armor july august web

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 02046

This issue of ARMOR almost certainly complies witha publishing rule we unabashedly borrowed years agofrom an old-time New York tabloid writer. His conten-tion was that readers would always come back formore if each day’s paper contained at least three sur-prises — items or stories that made the readerscratch his head and say, “Hmmm...that’s interesting.I didn’t expect that...” In this issue, I think we’ve metthat criterion.

First off, we know that the feature article, this montha history piece, Commanding the Red Army’s Sher-man Tanks, will surprise all of you in one way or an-other. Lots of people don’t know, or have completelyforgotten, that the Soviet Union used tens of thou-sands of Lend-Lease vehicles during WWII. Stude-baker trucks earned a solid reputation with Soviettransport troops. But fewer recall that the Sovietsused thousands of armored vehicles, 5,000 mediumtanks alone. Huge formations, divisions and corps,were equipped with U.S. equipment. Due to the ColdWar and the overwhelming control of information inStalin’s regime, this story was never told. Sure, a fewpictures exist here and there, but a first person ac-count, in English, has never appeared. But in recentyears, a Hero of the Soviet Union, a retired colonel inthe Soviet tank corps, wrote of his experiences, andwe believe you will find the excerpt from this book,soon to be published by the University of NebraskaPress, fascinating. We are excited to be able to giveyou a look into this little known part of the war.

The second article I’m throwing onto the table as alikely surprise is about wheeled armored vehicles, andwe aren’t talking about Hummers, even the upar-mored models, equipping the scouts or military police.The call for wheeled armor isn’t a new one, but theauthor’s perspective, that of a peacekeeper in Mace-donia, has given him some interesting ideas. Whetheryou agree with him or not on the utility of wheeledarmor, and in his choice of vehicle to fill the shortcom-

ings he observed, we believe you’ll want to read thispiece through. If you do believe that military opera-tions other than war are going to remain in (or enterinto) your unit’s mission essential task list, you’ll wantto thoughtfully consider the ramifications of this arti-cle.

Third, and deeper into the magazine, you’ll find twoarticles on command posts that should cause somediscussions. I think it is a truism that each unit com-mander puts his own spin into any TOC/CP organiza-tion and configuration. Therefore, no article or seriesof articles will ever provide the solution to the riddle ofwhat TOC configuration is the best for any unit in anysituation. However, these articles will help advancethe state of the art of TOC building by giving yousome good ideas that were successful for others insimilar situations.

One final surprise — I know it is four surprises notthree, but we really want to impress you — shouldn’tbe a surprise, but it may be in too many cases. At thevery least, you’ll want to slap your forehead and say,“I knew that.” Colonel (Ret.) Clarke, the Training Man-ager at the Royal Saudi Land Forces Armor Institute,has some interesting ideas on what he sees changingand what he sees remaining the same as the digitalwave sweeps over us. He believes the tenets of goodsoldiering and good leading, which have survivedother technological revolutions, will again survive thisrevolution. This article is worthy of your time and yourdiscussion with a friend or two in the range tower, atthe TOC, or in the club.

If we have managed to surprise you at least threetimes, that is good. Know that it is our goal, and withyour continued writing and submissions, we will beable to continue meeting that standard.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-4

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headauarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information conceming the training, logistiCS, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

July-August 1996, Vol. CV No.4

Features

7 Balkan Report II: Off-the-Shelf Wheeled Armor Proves Its Worth In Macedonian Winter by Captain Matthew D. Morton

11 In the Eyes of This Analyst by Sergeant First Class Willis A. Bullard

12 Leadership on the Digital Battlefield by Colonel (Ret.) Bruce B. G. Clarke

15 Forward Area Air-Ground Defense by Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon

21 How Soviets Fought in U.S. Shermans (Book excerpt of Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks) by Dmitriy Loza (Translated by James F. Gebhardt)

32 The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's Tactical Command Post: An Alternative Command and Control Facility by Captain Christopher Boyle

36 CompanyfTeam Command Post: The Missing Link by Captain Dave Thompson

39 Improving Your Company Trains Operations by Captain Andrew I. Green

42 Training the Task Force Scout Platoon by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lynch and Captain Steve Cichocki

45 Reconnaissance in the Offense "Command PUSh" vs. "Recon Pull" by Captain Christopher D. Kolenda

50 Comments on the (Draft) Brigade MTP

51 Book Essay: He Rode Up Front for Paffon

Back The Crew Station Trainer (CST) Cover by Master Sergeant David T. Worley

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 5 Commander's Hatch 6 Driver's Seat

52 Books 53 Software Review

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Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens

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Production Assistant Mary Hager E-Mail: [email protected]

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u.s. Army Armor School

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Chief of Staff, Armor School (ATSB-CS) COL Paul E. Lenze 1050 E-Mail: [email protected]

Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) CSM Gerald D. Utterback 5405 E-Mail: [email protected]

16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Gregory M. Eckert 7848 E-Mail: [email protected]

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u.s. Army Armor Center

Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MG Lon E. Maggart 2121 E-Mail: [email protected]

Deputy Commanding General BG Clayton E. Melton E-Mail: [email protected]

Chief of Staff COL Jerry L. Veach E-Mail: [email protected]

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Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab COL Gary Krueger E-Mail: [email protected]

Office, Chief of Armor Mr. Aubrey Henley E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

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ARMOR - July-August 1996

Digitization Won't Compromise a Commander's Freedom of Action

Dear Sir:

As the Army moves to make a technological leap in doctrine with the advent of digitization, it is nice to see discourse about the possible ill effects of the move to Force XXI. Captain Bateman's article "Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik," from the January-February 1996 issue, brings forth some valid issues, but I believe that he draws the wrong conclusion. Digitization of the battlefield does not mean the death of auftragstaktik or the loss of independence of action by company commanders. Both will be retained in the digital force, but higher level commanders will be better able to conduct planning, manage resources, and issue FRAGOs to subordinate commanders.

Captain Bateman quotes Ronald Bashista's definition of auftragstaktik, identifying its four components. Bateman places great emphasis on what he believes is the paramount component, independence of action. He further proposes that digitization will restrict the company commander's independence of action by providing battalion and brigade commanders with a greater amount of raw data than the company commander has access to. He is quite correct in his conviction that company commanders "bouncing across the terrain" will have little opportunity to consult their digital displays, but the conclusion that he draws from this is incorrect. Digitization will not result in the devaluation of the company commander's authority that he fears.

Higher level commanders already have access to a greater amount of combat information and intelligence than their company commanders. The company commander's view of the battlefield is limited to what he and his subordinates can see and what information he can glean by eavesdropping on the battalion command frequency. Brigade and battalion commanders have dedicated reconnaissance soldiers (battalion scouts, ADA scouts, COLTs, CI/IPW teams); highly specialized information gathering equipment (GSR, Signal intercept, Firefinder); access to division and higher collected information (LRSD, divisional scouts, Guardrail, J-STARS); and a full-time staff section to process this information into intelligence. Even without digitization, higher level commanders (and their 03 battle captains) have a better view of the whole battlefield than the company commander.

This better view allows higher level commanders to make decisions and give orders that may seem irrational to anyone divorced from seeing the whole battlefield, but are calculated to accomplish the mission. In terms of auftragstaktik, the com-


pany commander must have the obedience to follow his commander's orders - not blind obedience created by fear, but obedience built through trust and respect for the commander's competence. Company commanders must trust that their commander is focused on the success of the mission and execute his orders, however illogical they may seem. The commander who questions his orders without just cause is a force distracter. Independence of action comes not from a company commander operating independently from his battalion, fighting his company based on his own limited view of the battlefield, but rather from the freedom to execute the commander's orders in the manner that best fits the factors of METTT. True, any battalion commander can usurp the company commander's authority by giving orders directly to platoon leaders, but in doing so, he loses the ability to effectively control his battalion. Digitization will not increase the tendency of higher level commanders to bypass company commanders, but merely increase the amount of information available to paint the picture of the whole battlefield. Captain Bateman suggests that commanders will "become tied to the information node" and command from their BCVs. Currently, the tactical operations center has the ability to replicate the functions of the proposed BCV, albeit non-digitally. Despite the access to information, radio nets, and battlefield operating systems representatives, commanders chose to position themselves forward at the critical point. Executive officers occupy the tactical operations center, aSSisting the commander by synchronizing the battlefield operating systems. Future commanders will not necessarily want access to the raw information as it flows from the digital network. Rather, they will want their staffs to transform the information into short and concise intelligence bytes that can be readily used to make decisions. By allowing the executive officer and staff to conduct their functions, the commander is not tied to the information nodes, but can move forward to the critical point.

Digitization is not the threat to the company commander's authority that Captain Bateman believes it is. Digitization will increase the amount of information and the speed of its flow. This in turn will sharpen the resolution of the commander's view of the battlefield and reduce some of the fog of war confusion. It could revolutionize the way we fight and increase, rather than decrease, the importance of the company on the battlefield.

Company commanders will continue to be useful in the age of digitization. They will still be required to execute orders and their commander's intent without the com· mander holding their hands each step of the way. They will still have the independence of action to execute their orders as they see fit. They will not (and do not)

have the freedom to roam the battlefield, fighting as independent companies.

When company commanders receive their orders, they will still need the four components of auftragstaktik to effectively execute those orders. They will need the tactical competence to effectively fire and maneuver on the enemy, the self-esteem to know that they can accomplish their orders without having to be guided, the independence of action to apply tactics and doctrine to the situation at hand, and the obedience to follow their commander's orders.

CPT GARRETT L. IDE B/2-63 Armor

Vilseck, Germany

Bradley FIST Mounting Will Harm GNLLD's Lasers

Dear Sir:

I read with great interest CPT Crowson's and SSG Peterson's well-written article on converting an M3 Bradley for use as a FIST track ("Now Make a FIST ... ; Mar-Apr 96). They are both to be saluted for applying innovation to solve a long recognized problem in the field. We all know what a "dog" the M981 is.

Unfortunately, hard mounting the GNLLD on top of the turret as shown will ultimately bring serious harm to the device. In the M981 turret, the GlVLLD is mounted on a floating plate to dampen vibration during movement. This plate "locks down" only in a firing configuration. Without such an arrangement, the GNLLD's laser rods will be destroyed, sending the unit back to the depot at a cost of about $100,000. If the money isn't a concern, the lack of combat readiness should be.

It's a sad commentary on TRADOC and AMC that good folks in the field have to go to such lengths to have a useable system. A wide array of upgrades have been proposed for the M981 to solve its problems until the BFIST arrives. All have been rejected for fear that providing an interim fix to the system will threaten the BFIST program. These upgrades, many of which are fully developed and immediately available to the field, include everything from upgraded power trains (from the M 113A3 package), to improved north-seeking gyros, and a new turret to cut set-up time and eliminate much of the FIST's easily recognized signature. In most cases, these upgrades would have paid for themselves with their O&M savings before the much needed BFIST is fielded.

In an age where the requirements process is so carefully supported with sophisticated computer models and gigabytes of

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analytical data, it's a shame that common sense is overcome by politics, leaving our soldiers to fend for themselves with welding rods and drill bits.

STEVE SHELTON MAJ,OD

USAR

Resources Aren't There For Field Trains Command Post

Dear Sir:

Once again, I am generally pleased with the current issue of ARMOR (Mar-Apr 96). You truly set the standard in both looking forward and reviewing the past in each and every issue, however, the articles regarding present operations and organizations might stand some improvement. Specifically, I refer to CPT Kevin Banks' article, "The Field Trains Command Post Organizing for Success." CPT Banks makes several great suggestions for the new HHC commander of the cavalry, armor, or mechanized infantry battalion. His design for the organization and execution of a field trains command post could well result in changes to all of our Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). There is, however, one real problem with much of what CPT Banks suggests ... reality.

Reality is that armor and mechanized infantry MTO&Es have no allocation for the Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) beyond the commander's HMMWV and one GP Medium.

Reality is that armor and mechanized infantry MTO&Es do not allocate an "OPS NCO" or a "training NCO" or an "XO's driver: None of those positions are authorized. We all have them, true, but it's a bloody fight to get quality men in these positions, and the bottom line remains that when we start taking casualties, these "non-essential" positions are likely to be stripped, de facto as well as de jure.

Reality is that there is no "expando van" in an infantry or armor battalion to begin with. Nor are there "extra" M577s. I cannot speak for division or regimental cavalry squadrons, so perhaps CPT Banks' experiences are applicable there.

I have commanded an HHC for 24 months; I have deployed a mech TF field trains numerous times in those years, both here at Fort Hood and to the National Training Center. I cede the point that CPT Banks suggests what SHOULD BE. I hope that someday what should be, WILL BE. (I doubt it, but I still hope!) But for today, ARMOR needs to concern itself with accuracy in its articles. What is published in ARMOR is seen in the field as reality, and accepted as factual. The fact is that the Field Trains Command Post (and HHC company head-

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quarters) is not acknowledged as a valid resource requirement in our armor and infantry MTO&Es. Until it is, the FTCP will remain deficient in personnel and equipment, and the force will suffer.

ROBERT L. BATEMAN CPT, IN

Cdr, HHC/2-7 Cav, 1st CD Ft. Hood, Texas

Editor's note: Throughout ARMOR's 108-year history, it has been a magazine where the professional warfighter could discuss what should be versus what is and be guaranteed an audience. In that sense, it is not an official publication, as the views represent those of the authors (see page 2). We will continue that winning tradition.

External Gun Turrets: Refuting the Critics

Dear Sir:

There were two letters in the March-April issue that were very critical of my article, "The External Gun Turret: Often a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride" (ARMOR, Jan-Feb 96), one by J. Boucher, U.S. Army (Ret.) and the other by MAJ R. Duvall, USMC. These tirades did not offer any reasoned response to the issues that I brought up, but relied instead on personal insult and accused me of saying things I never said. In my article, I made several points: (1) That the EGT's loss of good direct vision from the turret top is a decrease in survivability; (2) That the elevated gun position decreases survivability because of high silhouette and exposed mechanisms; (3) That the EGT is excessively complex due to remote operation of subsystems; and (4) That there is an unacceptable loss of interior volume and surface area for mounting components. In the article, I explained why these four pOints were valid.

Prior to submitting the article, I asked three friends to read and comment on the article. They did so, and all their comments have been incorporated. All are experienced in design, testing, and production of combat vehicles. Two are experienced turret design engineers (real turrets, as well as paper turrets) and one is a program manager on development of an armored fighting vehicle. Two of the three are armored combat veterans of Vietnam, and all three must average about 30-35 years experience each. They are still active in the defense business. I omitted their identities because I anticipated a hostile reaction due to the fragile pride of the government developers.

The critical letters did not offer any reasoned counter-argument against my points except to say that:

(1) I am naive. (Boucher) Not true. I am very cynical, especially of federal programs that spend a lot of money on not much more than paper.

(2) I use the kind of logic that opposed the machine gun and the airplane. (Boucher) Not true. That kind of logic was an entirely internal military problem which resulted in our going into WWI so poorly equipped that our allies had to furnish us with not only machine guns and airplanes, but also artillery and tanks. Not all this problem was due to penurious pre-war funding levels. Most of it was due to a dithering bureaucracy that couldn't make up its mind. "Machine gun development in this country floundered on one thing only: Those in authority could not make up their minds on what was wanted . ... " (Chinn, George M., LTC, USMC. THE MACHINE GUN, History. .. Weapons, p. 173, Vol. I of III. BuOrd, 1951.)

(3) I never said or implied that the external gun turret (EGT) was extenSively tested. (Boucher and Duvall.) A bad idea doesn't need a lot of testing to reveal its limits. Even a design study, if honest, objective, and performed by competent engineers, can reveal most of the advantages and disadvantages of a particular approach. A final decision as to whether or not to enter production, of course, must follow extensive testing.

(4) Mr. Boucher questions my motives. My motive is to show the readers of AR- . MOR a different viewpoint of EGT than the one offered by proponents of the program. If Mr. Boucher has something concrete about my motives being other than advertised, say so.

(5) MAJ Duvall's first two paragraphs state his unfavorable opinion of my work, which comments I summarize as, to use his word, "drivel." His second paragraph is not related to anything I said. In regard to the ignorance of EGT that he ascribes to me, he should know that ideas such as EGT existed long before ASM and have been examined for other applications in parallel with ASM. Unfortunately, there are those in government who have fallen in love with EGT and it will, like Dracula, rise again from the grave to suck the taxpayers' blood.

(6) MAJ Duvall, in his third paragraph, speaks highly of the experts for whom he worked on the ASM program. I am sure they are experts, but the facts are that many major federal programs get into trouble, even though led by highly qualified people. For those who wish to learn more about ASM, try: ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION, Program Inconsistent With Current Threat and Budgetary Constraints; U.S. GAO, Report No. B-244187, July 1991. AD-A242 142.

Continued on Page 49


For more than forty years, military ana-lysts have predicted the coming of “push-button war” where experts wearing whitelaboratory coats monitor super-sophisti-cated machines capable of conducting tar-get acquisition and attack without theneed for human intervention.

With the 1991 Persian Gulf War, therewere glimmerings that this era had ar-rived. Carefully-chosen footage of “smart”munitions selectively destroying bridgesor flying through specific windows of abuilding showed a world where guess-work was removed, human error elimi-nated, and perfect execution mastered.Best of all, it looked safe and easy. Unfor-tunately, this perception is not true. Nomatter how sophisticated the world be-comes, warfare will never be safe, easy, orsterile. War will be dirty, bloody, danger-ous, and very, very difficult.

America’s Army is committed to usinginformation age technology to provide arapid and accurate common view of thebattlefield to the combined-arms team.The mounted force was the first to appre-ciate the value and importance of applyingadvanced technology to all elements ofthe combined arms team to make combatoperations more effective. The Army willfield the best equipment money can buyto win on the battlefields of the 21st Cen-tury. But at the same time, we must under-stand that advanced technology alone willnot solve all of our problems. I believethat the best weapon available to themounted force is one that already existsbetween the ears of our soldiers — thebrain. A trained and educated mind is themost important weapon on the battlefieldtoday and will be well into the future.

It is easy to be impressed by the technol-ogy of the M1A2 Abrams tank. Its accu-rate main gun, its thermal sights and com-puterized fire control, its powerful engine,and its digital architecture are the best inthe world. But, without the four crewmenwho have the knowledge, courage, anddesire to close with and destroy the en-

emy, all of the attributes of this greatfighting machine will be wasted.

Machines are tools, and tools are only asgood as the minds that guide them. Even aCray supercomputer cannot tell its opera-tor that he asked the wrong question, or isusing the answer in the wrong way. Thewords and symbols on the IVIS screencannot convey emotions, urgency, fear,pain, weariness, or excitment.

The mind of the tank commander mustconvert the information that his IVISscreen provides into action, based on thesituation and his commander’s intent. Thecapabilities resident in advanced technol-ogy combat platforms can only influencethe situation when the crewmen think andtake action. We in the mounted force mustrecognize the requirement for the long-term development of brain power in orderto prepare for the challenges of future op-erations. Our warfighters must developnew technical-tactical skills to master themany new nuances of digital warfighting.

Mastery of warfighting on the next bat-tlefield will require new ways of thinkingand operating, in part, because everyonein a digital organization will have the in-formation to make and execute tactical de-cisions. The situational awareness thatcomes with increased information flowenables truly decentralized execution. Thisincreases the need for individual imagina-tive thinking and initiative. The more so-phisticated our machines become, themore important it is that we pay attentionto our primary weapon — the minds ofthe soldiers that guide these machines.Only then will we optimize our weaponsystems.

Technology bridges the gap between ourunaided abilities and a given task. Adapt-ing technology for mounted warfightingresults in being able to perform tasks bet-ter and faster, and more importantly, per-forming tasks that were previously impos-sible. Our greatest challenge today will beto identify and train on tasks that beforewere impossible to perform.

A laser rangefinder is an example ofhow technology takes an existing task andmakes it easier. The physical task itself —measuring the distance to the target — hasnot changed. However, the technologysimply makes it faster and more accurate,and requires less effort from the crewman.The ability to range to a target and thentransmit that information directly to an ar-tillery piece or to a wingman instantane-ously is an example of a task that was im-possible to do previously, but which cannow be performed in minutes. The trick isto understand where and how to apply thiscapability to tactical situations...to under-stand the possibilities for a better way offighting.

For the first time ever, current technol-ogy permits a friendly force commanderto know precisely where his unit is in re-lation to other friendly and enemy forceson the battlefield. Before now, this hadbeen so difficult and time-consuming thatwe used pre-arranged control measures —unit boundaries, directions of attack, limitsof advance — to keep ourselves organ-ized, because it was impossible to see thebattlefield in real time. Information agetechnology gives us the capability to seethe battlefield in real time. Now, insteadof controlling units to operate within rigid,pre-determined boundaries, we have thepotential to move units over multipleroutes to attack an enemy from many dis-parate locations. The possibilities for fu-ture combat operations given such capa-bilities are limited only by our intellect.

Nothing can take the place of thinkingsoldiers on the ground who understandhow to use their equipment. Equipmentmay fail; but, minds can improvise, makeallowances and adjust. War is a contest inwhich the side with the wits and will towin will prevail. We clearly have the bestequipment on the battlefield. Our strengthas an Army and our success on future bat-tlefields will depend on how well we cantrain our minds to use this equipment. Wemust prepare our leaders’ minds to fighton the digital battlefields of tomorrow...

ARMOR — July-August 1996 5

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Your Mind Is Your Primary Weapon

To train tank commanders or cavalryscout section sergeants/squad leadersto be technically and tactically profi-cient in skill level three tasks, to fight,maintain, train, and sustain theircrew/section and to perform duties of atank commander or scout section ser-geant in armor/cavalry units. This pur-pose is the first item in the CMF 19Basic Noncommissioned OfficersCourse (BNCOC) program of instruc-tion (POI). Starting in the fourth quar-ter, FY 96, all 19D/19K sergeants (P)will attend BNCOC only at Fort Knox,Kentucky, which is a big change in thecurrent way we train our NCO leaders.Through consolidation, Fort Knox willbe keeping in step with the Army’sschool philosophy of “One Course,One Standard, One Army.”

The consolidation effort has been anongoing project and supports the down-sizing of the Army and the ArmorForce. With BNCOC consolidation ef-fective in the fourth quarter, FY 96, thevision has become reality. Just fouryears ago, seven external academiesand Fort Knox trained CMF 19 sol-diers. Due to the end of the Cold War,downsizing, and budget cuts, armorsoldiers stationed in Europe since Oc-tober 1993 started attending BNCOC atFort Knox. Gradually, four otheracademies closed and divided their stu-dent load among the other existingacademies. When the decision wasmade to consolidate at Fort Knox, therewere only two external academies andFort Knox still operating.

Consolidation of the CMF 19BNCOC at Fort Knox enhances stand-ardization of training and allows theArmy to keep the school portion of a

soldier’s training within TRADOC.The necessary ammunition and equip-ment is available to support hands-oninstruction. A solid instructional baseexists, and adequate space is availableto house the BNCOC student. A bigadvantage to students will be in thearea of simulation. The Battle Lab,SIMNET, and Test Bed allow the stu-dents to become exposed to state-of-the-art simulation training unavailableanywhere outside of Fort Knox. Theyoung soldier will receive a compre-hensive and challenging course. Thiswill relieve budget constraints on or-ganizations that previously sponsoredacademies. To assist Fort Knox in thesuccess of BNCOC consolidation, unitsensure that selected soldiers are, in fact,the correct soldiers.

Fort Knox has the ability to train 4819Ks, and 32 19Ds, per class with 10classes scheduled for the upcomingyear. The class dates for the remainingportion of FY 96 and FY 97 follow:

BNCOC CMF 19FY 96

Report Date Start Date

21 Jul 96 22 Jul 9611 Aug 96 12 Aug 96

FY 971 Oct 96 2 Oct 96

23 Oct 96 24 Oct 965 Jan 97 6 Jan 97

26 Jan 97 27 Jan 979 Mar 97 10 Mar 97

30 Mar 97 31 Mar 9711 May 97 12 May 97

1 Jun 97 2 Jun 9720 Jul 97 21 Jul 97

10 Aug 97 11 Aug 97

Note: The 19D and 19K classes startsimultaneously, so only one start dateis listed.

Forecasting soldiers for attendance atBNCOC is primarily the responsibilityof individual units. Future plans are toforecast soldiers using a centralizedmethod similar to the procedure used toselect soldiers for ANCOC. Those sol-diers selected must be in a promotablestatus when they arrive at Fort Knox.They should be in the best possiblephysical condition, possess no tempo-rary profiles, and meet the other pre-requisites necessary for attendance atBNCOC. To ensure that the school fillsall seats, a unit should identify a pri-mary and alternate attendee for eachcourse. This will eliminate unit short-falls and allow the academy to keep asteady flow of graduates moving intothe field. In a downsized Army, thiswill be a key to the success for boththe Army and the soldiers concerned. Ifa unit or soldier is having difficultygetting a school seat, contact one of thefollowing points of contact (POC) forassistance:

•• FORSCOM HQ, Mr. Grady Ham-mock, DSN 367-7035

•• PERSCOM, Ms. Dorine Hagarman,DSN 221-8693

•• National Guard, Mr. Jim Coats, DSN327-7339

•• G3 Schools (Ft. Knox), SGT Mann,DSN 464-3255

If you are within the 30-day windowprior to a class start date, contact ARSchool HQ, Ms. Carol Hickok, DSN464-3585.

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Consolidation “A Vision Realized”

6 ARMOR — July-August 1996

Continued on Page 49

Much has been written in recent edi-tions of ARMOR about the versatilityand unrealized potential of theM113A3 in Operations Other ThanWar (OOTW). Our joint task force, re-ferred to by the UN as USBAT, usedthem as the only form of armoredtransportation (unless you count ourlimited number of armored HMMWVsas armored vehicles) in the UnitedStates sector of the former YugoslavianRepublic of Macedonia (FYROM)while conducting peacekeeping opera-tions. The M113 worked well in thevalley floor around Camp Able Sentry,our task force headquarters, but was oflittle or no use at our OPs. What oursoldiers really needed was a wheeledarmored personnel carrier to fill therole for which our M113s were not ap-propriate or capable. A better tool forthe job would have been the LAV-APC.1

I am not suggesting a change to theTO&E for any of the organizations inthe current Army structure. What I amsuggesting is this: If a mechanized in-fantry battalion can deploy from Ger-many without their M2A2s and fall inon equipment already in place, why notadd a complement of LAV-APCs whenthe terrain, weather, and situation makeit a better tool than the tracked M113?Obviously, it was not a stretch of theimagination for a smart planner tomake sure our OPs were equipped withSmall Unit Support Vehicles (SUSV),best described as similar to the type of

snow caterpillar seen on ski slopes, toaid us in accomplishing our mission inmountainous, snow-covered terrain.The LAV-APC would be another wel-come addition in this environment andin other peacekeeping missions as well.

While deployed, our company’s mis-sion was to observe, monitor, and re-port any activity along the NorthernLimit Area of Operations (NLAOO),2

which could undermine confidence andstability in FYROM or threaten its ter-ritory. Our company manned USBATsector east (see attached map). We ac-complished our mission from a seriesof fixed OPs, which looked into Serbia,and with regular patrolling, bothmounted and dismounted. Our sectorwas marked by extreme mountainousterrain with only one major hard-sur-faced highway which ran from Kosovoto Bulgaria in an east/west direction.All of our fixed OPs were located morethan 20 kilometers north of this high-way at the end of small, unimprovedroads that transitioned to small dirttracks as they approached the NLAOO.Winter weather proved extreme. Four-and five-foot snow drifts were not un-common during the months of January,February, and March. We received ourlast snowfall in May. Terrain andweather were daily challenges to mis-sion accomplishment and force protec-tion.

Patrolling supported accomplishmentof the mission and provided a vehiclefor showing our presence to the local

citizens on a daily basis. Showing apresence is an important aspect of anyOOTW mission. We were able to ac-complish the majority of our mountedpatrolling with HMMWVs and occa-sionally SUSVs when weather did notpermit the use of our wheeled vehicles.Rubber tires and the rubber tracks ofthe SUSV did no damage to the nearlynon-existent network of trails and un-improved roads found in our sector.Had we been forced to use trackedM113s, M2A2s, or M1A1s, the fragileroad network never would have lasted.Certainly the civilian population wouldhave been displeased had we destroyedtheir already limited infrastructure, notto mention a rapid inability to supplyour own OPs along these same fragilesupply lines. Unlike fast-paced maneu-ver warfare, in which we hope toachieve rapid and decisive victory, theOOTW environment demands that weuse the same infrastructure and dealwith the local populace for an extendedperiod of time. Planning to let follow-on forces deal with the people and im-prove the MSR is no longer an option.

Our soldiers safely accomplishedtheir mounted patrolling missions fromunarmored vehicles. They were able todo this because of the total lack ofmine activity and violence in FYROM.This may not be the case in otherOOTW areas of operations, and couldhave changed in our area during thecourse of our deployment. Increasedprotection would be desirable in a more

BALKAN REPORT II

Off-the-ShelfWheeled ArmorProves Its WorthIn Macedonian Winter

by Captain Matthew D. Morton

Two Finnish SISU 6x6s team up to extract a bulldozer mired in the Macedonian mud.


threatening environment. The ability oflight and heavy tracked armored vehi-cles to move in the places that ourtroops patrolled was not an option forour company. Tracked armored vehi-cles quickly become unstoppable sledson ice and snow. Riding an 11-ton sledoff the edge of a steep mountainousroad is not a prospect many of us rel-ish. A 30- or 60-plus-ton sled is aneven worse thought. In fact, we had anM113 slide off one of our OPs. It cameto rest only after it slid into a group oftrees. We recovered this vehicle using atechnique taught during the Armor Of-ficer Basic Course. The perimeter wirewas reduced to allow the M113 todrive back onto the OP from a lessacute slope. This would not have beenan option on any of our other OPs. Wetried removing track pads to improvetraction, but with only minimal suc-cess. In our environment, we were leftwith no armored alternative. Had therebeen a greater threat, this would nothave been acceptable. Our Army mayeasily find itself in a similar environ-ment but facing a greater threat thanwe faced. Armored protection would berequired to protect our force. WheeledAPCs can meet both the force protec-tion and mobility requirements.

There is another less tangible aspectof patrolling worthy of note.

How many times has the media misi-dentified a tracked APC as a tank? Themere mention of a tank takes the psy-chological aspects of an operation toentirely different levels. The tanks atTianamen Square never had to fire ashot to send a very serious message.No, an M113 is not a tank, but the dif-ference between an M113 and a tank ismuch less obvious to a civilian than toa professional soldier. The differencebetween patrolling in tracked armored

vehicles and wheeled vehi-cles would not have beenlost on the civilians living inour sector. Certainly therewill be times when some de-gree of protection is re-quired, but protection shouldnot be gained at the expenseof the local population’s atti-tude toward our presence.Wheeled APCs provide thatoption.

