army aviation digest - feb 1980

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1980

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FEBRU RY 198


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25th nniversary IssueFEBRUARY 1980 VOLUME 26 NUMBER 2

* *rigadier General Richard D. KenyonArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the Army Major General James H. MerrymanCommander Brigadier General Carl H. McNairDeputy Commander

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page 24

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama1 Constant Enforcer 79, LTG Sidney B. Berry andLTC Lynn C. Hooper4 Army Accepts YCH-47 D, LTG Robert J. Baer5 Rescue In Japan, SP5 Kathy Wright6 McNair Versus The Bull, LTC Carl H. McNair Jr.11 Views From Readers

12 Check And Double Check14 Decisions On Flight, CW3 Wes Bishop15 Proper Seatbelt Installation For OH-5816 Helicopter Ice Encounters, CW4 Thomas W. Witten18 Welcome Back to Fort Rucker,CPT P) Kenneth M. Wanless19 DES Report To The Field: Training Feedback24 SEAD And The 2-Minute Drill,CPT Demetrio J. Tehero28 AACC, CPT Alan J. Bacon35 Reporting Final38 PEARLs41 Tips For Instrument Flight Planning,CW3 Charles E. Cook45 The Threat: The Threat Branch,MAJ Forrest D. WilliamsInside Back Cover: ATC Action LineBack Cover:ASH Status Report, LTC Vincent P. Mancuso

In this 25th Anniversary issue, the Aviation Digestproudly features Army aviations role in ConstantEnforcer 19 conducted last September in Europe.The article, by Lieutenant General Sidney B. Berry,V Corps commander, and Lieutenant Colonel LynnC. Hooper, V Corps assistant operations officer,starts on page 1. The V Corps cover art is by FredMartin.The Aviation Digest also has a special gift for itsreaders on its Silver Anniversary. For more on thissee the editorial note with the article beginning onpage 6.

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page 45Richard K. TierneyEditor

The mission of the U.S. rmy viation Digest USPS 415-350) is to provideinformation of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraftaccident prevention , training, maintenance, operations, research and develop-ment, aviation med icine and other related data .

This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General, Headquarters,Department of the Army, 23 February 1979, in accordance with AR 310-1 .Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system

as outlined in AR 310-1 . Complete DA Form 12 5 and send directly to CDR.AG Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard , Baltimore , MD 21220. Forany change in distribution requirements , initiate a revised DA Form 12 5 .The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthlyunder the supervision of the Commanding General , U.S. Army Aviation Center.Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of theArmy nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center . Photos'are U.S. Army unless otherwisespecified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest andto the author, unless otherwise indicated.Articres, photos and items of interest on Army aviation are invited Directcommunication is authorized to : Editor, U S. rmyAviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P,Fort Rucker, AL 36362 .

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution alsoshould submit DA Form 125 . Other National Guard units should submit reQuests through their state adjutant general.Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies ofthe Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents,U.S. Government Printing Office , Wash ington , DC 20402 . Annual subscriptionrates are 17 .00 domestic and 21 .25 overseas.


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LTG Sidney B erryCommander V Corps

LTC Lynn C Hooperv Corps Assistant Aviation fficer

rlDY Aviation Activities duringCONST NT ENFORCER 79E XERCISE Constant Enforcer79 was a CENTAG directed

and controlled field training exercise conducted in the State of Hessenin Central Germany from 12 to 19September 1979. The exercise wasconducted with Blue Forces opposing Orange Forces.The aviation assets for Blue Forcesincluded the 3D Armored Divisions

FEBRUARY 1980

S03rd Combat Aviation Battalionwith a UH 1 Huey platoon equippedwith M-S6 (aerial delivered mines)attached, Air Troop and SupportTroop Air organic to the 11 th ACR;and the 11 th Aviation Battalion withthe 29Sth Medium Lift HelicopterCompany attached under corpscontrol.

The aviation assets supporting the

Orange Force included the 8thInfantry Division s 8th CombatAviation Battalion with a UH-lplatoon equipped with M-S6 (aerialdelivered mines) attached, and dedicated CH-47 Chinook support on adaily basis.

The 444th Tactical HelicopterSquadron with 11 OH-S8 Kiowaaircraft remained organic to its


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OR NGE FOR ES

HH A

parent unit, the 4th Canadian MechBrigade Group. During the courseof the exercise the 4th CMBG wasa member of the Orange Forcesand the Blue Forces. The 444thprovided reconnaissance, commandand control and facilitated attackhelicopter operations in the 4thCMBG sector.

Aerial medical evacuation wasprovided to all exercise participantsby the 63rd Medical Detachment421st Medical Company (Air Ambulance). Dustoff aircraft flew 159hours during the exercise with 66hours being flown on 55 actualevacuation missions for 50 patients.

The 59th ATC Battalion fieldedelements from each of its three organic companies. Elements included a flight operation center twoflight coordination cen ters , oneinstrumented airfield with approachcontrol two tactical instrumenteda irfields, three tactical YFR control

ACRARCSA

ATCCENT GCMBGFMFOCIFRIRLOSLARSOTASVFR

armored cavalry regimen tAviation Requirements forthe Combat Structu re ofthe A rmyair traff ic controlCentral rmy GroupCanadian Mach BrigadeGroupfield manual

fli ght operat ion centerinstrument flight rulesinf raredliaison off icerside looking airborne radarStand OHTarget AcquisitionSystemvisual flight rules

8

o 2 17M INT M-S6 MINE SOTAS

ATTACK

tower facilities, and an air trafficcontrol liaison team to the Y CorpsAirspace Management Element.The 59th ATC Battalion planned ,developed and flight checked tactical IFR airway systems which werein accordance with criteria in FM1 5 , Instrument Flying and Navigation for Army Aviators.

The tactical IFR system spannedthe entire exercise area and servedBlue, Orange and neutral aircraft.Army / Air Force airspace controlinterface was effected by havingthe 59th's FOC operate from theAir Force control and reportingpost. There were 9,801 aircraftmovements handled by 59th ATCfacilities during the exercise , with182 being tactical IFR.

Each force had two EH-IH StandOff Target Acquisition Systemsattached for the entire exercise. Inaddition to the combat intelligenceprovided by SOTAS the system wasused to vector aircraft conductingair assault and to alert attack helicopters to suspected enemy armorconcentrations.

Attack helicopters were extensively employed during both offensive and defensive phases of theexercise. Cross attachment of attackhelicopter units was planned andexecuted by the Blue Forces atcorps direction. Attack helicopterelemen ts were considered as airmaneuver units and their employment was monitored by corps anddivision G-3s in the same manneras ground maneuver units. This

procedure provided the necessaryinformation for the corps and division G-3s to provide a significantcombat multiplier to the respectivecommander to influence the battleat a critical time. Procedures andtraining with A-I0 Thunderboltsand AH-1 Cobras for Joint AirAttack Team Tactics were conducted during the exercise. Interoperability with German / Canadian / U .S. helicopters was practicedand refined continuously during theexercise.

Continuous medium lift helicopteroperations were conducted by the295th Medium Lift Helicopter Company. Significant CH-47 Chinookoperations were logistical resupply,engineer bridging support, air assaults, resupply of M-56 munition ,and aircraft recovery and evacuation. Medium lift helicopters flew383 hours, transported 716 tons ofcargo and 944 passengers.

All units having UH-l aircraftconducted air assault operations ,logistic resupply, and command andcontrol missions. Both divisions andthe ACR had attached UH-1 platoons equipped with the M-56 aerialdelivery mine system. This providedthe commander a dedicated andresponsive capability to rapidlyemplace mine field barriers in terrain where ground employmentcould not be accomplished in atimely manner.

The favorable weather permittedmore Army aviation and Air Forcesupport of ground maneuver units

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FORCES

HHC

HHC

TTACK

XXX

73

295

73MAl NT . 6 MINEXXX

SOTAS

IR SPT

than has been possible during preexercises. Flying operations

214 Air Force reconnaismissions and 949 tactical air

Five C-130 Hercules miswere flown using the ConDelivery System and the

Weather Aerial DeliveryArmy aircraft flew 30 Ov

lIRV-l Mohawk sorties to include9 SLAR/ Photo/ IR and Quick

missions; RU-21 aircraft flewGuard Rail missions. A total of

1,670 AH-l hours , 3,080 OH-58and 2,091 UH-l hours wereduring the exercise .

A significant factor in the overallfor Army aviation is the

that with more than 400 Armyparticipating in the exercise

ith V Corps units flying in excess7,400 hours, there were no major

accidents.The command interest and in

olvement at all levels and the proessional execution of realistic tactial flying by each Army aviator wasndeed commendable. It must be

BRUARY 1980

emphasized that low level, contourand nap-of-the-earth fl ight (to include under wire operations wereconstantly practiced and even administrative aircraft were restrictedto a maximum altitude of 150 feetover most of the exerc ise area .

Significant lessons learned are asfollows:

Attack helicopter units are ahighly responsive and lethal combatmultiplier which when lost in battlewill not be rapidly and continuouslyreplaced. It is imperative that corpsand divisio n commanders closelymonitor the employment of attackhelicopter assets and their battlefield attrition.

Planning requirements for airmaneuver units may be easily miscalculated . The ability to rapidlyemploy attack helicopters , conductair assault, and transport high priority ammunition and supplies cannotbe matched by ground means. However, the planning phase cannot becondensed and on most occasionsmore time is required to conduct

coordination and liaison with multiple units. The early use of LOswhen warning and be-preparedorders are issued by higher headquarters can eliminate many seriousproblems that arise due to a lack ofknowledge regarding capabilitiesand limitation of Army aircraft.

