****Arms Control Aff / Neg: NCC’19 DRAFT****SolvencyPlan: 1AC

The United States federal government should establish a national space policy substantially increasing its international space cooperation with the People’s Republic of China through the offer of, and implemention upon acceptance of, transparency and confidence building measures related to space weapons.

Solvency: 1AC

Plan solves–creates a posture shift that produces restraint and cooperation

Brian Weeden, Technical Adviser, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN STRATEGIC DOMAINS, NBR Special Report n. 57, National Bureau of Asian Research, ed. T.Tanner & W.Dong, 4—16, p. 80-81. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Transparency and confidence-building mechanisms for managing tensions and crises. The prospects of banning or prohibiting the development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO technologies are slim. RPO technology has many legitimate peaceful uses and potentially significant commercial applications. Both the United States and China are likewise developing their direct ascent kinetic-kill technologies as a result of strong, but different, national interests that are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Moreover, verification challenges associated with the space domain will continue to impede any arms control initiative that is built on bans or limits on deployment of technology or capabilities. A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct ascent and RPO. TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs: information exchange on space policies, information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities. Improving information on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in the U.S.-China relationship in this domain. While determining a satellite’s exact capabilities and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000 human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all satellite operators. China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and, presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India, and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well. As SSA capabilities continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on responsible and irresponsible behavior in space. Such agreements should be aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches of national security satellites; signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons. A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural and bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the national security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism in the space domain that results from policy decisions made during the Kennedy administration as well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States has a decisive advantage. For China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the United States, opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources. Both countries also have the usual organizational silos and impediments to sharing information internally that are inherent to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral sharing. Both countries need to come to the realization that enhancing SSA capabilities and increasing transparency on activities in space are in their national interests. While some more exquisite national SSA capabilities should be reserved for security uses, there is a much broader set of basic SSA capabilities that are relatively common among all spacefaring nations and essential to safe space activities, including those of commercial satellite operators. Increased sharing of data from these capabilities and collaboration on enhancing and improving them will result in positive externalities that will benefit all countries.

Transparency between the two parties is low now—opacity in decision-making, intent

Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation and Vice-Chair, Global Agenda Council on Space Security, World Economic Forum, “U.S.-China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities, and Options,” ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, DETERRENCE AND SINO-AMERICAN SPACE RELATIONS, Stimson Center, ed. M.Krepon & J.Thompson, 9—13, p. 115. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The United States has consistently pushed for greater transparency concerning China’s decision-making process, budget and space policy. China is deliberately opaque on military capabilities in general, and space capabilities in particular. Opacity in decision making can be an effective way for a weaker state to deal with a stronger state. The United States may also be opaque to China, but for different reasons, as the abundance of information and diversity of viewpoints can lead to confusion abroad about US policy. Transparency is even more challenging an issue because neither China nor the United States wishes to reveal military space capabilities or vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is extraordinarily difficult for Washington and Beijing to distinguish between correlation and causation relating to military space decisions. It is often unclear whether national actions reflect a rational decision-making process of a government as a whole, organizational behavior within a government or “court politics” within a government. The US X-37B space plane serves as an example of the difficulty of divining intent, the lack of transparency and distinguishing between correlation and causation. The X-37B is a miniaturized, fully-automated version of the space shuttle that is able to stay on orbit for several months at a time. It could be used for either peaceful or offensive military purposes. The Pentagon will not describe specifically what the X-37B is doing on orbit nor provide details of its location while on orbit.

Cooperation is possible—both countries have a strong interest in the sustainability of space domain activities

Brian Weeden, Technical Adviser, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN STRATEGIC DOMAINS, NBR Special Report n. 57, National Bureau of Asian Research, ed. T.Tanner & W.Dong, 4—16, p. 77. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The long-term sustainability of space. The biggest area of overlap is both countries’ desire to maintain the long-term sustainability of the space domain. The United States, as well as increasingly China, has invested significant resources in developing space capabilities to support national security, economic, and political goals. Thus, both have a keen interest in mitigating the negative impacts that environmental concerns such as space debris, space weather, and radio-frequency interference have on day-to-day space operations and the long-term ability of all countries to use space. While these dangers often get less attention than intentional threats such as ASAT weapons, they are more probable and could have just as devastating an impact on space capabilities. Both the United States and China should thus continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability of space. Over the last several years, space sustainability has become an increasingly important issue and the focus of a number of initiatives. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both the United States and China to be seen as playing a leadership role in space governance and being responsible space powers.

S: Dialogue / Diplomacy Key

Dialogues are key to strategic stability in space—need to be expanded

James P. Finch, Principle Director, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth,” JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY, 1st Quarter, 2015, p. 20. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

At the government-to-government (so-called Track 1) level, there is not currently a productive venue for the United States and China to develop a mutual understanding of how space plays into crisis stability. While space security has been incorporated into existing diplomatic and defense dialogues, these steps in the right direction have been slow and tentative, and there is much work to be done. Recently, some engagements led by think tanks (known as Track 1.5 dialogues due to mixed delegations of government and academics) have begun to explore the issue, and it is clear that both sides harbor a lot of mistrust and misperception. The United States continues to raise questions about China’s military modernization and its potential coercion of regional neighbors over contested territory. China continues to question the implications of expanding U.S. missile defenses and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Suspicions about space activities fit within this broader geopolitical mistrust. The United States continues to express concern about Chinese space activities and China’s lack of transparency when it comes to unique space launch profiles or robotics experiments. China, for its part, expresses concerns about U.S. activities, such as the reusable experimental test platform known as the X-37B. These misperceptions are hard to resolve, both because of the inherent dual-use nature of space systems and the difficulty in creating transparency for a regime so far removed from terra firma. Resolving such suspicions and building trust take time and require a common understanding of the nature of the space domain and space systems. Returning to the formulation of Colby, recall that “in a stable situation . . . major war would only come about because one party truly sought it, not because of miscalculation.” Miscalculation is best avoided when each side understands the implications of its actions and understands how the other side will interpret and react to those actions. This situation does not exist in today’s environment regarding space systems and space weapons. We lack a common understanding of how space will contribute to, or come to define, potential crises between the United States and China. As both countries seek to define a “new type of great power relationship,” it would be wise to consider how new technologies and operational concepts are best managed during crises. Given both sides’ growing reliance on space systems to achieve their future military and political aims, a lack of understanding comes with great peril. We should strive to build a common framework now, using dialogues during peacetime, before provocative actions in space during a crisis imperil stability here on Earth.

