arizona department of corrections

Arizona Department of Arizona Department of CorrectionsCorrections

MTC Private Prison Escape MTC Private Prison Escape July 30, 2010July 30, 2010

ASCA PresentationASCA Presentation

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Arizona Department ofArizona Department ofCorrections OverviewCorrections Overview

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WinslowWinslowGP 4 3 2GP 4 3 2

DouglasDouglasGP 3 2GP 3 2

YumaYumaGP 4 3 2GP 4 3 2 SaffordSafford

GP 3 2GP 3 2

PhoenixPhoenixR, MH 5 4 3 2R, MH 5 4 3 2

PerryvillePerryvilleAll 5 4 3 2All 5 4 3 2

LewisLewisPS 4 3 2PS 4 3 2

Florence/EymanFlorence/EymanGP 5 4 3 2GP 5 4 3 2

TucsonTucsonM, MH 5 4 3 2M, MH 5 4 3 2

MTCMTCGP 3 2GP 3 2

GeoGeoDUI 2DUI 2

Geo (2)Geo (2)GP 3 2GP 3 2

MTCMTCGP 2GP 2

DUI = DUI DUI = DUI GP = General GP = General

PopulationPopulationM M = Medical= MedicalMH MH = Mental = Mental HealthHealthPS PS = Protective = Protective SegregationSegregationR R = Reception= Reception

Physical SecurityPhysical SecurityLevels:Levels:5 = Highest 5 = Highest (maximum)(maximum)4 = High (close)4 = High (close)3 = Moderate 3 = Moderate (medium)(medium)2 = Low2 = Low (minimum)(minimum)

ADC Contracted Private Prison

ADC Owned & Operated Prison

ADC Facilities by Security Level/MissionADC Facilities by Security Level/Mission

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Custody Level DefinitionsCustody Level DefinitionsCustody Levels:

• Maximum Custody: Inmates who represent the highest risk to the public and staff, and require housing in a single cell setting. (Some maximum custody inmates may be eligible for a double cell environment). These inmates have limited work opportunities within the secure perimeter and require frequent monitoring. These inmates require escorted movement in full restraints within the institution.

• Close Custody: Inmates who represent a high risk to the public and staff, and require housing in a secure institution. These inmates shall not be assigned to work outside the secure perimeter of an institution. These inmates require controlled movement within the institution.

• Medium Custody: Inmates who represent a moderate risk to the public and staff. These inmates shall not work outside the secure perimeter of an institution and require limited controlled movement within the institution.

• Minimum Custody: Inmates who represent a low risk to the public and staff. These inmate may work outside the secure perimeter of an institution, to include community work crews, and do not require controlled movement within the institution.

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Distribution of Public & Private BedsDistribution of Public & Private Bedsas of October 31, 2011as of October 31, 2011

• Total ADC Prison System Operating Capacity (Rated Beds plus Temporary Beds): 42,393– ADC State-Run Prison Operating Capacity: 35,855 (85%)– Private Prison Operating Capacity: 6,538 (15%)

• The 6,538 current private beds consist of:– 3,750 minimum custody beds (22% of all minimum custody

prison system beds):• 1,250 DUI/Substance Abuse/Return To Custody• 2,500 General Population

– 2,788 medium custody beds (17% of all medium custody prison system beds):

• 1,280 Sex Offenders• 1,508 General Population

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ASP-Kingman/MTC HistoryASP-Kingman/MTC History March 22, 2004 to July 30, 2010

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ASP-Kingman/MTC HistoryASP-Kingman/MTC History

• March 22, 2004: Original ASP-Kingman Contract awarded to MTC for 1,100 minimum DUI beds, 300 medium DUI beds, and 108 emergency DUI beds.

• October 2004 - May 12, 2005: ASP-Kingman housed 472 DUI minimum inmates.

• May 12, 2005: Former ADC Director changed ASP-Kingman inmate population from DUI to General Population, allowing non-DUI inmates to be housed at Kingman.

• May 13, 2005: The first medium custody inmates were housed at ASP-Kingman, marking the first time a medium custody inmate was placed in a contracted Arizona private prison.

