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P R E F A C E

The air assault (AASLT) division is unique. It provides the warfighting commanders-in-chiefs(CINCs) an operational ground force capable of attacking directly into the enemy’s vulnerablerear areas. It fights according to the proven tenets of Army operations.

The AASLT organization and its tactics significantly differ from its armored and light infantrycounterparts. To unleash its full potential soldiers must understand how this extraordinary forcefights.

Field Manual 71-100-3 builds on the solid foundation of current doctrine that the following fieldmanuals (FMs) discuss. Field Manual 100-1 describes the Army’s role in achieving nationalobjectives. Field Manual 100-5 explains how the Army fights campaigns. Field Manual 71-100describes the general nature of the division and addresses its tactics. Field Manual 90-4 describesthe principles for heliborne movements and landings by any Army force.

Field Manual 71-100-3 goes beyond these fundamental doctrinal works to explain how theAASLT division fights. It describes, through samples of tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs), how commanders might employ the division.

The proponent of this manual is headquarters (HQ), US Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC). Submit changes and suggestions on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 andforward them to the Commanding General (CG), US Army, Combined Arms Center (CAC),ATTN: ATZL-SWW-D, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

Masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

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If you visualize an enemy force out there that needs to be taken down..., visualize an armorforce which would be obviously a strong opponent to us . . . . We would go out 150 kilometersand start working that force with our Apaches and take most of that force down.

We would only introduce our close battle forces for one or two reasons. One is to helpclean that force up if that is necessary. The other is to establish a gas station for our Apachesso we can continue that fight even further.

That is how we would use our close battle forces. Now, they are used in other situations.You need close battle forces (foot infantry) to control populations; you need them to control

facilities; you need them to take ownership of ground as you process yourself into a countrybecause that is going to drive you to the center of gravity; that is going to drive you to thewar termination event; that is going to drive you to victory.

Now, I’m not minimizing the importance of that force. But, what I’m suggesting to you ishow you introduce it and when you introduce it is very different in terms of how we employthis force in the 10lst today and in the 1990s.

MG KeaneCG, 10lst Airborne Division (Air Assault)

April 1995

INTRODUCTION

The Evolution of the Air Assault DivisionAir assault operations arose from the “airborne idea,” one of several solutions suggested to break

the brutal trench deadlock of World War I’s (WWI) Western Front. In simplest terms, the airborneidea looked to new technology-the airplane-to transport fighting forces across contested frontlines into the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas.

During WWI, United States Army (USA) Air Corps pioneer Colonel Billy Mitchell drew upplans to parachute the 1st Infantry Division directly into the German-held city of Metz. The warended before he could try this ambitious plan.

Experimentation before and during World War II (WWII) led to the creation of sizeable airborneforces in Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. All powersdeveloped parachute troops built around light infantry formations. Each country also activatedglider troops centered around more heavily armed combined arms forces which possessed someartillery, vehicles, and even, by 1944, some light armor.

Both parachute and glider forces displayed strengths and weaknesses. The paratroopers oftenflew from distant bases directly into battle. They could fight upon landing, conducting what wenow call a forced entry. But, with their limited array of handheld weapons and their tendency toscatter wildly on night drops, parachute units often could not exploit the initial surprise of theirlandings.

Glider units could also launch from far-off bases into combat to force an entry. Gliders usuallylanded a more coherent, heavily armed element on the ground-provided the men and gear inside

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survived the impact. However, being at the mercy of their towing airplanes, gliders typically spreadout far from their assigned objectives. Therefore, even though the glider force could land a strongerforce, it could rarely organize rapidly enough to capitalize on the element of surprise.

The airborne divisions of WWII enjoyed some noteworthy successes. German falschirmjaegerspounced on Belgium and Holland in 1940 and seized Crete in 1941. British and Americanparatroopers secured the beach exits at Normandy in 1944; a smaller contingent helped ease theRhine crossings in 1945. Despite these triumphs, the constraints of 1940s technology stunted filldevelopment of the airborne idea’s potential. As good as airborne soldiers were, they were onlyable to conduct one assault landing per campaign. And, their lack of heavy armament and availablemotor transport made them slow in exploiting opening drops. Faced by enemy mobile reserves orstiff opposition on their drop zones (DZs), the paratroopers and glidermen suffered inordinatelyhigh casualties, bloody reminders of their lack of firepower and deficient battlefield mobility.

After WWII, technological and doctrinal developments changed the nature of parachute andglider forces. Carried in faster, larger aircraft and equipped with dramatically better airdropequipment, parachute troops gradually evolved into today’s all-weather, more heavily armedairborne units. Even more impressive developments altered the glider portion of the equation.

Army aviation, built around increasingly sophisticated rotary-wing aircraft, grew from anadjunct player to a primary member of the combined arms team. During the Korean War(1950-1953), the Army experimented with aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and theMarine corps attempted to move fighting men by helicopter. The helicopter offered all theadvantages of a glider with two important additions: a pilot could steer it directly onto target, andhe could repeat the process again and again.

The 1960s witnessed the birth of Army airmobility, an interim stage between the glider era andmodem AASLT methods. The jet-powered utility helicopter (UH)-1 Iroquois (the ubiquitousHuey of Vietnam fame) provided the means. Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze’s famous studygroup suggested the doctrine. The Vietnam War (1965- 1973) provided the testing ground.

In Vietnam, most all units used helicopters to fight, move, and resupply in the dense junglesand mountain ranges. Two divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division,fought airmobile formations structured around the speed, range, and lifting power of the newturbine-powered Huey and cargo helicopter (CH)-47 Chinook helicopters.

Despite the many frustrations that dogged the Army in Southeast Asia, airmobile operationsclearly showed great promise. However, the nature of the Vietnam War did not demonstrate thefull potential of airmobility. Platoon and company engagements against an elusive light infantryopponent offered only the barest hints of the tempo, range, and hitting power of forces fightingaboard rotary-wing aircraft.

The goals in Vietnam were almost exclusively tactical—gaining and maintaining contact.Airmobile forces never struck deep into the enemy’s unprotected vitals. Day operations, limitedattack aviation roles, and company-size landings typified Vietnam-era use.

After Vietnam, technology and doctrine evolved toward contemporary AASLT operations. Asecond generation of Army aircraft offered the right tools—squad-carrying UH-60 Blackhawks,medium-lift CH-47D Chinooks, and the attack helicopter (AH)-64 Apache gunships, all capableof flying and fighting at night. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) developed the tacticsand techniques for using these potent new flying machines.

During Operation Desert Storm in February 1991, a hundred miles into Iraq, AASLT forcescame of age. The 101st Airborne turned the Iraqi flank and severed enemy withdrawal routes.Attack helicopters and air assault task forces (AATFs) ranged across an area some 300 by 200

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miles deep conducting 3 brigade-scale air assaults in 4 days. In doing so, the AASLT divisionhelped determine the outcome of the Persian Gulf War.

The Air Assault Division’s Combat PowerThe 101st Air Assault Division is a microcosm of Army aviation. Every battlefield operating

system (BOS) element in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) uses Army aviation toaccomplish its mission.

The AASLT division can extend Army operations to operational depth, habitually flying andfighting at night. Using organic Army aviation, the division can—

Air assault one brigade with habitual attachments out to 150 kilometers (km) every 24 hours.Attack deep with three attack aviation battalions out to 150 kilometers every 24 hours.As demonstrated by its performance during the Persian Gulf War, the division can operate at

this pace for from 72 to 96 hours. After maintaining this operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for upto 96 hours, the division must reduce its OPTEMPO for a period of from 24 to 48 hours to plan,maintain, and sustain operations for division units.

The AASLT division rapidly deploys lead units by air to any contingency area in the world.When possible, it self-deploys its aviation assets to the contingency location.

The AASLT division’s lead battalion task force (TF) can begin movement 18 hours afternotification. Depending on the conditions in theater, the division can fly directly into a secure areain country or assemble at an intermediate staging base (ISB) outside the future area of operations(AO).

Working from an ISB, the division can conduct an AASLT forced entry. The division has themobility and combat power to expand its initial forced lodgment in an aggressive, swift, andpotentially decisive way. The remainder of the division deploys via airlift or sealift based onmission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).

All types of Army divisions make important contributions to battlefield success. However, theAASLT division combines a particularly potent and impressive array of capabilities. It alsooperates farther and faster than other divisions and is generally free from terrain restrictions.

With the fire power of its attack aviation and the tenacity of its AASLT infantry, the AASLTdivision possesses the strength to hold its own against enemy armored regiments in conventionalcombat. Although much of the division normal] y deploys via sealift, the division’s relatively lightstructure allows it to quickly move via airlift. Its aviation mobile combined arms punch makes ita force to be reckoned with in crisis-response contingencies. In short, the AASLT divisionconstitutes a force designed to meet the majority of foreseeable armed conflicts or even operationsother than war (OOTW).

Fundamentals of Air Assault Division EmploymentThe AASLT division is organized, equipped, and trained for decisive combat. Aviation and

combined arms create remarkable agility bold leaders employ personal initiative to seize and holdbattlefield initiative; and the division fights and sustains in the extraordinary depth unique toAASLT forces. To do this, they synchronize their efforts around the following five ideas (alignedwith the tenets of Army operations):

1. FIGHT DEEP (depth). Potent combined arms teams jump the enemy’s front lines and leapover forbidding terrain, all to get into the hostile rear area and hurt the enemy where he can leasttolerate the damage. Over all other considerations, the wholehearted commitment to the tenet of

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depth, exploiting the potential to go deep and slash at the enemy’s vitals, characterizes the AASLTdivision.

2. FIGHT FAST (agility). Reaching almost four times the best speed of mechanized forces, anAASLT division can plan and execute actions faster than the enemy can react. Intensive trainingand a shared vision of the battlefield allow division leadership to see, think, decide, and act at anaccelerated, synchronized tempo.

3. FIGHT HARD (initiative). Attacking deep into enemy rear areas with speedy rotary-wingedaircraft, the AASLT division rapidly concentrates overwhelming combat power well behindenemy lines. Air assault commanders fight opportunistically, flying and marching to the sound ofthe guns, always alert for chances to destroy the enemy.

4. FIGHT OFTEN (synchronization). Decisive AASLT operations require the ability to delivera relentless, synchronized succession of attacks, knocking the foe down and finishing him off.The division conducts combat operations on a continuous basis fighting around the clock. Divisionlogistic units conduct sustainment operations both day and night to support the force. Whennecessary, the division conducts reconstitution operations for identified units.

5. FIGHT JOINT AND COMBINED (versatility). The AASLT division is a force-projectiondivision, which can easily act in conjunction with air, naval, and space assets, and can fight as apartner with allied nations.

Synchronization of AASLT forces across time and space allows them to fight deep, fast, hard,and often. In an AASLT division, time is always at a premium. Synchronization measures mustbe routine and in place before fighting begins. Equally important, other Army commanders whodirect the AASLT division should know how best to employ its unique capabilities.

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CHAPTER 1

THE AIR ASSAULT (AASLT) DIVISION

This chapter describes the AASLT division’s or-ganization, capabilities, and limitations; its brigades,separate battalions, and separate companies. TheAASLT division is austere and capable of conductingindependent operations for only 48 hours. It makesoptimum use of offensive, decentralized, irregular-type operations by highly trained small units.

The AASLT division can conduct deep operations,urban and jungle warfare, infiltration operations, andcontrol land areas, including local populations andresources. It can destroy enemy armored vehicles onany battlefield.

The AASLT division uses helicopters to provideenhanced combat power and tactical mobility to in-fantry, artillery, combat support (CS), and combatservice support (CSS) units (Figure 1-1, page 1-2).Division organization includes—

A division headquarters and headquarters company(HHC), which controls assigned or attached units.

Three AASLT infantry brigades, each consisting ofan HHC and three AASLT infantry battalions.(Heliborne infantry battalions serve as the divi-sion’s close combat units with the mission to closewith and destroy the enemy and to seize and holdterrain.)

The aviation brigade, which includes—

– A brigade HHC.

– Three assault battalions (to provide combat liftaircraft for troops and equipment).

– Three attack helicopter battalions (AHBs) (torange fast and deep to destroy enemy forces).

– One medium assault battalion (to provide com-bat lift for heavier troops, weapons systems,materiel, and supplies).

– A command aviation battalion, which includesthe division’s pathfinder detachment and aerialelectronic warfare (EW) detachment (to providegeneral support (GS) for the division’s commandposts (CPs), including courier service).

– One air cavalry squadron (to conduct reconnais-sance and security (R&S) operations).

The division support command (DISCOM), whichdelivers CSS and consists of five assigned units:

– The HHC, including the division materiel man-agement center (DMMC), division movementcontrol center (DMCC), and the division medicaloperations center (DMOC).

– Three forward support battalions (FSBS) (to pro-vide medical, supply, and maintenance support tothe maneuver brigades).

– One main support battalion (MSB) (responsiblefor medical, supply, maintenance, and truck trans-portation support throughout the division area,including bolstering the efforts of the FSBs).

– One aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM)battalion (to repair the division’s aircraft).

– An air ambulance company (to ensure aerial casu-alty evacuation).

The air defense artillery (ADA) battalion, whichcounters enemy air threats.

The engineer battalion, which concentrates on en-hancing mobility and survivability (M/S).

The signal battalion, which installs reliable, secure,fast, and mobile communications.

The military intelligence (MI) battalion, which pro-vides intelligence (intel), counterintelligence (CI),and EW support

The chemical (cml) company, which provides de-contamination, flame field expedients, and smokegeneration.

The military police (MP) company, which-

– Provides support by combatting enemy forces inrear areas.

– Conducts area security missions, providing secu-rity to critical division resources.

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– Expedites movement of critical combat re-sources while conducting battlefield circulationcontrol (BCC) missions.

– Evacuates and controls enemy prisoners of war(EPWs).

– Provides police services, keyed to the echeloncommander’s priorities, as needed.

Nondivisional units, usually allocated to anAASLT division, include air traffic control(ATC), target acquisition, additional artillery, en-gineering assets, parachute riggers, and addedCSS. Additional aviation is also often assigned.

A corps support group (CSG) is normally allo-cated to the AASLT division upon commitment.

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The CSG provides additional CSS capabilities forsustained operations.In organization for combat, the principal decision

involves allocation of aviation assets. The com-mander must mass all aviation assets to fullyachieve the aviation brigade combat capability forlift and AHB assets.

Situational factors may dictate distribution ofsome or all aviation assets. The commander andstaff must consider all the factors affecting thedivision before recommending or making a decisionto split aviation assets (Figure 1-2). Rarely wouldaviation be task-organized to a battalion to accom-plish a mission.

The AASLT division—Conducts an AASLT operation for one AASLTbrigade with its habitual attachments out to 150kilometers once every 24 hours.Attacks deep, along with or separate from a bri-gade air assault, with three attack aviation battal-ions out to 150 kilometers once every 24 hours.Characteristically, the division exercises its

capabilities—By fielding organized, trained, and equippedcombat, CS, and CSS units to conduct helibornewarfare. Army aviation integration spans theentire division.By rapid deployment to the theater of war byairlift and/or self-deploying Army aviation.By forced entry into the theater when launchingfrom a secure ISB.By forced entry into the theater when launchingfrom a secure ISB.

By setting the conditions for forced entry opera-tions using joint and organic fires.By flying and fighting at night.By overflight of terrain obstacles, including cit-ies, rivers, mountains, and forests.By aerial penetration and/or overflight of the lineof contact (LC) and enemy front-line forces.By operations at speeds exceeding 216 kilometersper hour.The division exhibits several noteworthy

limitations:Weather extremes affect flight operations.Enemy air defenses threaten division aviationoperations.Resupply of fuel, ammunition, and aviation partsrequires special attention.The division is only 70-percent mobile in groundvehicles; it relies on aircraft to move around thebattlefield.Like most Army forces, the division remains vul-nerable to nuclear, biological, and chemical(NBC) weapons.Division CPs, logistic sites, and pick-up zones(PZs) are vulnerable to enemy indirect fires, airstrikes, and ground attacks.The division can only air assault one brigadeevery 24 hours. While augmentation with corpsor joint task force (JTF) assets or both canincrease this, the number of organic aircraftprecludes a larger assault. Consequent effectson other concurrent combat, CS, and CSS isdramatic if not well thought out in advance.

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This applies particularly to the division’s valu-able medium lift assault aircraft.In and of themselves, none of these limita-tions completely rule out AASLT operations.However, if not addressed each can stunt theperformance of AASLT forces and reduce thelikelihood of decisive results.

THE MANEUVER BRIGADE

The division’s three maneuver brigades are theprincipal headquarters charged with integratingand fighting AASLT combined arms teams. AnAASLT division fights by continuously leapfrog-ging brigades either forward, laterally, or to therear, moving one brigade-size unit every 24 hours.As a result, maneuver brigades routinely receiveattached, operational control (OPCON), and directsupport (DS), CS, and CSS forces.

In strictest terms, only the HHC is an organicbrigade element. The brigade may be assigned fromtwo to five maneuver battalions with three AASLTinfantry battalions as the norm. When task-organ-ized, brigades often receive—

A DS field artillery (FA) battalion.An OPCON attack aviation battalion.An OPCON aviation battalion TF (assault, me-dium assault, command aviation, air traffic con-trollers, and pathfinders).A DS forward support battalion (FSB).A DS air defense (AD) battery.A DS engineer company.A DS MI company team (electronic collectionand jamming (C&J), ground surveillance radar(GSR), CI, and EPW interrogation).A DS chemical platoon (smoke anddecontamination).A DS MP platoon.Two DS signal operations (SO) teams.The brigade—Conducts a brigade air assault.Conducts or directs a battalion air assault.Secures terrain and facilities.

Destroys and defeats enemy forces.

When task-organized, fights independently forfrom 24 to 72 hours or fights under the control ofanother Army division, JTF, or combinedcommand.

There are two limitations. One is reliance onaviation for battlefield mobility, with the conse-quence of allowing for weather extremes, enemyair defenses, aircraft maintenance, and aircrewendurance. The other includes the significantCSS requirements for fuel, ammunition, andaviation parts and the demand for a major avia-tion resupply effort, use of US Air Force (USAF)airlift and airdrops, or ground lines of communi-cation (LOC).

The AASLT infantry battalions that constitutethe brigade’s primary maneuver componentclose with the enemy to destroy forces, secureand defend terrain and facilities, and carry outair assaults and raids. With an HHC, three riflecompanies, and an antiarmor company, thesebattalions have sufficient power and flexibilityto fight against enemy armored and dismountedtroops.

The AASLT infantry battalions train for nightheliborne operations. Under certain conditions,an AASLT battalion TF might perform inde-pendent missions such as raids and rearoperations.

THE AVIATION BRIGADE

The AASLT division’s aviation brigade containsthe forces most responsible for the division’s tempo,range, and combat power. The aviation brigadeconducts combat operations, especially deep at-tacks, either with air assaults or separately. It can actas a fourth maneuver brigade when task-organizedwith combat, CS, and CSS units.

During operations, the division may allocate liftunits to maneuver brigades or DISCOM. The aircavalry frequently works directly for the division,which allows aviation brigade headquarters to focuson deep attack aviation missions and future opera-tions as well as to synchronize all operations (close,deep, and rear).

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When allocated by higher headquarters, the bri-gade accepts OPCON and/or attachment of corpsaviation units. The brigade—

Controls a brigade-scale air assault as the airmission commander’s (AMC’s) headquarters.

Attacks deep with at least three attack aviationbattalions (more if provided by the corps or JTF).

Fights as a fourth maneuver brigade, when prop-erly augmented, and commands and controlsfrom two to five maneuver battalions (attack heli-copters or ground battalions).

Shifts resources rapidly and in strength to thelimits of range and speeds unhampered past inter-vening terrain.

Provides liaison and coordination elements tomaneuver brigades.

Six limitations influence the aviation brigade’sperformance:

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Weather extremes.

Enemy air defenses.

High consumption of ammunition, fuel, andaircraft repair parts.

Lack of any substantial capability to dig in anddefend aircraft staging and servicing areasunless augmented.

A significantly broad span of command andcontrol (C2) if the brigade serves as the AMC forbrigade-size AASLT operations and simul-taneously conducts deep attack missions with itsattack aviation battalions.

Aircrew endurance.

The AASLT division has over 300 aircraft. How-ever, to maintain a high OPTEMPO, the divisionrequires additional aviation augmentation. By de-sign, only one-third of the ground force can airassault at any one time. Therefore, aviation’s taskorganization becomes one of the most crucial issuesin determining the success of divisional operations.

DIVISION ARTILLERY(DIVARTY)

The DIVARTY headquarters staff synchro-nizes all supporting fires and provides FA firesupport to the AASLT division. DIVARTY head-quarters consists of a CP, liaison section, firesupport element (FSE), communications platoon,survey planning and coordination element, andmeteorological section.