U.S. diplomatic engagement is necessary to secure the space environment

Laura Grego and David Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists, SECURING THE SKIES: TEN STEPS THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF SPACE, 11—10, p. 12-13. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Substantial Diplomatic Engagement Is Essential The purpose of diplomatic discussions and negotiations on space is to assure the beneficial uses of that environment and prevent hostile or irresponsible ones. This goal may be achieved through agreed-upon rules, institutions, and coordinating mechanisms that would set standards of behavior, create predictability, and define rights, responsibilities, and consequences. Active diplomatic engagement, as well as the agreements it produces, can also help ensure that disputes over the use of space are averted—or at least managed in ways that do not create conflicts or exacerbate crises on the ground. While efforts to control some dangerous technologies are valuable, the primary emphasis of these efforts should be on regulating behaviors rather than technologies. The fact that much space technology is dual-use can make it difficult to construct a detailed definition of “space weapon.” But by focusing on behaviors, making progress on space security does not depend on agreeing on such a definition. The CD is seen by many countries as the legitimate forum for discussions on space security. However, to make fruitful space talks more likely, the countries involved might also consider new procedures that avoid the CD’s requirement of reaching consensus on an agenda, which has linked other issues to space security discussions. For example, countries at the CD could agree to allow an agenda to move forward even without unanimous agreement. Consensus could still be required for any formal agreement resulting from the discussions. More generally, the best venue, format, and scope of diplomatic engagement should all be part of initial discussions, during which time they could be chosen through agreement among the countries with the biggest stakes in the issues involved. In addition, such initial discussions should consider not only the range of problems but also the range of possible solutions and outcomes. The goal of negotiations should be to reach agreements, while recognizing that those agreements may take different forms. Less formal types of cooperation—including voluntary codes of conduct, coordination, or transparency measures (which provide information about capabilities or activities but do not constrain them)—may be appropriate solutions to some problems. Other issues may best be addressed with legally binding obligations, verification, and compliance-management mechanisms. These various options should all be considered possible parts of whatever solution is being sought. The temptation to rely entirely on informal agreements may be hard to avoid, as they are sometimes easier to negotiate and are less constraining. However, formal legal agreements have important benefits. They are binding and more durable than informal agreements, they can include more extensive and effective verification and compliance-management mechanisms, and they often establish a body with the legal authority and resources to facilitate implementation and resolve disputes. Because formal agreements are more likely than informal ones to provide the confidence and predictability that is a key benefit of diplomacy, for some issues they will be the most appropriate solutions. These solutions must be guided by the interests of the full spectrum of stakeholders. National security issues, while important, are only one aspect of space activities. The U.S. approach to these discussions (and U.S. policy) should reflect this fact by better balancing military, commercial, and civilian interests in space.

S: TCBMs Effective

We should engage China, particularly over issues related to checking weaponization

Ralph A. Cossa and David Santoro, analysts, Pacific Forum CSIS, “Paving the Way for a ‘New Type of Major Country Relations’”, Eighth China-US Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics, Conference Report, ISSUES & INSIGHTS v. 14 n. 9, Held in Beijing, November 4-5, 2013, p. 15. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Our Chinese speaker agreed that China and the United States have important shared interests and goals in space and that dialogue is important, especially as threats are increasing. The question is how to frame this dialogue. According to Beijing, it should be based on equality and mutual trust and take into account political considerations. In this regard, Washington needs to remember that Beijing’s activities in space are essential. Progress in space cooperation is urgent because it has become a strategic issue but, as our speaker put it, “we need to find the right atmospherics now.” Beijing’s principal focus is to promote the peaceful uses of space and, in particular, to prevent the weaponization of this domain. Since existing rules in outer space cannot address current problems, it is important to enhance multilateral cooperation to close gaps and limitations in the regime. Developing an international code of conduct would be a positive development, but it is not an end in itself. A more comprehensive system of rules is needed. A new outer space treaty would be ideal. In this regard, the 2008 PPWT proposal is critical. Many, including the United States, have criticized it on the basis that such a treaty would not be verifiable. Opening negotiations now, however, would be harmless and, with time, solutions can be found to its problems. Recent developments suggest that progress may be in the offing. The draft resolution on “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities” jointly tabled by China, Russia, and the United States in the UN General Assembly First Committee Meeting in October 2013 suggests that greater cooperation among major powers is possible.

We need a reassurance strategy for military issues—information exchanges and joint studies would be effective

Nancy W. Gallagher, Associate Director for Research, Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) and Senior Research Scholar, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, “Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation,” CISSM WORKING PAPER, 8—14, p. 18. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Both the United States and China would like reassurance that the other is not preparing to attack their satellites, or conduct debris-generating tests that could inadvertently damage them. They will get further by specifying the problem in a way that covers both sides’ concerns, and thus creates incentives for both sides to cooperate. Thus, if the United States wants to talk about how China plans to use its advancing hit-to-kill capabilities, the United States should be willing to provide more reliable reassurance about its missile defense and anti-satellite plans.