Our task force was notequipped with LAV-APCs,but our sister battalion,NORDBAT,3 was equippedwith the SISU XA-180, fromFinland. This 6x6 APC is ca-pable of carrying 10 soldierswith a crew of two. It is amphibious,though I never saw this capability usedduring our six-month deployment. Thewelded hull is designed to stop smallarms and shell fragments. It sported a10 metric ton winch with 50 meters of16mm cable. Its listed road speed is100 KPH. On occasion, I was passedby SISUs while traveling at highwayspeeds in my HMMWV. Cleated snowchains extended the mobility of theXA-180s operating in our sector. Chainusage had no noticeable effect on thelimited number of hard-surfaced roads.This is probably because they wererarely used anyplace in our sector ex-cept under the most extreme off-roadconditions. SCANDCOY4 soldiers op-erating in our sector did comment thatthe XA-180 did not handle particularlywell on snow and ice, and that they toowere forced to slow down. The impor-tant thing is that they were still movingwith armored protection under condi-tions that stopped our HMMWVs.

Before citing examples of the XA-180 in action, a basis for our ability to

insert the LAV-APC into similar situ-ations should be established. The LAV-APC is an 8x8 vehicle capable of car-rying eight soldiers and a crew of two.It, too, is amphibious. Its armored hullprovides protection against small armsand shell fragments. Its standard winchis not as heavy as the XA-180’s at15,000 lb. The listed road speed is 100KPH, and it can be equipped withsnow chains. A machine gun mounts atthe commander’s station. It weighs lessthan the XA-180 by 2,000 kg, and ithas both power steering and powerbrakes. Best of all, it is field tested; lo-gistics requirements already exist, anda cadre of experienced operators can befound inside our military, the UnitedStates Marine Corps. The LAV-APC isnot exactly the same as the XA-180,but close enough that the following ex-amples of the XA-180 in action shouldalso apply to the LAV-APC.

As mentioned before, the poor infra-structure made resupplying our fixedOPs extremely difficult. Small roadsand tight turns, which had collapsed on

At upper left, a SUSV that left the road in a severesnowdrift and overturned. No one was injured. Above,a SUSV takes to the air on helicopter sling.


more than one occasion, made the5-ton truck (we had multiple series)“king of logistics. The HEMTTswe did have in FYROM were usedto refuel our helicopters at CampAble Sentry. Because of the manytight turns on already narrow roads,even our 5-ton trucks were forcedto make a series of forward andbackward movements to negotiatethe curves on some roads. Heavysnow at our higher elevation OPsforced us to use helicopter slingloads, or more commonly sendingthe SUSV down to meet the LOG-PAC and make multiple trips froman LRP to the OP and back.5 Thiswas time-consuming and ineffi-cient. We also supplied oneSCANDCOY OP located in the ex-clusion zone,6 atop the highestmountain in our sector, 1703 me-ters. They also shuttled fuel andwater with their SUSV, but theyalso had the use of their XA-180. Awater blivet fits nicely in the back ofthe XA-180. Our M113s were immo-bile when the weather required thistechnique; their APCs were productive,and if the THREATCON had everrisen, they would have provided theirsoldiers with protection to and from theLRP.

Our engineers worked non-stop tryingto improve the trail to the loneSCANDCOY OP in our sector. Thebulldozer which did much of this roadimprovement was also responsible forassisting the LOGPAC trucks up someof the steeper hills on the days theytraveled all the way to the OP. Unfortu-nately, the bulldozer became fenderdepth mired in a spring hidden beneaththe snow. Two XA-180s with their 10metric ton winches, three snatchblocks, an additional length of cable, awhole lot of timbers, one very squaredaway NCO with years of service at Ft.Greely, Alaska, and a Swedish infantrycaptain extracted the bulldozer in a day.There were no M88s in country, notthat it mattered, for an M88 couldn’thave traveled the 60+ kilometers to theOP in January from Camp Able Sentry.SUSV winches are for self-recoveryonly. Our HEMTT wrecker would havehad a hard time getting to the OP underthe winter conditions we were experi-encing. Even if our HEMTT wreckermade it to the scene, it only wouldhave made it there with its one winch.

Moving two forward-deployed, winch-equipped APCs is easier and provides amore flexible response than bringing aresource in great demand and shortsupply7 to the farthest limit of the sec-tor when, with the right tool, infantry-men, tankers, scouts, and engineerscould solve the problem with limitedadditional resources. The XA-180winches pulled other vehicles backonto the roads on other occasions. AnLAV with its 15,000-lb winch is justanother tool which would give ourtroops more self-sufficiency. An LAV-Rmounts a 30,000-lb winch and, in anOOTW environment, affords its crewmore protection than a HEMTTwrecker.

Our OPs rotated personnel every 21-days. Once in the rear, they served onthe Quick Reaction Force, the guardforce, or took their UN pass. Our rota-tion of squads took place by exchang-ing one fire team at a time by air orground extraction. This process was of-ten complicated when an OP’s HMMWVwas deadlined, which required the lat-eral movement of vehicles across thesector.8 The SCANDCOY soldiers ro-tated on a weekly basis, using their XA-180 to rotate an entire squad at a time.Had our troops been equipped simi-larly, the contortions we went throughwould have been greatly reduced. Theaverage OP during our operation was asquad — nine infantrymen and onemedic. The LAV-APC carries 10 sol-

diers. Imagine this: Incoming squadmounts up and moves to sector inits own vehicle, the same vehiclejust used on the QRF or guardforce. Incoming squad arrives, isbriefed on current situation, con-ducts joint inventories, and mainte-nance checks. The outgoing squadmounts up in its own APC, anddrives to the rear. Rotating on andoff of equipment is something noone likes. It is very hard to establisha sense of ownership when that own-ership is only for 21 days at a time.

Our Quick Reaction Force wasequipped with HMMWVs andM113s. The QRF rehearsed to in-sert in support of an OP by air, UH-60, or ground. It wasn’t uncommonfor Camp Able Sentry, located nextto Skopje international airport, to befogged in when the weather wasperfectly clear out in sector, or vice

versa. Anyone who has ever dependedon helicopters has at some time beendisappointed (our pilots, both UN andU.S., were very capable and very dedi-cated). This leaves HMMWVs andM113s. By HMMWV, under ideal roadconditions, the drive to our closest OPtook at least 21⁄2 hours. This isn’t quickby any standard, and to still be arrivingin a light-skinned vehicle probably isnot the best idea if the situation de-mands the deployment of the QRF. TheLAV-APC provides the mobility andspeed of a HMMWV and the protec-tion of an M113. A QRF equipped withthe LAV-25 would be an extremely le-thal force in many OOTW scenarios. Inthe context of the large frontages ourtask force had to cover, and manyOOTW situations may demand, I willnot even discuss how long it wouldtake an M113 to make the trip out tosector.

Those who would argue that anothertype of vehicle would strain our logis-tics system even more may be right.Yet, none of our mechanics had everworked on a SUSV until we deployed,but somehow they managed to keepour fleet up and running. Of course,when the Air Force could not land withour sustainment packages of Class IX,our mechanics found a way to local-purchase the required Mercedes parts9

for the SUSVs and glow plugs for ourHMMWVs. Yes, I think our 63s and45s can handle the additional task of

A HMMWV in deep mud just south of the buffer zone.


working on a LAV instead of spendingtheir time pulling services on an M113that never leaves the perimeter. The AirForce supplied our joint task force withan Air Force NCO to run our mailroom. Certainly the Marines could pro-vide a knowledgeable mechanic, evenif only on a temporary basis. Civiliancontractors flew in to apply Modifica-tion Work Orders (MWOs) to ourHMMWVs. Our task force also had afull time Logistics Assistance Repre-sentative, who helped us maintain ourequipment readiness. Logistics shouldnot be the excuse used to keep thisvaluable tool out of the hands of sol-diers who could really use it.

The wheeled APC isn’t the answer toall the problems that will face ourtroops in OOTW. It is another toolwhich will allow our soldiers to domore with less. If we can put togetherthese packages of equipment that ourtask force fell in on, certainly we couldadd a useful tool to the package.OOTW continues to present us withnew problems which require innovativethinking, or in this case not so innova-tive. Many of the places our troopshave already gone were not conduciveto heavy armor for a variety of reasons,to include terrain, weather and politicalconsiderations. We have also been toplaces where we did not have the righttool at the right time, and our depend-ence on someone else to provide it costus dearly. The LAV is a tool already onthe shelf. It comes tested, with a cadre

of experienced NCOs and officers toteach us how to use it.

The flexibility of our Army is unques-tionable, and it always finds a way toaccomplish the mission. As our mis-sions become more diversified, the sol-diers in the field deserve the bestequipment to accomplish the mission.The LAV-APC would serve the Armywell, and in the type of mission we arecurrently performing in FYROM, it ismuch better than the M113. Missionslike Operation Able Sentry will con-tinue, as will the demand for vehicleswhich afford more protection than theHMMWV, yet not all that is encom-passed with the use of armored trackedvehicles. Fortunately, we already havethe compromise in the form of theLAV-APC; all we have to do is use it.

Notes

1The LAV comes in a variety of configura-tions. For the purpose of my article, I will focuson the LAV-APC, not the LAV-25.

2Consider this the unofficial border betweenSerbia and FYROM. For political reasons wedid not refer to it as a “border.!

3NORDBAT was composed of two Finnishcompanies, FINNCOY 1 and FINNCOY 2, andone company composed of platoons from Nor-way, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, SCAND-COY.

4See Note 3.5All electricity on our OPs was generated by

60 kw and 30 kw generators, which required

diesel fuel resupply on aweekly basis. Large fueltanks were also requiredto refill HMMWVs,SUSVs, and any engi-neer vehicles that mightbe temporarily operatingfrom a forward OP. Allwater used to supportour on average 10-manOPs was brought upduring LOGPAC. Thisprovided our soldiersenough water for cook-ing, personal hygiene,and about one showerper week. Class I resup-ply was conducted froman M998. All rationswere issued in bulk andprepared in kitchenCONEXs by infantry-men on our forwardOPs.

6The exclusion zone was a small portion ofour sector where no Serbian or FYROM sol-diers were permitted to patrol. OP U55A waslocated in the middle of this zone atop hill1703. During our rotation, it was only mannedby SCANDCOY soldiers. Our task force sup-plied the bulk of their logistics needs and con-ducted multiple OP improvements. Our com-pany was responsible for tracking all operationsand patrols at U55A.

7HEMTT wreckers were useful: they moveddragon teeth at Camp Able Sentry, moved Mil-vans into holes during OP improvements, re-covered vehicles throughout the task force sec-tor, and provided overhead lift for maintenanceoperations.

8Though our OPs were relatively close interms of east-to-west, straight-line distance, al-most all lateral movement took the form ofmoving south to the one hardball road, movinglaterally and then moving back to the north.The result? A 6k distance turns into a 4-hourround trip just inside the sector.

9NORDBAT and SCANDCOY used Volvoengines in their SUSVs.


Captain Matthew D. Mortonis a 1991 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy. His previousassignments include tank pla-toon leader, 2/11 ACR; BMO,3-5 Cav (Mech Infantry); andrifle company XO, TF 3-5 Cav,Operation Able Sentry III. Heis currently stationed at Ft.Polk, La.

During the past decade, the intelligence community has beeninundated with rumors of a dissolving worldwide threat. With thefall of communism in Eastern Europe came a resounding sigh ofrelief from many analysts who, just the week before, were tryingto keep up with the limitations and performance characteristics ofSoviet-made equipment. The uncertainty of the fall of commu-nism led to a lack of focus for intelligence collection. Our mis-sion in Europe has been drastically altered, while other units con-tinue to determine which direction their intelligence should leadthem. Well, the tragedy is to ignore intelligence.

A viable threat still exists throughout the world. No, we cannotpinpoint this threat in terms of which army is invading whichcountry, or whom our nation will fight next, but we can point astrong finger at the continuous production and improvements ofcombat weapon systems. Countries that were once enemies aredrawn together in the arms market, making business deals forweapons purchases. Turkey has recently ventured into the mar-ket, buying both Soviet and Brazilian equipment. In ten years,what kind of equipment will we and our allies see emerging fromour potential foes’ arsenals and armories? Countries with little tono financial stability have found themselves tempted by reason-ably-priced equipment now on sale by the Former Soviet Union(FSU). Not to be outdone, countries not so eager to make abuck,” but to retain market share, have matched the prices of theFSU manufacturers in order to remain competitive in the worldarms trade.

In the last five years, we have seen the introduction of manyRussian-built weapon systems into the arms market. From theSA-15 TOR, a sophisticated surface-to-air missile system, to thenewest armored fighting vehicle, the BTR-80A. Yes, the BTR-80armored personnel carrier now has a variant described as a fight-ing vehicle.

At first glimpse, I thought that someone had modified aBRDM. From the front you see a low-profiled wheeled vehiclenot too unlike the BRDM. After a closer look you can see thedistinctive body style of the BTR-series vehicle: a pointed nosewith splash plate on top, rather than folded underneath like theBTR-60, two windows with hatches that open upwards for thecommander and driver, with a searchlight just above the com-mander’s window (great target identifier), a full-sized door lo-cated between the second and third axle with a swing-out stepfor easier entry and exit than in the earlier BTR-series vehicles,and, finally, the familiar exhaust system on the rear that lies par-allel to the ground (an identifying feature that separated theBTR-80 from earlier versions of the vehicle). But then you seesome small, almost unnoticeable differences. On the right sidethe vehicle, just below the exhaust system, is an unidentified box.Just to the right of the commander’s window is a cylindrical ob-ject that I believe to be a ventilator, similar to that found on theturret of the original BTR-80.

And then the greatest difference — the lack of the traditionalBTR turret. The BTR-80A has a new one-man turret with an

externally-mounted 30-mm automatic cannon which is presumedto be the 2A42, the same gun found on the BMP-2, and a 7.62-mm PKT machine gun. The turret is capable of traversing 360degrees and can be used against both ground and air targets. Ba-sic load for the 30-mm cannon is 300 rounds, and the gun shouldhave a maximum effective range of 1000 meters against groundtargets, although it can be sighted out to 4000 meters. There aretwo automatic rates of fire for the 2A42 gun, low at 200 to 300rounds per minute and high at 500 rounds. The 7.62-mm ma-chine gun has 2000 rounds available. The introduction of a 30-mm cannon to this familiar armored personnel carrier does not,in my opinion, make it a fighting vehicle. It does, however, nul-lify one of the BTR-80’s shortcomings as a survivable system ontoday’s battlefield. It provides additional protection and fire-power support for personnel getting in and out of the vehicle.Standard equipment includes a central tire pressure system thatallows tire pressure adjustments from inside the vehicle, nightvision equipment, and firing/vision ports for its eight passengers.The BTR-80A is fully amphibious and propelled by a single wa-terjet at the rear. It maintains a water speed of 10km/h like itsBTR relatives. Power is supplied by either a KAMAZ-7403 die-sel with 260 horsepower or a YaMZ-M2 diesel with 240 horse-power, both capable of achieving a maximum speed of 90km/h.

This system, revealed last year, is in service with the RussianArmy and is available for export. Many countries lacking formi-dable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) can feasibly use this sys-tem as their battlefield mainstay. The BTR-80A’s amphibiousability can also be a boost to the inventory of nations planningfor or expecting maneuvers in marshy areas. This system, likemost wheeled systems, unfortunately does not have the mobilityof a tracked vehicle. Cross-country movement is more difficultand slow, compared to tracked counterparts such as the BMP-se-ries IFV.

An important question to consider is whether earlier versions ofthe BTR-80 and the other BTR-series vehicles will be retrofittedwith this armament. Is the BTR-80A going to replace or comple-ment the Russian Army’s current BTR fleet? There is nowworldwide interest in the vehicle. The BTR-80A has recentlybeen exhibited and demonstrated in the United Arab Emirates(UAE) and Turkey (which acquired the earlier BTR-80 fromGermany and Russia). But this is not the end of the BTR line.Just last year the Russians unveiled the BTR-90, which combinesthe BTR-80 body with the turret of the BMP-2, including theAT-5 antitank missile system. In the eyes of this analyst, theCold War may be over, but I believe it was just a precursor tothe opening of a warehouse of trouble.

In the Eyes of This Analyst by Sergeant First Class Willis A. Bullard

SFC Willis A. Bullard is a Middle East analyst at theDefense Intelligence Agency. He previously served as aTechnical Intelligence Analyst with C Det, 203rd MI Bn,National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.


Drawing used by permission, Jane’s Information Group

The armies of the world are currentlystruggling with the strategic and tacti-cal implications of digital technology.The United States Army is finally field-ing the M1A2 tank with its Interve-hicular Information System (IVIS); theRoyal Saudi Land Forces were the firstto have a battalion in the field with theM1A2, and other nations are trying tocatch up with similar systems that arenot as sophisticated. In each case, mili-tary leaders are struggling with the im-plications of digital technology and theinformation that it may make availableto field commanders.1 Some see thischange as evolutionary, others as revo-lutionary. Those that see it as evolu-tionary are more willing to strugglewith the issues that always accompanysuch a transition. Those that see it asrevolutionary are more prone to see theinformation sky as falling on them.2 Inactuality, reality is somewhere in be-tween. This essay will attempt to showthat the digital battlefield is not some-thing so new that command and con-trol, i.e. leadership, is different on thatbattlefield. To think the opposite is afatal mistake. It will also be fatal forthe commander who tries to microman-age his unit or forgets the tenets ofleadership.

The Political Nature of War

Before discussing leadership on thebattlefield, one must understand whysoldiers are on the battlefield — toforce an opponent to change his politi-cal objectives to accommodate ours.3

The true challenge is to translate politi-cal goals into militarily achievable ob-jectives. Digital technology and instantcommunications may facilitate thisprocess by allowing for the rapid trans-mission of observable intelligence. Itwill neither replace human intelligencenor perform the analysis that is neces-sary for the determination of centers of

gravity and achievable objectives.These are mental processes that are de-pendent upon subjective, rather thanobjective, analysis.

If we are not careful, we will forgetthe entire objective of warfare. For ex-ample, a recent edition of the ArmyTimes reported that the probability ofvictory was listed at between “51 and85%” based upon the casualities thatare expected to occur in a war inSouthwest Asia in the year 2001. In hisbook, On Strategy,4 Harry Summerstried to convince future military leadersthat the whole concept of body countwas useless. In his work, he quotes aNorth Vietnamese colonel as sayingthat the fact that the North VietnameseArmy lost every battle, measured inbody count, was irrelevant to who wonthe war.

The key to victory is for the strategistto synchronize the elements of powerso that the opponent sees more to gain(less to lose) by changing his objec-tives to accommodate ours. As Sum-mers pointed out, this will to resist can-not be calculated in casualties (bodycount). It is an intangible piece of thestrategic calculus and thus not suscepti-ble to digital manipulation.

A classical example of where a forcewon the war and lost the peace is Fin-land in the Russo-Finnish War. TheFinns won every battle and inflictedcasualties at the rate of about 40 to 1,but lost. Additionally, the final termswere more odious because of their suc-cess on the battlefield. So much forbody count and for our ability to “cal-culate” victory. Therefore, when wetalk about “victory,” we should not linkit to casualties or exchange ratios. Weshould talk about the achievement ofpolitical objectives. In future wars,digital technology can assist in achiev-ing such a victory, but not by replac-ing classical strategic/political-militarythought.

Future Warfare

To understand the application of digi-tal technology to the battlefield onemust also understand the nature of fu-ture war. Except in the Mideast or thevalleys and mountains of Korea, war-fare in the future will be characterizedas geographically isolated events on ahighly dispersed battlefield of smallunit actions — platoons and compa-nies. The battles of the Fulda gap orthe North German Plain are a thing ofthe past. Even the potential for DesertStorm-levels of conflict has been mini-mized by the cost of waging war. Ar-mies of the future will be unable to af-ford the mass formations of the attri-tion warfare of the past. They will bereduced in size, though not necessarilyscope (because of technology). Thewarfare of Frederick the Great, charac-terized by maneuver for strategic ad-vantage so as to “win” with minimalcasualties, will be the warfare of thefuture. Mass will be achieved by firesand movement over much larger areasby numerically smaller forces. How-ever, in many cases the superiorities —information, accuracy, decision speed,5

etc. — offered by the situationalawareness made possible by digitaltechnology may allow for overwhelm-ing force to be achieved without over-whelming numerical superiority.

This warfare of maneuver will be fo-cused on strategic objectives.6 It iscritical to again note, at this juncture,that every battle and action should con-tribute to the achievement of the politi-cal objective.7 It is this focus that thebattalion and brigade commandersshould provide. In the few cases wheredivision flags may be on the battlefield,this will be even more true.8 Thesecommanders’ purpose will be the trans-lation of broad political-military objec-tives into tactical missions and themaintenance of focus, while minimiz-ing casualties. It cannot be the over-su-

LEADERSHIPon the Digital Battlefieldby Colonel (Ret.) Bruce B. G. Clarke


pervision of the tactical employment ofplatoons and vehicles that some fear.9

Given the coalition nature of most fu-ture conflicts, the battalion and brigadelevel commanders will spend a signifi-cant amount of time working the multi-tude of problems that will come withsuch relationships. They must alsowork to provide focus and unity of pur-pose with forces that may not be digi-tal, or whose digital system may not in-tegrate with their own.10

In short, the division or brigade com-mander of the future will have a multi-tude of new tasks — but they will notbe purely of an informational nature, assome have suggested.11 The com-mander will have his hands full provid-ing military objectives that are in con-sonance with the political goals,12 theresulting focus, maneuver guidance,and coalitional support.13 He will betoo busy to over-supervise. The newdemands of the expanded horizons andvariables of the “battlefield” will pre-clude over-supervision.

METT-T and the Digital Battlefield

Once one understands the above, onemust still deal with the battlefield real-ity of overcoming the opponent’s mili-tary will to resist so that he will changehis objectives to accommodate ours.Winning the battle, as long as it is infulfillment of the political objective, iswhere digital technology is truly appli-cable. Technology may allow the com-mander to more accurately accomplishhis mission and enemy analysis. Hemay have more visual and electronicintelligence on the enemy and an in-creased appreciation of the terrain. Hemay have an “accurate” picture of thephysical status of his own troops. But,he will only have a true comprehensionof his own troops’ morale and well-be-ing by interacting with them. This iswhat true leaders do. It is in this sub-jective area that leadership will remaincritical to success on the battlefield.The abilities discussed in several arti-cles14 of information management andother technical skills will in fact be im-portant, but leadership will remaincritical — not the ability to manage ormanipulate data, but the ability to relateto and motivate soldiers to operate themachinery of war, the machinery criti-cal to the conduct of massed, accuratefires, and the delivery of digitally con-trolled munitions.15 Digital technologymay allow for a compression of time if

one side’s capability is superior to theothers.

A commander’s ability to know hisenemy and his own ability to collectand process information, and then ex-ploit that information to deliver highlyaccurate fires, will be critical. If the en-emy is also capable of collecting, proc-essing, and acting upon such data, lead-ership and initiative will be the criticaldifferences on the battlefield. The com-pany commander who exercises initia-tive because he understands the com-mander’s intent and the focus of thecampaign will bring success, while thecompany commander who waits foroverly detailed instructions will be con-tributing to the defeat of his unit bysurrendering the initiative. A sophisti-cated enemy will also cause increaseddispersion to avoid creating too lucra-tive a target. The unit will mass asFrederick did at the strategic time andplace. This much more fluid battlefieldis both a result of, and a survival ne-cessity of, digital technology.

When one gets to the turret, wherethe massing of forces and/or fires willtruly occur, leadership will continue tobe the decisive factor. The leader at thehead of his company or battalion willknow whether the data in the digital re-port on his screen is accurate andtimely.16 He will also appreciate therhythm of the battle and be able to cutthrough some of the fog of war. This isa critical point. Many pundits seem toassume that digitally generated datawill eliminate the fog of war. This isnot true. The data that is available tothe commander will be as accurate andtimely as the sources of the data andthe ability of the opponent to manage,confuse, obfuscate, or deny that data.The current discussion assumes awaythese considerations. The fog of warmay be different, but it will still bethere, and both sides of a fight will beseeking to increase it on their oppo-nent’s side, while reducing their own.This is the information war that theTofflers talk about.17 At the battlefieldlevel, it is not a new phenomenon — itis simply a repackaged one. The battle-field commander has always sought todeny the enemy information on hisown capabilities and vulnerabilities,while gaining and exploiting the oppo-nent’s. What may have changed are theweapons that are available to do this.

On the battlefield, the leader also willbe engaged in an informational struggleof a personal nature — sorting the rele-

vant from everything else. This sortingwill be between digital information ona screen, down-linked images from bat-tlefield visual sensors and, most impor-tantly, his own observations and emo-tions. The sense of history and prece-dent that has made it possible for mili-tary leaders to take the initiative andmake gutsy, but correct, decisions willnot go away because of the advent ofdigital technology. Leadership and thepersonally evaluated factors of METT-T will remain critical for battlefieldsuccess.

Finally, as noted, it is the leader thatmust also consider his own vulnerabili-ties. This consideration takes on addedimportance as the opponent of the fu-ture gains a similar capability. The abil-ity to target, confuse, mass quickly, dis-perse, and respond quickly will not bea one-sided set of attributes. Both sidesmay have them. At this point, it will beclassical leadership, not the manipula-tion of data, that will determine successon the battlefield.

Conclusion

The successful military of the futurewill learn how to manage data andprocess it without becoming overly en-amored with it, or enslaved by it. Thegreat battlefield captains of the futurewill be students of history and leadersof men who understand the limits, vul-nerabilities, and advantages that flowfrom digital technology. They will notforget the importance of the individualserviceman to the success of the unit.They will understand that, becausesomething is displayed on a video ter-minal, it may still contain the fog andfriction of war. Finally, they will have agreater appreciation for the politicalpurposes of the conflict — not just thetechnical. The challenge for training fu-ture combat leaders is thus to ensurethat they don’t become prisoners of avideo screen full of data at the expenseof realistic, challenging, dirty training.18

It is the exhausting tactical reality of aRanger School or an NTC rotationwhere training for war occurs — notbehind a video screen.

As the understanding of the dynamicrelationship between battlefield eventsand political objectives matures, thecombat leader of the future will need tobe mentally flexible, technically com-petent, and physically prepared to meetthese new challenges of what it meansto win.19


Notes

1MG Maggart, “Armor and Cavalry in Transi-tion — Time to Inventory Your Tool Bag,” AR-MOR, Jan-Feb 1996. He argues that the tools ofthe future are currently not developed in formalinstruction or unit training programs.

2CPT R.L. Bateman, “Force XXI and theDeath of Auftragstaktik,” ARMOR, Jan-Feb1996.

3Bruce B.G. Clarke, “Conflict Termination: ARational Model,” Journal of Conflict and Ter-rorism. In this article, Clausewitz was referredto as highlighting the political importance ofthe meaning of winning.

4Harry Summers, On Strategy.5Decision speed may be accelerated because

of the ability to more quickly gather and trans-mit data, but also because of the lower levels(compared to classical military thought) thatwill be making the decisions — battalionsrather than divisions, etc. See 12 below.

6Hooker, et al, Maneuver Warfare: An An-thology. In this work, the authors discuss ma-neuver warfare from several perspectives. Theone point that emerges is the criticality of thecommander’s intent for providing this focuswhile allowing individual initiative to exploitthe tactical situation.

7Manwaring, Olsen et al, Managing Contem-porary Conflict: Pillars of Success. “End StatePlanning.” In this chapter, I discuss focus. Fo-cus is critical in the warfare of the future.

8In the authors view, future engagements willbe fought by battalions and maybe a brigadethat is part of a joint task force. In short, thedivision of today and yesterday will haveevolved into a tactical formation in the Israelimodel, capable of providing Command andControl of Joint Forces — the Joint Force Tac-tical Headquarters.

9Bateman, op. cit. CPT Bateman argues thatdigitization will result in the emasculation ofthe subordinate commander because of the ten-dency for higher level commanders to meddlein their jobs. CPT Bateman has done a serviceby beginning the process of pointing out whythis should not happen. Hopefully, my futureparagraphs will add to this fine effort. Those ofus who experienced the stacked helicopters ofthe Vietnam War understand clearly the imbed-ded problems of such over-supervision.

10The integration of digital technology is turn-ing out to be extremely difficult for the U.S.Army. Rather than apply IVIS or some form ofIVIS to every radio-equipped component on thebattlefield, they have elected to have every sys-tem have its own digital formats, routing matri-ces, etc. This is the source of much of theArmy’s difficulty. It should be pointed out thatthe routing matrix in IVIS, that controls the dis-tribution of digital communications from everyM1A2, may be the technical solution to CPTBateman’s emasculation concerns.

11Maggart, op cit.12Dave Jablonsky. COL (Ret.) Jablonsky has

argued that the tactical, operational, and strate-gic levels of warfare will be compressed bydigital technology. This may be true in the clas-

sical theater commander, component com-mander, corps, division, brigade, etc. levels ofcommand because each level will be planningsimultaneously based upon digital data. How-ever, what we are arguing here is that theremost likely will not be those intervening levelsof command. The brigade commander will alsobe the ground component commander and hisbattalions will be operating over greatly dis-persed areas in a semi-independent nature. Sucha scheme is very similar to operations in an un-conventional warfare situation. These forceswill mass at least their fires when required, butwill operate more autonomously the rest of thetime. The force developer may see this as anopportunity to reduce the overall size of theforce, while the student of the post cold warworld will realize that there may be numeroussuch “small scale” operations occurring in mul-tiple theaters at any one time.

13In the Vietnam War, there occurred a clas-sic example of a division commander under-standing and working at the interface betweenthe political and military. On 1 April 1968, theFirst Cavalry Division, commanded by MGJohn J. Tolson, attacked along Highway 9 innorthern South Vietnam to relieve the siege ofthe Khe Sanh combat base. Several days earlier,the division had received its next mission — toattack into the Aschau valley and relieve thepressure on Hue. Major Paul Schwartz, the di-vision plans officer, had prepared a concept thatincluded continuing the attack along Highway 9west into Laos, turning south along the Ho ChiMinh Trail, destroying the trail in the processand then entering the valley from an unexpecteddirection, thus achieving tactical and maybestrategic surprise. The 1 April briefing to Gen-eral Tolson was very brief. He turned to the as-sembled planners and said: “You obviouslydidn’t hear the President’s speech last night. Heannounced a partial bombing halt. What you areproposing is politically impossible.”

14Maggart, op. cit. One can even make the ar-gument that the young soldier entering theArmy with his computer and data skills willneed more traditional leadership skills and ex-periences, not a focus on these computer skills.This argument is based on the concept that thesociety is providing the digital skills and themilitary should develop the leadership skills.

15Massed fires is of course an artillery con-cept. But it is also the goal of synchronizationand applies to Armor units as they maneuver toclose with and destroy the enemy. CPT Pryor,“M1A2, Smart Ammunition, Time and SpaceTheory,” ARMOR, Jan-Feb 1996. This articleand the analysis that accompanies it proves twothings: That the analytical techniques necessaryto operate on the digital battlefield are alreadygrowing within the military, and that static,non-fog of war type of analysis referred to inthe 18th footnote of this paper and elsewhere isalready becoming prevalent. Though an excel-lent analysis and understanding of the tremen-dous capabilities that will soon be on the battle-field, the article displays the “bean-counter”mentality that this article is railing against.