Air assault operations challenge DIVARTY inboth coordination and delivery of supporting firesbecause the division habitually operates well out-side the firing radius of tube artillery. DIVARTYcoordinates alternate fires and AASLT FA batter-ies into and adjacent to maneuver-unit landingzones (LZs).

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The DIVARTY—Coordinates and masses all Army, joint, andcombined lethal and nonlethal fire support, in-cluding mortars, EW, tube artillery of all types,rocket and missile artillery, air strikes, and na-val gun fire (NGF). DIVARTY FSE soldiersattached to all forces ensure continuous support,coordination, and liaison.

Commands and controls reinforcing artillery bat-talions and brigades.Provides DS AASLT field artillery for maneuverbrigades.Directs and delivers counterfire.

Conducts suppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD), coordinates joint suppression of enemyair defense (JSEAD), and/or neutralizes or de-stroys enemy AD assets within their capabilities.DIVARTY exhibits four limitations:

Organic howitzers cannot fire most improvedartillery munitions.

Reinforcing self-propelled (SP) tube and missilebatteries cannot air assault.

Air assaults usually far outrange most indirectfire support means, especially all varieties oftube artillery.

Air assaults and deep aviation attacks consumelarge quantities of ammunition to suppress,

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neutralize, and destroy enemy air defenses, firesupport, and mobile reserves.

DIVARTY and the aviation brigade work to-gether to set conditions for successful cross-forwardline of own troops (FLOT) operations. Fire supportsuperiority is essential to deep air assaults and deepattack operations.

THE DIVISION SUPPORTCOMMAND (DISCOM)

Combat service support presents many chal-lenges for the AASLT division. Massed use ofrotary-wing aircraft demands substantial fuel, am-munition, and repair parts. Supply, medical, main-tenance, and transportation support must span vastdistances and displace forward in tempo withAASLT operations.

The DISCOM ensures CSS to far-rangingAASLT forces. DISCOM—

Operates a division support area (DSA) to pro-vide supply, medical, maintenance, transporta-tion, and CSS supervision to the entire division;DSA elements build on brigade forward logisticsbases (FLB) to create up to two forward opera-tions bases (FOBS).

Provides DS multifunctional FSBs to maneuverbrigades to coordinate all CSS and to deliverfocused supply, medical, and maintenance sup-port; an FSB can air assault a tailored forwardlogistics element (FLE) alongside the infantry.

Conducts AVIM for the division.

Provides air ambulance support to the divisionwith a three-aircraft team forward with each ma-neuver brigade FSB.

Closely supervises medical operations, materielmanagement, and internal movements throughdedicated operations centers.

The DISCOM operates under four importantlimitations:

1. It cannot adequately dig in and defend its serviceelements and commodities using only organicassets; in addition, FSBs are not staffed for24-hour operations.

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2.

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It must have a ground LOC if weather precludesArmy aviation (AAVN) or USAF airlift support;aviation units cannot sustain combat operationswithout a constant infusion of supplies.

Armored units task-organized to the division canovertask the austere DISCOM. The armoredunit’s parent organization ensures that a fullsupport package accompanies the armored unitto the AASLT division.

The DISCOM requires a CSG to sustain itsoperations (especially with Class III and Vsupplies and transportation assets) and supportattached units such as armored forces to thedivision. The DISCOM can support the divisionfor only a few days without resupply from theCSG.

Like artillery and other combat multiplier forces,the DISCOM features units and equipment opti-mized to employ AAVN. To guarantee continuousAASLT operations, it must receive its share ofdivision aviation.

THE AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY(ADA) BATTALION

Freedom from enemy air attacks permits theAASLT division to fight and sustain its operationsand forces. Although most conceivable contempo-rary threats will not gain air superiority over anAmerican corps or JTF, strong individual raids re-main a concern. Air defense is vital given the lucra-tive targets which an AASLT division’s aviationassembly areas (AA), CSS sites, and PZs pose.

The ADA battalion consists of one HHB and fourfiring batteries. It provides forward-area air defense(FAAD), an air battle management operations cen-ter (ABMOC), and early warning of enemy missile,fixed-wing, and rotary-wing threats. One firing bat-tery habitually provides DS to each maneuver bri-gade; the fourth supports aviation brigade,DIVARTY, DISCOM, and other division troops.

The ADA battalion’s capabilities include—

Displacement to ensure continuous coverage byAASLT, vehicle, or foot.

Liaison to supported units.

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Reliance on a light, relatively simple, high-prob-ability of hit and/or probability of kill weaponsystem (such as the Stinger).Small, light elements linked by the ABMOC toensure integrated low-altitude air defense.Integration of all organic and supporting AD net-works through the ABMOC including otherArmy, joint, and combined firing and early warn-ing systems.Control and integration of attached, OPCON, andreinforcing AD units.The commander and staff must also consider four

unit limitations:1.

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The division relies on the corps or JTF for high-to medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD).The division receives warnings of inboundthreats through the corps or JTF.The current ADA organization does not includeany cannon system for point defense of targets,and overreliance on the Stinger family ofweapons may simplify enemy countermeasures.Vehicle-mounted ADA systems require mediumassault aviation to displace by air. -

The commander and staff always analyze theMETT-T factors to determine how much, if any,ADA support is to accompany maneuver forcesduring an air assault.

THE ENGINEER BATTALION

Air assault forces employ engineers to shapeterrain for survivability and countermobility. Lightengineer units breach and reduce obstacles and per-form general engineering tasks to build and upgraderoads, bridges, airstrips, and LZs or PZs. Air assaultengineers work throughout the division AO fromthe front lines to the rear boundary.

The engineer battalion consists of one HHC andthree line companies. Typically, one line companyis attached to each maneuver brigade. The engineerbattalion’s capabilities include—

Coordinating all divisional engineering efforts,including integrating nondivisional units.Providing AASLT engineers and additional engi-neer support for committed brigades.

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Providing liaison to supported units.Conducting M/S and limited engineering tasks.Fighting as infantry.

The engineer battalion has five limitations:

It requires additional support from corps or JTFlevels for bridging, general engineering, andsurvivability support to rear area units.It only performs limited survivability tasks withorganic equipment. (DISCOM and the aviationbrigade share the equipment that supports thedivision HHC or they strip out assets normallysent to maneuver brigades.)

Engineers require medium lift aircraft to airassault their equipment.

Employment as infantry requires addition of firesupport teams.The division has no organic bridging to supportground supply truck convoys conducting rivercrossings.

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE(MI) BATTALION

Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) allowsAASLT forces to see the battlefield while denyingthe enemy the same opportunity. The MI battalionconsolidates and integrates most of the specialized,technical aspects of the various collection and EWsystems.

The MI battalion includes a headquarters and aheadquarters and headquarters support company(HHSC), three direct support MI companies, oneGS company, and a long-range surveillance detach-ment (LRSD). The companies are organized asfollows:

The HHSC includes—

Battalion headquarters and the analysis andcontrol element (ACE).

The maintenance section.

The communications and electronics (C&E)maintenance section.

A dining facility (DFAC) section.

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Direct support companies include—

– The C&E platoon with three low-level voiceintercept (LLVI) teams and one electroniccountermeasures (ECM) team.

– The intelligence and surveillance (I&S) pla-toon with a counterintelligence/interrogationsection and a remotely monitored battlefieldsensor system (REMBASS) GSR section.

The GS company includes—

– A signal intelligence (SIGINT) platoon.

– Three GSR squads, five REMBASS teams,one interrogation of prisoners of war (IPW)section, and one CI section.

– An I&S platoon with a GSR section.

An LRSD that includes—

– Two base radio teams.

– Six surveillance teams.The MI battalion—

Collects, jams, and performs surveillance in thedivision’s AO.Provides a DS AASLT company team to eachmaneuver brigade.Provides a GS company in support of the division.Ensures continuous liaison to supported units.Provides aerial jamming to suppress enemy com-munications in support of division operations.

Provides trained LRSD teams to the division foremployment on and in support of divisionmissions.The MI battalions’s major limitation is that air

assaults range well beyond the effective radius ofC&J systems. Therefore, corps or JTF and nationalresources must look deep for the division until thedivision can deploy these assets forward on thebattlefield.

Commanders and staffs consider METT-T fac-tors for employing MI assets. These assets cancontinue to support the division’s close operationsor they can perform air assault deep behind enemylines to collect intelligence for future operations.

Military intelligence assets are normally not left inreserve.

THE SIGNAL BATTALION

Air assault division operations place great bur-dens on military communications by rapidly stretch-ing networks to extreme ranges. The AASLT divisionsignal battalion provides the following:

High-frequency transmissions.Division frequency modulated (FM)retransmissions.Single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT)broadcasts.Multichannel TACSAT services.Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) service topass voice, data, and facsimile (FAX) messages.The signal battalion links major division CPs,

maneuver brigades, the aviation brigade, DI-VARTY, DISCOM, the ADA battalion, the engi-neer battalion, and the MI battalion. It consists of anHHC, two area signal companies, and a signal sup-port company. The battalion organizes for combatby providing an MSE “backbone” network withextension teams providing connectivity of divi-sional units into the tactical phone network. It—

Creates and maintains redundant division com-munications networks for voice, data, andfacsimile.Uses air assault MSE extension teams with ma-neuver brigades as part of the brigade TF.Dispatches a forced-entry platoon trained andequipped to establish single-channel communica-tions in the initial objective area.Provides single-channel TACSAT during air as-saults. (The division has 28 man-packed TAC-SATs with an additional single-channelTACSAT capability in the console of each C2

a i r c r a f t . )There are two limitations when using air assault

MSE equipment:1. Air assaults routinely exceed the bounds of

terrestrial line of sight (LOS) communicationssystems and may require installation of LOSrelays.

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2. An MSE system requires medium lift assaultaircraft for transport.

Combat commanders may air assault MSE unitsforward if they are willing to commit sufficientmedium assault aircraft. Once in place, MSEs allowthe AASLT task force commander to communi-cate through the theater network.

THE CHEMICAL COMPANY

The AASLT division’s chemical company offersdual-purpose smoke and decontamination platoons.It includes the division chemical section, companyheadquarters, and three smoke and/or decontamina-tion platoons. The chemical company—

Operates the division’s chemical staff section,including NBC threat warning systems for divi-sion CPs.Normally—

Provides an NBC defense platoon in DS toeach maneuver brigade.

Is METT-T dependent.

Is capable of decontamination support or ofproducing a 2-kilometer-wide smoke screenwhen in the mobile mode.

Constructs and emplaces flame field expedientdevices.Five limitations which hinder the chemical com-

pany include the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

If all three platoons are task-organized tomaneuver brigades, no assets remain to supportDIVARTY, aviation AAs, CPs, and CSS sites.Decontaminating large CSS facilities can exceedthe company’s capabilities.

The chemical company is not manned tosimultaneously deliver smoke and conductdecontamination; one platoon cannot conceal adecontamination site with organic smoke.Smoke operations impose a significant need forfuel on top of an already substantial divisionalrequirement.

Smoke and decontamination assets aresignificantly reduced once they AASLT forward

because of the inability to resupply water and fogoil.

THE MILITARY POLICE (MP)COMPANY

Air assault MPs operate much the same as thosein other divisions, albeit over an extended area. Thecompany includes the division provost marshal(PM) section, the company headquarters, and fourplatoons. At threat level 1, capabilities include—

Providing an MP section to exercise C2 overassigned and attached units.Performing the following missions, but notsimultaneously:

– Battlefield circulation control operations to ex-pedite movement of vehicular traffic andindividuals.

– Area security operations employing mobile 3-man teams with crew-served and individualweapons capable of defending against dis-mounted infantry.

– Area reconnaissance in conjunction with mo-bile patrol operations in the division rear area.

– Manning one EPW and/or civilian internee(CI) collecting point within the division reararea.

– Temporarily detaining US military prisoners.

– Battlefield law and order operations to allevi-ate major problems endangering the successfulaccomplishment of the division’s mission (forexample, war crimes and criminal diversion ofwar materiel).

– Augmentation by the division band.

– Security operations for the division main CPand all-source production section (ASPS) andother missions, as required.

– Enemy prisoner of war operations.

– Extensive area security operations within thedivision area.

– Assisting the host nation (HN) in joint lawenforcement operations within the division.

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– Providing support during division river cross-ing operations and passage of lines.

– Providing support in convoy security.

The MP teams are capable of responding to anddisrupting or defeating nonmechanized incursionsduring daylight hours involving threat levels I andII. Night fighting capabilities are limited. However,when equipped with the required number of nightvision systems, MP teams can effectively performarea security operations. They can delay level IIIthreat forces for short periods of time, although at aheavy cost in personnel and equipment.

The MP company has three limitations:

1.

2.

3.

If three platoons operate with the maneuverbrigades, the remaining platoon will not be ableto cover the division rear area withoutaugmentation.

Each platoon has only six three-person MPteams with which to accomplish the mission.

More than 100 EPWs per day, or a corps’ orJTF’s inability to relocate EPWs from thedivision, would rapidly overtax the organicMP’s capability to process prisoners.

The MP company depends on—

The appropriate elements of the division or corpsfor legal, financial, and personnel and administra-tive services.

The appropriate elements of the division fortransportation support to provide back-haul forevacuation of EPWs from the brigade rear to thedivision collection point.

The division HHC for food services for the com-pany headquarters and one platoon and the for-ward supply company for the other three platoonswhen providing direct support to the brigades.

The unit ministry team organic to HHC for relig-ious services.

The HHC medical battalion for combat healthsupport (CHS), including evacuation.

Augmentation by corps MP assets.

NONDIVISIONALATTACHMENTS

The AASLT division operates most effectivelywhen augmented by key nondivisional units. Theseunits fill gaps in the basic organization, reinforcecapabilities already on hand, and ensure support forspecific situations.

Assignment of a CSG should always occur whencommitting the AASLT division to reinforce andprovide DS and GS to other nondivisional units.Nondivisional elements typically allocated to theAASLT division include—

An artillery target-acquisition detachment to as-sist in finding enemy firing batteries.A towed 155-millimeter (mm) battery to providesome capability with improved munitions whilestill retaining the ability to perform air assaults onmedium lift aircraft.An engineer light equipment company to assist inroad and airfield construction and repair and tosupplement the division’s survivability assets.A parachute rigger detachment to prepare air-de-livered supplies and equipment.An air traffic control company.Some USAF combat aircraft and airlift liaisonteams.A USAF weather team.Reinforcements for capabilities already on hand

include—Additional medium lift assault, attack, and assaultaviation units (in order of preference based onMETT-T factors).Reinforcing artillery battalions and brigades.Additional CSS, especially fuel and ammunitiontransportation and storage units.Additional AD batteries and battalions.Additional engineers, especially survivabilitysystems, general engineering units, and bridgingunits.Additional MI assets.Additional chemical platoons and companies.Additional MP platoons and companies.

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Support for certain situations includes—

Civil affairs (CA) units.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) units.Liaison for special operations forces (SOF).

Heavy battalion TFs or brigades (usuallyOPCON).

Assignment of a medical group should be consid-ered when committing an AASLT division separatefrom a normal corps support base, particularly inearly entry and/or split-base operations. The medi-cal group will provide the full range of CHS neces-sary for the sustainment of the division.

Corps medical elements typically allocated to theAASLT division and supporting corps nondivi-sional units include—

A combat support hospital to provide hospitaliza-tion for all classes of patients.Forward surgical teams attached to the FSB medi-cal company of each maneuver brigade.Air and ground MEDEVAC units to evacuatepatients from the division and to augment divi-sional medical units when required.Area support medical elements to provide eche-lon I and II treatment for nondivisional units andreinforcement for divisional medical units.Dental, preventive medicine, combat stress con-trol, and veterinary elements as required for allsupported forces.A medical logistics support detachment to medi-cal supply and services for divisional and nondi-visional medical units.

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CHAPTER 2

BATTLE COMMAND

In modern battle, the sheer magnitude of availableinformation challenges leaders at all levels. Ulti-mately, they must assimilate thousands of bits ofinformation to visualize the battlefield as it actuallyis and then direct military efforts to achieve victory.

Thinking and acting are simultaneous activitiesfor commanders in battle. The commander leads,conceptualizes, synchronizes, and makes timelykey decisions. The staff acquires, synchronizes, anddisseminates decisions and information.

By definition, AASLT operations feature ex-tended distances and tremendous speed of execu-tion. Air assault operations involve deeppenetrations, wide sweeps, and bypassing enemyforces and terrain obstacles, almost always at night.To quickly react to intelligence on hostile forces,planning and execution must keep pace with theaccelerated AASLT tempo, maximizing surprise toensure effective execution at the decisive place andtime.

The AASLT operation’s unit leaders must haveflexibility, the ability to aggressively execute deci-sions, and the capability to fight based on missionand intent rather than bulky formal orders. To workswiftly under pressure, they must synchronize theirefforts based on a sensible AASLT command struc-ture, a well-organized CP network, a sound plan-ning process, well-defined execution techniques,and important airspace control measures.

FUNDAMENTALS

Command and control are not one and the same.They are separate and distinct with differing appli-cations to how the division fights. Command is theart of making decisions, assigning missions, priori-tizing resources, leading subordinates, and focusingthe entire division's energy to accomplish itsobjectives. Control is defining limits, computingrequirements, allocating resources, prescribing re-quirements for reports, monitoring performance,identifying and correcting deviations from guid-ance, and directing subordinate actions to accom-plish the commander’s intent.

Control allows commanders freedom to operate,to delegate authority, to lead from any critical pointon the battlefield, and to synchronize actions acrossthe entire area of operations. Moreover, the C2

system helps the commander and his staff adjustplans for future operations even while focusing onthe current fight. Related tools for implementingcommand decisions include communications, com-puters, and intelligence.

GUIDELINES

Basic time-tested imperatives drive the success-ful development and efficient operations of divi-sional CPs and determine their effectiveness incombat; for example—

A headquarters must be small to be efficient.There can be only one CP exercising control atany one time, just as there can be only onecommander.A commander must limit the number of voices hehears if he is to be effective in a crisis.A commander should avoid lengthy preparedbriefings and rely on unstructured, unscheduleddiscussions if he wants his staff to keep himinformed. (Not that briefings in CPs do not occur;they occur periodically to keep everyone up todate and to obtain needed information.)Organizing a CP is a science whose purpose is toacquire and disseminate information in a priori-tized fashion.The commander should frequently visit subordi-

nate CPs. The best way for him to get informationis by firsthand observation and listening to subordi-nate commanders and their command nets.

COMMAND POSTRELATIONSHIPS

Divisional CPs are centers for planning and coor-dinating acquisition as well as for generating, proc-essing, and disseminating information and orders.

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They exist to support the commander wherever hemay be on the battlefield.

Within current force structures, commanders caneffectively organize, and staffs can implement, thedivision C2 system. However, commanders andstaffs must clearly understand the relationship be-tween C2 facilities supporting the division and doc-trinal functions that each element of the total effortperforms.

Doctrinally, the division fights one simultaneousbattle, consisting of deep, close, and rear actions, asone seamless fight which occurs during a singletime frame. If the division fights only one battle,then common sense and the principle of unity ofcommand mandate that it have only one central CP(Figure 2-l).

extensions of the main CP, to improve synchroniza-tion of combat power throughout the battlefield.

The AASLT division calls their TAC CP an as-sault CP (ACP). This is different from the doctrinalassault CP which is a portion of the main CP thatdeploys with the division’s lead units during a force-projection operation.

The primary concern of the TAC CP is the closeoperation; the rear CP focuses on rear operations.Each CP performs its roles and functions within thedivision’s overall mission, which the main CPdirects.

With three CPs simultaneously participating inthe battle, confusion can result. Who is really in

The main CP manifests unity of command. The charge? Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs)division resources tactical (TAC), and rear CPs as must clearly delineate each CP’s authority and

responsibility.

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Division CP staff activities have five commonfunctions:

1. To provide information.

2. To make estimates.

3. To make recommendations for decisions.

4. To prepare plans and orders.

5. To supervise and monitor the execution ofdecisions.

Only the division main CP has the capability to planbranches and sequels to the current mission.

Because of the speed with which the AASLTdivision executes moves, it has a fourth CP calledthe jump CP, usually configured with and moved byhelicopter assets. The commander controls theAASLT division through the jump CP, TAC CP,and the main and rear CPs.

Command posts provide the physical facilities,staff expertise, and communications the divisionneeds to direct wide-ranging, rapid AASLT opera-tions. This CP network provides the control, coor-dination, and communications systems (C3) fromwhich the division plans, executes, and sustainsAASLT operations.NOTE: Figure 2-2 describes the usual commandersand functions of each CP.