Some of that reassurance could come in the form of information exchanges and joint studies. For example, the more China has learned about the capabilities and limitations of existing missile defense technologies through its own research and development efforts, the less alarmed it is about the near-term effects of U.S. missile defense programs on strategic stability, although it remains concerned about the long-term effects of large U.S. investments in missile defense, especially around China’s periphery. The more the United States and China learn about how small and short-lived would be the military advantages of disabling or destroying one of the military satellites that the United States uses over the Asia-Pacific region for communication, intelligence, targeting, or navigation, and how much harder it would be to control conflict escalation if either side began attacking satellites, the less likely they are to see this as an attractive course of action.

S: A2 “No Coop”

Cooperation is possible—we need to establish diplomatic channels to prevent divergent interests from hurting the relationship

Brian Weeden, Technical Adviser, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN STRATEGIC DOMAINS, NBR Special Report n. 57, National Bureau of Asian Research, ed. T.Tanner & W.Dong, 4—16, p. 77. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The previous two sections on U.S. and Chinese perceptions of their own and each other’s interests in space revealed several areas of overlapping interests. These areas present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement that could help strengthen the bilateral relationship. At the same time, it is clear that stark differences and disagreements also exist between the two countries in the space domain. These areas of divergence are the result of major structural, cultural, and political differences that are unlikely to be resolved in the near to medium term. Thus, mechanisms are needed to help manage tensions and crises that may occur over time. The following discussion identifies these areas of convergence and divergence and proposes steps that can be taken to strengthen the U.S.-China relationship in space while also reducing tensions and the risk of conflict.

Adv: Crisis StabilityCrisis Stability: 1AC

A space arms race is coming and it risks massive instability

David A. Koplow, Professor, Law, Georgetown University, “The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space,” HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL v. 59 n. 2, Summer 2018, p. 339-347. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Humans have demonstrated remarkable creativity and persistence in developing a plethora of space weapons. For purposes of this Article, the full array of counter-space or space-control activities and apparatus is under evaluation. The technology (as developed, tested, and deployed, or at least as conceptualized) includes kinetic-energy interceptors (developing a physical mass of some sort to be sent into space, to collide with a target or to explode nearby, shattering both vehicles); directed-energy systems (exploring the use of high energy lasers, microwave systems, or other concepts, to burn holes in targeted satellites, blind their sensors, or otherwise damage or destroy them); or cyber mechanisms (inventing capabilities to interfere with uplinks and downlinks, to disrupt the space vehicle’s normal functions, or even to commandeer it).10 Critical elements of these systems could be based on Earth, on aircraft, or on satellites. Moreover, an attacker contemplating a challenge to a rival’s space system could elect to target whatever appeared to be the weakest, most vulnerable component: the satellite itself, the ground station that controls and communicates with it, or the electronic or other links between them.

With all those variables, it is not surprising that the world has seen arms races in space before, but what is surprising is that we have always managed to avoid the worst, most expensive, and most destabilizing versions. In fact, the history of ASAT weaponry is virtually as old as the history of satellites— both the United States and the Soviet Union began exploring mechanisms for attacking enemy orbiters in the 1950s and 1960s.11 By the 1970s and 1980s, each superpower had thoroughly tested and evaluated multiple concepts, and each had deployed an ASAT weapon with “operational” status.12 The principal U.S. enterprise employed a guided missile to be launched into space by a rapidly-ascending F-15 Eagle fighter jet; it was successfully tested in 1985 against a defunct Solwind satellite, spectacularly obliterating the target.13

However, a remarkable hiatus then followed, as both countries refrained from further overt ASAT-test operations. No treaty required this restraint; there was not even an explicit non-legally-binding agreement on unilateral moratoria. But the next two decades were relatively free of salient ASAT developments, as each side seemingly assessed that further acceleration in that direction was contrary to its interests.14 A common refrain was that space had been “militarized, but not weaponized,” meaning that multiple military operations were conducted through satellites, but that no weapons (capable of attacking satellites or targets on Earth) had yet been operationally deployed into space.15

That complacency was rudely shattered in 2007, when China dramatically entered the ASAT testing business. Beijing authorities launched an SC-19 interceptor aboard a multi-stage solid-fuel missile from the Xichang Satel lite Launch Center in Sichuan Province; it collided with a defunct FY-1C satellite at an altitude of 865 kilometers, shattering both spacecrafts. The resulting plume of fragments—over 3000 pieces large enough to be tracked from Earth (and large enough to pose a substantial hazard to other satellites)—is expected to remain aloft for decades as the single worst debris creating incident in space history.16

The next year, the United States responded, shooting down one of its own failing satellites, in Operation Burnt Frost. There, the U.S.S. Lake Erie, a Navy guided missile cruiser, launched a Standard Missile-3, part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, to ram into a non-functional National Reconnaissance Office satellite designated as USA-193 at 240 kilometers altitude several hundred miles northwest of Hawaii. Because of the lower altitude, the debris from this event fell back to Earth relatively quickly, posing much less hazard to space navigation—but nonetheless demonstrating the U.S. capability for neutralizing satellites.17

If those events served as a “wake-up call” about the renewal of ASAT activity, the alarms continued to sound (albeit without the concussive effect of satellite destructions) in the following years. China, for example, continued to test space interceptors, but without causing catastrophic collisions by targeting an ascending vehicle against an unoccupied pre-designated point in space or by gently “bumping” a target spacecraft at low relative speed. In 2010, 2013, and 2014, China conducted delicate maneuvers involving multiple satellite close approaches and a robotic arm, activities with both benign and weapons applications. Most vividly, in 2013, China ominously launched a similar experimental rocket to much higher altitude, almost reaching the special geosynchronous orbit at 36,000 km, at which many of the most valuable reconnaissance and communications satellites are parked.18