This article does bring home the concept ofachieving mass without numerical superiorityand highlights the lack of OPFOR capability

analysis that can get a bean counter into diffi-culty.

16Every IVIS SOP or discussion highlightsthe requirement to initally submit a contact re-port verbally and then, once one has lased andengaged, to send the digital contact report.

17Tofflers, The Third Wave. The critical pointthat is missed in all the discussion of futurewarfare is the concept of fighting an opponentwho has a different level (wave) technology.The third wave force must still be capable offighting and winning against a second or firstwave force. Guerrilla wars and large, low tech-nology forces are not yet a thing of the past.

18Finally, should we allow leaders to becomecaptives of the tube? If we do, we run severalrisks. The most important of which is the deper-sonalization of warfare. If warfare comes to beviewed as an impersonal process, it will be eas-ier for leaders to get soldiers into wars andmore of them will die. The exact opposite ofwhat a true leader will do.

19Bruce B.G. Clarke, “ Conflict Termination:What Does It Mean to Win,” Military Review,November 1992, pp. 85-86.


Colonel (Retired) Bruce B.G.Clarke is the Training Managerat the Royal Saudi Land ForcesArmor Institute in Tabuk, SaudiArabia. Before retiring, he wasthe Director of U.S. NationalSecurity Studies at the ArmyWar College, Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania. Before that, hecommanded the 2d Brigade,1st Infantry Division (Mecha-nized), Fort Riley, Kansas.Colonel Clarke also com-manded the 2d Squadron, 11thArmored Cavalry Regiment,and A Troop (Abn/Mech), 3dSquadron, 8th Cavalry Regi-ment, 8th Infantry Division, bothin Germany. He has served asa District Advisor in the Repub-lic of Vietnam, a Political-MilitaryAnalyst in the Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, Washing-ton, DC, and as a staff officeron the Army Staff. He is a 1965graduate of West Point andtaught in the Department of So-cial Sciences there. He has anMA in Political Science fromUCLA, and is a graduate ofCGSC and the National WarCollege.

Operational Requirements

Combined Arms Team (CAT) forwardarea armored maneuver forces are cur-rently deficient in close tactical air andground defense protection. The require-ment for armored formations to be ac-companied by self-propelled air-grounddefense system (AGDS) vehicles, com-parably mobile and ballistically pro-tected, is nowadays widely acknow-ledged. Typically, air defense (AD) sys-tems utilize radar-directed, light to me-dium gun systems or ‘surface-to-air’guided missiles against a variety of aer-ial and ground targets.

Operational needs for an effective andcrucial protective ‘coverage’ for theCAT have substantially escalated overthe last two decades. The predominantrationalization is the proliferation of: a)ground-attack tactical fighter (fixed-wing, low-altitude aircraft) and antitankmissile-launching, advanced attackhelicopters; b) precision guided muni-tions (PGM); c) remotely piloted vehi-cles (RPV) and cruise missiles (CM);and d) a plethora of antitank weaponsystems operated by armored fightingvehicles (AFV) or dismounted infantry.

A modern dual-role hybrid AGDS forthe armored forces, at the brigade ordivision level, must be capable ofkeeping up with forward armored com-bat elements. Additionally, it must sur-vive the extremely hostile ‘armor vis-à-vis armor’ intense battlefield environ-ment. Consequently, an effective air-ground defense role may be accom-plished by providing a timely and pro-tective defense “umbrella” against most

antiarmor threats encountered in themodern battlefield presently and in theforeseeable future.

A highly-effective AGDS is charac-terized by:

• Cost-effectiveness in acquisition,procurement and operational deploy-ment (affordable ‘life cycle cost’-LCC)

• High operational availability andreadiness

• Autonomous rapid fire control andweapon reaction

• Air/ground long-range target iden-tification, acquisition, prioritization,and tracking with high ‘hit and kill’probability

• Ammunition lethality and effectiveengagement range against all air/ground antiarmor designated targets

• All-weather, day/night, extendedfighting capability

• Search and shoot ‘on-the-move’overall capability

• Optimum crew ballistic protection,mobility and agility comparable to theM1-series tank

The typical advanced attack “tank-hunter” helicopter is predominantlyperceived as a major, practically un-challenged threat to the armored forces.In fact, if the CAT is not equipped witheffective antihelicopter ammunition orcounterattack measures, it can do verylittle, if anything at all, to threaten and

encounter this predator on equal terms.The reader will find it hard to conceivethat one or two attack helicopters, ef-fectively operated, may strike havoc,temporarily disrupt, and disable awhole armored formation if the latter isnot provided nor equipped with ade-quate protection and effective counter-measures.

In addition to its enhanced capabili-ties against low-altitude, fixed-wing at-tacking aircraft and antitank helicop-ters, a modern AGDS must be capableof effectively engaging and defeatingmost ground targets, including tanks(!)and heavy armored vehicles (primarilyin a self-defense mode). More oftenthan not, the AGDS will be accompa-nied by tanks, so apparently there is nocategorical need to provide it with apredominant ‘tank kill’ capability.Nonetheless, occasionally, while oper-ating on the battlefield’s forefront, anAGDS may encounter enemy tanks allby itself. In such a scenario, it needs tohave the capability on board to survive.

Furthermore, its inherent antitank ca-pability could be selectively exploitedto engage vital-point, high-priority tar-gets such as command vehicles (tanks),tank destroyers, and other highly sensi-tive targets. Indisputably, the AGDS’sinherent capability to effectively en-gage such “hard” and “soft” groundtargets as mounted or dismounted in-fantry, will substantially enhance theclose-support and protection providedto the CAT.

Forward Area Air-Ground Defense

Do We Need A Dual-Role Hybrid Air-Ground Defense Systemfor the Armored Forces?

by Dr. Asher H. Sharoni

and Lawrence D. Bacon


A Proposed Solution: The Hybrid AGDS for the CAT

As a viable, cost-effective and practi-cal solution to the above mentionedthreats, a hybrid AGDS must be capa-ble of providing adequate defense fortanks and armored formations by creat-ing an effective and close “fire screen.”A hybrid AGDS epitomizes the best ofboth AD worlds — missiles and guns.Though ‘surface-to-air’ guided missilesdemonstrate high kill probability atlong ranges (10-12 km), they are ex-pensive to operate and vulnerable toElectronic Warfare (EW) and Elec-tronic Counter Measures (ECM). Con-sequently, it is essential to include acomplementary weapon system, com-prised of automatic barreled weaponsagainst low-level aircraft, RPVs, heli-copters, and various ground targets op-erating at short ranges (2.5-3 km).Thus, a modern AGDS must beequipped with a hybrid, completely in-tegrated weapon system, optimized toengage air and ground targets/threats atrequired ranges under all adverse bat-tlefield conditions.

History: Division Air Defense Gun System (DIVAD)

The U.S. Army recognized the needfor a new AD system two decades ago.In January 1978, the DIVAD (“Ser-geant York”) program was embarkedupon by the U.S. Army for the design,development, fabrication, and test oftwo prototypes. The reasoning for theprogram was that the Army’s forwardmaneuver forces were recognized to beseverely lacking in air-defense cover-age. Prototypes were scheduled for de-livery to the U.S. Government in mid-

1980 for a comparative test and evalu-ation.

Development contractors employedexisting European cannons and U.S.-made fire control systems and radars.The chassis, as prescribed by the U.S.Army, was a modified, GovernmentFurnished Equipment (GFE), M48A5tank. The U.S. Army planned to opera-tionally deploy the first DIVAD units inthe mid-1980s. Contractors were givenample flexibility to encourage designof a cost-effective system that couldsuccessfully achieve operational re-quirements commensurate with thethreats. One prototype had as the mainarmament twin 40-mm L70 Bofors(Sweden) guns, while the other twin35-mm KDA Oerlikon (Swiss) guns.

For various reasons, the DIVAD pro-gram did not live to see actual deploy-ment. Nevertheless, the operationalneed did not vanish nor diminish. Con-versely, it has steadily and persistentlyevolved to a degree that constitutes aclear and present threat to the CAT.The authors believe it is high time thatthe threat definition and present air-ground defense operational capabilitiesbe reassessed, the operational require-ments revisited and updated, and sub-sequently, an AGDS be fielded.

AGDS/M1 Major Operational Capabilities Overview

The proposed AGDS/M1 is an ar-mored, self-propelled, mobile, autono-mous, cost-effective, technologicallysuperior, and economically affordableintegrated weapon system. It is de-signed to function as a dual-role, hy-brid Air-Ground Defense System for

the CAT. The AGDS/M1 is a self-con-tained “fire unit” employing its ownsurveillance/tracking radars, fire controlsystems and main armaments for earlydetection and destruction of low-flyingground attack aircraft and aerials, an-tiarmor attack helicopters, and antiar-mor ground targets. The AGDS/M1 isbased on the battle proven, highly reli-able M1 Abrams tank chassis.

The AGDS/M1 concept represents anextremely potent weapon systemwhich, through effective sub-system in-tegration, constitutes a significant leap-ahead in current armored air-grounddefense conception and capabilities. Itutilizes available proven weapon sys-tems and mature technologies to ad-dress a pressing operational need. Thefollowing is an overview of its majoroperational capabilities related to themain armaments:

• Primary Weapon System Candi-date: ‘Surface-to-Air’ and “Surface-to-Surface” Guided Missile: Air De-fense, Anti-Tank System (ADATS)‘type’ missile system is selected as thebest overall ‘system’ choice for a pri-mary weapon because of its inherentadvantageous characteristics. ADATSwas developed as an international pri-vate joint-venture undertaken by Mar-tin Marietta (USA) under contract toOerlikon-Bührle (Switzerland). ADATSis a single-stage, multipurpose, highlyaccurate, day/night and adverseweather missile system. It has a trueand unique dual-target capability forengaging low-flying aircraft, advancedattack antitank helicopters, and ar-mored vehicles.

The proposed AGDS/M1 consists of apassive electro-optical sensor retract-able head containing a FLIR, TV, a la-

The ill-fated DIVAD (“Sergeant York”). Proposed AGDS turret on M1 tank chassis.


ser rangefinder and a laser beam guid-ance sensor. Two banks of six missileretractable launchers each (12 missilesin a ‘ready-to-fire’ mode) are locatedand integrated at either side of the tur-ret. ADATS was originally designed topermit flexible installation on a varietyof wheeled and tracked vehicles andtherefore could be modified andadapted to the AGDS/M1 configurationwithout major difficulty. The additional‘surface-to-surface’ antiarmor capabil-ity of the ADATS is considered essen-tial, but complementary to its principalantiair role. It can penetrate the equiva-lent of 900+ mm (with growth poten-tial) rolled homogeneous armor steel,sufficient to defeat most armored tar-gets (composite/reaction) today and inthe foreseeable future. In its varioustest programs, ADATS has undergonehighly successful operating trials in alltypes of conditions and environments.

AGDS/M1 Individual Mode of Op-eration: On detection of an aerial tar-get, it is handed off to the passive opti-cal tracking system (high-resolution TVor thermal imaging IR) which is im-mune to both anti-radiation missilesand ECM. Following passive tracking

of the target in the Line of Sight(LOS), the missile is launched whenthe target is within range, subsequentand final guidance only being by en-coded laser beam radiated from thelaunching vehicle or an external source.In an antitank ‘surface-to-surface’ op-eration, the target is acquired andtracked with FLIR/TV and a laserrangefinder ensures optimal engage-ment. Launch and guidance of the mis-sile is performed with an encoded laserbeam. AGDS/M1 could receive infor-mation on targets from a Skyguard firecontrol station.

The passive guidance system, com-bined with a smokeless, solid fuelrocket motor propellant, further en-hance the system’s survivability on thebattlefield. The dual-purpose warhead,with fragmentation effects against airtargets and shaped-charge against ar-mored vehicles, is detonated by a nose-mounted, impact/crush fuze. An elec-tro-optical proximity fuze is used foraerial targets only. The ADATS missileweapon system will be deployed to in-tercept air targets at ranges between 3to 10 km and ground targets between500 meters and 10 km.

AGDS/ADATS Operating as an AirDefense ‘Network’: A ‘network’ of sixAGDS/M1, at the division level, canprioritize and engage up to 20 aerialand vital-point ground targets at anygiven time. The regional AD com-mander has a complete and expedientpicture of the surrounding tactical areawith inputs from all subordinateAGDS/M1s. The commander transmitsinformation and targeting assignmentsto the individual AGDS/M1 over a datalink. One or more surveillance radarsof the AD network can provide neces-sary target information to other vehi-cles, which can then track and engagetargets in a ‘radar-silent’ mode to mini-mize exposure.

ADATS Missile Major Specifica-tions: Length: 2.08m; Diameter:152mm; Weight: 51 kg (at launch);Dual-Purpose Heavy Warhead: shaped(hollow) charge and HE fragmentation(12.5 kg); Fuze: electro-optical range-gated laser proximity fuze with vari-able fuze delay and nose-mountedcrush/impact fuse; Propulsion: solid,smokeless, rocket motor; Max. Speed:Mach 3+; Max. Intercept Range: 10km (slow-air/ground targets), high


speed maneuverable aerial targets: 8km; Max. altitude: 7 km.

• Secondary Weapon System Can-didate: Air-Ground Defense Auto-matic Guns:

Two Bushmaster III 35-mm automaticcannons were selected as the best over-all ‘system’ choice for a secondaryweapon because of their inherent ad-vantageous characteristics: American-designed and to be produced in theUSA; near end of development; firesNATO standard 35-mm ammunition;demonstrates high reliability, superiordurability, exceptional accuracy, andsafe operation under all firing condi-tions. Bushmaster III is virtually an‘upscaled’ design and incorporates allthe battle-proven features of the Bush-master 25-mm M242 gun which servesas the primary armament on theArmy’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

Bushmaster III combines design sim-plicity, external operation, positiveround control, ease of maintenance andconstant velocity feed to enhance reli-ability of gun and feed systems. Firedcases are ejected forward (overboard).Longer dwell after firing eliminatesgun gas buildup ‘under armor.’ Bush-master III capitalizes on the use of ex-ternally powered operation to separatemechanism motion from cartridge bal-listics, This allows for a preciselytimed and fully controllable operatingcycle. A key feature assuring outstand-ing reliability is 100% positive car-tridge control from the time the ammu-nition enters the feeder until the firedcase is ejected from the weapon. It isreadily adaptable to advanced, highperformance, antiair and antiarmorpenetrating rounds currently being de-veloped to defeat present and projectedfuture threats.

Utilization of the ‘twins’ will be lim-ited to targets at ranges not greater than2.5-3.0 km. To be effective, and yetpreserve ammunition, single fire burstsmust take no longer than 1.5-2.0 sec-onds. A very high rate of fire is notnecessarily a decisive and mandatoryfactor at such a short range. Nowadayswe have stabilized, highly accuratefire-control systems with enhancedcomputerized tracking and ‘smart’ pro-grammed proximity fuses. These renderthe philosophy of “filling the sky withbullets...” — to increase hit probability— obsolete. The rate of fire is alsoadequate for engaging relatively slowmoving ground targets. Therefore, arate of fire of 250 rounds per minute,

500 rounds per min-ute total on target,should be suffi-ciently effective inhitting and killingair/ground targetswithin the desig-nated ranges.

Bushmaster IIIGun Major Specifi-cations: Caliber:35mm; Muzzle ve-locity: 4540 fps;Peak recoil: 14,000lb; Total weight: 535lb; Overall length:158.1 inch; Rate offire: Single shot, 250spm; Power re-quired: 3.0 hp @ 28VDC; Clearingmethod (‘cookoff’safe): open-bolt;Safety: AbsoluteHangfire Protection;Case ejection: for-ward (overboard).

Ammunition(NATO Standard35mm): Antiair andsoft to mediumground armored tar-gets-HEI/T (HighExplosive Incendi-ary, T-tracer);SAPHEI-T (Semi-Armor Piercing+HEI); FAPDS (Frangible ArmorPiercing Discarding Sabot). Oerlikon-Contraves has recently developed theAHEAD antiair/missile ammunition tokeep abreast of the ever escalatingthreat scenario.

The essence of the AHEAD conceptis the high-precision determination oftime and projectile location in space towithin 1/1000 of a second and one me-ter of distance from target. The actualvelocity of each projectile leaving themuzzle is measured by muzzle velocitymeasuring coils and processed instantlyby the fire control computer. Time offlight is calculated and impartedthrough electronic induction via frontcoil to the projectile’s base fuse. Whenthe projectile’s timer hits the ‘zero’mark, the fuse detonates the payloadejection charge, erecting a ‘cone’ of 100-200 heavy-metal, spin stabilized sub-projectiles that are directed towards thetarget with devastating terminal effects.This type of ammunition reduces theneed for a high rate of fire to achieve a‘hit and kill’ of an aerial target.

Anti-Armor - FAPDS, APDS-T (Ar-mor Piercing Discarding Sabot),APFSDS-T (Armor Piercing Fin Stabi-lized Discarding Sabot) to combat ar-mored targets. Evidently, if BushmasterIII is selected, 35-mm NATO standardammunition must be produced in theU.S. under license. NATO 35-mmstandard ammunition, when fired toranges up to 3 km, is characterized bya short time of flight which ensures flattrajectories with resultant high hit prob-ability.

It has excellent armor-piercing per-formance by use of discarding sabotshell and excellent final ballistics. Stor-age, transportation, handling and firingcriteria are all in full compliance withthe U.S. Army and NATO specifica-tions.

• Surveillance/Scanning Radar: Adual beam, X-band, pulse Doppler sur-veillance radar, 25 km range with en-hanced ECM resistance; High-elevationangle search armored antenna ensureslong-range rapid target detection, IFFinterrogation, acquisition and trackingwith high survivability.


• Primary (ADATS) Fire ControlSystem: Comprised of Forward Look-ing Infra-Red (FLIR) and TV trackers,a Nd-YAG laser rangefinder and a laserbeam rider using digitally encodedcarbon-dioxide laser which provides aguidance beam for the beam-ridingADATS missile. It is fitted with search‘on-the-move’ (preferably fire ‘on-the-move’), ‘track-while-scan’ and auto-matic threat IFF interrogation, acquisi-tion and prioritization for up to 10 tar-gets.

• Secondary (Guns) Fire ControlSystem: High-powered armored track-ing radar transmitter in the J/X-band(preferably ‘off-the-shelf’) provides en-hanced performance against enemythreat and Electronic Warfare (EW)countermeasures; precision angle radartracking for enhanced direct hit capa-bility; rapid search, track and fire ‘on-the-move’; target identification, acqui-sition and IFF interrogation by radar;Passive tracking FLIR, TV and opticalsight; Active tracking by radar.

• Gun Optical Sight and OpticalTarget Designator: Stabilized, dual-power sight for search, track, identifi-cation, and kill assessment while sta-tionary or ‘on-the-move’; Computeraided optical tracking against evasivemaneuvering targets; Integrated nightsight (FLIR) capability; Dual-beamwidthlaser rangefinder for accurate air/groundtarget engagements; open hatch opera-tion would require an optical targetdesignator which provides quick targetdesignation to the tracking radar or theoptical sight.

• Command Control and Commu-nications (C3): C3 net allows theAGDS/M1 to be linked with higherechelon defenses and command cen-ters, other radars and weapon systemsfor automatic response to saturationand time-compressed coordinated at-tacks.

• Armored Turret: The turret’s ex-ternal envelope configuration and levelof ballistic protection will resemble anM1 tank but it is not an M1 turret. Thiswill make it more difficult for the en-emy to ‘single-out’ the AGDS/M1 fromthe M1-series tank fleet as a high prior-ity target. To enhance crew and vehiclesurvivability, “blow-off” panels will beinstalled in the magazine compart-ments.

• Gun Ammunition Handling Sys-tem (AHS): The AGDS/M1 utilizes aunique Ammunition Handling System(AHS). This system is comprised of a

linear-linkless magazine, transfer unit(“Twister”) and a 4-bar mechanical ac-cumulator. It is a high-density systemthat minimizes the required volumesuch that the AHS approximately fitsinto an existing M1 tank turret enve-lope. The unique feed system also per-mits the elimination of flexible chuteswhich take up large volume, introducemechanical complexity and substan-tially reduce reliability. Linear Linkless(LL) AHS is characterized by 60-70%increase in ready ammunition, en-hanced operational effectiveness, lowerLCC, less susceptibility to jammingand less chance of round damage.

• Dual Feed Capability: Bushmas-ter III has a dual feed capability. An-tiair ammunition is stored in the mainmagazines (2x500 rounds total). Antiar-mor ammunition is stored in two addi-tional small magazines (40-50 roundscapacity each), both located above theguns and each elevating with one gunto allow switching and immediate feed-ing of antiarmor ammunition in emer-gency situations. This dual feed ar-rangement reduces cost and volume,keeps the design simple, and maintainsthe highest possible system reliability.

• Crew: 3-man crew (commander, gun-ner and driver) with one man full arma-ment non-intense operation. Commanderand gunner can interchange roles.

• Crew-Served Weapon System(CSWS): The CSWS (currently underdevelopment) delivers a heavier vol-ume of fire than contemporary crew-served weapons. It is primarily em-ployed to defeat or suppress area-tar-gets such as: personnel under cover andconcealment, protected and unprotectedpersonnel, unarmored and lightly ar-mored vehicles, slow flying aircraft andground emplacements. The CSWS willbe installed on a stabilized, remotelyoperated turret with ‘under-armor’loading capability (100-rd. magazine) Itwill be utilized as a day/night supple-mentary suppressive weapon systemagainst enemy infantry operating an-tiarmor weapons. Specifications:Weight: 38 lb; Effective Range: 2000m; Suppression: high at all ranges; Hitprobability: high up to 2000 m; Opera-tional Environment: all-weather, 24-hour, against air and ground targets.

• M1-Series Tank Chassis: The pre-ferred chassis for the AGDS is ostensi-

35mm GunAmmunitionTransfer Unit


bly the M1-series tank. If the AGDS isto provide close and immediate supportto the CAT, it stands to reason that itshould equally share the same levels ofballistic protection, mobility, and agilityas the forces it is designated to protect.Otherwise, it will not survive, or not bethere when its critical support is re-quired. Oftentimes, we tend to makethe misconceived decision of selectinga ‘degraded’ chassis for weapon sys-tems that assume a combat supportrole. Over the life of the system, it gen-erally proves to be erroneous, both op-erationally and economically. The M1tank chassis will require only minormodifications to allow adaptation to theAGDS turret. The AGDS/M1, based onan M1 tank chassis, will benefit fromimminent and future fightability andmaintainability improvements plannedfor the M1-series tank fleet.

The M1A2 chassis provides mobility,agility, and maneuverability. It cankeep up with armored formations andprovide optimum crew ballistic protec-tion with an inherent 20-25% weight

and combat load growth potential. AnAGDS/M1, if not heavier than 55-60tons, will have better mobility and agil-ity than the M1-series tanks it is desig-nated to protect. This unprecedentedmobility and agility will permit theAGDS/M1 to exploit its firepower po-tential to the utmost and provide thenecessary ‘coverage’ when and whereit is required.

Concluding Remarks

This article was written to capture theattention and imagination of the readerand trigger a creative and productivethought process within the defensecommunity. The AGDS/M1 conceptpresented herein, may not be the opti-mized solution after all. Detailed, quan-titative system engineering analysesmay indicate alternative choices ofguns and missiles. The operational re-quirement for a dual-role AGDS for thearmored forces is more valid todaythan ever before. The authors believe

that prototypes could be feasibly devel-oped in about 30-36 months and thefirst systems deployed within 48-60months if an AGDS/M1 is devised anddeveloped as proposed herein. For thisto occur, the U.S. Government mustadopt a true “hands-off” approach forprocurement in the old spirit of “Proto-typing for Production” and vigorouslyimplement the new policy for stream-lining the procurement and acquisitionprocesses.

Potential sales of the AGDS/M1 inter-nationally should be another paramounteconomic consideration in the develop-ment process. Foreign sales preservethe industrial base, keep productionlines alive, and ultimately reduce thecost of procurement to the Govern-ment. An AGDS/M1 is likely to beprocured by those foreign countriesthat operate the M1-series tank andhave the logistic infrastructure alreadyin place.

35mm Linear Linkless Magazine Details


Western Design Howden(WDH), is a small defense com-pany in Irvine, California, whichspecializes in the design, devel-opment, and production of am-munition and material handlingsystems for the U.S. and Inter-national military markets. WDH’strack record includes a variety ofair, land, and seaborne weaponsystems which require auto-mated feed, resupply, and opti-mized ammunition packaging.

Mr. Lawrence D. Bacon is theDirector of Graphic Arts at WDHwhere, for the past 16 years, hehas been responsible for creat-ing numerous concepts for auto-matic ammunition handling,loading, and storage systems.

Dr. Asher H. Sharoni is the Di-rector of Engineering at WDH.He holds a Sc.D. in MechanicalEngineering from MIT and anM.Sc. and B.Sc. from the Tech-nion, Israel Institute of Technol-ogy. Dr. Sharoni is a formercolonel in the Israeli DefenseForces in which he was involvedin various major armored weap-ons developments.

The First Difficult Trials1943. The largest battle of World War

II thundered on at Kursk in July andAugust. By November, the enemy hadbeen thrown back to the right-bankUkraine. With each day, the front lineinexorably receded westward. Germanyand its satellites were forced to go overto the defensive. Occasionally, the en-emy made vain attempts to retake thestrategic initiative from the hands ofthe Red Army.

Thus, at the end of November and thebeginning of December, the Germancommand launched a powerful attacknorthward from the area south of Be-laya Tserkov (80 km south of Kiev),with the intent to liquidate the Sovietforces’ bridgehead on the west bank ofthe Dnepr River. Although hurriedlyoccupying defensive positions, our in-fantry forces were unable to withstandthe powerful enemy thrust. The Ger-man attack threatened Belaya Tserkov,the capture of which would put themon the near approaches to Kiev, theUkrainian capital.

Units of 5th Mechanized Corps werein their second month of reconstitutionin the forests north and west of Naro-fominsk [sixty-five kilometers south-west of Moscow]. Seven hours wereset aside each day for rest, and the re-maining time was spent in study of theequipment, gunnery at a range com-plex, and tactical field exercises. Thefollowing method was employed in our233d Brigade to accelerate the masteryof the equipment. Permission wasgiven to one crew in each battalion todisassemble almost completely oneSherman tank. The design and functionof each instrument, component, system,and the armaments were studied. Wehad the full opportunity, as they say, toput our hands on a piece of “live”equipment. Ten days were spent in thisexercise, after which the tank was reas-sembled by its crew. The deputy battal-ion commander for maintenance, to-gether with the chief mechanic, moni-tored the assembly process, and thebattalion armorer inspected the maingun and machine guns. A new group of“students” arrived, and studied the“American” by the same method. De-

tailed posters on the design and func-tion of all the Sherman’s systems andarmaments had been issued in earlyOctober, and a good study guide hadbeen published. Previous training meth-ods were quickly abandoned...

I want immediately to say a goodword about the manufacturer of theShermans. Their representative wascontinuously available at the headquar-ters of 5th Mechanized Corps. He scru-pulously collected and studied all inci-dent reports pertaining to the “Emcha”1

during its fielding. I can’t recall his lastname. It was categorically forbidden toconduct any kind of note taking on thefront-line. But I remember we allcalled him Misha. Even now, at veter-ans’ gatherings, we fondly recall howMisha, having observed a driver-me-chanic attempting to twist something inthe engine compartment, for example,with a key or a screwdriver, sternlyspoke up: “This is factory sealed —tinkering is not permitted!” And thewould-be tinkerer immediately lost theurge to turn and tighten screws. TheEmchisti [Emcha tankers] later becameconvinced that these machines workedlike a good chronometer with just nor-mal maintenance resources.

“Hunting With Borzois”I do not know who first used hunting

terms to describe the means developedby Emchisti for combating heavy Ger-man tanks. It was not for a lark that wehad to resort to this tactic in the Kor-sun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation (Janu-ary-February 1944).

The tanks of the two sides were farfrom equal in firepower. The Tiger andPanther were equipped with long-bar-reled 88-mm and 75-mm cannon. TheShermans also had a long gun, but oflesser caliber — 76.2 mm. The 85- to100-millimeter frontal and turret armorof the enemy tanks made them practi-cally invulnerable to the Emcha’s pro-jectiles at those points. However, theydid burn, and could be immobilized inplace by our precision shooting.

The Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Opera-tion of two Ukrainian Fronts began on26 January 1944. The recently created

BOOK EXCERPT: Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks

How Soviets Fought in U.S. Shermans

Translator’s Note

In May, 1993, I came into posses-sion of a manuscript entitled Storiesof the Sherman Tank. It was writ-ten, in Russian, by a Red Army vet-eran of World War II, Hero of theSoviet Union Dmitriy Loza. FromNovember 1943 until the end of thewar in August 1945, Loza was as-signed to, and then commanded, aSoviet tank battalion equipped withthe M4A2 Sherman tank (diesel en-gines, 76-mm gun). These tankswere sent to the USSR through theLend-Lease Program. Loza’s unitfought in Ukraine, Romania,, Hun-gary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.At the completion of hostilities inthe West, his unit moved to Mongo-lia by rail, where they were issueda new set of Shermans. They thendrove across the Grand KhinganMountains into Manchuria to fightthe Japanese Army.

In the twenty years that I have fol-lowed this topic, Dmitriy Loza’sfirst-person account is the most de-tailed description I have seen of theemployment of American militaryequipment by the Red Army. Hisstory is a collection of anecdotesthat speak to the life of a juniorRed Army tank officer at the small-unit level. Some are humorous,some will put a lump in the reader’sthroat.

The Soviets received approxi-mately 1,200 light and 5,000 me-dium tanks from the USA duringWorld War II. The first tanksshipped to the Soviet Union in1941-42 were the M3A1 GeneralLee and the M3A5 General Grant,equipped with gasoline-poweredengines. Stalin complained openlyto Roosevelt about these earlyAmerican tanks in his personal cor-respondence, writing, “...U.S. tankscatch fire very easily when hit frombehind or from the side...” TheAmericans responded by ceasingdelivery of gasoline-powered tanksand sending instead the M4A2.

By Dmitriy Loza (Translated by James F. Gebhardt) © 1996, Univ. of Nebraska Press


6th Tank Army, to which the 5thMechanized Corps belonged, was at-tacking in the southeastward directiontoward Zvenigorodka from the areanorth of Tynovka. 5th Guards TankArmy of the adjacent First UkrainianFront was attacking from the oppositedirection to converge with it. In coordi-nation with infantry formations, thesetank armies were to encircle significantenemy forces in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy bulge.

Beginning on the morning of 27January, 233d Tank Brigade — thebackbone of the corps forward detach-ment — received the mission not to be-come engaged in protracted battles forisolated enemy strongpoints, but topenetrate into Zvenigorodka, where itwas to close the ring of encirclement.