Jump Command PostThe jump CP—Serves as a highly mobile CP; is available andMETT-T dependent during offensive AASLToperations; and is not mandatory to use but maybe able to control the battle.Places the commander or the assistant divisioncommander for operations (ADC-O) well forward.Allows the CG/ADC-O to fly into the objectivearea with the lead maneuver brigade.Serves as the de facto TACCP until the CG/ADC-Oand the CP rejoin.Moves aboard two UH-60 aircraft, one of whichcontains a command console, and includes a spe-cially configured C2 aircraft with appropriatestaff and communications.

Operates on the ground for up to 24 hours. (Airendurance depends on the precise mission profile,but usually exceeds 3 hours).Jump CP personnel normally include—The CG or ADC-O.The assistant chief of Staff (COfs) G2 (intelli-gence) representative.The assistant Cofs, G3 (operations and plans)representative.The FSE representative.The air liaison officer (ALO).The air and naval gunfire liaison company(ANGLICO), if attached.Signal personnel.

Tactical Command Post (TAC CP)The TAC CP—

Primarily focuses on close current operations andshould not be distracted from that focus.Is configured and operates on organic tacticalvehicles that can move by ground or AASLTmeans.

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Locates well forward with the maneuver brigadesto respond to the close operation’s immediatetactical requirements.

Is minimally manned to support maneuver, intel-ligence, mobility, and fire support.

Controls only units committed to or engaged inclose combat. (The main or rear CPs perform allother C2 functions and control units within thedivision AO not committed to close operations.)

Stands ready to assume the main CP role if nec-essary, especially during early phases of contin-gency operations.

Usually accompanies brigade air assaults.

Division Main Command Post

The division main CP performs seven primaryfunctions to support the division battle. It also per-forms the following collateral support functions forthe TAC and rear CPs: planning, coordinating, in-tegrating, synchronizing, prioritizing, allocating re-sources, and monitoring close and rear operations.The division main CP normally moves by groundon organic vehicles, but any or all of it could movein a helicopter.

If the division receives allocation of nondivi-sional units, a staff element at the main CP focuseson those elements and integrates their current andfuture support to close, deep, or rear operations. Themain CP rarely makes immediate tactical decisionsbecause it does not have the most current informa-tion. However, it does make decisions, based onrequests from the TAC and rear CPs, that supportimmediate close and rear operations.

The main CP controls all aspects of the divisionbattle, receiving input from the TAC, jump (if em-ployed), and rear CPs and higher, lower, and adja-cent units. The main CP synchronizes all operationsand makes plans that affect committed forces sev-eral days out.

The main CP is the focal point for integrating allintelligence. The main CP is usually just behind themaneuver brigades’ rear boundaries at a centrallocation which provides necessary cover, conceal-ment, and access. It rarely air assaults.

Division Rear Command Post

The division rear CP performs sustainment, ter-rain management, movement control, security, andfire support. The rear area is no less an assigned AOthan is a brigade AO; there are numerous fire sup-port requirements for rear tactical operations, tacti-cal air (TACAIR) support, artillery, and electronicwarfare.

The AASLT division rear CP includes headquar-ters, operations, intelligence, and CSS cells. It ha-bitually collocates with DISCOM.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONSAND TECHNIQUES

Alternate Command Post

The division designates an alternate CP with aclear delineation of its purpose and roles. It does notneed to perform all main command post C2 func-tions. If a catastrophic loss occurs, an alternate CPenables the division to sustain continuous C2 opera-tions until surviving elements rally at another loca-tion, assess casualties and damage, reorganize, andreestablish critical division C2 functions.

The alternate CP’s communications facilitiesmust be able to assume the destroyed CP's criticalfunctions; it normally does not support CPdisplacements.

An alternate division CP retains the capability tocommand and control operations for its own units.No subordinate unit CP within the division hasenough personnel to simultaneously execute its ownprimary C2 functions and to support those of adivision CP. If attempted, the division CP’s func-tions would quickly consume the alternate CP’saustere C2 facilities and assets and degrade opera-tional effectiveness.

The designated alternate CP activates when a CPinforms the command net of its attack, destruction,or inability to function; when contact with all ele-ments within the CP is lost for a prespecified time;or when a unit or element reports and verifies theCP’s destruction. Tactical standing operating pro-cedures (TSOP) designate alternate CPs for main,assault, and rear CPs and establish criteria for theiractivation.

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When necessary, the TAC CP’s alternate CP mustbe able to assume the G3‘s, G2’s, and FSE’s criticalfunctions, in that priority. The first choice for a TACCP alternate normally is wherever the CG and thecommand group’s vehicles are located.

The CG knows the situation, and the commandgroup should be able to pick up the close operationwithout losing momentum during informationtransfer. The command group’s vehicles also pos-sess the organic communications capability andpersonnel to perform critical G3, G2, and FSEfunctions.

Once the new TAC CP is functional, informationand operations transfer from the CG to the TAC CP.If the CG is unavailable, the next alternative for anadequate TAC CP is the division cavalry squadronCP.

Designating an alternate CP for the main CP isdifficult because of the size and complexity of itsfunctions. The problem becomes less complexwhen the division identifies which critical functionsoccur at the alternate CP and which occur at otherCPs within the division. However, no other organicdivision CPs are capable of assuming all the mainCP’s functions.

After the main CP’s destruction, and the verifica-tion of its destruction, subordinate division CPs thatroutinely send liaison elements to the main CPassume the functional responsibility of their liaisonpersonnel and provide assistance. When selecting aunit CP as the alternate, the division determines theeffect the choice will have on current division tac-tical operations.

The number of surviving personnel and equip-ment from the main CP determines the number ofpersonnel and the amount of organic equipment theaviation brigade CP needs. Engineer, signal opera-tions, ADA, and MI battalions, plus DIVARTY,temporarily assume other main CP functions untilthe division main CP is once again able to functionand assume its duties.NOTE: Despite a distance issue, some divisions usethe division rear CP as the initial alternate CP.Figure 2-3 shows a conceptual allocation of C2 tasksand functions for alternate CPs.

Divisions also designate an alternate rear CP.Functionally, DISCOM’s CP manning and equip-ment allows it to assume critical functions of the

assistant CofS, G 1 (personnel); assistant CofS, G4(logistics); and division transportation officer(DTO), from the rear CP CSS cell, without impact-ing the sustainment function. Should the enemydestroy the DISCOM CP also, the MSB may be thenext best alternative.

The main CP G3 operations cell assumes the rearfunctions of terrain management, security, andmovement coordination. Selecting an alternate rearCP must not interfere with the capability of CSSelements to continue to logistically sustain currentoperations.

Designating an alternate CP and transferringfunctions to that CP require definitive, practicedstaff drills to make the operation efficient and effec-tive. Prioritizing the critical functions each alternate

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CP performs assists the transfer from one CP toanother.

Identifying and rehearsing synchronization andcoordination issues in the transfer of CP functionsto and from an alternate CP occur routinely. Themost critical consideration is to minimize disruptionof the division’s capability to command and controlcurrent tactical operations.

Information ManagementThe key to effective control is information man-

agement. All information the unit’s automated andmanual systems generate has one overriding pur-pose—to help the commander make timely deci-sions during the turmoil and confusion of battle.

The commander’s critical information require-ments (CCIR) drive information-generation. Theinformation system focuses on getting the rightinformation to the commander or decision maker asquickly as possible. The division should abandonefforts to provide the commander “nice to have”information that does not contribute to a current oranticipated decision.

The commander, not a staff officer, developsCCIR. However, the staff may recommend CCIRto the commander as—

Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) (how Isee the enemy) to determine what the divisionwants or needs to know about the enemy.Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR)(how I see myself) to allow the commander todetermine the combat capabilities of his units.

Essential elements of friendly information(EEFI) to allow the commander to determine howhe must protect his unit from the enemy’s infor-mation-gathering sources.The chief of staff (CofS) or executive officer

(XO) is the unit’s information manager. He outlinesand monitors the staffs performance and responsi-bilities in processing information to support theoperation and the flow that feeds the system.

Using color codes on charts to depict currentstatus helps the commander quickly assess criticalelements and focus staff efforts to "fix" or "continueto fix" the problem. If the commander desires fur-ther information, the CP staff can retrieve or pull it

from the submitting staff section or major subordi-nate command (MSC) in the tree mode.

To eliminate confusion, a color code standardshould be consistent throughout all command eche-lons. A commonly used standard color code is—

GREEN—From 80 percent or greater combatcapability remains (full strength).

AMBER—From 60 to 79 percent combat capa-bility remains (mission-capable with minordeficiencies).

RED—From 40 to 59 percent combat capabilityremains (marginally mission-capable with majordeficiencies).

BLACK—Less than 40 percent combat capabil-ity remains (NOT mission-capable).

Operations maps should contain only the mini-mum essential information to allow the commanderto see the battlefield. Staff section maps containmore detail to enable analysis of data before the staffprovides information to the command center. How-ever, updating an operations map with too muchdetailed information is time-consuming. It also in-terferes dramatically with coordination, integration,and synchronization.

Operations noncommissioned officers (NCOs) ofeach element or section within each CP manage infor-mation by maintaining a current operations journal.This is a chronological listing of messages, fragmen-tary orders (FRAGOs), and warning orders. It is acontinuing requirement maintained to reconstructevents, clarify guidance, or validate requirements.

Maneuver Information

Maneuver is the responsibility of the operationsofficers (G3 or operations and training officer (S3))at each echelon of command. It is the pivotal systemaround which all other support systems revolve. Allinformation relating to the maneuver of forces or thecoordination, synchronization, and integration ofcombat and CS elements passes through the G3 orS3 sections.

Distributing maneuver information occurs be-tween the G3 operations elements at the TAC, main,and rear CPs. Command posts receive differentparts of the information, although all of it eventually

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goes to the G3 at the main CP for analysis andposting.

The division TAC CP receives maneuver infor-mation from committed brigade CPs during or, asquickly as possible, after a situation occurs in a"salute" format spot report (SPOTREP) or the moredetailed commander’s situation report (SITREP).The commander or ADC-O must continuouslymake timely maneuver decisions. Their need to seethe current situation requires expedited transfer ofinformation.

The division TAC CP collates, posts, and ana-lyzes maneuver information. It then turns the datainto updated current close operations informationwhich it sends to both the division main CP opera-tions cell and its higher headquarters.

Maneuver information maintained by the G3 op-erations of the TAC CP and the G3 operations of themain CP should be identical. Command posts usu-ally focus on enemy combat capability two levelsdown. In the AASLT division, in order to maintainvisibility on setting conditions for air assault, it isimperative that enemy combat units be tracked toplatoon level.

Intelligence Information

The G2 operations cell at the main CP collatesall information relating to intelligence functions.The cell monitors the entire intelligence battlefieldby placing elements at the TAC CP and the rear CP.

The intelligence flow follows a clearly definedand disciplined path using established proceduresand reports throughout each echelon from companyto echelons above corps (EAC). The G2 cell at theTAC CP (for hasty analysis) or the main CP (fordetailed analysis) analyzes all information receivedfrom the terrain analysis team as well as from sub-ordinate and adjacent units (other than quick firetargeting information).

ADDITIONAL AIR ASSAULTDIVISION KEY PERSONNEL

The key leaders in an air assault are the air assaulttask force commander (AATFC), the air missioncommander (AMC), the air battle captain (ABC),the ground tactical commander (GTC) (Figure 2-4).

Other key leaders are the aviation liaison officers(ALO) and flight leaders.

Air Assault Task ForceCommander (AATFC)

For brigade-level air assaults, the AATFC is nor-mally the brigade commander. He locates where hecan best command, control, and maintain positivecommunications with his forces. During an air as-sault, he is normally in a C2 helicopter.

Air Mission Commander (AMC)The AMC commands all aviation elements in-

volved in an air assault, including the attack ele-ment. He typically commands the assault aviationunit supporting the operation. During an AASLToperation, the AMC does not pilot or copilot a C2

aircraft. He collocates with the AATFC at the C2

console and commands air operations throughoutexecution of the air assault.

Air Battle Captain (ABC)The ABC is responsible for coordinating, inte-

grating, and controlling all attack aviation and sup-porting fires (ground and air). He understands theAATFC’s fire support plan and places himselfwhere he can maintain positive control of all air andground fire support assets.

The ABC controls the synchronization of anyprogrammed joint air attack team (JAAT) operationthat masses attack helicopter fires, close air support

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(CAS) aircraft, indirect fires, and direct-fire sys-tems. Although the AATFC has overall responsibil-ity for conducting the battle, the ABC coordinatesfires and communicates with the AATFC. The ABCis usually the commander of the attack elementsupporting the air assault.

Ground Tactical Commander (GTC)

The GTC is the commander of the largest groundmaneuver task force inserted during the air assault.He is usually an AATFC subordinate maneuvercommander and flies on one of the first serials intothe objective area. He maintains communicationswith the AATFC during flight.

On the ground, the GTC initially uses the combataviation net (CAN). At a predetermined time heswitches to the AATF command net. During flighthe uses the assault aircraft’s headset and console.After insertion he uses organic communicationsassets. The AATF command net becomes the pri-mary command net at the AATFC’s designation.

The Relationship Between the Air MissionCommander and the Air Battle Captain

The exact relationship of attack aviation to theAMC during an air assault depends on METT-T.Normally, attack aviation forces work directly forthe maneuver commander, fully coequal with thelift aviation battalion. Synchronizing Army avia-tion in an air assault necessarily alters this relation-ship. The result is the unusual circumstance of onebattalion commander (attack) working for another(assault).

The AMC controls attack helicopter units duringan air assault. This command relationship aids navi-gation, sequencing into the objective, recoveringdowned aircraft, managing airspace, refueling andrearming, and providing an armed escort.

If the attack element fires in support of a maneu-ver element already on the ground, the AATFC cantemporarily place the attack element, or a portion ofit, under the GTC’s control. When released, theattack element reverts back to the aviation task forceunder the AMC’s command until the air assaultends.

Aviation Liaison Officers (ALO)Air assaults require close integration between

Army aviation and maneuver units. Air and groundunits depend on—

A permanent liaison system.A well-understood aviation command and sup-port relationship.A reverse planning system to prioritize efforts.A common air mission order format to synchro-nize troop-leading procedures (TLP).Continuous and effective liaison is crucial be-

tween all combined-arms units participating in com-bat air assaults. The aviation brigade headquartersprovides liaison officers (LOs) to the division (anassistant division aviation officer (ADAO)).

Assault battalions provide liaison teams attachedto habitually affiliated maneuver brigades (the bri-gade aviation element (BAE)). Attack battalionsprovide liaison with maneuver brigades on a mis-sion basis.

Medium assault aviation brigades provide liaisonwith DIVARTY or DISCOM on a mission basis. Atthe brigade level, BAEs provide the maneuver com-mander the following:

Capabilities, limitations, and tactical employ-ment of aviation brigade assets.Assistance in preparing aviation estimates, plans,orders, and reports.Assistance in planning aviation combat, CS, andCSS missions.Coordination with airspace users and the divisionA2C2 element for airspace management in the TFsector.The operational status of aviation brigade assetsand its effects on the supported task force’s mis-sion.Informing appropriate aviation units of currentand possible future operations.Continuous communications with units support-ing the brigade.At the brigade level, the assault aviation battalion

commander who habitually supports a maneuverbrigade normally collocates a TAC CP with that ofthe brigade AATF. The assault aviation TAC CP

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coordinates all facets of aviation support the brigadeTF uses, including planning, operations, andlogistics.

The assault aviation TAC CP maintains commu-nications with the aviation brigade CP to timely andefficiently effect changes to aviation task organiza-tions. The assault aviation TAC CP also---

Advises the maneuver brigade S3 air on manag-ing AATF airspace.

Assists the assault aviation commander in his roleas principal advisor to the AATFC on the properuse of aviation assets.

Controls all aviation units in the AATF during airassaults.

PLANNING TECHNIQUES

The division plans element locates near the mainCP and works for the G3. It is the only asset avail-able that allows the division commander to maintainhis ability to continually look toward the future andeffectively transition from current to future opera-tions and vice versa.

Neither the commander nor any staff officershould divert the plans element from its future plan-ning process to participate in developing plans andorders to support branches to current operations.Warning orders or FRAGOs to support changes tothe current operation (branches) are the responsibil-ity of the G3 operations element (not the planselement) at TAC, main, or rear CPs.

The corps and division are always planning. Thedivision conducts continuous mission planningwhether committed to the battle or in reserve. Plan-ning processes for both should follow the tradi-tional, formal estimate process which FM 101-5 (D)outlines. The division normally locates in a rearassembly area when conducting noncommittedforce planning.

Led by the plans cell, each CP element partici-pates in and supports noncommitted force planning.Key to noncomrnitted planning is time available toconduct the formal, time-consuming, step-by-step,detailed staff estimate planning process. The resultis a detailed, thought-out, war-gamed plan to beginthe division’s tactical operations.

Transition Operations PlanningThe plans element primarily focuses on future

operations by developing, coordinating, integrating,and synchronizing plans with current operations toeffect a smooth transition to another operation, abranch, or a sequel. The objective is to prevent a lossof tactical integrity and momentum. Main CP staffelements, less the plans element, control the currentoperation.

During combat, the division cannot stop to con-duct formal planning for the next operation. Thisrequires transition planning battle drills supportedby all primary and supporting staff elements.

Even when not committed, the division plans cellleads the planning effort. Each staff section supportsthe planning process and also monitors current op-erations in preparing for combat activities such asreconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, move-ment, and resupply.

Successful transition from one operation to an-other involves several key factors:

Early anticipation by the commander and theassignment of one clearly articulated future op-erations mission (or sequel).Development of a concept of operations that ac-cepts risk with economy of force to allow mass.Continuous planning, coordination, integration,and synchronization of future operations require-ments with those of current operations.

Parallel PlanningParallel planning is the act of conceptualizing,

developing, and synchronizing a future operationplan (OPLAN) (sequel) with a current operation andits continually changing situations. It replaces theone-third, two-thirds rule and similar fractional di-visions of time.

Parallel planning is effective when dealing withreduced planning time and when transitioning fromone operation to another. It requires planners to becontinually aware of current tactical developments.

Parallel planning emphasizes continuous infor-mation-sharing through verbal and written means(warning orders, FRAGOs, reports, and messages)to quickly distribute intelligence, planning guid-ance, and coordination instructions to subordinate,

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adjacent, and higher staff elements. Continuous in-formation-sharing allows all units to receive infor-mation on the future mission early in the planningprocess. Units should not wait for a detailed analysisor a single published order to begin parallel planningand to develop orders.

The plans cell has one mission only—to developand coordinate plans in detail once the corps or JTFcommits the division to an operation. Involvinghigher, lower, and adjacent staff elements early inthe planning process allows the entire staff to seeboth current and future operations and helps identifyknown or potential problem areas. Identifying con-flicts early allows time to fix problem areas withoutdisrupting the current mission.

Air Assault Mission PlanningPlanning for AASLT operations requires

time—time to plan, time to prepare, and time tobrief. Available time dictates how much detail cango into the plan while allowing time to completeorders and supporting plans.

Twenty-four hours represents a minimum-timeperiod for a quality product. From 48 to 72 hours ispreferable.

Within time constraints, the AATFC carefullyevaluates capabilities and limitations of the totalforce as he develops a plan that ensures a highprobability of success. When time limitations exist,compression of planning steps and/or parallel plan-ning occurs.

The division is the lowest echelon that allocatesaviation assets, assigns appropriate missions, andhas an ACE to gather required intelligence data andanalyze enemy capabilities. Therefore, when thedivision assigns an AASLT mission, division head-quarters begins the planning process.

The division may complete some of the planningtasks itself. When the division performs these tasks,

subordinate commanders use their limited time toaccomplish other key preparatory tasks. (See alsoFigure 2-5.)

The battalion, on the other hand, is the lowestlevel with sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate,and control AASLT operations. When company-size operations occur, the bulk of planning occurs atbattalion and higher headquarters.

The higher headquarters is responsible for airassaulting subordinate units below brigade level; forexample, brigades insert battalions, and battalionsinsert companies. (Normally, the responsible higherheadquarters allows the subordinate maneuver corn-mand to choose LZs which best support the maneu-ver force’s ground tactical plan. However, higherheadquarters coordinates the selection of the LZsand assists coordinating flight routes.)

Brigades insert themselves. When multiple bri-gade operations occur simultaneously, each brigadeinserts itself. The division oversees operations.

Parallel planning offers a useful technique incompressed AASLT planning processes. Subordi-nate units, however, must be cautious so they do notbecome completely committed to a course of action(COA) or scheme of maneuver until they gain ap-proval from higher headquarters.