• June 2006: Despite issues with MTC compliance, ADC loaded additional inmates, bringing the total ASP-Kingman capacity to 1,180 minimum beds and 328 medium beds.

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• December 13, 2007: For the first time, murderers were assigned to ASP-Kingman; including a medium custody inmate and a minimum custody inmate sentenced for 2nd degree murder.

• February 2008: Contract for 2,000 minimum custody male beds awarded to MTC.

• May 2008: A Contract amendment combined new 2,000 and existing1,400 beds at ASP-Kingman, to create one 3,400 minimum/medium custody prison.

• October 2009: Prior to activation of 2,000 beds, ADC Director Ryan determined that ASP-Kingman Cerbat Unit (new 2,000 unit) did not have a perimeter consistent with medium security and confirmed it as a minimum custody unit and confirmed ASP-Kingman Hualapai Unit (original 1,400 unit) as a medium custody unit since it had medium perimeter.


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• April 6, 2010: ADC began loading the new 2,000 minimum custody general population Kingman beds at a rate of 140 inmates per week.

• May 31, 2010: Movement ceased by ADC Director Ryan based on a disturbance. Kingman population at the time of disturbance was 2,550.

• June 15, 2010: ADC resumed loading of 140 inmates per week at Kingman.

• July 30, 2010: Movement ceased by ADC Director Ryan based on escapes. Kingman population the day after the escapes (July 31, 2010) was 3,390.

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ASP-Kingman Escape

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ASP-Kingman EscapeASP-Kingman EscapeJuly 30, 2010July 30, 2010

• 1600 hours (4:00 PM): Inmates McCluskey, Province, and Renwick were accounted for at the 1600 hour formal count.

• 2045 – 2115 hours (8:45-9:15 PM): At sometime between yard closure at 2045 hrs and 2115 hrs which was shift change, Inmates McCluskey, Province, and Renwick, with the help of accomplice Welch, escaped; exiting the perimeter of the prison complex at a point on the East side and walking to the North and East of the prison.

• 2140 hours (9:40 PM): MTC positively identified two of the inmates as unaccounted for in their dormitory.

• 2143 hours (9:43 PM): MTC discovered the third inmate as unaccounted for in his dormitory.

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ASP-Kingman EscapeASP-Kingman EscapeJuly 30, 2010July 30, 2010

• 2150 hours (9:50 PM): MTC initiated ICS at approximately 2150 and ordered a recount of the entire unit.

• 2206 hours (10:06 PM): MTC perimeter patrol found the breach in the perimeter fence (30 inches by 22 inches hole) including wire cutters inside & outside of the perimeter fence and tracks leading into and out of the perimeter fence.

• 2230 hours (10:30 PM): At approximately 2230, MTC notified Mohave County Sheriff’s Office. This and subsequent notifications were all later than appropriate.

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ASP-Kingman Escape ASP-Kingman Escape July 30, 2010July 30, 2010

• 2337 hours (11:37 PM): ADC was officially notified of the escape 2 hours after MTC positively identified the inmates had escaped.

• 2337 hours (11:37 PM): ADC Division Director of Offender Operations dispatched K9 teams from the Lewis, Florence and Winslow Prisons.

• 2350 hours (11:50 PM): ADC Division Director of Offender Operations activated ADC Central Office Emergency Operations Center and assumed Incident Command for ADC. ADC maintained constant communication from the ADC Central Office Emergency Operations Center with the Kingman ADC On-Site Monitor, MTC officials, and law enforcement.

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ASP-Kingman Escape ASP-Kingman Escape July 31, 2010July 31, 2010

• 0254 hours (2:54 AM): ADC sent out media advisory of the escape.

• 0400 hours (4:00 AM): ADC Tracking Teams began arriving at ASP-Kingman. ADC Division Director of Offender Operations deployed them to assist Mohave County in tracking the inmates.

• 0800 hours (8:00 AM): Contract Beds Operation Director arrived on scene at ASP-Kingman and took over as on-scene commander for ADC. Kingman is directed to enhance their perimeter patrols effective immediately and remain in place until further notice.

• 1400 hours (2:00 PM): ADC accepted offer from US Marshal’s Service to assist in the man hunt.