The ARCSA III study validatedthe requirement for an attack helicopter battalion under corps control. The urgent requirement forthis combat multiplier cannot beoverstated. When it becomes necessary to weight or thicken the battlearea in a corps sector by cross attaching attack assets, commanderswho must release an attack helicopter unit realize a sign ifican treduction in their ability to rapidlyinfluence the battle in a specificsector. The responsiveness andflexib ility afforded by the properemployment of attack helicopterunits is essential to the combatcommander at all levels, and mustbe provided to the corps commander as early as possible.

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RMYACCEPrSYCH 47D

Lieutenant General BaerLast December the U.S. Army accepted the first YCH-47D Chinookhelicopter, in ceremonies at the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker,AL. The following is an adaptation of remarks made by LieutenantGeneral Robert J Baer, Deputy Commanding General for MaterielDevelopment U.S. Army Materiel Development and ReadinessCommand. For more on the acceptance ceremony at Ft. Rucker seeReporting Final beginning on page 35

Lieutenant General Robert J BaerDeputy Commanding General for Materiel Development

US rmy Materiel Development and Readiness Command

I TWAS ABOUT 10 years ago thatthe Army-faced with an affordability issue in the development andprocurement of a new heavy lifthelicopter capability to carry usthrough the 1990s and into the 21stcentury-made the decision to meetthese requirements by modernizingan existing resource the CH-47Cllinook helicopter.

At that time we knew the C modelChinook met the lower bands ofperformance required for a newmedium lift helicopter. But at thesame time we recogn ized the shortcomings to overcome if we were tohave the means of providing rapidresupply and logistical support forour combat forces. Our effectiveness in engaging and our success incountering and overcoming theenemy is ultimately dependent uponour ability to resupply the necessaryammunition, weapons, missiles andfuel to a highly mobile fightingforce, and do it in a timely manner.

Hence our modernization program for the Chinook has focusedon those areas that had the greatestimprovement potential for reliabil-4

ity, availability, maintainability andproductivity, wh ile giving at leastequa l attention to safety and costreduction. We expect increases inoperational readiness and decreasesin operating and support costs.

Acceptance of this aircra ft todaymarks a major milestone in thisprogram as we transition from contractor development testing to theArmy's developer and user testing.This testing will determine how wellthis modernized aircraft systemmeets the Army 's requirements ,how well it measures up to thestringent goals we established yearsago.

It is my pleasure to accept thisaircraft- the first YCH-47D for theU.S. Army-and to pass the keys toMajor General John Koehler, Commander, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command for the initiationof comprehensive development testing.I am certain that the Test andEvaluation Command the AviationDevelopment Test Activity and theOperational Test and EvaluationAgency will expeditiously confirm

the suitability of this fine aircraftfor its important operational missionin our force structure and we willsoon have its tremendous capability employed in the field Army.Editor's note: For more on the CH-47D see the September 1979 issueof the Aviation Digest for articlesby: Mr. Joseph P. Cribbins , Special Assistant to the DCSLOG andChief Aviation Logistics Office,HQDA. Colonel James H. Hesson , CH-47 Modernization Project Manager,U.S. Army Materiel Developmentand Readiness Command, St. Louis,MO. Colonel Charles J Oram , Director of Combat Developments ,U.S. Army Transportation School ,Ft. Eustis, VA.

The Aviation Digest has a limited number of September 1979 issueswhich are available upon request.Write Editor, Aviation Digest P.O.Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362 orcall AUTOVON 558-6680 or Commercial 205 255-6680.

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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T HE TRAGIC STORY beganw hen scores of young U.S.Marin es becam e trapped in Quon set huts during a raging sto rm thathi t Ja pan late last year. A stoveignited a deadly s tr ea m of gaso lineand engulfed th e me tal shelters in ablazing infe rno. Befo re a ny warn ingcou ld be sounded, lives were lostand many were injured as the flamesgutted the structures.

Howeve r, several of the fire'svictims we re rescu ed from grea te rharm o r eve n death du e to the spontaneous act io ns of th e perso nn e lfrom the United States Army Aviation Detachment , Ja pa n a nd theni ted States Army Hea lth Clinic,Ho nshu.

It was a total team e ffo rt , poin ted out NIajor Lew is F. Gold, a pediatrician at the U .S. Army HealthClinic, Honshu. Witho ut eve n oneof the individuals who participated ,th e task of caring for the injuredwo uld have be e n impossibl e o r atbes t , hampe red.

The task turned in to a feverishnight a nd day operation as both th emedi ca l and aviation units workedduring the crucia l first 24 ho ursfollowing the d isaster.I was leaving the clinic th at daybecause th e threat of the storm haddiminished in the Camp Zama area,reco un ted Major Gold. But I mentio ned to th e ot hers that if anythingcame up to just call me. I was homeonly 10 minutes whe n th e ph o nerang.

About the same time, the aviationunit a t Camp Zama was hurriedlypreparing to fly he licopte rs to transport much nee ded medical suppliesand to med evac the most ser ious lyinjured. We had th ree hel icoptersinvolved in the ove r-all operation,explained Major Ea rl W. D ennis

Well on f Br igadier General JosephH. Kastner right), Chief of Staff, UnitedStates Army Japan , presents Lieuten-ant Colone l Lesly F. Ware Jr ., Com-mander, U.S. rmy viation Detach-ment, Japan,with a Certificate of Achieve-ment at Rankin irfield , Camp Zama.U.S. rmy Photo By SP5 Scott Holt)

FEBRUARY 1980

Rescue. nJapanSP Kathy Wright

Public Affairs OfficeU.S rmy , JapanJr. , operations o ffic e r of th U.S.Arm y Aviation Detac hm ent. Butthe biggest o bstacle we had thatevenin g was getti ng to the Marin ebase itse lf. Since the re mnants ofthe storm we re still hov e rin g overth e area, we had to co mbat windsgusting up to 45 mil es per hour.'

While the av iators were gettingrea dy, a caravan of ambulances andmedical tea ms from Camp Za m aand Atsugi Naval Air Fac ili ty werea lready headed towards the accident site .We were the first med ical gro upthere, recall ed Major Go ld. Ourfirst step was to es tablish who, wherea nd how bad th e victims were injured. By thi s time, th e Yo kota A irBase rescue squad was on the scene.Fortunately they we re equ ipped toadm inister aid to 200 people andalso to provide a co uple of s urgeons.T he nex t m ove was to pu t themost critical patie nts on th e aircraft which would transport themto several U.S. military and Japanesemedical faciliti es . We logged in

approximate ly 40 flight hours duringthe awesome o rd ea l But with theresponse and cooperat ion fromeve ryone who had a rri ved, I knowwe saved seve ral lives th at night,reported Major Den nis . Althoughwe suppl ied air support, the Navycrew a nd the ir he lico pt er also play-ed a very impo rtant part in the mis-sio n.

While some of the less se r io uslyhurt Marines we re being treated atthe Camp Fuji med ica l facility, itwas dec ided that a ll wo uld be tran s-fe rr ed as soon as possible.

The Marine troops helped setup lights and worked diligently toconstruct a makeshift landing sitenea rby, e labo rated Major Gold.Our next goa l was to arrange to

send a number of th e yo un g vic timsback home to the States via thefastest met hod poss ible . They wo uldth en be able to receive more specia lized burn treatment a nd ha ve ach a nce to be with their famil ies.Unfo rtunate ly, it was the last tripfor some of th e m .

Both th e Army Aviation Detach-men t and the Army Health Clinicrecently rece ived well-deservedrecognition for th e ir o ut sta ndin gservices rendered during the tragedy when they were awarded Certifica tes of Achievement.It was ju st part o f o ur job, mod est ly reasoned Major Dennis .Wo rd s can't exp ress the remorse

we a ll felt du ring the terrib le acc i-dent. I pray it's a job we never haveto do aga in .


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Reprin ted fromFebruary 1972viaton gest

:; . .

atrversus the

Lieutenant Colonel Carl H McNair JrTwenty years appears to be n adequate periodfor the statute of limitations to expire on a younglieutenant's errors in flight planning and proce-dures; therefore, the following article is reprintedfor all to read and enjoy, but most of all , thatsome might learn and profit from my mistakesand experience. Except for the time and place,its principal character, me, could well be a currentstudent here at the Army Aviation Center, who,like me , might elect to take a shortcut on apreflight or to not precisely follow his checklist-on a cold and windy January Alabama morn.

: -:.....-- -O ~ = : . . ' ; - ~ ? - : ~ q ~ : , . , , = = : _ _ _

More than 3,000 hours have been added to mylog since this incident in January 1960, and I mproud to say all have been accident free. Thanksto good maintenance, good crews, good tr in ing ,even a little luck, and perhaps, in some smallway, to that lesson I learned s a young lieutenantfrom that darn bull.Brigadier General Carl H. McNa ir Jr.