Russia undertook a series of four launches in 2013 and 2014 that delivered maneuverable spacecraft into orbit, conducting covert “rendezvous and proximity operations” (“RPO”), testing the ability to execute deft approaches to other orbiters and employing a robotic arm. Similar, still-mysterious events in 2015 involved repeated, slow close approaches to targeted spacecraft, validating capabilities for inspection, servicing, or attack. Again in 2016, Russia conducted non-destructive interception tests in space. Russian officials have been ambiguous about their intentions, sometimes ascribing these events to anti-missile programs, but sometimes overtly acknowledging a dedicated ASAT-development enterprise.19

In each instance, the nature and motivation of these test flights remain obscure—in space, many of the techniques and much of the hardware are inherently dual-capable, adaptable for both benign scientific research and weapons applications. Even within the military sector, it is difficult for outside observers to discern whether a particular space enterprise is devoted to anti-satellite functions or to the refinement of an ability to defend against incoming ballistic missiles and warheads.20

Thus inspired (or panicked), U.S. space officials have responded with renewed concern about the safety of U.S. space assets, and they have redoubled their attention to corrective or offsetting actions. The Obama administration hurriedly added an extra $5 billion to the Pentagon budget for unspecified space security enhancements and undertook to assess how best to protect the U.S. satellite architecture from surging threats.21 The United States launched two new observation satellites into geosynchronous orbits as sentinels against malicious activity,22 and it continued testing the mysterious X-37B space plane, which could be capable of a plethora of dual-purpose operations.23 Some of the new funding has also been devoted to frankly offensive space control activities, about which less has been made public.24

Leaders in each of the three protagonist states have spoken with increased frankness about the prospect of a new arms race in space.25 From the United States, much of the rhetoric sounds in inevitability and “normalization”— depicting space as just another military operational environment, akin to land, sea, and air, in which armed competition is to be expected sooner or later. From that viewpoint, a prudent defense must anticipate hostilities from all azimuths and prepare to respond to (or to anticipate) an adversary’s pursuit of the special advantages of operating in the “new high ground.”26

Other states, too, are expressing new interest in military operations in space, including pursuit of ASAT capabilities. They—including Russia and China—may feel that they are not “starting” a new arms race but are merely attempting belatedly to follow the space weaponization lead pioneered by the United States.27

In any event, the “mantra” of the U.S. space defense community has come to focus on the “3 Cs”—the description of space as being “congested” (crammed with an ever-increasing number of operational satellites and uncontrolled debris); “contested” (with more countries initiating military activities designed to challenge other states’ abilities to conduct space operations); and “competitive” (with multiple users crowding into finite orbital slots and employing scarce radio frequencies for communications). In this context, if outer space was ever a true “sanctuary,” removed from the burdens of traditional terrestrial military competition and threat, it is no longer so privileged, and the prospect looms of a particularly parlous military space race.28

Underpinning these dangers is the observation that space is an environment in which the offense enjoys distinct advantages. That is, the task of attacking a satellite is technically easier and cheaper than the task of defending against those onslaughts. Many of the current satellites that constitute the backbone of the national security space capabilities incorporate numerous inherent vulnerabilities: they are often large and conspicuous, following known trajectories with little maneuverability, making them “sitting ducks” for attack. They are expensive and few in number, without backup inventories of spare replacements that could be rapidly launched to substitute for any damaged in conflict. They are not “hardened” or shielded against attack, and adding protective cladding would impose weight penalties that could raise costs and degrade performance.29

Future generations of small or micro-satellites might redress many of these vulnerabilities, and efforts are underway to develop a more resilient satellite architecture, better able to withstand possible hostilities. Adaptations could include dispersing satellite functions among many, smaller satellites—instead of relying so extensively upon a few exquisite behemoths— and leveraging the growing space capabilities of the private sector and of U.S. allies. Learning, or relearning, how to fight without access to the full suite of satellite services, such as by reinvesting in some old-fashioned terrestrial alternatives, is part of the emerging picture, too. The newfound goal is to create a more responsive and diverse structure, capable of persistence and reconstitution in the event of an attack—one that could fail gracefully, rather than catastrophically, when things go wrong. But for now—and until the United States and others are able to reconfigure their satellite portfolios—space is a realm in which the potential offense remains dominant.30

One possible U.S. response to these emerging provocations, therefore, would be mimicry: creating or enhancing ASAT systems of its own, matching or exceeding whatever advances Russia and China can accomplish. As noted above, there could be multiple venues for this extraterrestrial competition, including kinetic, directed-energy, cyber, and other technologies, with components based on Earth, in the air, or in space. Proliferating such weaponry might create a deterrence relationship in space, perhaps akin to the uneasy interplay of offsetting threats and counter-threats that (sometimes) constrains inter-state violence on Earth. Each side would know that if it initiated anti-satellite attacks, it would suffer corresponding harm to its own orbiters, and each might be definitively reluctant to go there.31

But that structure is unreliable and uncomfortable, for all the reasons that deterrence doctrine suffers in more traditional contexts.32 Moreover, in space, a profound asymmetry exacerbates the problems: the United States extracts far more benefits from its satellites than do other countries, and the U.S. satellite constellations are therefore more exposed and endangered than others’. If a shooting war were to start in, or move to, space, the United States would have far more to lose, and even if the U.S. ASAT capabilities were greater than those of its rivals, the United States would run out of targets to shoot at fairly quickly, long before its potential adversaries had exhausted their ASAT magazines.33

In sum, the contemporary and emerging dangers are multifaceted. First, and most obviously, any substantial use in combat of anti-satellite weapons would be catastrophic: the damage to military capabilities and to the civilian economy could be both vast and irreparable. Even the peacetime testing or demonstration of an evolving ASAT musculature could generate an untenable quantity of debris, ruining all states’ aspirations for effective, economical use of space. Moreover, an international arms race in developing competing mechanisms for asserting space control could deter optimal patterns of peaceful exploitation of space, and even the current amplifying rhetoric about weaponization of space may make some wary potential space actors hesitate about investing in new space capabilities.