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ASP-Kingman Escapees Captured ASP-Kingman Escapees Captured August 2010August 2010

• August 1, 2010: Inmate Renwick was captured in Rifle, Colorado.

• August 8, 2010: Inmate Province was captured in Wyoming, near Yellowstone National Park.

• August 19, 2010: Inmate McCluskey and accomplice Welch were captured at a campground near Sunrise Ski Resort, in Arizona, by a tactical-response team of Apache County, Arizona sheriff's deputies, with the help of the Arizona Department of Public Safety and United States Forest Service.

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ADC Response

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ADC Response and ActionADC Response and Action

• July 30, 2010: Movement ceased by ADC Director Ryan. ASP-Kingman population the day after the escapes (July 31, 2010) was 3,390.

• August 2010: ADC Director Ryan met with MTC leadership in Phoenix on August 4, 2010.

• August 4-6, 2010: ADC conducted first Security Operations On-Site Assessment of ASP-Kingman. Serious deficiencies were identified.

• August 30 - September 1, 2010: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, ADC conducted a second Security Operations On-Site Assessment of ASP-Kingman. Additional and uncorrected deficiencies were identified.

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• September 9, 2010 and September 19, 2010: ADC Director Ryan and Staff conducted follow-up inspections of ASP-Kingman. Many of the operational deficiencies still existed, almost 60 days following the escape.

• September 21, 2010: ADC imposed new inmate restrictions, prohibiting inmates with current or prior convictions for murder, inmates serving life sentences, and inmates with a history of escape, and transferred 238 inmates from ASP-Kingman to other medium custody and minimum custody state prisons.

ASP-Kingman Escape & ADC ResponseASP-Kingman Escape & ADC Response

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ASP-Kingman Inmate RestrictionsASP-Kingman Inmate Restrictions

Following the escape from ASP-Kingman and due to a lack of public confidence with the management of ASP-Kingman, ADC also placedthe following restrictions on the ASP-Kingman inmate population and removed Inmates from the prison:

• Minimum Custody: No inmates convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder or attempted murder; no inmates with a history of escape or attempted escape from a secure perimeter; no inmates with more than five years to serve.

• Medium Custody: No inmates with life sentences; no inmates convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder or attempted murder; no inmates with an escape or attempted escape from a secure perimeter within the last ten years; no inmates with more than 20 years to serve.

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ASP-Kingman Inmate RestrictionsASP-Kingman Inmate Restrictions

Under these new restrictions, ADC transferred 238 inmates from ASP-Kingman to other medium custody and minimum custody stateprisons:

• 25 Minimum Custody Inmates: 20 convicted of 2nd degree murder or 1st degree attempted murder; and 5 with a history of escape or attempted escape from a secure perimeter.

• 213 Medium Custody Inmates: 68 with life sentences; 12 convicted of 1st degree murder or attempted 1st degree murder; 83 convicted of 2nd degree murder or attempted 2nd degree murder; 15 with an escape or attempted escape from a secure perimeter within the last ten (10) years; and 35 with 20 plus years to serve.

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• November 15-19, 2010: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, the ADC Office of Inspector General conducted an Annual On-Site Inspection of ASP-Kingman and ADC conducted a third Security Operations On-Site Assessment of ASP-Kingman using the new “GAR” assessment tool. These two assessments revealed a total of 170 deficiencies.

• December 15-17, 2010: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, ADC conducted an On-Site Assessment follow-up. The follow-up revealed 31 remaining deficiencies.

• December 29, 2010: ADC issued MTC a 90 day cure notice identifying the 31 default occurrences:– Deficiency #1:Inmate ID Card Compliance (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #2:Staff Communication with Inmates(30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #3:Command Communication with Line Staff (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #4:Inmate Housing Compliance (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #5:Staff Training (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #6:Perimeter Condition (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #7:Perimeter Alarm Response (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #8:Perimeter Security Challenges (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #9:Perimeter Post Order Revisions (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #10:Perimeter Lighting (30 Day Required Timeframe)


