consequence, almost everyChristian Bible translation of Job's reply is avariation of the New Revised Standard Ver-sion's rendering:

"I know that you can do all things,and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted.

'Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?'Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand,

things too wonderful for me, which I did not know.'Hear, and I will speak;

I will question you, and you declare to me.'I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear,

but now my eye sees you;therefore I despise myself,

and repent in dust and ashes." {Holy Bible, Job42:2-6)

Building upon previous scholarship. Milestranslates Job's reply in a way that is moreconsistent with Job's lines of argumentation,which congeal around justice. In this trans-lation. Job answers God's power-motif as fol-lows:

You know you can do anything.Nothing can stop you. .. .

'You listen, and I'll talk,' you say,'I'll question you, and you tell me.'

Word of you had reached my ears,but now that my eyes have seen you,

I shudder with sorrow for mortal clay. (Miles 325)

Miles believes that this translation is strongerphilologically. It is also reflects Job's founda-

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tional claim that, while God may kill him, hewill continue to argue his case. Job does notyield his claim for justice to God's powerand, in critique of God's monologic deploy-ment of argument, displays God's failure toengage in genuine argument, I agree withMiles's judgment: "Morally, Job has held outto the very end ,, , when the Lord praisesJob at the end of the book, he is praisingboth Job's earlier stubbornness with his hu-man interlocutors and his final, utterly con-sistent, stiff-necked recalcitrance before theLord himself (325), The implications of thisfinal exchange are important,

'Job has won," Miles concludes: "TheLord has lost" (325), God recognizes that Jobwas just and in the end restores Job's healthand family, giving him twice what he had atthe beginning of the story. With this defeat,God falls silent; this is God's last argument inthe Hebrew Bible, This loss, though, is par-adoxical, as "Job may, therefore, have savedthe Lord from himself (Miles 327) by insist-ing on the pairing of justice and power,God's silence after Job has profound theo-logical implications. God's nature is revealedas contested, leaving in the wake of this si-lence "a realistic vision of the world in whichjustice is both guaranteed by the good Godand occasionally threatened by the badGod" (Miles 327), By besting God in argu-ment. Job demonstrates that humans can re-main true to justice in the face of power.With the gifts of the Torah, argument, andthe aspiration of Tsedek, humans from thispoint had no direct need to argue with God;God could be absent, although present in theface of the Other, and interpretation of theHebrew Bible could proceed via the argu-mentation captured in the Talmud, the textthat provides an unending dialogue aboutthe meaning of the Torah,

TALMUDIC ARGUMENTATION

Emmanuel Levinas would write in thetwentieth century: "[To love the Torah more

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than God is] protection against the madnessof a direct contact with the Sacred that isunmediated by reason" [Difficult 144), Re-sponding to the Holocaust, he drew from theresources of Judaism to emphasize ethicsover ontology. Contact with God, Levinasbelieved, cultivated a divine madness. Heshifted the divine to the Torah and the faceof the Other, Similarly, the Rabbis saw noneed for God's direct presence since Godhad given them the law (Torah) at Mt, Sinai.Reason would serve as the mediator be-tween and among people, although Levinas,in contrast to the Rabbis, was quite critical ofrhetoric. The nature and form of reason usedin the Talmud and by the Rabbis was argu-mentation,

Talmudic reason expressed through argu-mentation did not turn directly to God, wasrooted in experience and lived time, as-sumed a set of constant but mutable tradi-tions, placed the beliefs of those who arguedat risk, allowed freedom of dissent, empha-sized ad hominem reasoning, sought reasonsfor action, and did not seek an end to argu-ment. The development of this sense of rea-son was due, in part, to the circumstances ofJewish life in the Diaspora, With no state orcentral power demanding obedience in theJewish community, persuasion and argu-ment were the primary modes of delibera-tion. Two well-known Talmudic storiesground its system of reason: the Oven ofAkhnai, "the most frequendy cited talmudicpassage in modem literature," justified com-munitarian rule over that of God; and thedispute between the two major rabbinicalschools, Hillel and Shammai, produced the"these and these" principle (Stone 855), Ihave discussed these stories as critical intel-lectual influences on Chaim Perelman's sys-tem of argumentation (Frank, "New Rheto-ric"; Frank, "Dialectical Rapprochement"),For present purposes I consider them from adifferent angle, namely, how the arguing-with-God tradition establishes the conditionsnecessary for decision making in the Tal-

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mud, which leads to the placement of ethicsbefore ontology and genuine argument be-fore coercion in normative Jewish thought.