The central premise of this Article—and a core postulate for much of the standard U.S. national security policy—is that reliance upon measures of deterrence and defense alone is insufficient and unsound. Arms-control measures—if well-crafted, with adequate assurances of verification of compliance and robust enforcement—would provide a valuable complementary posture. Instead of simply emulating and offsetting the undesired counter-space deployments by our potential enemies, it would be more advantageous to prevent those weapons from being developed and fielded in the first place. Wise U.S. policy, therefore, should undertake to divert the leading spacefaring states from ASAT competition, rather than lead (or even follow) an arms race in that catastrophe-prone direction.34

The resulting security dilemmas risk war

Jack M. Beard, Assistant Professor, Law, University of Nebraska and former Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense, “Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 37, 2017, p. 358-359. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Varied bilateral and multilateral instruments that are intended to serve as arms control measures between adversary states must, however, overcome many hurdles to be established and face severe challenges in functioning effectively. This is particularly true in the domain of space, where conditions encouraging an arms race abound. Fears, suspicions and accusations about new space weapon systems and military space projects continue to multiply, as evidenced particularly by the growing concerns expressed by Russia and China on the one hand, and by America on the other, about each other’s space programs.

Such fears and suspicions can contribute to the classic “security dilemma,” in which actions taken by a state intended to be defensive in nature are instead perceived by other states as aggressive or threatening, producing unintended and undesired consequences.92 Arms races are “only the most obvious manifestation” of the resulting downward spiral of these misperceptions.93 Predictable and yet unnecessary counter-measures may thus be taken by “threatened” states (for example, as U.S. rivals are developing their own responses to a spaceplane like the X-37B), causing further insecurity and fueling more dangerous and expensive arms races in space.94

The classic security dilemma is made even more acute in space because a state may feel threatened by an adversary’s development and deployment of technologies that are dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses.95 The abundance of dual-use technologies in space may thus further obscure an adversary's real intentions and make it even more difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures (and the possibility that new, devastating military advantages have been achieved).

Space miscalc will happen without norms and escalates---risk is high from preemptive pressures---five (?) warrants

Grego 18, Laura---senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (“Space and Crisis Stability,” draft accessed via UPenn, March 19, 2018, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypd, accessed August 14, 2019) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an ―offense-dominant‖ regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass 5 is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel ―use it or lose it pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these ―use it or lose it pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to ―natural‖ causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a ―hair trigger‖ or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame, or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24 warned that it was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employed to achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionality States have fairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea, built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or ―red lines‖ lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons. For example, the United States is the country most heavily dependent on military space assets. Its proportionally higher commitment to expeditionary forces make this likely to be true well into the future. So while the United States seeks to create a deterrence framework, punishment-based deterrence would not likely target its adversary‘s space assets. But then there is difficulty finding target on the ground that would be credible but also not unpredictably escalate a crisis. If an American military satellite were attacked but without attendant human casualties (‗satellites have no mothers‘), retaliation on an adversary‘s ground-based target is likely to escalate the conflict, perhaps justifying the adversary‘s subsequent claim to self-defense, even if the initial satellite attack didn‘t support such a claim. Little experience in engaging substantively in these issues Related to this issue is that there is relatively little experience among the major space actors in handling a crisis with the others. The United States and the Soviet Union, then Russia, have had a long history of strategic discussions and negotiations. This built up a shared understanding of each other‘s point of view, developed relationships between those conducting those discussions, and created bureaucracies and expertise to support those discussions. This experience and these relationships are important to interpreting events and to resolving disputes before they turn into a crisis, and to managing one once it begins. There is nothing like this level of engagement around space issues between these two states, and much less between the US and China. One of the participants in a 2010 US space war game, a diplomatic veteran, imagined25 how things would play out if one or more militarily important US satellites failed amidst a crisis with an adversary known to have sophisticated offensive cyber and space capabilities: The good news is that there has never been a destructive conflict waged in either the space or cyber domains. The bad news is that no one around the situation room table can cite any history from previous wars, or common bilateral understandings with the adversary, relating to space and cyber conflict as a guide to what the incoming reports mean, and what may or may not happen next. This is the big difference between the space-cyber domains, and the nuclear domain. There is, in this future scenario, no credible basis for anyone around the president to attribute restraint to the adversary, no track record from which to interpret the actions by the adversary. There is no crisis management history: the president has no bilateral understandings or guidelines from past diplomatic discussions, and no operational protocols from previous incidents where space and cyber moves and counter-moves created precedents. Perhaps the adversary intended to make a point with one series of limited attacks, and hoped for talks with Washington and a compromise; but for all the president knows, sitting in the situation room, the hostile actions taken against America‘s space assets and information systems are nothing less than early stages of an all-out assault on US interests.

A space conflict would be devastating—goes nuclear, and destroys the economy

Omar Lamrani, Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor, “What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,” NATIONAL INTEREST, 5—18—16, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248?nopaging=1, accessed 5-18-19. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to better prepare for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological advancements in the coming decades could allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space attack.

Economic decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, and regional instability

Mann ’14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system. The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

The plan solves – provides a middle ground for the two countries  

Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Science, “Use Outer Space to Strengthen U.S.-China Ties,” WAR ON THE ROCKS, 4—2-6—16, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/, accessed 8-20-19. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China.∂ The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship.∂ The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy.∂ China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States.∂ As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression.,∂ Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities.∂ Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.∂ At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.  That effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemma.”  