An AASLT operation consists of five plans: aground tactical plan, a landing plan, an air move-ment plan, a loading plan, and a staging plan. Allfive plans are important, but as time becomes criti-cal, a unit may not have time to write each plan.Therefore, the war game that the senior planner andcommander conduct can be informal (Figure 2-6).

As the higher command refines its scheme ofmaneuver and fires (usually through informal war-gaming procedures), modifications may well affectlower command missions and tasks. Therefore, sub-ordinate units must be flexible enough to incorpo-rate the changes and realize that this situation oftenoccurs as they participate in parallel planning.

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When time becomes short, reliance on the reverseplanning process can pay big dividends on focusingand priortizing efforts. There are five pieces in thereverse planning process.

The ground tactical plan is the foundation for asuccessful air assault. All other plans support thisone. It specifies actions in the objective area toaccomplish the mission and to set the stage forsubsequent operations.

The landing plan enables accomplishment of theground tactical plan. It sequences elements into theAO. Units must arrive at designated locations andtimes prepared to execute the ground tactical plan.

The air movement plan supports the ground tac-tical plan and the landing plan. It specifies theschedule and provides instructions for air move-ment of troops, equipment, and supplies from PZsto LZs. It also addresses coordinating instructionsregarding air routes; air control points (ACPs); air-craft speeds, altitudes, and formations; and theplanned use of attack helicopters, including securityand link-up locations. The air movement plan re-flects detailed coordination with the AMC and theaviation LO, who provide technical and tacticalassistance and recommendations.

The loading plan depends on the air movementplan and ensures that troops, equipment, and sup-plies are loaded on the correct aircraft. A goodloading plan incorporates integrity, cross-loading, abump plan, and "bump" priorities.

The staging plan supports the loading plan. Thisis critical to all air assaults, especially for CSS

assets. It prescribes arrival times of ground units andtheir equipment at the PZ in the proper order andlocation for movement.NOTE: Field Manual 90-4 contains a detailed ex-planation of how to execute the five AASLT opera-tions plans.

Available time normally does not allow theAATF staff to develop these plans sequentially.Therefore, the AATF simultaneously developsplans to make the best use of available time.

The staff begins to develop the ground tacticalplan first because it is the basis for the other plans.As the staff gathers information they begin workingthe other plans. As the commander approves eachplan, the AATF staff makes necessary adjustmentsto the other plans. Synchronizing all plans occursduring the air mission coordination process.

The AATF staffs issue multiple warning ordersas they gain more information, often appendingtentative schemes of maneuver. Experience at thecombat training centers suggest that making andissuing tentative plans early, even though they maybe changed later, is better than issuing a thoroughplan too late.

Finally, the commander and staff allocate time forair mission briefs and rehearsals. This becomesparticularly important during air assaults because ofthe complex combined-arms integration inherent insuch operations. (See Figure 2-7.)

The Air Mission Brief (AMB)The AMB is the order briefing for all key partici-

pants in an air assault. An air mission coordinationmeeting is the commander’s forum specifically forresolving and synchronizing details of the entireAASLT operation from staging, loading, air move-ment, and landing plans to ground operations. Theresults are briefed at the AMB.

The AATFC assumes great risk to the entirecomplex mission if he discards the AMB. (TheAATFC may also give an abbreviated AMB "plane-side.")

The AATFC synchronizes an air assault aroundthe air movement table (AMT). The AMT is amatrix depicting the who, what, when, and whereof an air assault. It focuses the operation in rela-tion to D-day and H-hour, thus allowing flexibility

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as those tentative times change. A written AMTconstitutes the bare minimum coordination tool thatmust occur for every air assault.

Fratricide

Fratricide is the employment of friendly weaponsand munitions, used with the intent to kill enemyforces or to destroy his equipment or facilities,which results in unforeseen and unintentional deathor injury to friendly, neutral, or noncombatant per-sonnel. Fratricide is a type of accident and is a real,grim consequence of war. Its effects, spreading deepwithin a unit, can be devastating.

Causes of Fratricide

Only one of five things will occur when a soldierfires a weapon; the projectile will—

1. Miss everyone.

2. Hit enemy forces.

3. Hit noncombatants.

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4. Hit friendly forces.

5. Hit two or more of the above.

Weapons systems can detect, engage, and destroytargets at maximum range. But weapons-sightingequipment cannot provide high resolution of targetsat extended ranges, especially during limited-visi-bility conditions.

Insufficient resolution of targets precludes defini-tive, positive target identification as either friend orfoe. Consequently, without additional visual aids orfire support coordination measures, the only thingsoldiers can do to definitively distinguish targets asfriend or foe is to observe subtle signature differ-ences. They must try to interpret the target’s activi-ties as being either friendly or enemy actions and actaccordingly.

Situation awareness improves a soldier’s or acommander’s ability to positively identify potentialtargets. Situational awareness is the real-time, accu-rate knowledge of the locations of friendly forces,most enemy forces, and neutral and noncombatpersonnel.

FM 71-100-3

Fratricide Risk ConsiderationsThere are two types of risk: (1) losing men and

equipment to attain the mission and (2) choosing aCOA that may not be successful or that may succeedbut fail to achieve the desired effect. A commandermust take such risks with prudence.

Prudent risks emphasize operational fuctionswith the proper balance of administrative functions;for example—

Understanding capabilities and limitations ofunits and components.Understanding the enemy, identifying weak-nesses, and creating opportunities to exploit en-emy weaknesses.Pursuing actions that gain or retain the initiative.Planning for a mission or for unit training.Training with supporting branches (joint andcombined arms).Participating, supervising, and observing unittraining.The format in Figure 2-8 parallels the five-para-

graph OPORD. The considerations/factors are keyto fratricide reduction and are structured where theywould likely appear in the OPORD. This is neithera change nor an addition to the OPORD format.

Fratricide CountermeasuresFratricide countermeasures preserve and con-

serve the force. Planning for specific fratricidecountermeasures begins during COA analysis.

During the war game, commanders identify pro-cedural and positive control measures which canhelp eliminate or reduce potential fratricidal situ-ations. (See Figure 2-9.) Commanders can derivespecific procedural and positive control measuresusing operational analysis and risk assessment pro-cedures. They must also balance Army operationsdoctrine with fratricide countermeasures considera-tions by integrating procedural and positive controlmeasures into training and materiel considerations.

The primary task of fratricide countermeasures isto optimize combat power. They must be consistentwith the intentions of the commander of the higherheadquarters while reflecting guidance two eche-lons down.

The degree to which commanders wish to go toimplement fratricide countermeasures often de-pends on time, enemy interference, and anoperation’s complexity. Other factors commandersmay need to consider are—

The unit’s proficiency.

Materiel advantages.

The proximity of maneuver units.

Environmental factors.

Rules of engagement (ROE).

Fratricide countermeasures are based on—

Ensuring unity of effort.

Anticipating events on the battlefield.

Concentrating combat power against enemy vul-nerabilities.

Designating, sustaining, and shifting the maineffort.

Pressing the fight.

Moving fast, striking hard, and finishing rapidly.

Effectively using terrain, weather, deception, andoperations security (OPSEC).

Conserving strength for decisive action.

Coordinating with combined-arms units and sis-ter services to complement and reinforce the mis-sion.

Understanding the effects of battle on soldiers,units, and leaders.

However, during the chaos of battle, no matterhow well commanders plan fratricide countermea-sures, they will confront situations for which theyare not prepared. Therefore, all soldiers must re-member two things before they tire their weapons:

1. If all potential targets are enemy targets, thendetect and engage all targets.

2. If there is a possibility that enemy targets andfriendly forces are inked together in thetargeted area, then detect, verify all targets,and engage enemy targets.

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Command and Support Relationships support for its committed aviation units. If the ma-

While preparing for an AASLT operation, thedivision commander decides the allocation of avia-tion assets. He normally assigns them in a commandor support relationship to the maneuver or supportcommand requiring these resources.

When planning a mission, the division’s com-manders and staffs follow certain command andsupport relationship rules of thumb. (See FM 101-5(D).) In most cases, aviation units establish a com-mand (OPCON or attached) rather than a support(DS or GS) relationship with a maneuver brigade.

The primary factor in determining if aviation isOPCON or attached revolves around the ability ofthe maneuver headquarters to provide logistic

neuver command cannot render logistic support, theaviation must be OPCON, which is the most com-mon command relationship for Army aviation.

This relationship works well for limited-durationmissions, tasks such as air assaults, or when the parentaviation unit can continue to provide logistic support.When an aviation unit is OPCON to a ground maneu-ver commander, the ground commander may assignits missions and task organization.

Aviation forces normally are not OPCON to aheadquarters below brigade except in special cir-cumstances. The maneuver brigade is generally thelowest level with the command and staff expertiseand resources to plan, control, and support com-bined-arms maneuver and aviation operations. In an

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air assault, attack and assault aviation units areunder the OPCON of the AMC.

The attached relationship gives the gaining ma-neuver commander the same command, control,and logistic support responsibilities, subject to limi-tations the attachment order imposes, over the avia-tion unit as he has over organic units. Of particularsignificance, the gaining commander provides alllogistic and administrative support to the aviationunit.

As with the OPCON relationship, the gaining com-mander assigns missions to the aviation unit and task-organizes the unit. Attachment is rare. Typically,attaching aviation units to ground maneuver com-mands only occurs when deploying for independentoperations and subsequent employment.

The DS relationship allows the gaining com-mander to assign missions to the aviation com-mander, but the aviation commander remains underthe higher aviation command’s command and con-trol. In addition, the aviation commander, not themaneuver or supported commander, task-organizeshis aviation element.

OPCON is another relationship used for aviationto support maneuver forces. During OPCON theparent aviation unit provides CSS.

The DS relationship works well for Army avia-tion CS (assault) and CSS (medium lift) providingsupport to DIVARTY or DISCOM. It can bethought of as support on a "mission basis."”

The GS relationship is exactly like the DS rela-tionship, except the division assigns priorities ofsupport to subordinate units. General support mis-sions include aerial courier, airborne communica-tions relays, and aerial electronic intercept work.

Other considerations for aviation command andsupport relationships are that—

Attack helicopters and air cavalry organizationsare maneuver units and usually work under com-mand relationships. Other aviation units receivecommand or support relationships as appropriate.Assault, attack, cavalry, and command aviationunits cannot sustain operations or plan exten-sively at the company or troop level. A companyor troop may occasionally receive a separate mis-sion to execute, such as aerial security in an airassault, but such employment is rare and

situation-dependent. Generally, employment ofthe battalion or squadron headquarters occurs forall aviation operations.When the AASLT division receives corps or thea-ter aviation, the preference is for them to be underOPCON unless they come with a significantcorps support command (COSCOMJ augmenta-tion. The division’s aviation brigade possesses alimited capability to sustain itself, let alone otherforces.

REHEARSALS

A rehearsal is the process of practicing for anactual performance. A division rehearsal for animpending combat operation ensures synchroniza-tion and agility through practice of the plan.

A rehearsal reinforces the scheme of maneuverand the support of CS and CSS units. It helpsidentify problem areas and necessary contingencyactions. It also determines movement reactiontimes, enhances coordination, and refines the plan.

A rehearsal focuses on actions critical to accom-plishing the mission. It ensures the division can, infact, accomplish the mission given its state of train-ing, the issued orders, and the expected terrain andweather conditions. A unit conducts some type ofrehearsal before executing a new OPLAN ormission.

Rehearsals are part of the tactical operation inwhich the division, or elements of the division,conduct one or more exercises. The force conductsrehearsals according to a plan which approximatesspecific operations. Rehearsals test the-

Familiarity of all elements with the plan.Timing of detailed operations.Combat readiness of participating forces.The division commander is the driving force in

the interaction that clarifies the plan in the minds ofhis subordinates. He helps focus the staff to createconditions that replicate upcoming operations. Thecommander emphasizes key events that triggerfriendly actions.

The rehearsal is a tool to reinforce understandingof the plan and to help subordinate commandersvisualize the commander’s intent and what they are

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to do when the battle does not go according to plan.In the final analysis, whether the commander, theCofS or XO, or the G3 conducts the rehearsal, itseffectiveness is the commander’s responsibility.

Rehearsal PlanningResponsibility for preparing rehearsal plans is the

same as for preparing the actual OPLAN. Staffsissue rehearsal plans separately, but as close in timeto the OPLAN as practicable.

During planning, commanders and staffs con-sider the number, nature, and scope of rehearsals;the date and time for each; and the area for rehearsalexecution. Tactical forces must also consider thedifficulty of repairing or replacing equipment dam-aged or lost during rehearsals.

Factors that influence the number, nature, andscope of division rehearsals are—

The complexity of the tasks assigned to divisionelements.The time available for rehearsals.The forces’ state of training.The suitability of available rehearsal areas.Special or unusual problems the force may facein the actual operation (the solution to which mustbe given special attention in the rehearsal).Intelligence and counterintelligence considera-tions.The dates of rehearsals and the time allocated for

them must provide for—Complete and careful execution of the entire re-hearsal.Repositioning of troops, equipment, and suppliesthat conforms to the original tactical plan.Rehabilitation or replacement of equipment andsupplies and repair or replacement of any dam-aged or lost vehicles or aircraft.Critiques at all levels of command to evaluate therehearsal exercise, to emphasize lessons learned,and to correct mistakes.Time to fix problems.Factors that influence

areas are—the selection of rehearsal

The suitability of the area for maneuver.

The similarity and location of the rehearsal areain relation to the actual AO.

The feasibility of employing live fire in the re-hearsal.

Security.

The susceptibility to enemy interference.

Conditions which might adversely affect theforce’s health.

Civilian activities that might interfere with therehearsal.

Rehearsal TechniquesThere are generally seven rehearsal techniques

available to the division. Each takes a differentamount of time and produces differing results. Timeavailable normally dictates the technique.

The division usually conducts a full rehearsal onlywhen not committed to tactical operations and whenlocated in an area that can support a division-levelrehearsal. In whatever rehearsal technique the divi-sion uses, personnel portraying the enemy shouldportray him as being highly uncooperative.

The full rehearsal is the most effective rehearsaltechnique, but consumes the most time and re-sources. It involves every soldier and system takinga direct part in the operation. If possible, the forceconducts the full rehearsal under the conditions(weather, time of day, terrain) forecast for the actualoperation.

The key leader rehearsal takes less time andresources than the full rehearsal. Key leader rehears-als can occur during daytime or nighttime but shouldbe under expected combat conditions. The com-mander decides the level of leader involvement,which is normally one of the orders groups whichthe SOP defines.

Terrain model rehearsal takes even less time andfewer resources than the others. It can be day ornight, under a tent, or in a building. The terrainmodel should depict all of the information on theoperation overlay. The commander walks each sub-ordinate leader through an interactive verbal execu-tion of the operation.

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The sketch map rehearsal can be day or night,almost anywhere, with minimum time and re-sources. Procedures are the same as for the terrainmodel rehearsal, except a sketch replaces the terrainmodel.

The map rehearsal takes less time and resourcesthan the sketch map rehearsal and can be day ornight. The commander uses a tactical map with anoperation overlay as he walks his staff and keysubordinate leaders through an interactive verbalexecution of the operation.

The commander uses the backbrief rehearsal toidentify flaws or problems. It reveals how subordi-nates intend to accomplish their missions and allowsthe commander to clarify his intent early in thetactical estimate procedure.

Staffs scheduled to participate in the tactical op-eration usually conduct radio rehearsals. Thesefrequently take the form of command post exercises(CPXs). When possible, rehearsals exercise allcommunications facilities and equipment.

Rehearsal SecurityBecause of the similarity between the rehearsal

and the actual OPLAN, units must enforce strictrehearsal security. Commanders and staffs carefullyconduct reconnaissance for, selection of and ar-rangements for locations in which to execute re-hearsals.

Deception operations and measures may be nec-essary to ensure security. Operational securitymeasures can prevent unauthorized observation orcommunications. Sealing off the rehearsal area withperimeter patrols or a security screen is the mosteffective way of ensuring physical security. Con-ducting rehearsals inside buildings or maintenancefacilities is also effective.NOTE: See FM 71-100-2 for details.

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

Continuous operations are a combat multiplierwhen a commander can maintain his unit’s effectiveperformance. Fast-paced combat operations con-tinue around the clock and are intense.

Stress and fatigue over time cause both individualsoldier and CP performance to deteriorate,

especially when there is no opportunity for units tostand down or for soldiers to catch more than a fewminutes of sleep. Therefore, every unit must have,and enforce, a sleep plan. Soldiers and leaders mustsleep when the opportunity exists, and senior lead-ers must ensure subordinate leaders get some sleep.

A soldier’s ability to quickly or effectively per-form necessary tasks significantly degrades afterfrom 36 to 48 hours. Normal sleeping habits orroutines are upset and soldiers feel the effects offatigue and stress.

Soldiers accumulate a sleep debt when perform-ing continuous operations under limited sleep con-ditions. The only corrective measure is sleep.

Variables such as training, motivation, and inter-est can reduce the initial effects of sleep loss. How-ever, no amount of training, motivation, or interestwill maintain performance. Commanders must rec-ognize the characteristics of sleep loss andunderstand—

From 6 to 8 hours of sleep per night indefinitelymaintains performance.From 4 to 5 hours of sleep per night maintainseffective performance for from 5 to 6 days. Sol-diers (and leaders) require a combination of 12hours sleep and rest (about 8 to 10 of which aresleep) after from 36 to 48 hours of acute sleeploss.

Thinking ability degrades more rapidly thanphysical strength and endurance.

Degradation of mental performance comes asearly as 18 hours into sustained work.

Speed and accuracy are trade-offs during sus-tained operations. Generally, it is better to main-tain accuracy and to sacrifice speed. Thelikelihood of errors, especially errors of omission,increases with sustained combat.The decline in performance when continuallyworking without sleep is about 25 percent every24 hours.

Continuous operations are combat multipliersonly if commanders can manage sleep and stress tosustain effective performance. Physical condition-ing delays fatigue, builds confidence, and shortensrecovery times after sleep deprivation, illness, andinjury.

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Before the need arises, commanders should iden-tify and support critical skills. A critical skill is onea soldier must be able to perform regardless offatigue so he or his comrades can survive.

Repetitive training and cross-training help sol-diers who perform duties requiring a high degree ofmental skill. Over-learning a skill provides greaterreliability and more rapid performance. Cross-train-ing permits soldiers to share duties and to cross-check computations.

Training under conditions of continuous and sus-tained operations allows units—

To develop sensible SOPs.

To develop and execute plans that provide at least4 hours of uninterrupted sleep each day.To determine how much additional time the unitwill need to execute tasks for each successiveperiod of operations without sleep.To determine how much recovery sleep the unitwill need to restore normal performance follow-ing sustained operations without sleep.As soldiers become increasingly worn out, lead-

ers must—Give only simple directions. Fatigued soldiershave difficulty in understanding complicated di-rections and are likely to forget some of them.

Give complete, clear, precise orders. Leadersmust leave no room for interpretation. Degradedsoldiers have great difficulty in reasoning. Theycannot "fill in" anything that has not been saidexplicitly.Repeat orders and directions. Leaders must havedegraded soldiers repeat orders given to them oreven write them down. Soldiers' memories fornew information will be faulty. They are likely toforget orders or parts of orders almost as soon asthey are given.

Double-check themselves and others. Degradedsoldiers may not correctly or completely carry outorders. Therefore, it is necessary to constantlydouble-check execution to ensure compliancewith orders as intended. Leaders should also ar-range a way to double-check their own activities.Leaders, on whose decisions mission success and

unit survival depend, must get the largest allocation

of sleep. (This may seem contrary to military tradi-tion, but it is sound practice.) Commanders mustplan and schedule their own sleep. If a single unbro-ken period of from four to five hours is not available,commanders should take naps. (This is less restora-tive however.)

Sleep priority goes to soldiers whose jobs requirethem to perform calculations, make judgments, orevaluate information. Priorities for sleep schedulingare—

From 2400 to 0600 (best).

From 1200 to 1800 (next best).From 1800 to 2400 (third best).

From 0600 to 1200 (least desired).Command and control of continuous combat op-

erations requires the CP to operate effectively overlong periods until the unit completes the mission oruntil it is pulled offline. To provide rest as well asto accomplish the continuous operations require-ment, division CPs must establish designated workshills for available personnel.

Command post work cycles must support two12-hour shifts. Personnel availability is the primaryfactor influencing the length of a shift.

Scheduling shift changeover of the entire CP at12-hour intervals is not effective. It allows departureen masse of the last shift and a complete loss of thecollective knowledge of the last 12 hours of opera-tion and planning coordination.