I T WAS ON A COLD and windyJanuary Texas morning when Ilearned my most important lessonabout flying - that almost all accidents start on the ground beforethe flight even begins. I was a youngand eager Army aviator with nearly1,500 hours and 5 years of flyingexperience in fixed wing aircraftfrom small LA Cubs up to C-47s.My flights had ranged from smallsod fields in the remote areas ofTaiwan to long ov e rwater international flights into places such asTokyo , Hong Kong and Manila.Having mastered the art of instrument flying a few years earl ier, Ihad a considerable amount of actualweather flying, and the Jeppesen ,International Civil Aviation Organization and Federal Aviation Administration procedures were all

equally familiar. Carburetor ice ,engine failure , lost radios and ablown tire had all come my way atone time or another. I felt that Ihad pretty well learned about flying- but then I met the helicopter ,and that bull.

When I received orders to attend he licopter transition trainingI was pleased to expand my aviationhorizons into the then rapidly growing Army mobility program. Qualification training was co nducted atan Army installation called Campnow Fort Wolters in north central

Texas where the winter winds canreally blow.I t was my fortune to return fromoverseas in midwinter to attend the8-week qualification enroute to mynext assignment. While it is cold innorth Texas when the temperature

plummets below freezing and thenorthers begin to blow, the weatherbecomes do ubly chilling when preflighting with a flashlight at 0630while helicopters parked all aroundare churning up gale winds duringstarting, warmup and runup. Thusopens the curtain on the day of mylife when I really learned what flyingwas all about.After about a week of dual in struction I had managed to solo theOH-23D observation trainer withouttoo much difficulty. In fact , I mayhave been a little too confident fora he licopter fledgling who had justlearned that the he licopter, unlikethe fixed wing aircraft, had two control sticks instead of just one. Thesehad come to be called y the studentssimply the go stick and the hostick.



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Each instructor in the school hadthree students and in order to maxi

f r < : l , n nn was allotted two helir>AT t ,' .C for each session. In this wayhe could have one student

FEBRUARY

Editor's note The iation igest periodicallywill be reprinting functional articles it has carried in its first 25 years. The significance of thearticle-then and now-wil l be pointed out in anintroduction by the author or by an appropriateperson or agency. Let us know If there are anyparticular A,, atlon Digest articles you wouldlike to see reprinted

nests misscrews and even screwdrivall had made indelible impres-sions. I was a student

almost to the

in the interveningyears I had been blessed with someconscientious and most cap-crew chiefs who mydaily mS1JeCtI011Sticulous l1 ' \


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Although the immediate malfunction was solved , I was nowabout 1 minutes behind the otheraircraft in the inspection, warmupand hoverout procedure. Not onlywas I getting colder due to the whirlof rotor blades all around me, but Iwas losing valuable training time.Still alert , however, to my inspection requirements I was somewhatoverconfident with myself becauseI had just found one deficiency andcorrected it. I hesitatingly tuckedthe checklist in my pocket andwalked around the aircraft , completing a more cursory inspectionthan my conscience told me I should.In a brief moment or two thewalk-around was over and I was

comfortably in the helicopter withdoors closed, rotor turning and atlong last heat. Warm air flowedthroughout the bubble and I settledback for a by-the-book run up,complete with the wrinkled checklist.All was well, everything in thegreen and I called for hover clearance to the takeoff pad. The shiphandled beautifully in the hover,no vibrations and good controlresponse. Best of all the heater anddefroster were doing a marvelousjob in spite of the -10 degrees C.showing vividly on the free air temperature gauge. I was satisfied thatin spite of my earlier tribulation Iwas well on my way to enjoying apleasant training flight. Little did Iknow that only seconds away a chainreaction was about to begin whichwould leave my airman 's pride bruised and battered with my face ascrimson as the helicopter I was flying.As the voice from the towerdroned, Number one pad , clearfor takeoff, I pulled in collective8

pitch, rolled on throttle and beganto accelerate onward and upward.A quick cross-check of the panelshowed everything in order-allgauges in the green, engine androtor tachometer needles joined,altimeter rising but wait , the airspeed is still zero. That's impossiblebecause I'm flying through the airgaining altitude and air speed everysecond. A slight nudge on the instrument and still the needle is gluedon zero knots. By process of elimination a more comprehensive examination of the situation includesglancing down through the bottomedge of the bubble. There blowingin the breeze was 12 inches of brightred cloth prominently stenciled inwhite: REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT.The pitot cover, still tightly affixedto the pitot tube, had been forgottenin my haste. All manner of thoughtraced through my head as to how Icould have overlooked such an obvious item. Jamming the checklistin my pocket before completing thepreflight inspect ion was now a vividmemory. While I had been mostconcerned about the cold a fewminutes before, I was now growingwarmly uncomfortable as I beganto ponder my situation.As anyone knows who has flownan aircraft, fixed or rotary wing,with an inoperative air speed indicator, this really isn't too serious aproblem - if the weather is good , ifall other instruments are workingproperly and if you have a goodidea as to what power settings andpitch attitudes will result in whatair speeds.

Unfortunately, very little of mypitch and power fixed wing experience was applicable to the helicopter. f I had learned anything in mygrand total of 15 hours of helicopter

flying it was that you needed an airspeed indicator on landing approaches. More importantly , if you wereamong the real unfortunate to experience an engine failure, an airspeed indicator is essential to maintain an adequate lifting speed forautorotation.

Lastly, I guess I was more concerned about landing at the stagefield in the midst of some 44 fellowstuden ts, 15 instructors and an aseeing flight commander operatingthe control tower. Fo r, even if theywere half-blind and looking theother way , they couldn 't miss seeingthe long red warning flag trailingviolently in the 60-knot breeze beneath my helicopter. Without anyreservation or trepidation I wouldautomatically get a failing grade forthe day, pink sl p as it was politelycalled. The embarrassment associated with such an amateurish blunder would probably surpass the academic impact however.

After pondering all these things Ielected to do the only honorablething and land at some intermediatepoint, unobserved and remove thepitotcover. Throughout the countryside there were small clearingsdesignated for practicing confinedarea approaches. These areas wereon private timberland or pasturebut were leased by the governmentfor student training. I spotted oneof these clearings along my routeand made a high reconnaissance. Itappeared satisfactory except thatthere were cattle grazing in an adjacent clearing only a scant 100 yardsaway.

Feeling that I had an adequatemargin of safety I descended steeplyover the trees. With the helicoptersitting on a level piece of ground I



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locked the controls and jumped outto remove the forgotten cover. As Ilooked up from untying the warningflag, a helicopter flew noisily overthe adjacent field and a few cattlebegan to move my way. Recognizingthis as a potentially catastrophicsituation should the cattle wanderinto the whirling rotor blades of myhelicopter, my visions were of abankrupt lieutenant paying for dam-ages to both helicopter and cattle.I moved quickly to meet thesituation and approached the leadcow with my bright blue flight capin hand, waving it violently to turnthe herd a way from the helicopter.t worked, the lead cow turned on

me and gave chase. Only then did itdawn on me that this was not in facta cow, but a large and blusterlybullMoving with the agility of a trackstar, I made it to the nearest treeand shinnied up. The bull pawedthe ground anxiously as the remain-der of the herd milled around closerand closer to the spinning bladesstill turning under idle power. Itcould only be a matter of time untilone of them would hit a blade andthe entire helicopter would tearitself into a million pieces.

When the bull was momentarilydistracted I cautiously slid downthe tree and lunged to an adjacenttree, thence to another tree alwayskeeping stout timber between us tothwart the bull s obvious intent.Finally, I had half circled the entireclearing and was within 1 yards ofthe helicopter.As the bull was once again dis-tracted I leaped madly for the plexi-glass door, flung it open and un-locked the con troIs as I slid in to theseat. Almost before my feet hadtouched the pedals I was pulling inpitch and roIling on throttle. Thehelicopter rose vertically but notgracefully from the clearing. As thebull charged under my skids he sur-prisingly encountered only emptyair. The ugly whirring orange irri-tant was now moving up and out ofhis reach.

FEBRUARY 1980

With a deep sigh of relief I leaned

back in the seat but my heartbeatstill sounded like a triphammerwhen I realized that in my haste Ihad not fastened my safety belt.The frequency of the hammer quick-ened.In the normal conduct of flightin a helicopter, both hands and bothfeet are used to control and fly themachine. Only for brief intervalscan one hand be taken from thecollective pitch to tune a radio oradjust an instrument, but under nocircumstances can one v r takeboth hands from the controls with-out cataclysmic results.I now found myself relieved fromthe pitot cover problem and thesubsequent encounter with the bullonly to face another dilemma: Howcould I fasten my safety belt beforelanding at the stagefield? To chancean arrival in full view of my instruc-tor with my safety belt flappingoutside the door would surely resultin a p nk slip This humiliation alsocould .lead to the exposure of mytwo earlier goofs if an explanationwere d e m n d ~ d as to why I wasflying around without a safety beltfirmly affixed around my posterior.Collecting my thoughts I decidedto land again and correct the dis-crepancy. This time I carefullyselected an unused farm road with-out an animal of any description,be it male or female, in sight. I.skillfully maneuvered the ship ontoa wide place in the road where the

skids fit neatly outside the ruts.Everything seemed under control,so I elected to take advantage ofthe situation and recoup my badlyshaken composure with a muchneeded cigarette break. I lockeddown the controls, walked about5 feet away and spent the breaktime going over in my mind justwhat had gone wrong on this flight.Not only had my early oversight ledme into a face to face encounterwith a stern bull without a matadorin sight, but my hasty departurewithout a fastened seat belt couldha ve smeared me all over a wideswath of pine trees. I chalked it allup to experience, confident that Ihad had three strikes for the day,was not out and, equally importantto the morals of a trainee, had notgotten a p nk slip for the day.

