army basic research …accelerating the pace of transformation workshop on software reliability for...
TRANSCRIPT
Army Basic Research…Accelerating the Pace
of Transformation
Workshop on Software Reliability for FCS
Dr. Mark L. SwinsonDirector of Mathematical and Information Sciences
2
Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army …Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster
From threat-based to capabilities-based approach
From the Cold War• Détente(2 superpowers) - Standoff with known enemy/threat • Anticipated battlefield – Fulda Gap• Prepositioned heavy forces and equipment• The arms race – strategic nuclear weapons
To current security environment• A Nation and Army at war• Enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology - enemy is terrorism• Conducted on homeland and across globe• Violence perpetrated against innocents
3
Increased strategicresponsiveness
Future Force for Full Spectrum of Missions
High
Low
Urban
Open rolling terrain
Major Theater War
EnvironmentalComplexity
Spectrum of Conflict
Stability and Support Operations
Small Scale Contingencies
Brigade in 96 hrs; Division in 120 hrs; Five Divisions in 30 days
Fight immediately upon arrival
Simultaneous air and sea lift
Render Previous Ways of Warfighting Obsolete
4
Pursuing Revolutionary Technologies… Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster
Today Future Force
~100 lb load
< 40 lbeffective
load
< 20 tons
Accelerating Transformational Capabilities
70+ tons
0 mph C-130-Like
Transportability
From Platforms toSystem of Systems
Fully networked
> 40 mph
5
Future Combat Systems (FCS) Maneuver Unit of Action (Brigade Equivalent)
Manned Systems:• MCS 60• ICV 84 • NLOS-Mortar 24• NLOS-Cannon 18• C2V 49• R&SV 30• Medical Vehicle 29
Medical Vehicle
LW FCS
Unmanned Systems:• UAV (CL III/IVa) 56• UAV (CL I) 54• NLOS-LS 24• MULE & ARV-A (L) 54, 27
• UGS 157• SUGV 81
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)
Mounted Combat System (MCS)
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Mortar
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) -Cannon
Command & ControlVehicle (C2V)
Land Warrior (LW) FCS 2550
Recon & SurvVehicle (R&SV)
Small Unmanned
Ground Vehicle (SUGV)
Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS)
MULE & Armed RoboticVehicle – Assault (Light)
(ARV- A (L))
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Launch System
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)(CL I)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)(CL III/IVa)
NetworkNetwork
6
Our Problem:
Major DoD acquisition projects regardless of Service are at serious risk of failure and cost overruns because of software problems
7
1960 1964 1970 1975 1982 1990 2000
F-4 A-7
F-111
F-15
F-16
B-2
F-22
1960 1964 1970 1975 1982 1990 2000
F-4 A-7
F-111
F-15
F-16
B-2
F-22
Sof
twar
e F
un
ctio
nal
ity
Ref: Defense Systems Management College
Capability Provided by Software in DoD Systems is Increasing but So
are the Failures……
Development Spanning
Decades and Yet No Planes in Production
Software and Testing Delays
Push Costs Above
Congressional Ceiling
8
Previously Unknown Global System Instability from an Low-level Operator-Interface Mistake
Crashes entire
shipboard system
USS Yorktown 1998“The Smart Ship”
…. and set the ship helplessly adrift at sea
9
During Gulf War was
blamed for the deaths of 28 US Soldiers
Subtle Timing Mismatch with Application Environment Lead to
Unexpected Failures ….
During Iraq War was
blamed for the shoot
down of a UK Tornado
Patriot Missile System
10
Software Disasters
Why within the three Services are there software disasters in highly visible well designed software intensive systems?
•More dependency on software•More interconnectivity provided by software•Much more complexity in systems of systems•Unexpected system interdependencies•More intricate project management
11
What about FCS?
“The software task alone is five times larger than that required for Joint Strike Fighter and ten times larger than the F-22, which after two decades is finally meeting its software requirements.”
Rep. Curt WeldonHouse Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee hearing April 1, 2004
12
What has DoD done about this long term?
• Study the Problem Again and Again
• Make Small S&T Investments in Software
13
Studies of DoD Software Report the Same Problems and Little Action
• “Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap,” DUSD (Industrial Policy) 2003
• “Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment,” Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, USD(AT&L), 2003
• “Report of the Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology,” 2002
• “Workshop on New Visions for Software Design and Productivity: Research and Applications,” Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and Development, 2001
• “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software,” 2000
• “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Open Systems,” 1998
14
Modest DoD Software S&T Investment
• DoD was a leader in Software S&T through mid-90s
• Mindset that “COTS can do it all” almost eliminated DoD Software S&T Research Investment
• Software S&T Investments in FY04 wereServices $2M DARPA $7M
Mismatch: $20B spent in FY2000 on software for major acquisition programs supported by less
than $10M in S&T
15
Why are there still problems?
–Convergence of Embedded Computing and Communications Fundamentally Changed All
–DoD Studies largely overlooked–Primary Reliance on NSF for New Ideas–DoD Very Small Part of Total Commercial
Market–Industry Demands Incentives for DoD
Problems
16
What Might We Do in S&T for Future Systems?
• Prevent architecture mismatches • Make System of Systems Interactions Coherent • Make Consistent Abstractions• Reduce Interactive Complexity• Assurance & Composition• High Confidence System Design• Correct-by-Construction Software Design• Evidence Technologies for Verification and
Validation
90% of Software Problems in ACAT Projects Might Be EliminatedWith such a Research Agenda
17
Role of the Workshop
• Articulate a Software Research Agenda
• Make Actionable Recommendations
• Answer the “So What?” Question
18
Back -Up