Regardless of how thorough the shift briefing is,personnel will forget some information, deem someas unimportant, or will simply not brief all support-ing decisions and rationale in the haste to go offshift. Incoming shift personnel may then confrontsituations about which they have no knowledge.They lose effectiveness in controlling current opera-tions and in planning future operations. Also, the CPloses valuable time in researching answers, andsynchronization of operations suffers.

Another disadvantage to the mass shift change isthat different cells and elements within TAC, main,and rear CPs have different times within which ashift change is more practical. This is normally aresult of specified times that reports are due tohigher headquarters or other requirements the mis-sion or tactical situation generates.

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The shift change should not affect the tacticaloperations center’s (TOC‘s) operations. A provenmethod of scheduling shifts and maintaining conti-nuity of information is to stagger the shift changeduring the 12-hour shift window that the unit SOPestablishes.

The staggered shift change involves schedulingofficers, NCOs, and enlisted men on overlappingshifts so each shift element has access to a body ofknowledge from four to six hours old. By staggeringpersonnel into the shift, the unit has a constantinterface of new and old shift personnel workingwithin the CP.NOTE: Figure 2-10 provides an example of oneshift-wheel technique.

When the CP displaces, it does so without wakingor working off-shift personnel. When rest for the offshift is not feasible, commanders must reestablishessential rest periods as soon as possible.

When planning dismounted infantry operations,commanders and staffs must consider the individualsoldier’s load and its affect on the soldier. The loadimpacts not only the soldier’s endurance, it alsoaffects mission performance. Normally, soldiers airassault without their ruck sacks. Units must imple-ment an effective supply means and instill confi-dence into the soldiers that the system will work.NOTE: Field Manual 21-18 and FM 7-8 address asoldier’s loads and provide planning factors and

techniques for managing them. These manuals alsoprovide time-distance planning factors.

LIAISON OPERATIONS

The division conducts liaison operations to aidcoordination, synchronization, and parallel plan-ning. Liaison teams have their own transportationand communications links to their headquarters.They may need to have a foreign language capabil-ity when working with allies.

Reciprocal liaison involves exchange of liaisonteams. When a formation is directly under the com-mand of a headquarters of a different service ornationality, or when units of different nations areadjacent, it requires reciprocal liaison.

The LO represents the commander at the head-quarters of another unit to effect coordination andpromote cooperation. Selection criteria for LOS in-cludes knowledge of the unit’s situation, ability tocommunicate effectively (language capability, asrequired), and other special criteria that enhanceeffective liaison.

NOTE: Field Manual 71-100-2 contains a detaileddiscussion of LO duties, responsibilities, andtechniques.

COMMAND POSTDISPLACEMENT

Displacing a CP is a function of training and staffbattle drills that each unit must accomplish withinits resources and training schedule. A CP does notnormally shut down and transfer operations to an-other CP while it displaces. Each divisional CP mustbe able to displace during tactical operations whilesimultaneously conducting its C2 mission.

Once the moving echelon establishes itself in itsnew location, it receives (from the other CPs viamaneuver control systems (MCS), MSE, and FMradio) only critical information obtained during themove. Once the echelon receives and understandsthe information, it accepts control. The remainingechelon then moves to the new location, or it mayleapfrog to another location past the last jump site.

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COMMAND POST SECURITY

Command post security takes many forms. UsingMSE or other wire communications as the primaryform of communications enhances electronic secu-rity (ELSEC). The CP uses FM communicationsonly when displacing or out of range of enemymedium artillery or electronic detection measures.

There may be times when the AASLT divisionCP deploys forward of the corps/JTF FLOT. Whenthis occurs, there is a higher risk to the CP fromenemy forces. Detailed planning must occur to pro-tect the CP.

COMMAND POST FACILITIES

This section describes critical C2 functions whichthe TAC, main, and rear CPs need to effectivelycommand and control tactical operations. All de-scriptions of CP operations derive from the func-tional CP study. They orient on the performance ofcritical C2 functions rather than on specific, rigidlyenforced CP configurations.

There is no requirement, nor should there be, toset up CPs in CP configurations only. The terrain,AO, and tactical situation determine the set-up con-figuration; however, the functions always remainthe same.

When committed, the AASLT division’s logisticsupport area should remain near the rear CP. There,the logistic support area, because of its size and lackof mobility, does not represent a security risk for the

main CP.

THE TACTICALCOMMAND POST

During combat operations, the division TACCP—

Continuously supports the close operation by co-ordinating and synchronizing immediate tacticalrequirements of elements committed to divisionclose operations.Receives, posts, analyzes, and distributes combatinformation and tactical intelligence from higher,lower, and adjacent units to support the closeoperation.

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Synchronizes and expedites fires of all fire sup-port assets supporting the close operation.

Coordinates and integrates M/S operations(chemical and engineer-obstacles) in support ofthe close operation.

The TAC CP is a combat command elementcapable of operating close to combat maneuverelements and subject to engagement by the enemy’sdirect or indirect fires. Well forward generallymeans near the lead or main effort brigade’s mainCP or even farther forward if the situation dictates.

The TAC CP is properly positioned if it can "seethe close battlefield." It deploys to be in a positionon the battlefield to manage and control the divisionforces committed or moving to close combat withan enemy force.

The TAC CP—

Serves as a net control station (NCS) to receivebrigade and separate battalion requests for sup-port and combat status reports (STATREPs).

Makes critical, time-sensitive tactical decisionswhen required.

Coordinates close operations requirements forsupport with the main CP.

The TAC CP is a small, survivable, highly mobileCP. Its survivability is directly related to its smallsize and its ability to rapidly displace.

Only essential personnel and equipment shouldbeat the TAC CP. When deploying the TAC CP,smaller is always better.

A security element from the AASLT militarypolice GS platoon operating near the division mainCP may accompany the initial assault force. Thiselement provides security for the division tacticalCP.

The TAC CP does not always deploy forward intothe division’s AO. But it does deploy when thedivision commits to combat operations or when itmust coordinate, synchronize, and conduct a collat-eral operation, such as a passage of lines, rivercrossing, or relief in place.

The TAC CP, when not deployed, normally re-mains near the main CP in a "warm" mode. Whenwarm, the TAC CP monitors radio nets, MCS

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terminals are on, and it maintains and compiles a 4. The FSE.current data base.

The TAC CP staff posts operational maps and 5. The M/S element.updates them as information changes. Manning isat a minimum. However, nearby personnel maintaina high state of readiness to deploy “hot” whenrequired.

NOTE: Figure 2-11 depicts two basic configura-tions the TAC CP uses when deployed.

To control and support elements committed tothe close operation, the TAC CP normally includesfive mutually supporting elements:

1. The ADC-O.

2. The G3 operations.

3. The G2 operations.

The high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehi-cles (HMMWVs) that make up the TAC CP haveredundant communications equipment and C2 ac-cessories to support continuous operations.

THE MAIN COMMAND POST

The main CP is the center of division C2 organi-zation and structure. It receives input from the TACCP, rear CP, and higher, lower, and adjacent units.It maintains its ability to see the battlefield andmakes plans and decisions that affect committedforces several hours out.

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The main CP controls all units not specificallydesignated as being under the control of the TAC orrear CPs. Its design, manning, and equipping allowsit to directly interface with all organic and support-ing division elements. It is directly responsible forplanning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing,establishing priorities, and allocating resources tosupport the division’s simultaneous conduct ofdeep, close, and rear operations.

The main CP commander does not normallymake decisions affecting the close operation be-cause of the delay in receiving information. Thetime required for information to travel from thesender through several information-controllingconduits (headquarters) negates its value. The infor-mation does confirm or deny the CP’s prediction ofenemy intentions and the adequacy of the division’splan against the current threat.

The main CP supports the division battle by re-sponding to requests for support by committed andnoncommitted units throughout the division area. It

TAC CP or rear CP, the main CP rapidly conductsall coordination to support the decision.

The main CP normally functions in a massedconfiguration (Figure 2-12). Enemy acquisitionand targeting capabilities, unit technology, andtraining determine if the CP must disperse to sur-vive. To function in the dispersed mode, the mainCP must have the requisite computer and commu-nications equipment that will allow it to electroni-cally collocate.

The main CP contains three major functionalcells: the command cell, the G3 cell, and the G2 cell.All elements within the main CP function under thedirect supervision, integration, or coordination ofone of these three cells.

THE REAR COMMAND POST

The rear CP focuses on the command and controlof all elements within the division’s rear area ofoperations. It also synchronizes rear operations for

focuses equally on the three operations supporting.

the division battle.the division battle. As decisions are made at the

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The rear CP contains three cells—headquarters,operations, and CSS. This austere structure providesC2 for security and terrain management of allelements functioning, residing, or transiting the reararea.

Units should not enter the division rear area be-fore coordinating with the rear CP. The rear CPclarifies and approves routes and locations of basesor base clusters, integrates this information into thesecurity OPLAN, and addresses requirements forsustainment. The rear CP passes this data to themain CP.

The rear CP normally operates from a base withinthe division rear area. At times it may be near theDISCOM CP for ease of transit and coordination.

The rear CP uses DISCOM organic life supportand security. This does not imply that together theyconstitute the rear CP. On the contrary, they are twoseparate and distinct CPs with different but criticalfunctions which require extensive cooperation andcoordination.

The rear CP’s primary concerns are terrain man-agement, security of the rear area, tactical and lo-gistic movement within and through the rear area,and synchronization and direction of sustainment.The DISCOM CP’s primary concern is sustainment.The rear CP contains elements from the assistantdivision commander for support (ADC-S) and theG2, G3, FSE, G1, G4, DTO, assistant division signalofficer (ADSO), G5, PM operations, and the G1support element.

The rear CP’s most critical role is to synchronizeand integrate rear operations with close and deepoperations. Within the rear area, command and con-trol, and especially terrain management, becomesespecially critical as brigades air assault from atactical assembly area (TAA). The air assault wouldleave only CSS units behind, creating a problem forthe rear CP during execution of the air assault. Also,establishing an FOB and maturing it into a TAA forfuture operations can be a challenge for the rear CP.Rear CP personnel must be proactive in anticipatingand controlling such situations.

The rear CP and the DISCOM CP jointly analyzefuture division plans for impact on current andfuture rear operations to ensure that logistic andpersonnel support is available. Alone, the rear CP—

Deconflicts tactical and nontactical moves whereneeded and controls them when required.

Manages rear area terrain.

Assigns units to bases, designates base clusterswhen necessary, and appoints commanders forbases and base clusters.

Coordinates and synchronizes rear security op-erations.The G3 designates the tactical combat force

(TCF). The rear CP then integrates base defenseplans and coordinates the TCF’s actions. To preventpotential conflicts with the division’s rear opera-tions, the rear CP monitors activity in the brigade’srear, in adjacent division rear areas, and in the corpsrear area. In addition, the rear CP monitors close anddeep operations. When augmented, it may assumecontrol of the fight if the main and assault CPs canno longer function.

THE ASSAULT COMMAND POST

During contingency operations, assault CP per-sonnel normally provide temporary control until themain CP deploys into an AO. METT-T factors drivethe assault CP’s specific design, although it is nor-mally austere and consists of selected sections of themain CP. However, its design may vary from de-ployment to deployment.

The assault CP controls all elements committedto the close operation. It conducts critical divisioncontrol functions in tactical operations as the divi-sion initially deploys into an unsecure, hostile con-tingency area.

To be effective, the assault CP normally arrivesearly in the deployment, via USAF airlift, with theinitial assaulting brigade, after the airhead is secure,or after a perimeter has been established. It controlsthe current fight with divisional forces on theground, synchronizing the flow of follow-on unitsinto the AO and phasing them into the fight toexpand and secure the airhead.

The assault CP also begins initial planning forconducting future operations (sequels). It serves asthe link between divisional forces on the ground, inthe air, at the home station, and with the higher corpsor JTF headquarters. It continues this function untilthe remainder of the division C2 system closes into

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the AO. As the remainder of the TAC CP, the mainCP, and the rear CP arrive, they initiate normalfunctions.

There is no standard design for the assault CP.Each situation or contingency mission may havedifferent requirements. However, the basic assaultCP design includes the functions of the G3 opera-tions, G3 plans, G2 operations, the FSE with anALO, the signal element, and the G4 operations.These critical functions require sufficient personnelto effectively sustain 24-hour operations.

The size of the assault CP normally depends onthe number of airframes available. As a general rule,the assault CP should deploy on no more than twocargo (C)- 141 aircraft.

The division TAC CP serves as the base fromwhich to build the assault CP. The assault CP isdesigned to peel off functions as the main and rearCPs establish operations.

Figure 2-13 is an example of a basic assault CP.It deploys with nine HMMWVs, eight standardizedintegrated command post system (SICPS) tents, andsufficient personnel to perform critical battle com-mand functions.

The HMMWVs contain all communications andcomputer equipment hard-mounted into the rear. Per-sonnel use this equipment either in the HMMWV,remoted to the SICPS tent or in combination.

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Chapter 3

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

This chapter provides some examples of how theAASLT division integrates and synchronizes or-ganic and supporting combat, CS, and CSS assetsto conduct offensive operations. The AASLT divi-sion supports the corps or JTF commander’s intentand concept of operations as part of a corps or JTFoperation.

Corps, divisions, and brigades use a variety oftactics and techniques to execute offensive opera-tions. The tactics and techniques in this chaptersuggest how the AASLT division might conductoperations.

FUNDAMENTALS

Offensive ManeuverThere are five forms of offensive maneuver:

envelopment, turning movement, penetration,frontal attack, and infiltration. They orient on theenemy force, not the terrain. The AASLT divisionconducts all five forms of maneuver.

The commander selects the best form of maneu-ver for achieving his purpose. Forms of maneuverand forms of offensive operations complement oneanother.

An envelopment causes the enemy to simultane-ously fight in two or more directions to meet con-verging attacks. It avoids the enemy’s maindefensive strength by attacking from his flanks or,preferably, his rear.

The AASLT division’s cross-FLOT operationsmay be thought of as a “vertical” envelopment. Airassaults and raids over the hostile front help secureand attack objectives in the enemy’s rear, cutting hisLOC and escape routes.

Supporting attacks, by brigades not air assaultingor by other corps forces, fix the enemy in positionas the envelopment proceeds. The division mayassist in a corps double envelopment to pocket anenemy force. At least one axis must be a groundattack because an aerial double envelopment wouldnot necessarily disrupt the coherence of an enemy’sdefensive scheme.

The AASLT division cannot conduct an aerialdouble envelopment without substantial assaultand medium assault reinforcements from the corpsor JTF. Against a weakened foe, one brigade mightair assault while another infiltrates overland, butthis would bean exception.

The turning movement goes deep to secure vitalareas far in the opponent’s rear to cause him to turnand fight or face destruction. The division partici-pates in a turning movement as part of a larger force.If combined with a strong penetration attempt at theFLOT, a turning movement would compel the en-emy to fight in two directions at once.

Turning movements generally involve entirecorps. The AASLT division could execute such amaneuver by seizing an FOB and then rapidly send-ing in the division’s remaining brigades in sequenceover the next 48 hours to expand the threat to theenemy’s rear.

In the penetration, the AASLT division attacksthrough the enemy’s principal defensive position todivide the enemy force and allow it to be defeatedin detail. Once a penetration occurs, the divisionexploits it out to its maximum range of operations.

The AASLT division can contribute to a corpspenetration in two ways. It can mass organic avia-tion fires and provide flexible task forces to rapidlyexploit the gap created during the penetration.

Commanders use penetration when enemy flanksare not assailable. To penetrate a dug-in enemy, theAASLT division could commit one brigade to adismounted deliberate attack to rupture the enemyline at a weak spot.

As soon as the breach occurs, the second brigade,or preferably an OPCON armored brigade, wouldpush through on the ground. Simultaneously, theother brigade might air assault deep to complete thecollapse of enemy defenses—a process aided bydeep attack aviation raids.

When employing an AASLT force, a penetrationrepresents a less desirable form of maneuver thanan envelopment. A penetration commits soldiersand units trained and outfitted for cross-FLOT

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operations into potentially costly front-line engage-ments better conducted by mechanized forces. Thesame lightness that allows AASLT formations to godeep and destroy enemy rear echelon elementsproves a liability in close combat against fortifiedpositions.

Forcing a rupture to break the enemy at the frontand to spring loose a ground convoy to open a mainsupply route (MSR) to the airhead certainly arguesfor OPCON of an armored or mechanized brigade.This especially applies if the corps wants theAASLT division to make a doctrinal ground pene-tration.

The frontal attack engages the enemy in more orless equal strength along the LC. The division fron-tal attack is the least desirable form of maneuver. Itserves as a useful supporting effort if begun simul-taneously with a deep air assault. Unlike an actualpenetration, an AASLT brigade can mount a cred-ible frontal attack to fix opposing forces along theFLOT.

Infiltration is the covert movement of all or partof the attacking force through enemy lines to anobjective in their rear. Small groups or individualsmove by stealth through enemy defensive belts overa period of time and normally under cover of dark-ness. They then assemble in predesignated spotsbehind the enemy’s front lines. Infiltrations—

Put surveillance teams and pathfinders in place.

Secure possible LZs and FARPs.

Raid enemy AD sites to open air corridors.

Position aviation-delivered artillery batteries.

Seize flight landing strips to create “instant”FOBs.

Secure choke points along future MSRs.

The AASLT division as a whole does not infil-trate. Infiltrations in the AASLT division work bestas supporting attacks timed to coincide with simul-taneous cross-FLOT operations.

Tactical OffenseThe four general forms of the tactical offense are

movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pur-suit. While it is convenient to talk of them as

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different forms, in reality they may flow readilyfrom one to the other.

Different forms of attack simultaneously occurthroughout the depth of the battlefield. An attackmay lead to exploitation, and exploitation can leadto pursuit. But there are often occasions when adeliberate attack can either follow a pursuit or leaddirectly to pursuit.

The ebb and flow of battle opens many avenuesfor attack. Victory normally goes to the bold andeludes commanders who can only see parts of thecombat instead of the whole.

The primary focus of division offensive deepoperations is to interdict by delaying, disrupting, ordiverting enemy division reserves (battalion- orregimental-size counterattack forces). It then shiftsto enemy units defending in depth.

The AASLT division effectively conducts cross-FLOT deep operations. When the AASLT divisionconducts deep operations it frequently receivescorps or JTF augmentation of combat, CS, and/orCSS assets.

The following paragraphs portray the AASLTdivision conducting an air assault and deliberateattack. See Chapter 4 for an expanded discussion.

Offensive Framework

In the offense, all types of Army divisions simul-taneously perform three operations in depth—deep,close, and rear. Deep operations focus on attackingkey enemy assets or centers of gravity. Close opera-tions, featuring main and supporting attacks, closewith and destroy the enemy and/or secure terrain.Rear operations sustain offensive momentum andensure freedom of action.

Synchronizing these three types of operationscreates high-tempo operations that present the en-emy with one continuous operation. To best meshthese operations, the AASLT division should playkey deep, close, or rear operations roles, based onits inherent capabilities and limitations, in the corpsor JTF framework.sive battlefield tomaneuver.

It then organizes its own offen-best support the higher units’

FM 71-100-3

The Division in a Corps OffensiveAs the corps or JTF commander marshals forces

for battle, he considers how best to employ theAASLT division. In a corps or JTF offensive, anAASLT division can effectively conduct corps deepoperations.

The division may attack targets well behind en-emy lines. When the corps or JTF does not plan aground linkup, the preferred method is a raid. An airassault to seize a choke point, create a blockingposition, or engage and destroy enemy reservesoffer chances for the corps or JTF commander toextend the battlefield to operational depth.

Placing an FOB in the opponent’s rear echelon,and subsequently conducting offensive operationsfrom this location, confronts the foe with a series ofraids and air assaults throughout the expanse of histerrain. Doing so endangers the foe’s MSRs andmovement of reinforcements.

In corps close operations, the AASLT divisionconducts either main or supporting attacks at a giventime. Because of lift constraints imposed by thenumbers of organic aircraft, the division can onlycommit a three-battalion maneuver brigade and athree-battalion attack aviation effort during a 24-hour period.

This constraint usually suffices for a corps sup-porting attack and, if aimed at a decisive spot inspace and time, could well serve as the corps’ mainattack. If employed as the main attack, the corps orJTF should augment the AASLT division with ad-ditional assault, medium assault, and attack aviationto increase the amount of force projected cross-FLOT.

In rear operations, the AASLT division domi-nates large areas with highly responsive AATFs andattack aviation forces. The division offers the corpsor JTF commander an organization well suited forsearch and attack operations against enemy uncon-ventional elements and local insurgents. When heelects to employ the division in rear operations, thecorps or JTF commander needs to carefully weighwhether he can afford to commit such a powerfulentity to the rear area.