More confiden t that ever in mycapabilities, judgment and skill, Itook off and flew the few remainingmiles to the stagefield. Buoyed upby my earlier evasions and anxiousto give the business as usualimpression to those on the field whowere watching, I turned on the baseleg calling for a touchdown auto-rotation. This poweroff emergencyprocedure disengages the engineand allows the helicopter to descendwith lift generated by the freewheel-ing rotor blades. While an approvedtraining maneuver, it is somewhatmore risky than an ordinary landingand consequently had some restric-tions attached to it which were


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Vi WSFRomREADERS

Editor:I read , with a great deal of interest,CW4 Joseph A DeCurtis's article inthe e m e r issue supporting the needfor a maintenance test pilot standard-ization program. 'CW4 DeCurtis is Correct in statingthat U.S. Army Safety Center recordsshow that several accidents have occurred during maintenance test flights.During the period 1 January 1974through 31 March 1979, there was atotal of 426 major and minor aircraftaccidents. Of this total 6, or J 7percentoccurred with a maintenance test piloton board the aircraft. Combined damage and injury costs for these accidentswas $6.2 million.I share CW4 DeCurtis' concern forreducing these losses. However, the coldhard fact is that the record also showswe have a far greater number of accidents caused by improper maintenanceprocedures and inspections.During the same period, 9 , or 21.6per ent of the 426 major and minoraircraft accidents involved maintenanceerrors as a direct or contributing cause.The upward trend in maintenance-errormishaps increased steadily throughoutthis period. Further, it is suspected thatmany mishaps recorded as being causedby materiel failure were, in fact, causedby maintenance error.From an aviation safety standpoint, Ifeel the Army would get more bang outof the buck from a concerted effort toassure strict compliance to by-the-bookmaintenance and inspection proceduresrather than a standardization program

FEBRUARY 1980

for maintenance test pilots.Standardization in itself has notproven to be a cure-all for crew-erroraccidents. During the 5-year period fromfiscal 75 through 79, Army aviators wereinvolved in a total of 468 aircraft accidents. Crew error was a factor in 336 of

these accidents. The Army's IPI SIPcommunity has been a significant contributor to this accident record and thecrew-error problem. Instructor pilotswere involved in 134 , or 28 percent ofthe to tal 468 accidents. In fiscal 79, IPswere at fault in 50 percent of all fixedwing accidents.

The high incidence of IPISIP in-volvement in - rather than preventionof - human-error accidents ould belooked upon as letting the fox in thehen house.

Editor:

Colonel Edward E Waldron IIU.S. Army Safety CenterFort Rucker AL 36362

There is a point in time past whichany man will exceed his physical oremotional capability of performance.t is not only of benefit to the individual

to recognize this fallibility, but imperative that supervisors be able to predictand avoid passing the point of no return.Accidents do not just happen but arecreated and, in most cases, by a predictable and preventable chain of events.I believe most have heard these postulates before. f not in the same words,

at least in some related context. Todeny in word or deed the implicationsof this philosophy is to admit a grossmisunderstanding of the vital partplayed by finite man in increasinglydemanding functional roles. Peoplemust not be expected to perform asjuggernauts with relentless devotion toduty and without point or purpose. Toomany times human beings are observedas just numbers filling slots, labeled bycertain skill identifiers, and expectedto perform any and all assigned tasksbased on this numbers rationale. Anenvironment must be created in whichwork is done because there is selfsatisfaction in doing so and temperedin volumn in order to prevent loss ofpurpose.Let us now try to relate what's beensaid to human failure in the scheme ofaccident prevention. Past behavioristssuch as Maslow and Gailbraith haveindicated a definite relationship between need satisfaction and behavior.In other words, to obtain sustained,desired behav ior from anyone, certainof his or her basic needs must be met.He needs a safe environment in whichto work. He needs a sense of purposeand self-importance in his job. He needsto know that a good job is appreciatedand that he will be rewarded , not necessarily in a material sense, but none-theless rewarded for a job well done.Accomplishing all of this will aid indeveloping pride, a feeling of contribution , and an interest in his work whichleads to education and skill. An educat-Continued on page 23


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heck and double checkE 1 T ~us RMY S FnY CENUR .

In a hurry to take off, pilot did not require removal of rear seat backrest cushion assembly. Cushion blew out ofOH-58, which was flying with a doors removed, and hit tail rotor blades. Blades separated from tail rotor, aircraftcrashed. and pilot was killed.

YOu are fooling nobody,including yourself, when youskip or do an inadequate jobon a preflight check because of toomuch pressure, not enough time,fatigue, or a self-induced idea thatthe checklist isn t all that impor tant inthe firs t place. Mishap experienceshows that some Army pilotsobviously believe that checklists arenot worth the time and patience theyrequire in the face of some reallyimportant task which shouldhave been finished yesterday at thevery latest. Unfortunately, thechecklist is one of the first things togo out the window when time andpatience run short. In a depressingnumber of cases, when the checklistgoes out the window so do the pilotand his crew, sooner or later.

12

Failure to make an adequate preflightor use the checklist correctly waslisted as a cause factor in 484mishaps for the period FY 77 throughFY 79. Seven resulted in accidentsand 42 in incidents, with 6 peoplekilled and 10 injured. However,over different terrain and underdifferent circumstances, these couldeasily have turned out to be majoraccidents.More than once you have probablyheard somebody say he has thechecklist so thoroughly engraved onhis mind he could recite it backwardsand forwards. To be sure, if you stickaround Army aviation for a while,you will become familiar with thechecklist, maybe even thoroughly

familiar. So familiar, in fact, that youcan become complacent and fall intothat ho-hum attitude which can doyou in. And that's when youoverlook a checklist item at just thewrong moment. No use suddenlyremembering it after you are aloftand your turbine starts giving offnot-so-funny noises.Carelessness, or complacency (and isthere any d ifference, really?),concerning the checklist probablystems from the fact tha t relativelyfew checks, no matter how detailedand careful, turn up anythingseriously wrong. So why botherwhen the odds are with you? Why goto your dentist twice a year?Complacency isn't the only item onthe list of potent checklist

U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


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troublemakers. There are people whonot only know everything they needto know but know it better thanmost. Operating on the usuallysound theory that no matter howgood something is it can be madebetter, people in the grip of this kindof self-hypnosis have been known totake pencil and shears to theprescribed checklist, performingdrastic surgery. They will tell youproudly that their home-grownversions not only save time but getthings done just as well.The person who allows complacencyor know-it -all ness to lead him in toprocedures the book would nevercondone is asking for what he is sureto get.Your aircraft is no better than theperson who flies and maintains it andif it is being asked to perform with anoily rag lodged somewhere in itscraw, something a thorough checkwould have turned up, it can't beblamed if it falls out of the sky.S ervice personnel comeblessed, or cursed, with thesame lavish helping ofhuman nature as other mortals,

including pilots. They react the sameway to fatigue, pressure, anxiety,extremes of discomfort, anddim-witted self-satisfaction. The bestof them can and do make mistakes.All top-f light mechanics know this.Like mature pilots they are keenlyaware that their capabilities andexperience have their limits and thatthey have to maintain a constant,all-points lookout against thecreeping complacency andoverconfidence which can turn theminto zombies before they know whathas hit them.

Checklist was not followed, andright passenger seatbelt was leftoutside aircraft. Seatbelt bangedagainst fuselage during entireflight, causing 5,000 damage.

Loose nut on accumulator end of air tube assembly resulting fromimproper torque caused power loss. Aircraft was landed on paved road,with major damage to cross tubes. Luckily, there was a landingarea available.

FEBRUARY 198

Like homemade preflight checklists,homemade maintenance proceduresjust won't do. Sticking to the book isthe only answer.Every unit commander has aresponsibility to see that all personnelfollow the checklist from top tobottom all the timel And the only wayto do this is to do it with book in hand.It is a matter of positive thinking. Nomature, normally confident personwho knows his job likes to have itdinned into him night and day that hemust perform in a certain way andonly that way. But we are all human.And accidents do keep on happeningin which failure to follow thechecklist is a factor.How often have you heard (or saidyourself when you were in a hurry toget back home): The aircraft'sokay. Let's give it a quick onceover.Or have been handed a revisedchecklist with the famous last words:Never mind what they told you at

school. We do things differentlyout here.Do you always insist on an oralcall-out when you are following thechecklist? When a fuel line has beentaken off and put back in place, doyou always check for leaks aroundthe connections? If you areinterrupted during a check, do youtake up where you left off, givinghuman nature a gap wide enough todrive a truck through, or do you startall over again?All this is a matter of individualresponsibility, particularly when theunit' s aircraft are operating over awide area out in the field. The safetyofficer and the unit commandershare the common human inability tobe in more than two or three placesat the same instant. A large part ofthe time, aircraft crews and evenmechanics are on their own to aconsiderable extent; and, in fact,indications are that most of them aredoing a good job most of the time.But what we want is all of the peopleall of the time.Check and double check

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~ t o ~ ~ 4 o < sa l C W : a : : : ' : ~ f ~ ~ O P~ O A 5 nd Army Security AgencyV ~ .. Glenview Naval Air Station ILAVIATORS ARE definitelydecision makersviation Psychology backs thisup by listing a number of characteristics of aviators as decisionmakers: flexibility in dealing with events; broad understanding throughexperience and training; self-programing; subjective perception-the pilots' views of reality are influencedby their perceptions, their motivations, their emotions, and vulnerabilities to confusion.In other words, pilots have someinherently good traits as decisionmakers, but they can be offset bypersonal involvement, emotionallyaffecting how they see a situation ,and the possibility of confusion.