I begin with the end of the Oven of Akh-nai parable. Elijah reported to the Rabbisthat "[God] laughed [with joy] . . . saying,'My sons have defeated Me, My sons havedefeated Me' " in argument with the Rabbis{Babylonian Talmud; Seder Nizikin 353). Theargument lost concerns God's jurisdiction ina dispute among the Rabbis regarding thepurity of the Oven of Akhnai. One Rabbiholds that it is pure, but the majority dis-agrees. This Rabbi offers four proofs that heis right: three physical signs from heaven (atree is uprooted, the flow of a stream re-versed, and the walls of the school crumble);and an announcement from a Divine Voice(a Bot Kol) that the Rabbi is right. The Rab-bis in the majority base their response onDeutoronomy 30:12 and Exodus 23:2,claiming that the "Torah had already beengiven at Mt. Sinai; we pay no attention to aHeavenly Voice because [God has alreadywritten] in the Torah at Mt. Sinai, [follow themajority]" [Babylonian Talmud; Seder Nizikin353). It is here that God admits defeat, doingso presumably because the majority has de-ployed sacred texts to justify the use of rea-son rather than divine contact to adjudicatedisagreement.

The use of an argumentum ad Deus to re-draw the lines of God's jurisdiction is bothironic and paradoxical, a result that seems tohave given God some pleasure. The impli-cations for subsequent patterns of thinkingand argument in the Jewish tradition areimportant, and I am aware of no similarstories in the classical or Ghristian traditions.The Oven of Akhnai parable speaks to ques-tions of authority, proof, and the role ofhuman community in judgment. God, andGod's mediators, are not authoritative in dis-putes. Although God accepts the texts citedin the majority justification as germane, Ibelieve the deeper reason why the majorityrejects the divine voice as proof is the one

expressed by Levinas: direct contact with theSacred without the mediation of reason pro-duces madness. Levinas, in particular, findsMoses's acquiescence to God's command tokill his son troubling, but finds relief inMoses's ability to hear and follow the subse-quent command to desist (G. Katz). In acqui-escing to God's initial command, Moses wasdisplaying a kind of divine madness, whichis a result of his contact with God. The rel-evance for this kind of divine madness in ourperiod is direct.

The story of the Oven of Akhnai excludesthe Divine from the realm of argument andseems to replace it with the majority. Yet, themajority's power in disputes is circum-scribed as well. The story of the debate be-tween the two major rabbinical schools, Hil-lel and Shammai, addresses the status of themajority and minority, as well as the natureof truth in Talmudic argumentation.

I begin, again, at the end: two key rabbin-ical schools have debated an issued for threeyears. Heaven is asked to judge, and a divinevoice declares: "both ['these and these'] arethe words of the living God" {Babylonian Tal-mud; Seder Mo'ed 85-86). Both schools aresaid to present truth, even though they maycontradict or display antinomies. Both werereasonable. But, although their argumentswere sharper, Shammai did not honor Hil-lel's arguments. As a result, Hillel cameeventually to be preferred in the traditionbecause they were in the majority andtreated Shammai's arguments with respect.

An implication of this story is that minor-ity opinion and dissent are highly valued inTalmudic argumentation. Shammai maycontinue to make arguments, and their argu-ments are included in those that earn theconsent of the majority. To secure commu-nal stability, majority rule is a necessary butcertainly not a sufficient guarantee. The"these and these" principle demonstratesthat those who disagree can commandshards of truth and that the process of argu-mentation, because it has no ending point.

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must continue. Eor argument to continue,the very structure of reasoning must be con-trarian, that is, reflect the multiple truths thatsometimes clash.