 

TCBMs prevent arms races and miscalc

Cong 15. (Fu, Chinese Ambassador to the UN. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador FU Cong of China at the joint ad hoc meeting of the First and the Fourth Committee on Space Security of the 70th Session of the UNGA,” Mission of the People Republic of China to the United Nations Office. 10/22/2015. http://www.china-un.ch/eng/hom/t1308678.htm) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

TCBMs in outer space are conducive to enhancing political confidence. Appropriate and feasible TCBMs can complement efforts aiming at prevention of space weaponization and arms race by enhancing mutual confidence, reducing misperception and misjudgement, and regulating space activities. TCBMs can also serve as the basis for verification of a future space legal instrument. In this connection, the 2013 GGE report made an objective evaluation of space security situation and proposed valuable recommendations on TCBMs for space activities. These recommendations are worthy of all countries’ careful consideration and implementation in light of their own national conditions. It needs to be emphasized, however, that countries at different level of space capabilities may have different concerns about TCBMs, and that their abilities to accept a specific TCBM may also vary. Therefore, multilateral discussions in this filed must be conducted in an equal and open manner, so as to ensure that the agreed TCBMs can be implemented smoothly and effectively. 

Crisis: A2 “Arms Control Fails”

Arms control is necessary and works—nuclear war otherwise

John Mecklin, Editor-in-Chief, “Why Star Wars Should Remain a Cinematic Fantasy,” BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS v. 74 n. 4, 2019, p. 135-136. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

Now, US military efforts, show business, and outer space are merging once again, under another president with a background as an entertainer. In February, US President Donald Trump announced the establishment of a Space Force, which the White House described as a sixth US military branch (while, simultaneously, noting that the new branch would “initially be established within the Department of the Air Force”). A White House fact sheet full of martial language says the president had directed the Defense Department to put forward a legislative proposal that would “[o]rganize, train and equip our space warfighters with nextgeneration capabilities” so as to “[m]aximize warfighting capability and advocacy for space while minimizing bureaucracy.”

I asked six top experts to weigh in on disparate aspects of the current state of global military competition in space. Perhaps not so remarkably, five of them – Russian researcher Alexey Arbatov, longtime US defense analyst Lawrence Korb, Joan Johnson-Freese and David Burbach of the US Naval War College, and UN space security fellow Daniel Porras – found their assignments leading them to advocate not for “warfighting capability,” but for arms control that might short-circuit the dangerous and destabilizing outer space-oriented arms race that already has begun. The sixth author, longtime science writer Jeff Hecht, wrote about the current state of laser technology, finding that it has improved over the three decades since the initial proposal for a space-based “Star Wars” missile defense program, but still is not ready for prime time: “The new enthusiasm for lasers in space is not exactly a sequel. Usually the characters in a sequel have learned something from their experience in the earlier films. So far it looks more like a remake, in which different actors in an updated setting repeat the mistakes of the original characters with more modern equipment.”

As Arbatov points out in “Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward,” space has been used for military purposes – for trials of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile interceptors, for tests of nuclear explosives, for deployment of military satellites and anti-satellite systems, and more – for seven decades. In recent years, however, the United States, Russia, China, and India have started down the more dangerous path of space weaponization, by, among other things, testing missiles that can shoot down satellites in low-level orbits. Weapons capable of targeting the early warning satellites that circle Earth at much higher orbits – these are the satellites that warn nations of ballistic missile attack – would be extraordinarily destabilizing and make nuclear war distinctly more likely. There is no reason to think weapons that can target early warning satellites won’t be fielded, unless the major nuclear nations agree to undertake negotiations on new arms control measures aimed at limiting spacerelated weaponry.

As the major powers of the world race to build military services dedicated to operating in space, it would be well to remember that, outside the movies, space war will involve little swashbuckling. If (as the Trump administration has so incautiously put it) significant “warfighting” occurs in space, Luke Skywalker won’t zoom to the rescue, and the results – the kind of high-tech, worldwide, conventional and nuclear “air-space warfare” that Arbatov describes – will be a show no sane person wants to watch.

Crisis: A2 “Arms Racing Inevitable”

Mutual constraint can prevent arms racing—it is not inevitable

James Clay Moltz, Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 2-3. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

The risk of space conflict raises a number of troubling challenges as we stand on the threshold of a major expansion of human space activity. In order to prevent space warfare, we will need to understand the preconditions for bringing about greater collaboration among Earth’s nations in orbit. Can we achieve cooperation sooner than in the Star Trek series and without having to go through the possibly disastrous effects of nuclear or space war? Might successful cooperation in nearEarth space—such as on the International Space Station (ISS)—serve as a first step? Perhaps, but the current space station does not include a number of important new spacefaring countries. Also, recent destructive activities in low-Earth orbit by China and the United States and threats by other nations to develop similar anti-satellite capabilities presage difficulties in overcoming international mistrust in space.

Yet humans have an amazing potential to learn and to engage in self-restraint, once they figure out that it is in their best interests to do so. If there is a single lesson from the Cold War in space, it is that both sides eventually learned that unrestricted military behavior risked uncontrollable conflict and the possible ruination of the near-Earth space environment, thereby worsening their individual and mutual security. For this reason, Washington and Moscow exercised remarkable self-restraint even during the most hostile years of the space race, forged non-interference agreements, and never fired shots in anger in space. Ironically, in some respects we seem further from such cooperative policies in the early twenty-first century.