Because of its large aviation complement, theAASLT division can reconnoiter and secure largeareas. It might screen the corps flank, perform of-fensive covering force missions, or carry out

large-scale deceptions to conceal other corps opera-tions and to keep the enemy at bay. The divisionconducts raids and air assaults to carry out thesetasks, but it also employs its sizable infantry strengthto secure critical sites in the corps or JTF rear.

If used as the corps reserve, the AASLT divisionoffers the corps or JTF commander maximum flexi-bility. It can join the battle at great range and highspeed, with no terrain limitations. However, adverseweather limits these advantages and severely re-stricts AASLT division activities.

The commander needs to avoid sending theAASLT division into action piecemeal. The temp-tation may arise to split out attack aviation, aircavalry, assault and medium assault aircraft, andAATFs on a variety of supporting missions through-out the deep, close, and rear battlefield. Doing sowould dissipate a force that fights best as a concen-trated force. The sum of the whole is greater thanthe sum of its parts. The corps or JTF must considerthe time required to reorganize, assemble, and rec-reate the division’s AATFs to permit maximumeffort cross-FLOT raids and air assaults.

The Air Assault Division OffensiveWhile METT-T assessments determine the exact

apportionment of forces for deep, close, and rearoperations, the AASLT division displays some con-sistent patterns in organizing for combat. The abilityto air assault one combined-arms brigade equivalentevery 24 hours affects the allocation of combatpower.

The aviation brigade plays a major role in deepoperations, with DIVARTY working closely to pro-vide responsive fire support, especially SEAD.Combined-arms forces up to brigade strength mayraid and attack into the deep zone. Deep operationsset the conditions for immediate and violent transi-tion into close operations in the same geographicalarea.

Before the division’s deep air assault, the divisionFSE conducts targeting-cell meetings to coordinatethe destruction of enemy assets that could influencethe division’s operation. The division commanderissues his guidance and establishes the amount ofrisk he is willing to accept.

The targeting cell then establishes the targets forattack. When the commander issues his guidance,

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the division battle staff and appropriate supportingarms (the FSE, G2, aviation brigade, and ALO)select and nominate targets for attack by both Armyand joint assets.

Commander’s guidance, METT-T factors, andenemy capabilities determine the conditions thatmust be set before the deep air assault. There arecertain enemy assets the targeting cells usually ad-dress, including—

Enemy ADA systems (radar guided that can in-fluence the division’s ingress and egress airroutes into the objective).

Fire support assets (rocket and tube artillery thatcan range, mass, and deliver large observed vol-umes of fire on the objective).

Enemy armored or mobile reserves that can reachthe objective within an established time limit oftroops landing on the objective.

The division determines whether targets are se-lected for destruction, neutralization, or suppres-sion. The division uses all available fire supportassets, especially organic attack helicopters andjoint assets, to deliver precision strikes on targets.Organic and reinforcing artillery use multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Army tacticalmissile systems (ATACMS) in conjunction withelectronic warfare to defeat targets.

METT-T factors determine the amount of timethe division needs to conduct condition-setting,which begins from 48 to 72 hours before conductingthe deep air assault. The division attacks targets andcollects battle damage assessments (BDA) to deter-mine how well the conditions are set.

If conditions are properly set by the establishedtime limit, the force conducts the deep air assault. Ifa commander feels that conditions are not set ac-cording to his guidance, he must decide whether toextend the condition-setting process or to select analternate COA.

Maneuver brigades normally conduct close op-erations for the AASLT division. One brigade de-livers the main attack, which is almost always adivision-controlled, brigade-scaled, cross-FLOTair assault. Another brigade conducts a supportingattack, using either limited aviation means or, per-haps, ground infiltration. Under certain circum-stances in the offense, attack aviation might make

the main attack or raid in a supporting effort, butthey prefer to fight deep.

Since rear operations must keep vulnerable avia-tion assembly areas, CPs, and logistic sites free fromthreats, the division may devote up to a brigade forthis role. Usually, a battalion TF, often augmentedfrom the command aviation battalion for lift and thecavalry squadron for aerial firepower, carries outdivisional rear operations when resources are par-ticularly constrained. An assault battalion could begiven an on-order mission to assist in this operation.

The AASLT division designates up to one brigadeas a reserve and places it in a PZ posture for com-mitment as required. If the rear threat is enough torequire the division to commit a brigade, and thedivision has already committed the other two ma-neuver brigades to close operations, the divisionmay accept the risk of having no reserve or only asmall one (perhaps an understrength battalion TF).

Under an optimum situation, the AASLT divisionoperates from a corps or JTF reserve assembly areauntil committed to an assigned zone. The divisiondoes not occupy ground at the LC, or if it does, itonly holds a narrow frontage to facilitate a groundattack to link up with the eventual airhead the divi-sion will form. Division attack aviation andDIVARTY fight deep to prepare conditions for themain air assault.

One brigade may air assault cross-FLOT to a FOBwhile the aviation brigade expands outward fromthe FOB to erect an outer ring. Meanwhile, anotherbrigade secures vulnerable rear areas. The air cav-alry screens as far forward as possible to identifyalerted hostile reserves. Finally, a third AASLTbrigade waits in PZ posture ready to stage forwardand launch follow-on deep operations within thenext 24 hours (Figure 3-1).

The AASLT division may employ two brigadesforward in separate FOBs. When they do this inorder to provide an outer ring for both, they will needattack helicopter battalion augmentation. The divi-sion’s aviation brigade may not always have theouter ring mission. If attack helicopter battalions areplaced OPCON to each forward AASLT brigade,this attack helicopter battalion augmentation’s im-portance increases.

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THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

The AASLT division normally conducts groundoffensive operations in restricted terrain. It conductsa deliberate attack as part of a corps operation toseize key terrain and/or destroy enemy forces. Itattacks with surprise and violence to destroy theenemy’s center of gravity.

A deliberate attack endeavors to overcome strongenemy forces in established positions. Charac-teristically, deliberate attacks rely on thorough plan-ning and reconnaissance, massive fire support, andlarge concentrations of maneuver combat power.All of these are designed to break the enemy at theFLOT and setup a penetration or envelopment.

Casualties may be high when friendly units fightthrough. Therefore, Army armored divisions at-tempt to maintain momentum by movements tocontact and hasty attacks that transition directly topursuit.

The AASLT division prefers the deliberate attackto the hasty attack. The division’s daily cross-FLOToperations reflect all of the traits of a deliberateattack, except one. The AASLT division does notconcentrate especially large maneuver forces topunch through at the FLOT. Instead it overflys it togain positional leverage in the enemy rear. Thismaneuver avoids the many losses normally

associated with trying to break through a dug-in,opposing army.

The AASLT division normally moves by deliber-ate aerial cross-FLOT bounds. Its deliberate-attackcycle (battle rhythm) permits H-hour about 48 hoursafter mission receipt.

The following example shows just one way theAASLT division maybe employed. METT-T fac-tors always guide the final decision.

The example shows the corps conducting a suc-cessful defense and preparing to transition to theoffense. The corps commander estimates a widelydispersed enemy at from 40 to 60 percent strength.

Rugged terrain is immediately to the corps’ front,causing difficulty for maneuvering heavy units. Theouter ring is a deep operation for the division and iscontrolled by the main CP.

An extensive corps intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB) determines the feasibility of usingthe AASLT division. During the IPB process, thestaff locates enemy forces, analyzes terrain, andconducts a risk assessment.

The corps provides IPB products to the AASLTdivision during the plans development process. Thecorps directs the AASLT division to conductAASLT operations over the rugged terrain.

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The corps commander’s concept for attack is touse AASLT infantry in a turning movement (Figure3-2). This would force the enemy to fight in twodirections. The AASLT division would seize keychoke points (objectives FOX and WOLF) and theriver crossing site (objective DOG).

The corps would penetrate enemy defenses within-place defending mechanized divisions, then at-tack with the corps reserve (an armored division) toseize objective SNAKE. The AASLT divisionwould continue to hold and expand the objectiveover a 48-hour period.

Following the armored division attack, theAASLT division conducts consolidation and reor-ganization operations. It then prepares to conductfollow-on AASLT operations to assist the corps’offensive operation. Or, if directed, it conducts op-erations to secure corps MSRs from the line ofdeparture (LD) or LC to objective DOG.

This operation is a five-phase corps operation. Inphase one, in-place divisions continue to defend,conduct aggressive patrolling, and perform counter-reconnaissance operations. The AASLT divisionmoves to PZs in preparation for the attack. Onebrigade’s mission initially is the division reserve.

In phase two, the two brigades air assault cross-FLOT to secure objectives FOX and WOLF (Figure

3-3). The third brigade is the division reserve andcontinues to prepare for commitment to secure ob-jective DOG as the division continues to support theoperation and expand the objective area.

In phase three, in-place divisions attack to pene-trate the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) andcreate a gap to pass the lead armored division for theattack on the corps objective (Figure 3-4). Simulta-neously, the first two AASLT brigades (now dis-mounted infantry) attack to secure dominant terrainand choke points at objectives FOX and WOLFwhile the division’s attack helicopters conduct asupporting attack deeper into the enemy’s rear area.

In phase four, the armored division attacksthrough the gap created in the FEBA by the in-placedivisions, conducts link-up, and passes throughchoke points secured by the infantry (Figure 3-5).As the armored division reaches phase line (PL)BLUE, the AASLT division continues to support theoperation at objectives FOX and WOLF, seizes theriver crossing site at objective DOG, and preparesto pass the armored division through the river cross-ing passage point.

In phase five, the armored division conducts alink-up operation with the AASLT division, con-ducts the river crossing, then attacks to seize thecorps objective (Figure 3-6). The corps may tell the

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AASLT division to conduct follow-and-supportoperations, to secure LOC from the FEBA to thecorps objective, or to assist in an exploitationoperation.

MANEUVERThe AASLT division commander and staff re-

ceive the corps commander’s concept. During thedecision-making process, they determine that onebrigade each is needed to seize objectives WOLF,FOX, and DOG.

The commander’s concept is to simultaneouslyair assault two brigades to seize choke points (ob-jectives FOX and WOLF) and to air assault the thirdbrigade to seize crossing sites at objective DOGwithin 24 hours.

To conduct this operation according to the divi-sion commander’s concept, the division must re-quest and receive substantial aviation augmentationfrom the corps. The commander task-organizes hisassets based on his concept and mission require-ments (Figure 3-7). Initially, seizing objectiveWOLF is the division’s main effort.

Deep OperationsThe AASLT division is part of the overall corps

attack. The corps coordinates its deep operationswith the AASLT division to synchronize theAASLT operation into the overall corps plan. Itsynchronizes the operation through detailed plan-ning and centralized execution of corps attack assetsbeyond PL GREEN.

The corps directs its efforts toward shaping thebattlefield to ensure the AASLT unit does not losethe element of surprise. It also wants to ensure thatsuperior forces do not attack the AASLT brigadesafter their insertion. Therefore, the corps uses otherassets, such as SOFs, to disrupt, delay, deceive, andconfuse the enemy. When the AASLT division be-gins its air assault, the corps may portray activity orpossible threats at other portions of the battlefieldto divert the enemy’s attention.

Close OperationsThe AASLT division commander’s concept of

operations supports the corps commander’s con-cept. Success depends on the division’s ability to

seize and hold its objectives until the armored force.conducts the link-up operation and continues acrossthe river to the corps objective.

The AASLT division commander knows the op-eration depends on his brigades and the defendingheavy divisions achieving surprise and a coordi-nated attack. The commander’s concept calls for afive-phase operation linked to the phases the corpsconcept presents.

In phase one, the AASLT division, with its rein-forcing and augmenting elements, moves to the PZs,conducts reconnaissance, and begins preparationfor combat activities (Figure 3-8). It coordinateswith corps and defending divisions to position artil-lery and support units and to identify airspace

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control measures and passage points (PPs) throughin-place divisions on land and in the air. Supportunits move to base clusters near the PZs. While thedivision moves into the PZs, the staff continues tocoordinate air corridors to support the air assault.

The AASLT division coordinates with the de-fending divisions for passage and SEAD support.They also exchange other essential information (firesupport measures, ADA coverage, and engineersupport) with the corps and the defending divisionsto support the air assault and subsequent attacks.

In phase two, the first and second brigadesconduct air assault through in-place defendingdivisions and through enemy areas to the LZs(Figure 3-9). As the brigades assemble for the airassault and attack, they do final coordination toadjust boundaries.

Brigade rear boundaries move closer to theobjective, thus establishing brigade boundariesaround each objective. This meets the corps com-mander’s guidance and provides the defendingdivisions room to maneuver as they transition tothe attack. This maneuver room is necessary tocreate the penetration.

In phase three, the assault on objectives FOX andWOLF begins and the heavy divisions attack simul-taneously to penetrate and create the gap in theFEBA (Figure 3-10).

During phase four, the brigades consolidate ontheir objectives, linking up with and passing thecorps armored division. The AASLT division hascoordinated link-up procedures with the armoreddivision before the attack. The brigade gives battal-ions the tasks of establishing link-up points at pre-determined locations.

In phase five, the third brigade conducts the airassault to seize objective DOG while the lead unitof the attacking armored force simultaneouslycrosses PL BLUE. Once the brigade secures ob-jective DOG and the crossing sites, it establisheslink-up points to pass the armored division. Afterpassing the division, it prepares for the next mis-sion. The AASLT division and the armored divi-sion coordinated link-up points and proceduresbefore the attack.

Rear OperationsThe primary role of division rear and CSS ele-

ments is to coordinate logistic operations and sup-port for maneuver brigades. The rear CP and thedefending mechanized divisions coordinate terrainmanagement in addition to controlling traffic andthe movement of displaced persons. The division’srear CP is responsible for coordinating rear areasecurity.

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Security OperationsThe corps protects the AASLT force by deception

as well as by active security. Before the air assaultbegins, the corps attempts to deceive the enemyabout the division’s movements and intent. It mayconduct feints and spoiling attack operations thatdivert enemy attention away from the AASLT area(PZs and LZs) or conduct a corps deception plan.Once the air assault begins, the infantry divisioncoordinates security with the defending divisionsand corps.

Reserve Operations

The division initially has the third brigade inreserve until it begins movement to the PZ. Uponcommitment of the reserve, the commander shouldreconstitute the reserve as soon as METT-T factorspermit.

IntelligenceThe division commander, working with the G2,

G3, and fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), de-velops the PIR. The G2 integrates intelligence assetsrequired to collect PIR into the division collectionplan. The division submits requests for intelligenceinformation or for additional assets to corps forsupport to the collection plan when the plan exceedsthe division’s organic capabilities.

The commander’s PIR focuses on enemy units oractions which may adversely affect the AASLT orattack helicopter raid. The division coordinates withboth the corps and defending mechanized divisionsfor previously collected information (enemy, sen-sor, or observation post (OP) locations). The corps’Quick Fix and division LRSD provide real-timeinformation and intelligence.

Division MI assets support the division collectionplan for all phases of the operation. In phases onethrough five, the AASLT division uses maneuverbrigades and those assets which do not have toaccompany AASLT units to collect information.

Military intelligence assets along the FEBA sup-port both division and corps collection plans. Toenhance collection of intelligence in phase five, anIEW team moves with the AASLT brigades. TheIEW team accompanies the forward ground elementand looks beyond objective DOG.

Fire SupportThe AASLT division supports its attack with

CAS, attack helicopter, artillery, and EW assets.These assets must provide responsive fires duringall phases of the operation. Task-organized divisionartillery and a corps-reinforcing FA brigade provideresponsive fire support.

Corps artillery assigns a priority of fire for eachphase of the operation. During phase one, priorityof fire is to the defending divisions; phase two, theAASLT division; phase three, penetrating divisions;phases four and five, the attacking armored division.

The division FSE selects areas and coordinateswith the G3 (or S3 at brigade level) before position-ing artillery in a unit’s sector. Brigade FSCOORDs,with their maneuver commanders, position DS ar-tillery (Figure 3-11). Artillery assets air assault for-ward with the maneuver brigades to precoordinatedpositions to support all phases of the operation—reconnaissance, air assault, attack, and linkup. Theyalso provide responsive counterbattery fire for thebrigades.

The defending armored or mechanized divisionsand corps artillery battalions receive nonstandardmissions to allow them to fire in support of changingpriorities. The nonstandard mission sets limits onammunition expenditure and positioning.

Units stockpile ammunition to support air assaultand penetration on the ground at battery locations.Corps and division artillery units use this ammuni-tion to fire preparations, SEAD, programs, targetgroups, and other types of fires. The corps artillerycommander and his staff integrate fires to ensureefficient use of in-place and supporting corps artil-lery.

Coordination between the AASLT division andthe corps FSE is critical to preventing fratricide. TheAASLT division establishes and coordinates firesupport coordination measures (FSCM) for AASLTcorridors, LZs, objectives, LRSD locations, andlink-up points.

The AASLT division FSE controls fire supportbetween PL GREEN and PL BLUE during the airassault. In-place divisions assume responsibility forfire coordination (within their boundaries to PLBLUE) once the air assault is complete.

The armored division assumes responsibility forcontrolling fires (beyond PL BLUE) when its lead

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element conducts the passage with the infantry. Thecorps establishes on-order restrictive fire areas(RFAs) around objectives and link-up points.

The division coordinates engagement areas (EAs)and family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) mine-field with the corps. Together they seal the objec-tives from possible enemy reinforcement and toneutralize enemy actions to the flanks.

The corps artillery headquarters coordinatescountermortar and counterbattery radar positioningand control. The AASLT division FSE coordinatesradar coverages with the defending division’s FSEs.

DIVARTY places radars to provide continuoussupport throughout the AASLT division’s sector.The corps establishes Quick Fire channels betweenradars and firing units to rapidly silence enemyindirect-fire systems which might affect the corps’plan. A Q-36 radar with the third brigade’s DSartillery provides counterbattery coverage at river-crossing sites.

Mobility and Survivability (M/S)

Priority of engineer support within the AASLTdivision is M/S in deep and rear areas. The divisionattaches AASLT engineer companies to eachbrigade.

During the air assault and attack, AASLT engi-neer companies support the breaching of obstacles,reporting information on obstacles, bridge condi-tions, and soil composition in the areas they occupy.The AASLT division, defending divisions, and thecorps use this information to prepare for penetra-tion, attack, and follow-on movement of CSS assets.

Division AASLT engineer companies deployedwith brigades breach obstacles during the assault onobjectives and, where possible, in and around link-up points. The AASLT division engineer, with inputfrom the brigade engineers and the deputy fire sup-port coordinator (DFSCOORD), and the ALO planscatterable mines to block enemy counterattacksand reinforcements. The AASLT division’s engi-neer battalion retains the personnel and equipmentnot task-organized to maneuver brigades to supporton-order (o/o) follow-and-support missions.

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Air Defense wounded are evacuated after objectives have beenThe division ADA’s primary role is to provide

AD coverage during all phases of the operation. Forthe air assault, brigades move with only man-port-able air defense (MANPAD) systems. Vulcans andAvengers remain in the rear near the PZs. Theyprovide coverage for division CS and CSS assets.Stingers provide coverage during the AASLT op-eration, movement to the objectives, the attack, andat link-up points.

During the air assault, the corps’ ADA priority isto air-assaulting brigades. The corps pushes its high-altitude ADA coverage as far forward as possible tosupport the operation. Division ADA weapons areunder “weapons hold” status during the air assault.Passive defensive measures are the division’s pri-mary air defense.

Air defense elements with air-assaulting brigadesform a protective umbrella around and over objec-tive areas. They maintain this coverage and extendit to cover link-up points once they secure the ob-jectives.

After the third brigade’s air assault, the corps’ ADpriority shifts to the attacking divisions. Air defensesystems in the third brigade establish coverage forthe assault and for river-crossing sites.

As soon as possible, the AASLT division’s G3directs division towed systems forward with theattacking heavy division. This strengthens coverageover choke points and river crossing sites and pro-vides additional ground firepower if required.

Combat Service SupportDivision G4 planners, in close coordination with

DISCOM personnel, develop a concept for support.The concept is a detailed plan that mirrors theconcept of operations and outlines the support pack-age for the operation. Field Manual 101-5 (D)gives an example of a concept of a support plan.(See also Figure 3-12.)

Brigades can sustain field operations for from 48to 72 hours without resupply. Throughout opera-tions, the division commander influences the maineffort by designating priority of support.

.consolidated.)

The G4 coordinates for maximum use of thecontainer delivery system (CDS) to conduct resup-ply. The G4 coordinates with DISCOM for precon-figured push-packages of Class VIII suppliestailored to meet specific CHS mission requirements.The loading plan and staging are critical to success-ful air assault of CSS.