These two stories reveal the crossover ofthe arguing-with-God tradition into thesphere of secular human argument. If God'sargument with Job is God's last in the He-brew Bible, the majority in the Oven of Akh-nai ensures that reason and argument incommunity, rather than with God or God'smediators, will be the primary means ofdealing with disagreement. And majorityopinion is not simply a replacement for thedivine, although it remains a necessary deci-sion rule. The "these and these" principle,derived from the clash between the two rab-binical schools, reveals the possibility in Tal-mudic thought that antinomies can coexist.An even deeper insight to be gained fromthis parable and a reading of argumentationin the Talmud is that, in the words of DavidKraemer in the Mind of the Talmud, "truth isindeterminable and that altemative viewscan encompass different aspects of the wholetruth" (139; see also Neusner). With the in-sights of these two Talmudic parables inmind, we now can consider the trajectoriesof Talmudic argument and the nature of itsrationality before concluding with a consid-eration of the Jewish-influenced contribu-tions of Levinas and Perelman to twenty-first-century argument theory and practice.

In both the Hebrew Bible and the Tal-mud, God admits defeat in argument withhumans. The arguing-with-God traditionends with God's defeat in Job; God is notgiven direct authority in the Talmud, accord-ing to the Oven of Akhnai story. Argumentbetween humans in the Talmud, absent thedirect presence of the divine, and capable ofhosting antinomies, does not have an endingpoint. "[E]inal answers," writes Kraemer,"may be unavailable" and as a result,

the process by which answers are sought assumes fargreater interest and acts of study and interpretationbecome, on their own terms, expressions of piety.

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Furthermore, in recognition of the elusiveness of asingle, definitive truth, practice is effectively divorcedfrom truth, and coercion, which may be justified inthe presence of truth, yields to considered persua-sion. (139)

The "considered persuasion" in the Talmudwas valued independently of its outcomes:"argumentation has a value independent of agiven conclusion. In fact, argumentation thatled to no conclusion at all was often com-posed" (Kraemer 90). At this point we canpause again to juxtapose this version of ar-gument with that practiced in the Greco-Roman tradition.

Having conducted close readings of theclassical canon, Hannah Arendt and GhaimPerelman both detected a clear desire in theclassical tradition to find a unitary Truth,which could "reveal itself only in completehuman stillness" (Arendt, Human 15). In-deed, disagreement indicated error: Des-cartes's famous codification declared that iftwo men disagree, one must be wrong. Ar-gumentation in this tradition was ruled byapodictic logic and the syllogism, producinga conclusion that would end disagreement.Auerbach argues that Greek reasoning ischaracterized by hypotactic logic (in whichthe elements of an argument are subordi-nated under a major or controlling premise)while Hebraic reasoning is characterized byparatactic rationality (in which the elementsof an argument are juxtaposed rather thansubordinated). Glassical argument has a de-finitive end, a conclusion that captures thetruth through apodictic reasoning, designedto end disagreement and speech. Jewish wis-dom, claims Arthur Waskow,

has always proceeded in a spiral where the future andthe past are intertwined . . .Jewish wisdom is neitherthe endless circle of tradition nor the abrupt progres-sion of a straight line forward. Always it does mi-drashr-takes an ancient tradition, gives it a twirl, andcomes out somewhere new. (42)

The Talmud is structured as a spiral, with theearliest arguments in the middle of the page.

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attended by responses curling around thecenter in chronological order. Disagreementis privileged and assumed, and speech isvalued most highly.