Achieving a peaceful and sustainable international approach to space will require an even firmer commitment to responsible behavior among today’s emerging space actors because useful orbits are becoming more populated than ever before. What each country or other spacefaring entity does has the potential to affect everyone else. But can we shift from a traditional focus on self-interest and beating our adversaries to a focus on broader goals for humankind, such as peaceful development, joint policing, and collaborative colonization of space? Perhaps if we step back to recognize that we exist in a rough universe for human life—at least judging by the apparent rarity of our species among the known planets— we can begin to broaden our perspective of what is truly important.

Crisis: A2 “No Arms Racing”

Arms racing risk is high---China, Russia, and the US all have new nuclear capabilities, and regional crises are likely to escalate

Grego 18, Laura---senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (“Space and Crisis Stability,” draft accessed via UPenn, March 19, 2018, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypd, accessed August 14, 2019) ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

For the foreseeable future, military tensions between the United States, China, and Russia are likely to remain high, as are those between China and India. Even absent intentional confrontation, regional problems, such as those in the Baltics and East and South Asia, have the potential to draw these actors into conflict. Thus, it is imperative to pay attention to any pathways that could lead an actor considering crossing the nuclear threshold, or approaching it very closely. The United States and Russia continue to retain large nuclear arsenals on high alert1 . Each are developing new strategic weapons, including hypersonic conventional prompt global strike systems with a suggestion mission of holding ground-based anti-satellite weapons at risk.2 Russia has declared the existence of novel nuclear delivery systems as a response to US missile defense systems,3 weapons which complicate the management of crises. China is reportedly considering increasing the size, capacity and alert status of its nuclear weapons delivery systems4 and is also developing new kinds of strategic weapons. China is also developing hypersonic weapons,5 and the ingredients for an arms race around these technologies is in place. India continues to increase the sophistication of its strategic posture. And India, China, Russia and the United States have or are pursuing missile defense technologies that are important both in the nuclear realm but in space issues, since missile defenses present demonstrated or inherent antisatellite capabilities. Thus it is critical to ensure that in times of tension, no actor escalates the crisis inadvertently or against their better judgment, and that misperception does not play an important role in the initiation or progress of the crisis. And that hostilities, if initiated, resolve as quickly as possible. Thomas Schelling‘s encapsulated an aspect of this idea in his landmark work this way: This is the problem of surprise attack. If surprise carries an advantage, it is worth while [sic] to avert it by striking first. Fear that the other may be about to strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other‘s motive. But if the gains from even successful surprise are less desired than no war at all, there is no ―fundamental‖ basis for an attack by each side. Nevertheless, it look as though a modest temptation on each side to sneak in the first place — a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack — might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of ―He thinks we think he thinks we think … he think we think he‘ll attack; so he thinks we will; so he will; so we must.6 This suggests that it is important to make the advantage of surprise attack negligible and the disadvantages as great as possible, to make sure that all actors understand this, and to make sure that actors have as clear an understanding of each other‘s motivations as possible to avoid miscalculation. In the last twenty years, space assets have become important not only for strategic missions but also increasingly underpin conventional military force for modern militaries, and especially those with expeditionary forces, such as the United States. They are essential not only for militaries, but are a critical provider of essential civilian, commercial, and scientific services. Not only do satellites perform many more missions than they have in the past, there are many more spacefaring nations. While most satellites belong to the United States, Russia, and China, more than sixty countries own satellites or a large stake in one.7 At the same time, the technologies that are useful for holding satellites at risk have grown significantly in sophistication and capacity even in the last decade, and have become more widely available. This is particularly problematic because attacks on satellites can create or escalate terrestrial crises in potentially difficult to predict ways. The world is drifting towards a space regime that faces an ever more prevalent and more sophisticated anti-satellite technology and greater numbers and types of targets in space, with very little mutual understanding about how actions in space are perceived. While space‘s foundational legal document, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, sets out the principles by which space is used and provides a number of useful, most recognize that more is needed to secure lasting peace on earth and the long-term health of the space environment. Different stakeholders are tackling space security issues from different angles. Under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament‘s (UNCD) Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) agenda item, Russia and China have invested in the Treaty for the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, a comprehensive ban on the deployment of space-based weapons and on threats of any kind against satellites. The United States has stated that it sees little value in this treaty, but has not proposed revisions that would make it more acceptable nor suggested its own preferred legally-binding treaty. And the UNCD has struggled to extricate itself from a deadlock that has kept it from moving forward on discussions on this (and all other) topics. Others have suggested a ban on destructive anti-satellite weapons development and testing,9 and limits on exoatmospheric missile defense tests.10 These efforts have not yet produced any appreciable progress. Others prefer the approach of starting with confidence building and transparency measures that are politically binding rather than legally binding. The European Union moved forward a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 11 which would set out rules of the road for space, creating transparency and building confidence. It did not address directly core security issues, and the gestures it made in this direction (the requirement by the United States that it include a specific reference to the right of self-defense) created disagreements serious enough to not be easily addressed in this format. The process hit a wall in 2015. A United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, convened to consider TCBMs for space, produced a consensus document,12 though for a number of reasons, little progress has been made on implementing them.13 Perhaps the greatest progress in creating new guidelines has come under the aegis of protecting the long-term sustainability of space. (While the long-term sustainability of space does imply that core security questions are solved enough to not threaten the space environment, work on this topic does not take the issue head-on.) The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has drafted a set of such guidelines which will be referred to the General Assembly in 2018.14 For its part, the United States, currently the most heavily invested in space in sheer capacity and in posture, is investing significant intellectual energy in creating a deterrence strategy to protect its military interests in space. While this is closely related to crisis stability, this work is distinctly from a US point of view. Each of these approaches have something distinct to offer. The aim of this paper, however, is to look at the issue differently and to use crisis stability (rather than, e.g., preventing an arms race, preserving the space environment) as an organizing principle or lens to help identify which facets of space activities are particularly dangerous, and to prioritize the existing initiatives, as well as to offer other unilateral and collaborative actions that can help reduce the pathways to confrontation between nuclear powers.