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• Deficiencies continued:– Deficiency #11:No Man’s Land Access/Storage (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #12:Count Procedures (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #13:Inmate Controlled Movement (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #14:Ingress/Personal Property (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #15:Pat Searches (30 Day Required Timeframe) – Deficiency #16:Key Control (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #17:Service Journals (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #18:Inmate Population Training (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #19:Facility Security/Unauthorized Metal (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #20:Sweat Lodge Enhancements (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #21:Fence Tie Accountability (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #22:Detention Training (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #23:Tool Control (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #24:Awning Security Enhancements (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #25:Security Devise Tracking (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #26:Kitchen Protocols (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #27:Fire Detection System (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #28:Weapons Storage (60 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #29:Weapon Munitions (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #30:Weapon Accountability (30 Day Required Timeframe)– Deficiency #31:Inmate Programs (90 Day Required Timeframe)


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• January 6-7, 2011: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, ADC conducted an On-Site Assessment follow-up. The follow-up revealed 21 out of 31 remaining deficiencies from the December 29, 2010 cure notice.

• February 17-18, 2011: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, ADC conducted an On-Site Assessment follow-up. The follow-up revealed 6 out of 21 remaining deficiencies from the December 29, 2010 cure notice.

• March 14-17, 2011: In addition to ongoing monitoring activities, ADC Director Ryan and ADC Staff conducted an On-Site Assessment follow-up on March 14-15, 2011. On March 17, 2011, MTC was deemed to have substantially cured all deficiencies from the December 29, 2010 cure notice.


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• March - July, 2011: Having substantially cured all deficiencies from the December 29, 2010 cure notice, loading of inmates was resumed.

• August 2011: ADC conducted an annual audit of ASP-Kingman, which confirmed substantial compliance with requirements.


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• Continuing ASP-Kingman Compliance Issues:– $1.25 million in Staffing Deficiency Monetary offsets:

• FY 2008: $ 67,350.16• FY 2009: $125,213.68 • FY 2010: $ 66,022.96 • FY 2011: $884,555.12• FY 2012 YTD: $104,916.16

– Lack of Fire Service Protection, resolved in October, 2011

– Failure to have 75% of inmate population engaged in work and/or programming activities.


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Media, Legislative, CommunityMedia, Legislative, CommunityResponseResponse

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• Between July 31, 2010 and August 19, 2010, ADC received and responded to over 200 local and national media inquiries.

• August 9, 2010: ADC gave a news conference.

• August 19, 2010: ADC gave two news conferences.

MediaMedia

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• July 31, 2010: ADC provided notice of escape to Arizona Senate President, Arizona House of Representative’s Speaker, and three legislators from the District where the escape occurred.

• ADC was in communication with the Arizona Governor's office on an almost daily basis between July 31 and August 19, 2011.

• ADC was in communication with the State Representatives from the District where the escape occurred on an almost daily basis between July 31 and August 19, 2011.

• August 1, 2010: Provided notice of capture of Inmate Renwick to Senate President, Speaker of the House, and three legislators from the District where the escape occurred.

• August 11, 2010: Met with a group of Arizona Representatives to discuss escape.

• August 11, 2010- Provided information briefing document to all legislators.

Legislative/CommunityLegislative/Community

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• August 19, 2010 - Communicated with 13 legislators and legislative staff to provide information regarding the escape and the capture of Inmate McCluskey.

• September 20, 2010 – ADC Director Ryan presented to Mohave County Board of Supervisors (Arizona County where the escape occurred), as well as the County Clerk, County Supervisor, County Sheriff, County Manager, Kingman Mayor, and the Deputy County Attorney.

• September 20, 2010 - Following presentation to Mohave County Board of Supervisors, Director met privately with one of the legislators from the District where the escape occurred and Kingman Vice-Mayor.

• March 2011 - Communicated with 13 legislators and community officials that MTC had substantially cured the 31 deficiencies and that ADC would start reloading ASP-Kingman.

Legislative/CommunityLegislative/Community

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ADC Correctional SystemADC Correctional System Comprehensive Review

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Review of PrisonsReview of Prisons

Following the escape from ASP-Kingman, ADC immediately began a comprehensive review of all prison operations. In addition to the ongoing security assessment of ASP-Kingman:

• All in-state private prisons were reviewed and assessed the week of August 16-20, 2010. Teams conducted complete security assessments of the other four in-state private prisons: ASP-Phoenix West, ASP-Marana, ASP-CACF, and ASP-Florence West.