At midday, the brigade’s 1st Tank Bat-talion, with tankodesantniki2 aboard,reached the outskirts of a large and im-portant — in the operational-tacticalsense — inhabited area, Lysyanka [135kilometers south of Kiev]. The enemy,realizing the key significance of thisstrongpoint, had concentrated up to abattalion of infantry, reinforced by fiveTiger tanks, to hold it.

Lysyanka — a small regional town —stretched out in a deep hollow. Itshouses could be seen only from a closevantage point. The Germans had dug inon the heights that framed this inhab-ited locale. They were covering theroad and heights adjoining it withdense interlocking fires from all weap-ons. The defenders paid almost no at-tention to the gullies and ravines. Theybelieved that their bottoms and sideslopes, deteriorated from the badweather, were unsuitable for deployingtanks.

We had to seize Lysyanka as rapidlyas possible. The most important targetsin its defenses were the tanks. Theyhad to be knocked out in the first as-sault. It would then be much easier todeal with the infantry. The accomplish-ment of this task was further compli-cated by the worsening weather—therain was growing heavier. Captain Nik-olay Maslyukov, the battalion com-mander, made the following decision:two tank platoons were to attack theenemy along the highway (demonstra-tion group), and the platoon of JuniorLieutenant Mikhail Prikhod’ko, movingalong the side of one of the broad gul-lies, was to reach the flank of the Ti-gers and attack them with armor-pierc-ing rounds on their hulls. This conceptfollowed the model of “hunting with

Borzoi” — the dogs tantalize the wolffrom the front, while several houndscome at him from the flanks to takehim down.

Our tanks maintained radio silence toachieve surprise in this unusual attack.Only the radios of the battalion com-mander and the two platoons attackingalong the road were left on. NikolayMaslyukov quietly orchestrated the ac-tions of the demonstration and flankinggroups.

Attentively studying the surroundingterrain, Prikhod’ko noticed nothing ex-cept dripping wet shrubbery and theoccasional modest tree. The Emchas ofhis platoon crept forward on idling mo-tors, avoiding movement along thesame track. There was the possibility ofgetting bogged down in the soggychernozem.3 As before, visibility waspoor. A meeting wind hurled large rain-drops into their faces, and carried thenoise of their laboring engines fromtheir sterns into the endless steppe.This encouraged the tankers, because itprovided additional security to their ac-tions. It would have been worse for thewind to be blowing toward the enemy.“Today, the weather is our friend,” theplatoon commander said encouraginglyto his crew.

Hundreds of meters of a difficult pathlay behind. Prikhod’ko understood thathis tanks could encounter the enemy atany moment, and he was not wrong.Up ahead, Mikhail noticed a mound —a small ground sheet hung suspendedabove the ground. It was motionless.Out from under the tarpaulin crawled aGerman soldier, who stared at the leadtank, clearly not knowing if it was hisor ours. Without hesitation, the driver-mechanic veered his Sherman towardthe enemy position and ground the sol-dier and his covered machine gun intothe earth. The enemy’s security outposthad been destroyed without a sound.This did not happen often. “The de-fender’s main forces are somewherenearby,” the platoon commander con-cluded to himself. A sheet of heavyrain hid the horizon from view. The en-emy position was somewhere up ahead,but it could not be discerned.

Prikhod’ko reported his engagementwith the enemy outpost to the battalioncommander, and received the order tostop. The demonstration group alongthe road began its spirited “teasing” at-tack, trying to attract the defenders’ at-tention completely to itself. By doingthis, it simplified for Prikhod’ko’screws the accomplishment of their mis-

sion. The Shermans of the flankinggroup froze in place, their motors qui-etly idling. The commands of the offi-cers of the tanks attacking frontallysounded crisply in the headphones.Frequent machine gun bursts and thenoise of motors were reported. Themain part of the concept of “huntingwith Borzois” had been accomplishedsuccessfully. At this time, somewherein the heights a strong gust of winddispersed the heavy curtain of clouds,and a broad patch of sky shonethrough. The rain halted. Would it holdoff long? A moment! A fortuitous mo-ment! Prikhod’ko fixed his glance atthe unfolding view. Some seventy me-ters ahead loomed two immense black-crossed tanks. Their main guns “pa-trolled” the road, prepared at any mo-ment to greet our tanks attacking fromthe front with deadly fire.

Two Shermans of Prikhod’ko’s pla-toon, moving in echelon, had stoppedat the same time. This enabled them toopen fire quickly, without interferingwith each other. Their main guns hadlong ago been loaded with armor-pierc-ing rounds. “The right Tiger is yours,the left one is mine. Fire!” commandedMikhail.

Main gun fires ripped through thedamp cold air. The engine compart-ment of the right “beast” was envel-oped in flames. The left Tiger shookfrom the strike of the solid shot, butdid not catch fire. Prikhod’ko shoutedto the gunner, “Finish him off!” Thesecond armor-piercing round did itswork — the clumsy target belchedblack smoke. The German tankers be-gan to jump out of their vehicle. Accu-rate machine gun fires found theirmark.

The Emchas attacked forcefully alongthe road, conducting intensive maingun and machine gun fires. Prik-hod’ko’s platoon also did not sparetheir ammunition. Having been at-tacked from two sides, the enemy be-gan to withdraw under fire to the south.Minutes later, the lead tanks ofMaslyukov’s battalion, in coordinationwith their desantniki, burst upon theenemy positions. Lysyanka stretchedout below.

The Emchisti participating in the de-feat of enemy attempts to break out ofthe Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy ring” em-ployed a different method of combatwith the enemy’s heavy tanks. TwoShermans were designated in each pla-toon for each single attacking Tiger.One tank fired armor-piercing shells at


one or the other track, the other tankawaited the moment when the undam-aged track had driven the German tankinto a 90-degree turn, exposing its en-tire flank. Then it delivered a solid shotinto the fuel cell. As a rule, attackingenemy tanks were permitted to close to400 to 500 meters. It was difficult tobreak a track at greater ranges.

A “Psychological” Attack

Each officer at the front had his ownmoment in the sun, a specific day (ordays) and a defined place. For CaptainNikolay Maslyukov, this was Lysy-anka. This, indeed, was the peak of hiscommand talent. Without a doubt, newaspects of the gifted battalion com-mander clearly would shine forth inother battles. But the time of his deathwas near. Maslyukov perished at 1300on 28 January 1944 in Zvenigorodka.We were doggedly fighting our waythere.

The wildly fluctuating weather con-tinued. The brief pause was sufficientonly for the capture of the importantheights on the approaches to Lysyanka.Even more heavy rain fell later and,with the coming of dawn, abundant wetsnow. Like it or not, this enemy strong-point had to be taken at night.

Nikolay Maslyukov assembled thecompany and tank commanders andexplained the developing situation. Atthis time the crews replenished theirEmchas’ ammunition supply. A stub-born fight in a built-up area lay ahead,at night. Nikolay Nikolaevich listenedto the opinions of his company com-manders and several platoon com-manders. All arrived at the same con-clusion: Attack Lysyanka without de-lay, bringing all the firepower of theirShermans to bear on the enemy, and, asbefore, not sparing main gun rounds ormachine gun bullets.

The captain agreed with his subordi-nates’ opinion. He himself added: “Wewill augment the strength of our fire at-tack by turning on our lights and blow-ing our sirens at full power. We willconduct a ‘psychological’ attack!”

The Emchas had modest headlights,with a sufficiently powerful beam, anda “wailing” signaling device — a siren.When it was turned on, even the tank-ers, who knew its voice, experiencedtingling in their spines. How would itaffect someone who was hearing it forthe first time? And at full power?Could he keep his nerve?

Then came CaptainMaslyukov’s terse com-mand: “Turn on lights andsirens! Forward!” Thoughyears have passed, the pic-ture of this unusual attack is clear inmy mind in all its detail. The piercinglight of the headlamps pulled the roadout of the darkness, along with the ad-jacent fields, houses, and trees. Itblinded the enemy infantry and artillerygun crew. The powerful howl of the si-rens ripped into the night. It assaultedthe eardrums and placed a heavy loadon the brain. The enemy fire, initiallysomewhat dense, began to weaken. The“psychological” attack bore fruit. “Anymeans is good in battle: blind the en-emy, destroy him with the tank!”

From the first moment of the attack,the Sherman crews conducted intensemain gun and machine gun fires. Whenthe enemy’s resistance had noticeablyweakened, Maslyukov sternly ordered:“Conserve ammunition! Use yourtracks!”

Each platoon and tank commander,emerging partially from his hatch,could easily see the enemy in the illu-minated surroundings. Using their in-tercom systems, they gave commandsto the driver-mechanic, directing theirEmchas toward observed targets. As-sault troops carrying submachine gunsran nearby, shielding “their” Shermanfrom panzerfaust gunners. The armorplate of antitank guns cracked. Themulti-ton mass of the “American” eas-ily overran the defenders’ mortars andmachine guns. The soft wet earth re-ceived the debris into its cold embracewithout resistance. Maslyukov’ s battal-ion and the submachinegunners of thebrigade commander’s reserve capturedLysyanka without losses.

Early April, 1945. Formations of 6thGuards Army had seized the cities Sho-pron and Sombatkhey in northwestHungary. Vienna was about sixty kilo-meters away. We had to interfere withthe Germans’ efforts to mine and de-stroy historical monuments andbridges, to move industrial equipmentand cultural treasures out of Austria’scapital. The army commander, Colonel-General A. G. Kravchenko, made thedecision to send a detachment to Vi-enna. This detachment consisted of 1stTank Battalion, 46th Guards Tank Bri-gade (eighteen Shermans), three SAU-152-mm guns, and a company of air-borne troops — eighty men from the1st Airborne Battalion of the 304th Air-borne Regiment, commanded by

Guards Lieutenant Nikolay Geor-gievich Petukhov. The detachment wasordered to function as a raiding detach-ment in the enemy’s rear area, hur-riedly reach Vienna, penetrate into thecity center from the south, and seizekey objectives: the parliament building,art history museum, opera house, Bel-vedere Palace, and Academy of Sci-ences. We were to hold the capturedbuildings and surrounding blocks untilthe arrival of the main body of 9thGuards Mechanized Corps. The crewswere briefed that they would be operat-ing in the enemy’s backyard fortwenty-four hours, possibly evenlonger.

The army commander cleverly in-cluded in the detachment the high ma-neuverability and firepower of tanksand self-propelled guns with the prac-ticed ability of airborne troops to fightfierce and prolonged battles in the en-emy’s rear. It was ever so strictly or-dered: “Except in the most extremecase, do not become engaged in com-bat on the way to the Austrian capital!”

As the detachment commander, Ishared a single thought and emotionwith each tanker — get to Viennaquickly. Two circumstances dictatedsuch operations. First, the objectivesdesignated for capture were located asignificant distance from the front line.Their defense might still not be wellorganized. Second, the Germans wereunlikely to conceive of the idea that theRussian command would take this un-believably risky step — inserting tanksand infantry into such a large metro-politan area.

The southeastern sector of Vienna hadseveral less dense built-up areas nearthe Danube canal. However, honestlyspeaking, we did not have full confi-dence that the approach of Russiantanks to the city was not known herealso. That is, on the new axis (if wewent that way), we might not be ableto achieve the necessary movement se-curity. One thing was sure. If we con-tinued on our present course, we wouldsuffer more losses. We studied the lay-out of the southwestern sector of theAustrian capital. We were looking for aroute through Meydling to the city cen-ter. There were substantial obstacles —hilly terrain covered by a forest, and awinding road. The enemy would not


need substantial forces to delay us. Wedecided upon a variant — bypass Vi-enna from the southwest and break intothe city in the sector of the Hutteldorf-Linz highway. Austria’s main highwayswere in excellent condition. The firesof war had not yet touched them. Theywere lined with tall, leafy trees. Theirinter-arching green borders camou-flaged the detachment well from themost dangerous threat in this situation— enemy aviation.

Darkness was approaching when thebattalion reached the bridge west of Hut-teldorf. Barricades blocked the streetsand approaches to the bridge. Antitankfire struck the tank of Guards SeniorLieutenant Grigoriy Danil’chenko,commander of 1st Tank Company. Wewere forced to withdraw a bit. We ma-neuvered to the right and reached Hak-king. Our mission was growing moredifficult as time passed! Here a solidfortress wall of some length blockedour path. We could not go around it.Time was slipping away. We had toram it with a tank. Guards SergeantNikolay Oseledkin, a driver-mechanic,executed this task masterfully. First hemade a small breach. With severalstrikes of the tank’s bow, he enlargedthe breach until a Sherman could drivethrough it. The guards tankers chris-tened this breach the “triumphal arch.”Tanks with paratroopers clinging tothem hurried along the railroad em-bankment toward the western station.The city was going about its normaldaily life — buses were plying thestreets, trolley cars were clanging, andthe Viennese people were scurryingabout with their business. Traffic po-licemen signaled our column forwardwithout delay at three intersections. Butthis atmosphere did not last long. Soonthe situation changed radically. Theyrecognized us. One after the other, thecanal bridges on our battalion’s routeof march went up in smoke. Therewere a lot of them.

Each Emcha commander had a mapof the city. This permitted the detach-ment to continue closing on our desig-nated objectives along multiple routes.

At 2300 on 9 April, I reported to thebrigade commander by radio: “Wehave reached the center of Vienna!”And so, the first part of our combatmission was accomplished. The second— no less difficult — was to hold thecaptured area until the arrival of ourown forces.

The principal concern of a com-mander in such situations is the organi-

zation in the briefest time of a defenseand, in particular, its most importantelement — a system of fire. The tank-ers and paratroopers were arrayed sothat each street, intersection, and pas-sageway was under our constant obser-vation. If an enemy appeared, he wasdestroyed by concentrated fires of allsystems. The SAU-152s comprised ourreserve, for reinforcing the threatenedaxis or sector in the course of the bat-tle.

On my order, Guards Lieutenant Nik-olay Petukhov’s paratroopers carefullybegan clearing the blocks adjoining thearea occupied by our force. Their taskwas to clean out enemy soldiers. Thefact that the electricity remained func-tioning in central Vienna until 0200 in-itially facilitated the accomplishment ofthis mission. As soon as the enemy re-alized the situation, he turned out thelights.

The night was uneasy. Knowing thecity well, the Germans made severalreconnaissance forays. They threw gre-nades at our tanks from the roofs andupper floors of houses. We had to parkour Shermans under the archways ofbuildings. The paratroopers quickly liq-uidated this danger from above. Thecrews did not sleep. All were at theirbattle stations, prepared to defeat anenemy attack. Only near morning didthe driver-mechanics and gun com-manders manage to snatch a bit of rest.No one doubted that at dawn the en-emy would launch his attack. And wewere not mistaken. The enemy madehis first strong attack in the morning.

Not long before this, the Germanshad begun to fire with an antitank gunat an Emcha parked under an arch.During the night, they had dragged it tothe upper floor of one of the housesnorth of Ratush’. The enemy managedto damage the track on two tanks. Wequickly had to take appropriate meas-ures to prevent the majority of our ve-hicles east of Ratush’, the University,and Parliament from being damaged.We wanted to leave them in those posi-tions, because from there they couldbetter engage an attacking enemy.

I called the commander of the SAU-152 battery, and ordered him immedi-ately to suppress the enemy firingpoint. The self-propelled gun, slidingalong the asphalt on its broad tracks,took a position on one of the streets onthe southeastern side of the square. Allof us were curious. We wanted towatch the self-propelled gun blow theGerman gunners and their cannon to

pieces. The tankers and paratrooperspoured out into the street and began towait. Now, recalling those minutes, Icannot excuse myself. As an inexperi-enced commander, I committed a seri-ous error. At the time, I permitted these“spectators” to line the street. We paida high price.

The Viennese lanes that ran in variousdirections from the central square werenot wide. Beautiful houses with vene-tian blinds on their windows rose up onboth sides of these lanes. Each soldierand officer would learn to his misfor-tune that these windows would end upon the street.

The shot of the self-propelled gun’slarge-caliber cannon roared forth. Theair itself shook. One and one-halffloors of the house, together with theenemy antitank gun and its crew,crashed to the ground. And in our ownposition? With a crash, the powerfulshock wave of the shot broke the thinwindow glass in the houses near theself-propelled gun. Heavy shards ofglass poured down on the heads of our“spectators.” The result was lamenta-ble: scores of wounded arms andbacks, and two broken collar bones.Thankfully, the tankers were wearingtheir headgear, and the paratrooperstheir helmets. Their heads remained in-tact. What now! We were fighting ourtanks inside a large city for the firsttime. Bad experience is experience, justthe same!

There was no time to moan or com-plain. Enemy tanks were already mov-ing along several streets toward theUniversity and the Parliament. Infantrywere attacking behind them, using thetanks for cover. The enemy was begin-ning an attack on a broad front. Verywell, then, the hour had come to “crossswords” — armor with armor, fire withfire! We had the advantage. The battal-ion was deployed in combat formation.The Sherman fired more accuratelyfrom a stationary position.

A Panther, the thick armor of its turretand hull forming a shield, was leadingthe attackers on every street. The longrange cannons of the heavy tanks thatstopped outside the direct fire range ofour Shermans’ 76-mm main guns en-abled them to strike our combat vehi-cles from a significant distance. In thisunfavorable situation, the Emchacrews, on general command, employeda minor, but important, deception. Theybacked their tanks deeper into the arch-ways. They remained ready to reoc-


cupy their position, on command, andspray the enemy with machinegun fire.

Battles are decided in seconds. Thedriver-mechanic of Guards Junior Lieu-tenant Bessol’tsev’s tank tarried a bittoo long, and was unable to repositionhis vehicle immediately. This smalllapse turned out to be fatal. The Emchawas hit. The commander and assistantdriver-mechanic were wounded, but themain gun was undamaged. The crewbandaged themselves, and remained attheir stations on order of the juniorlieutenant. The immobile Sherman wasprepared for an unequal duel, with anantitank round loaded in the main gun.The radio operator prepared a smokepot; its dark gray screen at the rightmoment would effectively conceal thetank position. The rapid disappearanceof our tanks, it seems, somewhat dis-couraged the enemy crews. The Pan-thers stopped. They hesitated, thenslowly moved forward. One of the Pan-thers turned toward Bessol’tsev’s tank,in all probability intending quickly toclose the range in order to fire the kill-ing shot. The junior lieutenant under-stood the enemy tank commander’s in-tention. He ordered the radio operatorto throw the smoke pot forward.

The thick cloud of smoke began toobscure the archway and the street infront of it. Now let the enemy try tofind the target.

At this time, assistance sent by thecompany commander, Guards SeniorLieutenant Ionov, came to Bessol’tsevby the rear courtyards. Knocking downthe intervening fence, the Sherman ofLieutenant Abib Bakuridze approachedBessol’tsev’s tank from the rear,quickly hooked a tow cable onto it, andtowed it to a safe place.

The Panthers did finally reach the linewhere they could be destroyed by thefires of the Emchas’ 76.2-mm guns.The command went out over the radio:“Take your positions! Ten secondslater, the archways of the houses on theeastern edge of the central square werebristling with the Shermans’ long bar-rels. A cannon duel commenced atclose range.

Combat in cities is a great number ofviolent isolated engagements, in whichsuccess depends on the quickness ofactions, the coolness of commanders ofall ranks, the mastery of each crewmember, and the skill of the infantrysupport troops. Guards Lieutenant Kon-stantin Drozdovskiy’s tank was in avery good position. The archway en-

trance into the courtyardwas ten meters from thecorner of the building. Ad-joining the house was asmall square. Earlier, Kon-stantin had prepared a good route formaneuver out from under the archwayinto the square and back. And not invain.

Up to one and one-half platoons ofenemy submachinegunners were ad-vancing on Drozdovskiy’s position. Be-hind them were two Panthers. Theforces were unequal. But the GuardsEmchisti did not flinch. They skillfullyengaged in a one-on-one fire fight. Thelieutenant ordered the full weight of hismain gun to rain upon the infantry,who represented a great danger to thetank. And then immediately to changepositions. Volley fire with high-explo-sive rounds cut through the enemy sub-machinegunners very well. Those whosurvived immediately turned back andtook cover behind the tank and in ahouse. The sector of observation andfire was better from the new position.Konstantin saw two armored vehiclesapproaching the square. They were al-most in one line, in places shieldingtheir vehicles behind house walls.There was deep thought shown in thiscombat formation. The Germans cor-rectly figured that our tank could si-multaneously knock out both targetswith a single shot. An intact Panthermanaged to detect and hit an Emchabefore the Sherman’s crew was able toreload their main gun. In this singlemethod, the enemy tank commandersdemonstrated that they were not nov-ices on the battlefield. Drozdovskiy ac-cepted the enemy’s challenge, andturned out to be more clever than theGermans. The first antitank roundstruck the right flank Panther on its lefttrack. The intact right track drove thistank to the left, pressing the adjacenttank into a wall. Both enemy tanksfroze in place. At the same instant, asmokepot flew from the turret ofDrozdovskiy’s tank. The thick cloud ofsmoke filled the square and street, de-priving the Germans of any possibilityof conducting aimed fire. Konstantinagain changed his position. When thewhitish shroud of smoke dissipatedsomewhat, the guards spotted a back-ward-moving Panther. A precision-firedantitank round forced it to stop in themiddle of the street.

My command observation post was inthe opera house. My reserve, the SAU-l52 battery, was nearby. Radio reportswere coming in from the company

commanders. I was monitoring theconversations of platoon leaders withtheir subordinates, describing the axisof the enemy’s main attack from a po-sition north of Ratush’ and the Univer-sity to Belvedere Palace. The enemy’sintentions were manifestly obvious: todivide our detachment’s combat forma-tion into two parts, press the larger(eastern) portion toward the Danubecanal, and destroy it.

As a result of an almost forty-minutefight, the attacking tanks and infantrywere halted at the approaches to thecentral square, three Panthers were de-stroyed, and we lost two Shermans.Not less than fifty enemy subma-chinegunners were killed or wounded.Our method of combating tanks —“hunting with Borzois” — that we hadtested in past battles, was not used inbeating off the Germans’ attack. Al-though I reminded everyone about itbefore the battle, I did not require itsemployment during our first encounterwith the enemy. Drozdovskiy made oneunsuccessful attempt, from out of anarrow alley. Not one Panther pre-sented its flank to him, therefore he didnot engage them. The damaged track ofa heavy tank can be repaired in a shorttime. Meanwhile, this “armored pill-box” is capable of conducting powerfulfire with its long-range gun. The en-emy, gathering up his forces, couldonce again launch his attack with thesupport of the immobilized Panther.

I had to turn the developing situationin our favor. And the quicker, the betterfor our subsequent presence in Vienna.Our self-propelled guns were an effec-tive means at my disposal. I discusseda plan of action with Senior LieutenantYakov Petrukhin, the battery com-mander of the big SAUs. We agreed onthe following: The self-propelled guns,employing the long range and fire-power of their 152-mm guns, wouldstrike first at the mobile Panthers. Theirsecond priority was to fire on vehiclesthat had already been hit. This methodwould minimize the expenditure of am-munition. We faced many hours ofcombat before the arrival of our owntroops. The battery commander wouldpay special attention to the conceal-ment of the movement of his self-pro-pelled guns into firing positions. TheSherman crews would try at this timeto distract the attention of the enemy


tankers, conducting fire in order toblind them.

Yakov Petrukhin reported that he hadselected two very suitable firing posi-tions: they had good cover in front todefend the hull of his vehicles from en-emy armor-piercing shells.

The firing intensity increased fromour side along the entire eastern line.The Emchisti were attempting to solvetwo problems at once: to prevent theGermans from spilling out onto thecentral square by blocking them up inthe surrounding streets, and to coverthe movement of the self-propelledguns to firing positions.

How slowly time passes when oneawaits the decisive moments in a fightwith the enemy. There was no doubt —the turning point was near. The long-awaited time had arrived. Two thunder-ing shots assaulted our eardrums, blow-ing the glass out of the windows ofnearby houses, and rattling other win-dows some distance away. “Pardon us,beautiful city, that we cause you totremble, and at times, we destroy partsof you! The laws of war are ruthless!” Iwanted to cry out loudly, seeing the de-struction we were causing.

The “second Viennese spectacle”turned out to be no less impressive.The strike of a large-caliber projectile(Yakov had ordered a concrete-break-ing round loaded, for greater effect)knocked the turret off one of the Pan-thers that had already almost crawledinto the square. The second heavy tankblazed up in an enormous fire. TheSAU-152 immediately abandoned itsposition. It was as if they had pouredboiling water on the enemy. The awk-ward armored vehicles hurriedly beganto withdraw rearward. The enemy in-fantry, now lacking tank support, ranaway through courtyards and alleys.And so, the enemy’s first attempt to di-vide the raiding detachment suffereddefeat. The Shermans and paratroopersstubbornly held the center of Vienna. Ireported the battalion’s situation to thebrigade commander. He informed methat corps units were conducting a suc-cessful attack on the southern ap-proaches to the Austrian capital.

Dinner in Vienna

The detachment’s personnel had noteaten hot food in more than a day.They were eating dry rations. If mymemory serves me correctly, in the

center of Vienna was a restaurant thatwent by the name “Astoria.” I decidedto order dinner for 180 people at thisestablishment. I delegated the battalionchief of staff, Guards Senior LieutenantNikolay Bogdanov (who spoke Ger-man fluently) to reach an agreementwith the restaurant owner. The desiredmeal time was 1200 (Moscow time).We had foreign currency — dollars,pounds sterling, and shillings — to payfor the dinner. There was no doubt thatthe enemy’s morning attempt to attackour positions would not be his last.Taking advantage of the coming lull, Iheaded for the area of the art historymuseum with a group of officers. Itwas possible that the Germans wouldagain throw themselves at us from theOttakring or Funfhaus sectors. We hadto inspect the organization of the de-fenses on the approach to the museum,and make some adjustments to the sys-tem of fire based on the experience ofthe enemy attack we had just defeated.I repositioned the SAU-152 battery toan area south of the Parliament.

After conducting the necessary workwith the units, I decided to take a quickglance at the museum, to see its dis-plays. We entered the building, andwere stunned. The halls were com-pletely empty of paintings or sculp-tures. The walls showed only varioussized dark rectangular and ovalpatches, signs that canvasses hung hereat one time. During the war years, eachof us had seen the fascists’ crimes morethan once. And here was their latestcrime: the theft of the artworks and his-torical artifacts of the state property ofAustria.

Passing through the labyrinth of largeand small halls, we found ourselves ina cellar area. Immense joy flooded overus: here were stacked hundreds of lat-ticed, reinforced crates. As it becameclear, these crates contained the mu-seum’s displays — paintings, sculp-tures, and so on. It was obvious to eve-ryone that the Germans were preparingto ship them. The hurried entrance ofour raiding detachment into Vienna haddisrupted the enemy’s plans. Thesepriceless treasures had not disappeared!

I returned to my command observa-tion post in the left wing of the Parlia-ment. Nikolay Bogdanov and the res-taurant owner were waiting there. TheAustrian wanted to confirm one impor-tant detail of the upcoming meal. Whatkind of alcoholic beverages should beserved? I thought about it for severalseconds. This was not a minor issue.

So I decided to allow the Emchisti andthe paratroopers to drink a limitedamount. They had earned it. “And whatdoes the proprietor of the Astoriahave?” I asked Bogdanov. “Cognac.” Icalculated that the troops had gonemore than a day without sleep or rest.How strong a “potion” would not harmour mission? “And what else does hehave, besides cognac?” “French cham-pagne!” The restaurateur raised thethumb of his right hand and pro-nounced, “Gut!”

Who would have believed it! Where,and when, would we dirty-coveralledtankers get a chance to drink such“nectar”! I ordered champagne for thetables, one bottle for every two men.“Does the manager have an adequatesupply?” I turned to Bogdanov.

The Austrian made a mental calcula-tion and replied affirmatively, “Ninety


bottles is nothing!” We agreed on thisquantity.

Thirty minutes before the appointedmeal hour, the restaurant owner invitedthe battalion command to the coveredtables. The table appointments were be-yond criticism: snow-white table lin-ens, nickel-plated utensils, and beauti-ful porcelain ware. In sum, everythingwas high class. Without a word fromus, the owner and the chef walkedaround all the tables and sampled eachprepared dish. This in itself guaranteedthe quality of the meal.

The command went out to all theunits: leave half the crews and para-troopers in the positions, and the re-mainder come to the Astoria for dinner!Thirty minutes was allocated for themeal, followed by a changeover of thepersonnel. Departure from and return tothe positions were to be conducted with

the strictest observation of securitymeasures.

The tankers, artillerymen, and para-troopers liked dinner. Yes! This wastheir first such feast along their war-time roads (for some, thousands ofkilometers). No doubt, they would re-member it for the rest of their lives.

My deputies, chiefs of services, and I(seven persons altogether) began to dis-cuss how much money to pay for thisfare, and with what currency. I willopenly admit that we all were totalnovices in these matters. We made a“Solomonic” decision, to let the restau-rateur himself present us with a bill forthe meal and specify the currency ofpayment.

The battalion chief of finance servicesplaced three stacks of currency on thetable: dollars, pounds sterling, and Aus-trian shillings. We called over the

owner of the Astoria. Nikolay Bog-danov explained what was required ofhim. He hesitated a bit with his answer,and then expressed a preference for“greenbacks.” He named a sum. I tookthe stack of dollars, the bank seal stillaffixed, and, saying “Bitte!” handed itto the Austrian.

With a slight tilt of his head, he ac-cepted the money and immediately se-creted it in the inside pocket of hisjacket. After several seconds, he pulledthe money out of that location and hur-riedly thrust it into his pants pocket,not releasing it from his hand. Withsome trepidation in his eyes, he threw ahurried glance in our direction. The pu-pils of his eyes (I wasn’t the only onewho noticed) were greatly enlarged.What was bothering him? Unfortu-nately, we never found out. My tankcommander, Guards Lieutenant IvanFilin, came running in and exclaimed,


“The Germans are attacking again!”We flew out from behind the table likethe wind. Everyone hurried to his com-bat post.

We defeated this German attack, fromthe Funfhaus area in the direction ofthe art history museum and the operahouse, easily and quickly. Having lostone tank and perhaps thirty soldiersand officers, the enemy withdrew to hisstarting positions. We had six woundedand two killed.

By the evening of 10 April, attackingunits of 9th Guards Mechanized Corpsbroke through toward the center of Vi-enna through Meydling. The Shermansfilled the streets and lanes of the Aus-trian capital. Our raiding detachmenthad accomplished its difficult combatmission! The battalion had fought inthe enemy’s rear, separated from thebrigade and corps main bodies fortwenty-four hours. The enemy had lostfour tanks, two antitank guns, and ap-proximately 100 soldiers and officers.Our ranks were also depleted: four Em-chas were destroyed, ten men werekilled, and fifteen were wounded. Inthese most difficult conditions, the de-tachment’s soldiers and commandersdisplayed exceptional endurance, cour-age, and determination. They had mas-tered their experience of combat in alarge city.