To end disagreement, classical thoughthas obeyed the three laws of rationality es-tablished by Aristotle and many modemteachers of logic: the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle, Tal-mudic logic dissents from these laws, at leastwhen they move beyond the realm of ab-stract symbol systems, geometry, and math-ematics. In the classical tradition, the law ofidentity demands that an entity possess animmutable essence beyond the reach of timeand speech. In thejewish tradition, identitymay be constant but mutable, God and hu-mans have temperaments, but they changein time, often because of argument. Take, forexample, the use of proper names in theHebrew Bible, A number of names describeGod, and the names of the patriarchs oftenchange as they mature. As I have discussed,the law of noncontradiction is transgressedoften in the Talmud; antinomies are notmerely tolerated but comprise the pluralisticnature of the Jewish universe. True contra-dictions, which may exist at a certain mo-ment, may be worked out over time: it maynot be necessary to exclude one of the con-traries. In the clash between Hillel andShammai, Hillel carries the day because itintegrates the contrary opinion of its oppo-nent into its argument. In Jewish logic, itdoes not follow that if two people disagree,only one must be right. Finally, in the clas-sical tradition, the law of the excluded mid-dle holds that a statement is either true orfalse; it cannot be both, Talmudic logic seeksout and cultivates an "included middle," onethat attempts to find or invent commonground between contraries, HannahArendt's Origins of Totalitarianism describesthe consequences of the application of thisform of logic, particularly in the Europeananswer to the Jewish question. The Naziclaim was that Furope is not Jewish, a state-

FRANK

ment that was either true or false. Of course,the truth was and is that one could have a"dual loyalty" and be European and Jewish.This truth underscores Miles's conclusionthat "Western civilization is descendedequally from Athens and Jerusalem" (408)and their responses to the tragic.

To summarize, the arguing-with-God tra-dition and the argumentation in the Talmudoffer a striking contrast to the vision of rea-son and argument in the classical tradition.In the final section, I conclude by brieflypositioning Levinas and Perelman as Jewish-inflected touchstones designed to workthrough the tragedies of the last century.Both reflect the assumptions about speechand argument that I have identified in theHebrew Bible and the Talmud, and give usphilosophical and practical insight into theconstruction of twenty-first-century systemsof argumentation.

LEVINAS AND PEKELMAN: THE

JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO

GENUINE ARGUMENTATION

Susan Handelman pairs Levinas andPerelman as Jewish thinkers, and observes:"Perelman's great masterwork. The NewRhetoric (1958), was written, like much ofLevinas's philosophy, in response to the ca-tastrophes and violence of World War IL"She further observes that "Perelman's 'newrhetoric' is close in spirit and has many par-allels to Levinas's philosophy , , ," [Fragments237), The major differences between the twothinkers lie in their views on rhetoric andreligion, Levinas conflates rhetoric with co-ercion and does not clearly address the pos-sibility of disagreement between or among"Others" [Totality and Infinity). Perelman ap-propriates the secular contributions of Jew-ish thought to justify rhetoric's rescue, butdoes not address religious or theological is-sues. Pairing Levinas and Perelman gener-ates a means of working through the traumasof the twentieth century and the touchstones

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for systems of genuine argumentation in thiscentury.

Ronald C. Amett's excellent recent over-view of Levinas's relevance to the study ofargumentation suggests: "It could be arguedthat [Levinas] is the most important figurefor understanding ethics between persons ina postmodern age" (49). In the wake of thedemise of the modem/western conception oflife, which enthroned the autonomous selfand Being, Levinas offers a "philosophicalstarting place" in the key notions of theOther and ethics (49). Amett sees Levinas asa "corrective" to modem thought and an"altemative to commonplace communica-tive assumptions" (49). Rather than begin-ning with self, Levinas shifts our focus to theface of the Other, which becomes for himthe face of God. We are responsible for andto this face, which is sacred.

In contrast to classical philosophies thatsought authenticity through Being, Levinascalls us to be responsible for others. Thissense of responsibility corrects and reversesthe hierarchy of Western philosophy, plac-ing the ethical response to the Other beforethe pursuit of Being, or ontology. For mypurposes it is important to recall that Levinasis very much a Jewish thinker, and his think-ing is directly informed by his encounterswith the Hebrew Bible and Talmud. Hisreflections on the story of Moses and Isaac, Ibelieve, are crucial in that they detect thedanger of direct contact with the divine andcall for the mediation of reason. Levinas,however, does not dwell on practical reasonor discuss disagreement among Others, nordoes he respect rhetoric.