Aerial assets accomplish resupply during the con-solidation on the objective. The DTO coordinatesthe integration of DISCOM support assets into theattacking division’s follow-on logistic movementwith the DISCOM commander.

The division’s DTO coordinates MSRs to loca-tions that forward brigades select. The FSBs moveforward on order from their supported brigade. TheDISCOM provides information on requirementsand displacements.

The infantry division DISCOM headquarters maynot move during this operation. Main support bat-talion units and elements of the MMC move nearthe FSBs to support reorganization of the brigadesin preparation for the next mission.

Battle CommandAfter receiving the warning order, the AASLT

division’s TAC CP moves forward to coordinate theinfiltration with defending divisions. The TAC CPdetermines brigade assembly areas, initial passagepoints, corridors, and link-up points as brigadesprepare to move to assembly areas.

In this example, the TAC CP is forward near theLD/LC to support brigade operations. To aid incontrol, the AASLT division provides liaison teamsto each defending division.

The AASLT division uses control measures thecorps establishes for coordination. It also estab-lishes brigade boundaries and responsibilities foreach phase of the AASLT division operation. Bri-gade CPs move forward and collocate with brigadeCPs through which they will pass, as do theirbattalions.

The AASLT division TAC CP moves forwardThe commander weights the main effort with behind the last maneuver brigade of the attacking

CSS assets, particularly CHS. (The majority of the armored division with the cavalry squadron ground

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troop. This provides security to the TAC CP while Follow-on friendly forces rapidly exploit successit moves.

The TAC CP repositions forward near objectiveDOG. The jump CP air assaults with the third bri-gade as it secures river-crossing sites. Main and rearCPs move on order.

PENETRATION

A commander uses penetrations when enemyflanks are not assailable and other forms of maneu-ver are not feasible. The penetration often pits theattacker’s strength against the defender’s. As a re-sult, there are higher casualty rates than with otherforms of maneuver except frontal attack, which hasthe highest casualty rate.

The penetrating unit masses sufficient combatpower at points of penetration to overwhelm theenemy. The AASLT division masses effects fromfires of all available means to breach enemy defen-sive positions along a narrow front, to hold open theshoulder, and to degrade the effects of a counter-attack.

of the penetrating force. Multiple penetration pointsmay be desirable if they will cause the enemy todisperse his fires and consider multiple threats be-fore committing.

If the AASLT division receives the mission toconduct a ground (dismounted) penetration, theyconduct it as an infantry division (light) (ID (L))would conduct a penetration. (See discussion in FM71-100-2.) However, if the AASLT division’s mis-sion is to conduct AASLT operations deep behindenemy positions to support the corps or JTF concept,the division conducts operations in a manner similarto the deliberate attack.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

The AASLT division conducts a movement tocontact to gain or regain contact with the enemy.The goal is to use the smallest possible force withwhich to find the enemy, then maneuver with theremainder of the division’s forces as the situationdevelops. A movement to contact ends in an attack(hasty or deliberate), a defense, or a retrograde.

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The best use of the AASLT division leading acorps movement to contact is as a covering force (inrestrictive terrain) against a relatively static oppo-nent or when the corps expects contact within hoursof the time of attack.

In wide-open terrain against a mechanized enemyor on long movements against a largely unknownfoe, the AASLT division’s liabilities begin to out-weigh its capabilities. Only attack aviation can holdits own in a meeting engagement with massedmechanized opposing forces.

The AASLT division cannot fight and prevail inits usual combined-arms style against massedmechanized forces. Therefore, the corps or JTFmust not allow this to occur.

In open terrain, a mounted enemy on the groundmight move unpredictably and quickly. He couldreposition faster than could landed AASLT forces,negating their speed advantage. Although theseconditions favor detection and destruction by attackhelicopters, a large, organized, constantly moving,aggressive foe with mobile AD systems could pene-trate the AASLT division’s rear areas by outflank-ing blocking forces and hasty FASCAM.

On restrictive ground, dynamics change. Evenstrong tank formations can find themselves divertedinto canalized avenues of approach, creating slower,more predictable patterns of motion.

and/or destroy his ADA and fire support units,locate his maneuver forces and envelop them deep,and defeat him.

Air assault cross-FLOT operations into unknownareas without a solid IPB are high-risk operations.Movements which take more than 24 hours withoutcontact quickly outrun the AASLT division’s abilityto set any sort of conditions for raids or air assaults.This consideration particularly applies when theforce is opposed by a competent conventional en-emy capable of his own offensive operations. If thecorps or JTF develops the situation into an outrightpursuit, it might run the risk of going deep withminimal information. The AASLT division shouldnot lead the corps movement to contact in thisinstance.

If enemy positions are within 150 kilometers ofthe FLOT, especially if the enemy lacks armor or isoccupying close terrain, the AASLT division be-comes a much better choice to lead a movement tocontact. The corps or JTF must provide an environ-ment for the division to conduct a condition-settingcycle, particularly for intelligence and fire support,before executing major raids or air assaults.

When moving to contact under favorable condi-tions, an AASLT division can move within an ap-proximate 300-kilometer radius. It relies on aviationto concentrate forces and develop the situation oncesignificant engagement occurs (Figure 3-13).

These dynamics play nicely into the AASLT di- The division usually leads with the aviation bri-vision’s normal process of decision, condition set- gade and is reinforced with an infantry TF withting, and execution. The resulting sequence of raids priority on fire support, including at least oneand air assaults would certainly favor the force least AASLT artillery battalion. Initially, the aviationaffected by terrain. brigade is the main effort.

Even if the AASLT division’s attack aviation Two brigades, each including sufficient lift avia-matches up well against hostile armored formations, tion to insert a battalion TF, follow and support thethe division as a whole might find it difficult to aviation brigade in zone. They wait in a PZ posturemaintain its OPTEMPO in the teeth of an attacking as operations proceed, then advance via helicopterenemy armored force. This is particularly true if the to subsequent PZs until the lead unit makes contacttanks catch aircraft on the ground or while landing. with the enemy.

The AASLT division requires only a short timeto establish defenses in order to hold its own. But ina movement to contact against a large armoredformation, that time might not be available.

If the enemy lacks mechanized technology, orproves unable or unwilling to conduct armoredcombined-arms warfare, the AASLT division canregain its edge. It can find a static foe, suppress

The third brigade (minus an infantry TF and theDS artillery supporting the aviation brigade), with abattalion-size slice of lift aviation, forms the re-serve. The division commander maintains a battal-ion of attack helicopters in reserve.

Ideally, the air cavalry squadron finds the enemy.Once the division establishes contact, it begins itsusual cross-FLOT process, setting conditions to

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pass behind the enemy’s main combat forces. The corps commander to use his AASLT division in adivision continues to observe the enemy and beginsfire support programs for aerial envelopment by raidor air assault.

Follow-and-support brigades identify, engage,and destroy small, hostile units in zone. They fixenemy battalions for destruction by fires, hasty at-tack, or to prevent enemy interference in other divi-sion deep operations. The AASLT divisioncontinues this pattern of moving to contact and hastyattacks until the situation changes and a branch orsequel to the current operation begins or until thecorps or JTF changes the division’s mission.

The approach march, reconnaissance in force,and search and attack operations are some of thetechniques for conducting a movement to contact.METT-T factors determine how a unit will conducta movement to contact.

The Approach March

In this example, the corps successfully drivesback enemy forces from their initial lines of defense.As enemy units withdraw, they break contact withfriendly forces. The nature of the terrain causes the

movement to contact to reestablish contact.If the AASLT division’s movement to contact is

successful, the corps commander commits his ar-mored force, intending to regain ground contactwith the enemy and to exploit success. The currenttactical situation and intelligence reports indicate—

The enemy’s exact location is unknown.The corps has no covering force.The enemy has the capability to disrupt or delaythe corps.Friendly forces have air superiority.The corps heavy division is in a hasty defense andhas an on-order mission to continue the attack.Terrain is restrictive with limited movementroutes for armored forces.

Maneuver

The corps commander’s concept of operationsrequires rapid movement over restrictive terrain.The division will lead with the aviation brigade andmove with the cavalry squadron leading the aviation

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brigade. It will be reinforced with an AASLT bat-talion, an artillery battalion, then the AASLT bri-gades (Figure 3-14).

Figure 3-15 depicts the division’s task organiza-tion. Once the division makes contact, it developsthe situation.

The cavalry squadron quickly assesses the situ-ation to determine exact enemy unit locations,strengths, depth of formation, and intentions. Theaviation brigade can use AASLT infantry, attackhelicopters, and/or field artillery against the enemy.If necessary, these assets take responsibility fromthe cavalry to filly develop the situation and destroyenemy forces.

The division has the option to destroy or containthe enemy, depending on the size of the enemy forceand the situation at the time of contact. If the divi-sion does not make significant contact, it continuesto move until it traverses the restrictive terrain at PLGREEN and the armored forces pass forward.Corps MLRS may be general support-reinforcing(GS-R) to DIVARTY.

Deep Operations. Using organic assets and pos-sibly SOF, the corps conducts deep operations

against uncommitted enemy forces, LOCs, and sup-ply of those forces. It provides the division withintelligence on these uncommitted forces.

Close Operations. While the division conducts amovement to contact to gain or regain contact withthe enemy, the goal is to make first enemy contactwith the smallest possible friendly force. If thedivision commander is reasonably sure of the en-emy’s location and is a considerable distance fromthe enemy, he may elect to use a less secure butfaster rate of movement until he nears the enemy’slocation. He can then adjust the tempo as he antici-pates enemy contact.

For example, the cavalry squadron conducts azone reconnaissance in front of the aviation brigadeto locate enemy forces. On order the division maychange this to a screen mission upon contact withenemy forces. The aviation brigade (+) follows thecavalry squadron while two brigades remain in theirPZs.

The two brigades prepare to move forward, con-ducting AASLT operations if they make contactwith the enemy; or air movement if they move to asubsequent PZ. The remaining brigade (-) is thedivision reserve.

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One brigade designates flank and rear securityforces and gives these units a screen mission. Eachbrigade integrates CS and limited CSS assets intotheir movement. The division cavalry squadron lo-cates the enemy and develops the situation.

If the division commander decides to conduct ahasty attack, the aviation brigade is in position to doso. This brigade receives priority of effort within thedivision.

If the enemy force is of sufficient size to precludean attack by one brigade, the aviation brigade fixesthe enemy force while the lead AASLT brigade air

assaults into position and moves to attack the en-emy. The next AASLT brigade prepares for com-mitment into this fight. If the lead AASLT brigadedefeats the enemy, the next AASLT brigade as-sumes the position behind the aviation brigade andprepares for the next enemy contact.

Rear Operations. Rear units, DISCOM, and di-vision troops remain in the DSA. The in-place unitprovides security until committed. The rear CP co-ordinates and synchronizes both air and groundmovements forward.

Sustainment units move on order once the divi-sion secures the restrictive terrain. (Ground resup-ply is the preferred method.)

Security Operations. The division conducts anadvance screen with the reconnaissance squadronduring zone reconnaissance. Each brigade has ad-vanced, flank, and rear guards.

The division maintains security by positioning itsassets within mutually supporting distances as itmoves. Early warning is critical to its security.Long-range surveillance patrols and electronic in-telligence-gathering assets help locate the enemyand indicate his possible locations and intent.

Reserve Operations. The division commanderretains one AASLT infantry brigade (-) and oneAHB in reserve.

Intelligence

The primary mission of intelligence assets is tofind the enemy and report to the commander in atimely manner. The commander establishes theCCIR early to focus the efforts of all collectionassets. He approves a collection plan and specificPIR, the acquisition assets to use, and actions to takeonce units report PIR information. (See Chapter 5for more information on this process.)

The division requires intelligence informationcontinuously as it moves forward. The cavalrysquadron reports directly to the TAC CP wherethe intelligence staff officer continuously ana-lyzes the information along with other sources,such as those from division and corps long-rangesurveillance (LRS) units. Information from desig-nated named areas of interest (NAIs) and targetareas of interest (TAIs) also aids the developmentof intelligence to locate the enemy.

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Intelligence acquisition gaps may occur. TheG2 employs MI assets in layers to see the battle-field to fill these gaps. Maneuver units accomplishforward and flank information-gathering. The MIbattalion moves its assets as necessary to accom-plish its mission.

Fire SupportPrimary fire support considerations in a

movement to contact include anticipating en-emy actions during the movement and whenorganizing for combat and moving artillery bat-talions and ammunition forward. Also impor-tant is the ability to provide rapid and accuratefires on targets which affect the force’s surviv-ability and mission.

cavalry squadron. The task organization providesflexibility, responsiveness, and agility when andwhere the division makes contact with the enemy.

As the division moves across the LD/LC, DSand GS artillery will be in position to providesupport. Once the brigades determine air corridorsand routes out of the LZs, FA units determinewhere to position their assets to best support theoperation. Since artillery follows its brigade, thebrigade maintains movement control. The divi-sion commander uses the battery with the aviationbrigade to rapidly provide additional fire supportas needed on the battlefield.

During the movement, maneuver elements areextremely vulnerable to enemy indirect fires. If

In this example, the division commander in- possible, the corps augments the division with thetegrates fire support into the total mission (Fig- capability to plan, execute, and coordinate effec-ure 3-16). Establishing a Quick Fire channel tive counterbattery and counterfire programs. Ar-improves fire support to the aviation brigade and tillery units carry maximum amounts of

ammunition but still require resupply.

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As maneuver units move forward, FSCM ensure the corps force and division supply points (SUPPT).rapid fire support. DIVARTY headquarters locates The DISCOM and the rear CP displace on ordernear the LD/LC where it maintains command and when the corps force passes through the division andcontrol and sustainment requirements for division when MSRs are secure.artillery.

Mobility and Survivability

The primary engineer mission is to locate andbreach enemy obstacles to facilitate mobility of CSSelements and the corps follow-on force. The divi-sion task-organizes its light engineer companies toeach brigade and the cavalry squadron.

Engineers with the cavalry squadron identify ob-stacles, report route conditions, and provide a lim-ited capability for breaching obstacles. Engineerswith brigades identify obstacles and report routeconditions along routes of march and to the flanks.

If required, engineers on the flanks constructsituational obstacles to stop possible enemy pene-trations from the flank. Engineers coordinate withthe division FSE to emplace FASCAM. The engi-neer battalion headquarters coordinates support toforward engineer companies to expedite divisionmovement.

Air Defense

The AASLT division has limited ADA assets.Critical division resources have priority for ADAcoverage. Stinger teams are in DS to brigades. Forthe movement, Avengers are kept under the ADAbattalion’s control.

The division requests additional ADA supportfrom corps. Corps assets provide ADA protectionfor the rear area.

Combat Service Support

The division task-organizes for speed and stealth.Units carry a 48-hour, unit basic load (UBL)(Classes I, III, V, and VIII) to ensure brigades havelimited logistic support. The FSBs move forward bywheeled vehicle when they can. Maintenance time-lines are short and units replace rather than repairmost unserviceable items to rapidly return equip-ment to use.

The DISCOM and the rear CP coordinate limitedwheeled vehicle routes in the division area between

Battle CommandThe commanding general positions himself well

forward to seethe battlefield. The rear CP maintainsa position in the rear behind the main CP. Brigadestask-organize into self-contained TFs to enhanceflexibility and the ability to attack enemy forces.

The division TAC CP moves behind the aviationbrigade and maintains communications with thecavalry squadron. The division main CP stays at theLD/LC until the division secures the restrictive ter-rain and the corps heavy division passes through.

Search and Attack OperationsA search and attack operation is a likely mission for

the AASLT division. Although brigades and battalionsconduct it as a decentralized mission, it requires divisionsupport.

The division allocates resources; moves troops,supplies, and materiel; and assimilates and distrib-utes intelligence. Search and attack operations are time-consuming. The division commander and staff mustallow subordinate commanders enough time to developintelligence before expecting results.

Smaller, lighter maneuver forces generally conductsearch and attack operations in large areas to destroyenemy forces, to deny area to the enemy, and to collectinformation. They may also conduct search and attackoperations—

Against a dispersed enemy on close terrain unsuitablefor armored forces.In rear areas against enemy SOF or infiltrators.As area security missions to clear assigned zones.Search and attack operations can prevent the enemy

from planning, assembling, and executing operations onhis own initiative. Ideally, the AASLT division’s threeAH-64 battalions are the first element to execute thisoperation.

Most search and attack operations begin withoutdetailed prior information about the enemy. The com-mander must produce much of his own intelligence as

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the operation unfolds. Historically, units conductsearch and attack operations—

In an environment of friendly air and fire superiority.

Against squad- to company-size forces equippedwith small arms and mortars, but normally withoutartillery support.Against both regular and guerrilla forces whose lo-cations are unknown.In an environment where the enemy has the advan-tage of knowing both the terrain and the local popu-lace.

At company, battalion, and brigade levels with divi-sion support.The corps or JTF may direct the division to conduct

combat operations to clear the enemy in zone. The intentmay be to eliminate an enemy’s ability to interfere withcurrent or future combat operations or with an HNgovernment’s ability to protect its population. Searchand attack operations orient on the enemy, not on takingor holding terrain.

To counter the threat’s potentially close ties to thepopulation, US units must gain local civilian support.PSYOPs are key to gaining this support. Therefore,search and attack operations accept some risk to friendlyforces to prevent collateral damage.

The corps or JTF and/or the division must clearlydisseminate ROE, strictly controlling reconnaissanceby fire, unobserved supporting fires, and air strikes. Thegoal is to destroy the enemy, not the host nation.

A division order directing search and attack opera-tions assigns brigade AOs and task-organizes them asself-contained forces with combat and CS forces. Bri-gades normally establish fire support bases for DSartillery and organic mortars. Brigades assign battalionsAOs, then further subdivides those areas into companyzones of action.NOTE: Figure 3-17 shows how the division assignssearch and attack brigade AOs. Figures 3-18 and 3-19show the task organization. See FM 7-30 for the tacticsand techniques for brigade search and attack operations.

The Find-Fix-Fight or Finish CycleA search and attack operation goes through a definite

cycle. Finding the enemy focuses friendly combatpower to destroy him. Fixing the opposition prevents

his escape as friendly combat power concentratesagainst him. Finally, fighting or finishing the enemydestroys him and provides combat information tolocate other hostile forces. This restarts the find-fix-fight or finish cycle.

Finding. Intelligence drives search and attack and itssuccess depends on a careful search for the enemy and,after finding him, massing superior forces to destroyhim. To find the enemy, units must conduct aggressive,continuous reconnaissance. Commanders must resistthe temptation to rely on saturation infantry patrols atthe outset. Instead, they must develop a detailed pictureof the enemy and the region so soldiers can enter itin force.

Searching is a time-consuming process. It onlybecomes effective when done methodically overtime. This gives the TF an area awareness equivalentto the enemy’s initial local knowledge. The IPBinvolves the entire staff and keys on enemy CSS, theleast mobile part of his array.

Finders maneuver to see the enemy, not kill him.Observation post (OP) and/or listening post (LP)units conduct surveillance, LLVI listen, and GSRscans while most of the infantry secures finderitems. The division uses patrols (which must be slowand stealthy).

Finding may require days or even weeks to dis-cern enemy patterns, depending on METT-T. Theideal result is an in-depth picture of the hostile CSSsystem and locations.

Fixing. Once friendly forces determine the loca-tion of a vulnerable CSS node or other lucrativetarget, the AATF maneuvers a small force (a com-pany or team at the battalion level) to fix the enemyat the site. This force intends to become decisivelyengaged.

Fixing sets conditions for employing fighters orfinishers. Fixers must maintain contact. Fixers mayfinish off small, isolated, or lightly held hostileoutposts without additional forces, but that is theexception, not the rule.

If the fixing unit can hold the opposing force, theTF masses combat power to overwhelm the enemy.The AATF may conduct a hasty or deliberate attackto destroy the hostile force.

If the TF cannot concentrate sufficient combatpower, it may keep the enemy force under

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surveillance until the brigade can shift reinforce-ments or blocking forces as required. If the fixingforce meets a more powerful opponent, it mighthave to withdraw or assume a hasty defense, pend-ing reinforcement.

Fighting or Finishing. When a contact arises, orintelligence indicates the presence of a vulnerableenemy element, friendly forces must entrap or en-circle the hostile force. The AATF attacks thosecontacts most likely to pay off in destruction ofenemy capability and production of new intelli-gence. They continue to fight until a decisive finishoccurs and they have destroyed or captured enemyforces. This necessitates rapid, precise placement ofstrong maneuver forces.

In search and attack missions, the AATF’s re-serve stands by with its aircraft in PZ posture, readyto attack once conditions are set. It air assaults on,

or as close as possible to, the fixed enemy or CSSsite and destroys him.