All the enlisted personnel of 1st TankBattalion, 46th Guards Brigade, theparatroopers, and the artillerymen wererecommended for decorations. Later, Iwas awarded the esteemed rank ofHero of the Soviet Union.

On 13 April 1945, after stubbornstreet battles, our forces took full con-trol of the city. Vienna. Many of ourtroops were awarded the medal “Forthe Capture of Vienna.”

***The first anniversary of Victory Day

was being celebrated in our unit on 9May 1946. At a ceremonial dinner onthe occasion of this holiday, one of theofficers said, “Hey, this is not even halfthe dinner we had in Vienna!” Thosecommanders who understood what hewas talking about began to laugh.“What did you expect?”

I immediately questioned the chief offinance, “How much did we pay theowner of the Astoria for our meal?”

“Comrade commander, do you re-member the denomination of the billsin that packet of money?” “I think theywere $100 bills.” “Yes. And there were

fifty of them.” “Damn!” “We paid thathospitable Viennese $5,000 for thatdinner.”

That’s what we thought at the time.Sometime not too long ago, I had aconversation with one of our Russianembassy officials. I told him aboutthose long-ago April days of 1945. Andabout the dinner in Vienna, and our set-tlement with the restaurateur. He cor-rected me. “There were not 50, but 100$100 bills in that packet. This was thetraditional bank packet!” This is whythe Austrian’s eyes got so big. It turnsout that we, simple Russian soldiers,paid him generously! Probably no onehad ever settled their bill so lavishly inthis restaurant. So much so, that it lefthim speechless.

East to MongoliaThe formations of 6th Guards Tank

Army completed their rail journey fromCzechoslovakia to Mongolia at the endof June 1945. 9th Guards MechanizedCorps detrained at Choybolsan station.Its 46th Tank Brigade was concentratedfifteen kilometers northeast of the city.The army’s forces had arrived in theFar East without combat vehicles ortransport. They were to receive thisequipment in their new operationalarea. Units were at full strength in tankcrews, gun and mortar crews, and truckdrivers. The headquarters of all troopformations were fully manned with en-listed personnel and had a sufficientnumber of buses. This permitted themto be included immediately in the enor-mous effort to prepare the forces forthe upcoming combat activities.

The Mongolian steppe was as flat asa table top, all the way to the horizon.Abundant rains had recently fallen. Thesun’s rays had not yet burned the tallgreen grasses. Everywhere one lookedwere large herds of sheep. Cattle herd-ers migrated here from the southeasternregions of the country.

For us “westerners,” everything was amarvel: unbearably hot days and some-what cool nights. We became ac-quainted with the charms of the sharplycontinental climate during our firstdays in Mongolia. Added to this wasthe absence of roads and clearly visiblelandmarks.

The brigade’s units were prepared forbattle from the moment they receivedtheir equipment. The Shermans werefully manned by crews battle-tested inthe West. These were soldiers, ser-geants, and officers who knew how to

“drive with the wind and cut down theenemy with precision fire.”

All around us was the vast “sea” ofthe steppe, covered with thick grass.There was nothing on it to catch a per-son’s glance. The only salvation insuch a boundless landscape was theability to move on an azimuth. Dayand night. For great distances. Without“His Majesty the Azimuth,” one couldnot move a step in these regions! Wehad some semblance of “western” ex-perience in moving by azimuth withthe aid of the tank gyrocompass thatwas mounted on each Sherman. Wewere required to sharpen our pre-viously acquired skills and adapt themto new and unusual conditions. Crewtraining was divided into two phases:the first was movement on an azimuthon a “dismounted tank;” the secondwas practice in this same task, butmounted on the vehicles. We plannedparallel exercises on the design andfunction of the gyrocompass and howto use it.

Before their departure to start posi-tions, the Soviet and Mongolian forceswere concentrated principally in thenorthern part of the Mongolian Peo-ple’s Republic. Formations of 6thGuards Tank Army were positionedwest, south, and southeast of the cityChoybolsan, not far from the KerulenRiver. In these areas were a small num-ber of nomadic herders with all sorts ofherbivorous small and large livestock.The staff officers joked, “There werenever such densities of tanks, guns, cat-tle, sheep, and horses before a singleoperation in the West!”

We “westerners” understood that this“Mongolian phenomenon” was possi-bly due to several factors. The recentvictory over Fascist Germany had radi-cally changed the world situation. Thefate of Japan — the Third Reich’s lastally — had been sealed. The removalof the Mongolian peasant herders fromareas of succulent grasses would causesignificant damage to the Mongoliancivilian economy. The grass in thewestern and southern areas of thecountry had all been consumed, andwhat remained had been dried out bythe merciless hot sun.

Thus, we, tankers and herdsman,lived as good neighbors until the begin-ning of the August offensive.

At the same time, an order arrived onthe conduct of a march and the occupa-tion of a start position for the offensivein the area of Tamtsag-Bulag. The 9th


Guards Mechanized Corps commander,General-Lieutenant Mikhail Volkov,planned for the wheeled vehicles tocomplete the movement in two legs,and the tanks in three. To avoid over-heating the engines of the tracked vehi-cles, units were to move mainly atnight. During the day, the troops restedand conducted maintenance.

For brigade and battalion command-ers, crews, and engineer-maintenancepersonnel, the forced march to the bor-der became its own form of “dress re-hearsal” for the upcoming operation.Experience was gained in movement inextremely dusty conditions and in rap-idly servicing vehicles at nighttimehalts. The chiefs of the engineering-maintenance services came to the con-clusion that in the desert and steppeterrain, the Shermans required replace-ment of track shoes every 300 to 400kilometers, and complete rebuild of thetrack with replacement, for example, ofone-third of its track shoes every 500to 600 kilometers. The necessity ofmore frequent and careful checks of thelubrication, charging, cooling, and es-pecially air filtration systems was em-phasized.

By the morning of 8 August, forces of6th Guards Tank Army were occupyingtheir forward assembly areas for the of-fensive. We did not realize that onlytwenty-four hours remained until thestart of combat activities.

On the Eve

The Manchurian strategic offensiveoperation (8 August to 2 September1945) was one of the largest operationsin the concluding stage of World WarII. It is unequaled in a number of op-erational norms and characteristics. Thecombat actions were projected to un-fold on the broadest scale: troops occu-pied start positions along a 5,000-kilo-meter line; the forces of three frontswere concentrated in a zone of 280 to300 kilometers, which comprised 7percent of the front as a whole.

The concept of the conduct of the op-eration against Japan envisioned forcesof the Transbaikal First and Second FarEast Fronts executing a rapid penetra-tion into the heart of Manchuria onthree strategic axes. The main attackswere planned to be launched from theterritory of the Mongolian People’s Re-public to the east and from the area ofthe Soviet Primorya [that portion of theUSSR bordering Manchuria on theeast, basically south of Khabarovsk] to

the west. These two meet-ing attacks were separatedone from the other (meas-ured along the internationalboundary) by a distance ofnot less than 2500 kilometers. Theforces had to capture important mili-tary-political and economic objectivesin central Manchuria — Mukden,Chan’chun, Harbin, and Gerin — asrapidly as possible. This was to be ac-complished by the division of theKwantung Army’s main forces into iso-lated pieces, with their subsequent en-circlement and destruction in northernand central Manchuria. Transbaikal andFirst Far East Fronts were given a lead-ing role in the operation. Forces of theSecond Far East Front were launchinga supporting attack from theBlagoveshchensk area in the generaldirection of Harbin. They were to assistin breaking up the enemy grouping anddestroying it in detail. The three frontshad a total of eleven combined arms,one tank, and three air armies, and anoperational group. These formations in-cluded eighty divisions (of these, sixcavalry, two tank, and two motorizedrifle), four tank and mechanized corps,six rifle and thirty separate brigades,and the garrisons of fortified regions[primarily artillery and machine gununits]. Of the 63 tank and mechanizedformations deployed in the three fronts,29 — more than 16 percent — were inthe Transbaikal Front. This was on theaxis of the most complex natural con-ditions, which the Japanese commandconsidered insurmountable and unsuit-able for use by large masses of forcesand combat equipment.

Altogether, 1,566,725 personnel;26,137 guns and mortars; 5,556 tanksand SAUs [self-propelled guns]; andmore than 3,800 combat aircraft wereconcentrated in the Far Eastern group-ing of Soviet forces. The overall supe-riority over the enemy was 1.2:1 introops, 4.8:1 in tanks and artillery, and3.6:1 in aircraft. On the axis of themain attacks, the Soviet commandsought to create a decisive superiorityin forces and means. Thus, on theTransbaikal Front, the correlation ofSoviet forces to Japanese forces was1.7:1 in infantry, 8.6:1 in guns andmortars, and 5:1 in tanks and SAUs.

Let’s take the Berlin strategic offen-sive operation (26 April to 8 May1945) for comparison. It was also con-ducted by the forces of three fronts.Sixteen combined arms and four tankarmies, nine tank and mechanized andfour cavalry corps, and four air armies

were allocated for the breakthrough ofthe enemy defenses. A total of 2.5 mil-lion men participated in this concludingoperation for the defeat of Fascist Ger-many. 41,600 guns and mortars; 6,250tanks and SAUs; 7,650 aircraft, and aportion of the forces of Baltic Fleet andDnepr Flotilla were employed. And allthese forces and means were deployed,in contrast to the Manchurian opera-tion, on a continuous front in a zone ofnot more than 300 kilometers.

On the Central Manchurian Plain

Dropping down out of the mountains,the tankers rejoiced that they finallyhad broken loose from the “mouth ofthe dragon.” They could see farther andbreathe easier on the plain. As we laterlearned, our joy was somewhat prema-ture. Our difficulties were not yet over.In comparison with our previous trials,they were twice or even three timesworse. In other words, the severe test-ing of the Shermans and the verifyingof their crews’ endurance and couragewould continue. On the first day of ourmovement toward Tunlyao, the soldiersexpressed their attitude toward the de-veloping situation with the words:“You are a broad valley, but we hateyou!”

During the course of the march, eachkilometer cost us immense effort, andtwice the norm of fuel. The rainsstopped briefly, permitting us to admirethe limitless crops of succulent grasses,then again pelted our faces with tor-rents of water. The road surface be-came a thick porridge-like mash. Inplaces, the tanks created a muddy bowwave ahead of them. We had to takethe l60-kilometer distance to Tunlyao“by storm” over the course of morethan two days. No consideration wasgiven to maneuvering around difficultsectors of the route or increasing speed.For “everywhere one looked, it wasswampy fields and, on the road, a me-ter of fermenting mud!” The Emchas’motors were stressed to the limit. Theywithstood the enormous strain well; notone broke down. Having crossed theSilyaokhe River by bridge, the bri-gade’s units drew up to the westernoutskirts of Tunlyao on the morning of19 August. This was the second largecity on our route. It became, in its own


right, the jumping off point for an un-usual and most difficult march.

Something unbelievable happenedhere. The roads leading from Tunlyaoto the southeast were unsuitable evenfor the movement of tanks. The severaldays of pouring rain had turned thebroad central Manchurian plain into akind of artificial lake. In this criticalsituation, when each hour was pre-cious, a uniquely practicable decisionwas made — to cross this submergedterrain on the narrow embankment ofthe railroad bed, from Tunlyao toChzhan"u and beyond to Mukden. Thetotal length of this “cross-tie road” wasapproximately 250 kilometers.

I remember that day well. When thechain of command’s decision was an-nounced, several of us veteran officerswere somewhat alarmed. We under-stood too well that such a risky stepwas not taken on a whim. Two corps(5th Tank and 9th Mechanized) wouldbe moving along a single slenderthread. “He who has not fought in wardoes not know what risk is!” This istrue. We wondered: How many “hid-den boulders” were on this lifesaving,and dangerous, route.

It would be twice as difficult for thearmy’s second echelon units, that is tosay, for us, the “inomarochniki” [for-eign-vehicle tankers], to move alongthe fairly well broken up railroad em-bankment. We had no doubts about thiswhatsoever. The rugged track system ofthe 32-ton T-34 had left the embank-ment in just such a condition. TheSherman was four tons heavier than theSoviet tank. This had to be taken intoaccount.

The brigade’s tanks drove up onto therailroad embankment south of Tunlyao.We began the march across the railroadcross ties. This continued for two days.All sorts of things occurred along thisroute. From the first meters, we felt the“charm” of the sole dry strip of ground.The ends of the ties were heavily splin-tered. Deep gouges remained from thetracks of 5th Tank Corps’ T-34 tanks.The T-34, with a somewhat narrowertrack block than a Sherman (500 versus584 millimeters), moved with the railsbetween its tracks. The Emchas werenot able to do this. We had to drivewith one track between the rails, andthe other on the gravel ballast of theties. In doing this, the tank leaned sig-nificantly to the side. We had to movemore than 100 kilometers in this “lop-sided” attitude. In addition, the vehiclesvibrated on the ties, like they were in

convulsions. It was especially difficultwhen we encountered bridges. We hadto go around them. In order to do so,we had to prepare dismounting andmounting points to get down off of andback onto the embankment. And all ofthis with the efforts of our crews anddesantniki. True, we had all the bri-gade’s units.

At 1700 on 19 August, my 1st Battal-ion — the lead unit in the column —reached Bakhuta siding. Here stoodone modest brick building. The rainhad stopped a short time earlier. TheEmchisti and tankodesantniki were re-moving their wet clothing. As before,the water was all around us. An un-usual engagement occurred at this pointalong our route of march.

Observers loudly shouted out: “Air!”The gun commanders in the crewsrushed to their covered antiaircraft ma-chine guns. For several days now, wehad protected them from the heavy pre-cipitation. During the brief interludesbetween rains, they remained in thetravel position. Prior to this, enemy air-craft had never bothered us. Now, sixspots had appeared on the horizon,fighter bombers hurriedly approachingfrom the south. Our “westerners” hadmastered well the tactics of German pi-lots. Before they dropped their bombs,they circled over the target. They se-lected the aiming point, and only afterthis, the leader turned his aircraft into adive. But here, everything unfolded ac-cording to a different scenario. Eventsdeveloped so rapidly that we did noteven have time to bring our machineguns into action. How did this unusualJapanese attack conclude?

The first aircraft raced toward the bat-talion’s lead tank at low altitude. Andat full speed, it plowed into the tank’shull. Pieces of the fuselage flew off inall directions. The airplane’s engineburied itself under the tank’s tracks.Tongues of flame licked around theSherman’s hull. The driver-mechanic,Guards Sergeant Nikolay Zuev, re-ceived numerous cuts and bruises.

The desantniki from the first threetanks ran into the brick building in or-der to seek cover. The second Japanesepilot guided his aircraft into this struc-ture. Crashing through the roof, itlodged itself in the attic. None of oursoldiers were injured. It immediatelybecame clear: kamikaze were attackingour battalion.

The third pilot did not repeat the mis-take of his comrades. He dropped

sharply toward the ground and flew hisaircraft toward a window of the build-ing. He also was unable to reach histarget. His wing caught a telegraphpole, and the fighter bomber crashedinto the ground. It quickly burst intoflames.

The fourth aircraft dived on the col-umn. It crashed into a truck belongingto the battalion aid station, setting it onfire. The last two kamikaze directedtheir attack at the column’s trailingtanks, and were met by a dense curtainof antiaircraft fire. Struck by machinegun bursts, both aircraft crashed intothe water not far from the railroad em-bankment. The air attack had lastedseveral brief moments. Six fighterbombers were turned into shapelessheaps of metal, with six dead pilots.What really surprised us, however,were the female corpses in the cockpitsof two of the aircraft. In all likelihood,these were fiancees of the kamikaze pi-lots, who had decided to share the dis-mal fate of their selected ones. Ourlosses were insignificant: one truckburned, a gouged turret on the leadSherman, and one driver-mechanic dis-abled. We quickly pushed the truck offinto the water, sat the assistant driver-mechanic behind the controls of thetank, and continued the march

By the middle of the day, the bri-gade’s units had reached Chzhan"u.Here, to the great joy of the tankersand desantniki, we abandoned the rail-way and drove along the concrete. Weimmediately increased our speed to themaximum — just under fifty kilome-ters per hour. Even the “lame” tanksdid not fall behind. Ninety minuteslater, the column was once again forcedto straddle the hated railroad tracks. Itwas sixty “vibrating” kilometers toMukden.

The tankers had experienced much onthe long journey from the forward as-sembly area: they scorched in the heat,bogged down in the desert sands,forced a track through the mountains(every minute risking a rollover), atedust for several consecutive days, andwashed it down with torrents of rain. Itwould seem that everyone had beendriven to the brink. But no! A newproblem arose — another obstacle. Wehad to cross the Lyaokhe River on arailroad bridge. This would be no sim-ple matter. The “listing” Shermans didnot fit between the [low] sides of thebridge structure. We had to “stream-line” the vehicle. I thought about it,and the company commanders and bat-


talion staff sought a solution. We dis-cussed various ideas. The best of thesewas to load the Emchas on platformcars and move them to the oppositebank.

We had to find platform cars, evenjust two or three. And a steam engine.We created two groups of scouts to goout and find the necessary equipment.One group was sent back to the stationwe had recently passed through, thesecond to the next station ahead. Afterabout an hour, discomforting newsreached us. Platform cars of only six-teen tons capacity had been found, butno locomotives.

There was one way out: we had topush these loaded platform cars acrossthe bridge by hand. A herculean task,for sure. We constructed a loading plat-form out of various makeshift materi-als, and maneuvered a single tank ontotwo platform cars. A team of twentymen was assigned to each platform.Their strength was sufficient to push,and to hold the valuable “cargo” ongrades. The first shuttle was successful,but it took almost four hours. The axleboxes smoked from the inordinateoverloading. We took various meas-ures, such as pouring diesel fuel and oilon the bearings. And again we putthem under the load.

The sweat poured off of our arms.Our hands bled from pushing and drag-ging all the Shermans to the oppositebank of the Lyaokhe River. Webreathed a sigh of relief, then movedoff toward Mukden. On the morning of21 August, we reached its northwesternoutskirts. The order came down to haltin the city.

Mukden How long would we be in Mukden?

At the time we still did not know thatthis was the final stop on the offensiveadvance by units of 9th Guards Mecha-nized Corps. 5th Guards Tank Corpscontinued to advance to Port Arthurand Dal’nya.

When the battalion had been in Muk-den for about two hours, we werealerted. We received the mission to dis-arm a Japanese tank unit in a nearbysector of the city. The five-kilometerroadmarch required little time. Wereached the objective: a military garri-son of a Japanese tank brigade. We en-circled it with our Shermans, theirmain guns and machine guns loaded.We were ordered to open fire on thegarrison at the slightest sign of resis-tance.

The Japanese officer — acaptain, with anger in hisvoice, reported to me in per-fect Russian that they hadreceived an order from theirown command to surrender their arms.“What procedure do you wish us tofollow?” he asked me.

We gave the following instructions tothe Japanese officer: to surrender allsmall arms; where to drive and parkthe tanks and other combat vehicles;and where, after this had been accom-plished, to assemble all the soldiers.Bogdanov also drew him a sketch indi-cating the locations of these points. TheJapanese captain indicated his under-standing of the instructions and re-turned to his unit. We worriedly waitedthe fulfillment of our requirements.Brigade and corps staff officers arrivedto observe the activity, and I briefedthem on the situation.

About an hour passed in waiting. Asbefore, all was quiet in the compound.The emchisti were ready for anything.Suddenly, it was if the Japanese werepreparing for their last engagement. In-side the compound we heard the racingof tank engines. A light truck quicklyappeared in the gates. Behind it fol-lowed several staff buses, and then thetanks. It was a brigade column. Thelead tank came up to my Sherman andstopped. I was handed the TOE [tableof organization and equipment] for thebrigade, in Russian. This was a greatsurprise to us. It was clearly the workof the captain-negotiator.

The commanding officers of the unitswere the first to lay down their weap-ons. They immediately were seated intwo light vehicles and taken to corpsheadquarters under guard.

For almost the remainder of the daywe accepted the capitulation of theJapanese tankers. Fairness requires meto note that even in this difficult, dis-graceful period, the officers, noncom-missioned officers, and soldiers carriedout every instruction regarding surren-der of their weapons and equipment.Military discipline was maintained tothe last fateful moment, when all of themore than 1,000 assigned soldiers ofthe brigade became prisoners of war.The final command was issued in Japa-nese and the former tankers, underheavy guard, marched off into Mukden,to a prisoner-of-war collection point.

I turned to the captain who had nego-tiated for the Japanese command with aquestion. “Captain, where did you learn

Russian so well?” Standing quietly fora moment, he replied, with some asser-tiveness in his voice, “It was my duty.”

“Captain, how did you intend to fightagainst Soviet T-34s and AmericanShermans with such tanks as these?” Iasked the Japanese captain-parliamen-tarian. Not concealing his enormoushatred toward us, the Japanese officerresponded, “Captain, had there been aconfrontation, had we seen your fivethousand tanks, we would have foundtwelve thousand soldiers willing to sac-rifice themselves.”

The Japanese forces moved rapidlytoward their fate. Garrison after garri-son, position upon position laid downtheir arms. The Kwantung Army, likesnow before the sun, melted away bythe day, by the hour.

Notes1“Emcha” is a Russian nickname, a shorten-

ing of “M4.” - Editor2Tankodesantniki: a Russian term for accom-

panying infantry who rode on the tank’s hull.3Chernozem: the blacksoil typical of the

Ukraine.

This article adopted with permission fromCommanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks,by Dmitriy Loza, translated and edited byJames F. Gebhardt, to be published in Decem-ber. © by the University of Nebraska Press.


Major James F. Gebhardt(Ret.) is a former Armor officerand Soviet Foreign Area Officer.Prior to retirement in 1992, hewas the author of LeavenworthPapers No. 17, a study of So-viet Arctic combat. He now op-erates Russian Military Transla-tions in Leavenworth, Kan.,which has produced several re-cent translations of Soviet mili-tary memoirs, with three due tobe published this fall. He hasalso translated Soviet smallarms instruction booklets on theMakarov pistol, recently publish-ed, and several others in pro-duction.

by Captain Christopher Boyle

Framework

Equipped with a large tactical com-mand post, the 3d ACR decided to ex-periment with a smaller, more deploy-able regimental TAC. The old andcumbersome TAC consisted of threeM577s (S3, S2, and engineer); threeM113s (S3, FSCOORD, engineer bat-talion commander); two commandBradleys; and five HMMMVs. Thisconfiguration was too large and too dif-ficult to set up and break down; thecommander wanted a command postthat could displace quickly, retain theability to track current operations, pro-vide a limited planning area, and be airdeployable in support of the regiment’srapid deployment mission. The newconcept, based on a model once usedby the 11th ACR in Germany, elimi-nated the S3 and S2 M577s and re-placed them with a 5-ton expandablevan. Because a van was not available,the regiment used a modified M109van.

Equipment

The regiment modified a standardM109 shop van to meet the regimentalcommander’s command and controlneeds. The modifications were focusedon three areas: the communications ar-chitecture, the continuous operationssuitability, and the battle tracking sys-

tem. The communications structure inthe M109 had to provide redundant,long range voice and data links tohigher and subordinate headquarters.Our challenge was to maintain commu-nications with the corps commander atpotentially great distances while retain-ing communications with the regimen-tal combat team. To accomplish thesetasks, the regiment installed fourSINCGARS radios used primarily forthe regimental command and O/I netsand the corps command and O/I nets.The M109 van was equipped withwhip antennae for the FM radios;therefore, the RTAC required no timeto establish communications. The TACpersonnel assembled OE-254s to in-crease the range of the FM radios whentime permitted.

The regiment enhanced the TAC’scommunications capability by provid-ing an MST-20 Single Channel TacticalSatellite (TACSAT) with an omni-di-rectional antenna; this system estab-lished the communications link be-tween the regimental commander andthe corps commander. The regiment ef-fected a voice and data link using aMulti-Subscriber Radio-Telephone(MSRT) equipped with a Crypteks se-cure fax. This equipment allowed thecommand group to pass informationquickly and securely to the squadronsand to the corps. To pass selected, non-secure information, the regimentequipped the TAC with a 3W cellularphone. Although cellular phones wereused rarely in tactical environments,

they provided another reliable form ofcommunications at the regimental com-mander’s disposal. The redundancy ofthe TACSAT, MSRT, Crypteks fax,four SINCGARS radios, and cellularphone ensured that a continuous com-munications link between regimentalcommander and the corps and squad-ron commanders remained intact.

The TAC used trailer-mounted, twin3kw generators to furnish power to theM109 van. Twin generators providedcontinuous power and allowed thecrew to service one generator while theother was in operation. With both gen-erators mounted on a single trailer, theM109 van pulled its own power gen-eration source. At least one generatorwas always operational; however, theM109 could operate for a limited timeusing the vehicle batteries. The twogenerators and the M109’s batteryguaranteed that the TAC always hadpower to operate.

Besides the considerable communica-tions ability, the commander requiredan all-weather, day/night environmentconducive to command and control ofthe regiment. The van’s hard shell of-fered protection from the elements anda dry, comfortable work area. To con-trol the climate inside the TAC, the vanwas fitted with a 3,000 BTU heater and3,000 BTU air conditioner. With a con-trolled environment, the TAC couldconduct 24 hour operations while pro-viding necessary environmental controlto the communications equipment. The


The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’sTactical Command Post:An Alternative Command and Control Facility

regiment mounted two fluorescentlights from a Modular Command PostSystem tent which proved to be signifi-cantly cooler inside the M109 than thestandard lights built into the shelter. Toensure light discipline, we constructeda custom-fitted boot to fit over the exitof the truck entrance to the tent. Theboot prevented light from escaping andprovided more room to operate whentemporarily halted. The additionalspace allowed the regimental com-mander to plan and conduct rehearsalsin limited visibility conditions forwardon the battlefield.

With an all-weather environment andan effective communications platform,the next concern was the battle-track-ing system. The TAC crews used twomap boards: a current operations mapconsisting of friendly and confirmedenemy locations, and an intelligencemap, consisting of templated enemy lo-

cations and likely courses of actions.The consolidation of enemy andfriendly locations on one map providedthe regimental commander with atimely picture of the regiment’s battlespace. To assist the commander inmaking decisions based on the currentsituation, the TAC maintained combatpower charts down to the troop level.Each of the regiment’s combat systemswas included on these charts. With thissystem in place, the TAC could providethe commander, the TOC, or the corpsheadquarters with the friendly and en-emy situations and the current combatstatus of the regiment.

The equipment was the infrastructureof the TAC. With an unfailing commu-nications architecture, a secure, com-fortable work area, and a simple battletracking system, the TAC was success-ful in assisting the regimental com-mander in fighting the regiment.

Personnel

The next challenge was to tailor theTAC personnel manning to accomplishthe mission both inside and outside thevehicle. The main constraint of theTAC was the limited space inside thevan; only five personnel could effec-tively work inside. To remain effective,the TAC required a staff tracking en-emy and friendly operations and acommand and control element to su-pervise the security and operations out-side the TAC. To accomplish thesetasks, the regiment utilized the soldiersat the TAC as shown in Table 1.

The crews that operated inside theTAC aided the commander by provid-ing him with a clear picture of thefriendly and enemy situation. A normalshift at the TAC consisted of an S3 bat-tle captain, an S2 battle captain, and ashift NCOIC. During battles or otherpeak times during the operation, twoS3 battle captains surged to enhancebattle tracking and command and con-trol of the regiment. Maintaining S2and S3 battle captains in the TAC al-lowed outstanding situational aware-ness. The S2 battle captain maintaineda situation template on the intelligencemap and posted known enemy loca-tions on the operations map. Enemy lo-cations transposed on the operationsmap provided the regimental com-mander a clear picture of the battlefieldand facilitated analysis of the enemy’scourses of action.

The battle captains were assisted bythe shift NCOIC who tracked and re-ported required information, i.e., com-bat power and unit locations. The shiftNCOIC also maintained the equipmentinside the TAC. He ensured that com-munication with higher and subordinateheadquarters was maintained and thatall equipment inside the van remainedcombat ready.

While the crews inside the TAC weretracking the battle, an outside crew en-sured that the TAC remained secureand provided for continuous operations.The crew outside allowed the soldiersinside to focus on their primary task,aiding the regimental commander.

To ensure success, the regiment as-signed an SFC(P) as the TAC NCOIC.He developed and supervised the secu-rity plan, supervised maintenance, and

HQ-6 HMMWV Regimental Commander COLCommander’s Driver SPC

HQ-3 HMMWV Regimental S3 MAJRS3 Driver SPC

*HQ-66 M3A2 Commander’s Gunner SSGAssistant Gunner CPLDriver PFC

*HQ-33 M3A2 RS3 Gunner SGTAssistant Gunner SGTDriver SPC

HQ-37 M109 Truck Commander (Shift NCOIC) SSGDriver PV2

HQ-36 HMMWV RTAC NCOIC SFC(P)Driver PFC

HQ-33 (Engineer) M577 S3 Engineer Battalion MAJTrack Commander SFCDriver SPCCrewmen x 3 SPC

*HQ-66 (Engineer) M113 Commander, Engineer Battalion LTCTrack Commander SSGDriver SPC

*HQ-66 (Artillery) M113 FSCOORD LTCTrack Commander SSGDriver SPC

HQ-38 M113 RS3 Battle Captain x 2 CPTRS2 Battle Captain CPTRS2 Battle Captain SFCDriver PV2Generator Mechanic PV2Shift NCOIC SFCShift NCOIC SSG

HQ-6P OH-58 Pilot CW2Crew Chief SPC

HMMWV Air Liaison Officer MAJAssistant SSGT

*During battles, the command vehicles moved forward.

Table 1


ensured that the TAC received neces-sary logistics support. With a seniorNCO operating in this capacity, thebattle captains were able to focus ontheir duties and to maintain a sleepplan.

Support

The TAC never lacked for logisticalsupport because the regimental HHT1SG ensured that we received a LOG-PAC daily, and sometimes twice a day.To facilitate the HHT commander inhis logistical planning, the TAC sub-mitted a logistics request to HHT daily.Face-to-face communications with theLOGPAC personnel, and an accurateestimate of the logistical support re-quired, expedited the process. A clearcommunications link to HHT, an NCOwho monitored the TAC logisticsstatus, and a supportive chain of com-mand set the conditions for success.

Operations

Operations inside the TAC weresimilar to those in any TAC. Normally,the regimental commander and S3fought forward from their Bradleys.Occasionally, during battles when theregiment was spread across a widefront, the S3 operated from the TACwhile the regimental commander util-ized his command console in the UH-60. The TAC provided an excellentplatform for the S3 to recommend criti-cal decisions: priorities of fire for highpayoff targets, close air support, andcommittal of the reserve. The TAC pro-vided a command and control center tocommunicate with subordinate, higher,and adjacent unit headquarters and theregimental commander. The S3 couldtrack operations effectively throughoutthe regiment’s battle space.

Security

With the regimental commander, theS3, and at least two battalion com-manders sometimes at the TAC, it be-came a high value target, and securitywas a chief concern. The majority ofthe TAC’s security was passive, al-though available weapons systemswere used to help secure its perimeter.