When flying, the need for gooddecisions is very clear-lives dependon them. The purpose in discussingdecisions here is three-fold: Pilots need to understand twodetrimental characteristics theyhave as decision makers. Aviators need to gain a workingknowledge of techniques to compensate for their limiting characteristics by making flight decisionsahead of time - if possible on theground. Aviators need to know wherethe trouble spots are in the particular areas they operate so they canproperly prepare for them.Aviators must be aware of theirlimitations. For example, subjectiveperception is the way we see things.It begins with what senses tell us, toinclude how we interpret this information. Poor lighting, scratched ordirty windshields, weak radios andmany more limiting factors encourage misinterpretation of what reallysurrounds us. Then we face a prob-

lem with the varying degrees ofaccuracy of how we remem er thisinformation. Also we should beaware of how we attach dlfferentvalues to each piece of informationand every possible alternative. Wedon 't just decide , "Is it safe?" or "Isit efficient?" but also, "Is it fun?"and , "What will the others think ofme ?Sometimes we even add confusion to the whole situation. We mayget overloaded by cockpit choresand misread a chart or instrument,or misunderstand a radio call.A viators also can become confused in their values, choosing tofly home in adverse weather ratherthan remain overnight, or carry justone more person - thus impressingthe commander, or maybe the copilot. Or perhaps they can't suppressthe desire to fly a bit of low leveljust for fun. Nearly everyone hasseen the results of these acts inFLIGHTFAX accident summaries.

We know that if we make decisions while we are emotionallyinvolved or while we are distracted ,it won 't be as good as if we had hadthe situation under control. Also,aviators never have as much controlover fligh t decisions as they do onthe ground during preflight planning. Consider some advantages ofmaking decisions on the ground:

Availability of resources. Fewer distractions; less stress. Reduced cockpit chores. No loss of face if you decide"no go" on the ground. You are at your freshest. Making the decision is toppriority on the ground, flying theaircraft is top priority in the air. Time is available to considerand research alternatives. Surprises can be avoided (no

gas or beacon out at your destination , etc. ). Options can be chosen beforethe critical point has been reached.

These are some good reasons forplanning the entire flight on theground.Now, let's take a look at a likelytrouble area that's difficult to han le Murphy 'S Law. Here 's a situation. You've done everything thebook requires. You have completedDD Form 175. You had a weatherbriefing. You have the aircraft looking good and the weight and balanceworked out OK. Now ask yourself,"What could go wrong?" RememberMurphy's Law-If it can go wrong,it will, and at the worst possibletime and place. Your best defenseis to expect the unexpected.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has drawn the conclusion that often the cause of anaccident is not a bad decision, butfailure to recognize a decision wasnecessary: The pilot did not know a certain course of action was possible ,legal or expected. The pilot failed to recognize adecision point. The pilot was confused by irrelevant factors - pushed by "gethome-itis." The pilot was not qualified tomake the decision at hand - beingnew to the aircraft and local weather.

The two limiting decision makingcharacteristics a pilot has- su bjective perception and vulnerability toconfusion - have been discussed.But judgment is a difficult thing toteach. It depends on what kind ofperson the aviator is. The FAA hastwo suggestions to become saferpilots: make decisions beforehand;and, check your own decision byasking, Would I recommend thiscourse of action for someone else?

Remember , as an Army aviatoryou are a decision maker. And thebest decisionmakers plan ahead andexpect the unexpected. . . .

14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Proper Seatbelt Installation For The OH-58Figures 1 and 2 are corrected views of the illustrations which appeared

in Reporting Final, page 25, November 1979 Aviation Digest

Proper Seatbelt Installation or the OH 58. DuringAviation Flight Standardization Evaluation/Assistance Visits, Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization OH-58 Kiowa standardizationinstructor pilots (SIPs) have noted widespreaddiscrepancies in the installation of the pilot s andcopilot s seatbelts on aircraft with MWO 55-1520-22830-19 completed. TM 55-1520-228-23, page 2-20A,paragraph 2-93b and figure 2-7a, page 2-20c, outlinesthe proper installation of the pilot s and copilot sseatbelts.Figure 1 (be low) shows the proper and improper

PROPER INSTALLATION

l i M w t ~n this sideo support

seatbelt installations. The pilot s and copi lot sseatbelts are designed to be installed in this mannerto ensure crashworthiness. If properly installed, theforce exerted by the seatbelt in the crash sequence isdirected to the hinge, while, if improperly installed,the force exerted by the seatbelt is across the hinge,which can cause the hinge to be overstressed andsubsequently fail see figure 2). This deficiency canbe detected easily during the preflight and correctedon the spot. By correcting improperly installed pilot sand copilot s seatbelts, crash survivability can begreatly enhanced. (DES)

IMPROPER INSIALLATION

igura 1

force

~ I a p P J i ~igura 2

FEBRUARY 198 5


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By climbing it may be possible tofind an altitude between cloud layersor above the clouds. In some casesit may be possible to climb to colderair where the moisture has beenfrozen into crystals and will notadhere to the aircraft surfaces.Freezing rain is probably the mostdangerous form of icing. Freezingrain is caused by a temperatureinversion where rain drops fall intoa layer of colder air below. Whenthese rain drops strike an object atbelow freezing temperatures theyfreeze which results in a rapidbuildup of clear ice. In this caseclimbing to the warmer air aboveremoves the danger.

Since climbing is often the bestsolution to an icing problem aviators considering a flight into icingconditions should be familiar withaltitude restrictions without the useof supplementary oxygen. Alsoduring flight they should be alert tothe symptoms of hypoxia.In some cases diversion may bethe only means of avoiding the icingenvironment. For this reason it isimportant to consider the availability of instrumented airports alongthe intended route of flight includ-

ing the terminal weather at theseairports during flight planning.After considering all the facts aprofessional evaluation can be madeconcerning the hazard to safetyinvolved. Under no circumstancesshould aviators ever attempt a flightwhen they do not feel an adequatemargin of safety exists.Special attention should be focused in areas critical to flight in icingconditions during the preflight inspection. Prior to flight in conditionswhere the possibility of icing existaviators flying the UH-l Huey shouldensure the right and left engine airinlet filters have been removed. Thepitot heat defrost the the deice systems should be checked for normaloperation.

Before takeoff the pitot headshould be turned on. The defrostand deice should be off duringtakeoff and landing but turned onprior to entering the icing conditions. The level off check is animportant step during flight in icingconditions and should be completedas soon as possible.

The importance of monitoringinstruments cannot be over emphasized and is especially critical during

Airframe Icing Reporting TableTRACE Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation Slightly greaterthan sublimation. It is not hazardous even though deicing/anti-icing equipment is not used, unless encountered for an extendedperiod of time more than an hour).LlGHT The rate of accumulation may create a problem if flight is prolong-ed in this environment more than one hour). Occasional use of

deicing/anti icing equipment removes/prevents accumulation.It does not present a problem if the deicing/anti icing equipmentis used.

MODERATE The rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters be-come potentially hazardous and the use of deicing/anti icingequipment or diversion is necessary.

SEVERE The rate of accumulation is such that deicing/anti icing equip-ment fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate diversionis necessary.

The rate of accumulation should be monitored on the leading edges of the air-frame that extend into the airstream. Occasionally snow or ice crystals maybecome trapped under the windshield wipers and other places undisturbed bythe normal flow of air. This is not representative of ice formation elsewhere onthe airframe since it is not adhering to the aircraft surfaces.

FEBRUARY 1980

flight in icing conditions. Torqueexhaust gas temperature and fuelmust be monitored closely.Because of the loss of lift in-creased weight and drag power maybecome critical. An increase of 5psi above the cruise power settingused prior to entering icing conditions may result in loss of the autorotative capabilities in the UH-l.The exhaust gas temperature instruments always should be monitored closely during operation withthe deice and defrost on.

As power settings are increasedto maintain airspeed and altitudethe rate of fuel consumption shouldbe computed and the fuel availablecompared to the fuel required. I ffuel is critical it may be necessaryto recalculate for the increased rateof consumption.

When ice begins to form the rateof accumulations should be monitored. A PIREP should be transmitted as soon as the intensity canbe accurately determined using thestandard criteria for judging icingintensities contained in the FlightInformation Publication En RouteSu pplemen t If vibrations resultfrom asymmetrical shedding rigorous control activity is not recommended as this may aggravate thecondition.

Because of the hazard createdby ice being shed from rotor bladesduring landing and shutdown groundpersonnel should remain well clearand passengers should not exit theaircraft until the rotors have cometo a complete stop.Post flight inspection is importantafter flight in icing. Close attentionshould be focused in areas that mayhave been damaged by ice accumulation.As soon as possible after theflight the crew should brief theforecaster on the weather conditions they encountered. An accurate report of the weather conditions actually encountered duringthe flight will be of great value tothe forecaster and fellow aviatorsthat have decisions to make.