Handelman judges Levinas's "traditionalbias of the philosopher against the rhetori-cian [as] unfortunate and mistaken" becausehis "conception of the essential sociality oflanguage as truth is inherently rhetorical"[Fragments 221). Fortunately, Perelman cor-rects this bias; the new rhetoric developsargumentation as an expression of reasonthat complements apodictic logic. Perel-

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man's new rhetoric is adapted to its audienceof non-Jewish European philosophers andemploys ad hominem arguments by citing Ar-istotle's Rhetoric. As I have argued elsewhere,Perelman's project is subdy critical of theclassical tradition and of Aristotle's treat-ment of rhetoric (Frank, "Jewish Counter-model"). His project offers a new, expandedvision of reason that goes far beyond thelimited conception in Enlightenmentthought. Perelman's vision of reason turnedto Jewish thought as a countermodel. Hebelieved that a more expansive vision ofreason

ought to be completed by a theory of argumentationthat draws from the dialectical reasoning and rhetoricfrom Greco-roman antiquity, but also with Talmudicmethods of reasoning. It is to the study of this theory,and its extensions in all domains that I have dedi-cated, for more than twenty years, the majority of myworks. ("My Intellectual" 4)

Although many historians of rhetoric inter-pret his system as neo-Aristotelian, I believeit oudines a Jewish rhetoric that reflects asystem of Talmudic principles and practicesof argumentation. At the same time, Perel-man's new rhetoric almost certainly remainsindebted to classical thought. This suggeststhat his work may bridge the two traditions.

The New Rhetoric flows from normativeJewish habits of thought and Talmudic as-sumptions about reason and argumentation.First, it develops the touchstones and stan-dards of genuine argument present in theJewish tradition. Second, its focus on theaudience rather than the speaker is consis-tent with the Levinasian emphasis on theOther. Levinas's explanation is deeper andtheologically sounder than Perelman's, butPerelman better develops the argumentativeresources necessary to respect the Other.Third, Perelman revises the three laws ofthought in a manner consistent with Jewishlogic. His logic specifically permits the co-existence of antinomies, and offers dissocia-tion as a means of dealing with incompati-bilities (on the use of dissociation in

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argument theory, see Schiappa, "Dissocia-tion"; Schiappa, Defining.

In his new book. The Rhetoric of Rhetoric,Wayne C. Booth concurs with Crosswhiteand Vickers that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric was a "major rev-olution," represents the "most complex ef-fort to explore all rhetorical resources forcombating the 'absolutist,' 'Cartesian' viewof truth," and "launches an amazingly deep,rich, all-inclusive exploration of rhetoricalresources, both from classical giants, espe-cially Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, andfrom Renaissance anti-Cartesians on to1969" (73). "Perelman," Booth concludes, "isby now sadly neglected" (73). This is sadbecause Perelman attempts a rapproche-ment between classical and Jewish thought.

The Jewish tradition offers much to thebroader study of argumentation. Indeed, theprocess of argumentation is often more im-portant than Truth. Ultimately, the Jewishtradition of argument teaches the globalcommunity of the benefits of reasoned dis-course and pluralism. We now know thatethical behavior is much more likely whenargumentation and persuasion are taught asmecins of dealing with difference and dis-agreement. In the Jewish tradition, consen-sus and dissent coexist, the laws of reason aresufficiently flexible to accommodate bothconstancy and change, and unending argu-ment results.

Argumentation lies at the spiritual andmetaphysical core of Jewish thought. In thistradition, God argues with humans. In turn,humans argue with each other, authority re-sides in the strength of reasons that acknowl-edge experience and the Other, and dis-agreement and contrarian thinking areprized. Perelman and Levinas maintained adual loyalty, one to the classical tradition,the other to the Jewish heritage. They sawthe commitment of both traditions to reason.Argumentation scholars can do so as well,juxtaposing traditions in search of insightthat can help us cultivate the kinds of cour-

age and audacity it took to argue with God,the sense of responsibility that places ethicsbefore ontology, and a vision of reason ca-pable of hosting antinomies.

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