To prevent detection, the TAC relo-cated at least once a day. Because theTAC was extremely small, breakdowntook only 20-30 minutes, much fasterthan the Regimental Tactical Opera-

tions Center (RTOC). To decrease thetime required to displace the TAC, sol-diers kept all equipment stowed, in-cluding their personal gear. The onlytime-consuming processes remaining


HQ-33

HQ-66

M113

HMMWV

OH-58

M109

M113

M113

HMMWV

HMMWV

HMMWV

OP

Figure 1. RTAC configuration in a unsecure area with command Bradleys

M577(EN)

DISMOUNTED PATROL

M113

HMMWV

OH-58

M109

M113

M113

HMMWV

HMMWV

HMMWV

OP

Figure 2. RTAC configuration in an unsecure area with out command Bradleys

DISMOUNTED PATROL

M577(EN)

Figure 1. RTAC configuration in a unsecure area with command Bradleys

Figure 2. RTAC configuration in an unsecure area without command Bradleys

were the disassembly of the OE-254antennae and the combat rolling of thecamouflage nets. Realizing that thisequipment required the most time toassemble and disassemble, the NCOsmeticulously trained their soldiers onthese tasks. To decrease the set-up andbreakdown time, the TAC decreasedthe soldiers on security and inside thevan and utilized them to prepare fordisplacement. While the soldiers brokedown the TAC, a small quartering partydeparted to recon the new location.

While most of the TAC soldiers werebreaking down equipment, the S3 bat-tle captain not on shift would fly to thenew location using the OH-58. If theOH-58 was unavailable, the quarteringparty used a HMMWV or an M113.The OH-58 would provide early warn-ing until local security was established.Smooth quartering party operations fa-cilitated the movement of the TAC intonew vehicle positions and limited thesignature of a command post enteringthe area.

The considerations used in choosingTAC locations were simple: defendable

terrain, cover and concealment frommounted and dismounted observation,excellent communications with subor-dinate and higher headquarters, and ac-cessibility to the regimental com-mander.

The TAC, due to its small size, couldeasily hide in wadis and ravines, whichmade the TAC virtually invisible unlessthe observer was within 200-300 me-ters. The only exposed parts of theTAC were the antennae heads.

Besides passive security, the TAC es-tablished a 360-degree perimeter aroundthe M109 van. The two commandBradleys defended the most likely ave-nues of approach. The three M113s se-

cured the remainder ofthe perimeter. To pre-vent a dismounted at-tack, an OP and a pa-trol secured the dis-mounted avenues ofapproach (Figure 1).

When the commandvehicles were awayfrom the TAC, the S3M113 would defend themost likely avenues ofapproach and the pe-rimeter would be re-duced in size (Figure2). When the TAC waslocated in a securearea, the commandBradleys were placed

ramp to ramp under the SICUP (Figure3).

Deployability

The regiment deploys the TAC as theRegimental Assault Command Post. Inthis capacity, the TAC serves as the in-itial command and control node con-trolling the reception of the regiment.The TAC is deployable on a C-130 orlarger aircraft and has the organicequipment to control the regiment.

Summary

The 3d ACR TAC is a viable alterna-tive to conventional TACs. Its commu-nications platform, battle tracking abil-ity, and stealth allow it to aid the com-mander in the command and control ofthe regiment. Its personnel manningand the climate control system allowthe TAC to remain combat effectiveover long periods of time. Small andmobile, the TAC provides the 3d ACRwith the flexibility to quickly establisha command post to successfully controlregimental operations. The smallercommand post facilitates the regimentin rapid deployment operations with nodegradation in communications capa-bility.


HQ-33

HQ-66

M113

HMMWV

OH-58

M109

M113

M113HMMWV

HMMWV

HMMWV

OP

Figure 3. RTAC config uration in a secure area

DISMOUNTED PATROL

M577(EN)

Figure 3. RTAC configuration in a secure area

Captain Christopher Boyle is a1990 graduate of the U.S. Mili-tary Academy. He served as atank and scout platoon leader in3d Squadron, 2d ACR, and asa tank, support, and scout pla-toon leader in 2-37 Armor. Hewas the regimental training offi-cer in 3d ACR prior to his cur-rent assignement as com-mander, L Troop, 3d Squadron,3d ACR.

The regimental TAC and its twin 3kw generators.

The ability of the armor or mecha-nized company/team to accomplish itsmyriad of tasks during preparation forcombat is greatly enhanced by a func-tional command post (CP).

As observed during NTC rotations,the CP is often only a physical point inthe assembly area where the commandvehicles are located. Information flow,timeline management, and accuratetracking of the unit’s status during theplanning and preparation phases arelacking. That is not to say that there isno emphasis on how a CP should oper-ate, or what it should look like, butgenerally, there is not an orderly, SOP-driven approach to CP operations.

Furthermore, our doctrine does notadequately address this issue for the ar-mor or mechanized infantry com-pany/team. While it does mention thenumerous tasks that must be accom-plished during planning and prepara-tion, FM 71-1 does not include any-thing about the use of a command post.FM 71-123 states, “Companies havecommand groups rather than CP facili-ties. CP functions are normally con-ducted by the company XO from histank.” This lack of a doctrinal base,coupled with an inability to effectivelymanage information, result in a piece-meal effort by the company/team to ac-complish all of the commander’s pri-orities. This ultimately leaves criticaltasks incomplete and important infor-mation uncommunicated to subordinateleaders.

When discussing the nature of CPs athigher levels of command, FM 101-5states: “The commander also estab-lishes procedures which clearly identifythose CP activities and functions thatmust be accomplished on a routine ba-sis....” The commander has the sameresponsibility at the company/teamlevel. Therefore, it is incumbent uponthe commander to develop his owntechniques.

The following is a guide compiledfrom the suggestions of observer/con-trollers at the NTC. It is important tokeep in mind that this guide is intendedto assist company commanders in de-veloping a command post SOP for theplanning and preparation phases, whilethe unit is relatively static. While onthe move, the company/team XO per-forms the necessary CP functions, andthe first sergeant takes over when theXO becomes involved in the fighting(FM 71-123).

Company/Team Command Post

1. Purpose: To enable the company/team to effectively accomplish battlepreparation by providing a centralizedpoint for information gathering and dis-semination, coordination, time manage-ment, and tracking of unit status (Fig-ure 1).

2. Functions: The commander hasnumerous options in determining what,and who, the CP should consist of. Re-

gardless of the physical configuration,it is the function of the CP that is criti-cal. Good results are obtained when aninformation manager is designated tooperate the CP. In an armor com-pany/team, the information managershould be an NCO from the HQ pla-toon, preferably the master gunner orthe NBC NCO. Although duties pursu-ant to their primary positions will pullthem away at times, more often thannot they are available to perform as thecommander’s information managers. Ina mechanized company/team the infor-mation manager should also be anNCO from the HQ platoon, preferablythe master gunner or the commo chief.The requirement for additional person-nel in the CP can be met by rotatingsoldiers from the HQs platoon. Thesemay include available crew membersfrom the commander’s and XO’s vehi-cles, medics, FISTV crew members,and the driver of the first sergeant’sM113 in an armor company/team. Theinformation manager utilizes these per-sonnel to assist in accomplishing theCP tasks listed in Figure 2.


Company/Team Command Post:The Missing Link

by Captain Dave Thompson

Figure 1

Among its more important tasks, theCP records incoming information (intelupdates, directives from battalion, adja-cent unit coordination requirements, lo-gistical information, etc.). It also en-sures that information required by thetask force TOC is passed on time. Ad-ditionally, the CP is responsible formaintaining the commander’s timeline.That is, it verifies that subordinate ele-ments are accomplishing the com-mander’s priorities and then recordsthis information in a manner that al-lows the commander to get a quick, ac-curate status of the unit’s preparation.This prevents the commander fromhaving to individually poll each pla-toon.

It is important to note that, in orderfor the CP to be able to effectivelymanage the commander’s timeline, theplatoons must be able to update the CPat any time. Platoon leaders must pushinformation, rather than wait for aquery from the CP. In this manner, thecommander can make rapid, informeddecisions about adjusting his timeline.For example, if the platoons have ac-complished all the platoon-level prepa-ration possible, and have duly reportedthat, then it is possible for the com-pany/team to embark on some of itscollective tasks. These may includemounted drills and rehearsals. The re-sult is that time is saved, which allowsthe company/team to deal effectivelywith unforeseen requirements (screenmission, new task organization, etc.) aswell as handle setbacks such as mainte-nance problems — while still accom-plishing those tasks that the com-mander has prioritized. The CP is the“enforcer” of the commander’s time-line.

The CP also acts as the point of con-tact for attachments. For example, if anengineer platoon is attached to thecompany/team sometime during theplan/prep phase, the platoon leader re-ports to the CP to conduct coordina-tion, instead of attempting to find thecommander or someone “in charge.” Atthe CP, the information manager cangather critical information (headcounts,fuel and ammo status, special require-ments, etc.), and the attached elementcan be apprised of the current situationand informed of any applicable SOPs.The platoon can then be integrated intothe company assembly area. The mostimportant advantage is that it requiresno immediate personal involvement ofthe commander, XO, or first sergeant.

In this way, planningand preparation contin-ues without distractingkey leaders. Key lead-ers are often absentfrom the assembly areawhile preparing forcombat operations;therefore, a well in-formed, capable CP isnecessary in order toget attachments inte-grated into the teamquickly.

In order to speed thedissemination of plans,the CP is where writ-ten orders are preparedand overlays repro-duced. Since CPs aresheltered (section 3,Configuration), thesetasks can be performedin any weather. Be-cause there is roomand a map available,the CP can also beused to deliver the op-erations order to sub-ordinates. Although itis best to visualize theoperations order whilelooking at the terrain,some circumstances,such as darkness or in-clement weather, might prevent that,which makes the CP a good backup.The construction of a sand table of thearea of operations is another CP re-sponsibility. The same sand table maybe used during orders for walk-throughrehearsals, briefs, and subordinate plan-ning, giving the entire team a commonpicture of the terrain.

All warning orders are posted in theCP as well as the current MCOO(modified combined obstacles overlay)and initial SITEMP. In this way, the CPenables the commander and platoonleaders to plan in parallel. With this in-formation readily available, subordinateleaders can utilize it very early on tobegin their own Troop Leading Proce-dures (TLP). The benefit is a time sav-ings that is realized at the com-pany/team operations order when pla-toon leaders come fully armed with agood picture of the commander’s ter-rain analysis and enemy situation. Ifforced to wait until the operations orderfor their first look at the terrain andthreat courses of action, platoon leaders

are hard pressed to accomplish theirown TLP to standard.

The CP also assists in the sustainmentof the company/team by collecting lo-gistical information with which theXO can begin to derive a plan for sup-port. Some of the charts in Figure 3deal directly with logistics issues. Us-ing these charts to visualize the logisti-cal status of the unit enables the com-mander, XO, and first sergeant toquickly assess potential problem areasand take necessary action. The first ser-geant is also able to make use of thisinformation in the preparation of hisdaily logistics report. If the informationis accurate, it will reflect the on-handquantities of critical supplies and per-sonnel. This allows the assembly ofcustomized LOGPACs that resupplythe company/team with what it actuallyneeds. No longer is the first sergeantthe central point for logistical informa-tion collection. Instead, the CP per-forms that function, and as a resultadds flexibility to the first sergeant’sschedule.


CP Task List

1. Post timeline (adjust as needed or directed)

This includes all of the commanders priorities:boresight, PCC, PCI, recon, TF OPORD, company/ team OPORD, rehearsals, resupply, PLT OPORDS,time windows for dozers, etc.

2. Post unit status (see Figure 3, tracking charts)

3. Record and pass on information (monitor TF and com-pany/team cmd nets)

a. Intel updates

b. Warning orders

c. Task organization changes

d. Logistics information

e. Any directives from TF

f. Required reports to TF

4. Integrate attachments

5. Post map

a. Current area of operations

b. MCOO

c. Situational template

d. Operational graphics

e. Logistics graphics

6. Build sand table of area of operations

7. Coordinate reproduction of overlays/orders

8. Assist first sergeant and XO in coordination for logis-tics support as required

Figure 2

3. Configuration: There are a num-ber of good ideas on how to properlyconfigure a company/team CP givencurrent MTOEs. Regardless of the spe-cific setup, a CP must be austere,which allows for rapid displacement.There exists a point of diminishing re-turns when a CP is outfitted with toomany bells and whistles in an attemptto further enhance its function. Theconfiguration offered here results fromobservations of successful techniquesapplied during NTC rotations.

The armor company/team is bestserved by utilizing the first sergeant’sM113 armored personnel carrier inconjunction with a shelter as its CP.This works well as the first sergeantrarely has a need to use the M113 dur-

ing planning and preparation. Manyoptions are available when consideringwhich shelter to use. The canvas exten-sion originally designed for the M577command post vehicle can be usedwith the M113. Another option is touse a tent (GP small) with the radiosremoted from the M113. The preferredmethod is command post, modular(NSN 5410-01-334-7529). It is easilyset up and stored, and is waterproof.There is enough room to mount a mapand required charts, as well as accom-modate numerous personnel. Anothertechnique is to use the FISTV with anyof the shelters mentioned. However, theFISTV may come under the control ofa higher headquarters (due to its uniquecapabilities) and leave the com-pany/team. This makes the first ser-

geant’s M113 the best choice since itis organic to the company/team andusually remains there.

The mechanized company/teamcan use a Bradley from the HQ pla-toon with a shelter. Keep in mindthat using a combat vehicle posessome problems, due to its need to beboresighted and armed. These activi-ties usually require the vehicle to bemoved, as does participation inmounted rehearsals. Again, theFISTV is also an option.

4. Task List and TrackingCharts: Figure 2 is a listing of theminimum tasks performed by the CPin order to provide the advantagesdiscussed previously. Additionally, inorder to give the commander a clearsnapshot in time of the status of hisunit, the information manager canmake use of easily updated charts.Figure 3 is a compilation of thesecharts.

With digitization on the near hori-zon, more battlefield informationwill become available at much ac-celerated rates. This, in turn, shouldallow commanders at all levels toaccelerate their decision cycles. Thedesired result will be rapid tempooperations that allow the enemy littleor no time to react. Success, in part,will depend on our ability to manageand assimilate this ever-increasingvolume of information. The com-mand post function will take oneven more importance as command-ers attempt to “balance the scales”between rapid action/reaction andthe necessary preparation for combat(troop leading procedures and priori-ties of work). Better technology

helps to alleviate this conflict to somedegree, but the bottom line remains —less time is available to accomplish thesame number of tasks. The com-pany/team must be able to managetime, information, and resources, andthe company/team CP is the tool to useto get the job done.


Figure 3

Captain Dave Thompsonwas commissioned in Armorin 1986 from Texas A&M Uni-versity. He is currently servingas an armor company/teamcombat trainer at the NationalTraining Center.

The wind blew cold over the plains ofHohenfels...

The commander sat back; his armorteam had just fought a pitched battlewith the enemy forward security ele-ment of the OPFOR battalion and hadutterly destroyed them. He had sufferedsome losses, but nothing compared tothe destruction he had dealt to his foe.He could taste the praise his battalioncommander would give him for hisvictory; he would be a hero among thecommanders. All of his months oftraining and preparation had finallypaid off.

Now, he waited for the 1SG to bringforward the company trains and beginthe less glamorous job of casualtyevacuation and vehicle repair andevacuation. He watched the trains be-gin their work. For some reason, thingsweren’t going well. His medic trackmistakenly went to a tank that only hada slightly wounded tanker on it whilebypassing several tanks with soldiersneeding immediate evacuation. HisM88 recovery vehicle and maintenanceM113 waited on the road for someoneto guide them to a downed vehicle andfor the medics to clear the battle area.He could hear the frustration of the pla-toon sergeants and platoon leaders onthe company radio net as they tried to

guide the medics and mechanics to theless obviously damaged vehicles. Thecommander had to admit that, until youcould get close enough to see theirbumper numbers, all the M1s and M2slooked the same.

As time went on, things got worse,the medic track quickly filled up, andmany wounded still needed evacuation.The commander, in an act of despera-tion, tried helping out by sending in hisHMMWV, but it got tangled in barbedwire and now was down for mainte-nance. His M88 was lost looking for astuck tank in a well-concealed position.When the tank commander tried togive the mechanics his position usingcompany graphics, he discovered thatthe M88 driver had used the map boardas a lunch tray and the correct check-point was buried under yesterday’s“Pork in BBQ” sauce.

Now things became desperate; manyof his company wounded in action(WIAs) were now dying of theirwounds. There were too many casual-ties and not enough evac vehicles withroom to put the litters. Every time hismedics took another load, it seemedlike forever before they returned. Thebattalion medic assets that he had al-ways counted on to help weren’t avail-

able. In addition, his maintenance teamwas lost, and required someone to gofind them and bring them back to thecompany area. To top it off, his 1SGhad to leave to pick up an incomingLOGPAC. In desperation, he called inhis XO to bring order to the impendingchaos, but even with both of them co-ordinating the support effort, it seemedlike no one knew what they were doing.

In the end, many of the commander’ssoldiers died of wounds, he lost hisM88 to a minefield, and only half hisvehicles made the follow-on missiondue to many missing the LOGPAC andrunning low on fuel. The welcome hereceived from the task force com-mander differed radically from the onehe had envisioned.

Making the Plan

How can we, as armor leaders, keepthis from happening to us? The an-swers can’t be found in FM 71-1, FM71-123, or FKSM 17-16. They dealwith armor team operations but, otherthan generalizations, give little specificguidance. As with many important les-sons, one must use many differentsources and personal experiences to fixthese problems. Here is one solution.


Improving Your Company Trains Operationsby Captain Andrew I. Green

Team 2-70 Armor executes a LOG-PAC during training at Hohenfels.

Effective company trains operationscan be the key to a successful NTC orCMTC rotation and are critical to anycombat situation. Unfortunately, werarely train them as intensely as we doour combat drills. Most good 1SGs canhandle LOGPAC operations, casualtyreporting, and company trains opera-tions during limited platoon and com-pany ARTEP training events. Unfortu-nately, these offer few opportunities totrain casualty and vehicle evacuationoperations with all the distractions ofrealistic training or combat. With lanetraining and reliance on using the localtraining area, it’s rare that companytrains players deal with land naviga-tion, evacuation, or recovery operationsabove the platoon level in an unfamil-iar environment. LOGPAC times areoften structured and routine, withplenty of “admin time” to allow every-one to find the assembly area and eat aleisurely meal. Vehicles with majormaintenance problems are often towedback to the motor pool and worked onin the rear, as no one wants to have anyextra vehicle down days against theirOperational Readiness rate. The medicsgenerally are whatever team is avail-able and don’t look at their maps as,“they know the area.” These situationsdon’t train the key players in the com-pany post-battle operations to the levelrequired at the training centers or incombat.

Where does one start? First, the CO,XO, and 1SG must decide on a plan toimprove their trains operations and setgoals to work on identifiable weak-nesses. A commonly understood, easilyrecognizable signal system must also

be created and disseminated to eachvehicle in the company, with extra setsof signal material ready to provide toattachments and slice elements. VS-17panels and gunnery flags work well forthis.

Next, set aside time to rehearse andtrain full-scale post-battle operations.One idea is to practice casualty evacu-ation play at a SIMNET event withplatoon sergeants reporting, the medicteam and maintenance team chief roleplaying their part of the operation andkeeping records on the vehicles downand casualties reported. All LOGPACoperations should be a rehearsal for thereal thing. Vary the technique, decreasethe time allowed, hold the soldiers tothe standard every time, and keep secu-rity and vehicle density to a minimum.The 1SG is the key, and he has to bethe enforcer of the plan. Therefore, hemust believe in it and hold the rest ofthe company to the commander’sstandards.

Casualty EvacuationOne medic track isn’t enough! Com-

bat lifesavers can stabilize thewounded, but most wounds typical ofarmored combat (burns, major punc-tures, and amputation injuries) requirerapid medical evacuation and skilledmedical treatment. Using operablecombat vehicles to evacuate thewounded in an unsecured battle area isnot practical, as it is rarely obviouswhen a lull in combat will occur andhow long it will last, so it is impracticalto allow soldiers to leave the battle areawith one of your major weapons and

evac the wounded. Wheeled vehiclesare rarely practical in the main battlearea because obstacles and munitionsabound that will soon render them in-operable. Therefore, the M113 armoredmedics are still the primary casualtyevacuators. With some prior planning,the company commander can triple hiscasualty evacuation assets. All the com-pany M113s can be fitted with litterkits and carry litters tied to the top oroutside. Casevac takes priority over ve-hicle recovery, so the 1SG’s and themaintenance track can also help withmedical evacuation until the medicsalone are able to handle the flow ofwounded. Wheels can be consolidatedinto a casualty transfer point on a safeintermediate rear area road position,and casualties transferred, thus keepingthe tracks closer to the battle position.Good rehearsals are the key to this op-eration, and at least one combat life-saver in each vehicle is a must. Routerecons are also critical, and ambulancetransfer points, locations of main andjump aid stations, battalion and com-pany checkpoints, and all combat vehi-cle positions, if possible, must bepassed down to every vehicle in thecompany. The 1SG must play trafficcontrol boss and direct the medevacvehicles to the wounded, as the reportscome in, while evacuating wounded inhis track. It’s hard, but the results areworth it.

Vehicle RecoveryThe M88 is an underutilized asset,

usually maintained in the rear as timepermits. It is allowed to sit idle most ofthe year, employed only to pull packs


At right, mechanics from B Co., 2-70 Armor train with crew-servedweapons. Below right, Headquarters Platoon recovery team, whichrecorded the fastest recovery times of any 1993 CMTC rotation.

Below, mechanics fix a tank at aunit collection point.

Trains Training at Hohenfels

during services or driven to assemblyareas to sit until someone gets stuck orneeds to be dragged back fromARTEPs. The M88 driver generallyfollows the 1SG or some other guide,rarely land navigates, and uses mapboards for card tables and food trays. Ifanyone has the wrong mission graph-ics, it is liable to be the mechanics. Thecorrect graphics for the current missionare usually stuck in a cubby hole or un-der someone’s tool box in the crewcompartment. The reason: few leadersexpect more from these soldiers, ortake the time to train them. Fixing thisproblem is crucial to improving yourvehicle recovery operations. With themaintenance team chief doing casevac,the M88 is unescorted on the battle-field; this is his time to shine. With aworking knowledge of the plan, andplatoon sergeants calling for assistance,the M88 crew can begin the vehicleevacuation process before the battle isover. All non-functioning combat vehi-cles need to be taken off the battlefieldeventually, and it is better to start earlythan wait until it is too late.

To facilitate faster maintenance andbattle damage repair, the vehicle col-lection point should be in a relativelysafe area to the rear of the immediatebattlefield. Ensure that this area isn’ttoo close to casevac routes or supplyroutes, as once vehicles are beingmaintained, they can be hard to move.The benefits of using a company-levelmaintence collection point, run by themaintenance team chief, are many. Se-curity improves as mutual support fromsemi-combat ready vehicles can over-watch those less able. Vehicles evacu-ated there can be worked on moresafely until all of the down vehicles arecollected, parts cross-leveled, andmaintenance priorities established.

The limited number of companymaintenance personnel and their equip-ment can be co-located to speed repairand recovery times. Vehicles obviouslyin need of evacuation can be sent rear-ward after being stripped of neededparts to repair other, less damaged ve-hicles. Resupply of this area is easierthan trying to find individual downedvehicles for LOGPAC operations. Inter-platoon recovery is enhanced becausethe company maintenance area can al-low combat vehicles to tow damagedvehicles to safety and more quickly re-turn to the combat area. Finally, if taskforce recovery assets move forward toassist the company/team, it is muchfaster if they go to a single location,rather than wandering around an unfa-

miliar battlefield looking for brokenvehicles.

Security Is Everyone’s JobThe combat trains must also be able

to fight. These forward operations re-quire the support vehicles to operatesemi-independently and in an unse-cured battlefield. The crews of vehicleswith crew-served weapons must becomfortable with their ability to use theweapons and may need to be aug-mented with AT-4s and small arms.MILES gunnery for training eventsmust also be taught to support soldiersso that they see some reason to firetheir weapons. This, of course, meansthat they must be given ammunitionduring training events, something thatmany mechanics don’t ask for and,therefore, don’t receive. The companytrains can also improve their fightingability by placing your attached air de-fenders in their M2 vehicles betweenthem and the company during move-ments, or with them when stopped. TheStinger’s long range will reach past thecombat vehicles in front and theBradley 25-mm chain gun can kill anymarauding BMPs that threaten yourtrains.

One final asset that can be used betteris the company master gunner. He canaid the 1SG in reporting during the re-constitution phase of post-battle ops. Ifgiven the role of CINC/wheels, he canprovide senior leadership in the casu-alty exchange point and when the 1SGis rearward doing LOGPAC operations.

ConclusionGood casualty and vehicle evacuation

operations require innovative use ofcompany assets, prior planning, and re-hearsals. A simple plan, well rehearsedand enforced, as well as the completeinclusion of all company members induring- and post-battle operations, willensure that no soldier or vehicle is lostdue to wasted time or lack of coordina-tion.

Finally...The commander sat back, his armor

team had just fought a pitched battlewith the enemy forward security ele-ment and had destroyed them utterly.He had suffered some losses, but noth-ing compared to what he had dealt tohis foe. All of his months of traininghad finally paid off. He waited for the1SG to bring forward the companytrains and begin the essential job of

casualty evacuation, and vehicle repairand evacuation. His men were his pri-mary concern now, and he demandedthat they be taken care of. He watchedthe trains begin their work. His casevactrack went to every vehicle withwounded, most serious to less urgent,as shown by his easily-identified-from-a-distance company marking system.His 1SG coordinated the effort with apracticed ease, guiding the M113s us-ing company and task force graphics toeach vehicle. His M88 recovery vehicletirelessly drove around the battlefield,dragging the damaged vehicles to thevehicle collection point, where me-chanics waited to work on repairingany that could be quickly returned tocombat. He could hear the platoon ser-geants and platoon leaders as they re-ported their losses to the master gunnerwho sent the reports to the task forceuntil the 1SG was finished withcasevac. His M88 bypassed a minefieldthat was on his graphics and recovereda stuck tank in a hard-to-find woodline.

His medevac times were once againexcellent, and didn’t slow as his 1SGleft to go pick up an incoming LOG-PAC. The battalion medic assets that hehad always planned on to help weren’tavailable, but they were able to use thecommander’s and the 1SG’s HMMWVsto speed the most seriously wounded tothe jump aid station. In the end, thecommander had succeeded, with all ofhis vehicles making LOGPAC. and be-ing the first company to be Redcon 1for the task force’s next mission. Need-less to say, his company received highpraise from their observer/controllersand, more importantly, from the taskforce commander himself.


Captain Andrew I. Green wascommissioned in 1989 from Se-attle University ROTC. A gradu-ate of AOBC, AOAC, andRanger School, he served as atank platoon leader in 1/69 Ar-mor, Kitzingen, Germany, andas a tank platoon leader, tankcompany XO, and battalion ad-jutant, 2/70 Armor, Erlangen,Germany. He is currently a re-cruiting company commander inManhattan, Kan. His next dutystation will be Ft. Stewart, Ga.

One cannot overempha-size the importance of thescout platoon to the taskforce commander. That pla-toon is truly the eyes andears of the commander, andmust be trained to an ex-tremely high level. The pur-pose of this article is toshare some thoughts andideas on how to do this.

Our observations arebased on two years of ex-perience training the scoutplatoon of Task Force 1-8Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Divi-sion. We used the FirstCavalry Division Scout Pla-toon competition in 1993,and the III Corps Cav Cupcompetitions, to determine if our train-ing program was properly focused.Specifically, we evaluated zone recon,screen, land navigation, enemy identifi-cation and doctrine, indirect fires, andcommunications during both competi-tions, and the task force scout platoonperformed well, winning the Division1993 competition and placing as thetop HMMWV scout platoon in the1994 III Corps Cav Cup. The true testcame in March 1995 during the Na-tional Training Center (NTC) rotation.The scout platoon performed assignedmissions admirably.

First and foremost, it is critical to de-fine duties and responsibilities as wedevelop the training plan. Who’s incharge of what? The task force com-mander has primary responsibility fortraining the scout platoon. He cannotdelegate that. He knows what he ex-pects from his scout platoon, and hehas the authority to allocate necessaryresources to ensure that the training isproperly conducted. The task forcecommander also has the responsibilityto ensure he has the right guy as hisscout platoon leader. As a rule, thisshould be a seasoned platoon leader

who has attended the Scout PlatoonLeader Course (SPLC). Specific com-petencies desirable in a scout platoonleader include confidence, stamina, en-durance, and mature judgement. Thetask force commander must be willingto have a close personal relationshipwith his scout platoon leader. Their re-lationship must evolve to the pointwhere the scout platoon leader knowswhat the task force commander wants,sometimes even before the commanderasks for it.

The task force commander must allo-cate time and resources to the scoutplatoon to effect its training plan. Alltoo often, the scout platoon gets de-tailed out on miscellaneous tasks whichpull members of the platoon from criti-cal training. The task force commandermust prohibit that. One technique is toprovide blocks of “protected time” forthe scout platoon. The place to spendthis protected training time is in thefield.

The commander has sole ownershipof the scout platoon. The scout platoonleader does not work for the S2 or theFSO; he works directly for the com-mander. All too often, the scout platoon

leader is overwhelmed bythe number of “bosses” hehas. When the commanderallocates protected trainingtime, the scout platoonleader must fiercely de-fend it. All the soldiersmust participate in thetraining. He must bringproblems to the attentionof the commander imme-diately.

The scout platoon leaderis the platoon’s principaltrainer. He knows what thebattalion commander ex-pects from the platoon, buthe cannot do it alone. Hemust properly utilize hisNCOs, who are clearly

critical in training the platoon. Thescout platoon leader must get them in-volved in the planning and executionof training. NCOs know the individualabilities of the platoon’s soldiers. Theymust ensure that all individual skillsare trained to a “T.”

FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 lead us totruly battle-focused training. The train-ing program that we designed for thescout platoon took battle-focused train-ing one step further. We used the samepriority intelligence requirements (PIRs)that we found ourselves employing intactical missions to help us further de-fine those critical skills — for thescouts individually, the scout sections,and the platoon as a whole.

All reconnaissance efforts must be fo-cused to a finite level. The scout pla-toon must look for those things that thecommander must know in order for thetask force to successfully accomplishits mission. These requirements comein the form of PIRs. They must bedrafted by the task force commander(upon recommendation by the TF S2).They must crystallize the things thecommander must know. If the taskforce leaders understand the com-


Training the Task Force Scout Platoonby Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lynch and Captain Steve Cichocki

mander’s intent, and know the PIRs,then they have multiplied their chancesfor success.