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I felt like I had returned, :i

CPT P) Kenneth M Wanless

I REMEMBER IT WELL. The phone conversationtook place on a sunny afternoon. The connectionwith the aviation assignments officer at Departmentof the Army was only fair. "Hello," I said.The assignments officer hesitated, as they alwaysseem to do while finding a person's first name on thecomputer. "Oh, hi, Ken," he responded. "So you'dlike to know where you're going to be assigned."Finally he said, You're going to be assigned to Ft.Rucker.""Ft. Rucker- well- I had hoped for somethingelse."He obviously heard the disappointment in my voice."Ken, the Army needs good aviators at the Aviation

Center and you fit the bill. And besides, you'll be ableto make the gate."I knew he threw that in to placate me. "Thanks," Iresponded. "I'll keep in touch with you and let youknow how things work out.""Fine," he said. And keep 'em flying."Ft. Rucker. I tossed it over in my mind for the restof the afternoon. Well, I rationalized, the beach isonly 2 hours away and the weather is a lot better thanhere. And what was it my instructor pilot (IP) atRucker had always said. Oh yes, I remember: Beingan IP at Rucker s one of the best kept secrets in theArmy.But was he right? Time would tell.I had been away from aviation for more than 5years. In fact, the closest I had come to a helicopter inthat time was when we were standing on a paradefield during a parade rehearsal and a UH-l Huey, orwas it an OH-58 Kiowa, flew by-and that was 2 yearsago.

The possible assignments I would receive kept mymind working endlessly. Would they really make mean IP? Or, would I teach academics? I had fewer than500 flight hours and wouldn't it be impossible to trainme to instruct? Well, if they felt I had potential, so didI. But where to begin? The years of absence surely18

my Alma Mater . . .l

Lowe DivisionDepartment of Flight TrainingFort Rucker, Lhad changed every hing - regulations, maneuvers,flight requirements. I sure would have to get on theright track after reporting to Ft. Rucker.The day finally came and I arrived at the AviationCenter early on a Friday afternoon. It was hot and athunderstorm was about to break loose. It's hotterhere than I remember, I thought. And look at allthose students. Red, green, blue and, yes, white hats- Iremembered flight school in the distant past.The first place I reported to was the standardizationofficer at the airfield to which I was assigned. I wasdetermined to find out what had changed and how

much work was required to get back into aviation.We talked for more than an hour as he mapped out aprogram. Flight physical, instrument qualificationrenewed, regulations . I sat there in shock. It wasgoing to take some time and a lot of work to becomeproficient again.Thank goodness for the weekend. I may be overthe shock by Monday, I thought-just in time to beginworking.Monday morning came sooner than expected. And,as I reported to work, I was completely recoveredand almost anxious to begin. The first thing I did was

report to get my books. As I had expected, the pileweighed about 50 pounds. "Ugh," I said, as I lifted thebooks. Hope I won't have to see the flight surgeontomorrow."I was ready to begin. My records were in order; Ihad a current flight physical and was cleared to fly. AsI sat down to refamiliarize myself with the dash 10old feelings began to surge through my body. It was asI had remembered.After putting in a few hours on the books, I got upand took a walk out by the flight line. That smell Itrushed up my nostrils. I remember it well. Look atthose birds I felt as if I had returned home to myAlma Mater after a long time.When I returned from my walk, I learned that I was

Continued on page 23U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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U S RMY irectorate of Evaluation Standardization

R[P RTT TH[ fl[LVI TION

ST ND RDIZ TION

DE S welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attentionon an area of major importance. Write to us at: CommanderU.S. Army Aviation Center ATTN: ATZQ-ES Ft. Rucker AL36362; or call us at AUTO VON 558-3504 or commercial 205-255-3504. After duty hours call AUTO VON 558 6487 or 205-255 6487.

rainingeedbackECENT REMARKS beingheard in the field are critical

of the quality of the individualentering the Army, the effectiveness of the institution in preparingSoldiers for duty in the unit; andreveal a general lack in understanding today's Army training strategies.In April's edition of the Digestreaders were introduced to an oftenoverlooked mission assigned toDES. The Evaluation Division's rolewithin DES is to determine the effectiveness of and identify weakareas in the Aviation Center's training. Additionally, training literaturefor which the Aviation Center hasproponency is evaluated and numerous other interests monitored.The External Evaluation Branch,Evaluation Division, DES has beencharged with designing and implementing a feedback system whichwill allow commanders, supervisorsand graduates to influence the training process within the Aviation Center. Also, the branch has been chartered to design, develop, organizeand implement a mobile traininganalysis and assistance team to seekout training problems during on-FEBRUARY 1980

site VISitS to units. This article isintended to inform all aviation andaviation related personnel of thetraining feedback initiatives beingundertaken by DES- an effort inwhich they are such a vital part.

The questionnaire program. Questionnaires mailed to randomly selected personnel is perhaps themost inexpensive method for obtaining training feedback. The fourAviation Center programs of instruction (POI) being evaluated arethe Initial Entry Rotary Wing(IERW), Flight Operations Coordinator (71P), Air Traffic ControllerTower Operator (93H) and RadarController (93J). The DA approvedsurvey instruments questionnaires- have been designed for the graduate and the graduate'Scommanderor supervisor. While the surveysample population does vary foreach course, adequate representative sampling has been planned.Given the support of those individuals receiving questionnaires, avalid and effective impact on therespective POI can be achieved.Success of the questionnaire effort is directly dependent upon the

responsiveness of the Soldiers queried. Commanders are encouragedto support the effort. By design, allquestionnaires initially are forwarded through the commander to thegraduate. However, should a questionnaire not be returned within 30days, a follow-up effort is made.The follow-up graduate questionnaires are sent directly to the Soldier.The Aviation Center is proud toboast of a very high percentage ratein the return of questionnaires inpast efforts. A frustration to otherschools, the fact that aviation related personneldo return questionnaires reflects accurately our motto-"Above the Best." Keep it upThe mobile training analysis ndassistance team. Although no specific title has been given the A viation Center's team, an acronym issurely forthcoming. What the teamwill be called is unimportant but,the mission of the team is paramount. The team will be composedof representatives from each training directorate at the A viation Center. Additionally, representativesfrom the Armor, Infantry, Signal,Intelligence and Transportation

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Schools will be invited to participa te in the team visits. Essen tially.the team s mission is to establish ameaningful and effective dialoguebetween you - the field Soldierand the school in which you weretrained. Objectives for the team are: To identify aviation unit problems regarding personnel and equipment.

To provide training managersup to date information on the Aviation Center s training programs andmaterials. To advise commanders ontraining management proceduresconsistent with the Army s trainingstrategy.

To assess doctrine pertainingto the tactical role of aviation units. To identify training resource

constraints and problems. To determine the quality of theAviation Center s training throughgraduate evaluations at the unit. To assess the applicability andeffectiveness of the aviation relatedexportable training materials. To provide feedback from visitsto agencies within the AviationCenter.

To help unit commanders insolving training problems.While the mission scope IS stillgrowing. span of control will bemaintained. t is realized that theteam will not be the salvation oftraining, but it will go far towardthe resolve of numerous difficulties currently facing both unit andinstitutional trainers in accomplishing their mission - training Soldiers.

DES is very concerned with theeffectiveness of Aviation Centertraining and training products. Recently-assigned officers within DESand Evaluation Division come fromfield units in Europe, Alaska andKorea. These Soldiers are professional trainers tempered by the realities of the real world which inhibittraining in units. DES welcomesinformal feedback from all members of the Army aviation community. Send us your commentsand suggestions for improvementof training. Is something workingfor you in training management?Let us hear from you so we mightall benefit from your innovations.WE CARE. The address is: CDR,USAAVNC, ATTN: ATZQ-ES-E,Ft. Rucker, AL 36362. _

an they do theiOb

2 U.S, ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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ouW IIIIell' f,om me

YesWe re interested in your opinion about how training nd training m n gement canbe improved to help you do your job. Write your comments below, detach this page,fold nd mail it to us.

Attention unit commanders:We would appreciate your distributing s many copies ofthe questionnaire s possible Responses may be returnedIn a franked envelope


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line at right fold and mail postage free

FOL... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .......DeDa rtment of the Army

CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ-ES-EFort Rucker AL 36362OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE 300

Commander

POSTAGE AND FEES PAIDDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DOD 314

U.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ-ES-EFort Rucker AL 36362

4 .

FOL


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Vi WSFRomRE DERS

ontinued from pageed, skillful man is much less likely to succumb to complacency, carelessnessor poor judgment. These are areas inwhich all supervisors have a hand increating improvements.It is intrinsic in all echelons of supervision to develop and maintain an abilityto emphathize. This is, walk a mile inthe other man's shoes at this particularpoint in time. Nothing is the same now

as it was in the "old days" nor is it thesame as it will be tomorrow. To needlessly over task simply because pastperformance seems to support such adecision or because it would look badif the word "can't" is used, is a sure wayof courting long run disaster. Is it not asfunctionally rational to sustain a 95mission accomplishment rate than toachieve 100 one month and 60 thenext because human and material resources have been stretched past thelimit? And what happens down in thetrenches after a month of low achievement? Additional work hours, temptation to take shortcuts, scarcity of repairparts because of increased demands,and pressure to produce.

The scene is set for human failurewhich has a high probability of leadingto an accident causing injury or destruction of material or both. How canany mission succeed without a concerted effort to preserve human andmaterial resources?

Short of combat, no mission is soessential, so imperative that resourcesbe subjected to a high risk of loss. Thebottom line is, take the time to do itsafely and it will be done. Crisis management has no place in aviation.

CW3 James S. GreerSafety Officer196th Aviation CompanyFt. Bragg, NC 28307

elcome ackontinued from page 8scheduled for a flight the next day. Excitement, fear,apprehension, exhilaration - all of these filled me.What would it be like?