Space threat perceptions growing—US—moving away from diplomacy

Paul Meyer, Senior Fellow, Space Security, Simons Foundation and Adjunct Professor, International Studies, Simon Frasier University, “Diplomacy: The Missing Ingredient in Space Security,” SIMONS PAPERS IN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT n. 67/2018, School for International Studies, Simon Frasier University, 11—18, p. 11-13. ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

A prominent theme recently in official policy statements has been the escalation of threat perceptions and a rise of belligerent narratives in response with allegations of weapon development programs aimed at deploying counterspace systems. Indicative of this trend was the US Director of National Intelligence’s recent worldwide threat assessment, which stated “Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons systems as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness”. The assessment projects that “Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years”. 15 The assessment asserts that Russia and China are being disingenuous in their diplomatic proposals regarding the nonweaponization of space, as “many classes of weapons would not be addressed by such proposals, allowing them to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain”. 16

Against this backdrop of a threat assessment that alleges major programs of counterspace capabilities development it is easier to adopt a belligerent posture in response. In the US context President Trump has reflected this new tone in the National Space Strategy issued in March 2018. In keeping with what is described as a “peace through strength” stance the new policy “affirms that any harmful interference with or attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner and domain of our choosing”. 17 Besides this wide-ranging right of retaliation (which implies that even a nuclear response could follow an attack on American space assets) the National Space Strategy “recognizes that our competitors and adversaries have turned space into a warfighting domain”. 18 This is a dubious assertion given the numerous statements by relevant US officials that have described outer space as a “warfighting” domain.19 President Trump in subsequent remarks has proclaimed “We must have American dominance in space” and he has ordered the Pentagon to create a new branch of the Armed Forces to that end: “the Space Force – separate but equal”. 20

For many states and other stakeholders, the depiction by leading powers of outer space as a “warfighting” domain (whatever the claims of which state was the first to do this) is incompatible with the “peaceful purposes” of the Outer Space Treaty and the regime it supports. Whatever the reality of the alleged counterspace programs, and this is clearly an area of military activity which would benefit from greater transparency, the ratcheting up of threat-rhetoric works to accelerate arms racing and detract from diplomatic efforts to foster international space cooperation.

There is in fact little trace of diplomacy in the National Space Strategy, which is silent on international cooperation or the possibility of diplomatic solutions to the space security challenges being referenced by the US Administration. Some Administration officials have spoken approvingly of norm development to assist the international management of space, but without specificity or a plan to promote them. As one observer has remarked: “given its general aversion to multilateral diplomatic approaches, it’s likely that the Trump administration will focus the majority of its efforts in this area on developing bilateral mechanisms”. 21

Although the “America First” stress of the Trump Administration may highlight the turning away from diplomatic engagement, there was already evidence of this trend under the Obama Administration. Its National Security Space Strategy was issued in February 2011 and introduced the characterization of outer space as “congested, contested and competitive” an alarming depiction of space activity that ignored another “c” word that had figured prominently in past human activity in space: cooperation.22

The downplaying of diplomacy with respect to national security policy for outer space in official American thinking was already evident in the fact that it was only the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence that were tasked with and issued the National Security Space Strategy with no reference to the Secretary of State as an authority that would also be a key actor in formulating such a strategy.

The National Security Space Strategy does contain a sentence to the effect that the Department of Defense and the intelligence community “will support the diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State to promote the responsible use of space and discourage activities that threaten the safety, stability, and security of the space domain” 23. There is however no elaboration of these diplomatic efforts nor is any specific arms control or restraint measure endorsed. The State Department and its diplomats are essentially referenced in the document as merely a means of disseminating the new policy abroad. The concept of national security being applied to outer space evidently wasn’t judged to require a diplomatic input on par with that of the military or intelligence communities.

The ascent of bellicose posturing and the decline of diplomatic efforts in the realm of space activity has not gone unnoticed within the international community and has arguably spurred some new initiatives in multilateral forums concerned with space security. It is too early to judge how effective these steps will be in countering the trend towards “warfighting” in space, but they reflect at least a desire to take some corrective action rather than remain passive onlookers as the environment for international cooperation in space deteriorates. The three initiatives to be considered are: i) the UN GGE; ii) the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and iii) the guidelines developed by the Long-term Sustainability Working Group of COPUOS. A likely constraint on these three initiatives is that they are all occurring within multilateral bodies that operate on the consensus rule and hence require unanimous support from their diverse constituencies to take any substantive decision.

Crisis: A2 “No Escalation”

Space war goes nuclear

James Clay Moltz, Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 130-131. *edited for language****NCC’19 Novice Packet****

What might a space war look like? It could begin with an increase in tensions over terrestrial issues and build into a conflict in which space assets (such as those for navigation, reconnaissance, and targeting) would play a critical role and might quickly become desirable targets. An advanced space power might target an enemy’s satellites in low-Earth orbit and seek to destroy them with kinetic weapons in order to “blind” hinder enemy forces. Such attacks would release large amounts of debris, quickly putting other countries’ spacecraft in the same orbits at risk. A less-developed country with little reliance on space might seek to carry out an even less discriminating attack using a nuclear weapon, although at the risk of destroying or disabling all satellites passing through that region of space. The country that had been targeted in space might respond by trying to take out launch sites in the aggressor country, causing casualties on the ground as well as destruction of critical facilities. This would be more difficult with mobile launchers, although the strikes could focus instead on vulnerable command and control sites. Space assets of that country might also be targeted for counterattack, increasing the field of orbital debris even more. Once these attacks are carried out, that country’s launch sites might then come under attack, escalating the conflict even further. At this point, the war might spiral out of con