An example set of PIRs for a taskforce defense are:

1) Size, location, and disposition ofenemy reconnaissance elements

2) Location of enemy’s main effort3) Enemy’s use of NBC assets4) Enemy’s use of FASCAM mine-

fields5) Location of engineer elements in

movement formation6) Helicopter/air insertions of dis-

mounted reconnaissance teams

In the TF attack, they might be:

1) Recon element OPs2) Size, location, disposition of recon

elements3) AT element locations4) Obstacle location and size5) Location of combined arms reserve6) Location of battle positions/enemy

main effort

While the PIRs provide focus for theactual conduct of reconnaissance, theyalso provide for a training baseline —an essential task list, if you will. Thescout platoon must train on those col-lective and individual skills that allowit to successfully gather the PIRs.These are the skills that we focused onas we developed the scout platoontraining plan. These fundamental skillsincluded physical conditioning, dis-mounted operations, land navigation,and employment of direct and indirectfires.

Scouts must be in outstanding physi-cal condition. The key to a successfulPT program is innovation. Use allavailable resources. Our plan includedmorning PT that concentrated on sit-ups and different variations of long dis-tance runs on Monday, Wednesday, andFriday. Monday through Friday after-noons, except Thursday, training con-cluded with a trip to the gym for a onehour weight-training session, organizedand supervised by section. On Tuesdaymornings, we swam laps at the pool,because scouts should be good swim-mers. On Thursday afternoons, organ-ized athletics helped team building. Tomaintain growth, we set goals duringcounseling and measured progress with

an APFT every third Fri-day. Our PT program wasthe result of experimenta-tion, and we continued tofind new ways to make PTinteresting and challeng-ing.

The scout platoon mustunderstand dismountedoperations. Nothing ismore effective than a dis-mounted scout. Althoughthe HMMWV is a stealthyvehicle, it is still essentialto get up close to confirmwhat you think you seefrom a distance, and togather more detailed infor-mation. Training for thistask must be realistic, atnight when appropriate,with all equipment, overmoderate distances, andwith an OPFOR.

If a scout has a most im-portant task, it is landnavigation. Every memberof the scout platoon, downto the junior man, must bean expert. Although somescout platoons possessSLGRs, and scouts mustbe trained on them, too,the majority of land navi-gation training should bewithout them. Assumeworst-case scenarios inyour training program. Re-member Murphy’s Law ofLand Navigation —SLGRs will malfunction atthe worst possible mo-ment.

There are really twocritical subtasks to scoutland navigation. The firstis knowing where you are,where you want to go, andhow to get there. Juniorleaders must be superiornavigators. Leaders cantrain subordinates on thistask by asking for frequentfixes during every trainingevent. Training must beboth mounted and dis-mounted. PLDC and EIBpractice courses are excel-lent dismounted training


“The place to spend protected training timeis in the field, with all assigned personnel andslice elements, to develop skills necessary togather PIRs and develop a sound SOP...”

“Our PT program was the result of constantexperimentation...”

Above, the platoon at the III Corps Cav Cupcompetition, which helped focus the unit’sphysical training program.

“Dissemination of PIRs is critical. Everymember of the platoon must know what infor-mation the commander has deemed most im-portant...”

devices and, on a larger scale, platoon-constructed mounted courses can beimaginative and challenging if con-structed properly.

The second critical subtask is figuringout where the enemy is and what helooks like. Junior leaders must also betrained in IPB to enable them to selectroutes, danger areas, and likely enemypositions as part of land navigationtraining. Of course, the R&S plan willaid in this process, but the scout mustnot rely on this completely. Includingjunior leaders in the IPB planning proc-ess during protected training time fieldmissions is a great way to build under-standing.

A scout that can bring effective longrange indirect fires on the enemy is anessential asset. Even the most juniorscout must be able to call for indirectfire. Preliminary training in garrisoncan employ devices like the ObservedFire Trainer (OFT), but every opportu-nity must be seized to train with liverounds. Mortar live fire is an excellentopportunity, as is registration for TTXII and other live-fire exercises inwhich mortars fire. Field artillery op-portunities, of course, are just as im-portant, but harder to come by. Battal-ion- and brigade-size live-fire exercisesenable scouts to hone their indirect fireskills with the big guns.

The scout platoon must also knowhow to use available direct-fire sys-tems. Fundamentally, we must remem-ber that, by design, the HMMWVscout platoon has a limited direct-firecapability. Its weapons are primarilyfor suppression and self-protection. Al-though still in its final draft form, FM17-12-8 is a manual badly in need ofrevision. Like its tank gunnery counter-part, it should train the live-fire situ-ations that are most likely to be en-countered. Close-in, ambush, and reac-tion-type engagements to suppress anenemy more accurately represent whata HMMWV-mounted scout will en-counter. A scout has no need to engagea moving flank truck at a range of800m in the offense during daylight.Further, multiple engagements at sta-tionary and moving vehicles at night inthe offense at 400m and 600m with 50rounds of M2HB ammunition reallysuggest a departure from reality, giventhe platform, weapon, and scout mis-sion. Finally, section runs by four vehi-cles more closely resemble what a tank

platoon would do, not what a scoutsection maximizing stealth would do.In the meantime, battalion scout pla-toons should tailor their scout gunneryprograms to reflect their most likelyengagements, given their missions.Analysis during tactical play can serveas a basis for designing the gunneryprogram. Commanders and scout pla-toon leaders must do a reality checkand train the platoon in what most ef-fectively supports their unit’s METL.

The make-up of the scout platoon isan important training consideration.The scout platoon can consist of morepersonnel than just the 19Ds assigned.In each section, we carried engineersfrom the battalion’s engineer companyslice to evaluate obstacles in detail andcalculate breaching assets required.Their knowledge assisted the platoon inmore exact reporting, and we learnedfrom them some of the expertise thatwas engineer-specific. Since we seldomused demolitions, our engineers alsotaught us the techniques they used forbreaching, and the entire platoon bene-fitted from our habitual relationship.The key is habitual association — thesame engineers all the time. Cross-fer-tilization of skills is smart training.

As an army, we must do better atequipping our scout platoons. Quitefrankly, binoculars are the most sophis-ticated piece of equipment the scoutplatoon has today in quantities. Thetools scouts need for the future arefound in technology that already exists.Efforts must be made to expedite theiracquisition. Specifically, the intrave-hicular information system (IVIS), inte-grated with a global positioning system(GPS), are extremely effective toolsthat enhance the scout’s abilities togather PIRs and transmit that informa-tion to the task force commander.Scouts need the capabilities of these in-formation-sharing systems, alreadyfielded in the M1A2. Also, the LongRange Advanced Scout SurveillanceSystem, integrated with the GPS anddigitally linked with the IVIS, completethe system that possesses the capabili-ties our scouts need on the battlefield.Increased acquisition, reporting, andnavigational capabilities, combinedwith information-sharing systems, areneeded to remain effective in the futureas we digitize our Army. The costs ofacquisition are far outweighed by thecapabilities our scouts need now andwill possess as a result.

The key element is that the task forcecommander must be personally in-volved in training the scout platoon. Hemust work directly with that scout pla-toon leader to ensure that the platoonleader clearly understands the neces-sary training focus dictated by PIRs,and that he has the resources to executedemanding, realistic training. The scoutplatoon leader must, in turn, be relent-less in his approach to training the pla-toon. Our soldiers deserve top-notchtraining, and our mission success de-pends on it.


Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lynchis a 1977 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy. He is agraduate of EOBC, AOAC,CAS3, CGSC, and the U.S.Army War College. He servedas the squadron S3 of 1stSquadron, 11th ACR and asthe regimental executive offi-cer of the 11th ACR. He com-manded the 1st Battalion, 8thCavalry, 1st Cavalry Divisionfrom May 93 to May 95. He iscurrently assigned to the EX-FOR Coordination Cell (ECC)at the 4th Infantry Division,Fort Hood, Texas.

Captain Stephen M. Cichockienlisted in the U.S. Army on 9March 1983. As an enlisted sol-dier, he rose to the rank of ser-geant first class and attendedboth the Advanced Noncom-missioned Officer Course andthe M1/M1A1 Master GunnerCourse. He was commis-sioned from the Officer Candi-date School at Fort Benningon 30 Jan 92. He served as atank platoon leader and battal-ion scout platoon leader in 1stBattalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cav-alry Division. He is a graduateof the Armor Officer BasicCourse and the Scout PlatoonLeaders Course. He is cur-rently a student at the ArmorOfficer Advanced Course.

One imperative during the planningprocess is the commander’s descriptionof what he wants each combat multi-plier to accomplish; in other words, thecommander’s intent for fire support,engineer support, etc. Stated properly,this method helps each element employits systems to their greatest effect insupport of the scheme of maneuver.While doctrine states that this methodshould be used for each combat multi-plier, we routinely fail to give this typeof guidance to one of our most impor-tant assets — reconnaissance.

Commanders employ their combatmultipliers in several ways. They usefire support assets to destroy, neutral-ize, or suppress. They use engineers toturn, fix, block, or disrupt the enemy orto prevent the enemy from doing thesame. These methods maximize the ef-fect of these systems on the enemy insupport of the scheme of maneuver.Employment methods for reconnais-sance, however, all too often remain ill-defined. As a result, our reconnaissanceassets often do not deliver the intelli-gence necessary to either develop orsupport the scheme of maneuver.

There are two fundamental employ-ment methodologies for reconnais-sance: recon-pull and command-push.1

These techniques are based on the Ger-man and Soviet models, respectively,and have given both armies a distinctadvantage over those who inappropri-ately define the role of their reconnais-sance assets. We, however, often use amethod called recon-push. Recon-pushis simply an effort designed to “get thescouts out early” in order to “identifyall enemy in zone.” It is a quantitativeapproach to reconnaissance that nor-mally uses a myriad of graphic controlmeasures to ensure the scouts leave nostone unturned in a particular area orzone of operations. Recon-push is theMission Training Plan approach to re-connaissance — a check-the-blockmethod that lends itself to planning in areconnaissance vacuum.

Here’s how recon-push often works:Once a staff receives the mission, theS2 and/or S3 hastily work out a recon-naissance and surveillance plan, com-plete with graphic control measures tocover all of the key terrain and tem-plated enemy locations. The scouts aretold to “identify all enemy in zone.” Asthe scouts are covering their routes,Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), andcheckpoints, the parallel planning proc-ess begins. The plan is developed, theorder is issued, and detailed rehearsalsbegin prior to the results of the recon-naissance. Once the intelligence reportsbegin to come in, the S2 and S3 gatherthese reports, which may confirm ordeny their template, then try to figureout how to overcome the enemy.

This process, typical of most units,seems logical, but it is a recipe for dis-aster. The initial breakdown occurs atthe reconnaissance planning level. Theproblem stems, first of all, from the in-ability of the planners to decide or ar-ticulate what they want the scouts toaccomplish and how this will contrib-ute to the success of the mission. Wetry to overcome this deficiency by giv-ing the scouts precise graphic controlmeasures to guide their efforts andhope that this will pass for proper defi-nition. We hope our deficiencies inguidance will be overcome if the scoutscan identify all enemy in the zone, butthis is rarely the case. The problem isgenerally one of two things:

• We do not know what we want ourscouts to accomplish or do not knowwhat they can accomplish.

• We know what we want them toaccomplish, but what we want andwhat we are asking the scouts to do aretwo different things.

An analogy is useful in illustratingthis problem. Traversing the battlefieldis like moving through a forest. It is amedium of resistance. The forest con-tains many unknowns that are hiddenbeneath the canopy, several of which

may prevent us from reaching the otherside. There are several ways of gettingthrough, some of which are more haz-ardous than the others. Since we cannotadequately determine the best way tonegotiate the forest from a map or aer-ial photograph, we must send a reconparty to fill in our informational gapsso we can select the best route for themain body. What we should reallywant is a better picture of the forestand an appreciation of how we can getthrough it with the least amount of re-sistance along the way. Yet, what weoften ask for is a detailed description ofthe trees rather than a better appraisalof the forest itself.

The recon-push approach to this prob-lem would be to give the recon party acomprehensive list of checkpoints androutes and ask them to report in detailon all of these — and in the recon-pushmentality we get just what we ask for.The recon party will report oak trees atone checkpoint, birch at another, andpine at a third. Road A may have somefallen trees in the path, road B a boul-der, road C washes out in deep ravinebut has a difficult bypass 50 meters tothe south, and road D, which is not inthe plan but a route the party happenedto stumble onto, is somewhat treacher-ous but does move through the forestunimpeded.

What we know now is that part of theforest has oak trees, part of it has birchtrees and another part has pine trees.We also know that each of the routeswe chose has an obstruction that wemust overcome in order to use theroute, and that a route we did not con-sider will get us through the forest un-impeded. The common sense solutionwould be to choose route D, but this isnot possible in recon-push.

The problem is that while the scoutswere out gathering information, theplanners had already chosen and re-hearsed a plan and a scheme of maneu-ver to negotiate the forest. This is the


Reconnaissance in the Offense“COMMAND PUSH” vs. “RECON PULL”

by Captain Christopher D. Kolenda

second breakdown. The results of thereconnaissance really do not matter asfar as the plan is concerned at themacro-level. The information is used todetermine what dangers the main bodymust overcome in order to execute theplan successfully. Some micro-level ad-justments are made, but the overallplan remains intact. The obvious resultis a lot of needlessly wasted time andenergy along the way.

If we replace the simplistic forest sce-nario with the complex battlefield sce-nario, the problems associated with thismentality become very serious. By se-lecting recon-push, we fail to maximizethe benefits of our reconnaissance. In-stead of gaining an appreciation for thebattlefield, we get a myriad of detailsthat may not help us better comprehendthe meaning of the entire picture. Butthe paradox of recon-push is that wereally do not want this portrayal any-way, because we have already decidedwhat to do. All we want to know iswhat we can expect to encounter alongthe way so we can line up our assets todeal with these problems. The founda-tion of the scheme of maneuver is notgood planning; it is hope sprinkledwith a little bit of luck. Ideally, wewant to pit our strength against the en-emy’s weakness and force him to fightin a direction or manner for which heis unprepared. If we are lucky in usingrecon-push, our main effort will strikeat a weakness in the enemy’s defense.If we are not, we will pit strength ver-sus strength with a dicey outcome. Therecon-push technique virtually assuresus of a strength-on-strength fight, be-cause we have not worked intelligentlyenough to avoid it.

The recon-push mentality derivesfrom our own inability to understandhow to use our reconnaissance assets,and our failure to define coherentlywhat we want our scouts to accom-plish. The result? We plan in a recon-naissance vacuum. Instead of adoptinga plan based on information and on anappraisal by the only element thatknows the texture of the battlefield, weselect a plan based on guesswork andthe hope that we can overcome what-ever gets in our way. The destructiveimpact of this has been demonstrated atthe combat maneuver training centersand in simulation exercises where theOPFOR repeatedly runs rampant overBLUEFOR units.

A classic example of a strength-on-strength frontal assault that resulted

from our propensity to plan in a recon-naissance vacuum was realized in a re-cent simulation exercise conducted atFort Hood. An armor-heavy brigadewas given the mission to conduct ahasty attack against a defending enemy.The enemy was roughly battalion-size,and had set up a complex obstacle beltto support their defense. The brigadehad developed a plan to create threebreach lanes through the obstacle beltand then conduct a frontal attackagainst the enemy battalion. A recon-naissance unit was OPCON to the bri-gade to create the breach lanes.

During the zone reconnaissance, thescouts reported that the obstacle beltwas approximately 30 kilometers wideand 10 kilometers deep. They had alsoidentified a three-kilometer-wide gap inthe obstacle belt along the westernboundary. The scouts reconned the gap,and reported that the gap was clear. Abattalion could pass through it inroughly 15 minutes. Furthermore, therewas no enemy unit overwatching thegap. The brigade could easily use thisroute to attack the enemy in the flankand rear and avoid plunging headlonginto the enemy’s main defense. Insteadof using this gap to bypass the obstaclebelt and quickly defeat the enemy, thebrigade insisted on adhering to theoriginal plan. Three to four hours laterthe brigade finally pushed through theobstacle belt, attacked into the enemy’sstrength, and suffered considerable at-trition.

This is an example of the paralysiswe create through the improper use ofreconnaissance in the offense. First ofall, the brigade developed the plan inan intelligence vacuum, despite havingenough time to send the recon unit for-ward to gain information. Second, thereconnaissance unit had identified agap in the enemy’s defense early in themission, but the higher unit failed toadapt their scheme of maneuver to theenemy situation. The result was need-less attrition and lost momentum, in-stead of a quick, decisive victorythrough an open flank.

The concept of surfaces and gaps thatI alluded to earlier is a fundamentalbuilding block of warfare at the tacti-cal, operational, and strategic levels.Surfaces are areas where the enemy isstrong; gaps are where he is weak.Since the enemy cannot be strong eve-rywhere, he must be weak (or weaker)somewhere. Our job is to discover orcreate an enemy vulnerablility and ex-

ploit this weakness to our advantage.What we are interested in is not a fairfight, in which we pit our strengthagainst his, but an unfair fight, inwhich we employ our strength againsthis weakness. When we attack an en-emy weakness with overwhelmingstrength, the result is a quick, decisivevictory. Yet, in order to do this we mustknow exactly where these surfaces andgaps are. Reconnaissance, when usedin its proper role, is the most importantfactor in gaining this portrayal of thebattlefield. The identification of the en-emy’s strengths and weaknesses mustbe the guiding principle behind our re-connaissance effort. This is more thanjust identifying all enemy in zone. It isa textured picture of the battlefield thatgives us an appreciation of where theenemy is most vulnerable and how bestto exploit this weakness. In this way itbecomes the cornerstone of our tacticalplan. Recon-pull and command-pushreconnaissance are two methods thatwill enable us to gain these results.

Recon-pull reconnaissance is derivedfrom what the Germans call Auftrag-staktik. Literally translated, it meansmission tactics. The concept behindAuftragstaktik is directive control inwhich the subordinates are given a spe-cific mission, but are allowed great lati-tude in deciding how to accomplish it.The binding principle behind Auftrag-staktik is the commander’s intent —what the commander wants to accom-plish by conducting a certain mission.The commander’s intent, as William S.Lind puts it, is the glue that holds theoperation together.1 This concept leavesthe initiative with subordinates so theycan create and exploit opportunities asthey present themselves on the battle-field. Their only constraint is that theiractions must support the commander’sintent.

In a classic employment of recon-pull, the commander would use recon-naissance or forward elements to movealong different routes or axes towardthe enemy. The forward elements(scouts, cavalry troop, advanced guardcompany) are the “reconnaissancescreen.” Their mission is to identify thesurfaces and gaps in the enemy’s de-fense. Once this gap is found, the com-mander will exploit the opportunity bysending the main body to attack thisvulnerability and penetrate into the gap.The main body can then commit forcesto widen the gap and envelop the en-emy from the rear. The forward ele-


ment continues to move, seeking pathsof least resistance, and pulling the mainbody deep into the enemy’s rear. Thekey is to avoid the places where the en-emy is strong and find a lightly or un-defended gap that leads to the enemy’srear. In doing so, the commander pitshis strength against the enemy’s weak-ness with considerable advantage,rather than rushing headlong into theteeth of the enemy’s defense.2

In a nutshell, the reconnaissance ele-ment pulls the main body toward theenemy weakness. The main bodycrushes the enemy at this point, poursthrough the gap, then continues deeperto destroy the enemy’s fire support as-sets, or attacks the enemy’s assailableflank or rear. In either case, the surfacethe enemy has built becomes insignifi-cant. This part of the enemy’s defenseis either bypassed, isolated, or forced tofight in a manner or direction that it isnot accustomed to or prepared for. Theresult is an unfair fight in which wehave a decided advantage.

Recon-pull tactics could have beenused very effectively in the abovesimulation exercise. The reconnais-sance unit could have “pulled” the bri-gade through the gap in the enemy’sdefense, thereby rendering the obstaclebelt insignificant and forcing the en-emy to fight in an unexpected direc-tion. The logical outcome would havebeen a quick, decisive victory in a mat-ter of minutes rather than a slow, inde-cisive, and attrition-laden frontal as-sault against the enemy’s strength. Theformer approach cuts through the en-emy’s defense like a sharp knife, thelatter is akin to performing surgerywith a blunt instrument — dull andpainful, lots of tissue damage, and witha much lower chance of success.

The use of recon-pull, however, is nota panacea. Recon-pull relies on direc-tive control, mission orders, and “trusttactics.” It emphasizes the ability toread a situation rapidly, identify aweakness, and exploit it. As a result, itrequires extensive training in recon-naissance, enemy doctrine, and rapid,agile battle drills to be effective. Sinceit stresses the primacy of opportunity,recon-pull requires a great deal of trustbetween senior and subordinate com-manders, and a clear commander’s in-tent and main effort to unify the action.Given the nature of the training re-quired to attain the level of battlefieldinsight necessary to recognize and ex-ploit opportunity, and the level of trust

a senior must place in the decisions ofhis subordinate commander, we cannotjust wake up one day and decide to userecon-pull tactics. We must create aculture within our units that trains, re-inforces, and rewards the confident, in-dependent, yet properly-focused atmos-phere and unity required to make this areality. This cannot be accomplishedovernight. It requires a deliberate com-mitment on the part of the senior com-mander to train and empower his sub-ordinate leaders to make the rapid, ac-curate decisions necessary to recognizeand exploit opportunity.

Skeptics will argue that these deci-sions are too important to be left in thehands of subordinate leaders. I wouldargue that they are too important not tobe. The side with the fastest decision-cycle wins. Sound decisions made atthe lower level are implemented fasterthan the same decisions made at ahigher level because of the nature ofcommunication. The question thus be-comes not whether our subordinatesshould make these choices, but whathave we done to train them to makethese decisions. Training our subordi-nates how to think rather than what tothink, and evaluating the decision-mak-ing process as well as the decision it-self, are important steps in this direc-tion.

Recon-pull is most appropriate in afluid situation where the enemy situ-ation is unclear, or is rapidly changing.However, if we are given sufficientplanning time against a relatively staticenemy force, a different approachmight be more suitable, “commandpush.” This type of reconnaissance isbuilt on the Soviet model which usesdetailed instead of directive control.This is also the model used by the OP-FOR at the Combat Maneuver TrainingCenters. The purpose of command-push reconnaissance, like recon-pull, isto identify enemy strengths and weak-nesses, or surfaces and gaps, and reportthem to the commander, who then de-signs a detailed plan to mass hisstrength against the enemy weakness.

This approach differs from recon-pushbecause the plan is selected on the ba-sis of the reconnaissance results, not re-gardless of them. Often, the com-mander designs several differentcourses of action and develops them inas much detail as possible prior to theresults of the reconnaissance. Once therecon units have painted the picture ofthe battlefield, the commander selects aplan based on this information and re-fines it in sufficient detail to give hisunit the greatest possibility of success.This precise plan emphasizes unity ofeffort at the expense of opportunity,since the enemy situation is known inenough detail to allow for rigorous,centralized planning.

This method of reconnaissance is alsovery effective. Fifty-five battles werestudied at the National Training Centerto determine the impact of reconnais-sance in the offense. In 50 of these bat-tles, the OPFOR reconnaissance wassuccessful in identifying 85-90 percentof the BLUEFOR’s vehicle positions.The OPFOR won 45 of these battles.

How does the OPFOR do it? First ofall, their reconnaissance units and intel-ligence officers are trained to look forenemy strengths and weaknesses. Theydo not send their scouts out merely tocheck a block on the MTP. They ag-gressively locate enemy positions,identify potential strengths and weak-nesses, then report those detailed find-ings. The commander then selects hisplan and scheme of maneuver based onthe enemy template developed by thedivision recon and confirmed by theregimental recon. The OPFOR acceptsrisk in planning time, but overcomesthis through detailed rehearsals on for-mations, movement techniques, and ac-tions on contact drills. This method al-lows the OPFOR commander to masshis strength against the BLUEFOR’sweakness. The result is a 90 percentsuccess rate.

Both methods of reconnaissance areextremely effective and can be used bythemselves, or in combination whenthe battlefield transitions from a staticto a fluid nature. Recon-pull empha-sizes opportunity over detailed control,and relies upon the commander’s intentand designation of the main effort inorder to achieve unity. Command-push,on the other hand, stresses early deter-mination of enemy strengths and weak-nesses, and a detailed plan to over-whelm the weakness over the exploita-tion of opportunity.

“How does the OPFOR do it?First of all, their reconnaissanceunits and intelligence officers aretrained to look for enemy strengthsand weaknesses. They do notsend their scouts out merely tocheck a block on the MTP....”


The key to a successful reconnais-sance effort is the identification of en-emy surfaces and gaps, for this allowsthe commander to mass his strengthagainst an enemy weakness. The com-mander’s intent for reconnaissance,therefore, must have the identificationof enemy strengths and weaknesses asits foundation, and our reconnaissancecollectors and assessors must be trainedto recognize these. The efforts of thecollectors (the scouts) and the assessors(the S2) must be mutually supportingand complement one another.

One of the great travesties of our sys-tem is the perpetuation of the “tell mewhat you see and not what you think”syndrome. This mentality assumes aminimum level of competence on thepart of the scouts and a maximum levelof omniscience on the part of the S2.Indeed, it often seems as though wetreat the S2 as the guardian of somebastion of doctrinal and interpretivetruth that no one is allowed to enter.This penchant robs us of the valuableanalysis that the only element witheyes on the battlefield can offer. It alsoplaces the S2 in an unfair position.

I had the opportunity to witness anunfortunate manifestation of this syn-drome while observing a unit at a com-bat training center. This particular unitwas planning an offensive mission andhad sent the scouts on a zone recon upto a designated phase-line. The unit hadassumed incorrectly that it would en-counter a moving enemy force the nextmorning and had based their plan ac-cordingly. Meanwhile, during the zonereconnaissance, the scouts encounteredan obstacle belt that was overwatchedby two enemy vehicles with a consid-erable amount of artillery at their dis-posal. The scouts did their duty and re-ported exactly what they saw and noth-ing else. The next morning, air scoutspreceded the ground scouts as the for-ward element, and the unit began mov-ing toward its objective. One air scouthad gotten himself into an excellent po-sition and observed roughly five vehi-cles moving into defensive positions.He also reported exactly what he saw— five vehicles moving. The reportwas incomplete because the scoutfailed to report that the vehicles weremoving into a defensive position, buteven if he had, the results would nothave been much different. The com-mand group — S2, S3, and commanderincluded — were firmly wedded to theidea that they were facing a moving

enemy force, and pushed the unit tomove quickly to gain a piece of defen-sible terrain. The reality was much dif-ferent. The enemy was stationary andhad occupied a hasty defensive posi-tion. The unfortunate unit was quicklydecimated before realizing what it wasup against.

The S2 was the scapegoat for the de-feat because he failed to interpret theenemy situation properly, but there wasplenty of blame for everyone. The ob-stacle belt and the overwatching obser-vation post should have been a tell-talesign that the scouts had entered the en-emy security zone. This should havebeen the first indication that the enemywas in a defensive rather than an offen-sive posture. The five moving enemyvehicles were the enemy’s reserve thathad taken up position to reinforce thedefense. Nevertheless, this entire situ-ation could have been avoided if thescouts were trained and trusted to ana-lyze what they had seen. We need toarrive at some level within the recon-naissance effort where analysis fromthe forward scouts and S2 is syner-gized. The appropriate level for this isthe scout platoon leader. He should betrained to do the S2’s job just as wellas the S2 himself. In this way, there isan analytical dialog between the frontand the command post based onknowledge and trust. The result will bea more precise and robust depiction ofthe battlefield.

Thus far I have discussed some of thefundamental problems associated withour reconnaissance efforts. The first ofwhich is the inability to define and/orarticulate what we really want thescouts to accomplish, resulting in amisalignment between expectations andinstructions, coupled with tactical plan-ning in an information vacuum. Thesecond is the lack of training and/ortrust we place in our scouts, which re-sults in an incomplete or erroneous de-piction of the battlefield. I have offeredsolutions to both of these problems. Ihave also laid out the theoretical con-ceptions behind recon-pull and com-mand-push reconnaissance and exam-ples in which they were either used orcould have been used to improve thesuccess of a tactical plan. I will nowoffer a technique which I have found tobe effective against a static enemy de-fense: layered reconnaissance.

The initial reconnaissance elementmoves out with the task of identifyingenemy strengths and weaknesses

through a detailed reconnaissance ofenemy positions. This may be accom-plished through the use of ground, airand electronic reconnaissance. Theirpurpose is to develop the enemy tem-plate to enable the commander to de-cide which axis he will use and deter-mine the focal point of his attack. Inthe meantime, the units can conduct re-hearsals on movement formations andtechniques, actions on contact, andbreach drills. Once the template is de-veloped, a second reconnaissance ele-ment (platoon-sized) confirm this tem-plate. That element should then be in aposition to bring artillery fires at thepoint of attack, and use smoke to iso-late that enemy element from the restof the defense. Once the template isconfirmed, the scheme of maneuver islocked in.

The last reconnaissance element is theadvanced guard (company-sized). Itspurpose is to establish the conditionsfor the attack of the main body by cre-ating a gap in the enemy’s defense atthe weak point and pulling the mainbody through the gap in the defense.The main body can then continue to adeeper objective, or attack the defend-ing enemy from the flank or rear andwiden the gap for the follow-on force.

This technique may sound suspi-ciously similar to the tactics employedby the OPFOR at the National TrainingCenter, but it is consistent with ourdoctrine. The only difference is in theuse of reconnaissance to accomplishone specific task — identify the sur-faces and gaps in the enemy’s defense— which enables us to pit our strengthagainst an enemy weakness. Anotherdifference may be the commitment ofan infantry platoon as a second layer inthe reconnaissance effort. While thisdetracts from the raw combat power ofthe main body, it becomes an importantcombat multiplier in confirming the en-emy’s weak point and bringing othercombat multipliers to bear at the focalpoint of the attack. If we can achievethese reconnaissance results, our suc-cess rate will increase several-fold, andenable us to gain a greater local supe-riority at the decisive point.

Reconnaissance is a critical, but oftenmisused, combat multiplier. Recon-pulland command-push reconnaissance aretwo methods that support their parentform of tactics, and have been used ef-fectively by both German and Soviet-style forces. The most critical task inthe reconnaissance effort is the identifi-


LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

In conclusion, I say to my critics: Lighten up! The world will not end because the readers of ARMOR Magazine have had an opportunity to read something about EGT that you don't want them to see. The readers of ARMOR Magazine are smart enough to form their own judgments.

Additionally, I Wuuld like to retrospectively add two references to my article. Unfortunately, the references were rediscovered too late to be included in the article. The references are:

(1) Eshel, Lt. Col. David, IDF (Ret.), "Battlefield Survival," NATIONAL DEFENSE Magazine, September 1989 In this article, Col. Eshel makes some cogent points about vision and survivability. Here is an excerpt:

" ... One of the foremost problems in tank fighting has always been to detect the enemy before he had a chance to fire for effect. Even the most sophisticated fire control equipment cannot replace the trained and experienced human eye in its surveillance and detection activities. ... detecting enemy targets is easier said than done. To... identify an enemy tank at maximum range is like trying to pinpoint a small mosquito on the far wall of a long room. . .. Quick reaction to target acquisition is the key to survival, and any impediment in

RECONNAISSANCE (Cont'd)

cation of enemy strengths and weaknesses, and using these reconnaissance results to match our strength against the enemy weakness. If done effecti vel y, the result is an unfair fight to our advantage where we can achieve a quick, decisive victory.