• Although the private prison in Oklahoma (Great Plains Correctional Facility, GEO) is currently in the deactivation process, its perimeter systems and fencing were assessed on August 23, 2010.

• Deficiencies noted in these private prison assessments were addressed with each facility operator in letters dated August 26, 2010. The facilities were mandated to address and provide Corrective Action Plans for the cited deficiencies by September 3, 2010, inclusive of a time line for completion.

• In addition, all ADC state prison perimeter systems and fencing were reviewed and assessed the week of August 16-20, 2010.

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Regulatory Oversight &Compliance Monitoring

• The post ASP-Kingman escape security assessment and administrative investigation revealed:– Significant security device and operational practice deficiencies that

were determined to be mostly of human error. – ADC methods for private prison contract administration and operational

oversight were not adequate as applied to that facility. Although processes to report problems were in place, it was learned that assigned ADC staff were not adequately following Inspection/Reporting Policies (Department Order 703).

• Further security assessments at all other contracted private prisons revealed that the inspection/reporting procedures lacked specific accountability components to ensure compliance and revealed additional failures to follow and/or enforce facility inspection policy requirements.

• Ultimately, although it is the contractor’s obligation to adhere to all ADC policies, it is the responsibility of ADC to inspect and report deficiencies to the contractor and to ADC Director Ryan and ADC executive staff.

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• Actions taken as a result of the post escape assessment at ASP-Kingman, and the security assessments at all private contracted facilities:– The ADC Contract Beds Operations Director resigned and the

at-will ADC Contract Monitor at ASP-Kingman was dismissed. – ADC Director Ryan named a new ADC Contract Beds

Operations Director, and assigned a seasoned Deputy Warden as the new ADC Contract Monitor at ASP-Kingman.

– ADC Director Ryan initiated Contract Monitor Training for ADC Staff overseeing private prisons.

– Due to the volume and nature of deficiencies identified in the security assessment and investigation, several management staff employed by ASP-Kingman were also terminated by MTC.

• Inspection and reporting requirements were immediately reinforced for all private contract beds. Corrective action plans were required from all private prison contractors for deficient findings resulting from the security assessments; with daily/weekly updates on corrective action progress.

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• A redesigned inspection program was implemented to replace the “Peer Audit Review” system that was in place since 2005: – It encompasses all ADC operated and private contracted beds. – It is a two part program that is intentionally redundant.

• Localized daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly inspections (GAR)• Annual Audits

• GAR:– ‘Green, Amber, Red’ compliance/warning/non-compliance system, conducted on

a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly basis. – If it is a ‘red’ indicator, then the ‘bad’ or ‘non-compliant’ practice repair/correction

must be made immediately.– Web-based system that is accessible to all users up to the Director and provides

instantaneous notification to all stakeholders of deficiencies.– Conducted by ADC local State-Run Prison Unit Management Staff and local

ADC Contract Monitoring Staff stationed in Private Prison Units.– GAR was originally developed with 16 competencies (areas of review), but has

now been expanded to 35 competencies.• The 35 competencies represent a menu of areas that can be reviewed.• Areas for review vary and are selected on both a targeted and random basis.• Areas are targeted for reviewed based upon analysis of results and identification of

problem areas.

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ADC 703 Monthly Inspection ReportCOUNTS/INMATE MOVEMENT - Department Order 701

Performance Measure (Description) Grn Amb Red Notifications Level

1 Is inmate movement controlled/coordinated by staff? 2

2 Does the picture board match the count sheets? 1

3Does the AIMS Facility Population Report match the Accountability Officer's latest count?

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4Are Formal Counts being conducted on each shift?At what times?

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5Do the formal counts include physical ID card to face check and are they recorded on the appropriate AIMS count sheet?

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6Is there documentation (information and significant information reports) supporting any emergency counts?

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Remarks: (Record significant facts, observations, and other data used to support ALL amber / red findings. Note- Inspectors may also use this section to note other observations regarding topics not specifically addressed within this section.)