The next morning came early. By this time, I wasnervous, but tried to outwardly portray the vision ofcoolness and confidence. As I approached the aircraft,Mr. Jones, the standardization IP fortunate enough tobe assigned the awesome duty of refreshing me, hadan unusual smile on his face. I'm sure he had been inthis position before and I wondered if he relished thescene.

The aircraft started without any problems, much tomy surprise."OK," Mr. Jones said. "Let's pick the aircraft up toa stabilized 3-foot hover." I recalled the 3-foot hoverfrom flight school, but the stabilized was a new addition."Well, here goes," I said, with some uneasiness inmy voice. The cool, confident exterior was cracking .As I increased power, everything was fine. But, thenit happened. In the flash of an eye, we were somewhere

above all the helicopters in sight and looking at thetower eye-to-eye."Not too bad," Mr. Jones responded. "But let's losesome altitude.""Right," I answered. My exterior fully cracked, asthe sweat began to fog up my visor.As we porpoised to the takeoff pad, the controlsbegan to feel more comfortable in my hands. Thingsnow were coming more naturally and I began to feelsome confidence.As we progressed through the flight, everythingwas going very well when Mr. Jones said, "Now, let'sdo an autorotation "

FEBRUARY 1980

My mouth went dry, my hands quivered and myvoice cracked. "Oh, OK." I had not done an autoro-tation in 6 years and did not expect to do any on thefirst flight.We rolled out on final and everything was surprisingly in order. My confidence soared. "Now, let's doit," Mr. Jones said.As I rapped the throttle to the stop and pushed

the collective full down I could see Mr. Jones becomeairborne, only to be restrained by his seat belts. Hegathered his composure on the way down and talkedme through the maneuver. "Not bad at all," he said.I'm sure he was saying that only to make me feelgood. But, he didn't fool me. I knew how rusty I wasand that many more hours were needed for me tobecome proficient.

The rest of the day was uneventful, as we practicedall the normal and emergency maneuvers in the contactphase of flight training.

The actual flying portion came easier than expected.However, getting back into the regulations and relearning the instrument procedures were the mostdifficult aspects of returning to full flying duty. Withthe aid of the standardization officer, I was able tomap out a program to renew my instrument qualification, learn the standards in the aircrew training manualand pass the annual writ.In retrospect, the process of returning to flyingstatus was greatly aided by the many capable andinterested aviators who helped me. f you find yoursel fin the same position, I would first recommend a longtalk with your standardization officer to map out asimilar program. This will ensure a complete programdeveloped for your own particular case and it willmake the refamiliarization a lot easier.

Happy flying And don't forget about the best keptsecret at our Alma Mater

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At 0615 Tango 31 'sflight ofsevenUH-1H Hueys passes the bridge atACP Rex on a heading of 092 degrees. The flight is in a tacticallydeployedformation carrying troopsfi-om 2 63 Infantry Battalion (Ranger). They are headedfora raid on aThreat Regimental Command Postwith a mission ofstalling the breakthrough attack andpossibly causingthe penetration force to lose momentum. Intelligence reports thatThreat ADA was heavy and that anA-IO aircraft has been lost to ZSU-23-4 fire. Intelligence was able toproduce the grids on two presentZS U-23-4s to the west of the objective, but others are certain to bedeployed in the area. The platoonraces on, each aircraft maneuversNOE into two small pastures usedas LZs. Up ahead are heard the"rumph, rumph" of the preplannedartillery fires on the objective, on24

liNu sRM

the suspected ADA sites, and onthe LZs.As the aircraft enter the LZ, theUHF crackles, 143 (aircraft num

ber 7) is taking fire I think they 'retwenty-threes on the ridge at twoo'clock "

Lead acknowledges, 131, roger."The troops jump of and head

for the assembly area.Suppression of enemy air defense

or SEAD is like the 2-minute drillthat football teams use to come frombehind near the end of the first halfor at the conclusion of the game. Itsuse varies from team to team: thosewho conscientiously practice it doit like precision clockwork; thosewho never practice it never make itwork.

There is one difference betweenSEAD and a 2-minute drill - survival. Players and fans walk home

T

I i I_

aptain D25th Av

Schofieldafter the game, but Army aviatorsmay not survive in combat i theplay isn't run right. The adage Wewill fight as we train is as true asever.This article will.focus on thenecessity for planning SEAD operations; on why the artillery is thelogical choice for suppression; onthe objectives of SEAD; and onhow and with whom to coordinateSEAD fire support.

he Need The Threat is real andgrowing. North Atlantic TreatyOrganization aviation forces havea formidable opponent with weapons not to be ignored: ZSU-23-4range 3 , meters; ZSU-S7-2range-4,OOO meters: SA-7 (Grail)range-3,SOO meters; SA-9 (Gaskin)



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n IEMfFiT nJ ~ l1d TH

range - 7, meters; SA-6 (Gainful) range-35 kilometers.When confronted with a threat

motorized rifle or tank regiment,Army aircraft can expect to encounter at least four ZSU-23-4s,four SA-9s and a multitude of SA-7s. Adjacent units also provide overlapping fire support. Threat doctrine calls for highly mobile tacticsand intensive electronic warfarewhich further weight their advantage.

Recent TOE changes have required assault helicopter units togive up organic weapons aircraft.This is understandable since current threat doctrine necessitates theAH-l Cobra attack helicopter inthe antitank role. However this

FEBRUARY 1980

leaves the lift units with only doorguns which are inadequate in rangeand firepower for long range suppression.But the most glaring shortcomingof all, which points to the need fordetailed training , is the lack ofpreparation for SEAD contingencies at the company level. Thethought of countering threat airdefense weapons is given only mental consideration , and like threatcapabilities, they are disregardedwith a turn of the head. Coordination never is carried to the last l inkthe fire support officer or the directsupport artillery battalion. Whenquestioned about dealing withADA , frequently responses willincorporate data about a mythicalgunship escort or readily availableartillery fire from an unknown battery to unplanned targets on unfamiliar terrain at undetermined grid

Illustration byave Watters

coordinates. Sound familiar?Was it ever considered that artillery units and fire support coordinators may need the practice also'TOCs and FDCs need to know whoyou are and they must work theiraviation support elements into theirpriority of fires.

he Solution The answer to thisdilemma is that every air missioncommander every battle captain ,every instruc tor pilot, every aircraftcommander and every pilot mustknow how to coordinate SEADsupport. And, whenever possiblein training , this individual mustmake contact with "real people"and arrange for support duringcritical phases.Field Manual 1 1 , "Terrain Flying," provides us with the followinginsight:

nfortunately the terrain doesnot always lend i t s e ~ f to our ad-

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sible for brigade fire support toinclude SEAD support. Airspacemanagement is a function of the S-3 at this level. The S-3 is assisted byaviation, air defense and Air Forceliaison representatives.

Complications could result if aflight of F-4s were interdicting inthe middle of the flight route. Thusthe information the S-3 Air providesas a member of the BAME may beimportant. The S-3 Air is also collocated with the S-2, so current enemyADA locations readily may be available. The S-3 Air also is responsiblefor all ADA operations in the brigade sector, and the S-3 Air shouldcoordinate suppressive fires in support of aviation operations at keytimes. The obvious advantage ofplanning with the S-3 Air is availability of ntelligence and fire planning channels.

If planning time is limited, thealternate coordinating individual isthe maneuver brigade FSO locatedat the brigade S-3 (coordination witha battalion FSO may be more appropriate in some cases). The FSO isthe artillery advisor to the brigadecommander, and the FSO has directcommunications with the DS battalion supporting that brigade.

The third individual who mayassist in planning and coordinatingSEAD fire is the aviation LO assigned from your unit or next highercommand. Although the LO is preoccupied with advising the groundcommander on aviation operations,this individual usually is collocatedwith a fire support coordinator. TheLO may achieve satisfactory resultsfor you.

As with most operations, faceto-face contact is optimum. However, sometimes coordination mayhave to be made by voice only.Whichever mode of communicationis used, here is a suggested checklistof items for planning: Coordinating preplanned targets/ times to be fired. Frequencies and callsigns. Ammunition available (VT,ICM, smoke).FEBRUARY 1980

Priority of fires during keyphases of aviation operations. Procedures for unplannedtargets (immediate suppression /smoke). * * *

Tango 31 radios on UHF "Flight,holdyourpositions, and hovers tothe treeline on the southeastern sideof the LZ. The copilot orients theaircraft toward the ridgeline, andon the A C's signal executes an NOEpopup maneuver. Within secondsafter the hel icopter dips below thecover of the treeline, 23 mm highexplosive rounds impact on the treetops. The A C has pinpointed theZSU-23-4 position.The A C motions to the copilotto go up to a high hover, changesFM frequency and calls, "Romeo 17this is Tango 31, immediate suppression grid 382476, over. "The artillery FDC answers, "Tango31 this is Romeo 17, immediate suppression grid 382476, authenticatealpha lima, over. "

Tango 31: 1 authenticate Juliet,over.Romeo 17: "Roger, out.Within seconds Romeo 17 radios,"Shot, over " Tango 31 acknow

ledges. Six rounds impact, and, aftera short pause, 31 pops up for alook. The ADA site has sustained

extensive damage, white phosphorous smoke is beginning to obscurethe weapon."This is Tango 31, end ofmission;break, suppress 714 and 715 (twoplanned ADA targets), over."