Notes

i For a detailed discussion of these m<!thodologies from a theoretical standpoint see Robert Leonhard. The Art of Mallem'er: ManeuverWmfare Theory and Airl.,(.md Bailie, Novato. Calif: Presidio Press. 1991. pp. 113-118. Leonhard's discussion centers on Aufrragstaktik and Befehlstaktik as command and control methodologies. but he also relates them to how reconnaissance is used within these conceptual frameworks. See also William S. Lind. Maneu· ver Warfare Handbook, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 18-19.

"See also Leonhard. pp. 113-114. and Lind. pp.18-19.


achieving first hit may be fatal." U. Col. Eshel is also a past contributor to ARMOR.

(2) Mergens, Maj. Michael and Capt. William Weldon, U.S. Army. "Now Where Do We Put ItT ARMOR, Nov-Dec 1994, This is three pages of good discussion on the stowage limitations in and on armored vehicles.

DON LOUGHLIN Bellingham, Wash.

Author Seeks Accounts Of War from the Turret

Dear Sir:

I'm a former member of the British Army's Royal Hussars and have been commissioned to write a book entitled "Voices from the Turret: Eighty Years of Allied Tank Warfare, 1916-1996." The idea is to have a definitive account of tank warfare as told by those who were in the turret. I am seeking first-hand accounts from Americans who served in tank combat in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, or the Gulf War. Accounts can cover all activities of service in combal tank units.

A final manuscript is to be submitted in January 1997, with publication scheduled

Captain Ch ristopher Kolenda is a 1987 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. His previous assignments include tank platoon leader (M Co) and scout platoon leader and XO (L Trp) 3/11 ACR; U.S. Boeselager Team, Sep 89-Jun 90; and motor officer, 1-7 Cav and commander, A Trp, 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division. A graduate of Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course (Distinguished Honor Graduate), BMOC, CAS3, and Air Assault, Airborne, and Ranger Courses, he is currently a graduate student, Modern European History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, enroute to Department of History, USMA.

that fall. Interested individuals should contact me at the following address:

MR. RODERICK DE NORMANN Tinkerfield House, Monument Hill

Stert, Devizes Wilts SN10 3HU

England

Armored SUSV Available If Requirements Exist

Dear Sir:

I read with interest the ARMOR, MayJune 1996 article, "Bosnia Report," on the use of the M973A 1 Small Unit Vehicle. The SUSV was one of the Army's first successes through the Foreign Comparative Testing Program in the early 1980s. Approximately 1,080 SUSVs have entered the Army inventory since the vehicle was Type Classified in March 1983. The FCT Program was created by Congress in 1977 to entice the services to consider allied equipment versus service-unique RDT&E programs. The goal of the program is to evaluate allied equipment towards the goal of fielding. Major successes include the Fox NBC Recon Vehicle and M1 chassis-based Heavy Assault Bridge. If a requirement for

DRIVER'S SEAT (Continued from Page 6)

Recently the gauntlet was passed in several key positions on Fort Knox. CSM Kevin P. Garvey assumed the duty of Commandant at the Fort Knox Noncommissioned Officer Academy on 21 March 1996, and CSM Gerald D. Utterback assumed the duty of Armor School Sergeant Major on 23 March 1996. They are working diligently to ensure the success of the BNCOC consolidation and further the education of armor soldiers.

Fort Knox has the capabilities and the technology to train all the armor soldiers necessary for the force of today and that of tomorrow. It is with great pride and commitment Fort Knox accepts the responsibility and will endeavor to produce the most effective and well trained armor soldiers this nation and the world has ever seen.

49

the BV-206S armored version of the SUSV does emerge, the IME Division can provide assistance in obtaining RDT&E funds. ARMOR readers are encouraged to contact our office for further information: International Materiel Evaluation Division, phone: (410) 278-1369.

TOM BUONAUGURIO Project Officer

HQ, Army Materiel Command

Mine Plow Tank Useful In Restricted Terrain

Dear Sir:

I would like to commend SSG Krivitsky for, although indirectly, bringing to light a valid point which I had stressed during my years within the Armor community, 'The Three to Six Second Advantage: Tank Combat in Restricted Terrain," (ARMOR, Mar-Apr 96). Although I believe that anticipating enemy attacks/ambushes involves more than having, ..... your weapon drawn ... accurately aimed and armed," the information provided was outstanding. The author's comments on 'recon by fire,' (The Crew's Critical Tasks para. 8, and Recon by Fire) were right on the money.

I thoroughly believe that routing the enemy with the use of the most unappreciated weapon system on board, the loader's M240 MG, has been for too long overlooked. Areas suspected, and capable, of concealing enemy positions should be saturated with fire, utilizing the loader's weapon system when applicable.

To effectively 'fight the tank: a crew must be allowed and encouraged to use all of

1995 Index Available

The 1995 ARMOR Index is now available. For your copy, contact Mary Hager at DSN 464-2610/2249, commercial (502) 624-2610/2249; e-mail: HAGERM@KNOXEMH1.ARMYMIL; or write ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5210.

the tank's available weapon systems. Training crews, especially the loader, to attack, suppress, and destroy targets utilizing the correct weapon system in its respective role against its appropriate targets, is absolutely essential.

In addition, I believe that when moving in such an environment as described in the author's article, a tank equipped with a mine plow should be placed in the lead position. The advantages to this are numerous, as well as common sense. Besides the obvious advantage of having a mine plow available in a defile road with little or no bypass area, the convoy's survivability would be increased. The added protection afforded by the mine plOW to absorb the impact of head-on and frontal oblique ATGMs and ATMs, would be substantial.

Also, the plow maintains the ability to prematurely detect and destroy antitank mines and disassemble obstacles. Another advantage would be 'bunker busting: The ability to 'charge' a bunker and utilize the plow as a means of destruction, although risky. should not be overlooked.

The M1's mine plow is like having an engineer detachment on the front slope of the tank. Its role in combat operations should not be limited to that of clearing a 'swath' or paths for follow-on vehicles.

I would like to point out what I believe may be a weak point in the author's plan. When operating in such an environment,

no task force should be deployed without infantry support. In such a situation as presented in the author's article, infantry support would grant an outstanding, as well as critical, scout advantage.

To drastically improve the task force's chance of survival (the bottom line here), crosstalk between armor and our attached infantry assets, both before and during the mission, would obviously be advantageous. These infantry units and their elements could best detect possible enemy AT and FO positions.

Also, let us not forget the M2's role in tank destroying, as well as quickly delivering infantry support. By utilizing bounding overwatches, coupled with already existing combined arms concepts, the combat strength and power of the task force drastically increases.

"Train as you fight" should be more than a catch phrase for professionals. It is imperative that we train our soldiers without mercy, teaching them the secrets of our trade, making them tomorrow's professional tankers. At the same time, we should be receptive to new and unorthodox ideas and suggestions. A new genre of soldiers means fresh and unburdened ideas and points of view. Let's listen to them.

JODEY C. KING Frederick, Md.

Comments on the (Draft) Brigade MTP ARTEP 71-3 MTP (Initial Draft) Mission Training Plan for the

Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff is currently under revision at the Armor Center. The Armor Center shares proponency with the Infantry School for this manual, but has primary writing responsibility. We are looking for specific comments on the content of the MTP. During the revision we added some new tasks:

• Employment of MI assets • Planning of R&S • HHC commander and CP-related tasks • Deployment-related tasks • Protection tasks .MP tasks

Copies of the ARTEP 71-3 MTP (Initial Draft) were sent out to all divisions and brigades, branch schools, and CTCs.

In an effort to make our doctrine as accessible as possible to the force, we have placed the MTP on the Armor Center's Home Page on the Internet Look at the Fort Knox Doctrine home page with the following URL (address):

http://www.awwg.orgl-dave/doctrineI71-3-mtp/brigmtp.htm

50

Your comments can be sent bye-mail/PROFS or mailed to this headquarters. Please include the name and telephone number of your POC with the comments.

The mailing address is:

Director, DTDD ATTN: ATZK-TDD-B U.S. Army Armor School Fort Knox, KY 40121·5000

The e-mail address is:

[email protected]

The PROFS 10 is RIGGSW at KN01.

For further information, call CPT Riggs at DSN 464-6651 or commercial (502) 624-6651.

ARMOR - July·August 1996

He Rode Up Front For Patton byBrig. Gen. Albin F. (Al) Irzyk, PentlandPress, Inc., Raleigh, N.C., 1996. 388pages. $32.95.

There is a tantalizing, final glimpse ofhorse cavalry operations that opens this ac-count of transition and employment of armorduring WWII. Cavalry is fast, able to getaround the enemy, but has no firepower. Ani-mals die, even in training. Armor will changethat.

The author’s perspective encompasses thischange, because he starts his career as anew horse cavalry lieutenant in 1941, and bythe end of the war in Europe, he is a lieuten-ant colonel and an experienced commanderof the fully mechanized 8th Tank Battalion,4th Armored Division.

It is the frequent assignment of the 8th,“The Rolling Eight-Ball,” to be in the lead ofPatton’s 3rd Army, which is the focus of thebook.

The author is a fighting commander who istwice wounded, and who knows tank opera-tions not only from the platoon, company,and battalion level, but also from the per-spective of combat command (in the 4th AD,the 8th functions most often as part of Com-bat Command B).

The action in Europe falls essentially intothree sections: heavy fighting with rapid pro-gress across France punctuated by enforcedbreaks, the relief of Bastogne, and entry intoGermany and victory.

The 8th and the author are not only part ofsome of the best-known battles of the war,but also many others of great importancewhich have received less attention. First-hand experiences include fighting out ofhedgerow country, backtracking and fightingat Lorient, and covering an amazing 328combat miles across France in 12 days to bewithin 63 miles of Germany by September 1,1944. The author is in command of an ad-vance guard that establishes the first bridge-head across the Moselle on September 11.

While much has been written about the en-circlement of Nancy, the Arracourt tank bat-tles and the great success of CCA, theauthor expands the record by describing hiscombat experiences in heavy fighting in CCBat Fresnes en Saulnois, the other half of theencirclement that made success possible(CCB knocks out 23 German Panther andTiger tanks). In spite of inflicting staggeringlosses on the Germans, for a second timesupplies are diverted, the 4th AD is stoppedfor a full month.

The author has been a major and battalionS3, but he regularly commands an advanceguard. In December, at the age of 27, he isgiven command of the entire 8th Tank Battal-ion, one of three in the 4th; the other two arecommanded by his counterparts, LTCCreighton Abrams, and LTC Delk Oden.

His first combat after receiving command isat Singling, a situation he inherits, and hedescribes what he did to resolve it, and in anafter-action summary analyzes its relativeimportance.

These highly useful summaries are in-cluded at key points, and are based on theauthor’s thoughts and knowledge at the time.They are often combined with straightfor-ward appraisals of the decisions of thosewith whom he serves, including the well-known, such as then-LTC Creighton Abrams,COL Bruce Clarke, Generals Wood, Gaffey,and Patton, as well as company command-ers, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants.

Appraisals are based not just on personalimpression, but are supported by descrip-tions of what went right and what wentwrong. They are there for you to agree withor not, and regardless, they are fascinatingreading.

The 8th is in the front of Patton’s 3rd Armyto relieve Bastogne (161 miles in 22 hours),and makes the initial contact with the 101st.The absorbing analysis of the commitmentand recall of Task Force Ezell highlights theinterplay of decisions among General Hol-mes Dager (CCB Commander), GeneralOmar Bradley, and General Patton, deci-sions which could have both lost the entireCCB, yet ultimately saves TF Ezell.

The author is wounded at Chaumont whenhis tank is hit, but he takes the town on De-cember 25th. On December 26th, CCR withthe 37th and 53rd, break through to the101st, and on the following day, the 8th linksup with the 101st. In January 1945, theauthor is promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In Germany, the author is wounded againin taking St. Johann, when he leads an at-tack and his tank is hit by a panzerfaust, buthe continues the fight which ultimately suc-ceeds. He was awarded the DistinguishedService Cross.

With the 8th in the lead, the 4th ADcrosses the Rhine on March 24, 1945. In ad-dition to its many combat experiences, the8th liberates North Stalag III concentrationcamp. The author is division chief of staffwhen the 4th is deactivated in the spring of1946.

In addition to crediting his troops and theirtraining for the accomplishments of the 8th,the author cites mission-type orders insti-tuted in the 4th AD by MG John S. “P”Wood, and supported by CCB commanderBG Holmes Dager. Regularly, when theauthor is given a job to do, he makes theimplementation decisions himself.

The above is only a brief outline, for onrough count I come up with descriptions ofnearly 40 engagements with the enemy inthis book, including the author’s growing“battle sense” and outstanding employmentof armor at Marthille, and his insightful use ofartillery in taking Voellerdingen and thebridge over the Eichel (with which he is cred-ited by General Patton in his personal wardiaries), all bonded together with descriptionsof what life was like for soldiers in the field.

Additionally included are the author’sevaluation of weapons, both U.S. and en-emy, based on his being on the firing andreceiving end: the M5, M4, M4A3E8 tanks,the German Panther and Tiger tanks, thePanzerfaust, and the 88. While Germantanks had higher velocity guns, the 360-de-

gree power traverse of the Sherman turretallowed U.S. gunners to get off more accu-rate shots faster. The Sherman could travelgreat distances, and its simplicity made itpossible to perform major repairs in the field.

The only illustrations are maps, some ofwhich are dark and hard to see, but the pathof movement is clear. For me, the most valu-able part of the maps were the contour lines,which give a good idea of the terrain in-volved.

The book does not suffer from lack of otherillustrations. Still, a few would have beenuseful, such as photos of the M3 (Stuart) inwhich the author starts his training, the M5,which he uses a lot in Europe, and the M4Sherman, which would graphically show theevolution of armor that occurs in a shorttime.

While this is the story of the 8th from theauthor’s vantage point, he writes in the thirdperson which is a little disconcerting at first.However, in a short time this becomes quitecomfortable for the reader.

Quite simply, I found this is to be an out-standing book, both in terms of content andthe absorbing writing style of the author.General Irzyk knows how to tell a story, andthere is an immediacy and freshness to thenarrative that makes you feel as if the actionhappened recently (for an example, see hisaccount of several meetings with Patton in“Patton Revisited,” ARMOR, March-April1995, which are also found in this book).The tempo stays up, and more than once Ifound myself awake at 3:00-4:00 in themorning, reading to find out what happensnext.

As time grows between the present andWWII, the value of this book will increasebecause it is a first-hand account of majorcombat action from a soldier’s point of view.It is not retrospective after many decades,but rather based on his experiences as theyhappened to him, and General Irzyk is emi-nently successful in conveying this.

PAUL S. MEYERCincinnati, Ohio

(Mr. Meyer is a former USAARMS Informa-tion Officer and Armor School Historian.-Ed.)

BOOK ESSAY


BG Albin F. Irzyk in April 1970.

Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat Line:America’s Undeclared War Againstthe Soviets by Colonel James U. Mi-lano, USA (Ret.) and Patrick Brogan,Brassey’s, 1995. 227 pages. $23.95.

The shooting’s over, a tenuous peace isstarting, and an ostensible ally is makingthreatening overtures. You’re assigned tofind out what’s really going on, and youstart with a few defectors from that “ally.”When you’ve gleaned everything fromthem, you need to find a safe place forthem. You can’t send them back, you can’tsend them to the U.S., and you can’t hidethem in Austria where the KGB would soonfind them. You and your inventive staff cre-ate a very unorthodox escape route, a “ratline,” to South America. And it works. Ohman, does it work!

This is the story of the 7769th Military In-telligence Service Battalion and its com-mander, Major Jim Milano, from Salerno ofWWII to 1949. It had 180 officers and 150enlisted men, nearly all linguists, and mostuniversity graduates. They were smart,hard working, and innovative. And, like thecharacters in TV’s “M.A.S.H.,” they were apretty route-step outfit. Milano ran his unitlike a big brother, father confessor, andeasy-going boss, all rolled into one. Itworked, probably because he was a finegauge of his troops. Later Milano becamethe chief of the Operations Branch of theIntelligence Directorate for Austria, but hismodus operandi never changed.

Milano was assigned a number of stand-ard intelligence functions to perform, but,as the uneasy peace settled over Austria,more specif ic assignments appeared.There weren’t many rules to follow on howto get the information, so the 7769th madeits own, along the standard of “get the datafirst and sort out the rules later.” The resultwas great intelligence collection in an oftenrowdy and hilarious masquerade. Therewere some wild and woolly adventures ofdubious legality, scary clandestine opera-tions with heart-stopping timing, and fre-quently unorthodox and questionable deci-sions. (Years later, General Abrams oncetold me to be careful about asking permis-sion to do something if a “No” would botherme. Milano adhered to a similar dictum.)

This book is anecdotal in form, like Eisen-hower’s “Stories I Tell To Friends,” withmost chapters dealing with a specific inci-dent or problem and some intervening

chapters to set the stage. In the turbulentarena of post-war Austria, Milano and hisdedicated but sometimes unscrupulousstaff worked with spies, refugees, thieves,and heroes. He tells of the Vatican priestwho sold phony visas, Russian defectorswho wandered into a bar and started a riot,his bribing a police supervisor with a stolenjeep to retrieve some counterfeit docu-ments, the beautiful Nazi who convincedher Russian lover to defect, and the Ameri-can general who tried to break into a Rus-sian hospital to rescue a friend’s mistress!

This is a rollicking good yarn. It’s funny,bawdy, exciting, very entertaining, con-stantly amazing, and almost unbelievable.But it’s true! It tells us how some intelli-gence operations functioned in the unset-tled and makeshift post-war period whensmart, young soldiers, under great pressureto deliver essential data, found their wayaround the most formidable obstacles(which, in Milano’s thinking, included theState Department!). It’s a fine example ofAmerican determination, ingenuity, and hu-mor. And it’s great reading!

JOHN R. BYERSCOL, USA, Ret.Alexandria, Va.

Five Years a Cavalyman, OrSketches of Regular Army Life onthe Texas Frontier, 1866-1871 by H.H.McConnell, University of OklahomaPress, Norman, Okla., 1996. 311pages. $12.95 (paperback).

The disparity of numbers of soldiers in-volved was not the only reason that therewere hundreds of memoirs written by CivilWar participants and only a few by frontierveterans of the Indian Wars. The RegularArmy soldiers of the Indian Wars wereoften illiterate, and few kept any form of di-ary. Most written material from that phaseof American military history has come to usthrough the writings of a few officers andthe wives of officers. Thus, this book by anarticulate and perceptive Regular Army en-listed man is unique.

First published in 1889, Five Years aCavalryman is an accurate portrayal of lifein the ranks of the Sixth Cavalry on theWest Texas frontier following the Civil War.Stationed for five years at Fort Belknap andFort Richardson, typical frontier posts of

the time, McConnell presents the unglori-fied story of the officers and his fellow en-listed men in unvarnished, but articulate,terms. He reports on the heavy drinking,the boredom, and the general lack of or-ganization of frontier military life. On theother hand, he demonstrates an apprecia-tion for the environment, an appreciationthat led to his settling down in the areawhen his military service was completed.

Clearly, McConnell was unique. A veteranof three years of Union service in the CivilWar, he enlisted in the cavalry following thewar. We follow him through training at Car-lisle Barracks, on a sea voyage to Texas,and by military convoy to the Texas frontierto join the Sixth Cavalry. He was obviouslya soldier of talent, as before long he hadbeen promoted to company first sergeant,a position of much prestige and power. Hewas an astute observer of human behaviorand provides insights into the personalitiesof the officers and enlisted men who madeup the post-Civil War Regular Army.

Any reader seeking the excitement of fre-quent clashes between the cavalry and thehostiles will be disappointed, for the book isnot a recounting of war stories. In fact, it isclear that Sixth Cavalry experiences withthe Indians were largely ones of learning ofIndian depredations against settlers andthen sending out patrols that would returnempty-handed. Either McConnell seldomparticipated in such actions or found themdull compared to daily observances of theenvironment and his fellow soldiers.

Nevertheless, the book earned a reprint-ing, largely because it is so unusual tohave a witty, well-written recounting of thefrontier experience by an interested and in-telligent observer from among the ranks.

PHILIP L. BOLTEBG, USA, Ret.

West Union, S.C.

Mao’s Military Romanticism: Chinaand the Korean War, 1950-1953 byShu Guang Zhang, University Press ofKansas, 1995. 338 pages. $45.00.

Viewing war from the enemy side is al-ways a difficult task and, in the case of warwith a closed communist nation, nearly im-possible. Shu Guang Zhang, an associateprofessor of history at the University ofMaryland, offers the western reader per-

BOOKS


Postwar Spies: “A Rollicking Good Yarn...”

haps the first comprehensive view of Chi-nese strategy-making during the KoreanWar. Mao’s Military Romanticism tackles adifficult issue in military theory — the deci-siveness of men over machines in war —and succeeds in painting Mao as a roman-tic who believed that victory did not neces-sarily go to the technologically-advancedforce. Mao used Chinese combat suc-cesses in the Korean War as an opportu-nity to expand and consolidate his politicalpower at home, while uniting the Chinesepeople against U.S. “imperialism.” Whilescience continues to march, there will al-ways be battlefields where combat resem-bles a “knife fight in a phone booth.” Mao’sMilitary Romanticism deserves a place onthe military professional’s bookshelf as aprecautionary tale to any force that reliesmainly on technology for its fighting power.

MAJ KEVIN B. SMITHExecutive Officer

1st Squadron, 7th US Cavalry1st Cavalry Division

Ft. Hood, Texas

Tiger Without A Home: The UnitedStates Army Ordnance Museum’sPanzerkampfwagen VI, AusfuhrungH1 by Richard Cox, U.S. Army Ord-nance Museum Foundation, Inc., Aber-deen Proving Ground, Md. 86 pages,$12.95 (softcover).

If you’re into armored vehicle militarymodeling, this book will give you a wealthof visual and written detail of a Tiger I thatfought in the North African Campaign. Ifyou want a great example of meticulous re-search into vehicle identity, keep this on ashelf. Mr. Cox, a charter member of theU.S. Army Ordnance Museum Foundation,Inc., has written a very smooth monographabout the history of an original Henschel Ti-ger I from factory to fighting to “internment”at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and thereasons for its present whereabouts in theFederal Republic of Germany.

Tiger is well illustrated and has ampleviews of the title vehicle, with additional in-formation that rounds out the picture quitewell. A bibliography, photographic credits,footnotes, a comparison chart of the Tiger Iversus Allied tanks and tank destroyers, in-dex, and a note about the Ordnance Mu-seum Foundation are found at the end ofthe book. He clearly explains how the TigerI was developed, its good points (armorand firepower) and bad (mobility andspeed), minor field modifications in NorthAfrica, and how this particular Tiger wasfound abandoned (but not destroyed) in theU.S. II Corps area of Northern Tunisia andfirst reported in British (!) notes on June 9,1943.

However, the unstated goal of the book isan appeal to support a private group dedi-cated to historical preservation of irreplace-able military artifacts at the Ordnance Mu-seum. With cutbacks in federal funding,wheeled and tracked military history is ac-tually rusting away from lack of facilities tostore them out of the elements at Aber-deen. I’ve driven past Aberdeen’s outdoorvehicle display several times; it’s impres-sive, but I didn’t realize until I read thisbook that maintenance, much less restora-tion, is sorely lacking for those wonderful

monuments of history. I strongly urge thoseinterested in preservation to send a dona-tion to this all-volunteer (no paid staff) or-ganization, whose primary goal is the con-struction of a facility to house the artifacts.If Mr. Cox’s enthusiasm and scholarshipare indicative of the dedication of the Foun-dation’s members, there is yet hope forsaving mobile history at Aberdeen.

LARRY A. ALTERSITZLTC, Field Artillery

Westville, N.J.


Software Review

The Great Generals of the 20thCentury by Flagtower Limited,$29.95. E-mail: [email protected]

Minimum system requirements: Mul-timedia PC with a 486DX33 processor,8 MB RAM, 2X speed CD-ROM drive,256-color SVGA, sound card, mouse, 8MB hard drive space.

“The Great Generals of the 20th Cen-tury” bills itself as an entertaining multi-media presentation and a rich, authorita-tive reference tool. I found it to be pro-fessionally produced but remarkablyshallow, much like an over-hyped mediaevent: all glitz, little substance. This isra ther d ist ressing g iven the hugeamount of space potentially available onthe CD-ROM, and the small amount ofactual historical content placed on thisone.

The main menu of the CD-ROM fol-lows the lives of 15 famous generals bygrouping them into three main tracks:World War I, World War II, and PostWar (Vietnam, Arab-Israeli Wars, andDesert Storm). As usual, Korea is ne-glected — although Douglas MacArthuris covered during the WWII section.

Each general’s story is told with beau-tiful graphics and sound clips, and istold as a narrative of his participation inthe current war period. To find out aboutthe actual general in question, however,you click on another icon, and the infor-mation is somewhat bizarrely brokendown into different subtopics such asResume, Broadcasts, Public Face, Bat-tle Experience, and Pressures.

To illustrate the lack of depth of theprogram, the resume for Patton containsall of about 180 words spread overthree multimedia pages. The accompa-nying pictures are nice, but the informa-

tion is shallow. Any good encyclopediawould have much more informationabout all of these generals and warfare.

The CD-ROM contains supplementalfactsheets on Technology, Battle Visuals,Personalities, On the Battlefield, Dis-patches, and Profile (Profile being an-other biographical sketch section). Thisattempt to provide background informa-tion is again extremely limited. TheTechnology section covers Aircraft, Artil-lery, Equipment, Guns and Small Arms,and Tanks and Transport. The corre-sponding one page entries number 19,8, 11, 14, and 23.

The program’s strong points are theintroductory tutorial and the index, whichboth perform their functions well. Theweak point, as stated, is the totally su-perficial information. The program looksgood, and sounds good, but tells youvery little.

The program installs without a hitch,although it ran extremely slowly on my486-66 VESA local bus with a DiamondSpeedstar Pro graphics card and 2Xspeed CD-ROM. The audio portionswould sometimes be jerky while waitingto load. When I used my Pentium 133with a 6X speed CD-ROM, the programran much better, but the point remainsthat the company’s minimum require-ments should probably list a Pentium100+ and 4X speed CD-ROM.

I was not really impressed with thisprogram; although it does perform, theactual learning value is small. I wouldonly recommend this program to possi-bly help inform someone who has littleinterest in the military, as the multimediaapproach may help keep their attention.The serious military professional willgain nothing from this disk.

MAJ GREGORY M. SMITHG3 Exercise, 3rd Army

Ft. McPherson, Ga.

The Crew Station Trainer is a stand-alone or net-workable M1A2 tank training device. It was devel-oped collectively by the New Equipment Training(NET) team, Program Manager (PM Abrams), andGeneral Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) for NETtraining and Doctrine and Tactical Training (DTT).

The CST utilizes a Sun SPARC work station with535 megabyte internal hard drive, 32 megabyte ran-dom access memory, Solaris 1.1.1 operating system,2.4 tank (GDLS) application software, touch screen,20-inch color monitor with 1152x900 resolution,M1A2 Commander’s Control Handle Assembly withswitches, cursor active, operating on an Ethernet net-working up to 21 CSTs. SINCGARS replication ispossible for tank-like operations on the net. There arecurrently 40 systems in use with the NET team, 35systems at Fort Hood for fielding of the M1A2 tankto the 1st Cavalry Division, and five at Fort Knox forNET and DTT instructor train-up.

The CST is capable of supporting multi-echelontraining. The primary role of the CST is as an indi-vidual skills and crew coordination trainer, necessaryskills required to operate the M1A2 tank. Beyondthese basic and essential capabilities, the CST is usedto conduct digital platoon-level to battalion-level ex-ercises with some brigade-level application. The CSTin these exercises is capable of training and sustainingthe mission planning, reporting, and command andcontrol functions of the M1A2 tank, both in offensiveand/or defensive scenarios. Furthermore, the CST hasapplications that assist in maintenance training of theBuilt-In-Test (BIT) and Fault Isolation Test (FIT)which are embedded in the M1A2 tank.

The NET Team uses the CST to introduce and trainthe soldier-machine interface (SMI) and explain thefunctionality of the M1A2 tank screens at theDriver’s Integrated Display (DID), Gunner’s ControlDisplay Panel (GCDP), and Commander’s IntegratedDisplay (CID). This training is conducted at a stu-dent-to-instructor ratio of 36:1, as opposed to trainingconducted on the tank at 4:1. The CST allows sol-diers in training to become fully familiar with the op-erations of the new tank prior to any hands-on train-ing. This reduces the fuel and Class IX needed for theNET process. The classroom is also more conduciveto learning the SMI and functions of of the tank dis-plays (the classroom is air-conditioned and heated).

Training is conducted on a staggered schedule. Atank battalion is divided in half, and its training con-ducted on a 2-day rotation. Two companies receivetraining in the classroom, followed by training in themotor pool, and then the other two companies starttraining. This rotation continues throughout the 20-day NET training cycle.

One primary instructor and six assistant instructorsconduct the classroom training. The primary instruc-tor presents all information required to operate thestation being trained and projects the display on ascreen observable by all the students in the classroom.The students follow along with the PI on their CST.

One of the CST’s key functions is its ability to trainthe unit on the uses of the Inter-Vehicular Informa-tion System (IVIS), which is the major part of thetraining required to master the M1A2. IVIS is the in-formation system that enables the tank to use the digi-tal data link between other digital systems on the bat-tlefield. Some of the information that passes throughIVIS are mission planning (graphics), position up-dates (both your tank and the location of all IVIS-equipped vehicles on the net), reports (spot, contact,request for fires, request for air, medevac, sitrep, etc.),and enemy location.

The CST has been used to train 3/8 and 1/7 Cavs atFort Hood. The system was a great help in reducingthe number of instructors required to train these units.During the training, numerous soldiers of 3-8 Cavmade favorable comments on the training. SFC Bitzwrote, “The entire course was broken down to wherethe most computer-illiterate person on my crew couldcomprehend and follow.” From another crew in ACo, “CST...made learning seem real life for the pri-vates who were having trouble.” The crew of A11wrote “CST is an excellent investment.” The crew ofD32 wrote the CST was a good training tool because“I feel that the crew watching someone else do it be-fore they get to the tank helps a lot.”

As the Army moves forward into the 21st century,the digital classroom will and must become an inte-gral part of training and sustaining a unit’s digitaliza-tion capability. Systems such as the CST will ensurethat we train intelligently for the future battlefieldsour tankers will find themselves on.

The Crew Station Trainer (CST) by Master Sergeant David T. Worley,

M1A2 NET Team Chief

PIN: 074746-000

armor july august web

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