Reviewer's Signature / Date

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35 Competencies

1. Administrative2. Counts & Movement3. Detention4. Ingress/Egress5. Inmate Regulations6. Key Control7. Mail & Property8. Perimeter Security9. Radios10. Searches11. Security Devices12. Tool Control 13. Tower Operations14. Transportation15. Visitation16. Weapons

17. After Hour Emergency Notifications18. Capital Inventory19. Core Staffing20. Employee Grooming21. Fire, Safety and Loss Control22. Food Service23. Hazardous Material Control24. Information Reporting25. Inmate Behavior Control26. Inmate Classification27. Inmate Regulations28. Levels of Supervision29. Maintenance30. Mental health watches31. Pace32. Protective Segregation33. Service canines34. Security Threat Groups35. Vehicles/Vehicle Maintenance

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• Annual Audit:– Conducted by ADC Inspector General Staff at both State-Run and Private Prison

Units– Companion to the GAR, but involves a greater depth of review and inspection.– Was originally developed with 13 competencies (areas of review), and 850

components, but has now been revised to include 10 competencies with 1,200 components to conform to A.R.S. § 41-1609.01(K), which:

• Requires that for executed private prison contracts, the Department Director conduct a biennial comparison of the private contractor’s provision of services to the state’s provision of services for a similar facility. The purpose of the comparison is to determine if the contractor is providing the same quality of services as the state at a lower cost or services superior in quality to those provided by the state at essentially the same cost.

• Identifies ten (10) service areas that the Department Director shall consider when conducting the biennial comparison.

• Competencies: 1. Security 2. Inmate Management and Control 3. Inmate Programs and Services 4. Facility Safety and Sanitation 5. Administration 6. Food Service 7. Personnel Practices and Training 8. Inmate Health Services 9. Inmate Discipline10. Other matters relating to services as determined by the Department Director.

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5,000 Private Prison Bed RFP Cancellation

• On September 10, 2010, in the interest of public safety and as authorized pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2539 and A.A.C. R2-7-C308, ADC cancelled a legislatively mandated 5,000 Private Prison Bed Request for Proposal (RFP).

• This was done to ensure that a private prison Contractor can meet security and operational requirements and to eliminate or reduce unfavorable occurrences within Arizona’s contracted private prisons.

• The RFP was revised and reissued on January 24, 2011 with additional safeguards, performance requirements, and compliance monitoring processes designed to ensure public safety.

• A contract award based upon the RFP is currently pending.

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Private Prison RFP & Contract Changes

• Future requests for proposals (RFPs) and contracts for private prisons, including the 5,000 Private Prison Bed contract, will contain new or expanded provisions:

– Expanded and better defined RFP evaluation criteria.

– More comprehensive information regarding a contractor’s past performance and past occurrences.

– Annual re-certification of all security systems.

– Staff mechanisms to report problems.

– Private prison coverage of costs incurred by federal and other jurisdictions.

– Enhanced contract performance auditing guidelines, required performance outcomes and measures, and reporting requirements.

– Contract monitoring general requirements.

– Additional monetary offsets and sanctions that can be when exigent circumstances occur.

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Lessons Learned

• The strict and uniform compliance with Department policy in all areas is essential and a priority, especially in terms of safety and security practices.

• Ensuring policy compliance in an agency with 10,000 employees, including 7,800 correctional security staff, is a daunting task, but one to which ADC must be openly and publicly committed.

• Policies and procedures that staff follows must represent sound correctional practices and, above all else, must ensure the safety and security of the public, staff, and inmates.

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Outcomes

• Practices initiated in the year before and the year after the Kingman escape represent the most aggressive and comprehensive security reform measures in the history of the Department.

• In order to better identify compliance and operational violations, ADC implemented a variety of mechanisms including enhancements to the significant incident reporting system, collection of assault data and mortality data, improved Contract Monitoring, improved Inspector General (IG) processes, and the new annual prison inspection process (IG annual audits & GAR).

• ADC is now able to identify areas of non-compliance and violations of policy, correct them, and use the information to make systemic operational changes to reduce violations.

• Public safety remains Job #1!

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Questions?Questions?

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