Romeo 17 acknowledges.Tango 31 returns to a low hoverand moves to the west end of theLZ. The A C instructs the flight todepart to the west 30 seconds af tertakeoff

HE/ VT and smoke rounds impact on the two other AD sites andTango 31 radios, 31 on the go.Tango 31 s aircraft breaks fromcover into the open, andfor 30 agonizing seconds the flight waits inthe LZ. Suddenly, the UHF radiobuzzes, "Well, come on, flight;ro.ute s safe and clear "* * *SEAD planning and coordinationis neither difficult nor time-consuming. It was done automatically inVietnam, although the targets werenot ADA (at least not until the lat terpart of the war), but rather hotLZs and targets of opportunity. Astrite as it may sound, SEAD preparation may run like clockwork whenthe going gets rough. But itwill work only if it is practiced now.

SEAD may well become yourtwo-minute drill.

References1. Army Training and Evaluation Program, Field Artillery, 155MM SP DirectSupport Units, ARTEP 6-365,1 December 1976, Headquarters , Department ofthe Army, Washington, DC.2. Artillery Ammunition, Reference Note WCXXAA, U.S. Army Field ArtillerySchool, Ft. Sill, OK.3. InteNiew with CPT Lawrence J. Buehler, former FSO 7-17th Attack HelicopterSquadron, Ft. Hood, TX 15 June 1978.4. FM 1-1 Terrain Flying, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington,DC, 1 October 1975.5. FM 6-20 Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 30 September 1977.6. FM 17-50 Attack Helicopter Operations, Headquarters, Department of theArmy, Washington, DC , 1 July 1977. .7. FM 90-1 Employmentof Army Aviation Units in a High Threat Environment, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20 May 1977.8. Interview with MAJ John S. Segura, USAF, U.S. Air Force Representative,U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, OK, 28 June 1978.9. Interview with CPT John G. Steers, former S-3 Air 3rd Brigade, 2nd ArmoredDivision (Brigade '75), 29 July 1978.

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The views expressed in this article are the author s and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the Department of the rmynor any other Department ofDefense agencyCaptain Alan J BaconCaptain Bacon wrote this article while attend-ing the Military Intelligence Officers AdvancedCourse at Ft. Huachuca, AZ

W HILE FLYING ALL typesof U.S. Air Force aircraftfrom fighters to communicationsjammers, some 2 ,000 Air Forceaircrews per year engage in combatagainst Soviet-type forces. Hightempo air-to-air combat skillfulmaneuvering against enemy airdefense weapons, and well executedattacks on opposing force (OPFOR)installations are frequent. No, this

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is not actual combat against theSoviet Union. This is the intense,realistic mock war training conducted at the U.S. Air Force RedFlag Training Center at Nellis AirForce Base, NV.After determining that insufficient pilot training caused the markedincrease in the loss of aircraft duringVietnam, the Air Force created thisoutstanding facility to upgrade pilot

combat proficiency. Using the latest_omputer and electronic training devices, operational pilots learn tosurvive and win in a sophisticatedhigh threat environment. ColonelMartin H. Mahrt, a Red Flag commander, calls the center, the turning point in the history of fighterpilot training.Red Flag is indeed a realisticpreparation against the ominous,



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NOE training alone is not enough to fight and win on themodern battlefield. Army aviators are long overdue intenserealistic mock war training equivalent to the combat prepara-tion Air force pilots receive at RedFlag The author feels thatan Army A viation Combat Center may be a solution

I I M Y VI TIONC O M B T C E N T E R

ever-growing Soviet threat. However, U.S. military doctrine doesnot designate the Air Force as oursole air combat participant. It directsArmy aviation with its preponderance of rotary wing assets to providefirepower, mobility and stayingpower to u.s. ground forces. Sincethe U.S. Army operates more helicopters than any other army or airforce in the world, it is only logicalthat Army aircrews should be provided sophisticated training equalto Air Force Red Flag training.

The U.S. Army currently is investigating a training program similar to the one discussed below, butunfortunately the need for such aprogram, or the final form it willtake, have yet to be justified.Since the emergence of the helicopter in the 1950s, the Army hasrevolutionized tactical rotary wingtraining. t has significantly up-.graded pilot preparedness for combat in a high threat environmentthrough terrain flight training whichencompasses nap-of-the-earth NOE)training. Nevertheless, even thoughArmy NOE training methodologiesare tactically sound, they do not aloneadequately prepare Army aircrewsfor the modern battlefield. In otherwords, NOE is not enough ThereFEBRUARY 1980

is an urgent need for a facility whereArmy aviators can conduct intense,realistic, mock war training equalto Red Flag's. The Army must establish an Army Aviation CombatCenter (AACC) similar to Red Flagbut tailored to the combat environment Army aviation will face onthe modern battlefield.

Terrain Flight A PassiveCountermeasureIn response to the proliferationof sophisticated air defense weaponry seen in the 1973 Mideast War,experts developed terrain fligh tdoctrine to enable Army aviationto survive in wars of equal or higherintensity. By definition, terrain flightis flight using the terrain, vegetation, buildings, etc., to enhance aircraft survivability by degrading theenemy's capability to visually, electronically or optically detect Armyaircraft. As a result, terrain flightenables aircraft to operate belowthe OPFOR's lethal air defense umbrella or to operate behind terrainwhich blocks out the umbrella.

Terrain fligh t, a broad term relating to aircraft battlefield survivability, consists of low level, contourand NOE flight. Generally, low levelis flown with constant airspeeds atconstant indicated altitudes, 100 to

200 feet above the terrain. Contourflight is performed closer to theearth with varying airspeeds andaltitudes varying with the contoursof the terrain. NOE, on the otherhand, is performed even closer tothe earth. NOE enables helicoptersto fly as close to the earth's surface,treetop and below, as conditions

permit using varying altitudes andvarying airspeeds. In short, NOE isour best protective maneuver forflights approaching the forwardedge of the battle area where threatweaponry is most lethal. NOE'simportance cannot be overemphasized. Without NOE, Army aviation's existence on the modernbattlefield could not be justified.Army aircraft above NOE altitudescould not survive exposed to minimal air defense threats.

The importance of NOE is demonstrated clearly by the emphasisplaced on terrain and NOEflight intactical helicopter training. Individual pilots and combat aviation unitsfrequently are trained and thoroughly evaluated in terrain flight.All tactical helicopter pilots areevaluated in NOE once at a minimum, during their annual checkrides. Overall unit terrain flight evaluations are conducted during an-29


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Sophisticated Mock War Training A Must For Army Aviatorsnual Army Training and EvaluationPrograms when all operations, excluding tactical instrument flights,are conducted at terrain flight altitudes. This integration of terrainflight doctrine into both individualand unit training is complete. Today, with few exceptions, all tactical Army helicopter pilots are competent in terrain flight operations.

Unfortunately, terrain flight alonefails to ensure that Army aviatorscan survive in high threat environments. Terrain flight-as classifiedby the recently published FM 1-2,"Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasuresand Survivability" - is merely apassive countermeasure. Therefore,since tactical aviation training isbased entirely on terrain flight, itprovides training in passive countermeasures only. Did the Israeli Armywin the 1973 Mideast War withpassive engagements? No. Did thePittsburgh Steelers win Super BowlXIV with a passive attack? Absolutely not. Can Army helicopterpilots using only passive countermeasures win their first battleagainst a formidable force theSoviet Army? Probably not Terrainflight alone, to include NOE, is notenough. It is time to advance Armyaviation anoth er step. Tactical helicopter pilots must undergo activeas well as passive countermeasuretraining. ctive and PassiveCountermeasure Training

The framework for active countermeasure training is prescribedclearly within FM 1-2. After realistically identifying all threats againstArmy aircraft in a sophisticatedenvironment FM 1-2 prescribesactive and passive procedures tocounter each threat category. Inessence, this doctrine shows aircrews how to survive against lethalweaponry. With limited knowledgeof most aviation threats, too manynonaviators erroneously identify30

OPFOR air defense missiles and airdefense artillery as the only threatsagainst Army aircraft. On the contrary, while operating at low altitudes, Army helicopters are vulnerable to threats against U.S.ground force personnel as well asthreats against Air Force aircraft.In order to illustrate the magnitudeof this cumulative threat, primeexamples of threat categories againstArmy aviation are listed as follows: OPFOR Attack HelicopterThreat High Performance TacticalAircraft Air Defense Artillery Air Defense Missiles Artillery Small Arms Nuclear Munitions Biological Agents Chemical Munitions Signal Intercept Threat Direction Finding Threat Deception Threat Jamming Threat

OPFOR Night Vision ThreatAs shown, Army aircraft face acumulative threat greater than therespective threats opposing U.S.ground forces and the U.S. AirForce. For the most part, thesethreats, representing the latest technology, can destroy low flying helicopters through direct fire, indirectfire , or target acquisition leading todirect and indirect fire.In addition to facing threats individually, Army aircrews must betrained to contend actively withseveral threats simultaneously. Forexample, while flying at night in atoxic chemical environment , anaircraft could be acquired throughradar and in frared devices alertingenemy small arms, air defense artillery, air defense missile and attackhelicopter attacks. Unfortunately,the active countermeasure skillsrequired for survival in this situationfar exceed the skills developed by

current Army aviation training.Today's classroom instruction onFM 1-2 is not enough. Althoughmost tactical aviation exercisesinclude some threats, they fall substantially short of effectively simulating the magnitude and intensityof all of the threats against Armyaviation.

The answer to this train