The fighting or finishing unit gathers prisoners,documents, and artifacts to feed the “find” part ofthe continuing cycle. A typical search and attacktempo might take up to a week to find, a day to fix,and another day to fight or finish the mission, Exacttimes depend on METT-T, but in any case, fixing,and especially finishing, proceed rapidly.

Maneuver

The success of search and attack operations de-pends on carefully searching for the enemy and, onfinding him, massing superior forces to destroy him.On finding an enemy force, friendly units take oneof several actions.

If the searching force is able to mass sufficientcombat power to overwhelm the enemy, it mayconduct a hasty or deliberate attack to destroy theenemy force. If it is not able to mass sufficientcombat power, it may keep the enemy force under

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surveillance until reinforcement and fixing forcesarrive. If a larger enemy force discovers the searchand attack force, the smaller force may have towithdraw or assume a hasty defense pending rein-forcement.

When contact occurs, or intelligence indicatesthe presence of an enemy force, friendly units entrapor encircle the enemy force. In most cases it is notsufficient to use only an attacking force and a block-ing force.

Ground combat units cover the most likely routesof withdrawal; light reconnaissance elements coverthe less likely routes. Units use air or other mobilemeans to emplace and/or extract forces to exploittime and space advantages.

Commanders rapidly adjust plans to enemymovements and alter schemes of maneuver to fixand destroy the enemy. Speed and deception char-acterize tactical maneuver. While speed is essential,commanders must pay meticulous attention to con-tinuous provision of air, artillery, and if available,NGF support.

Intelligence

There are three intelligence methods in search andattack operations: reconnaissance, human intelli-gence (HUMINT), and aerial surveillance and ac-quisition.

Reconnaissance. Aggressive, continuous recon-naissance is essential in all search and attack opera-tions. Saturation patrolling by platoon- orsquad-size units, either on foot or delivered byhelicopter, is a prime source of information. TheAASLT division should immediately exploit theseenemy contacts. Commanders understand and ac-cept that searching is time-consuming and can onlybe effective if done methodically.

The division LRSD observes likely enemy ave-nues of approach. It also observes and reports onareas the G2 identifies as potential enemy basecamps or cache sites.

addition to the acquisition efforts of brigades andbattalions.)

The division cavalry squadron is also an integralpart of intelligence acquisition. The squadron isnormally retained in GS of the division. The G2,through the G3, tasks both air and ground elementswith intelligence-collection tasks.

Like the LRSD, the squadron operates withinbrigade AORs and must be part of the overall acqui-sition plan. The division does not give these assetsto brigades for their use.

Special operations forces within the divisionAOR are another important intelligence-acquisitionsource. The division can request special reconnais-sance missions through the corps or JTF or jointspecial operations TF headquarters. Division forcesmust know the locations and missions of SOFs toprevent fratricide and duplication of effort.

Human Intelligence. The division can obtaininformation on enemy forces by establishing closeliaison with province, district, and village leaders.Frequent visits to local villages by searching forces(such as MP, HN, or security forces) often yieldaccurate and timely information on local enemyforces. This technique is especially effective if en-emy forces have oppressed the local population.

Aerial Surveillance and Acquisition. Aerial plat-forms yield valuable information on enemy forces.The division should maximize infrared detection,visual observation, and communications intercept.

Fire Support

Divisional units receive fire support during searchand attack operations by artillery, mortars, attackhelicopters, CAS aircraft, and when available, NGF.Brigades establish fire support bases for supportingartillery and organic mortars within brigade AOs.

Bases provide complete coverage of the AO andare mutually supporting. Establishing bases oftenrequires insertion and resupply by helicopters.

Because some of these operations may occur Sufficient security forces must be on hand forwithin brigade areas of responsibility (AORs), the protection. Units must filly fortify fire supportG2 closely coordinates the collection plan with bases and ensure they have all-around security in-brigades and exchanges information to prevent frat- cluding countermobility obstacles and survivabilityricide or duplication of effort. (Using LRSDs is in positions.

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Attack helicopters normally operate from thedivision rear area and do not locate within thesearch AO. The aviation brigade ensures the po-sitioning of these assets to provide rapid and re-sponsive fire support when divisional units locateenemy units.

Air DefenseNormally, enemy forces will not have air assets

in this environment. In most cases, the division onlyrequires ADA if it conducts operations close to ahostile nation which possesses an offensive air ca-pability. The division G3 normally positions ADassets in the division rear area.

Mobility and Survivability

The division engineer allocates engineers to thebrigades primarily to support mobility, countermo-bility, and survivability requirements in the closefight and for rear area operations. The divisionengineer normally task- organizes engineers in acommand relationship based on the nature of decen-tralized, small-scale, search and attack techniques.Typical missions requiring engineer effort includeengineer reconnaissance, breach operations, ammu-nition cache destruction, route or MSR clearance,and protective obstacle support.

Combat Service SupportDISCOM normally provides CSS for units con-

ducting search and attack operations on an areasupport basis. Resupply is normally by both groundand air, depending on terrain. Medical evacuationnormally is by aerial evacuation to brigade rearsupport areas.

Increases in Class V small arms, hand grenades,Claymores, and mortar and artillery ammunitionnormally occur, Forward-deployed units are nor-mally resupplied with small arms by air. Convoyescorts are critical to protect resupply efforts. Unitsmust ensure they maintain security for LOCs andsupply locations.

Battle CommandDuring search and attack operations, the division

TAC CP normally deploys forward in the AO,generally near a major reserve force. The TAC CP’s

primary mission is to provide division-level intelli-gence and attack assets to maneuver brigades. TheTAC CP commands and controls all division assetsin support of search and attack operations, includingthe cavalry squadron in GS to the division and thethree AHBs initially under aviation brigade control.

Although C2 of search operations in search andattack operations is usually decentralized, for maxi-mum effectiveness the division and brigades mustcentralize C2 of the attack portion. Once a friendlyunit establishes contact with an enemy force, thedivision or brigade immediately masses combatpower to prevent the enemy’s escape.

The division controls helicopter assets that bri-gades and battalions need to mass combat power.The main CP makes these assets available as quicklyas possible.

Rear Operations

The division normally maintains a rear area withdivision support elements and the aviation brigade.Depending on the tactical situation, at least onebrigade probably secures this area, which may beadjacent to the search and attack AOs or somedistance away.

Both the main and rear CPs locate in the securedarea. The rear CP is responsible for rear operations.

EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT

A division conducts exploitation and pursuit op-erations to take advantage of a weakened or col-lapsed enemy defense. The exploitation’s purposeis to prevent the enemy from reconstituting a de-fense and withdrawing to other defensible terrainand to destroy his C2. Figure 3-20 depicts a corpsexploitation and pursuit operation.

The AASLT division transitions to exploitationwhen the enemy cannot maintain or reestablish acoherent defense. For example, he may have lostmajor portions of his C2 structure; his AD, artillery,logistic assets; and the mobile reserves he couldhave used to restore the situation.

Because AASLT forces rapidly jump interveningterrain, they perform well in shaping the battlefieldto prevent enemy reconstitution of a defense. The

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division reserve often enters action to exploit asuccessful main attack.

The division exploits in a combination of move-ments to contact, hasty attacks, and deliberate at-tacks. Air assault operations easily traverse rivers,swamps, forests, and mountains to secure keyground to cut off enemy movements. The divisionseizes FOBs and builds airheads into FOBs to createlaunching pads for a relentless series of aerialoperations.

Raids go deep to continue the destruction ofenemy AD, artillery, command facilities, CSS,and mobile reserves. Intelligence and CSS de-serve special attention during exploitations. Asthe enemy dissolves and the battlefield deepens,both systems strain to meet the AASLT division’sneeds.

The division uses USAF reconnaissance; jointsurveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS)tracks; and Army aviation as principal means ofseeing deep. Air cavalry troops and AHBs conductreconnaissance and screen flanks to maintain

contact and to guide and support follow-on andAASLT forces.

The division pushes MI electronic collectors outwith combined-arms raids and air assaults. Analystsfocus on enemy unit movement (speed, size, type offormation, direction, and so on) and emitters (type,location, movement, numbers, and soon) as they tryto update a dynamic IPB template.

Logisticians use FOBs, logistic assault bases(LABs), and a network of MSRs and FARPs tosustain air and ground movements. With by-passed enemy platoons and fragments all acrossthe zone, the division will most likely commit upto a brigade to secure these vulnerable, valuableCSS nodes.

During an exploitation, the division assumes riskson flanks, in the rear, and in planning deep opera-tions. When pressed, an exploitation sets conditionsfor a pursuit. The exploitation may follow a delib-erate or hasty attack when—

The enemy is unable to maintain or establish adefense.

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Friendly forces overrun enemy artillery and C2and an enveloping force to block the enemy’s es-

positions. cape. The intent is to catch the enemy between theseThere is an increase in captured enemy equipment two forces and destroy him.and EPWs. The AASLT division pursues on its own or, pref-Friendly forces capture enemy supply dumps. erably, as part of a coordinated corps or JTF opera-

tion. Its attack aviation can provide direct pressure,Pursuit normally follows a successful exploita-

tion. A pursuit is designed to catch or cut off a hostileenemy force attempting to escape with the aim ofdestroying it.

Friendly units transition to pursuit when the en-emy ceases to try to defend or counterattack andattempts to break contact and getaway (normally ina highly disorganized manner). Once forces beginthe pursuit, they do not stop until they have de-stroyed the enemy.

A pursuit operation involves a direct pressureforce to prevent enemy disengagement and an en-circling force to get into the enemy’s rear area toblock or prevent escape. The direct-pressure forceattacks day and night to drive the fleeing foe intothe trap set by the encircling force. Once the direct-pressure force gets the enemy into the designatedEA, USAF strikes, fires, and maneuver finish himoff.

The commander normally uses a direct-pressure

although the preferred method is for an OPCONarmored brigade or a coordinated armored divisionto perform this role. An AASLT brigade sent tosecure a choke point and block enemy withdrawaloffers an ideal means of completing the encirclingtask. (See Figure 3-21.)

In pursuit, the AASLT division’s aerial envelop-ments are usually continuous. Brigades may airassault, destroy an enemy force, consolidate, buildup a LAB or FOB, then prepare to conduct andexecute another AASLT operation. Operations willlikely continue in daylight (a deviation from theusual practice on air assaults and raids) because ofthe acceptable risks friendly forces encounter whenthe enemy is in a completely disorganized retreat.

The division maintains the momentum until theenemy has been destroyed or surrenders. The tran-sition from exploitation to pursuit normally beginswhen—

The division advances without a strong enemyforce, usually the lead force from the exploitation, reaction.

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Friendly forces encounter an increased number ofEPWs, abandoned weapons, and unburied enemydead.There is a lessening of enemy artillery fire.Enemy obstacles are lacking.Decentralized execution characterizes exploita-

tion and pursuit operations. However, the corpscommander and his staff continuously monitor ex-ploitation and pursuit operations. They ensure thedivision does not overextend the corps to keep itfrom being put at risk by an enemy counterattack.

Although transitioning from the attack to exploi-tation and pursuit may present a major opportunityto destroy enemy forces, commanders must exerciseextreme care. Too rapid an advance risks overex-tending lines of supply (LOS) and LOC. This maygive the enemy an opportunity to isolate the pursu-ing force or to counterattack into an exposed flank.

The transition from deliberate attack to exploita-tion and pursuit may be abrupt or so gradual it ishardly distinguishable from current operations.Once the transition occurs, commanders ensureunits make every effort to maintain pressure on theenemy.

Small enemy units are bypassed by the direct-pressure force unless they are a threat to the divisionor cannot be bypassed. Maneuver elements of thedivision main body or follow and support operationsof other units destroy bypassed forces. The exploit-ing force directs follow and support units to enemypositions.

The AASLT division executes exploitation andpursuit operations in much the same way as theID(L) executes these operations. The most signifi-cant difference is the amount of organic aviation theAASLT division has.

The commander uses his AHBs as a direct-pres-sure force if he does not have an armored force. Themobility and firepower of attack helicopters makethem an ideal asset for the direct-pressure force.

If an armored force is available for the direct-pressure force mission, the commander can useattack helicopters to attack enemy forces from theflanks. Assault helicopters also have a significant

capability to place infantry forces into blockingpositions using organic assets. The AASLT divisionperforms exploitation and pursuit operations similarto those of an ID (L), but they have the capability tomove much faster.NOTE: See also FM 71-100-2, Chapter 3.

FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

The corps or JTF may assign the follow andsupport mission to the AASLT division. As a followand support force, the division is a committed force.It follows a force conducting an offensive operation(normally a pursuit or exploitation).

As a follow and support force, the division mustretain the agility and flexibility to respond rapidlyto the needs of the supported force. The follow andsupport force may require MP, MI, and PSYOPassets to meet these capabilities:

Destroy bypassed units.Relieve in place any direct pressure or encirclingforce which has halted to contain the enemy.Block movement of reinforcements.Secure LOCs.Secure EPWs, key areas, and installations.Secure key terrain.Control refugees.The follow and support mission requires central-

ized planning and decentralized execution. The di-vision can expect to commit elements piecemeal,from company to battalion size, when reacting tobypass situations the lead division creates.

Because of transportation mobility differences,the AASLT division might need ground transporta-tion augmentation to achieve mobility comparableto that of the division they are following and sup-porting. When committed, the AASLT divisionmoves its units via helicopters. With this exception,the AASLT division conducts follow and supportmissions similar to those of the ID (L).NOTE: See also FM 71-100-2, Chapter 3.

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Chapter 4

AIR ASSAULT DIVISION DEFENSE

Joint task forces, corps, divisions, and brigadesuse a variety of tactics and techniques to execute adefense. The tactics and techniques in this chapterdescribe only one way the AASLT division mayconduct operations.

TYPES OF DEFENSE

The defense is a temporary measure adopted untilthe division can resume or assume the offense.Defense as a form of warfare does not directlyproduce decisive victory. Therefore, the divisionaggressively conducts the defense to wrest the in-itiative from the attacker.

The commander mixes defensive and offensivetasks in his defensive concept of operations. Hisconcept clearly identifies how to seize the initiative.His concept also envisions a sequel to maintain theinitiative, transition to the offense, and exploit tac-tical successes.

The defense may be one battle or a series executedover time. The division gives subordinate units de-fensive tasks to contain or trap an enemy force, denyarea access, attrit the enemy, or perform tasks withan economy of force characteristic.

The division also gives some units tasks to attackor counterattack. The intent is to set the conditionsto gain (or regain) and maintain the initiative fordecisive offensive action. Without a compellingreason to defend, the division attacks.

There are two forms of defense—mobile andarea. Mobile defense orients on the destruction ofenemy forces by trading terrain to expose the enemyto a counterattacking mobile striking force. Areadefense focuses on denying the enemy access todesignated terrain for a specified time, rather thanthe outright destruction of the enemy.

Mobile defense can be more lethal than areadefense because it concentrates the bulk of combatpower on the enemy force, producing a decisiveresult. It requires a large mobile striking force, thecapability to mass overwhelming fires, adequatemaneuver area in depth, and at least air parity with

an effective air defense. The mobile defender hasthe freedom and capability to maneuver.

Area defense forces deploy laterally and in depth,retaining terrain rather than focusing on enemy de-struction. When defending against armored forcesin close terrain, area defenses normally defend onhigh-speed avenues of approach. Area defenses arebest—

In rough terrain.When a unit must retain specific terrain.When the sector lacks depth.When the defender lacks sufficient maneuver po-tential compared to the enemy.

When operating independently, as in a jungle orwhen encircled, units may find themselves in aperimeter defense.

FUNDAMENTALS

All defenses must use terrain properly. Terrain isa force multiplier for infantry units. It facilitatesmassing combat power at the decisive point of thebattle by allowing smaller forces to defend restric-tive terrain elsewhere.

Terrain, reinforced by barriers, influences enemymovements and tempo for exploitation. It degradesenemy maneuver and can fix him for effective attackin a location decided by the defending force com-mander. Terrain also provides cover andconcealment.

All defenses conduct security operations. Thedefender has the advantage of terrain, but initiallylacks the initiative.

Defenders accept risk in some areas in order tomass combat power elsewhere by assigning to unitsmissions that have economy of force characteristics.Security operations prevent surprise and reduce therisk of bypass or encirclement of the main effort.

Defense in depth provides flexibility and disper-sion while reducing risk. Deployment in depth pro-vides time to assess and react to changes on the

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battlefield once the battle begins. Defense in depthfacilitates—

Shifting of forces.

Counterattacks.Using EAs, barriers, and improved positions tocanalize, delay, or attrit in depth.Attacking the enemy’s flanks and rear.Deception planning.

Mutual support integrates the fires of the total force.It allows a dispersed force but focuses combatpower.

The AASLT division is a tactically mobile forcewith respect to terrain. After AASLT insertion, itlacks maneuver speed potential unless it fights anenemy with equal or less maneuver capability.

The division can defend successfully in closeterrain against mechanized or motorized forceswhen properly augmented with antiarmor or mecha-nized forces. The division may be part of a corpsdefense to act as an anchor, allowing other divisionsto concentrate for a counterattack or envelopment.

As a pure AASLT division, the division can con-duct an area defense in appropriate terrain to blockdismounted enemy movements. It can also defendagainst an enemy infantry armored force which hassmall organic tank units.

An armored brigade in support of a light divisionconstitutes a light-armored operation. (See alsoChapter 7.) Of the light divisions, only the AASLTdivision conducts mobile defense operations with-out augmentation.

Normally, the best technique for halting an enemyarmored attack is to use a combination of artillery,attack helicopters, USAF aircraft, integrated obsta-cle plans, and the division’s medium and heavyantitank (AT) systems.

THE AIR ASSAULT DIVISIONIN THE DEFENSE

In most cases, the AASLT division defends byconducting cross-FLOT offensive operations tospoil enemy attacks or to counterattack the depth of

threatening penetrations. In some cases, the divisionexecutes missions in the corps covering force area(CFA) or main battle area (MBA) in accordancewith the defensive framework. In such circum-stances, careful METT-T evaluation by the divisioncommander and his staff develops a basis on whichto allocate forces to each of the five portions of thedefensive framework. Even in the corps CFA orMBA, the division organizes to infuse its defensewith a strong offensive posture, maximizing oppor-tunities for raids and air assaults.

The aviation brigade conducts most deep opera-tions, which may include infantry teams or TFs forcombined-arms (CA) raids. The aviation brigadeconducts raids to identify, slow, disrupt, and/or de-lay enemy forces entering the division sector.

DIVARTY fires conduct SEAD, as necessary, insupport of deep operations missions. The divisioncoordinates with the corps to conduct most deepoperations missions in the event the aviation brigadeforms the division’s covering force or if the divisionas a whole assumes the corps’ covering force role.

Security operations prevent surprise and allowtime for further defensive preparations in the MBA.They extend to the main body’s front, flanks, andrear.

If the division creates a covering force, either theaviation brigade or a maneuver brigade fills thisrole. The air cavalry squadron often screens along acritical avenue of approach or exposed flank. Whenused, the division’s cover force exists to slow theenemy advance, force premature deployment,clearly locate the foe’s main thrust, and destroy hisartillery and air defenses to desynchronize hisattack.

In the MBA, maneuver brigades defend in sectorto defeat the opposition’s attack, destroy his forces,and create conditions for a decisive counterattack.Depending on allocation of forces for other tasks,two brigades generally fight in the MBA, with oneas the main effort. An OPCON armored contingentcould contribute greatly to this part of the battlefield.Although assault and attack aviation units fight inthe MBA, the aviation brigade rarely controls theaction in any part of this area.

Rear operations demand forces in the defensebased on a METT-T analysis. The division cannotdiscount the dangers of the enemy conducting deep

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operations for raiding and securing key terrain. Im-mediate, violent counterattacks address thesethreats as soon as they appear.

With the need for rapid response in mind, thedivision allocates an assault aviation unit to the rearoperations TF, likely from the command aviationbattalion. Doing so ensures the division has imme-diate access to artillery and attack aviation in adefined command or support relationship.

The division retains up to one brigade in reserve.The reserve brigade reinforces the MBA effort orair assaults to secure key terrain, thereby blockingthe withdrawal of defeated enemy forces or theintroduction of reinforcements.

If the defensive sector is large, the enemy strong,and much of the division is holding key terrain, thedivision might designate as little as an understrengthbattalion TF as a formal reserve. This reflects theunderstanding that, as in all AASLT operations,every uncommitted force represents a potentialreserve.

Unlike the offense, the defensive framework al-ters significantly, based principally on the mis-sion—to counterattack as the corps reserve, to fightin the CFA, or to fight in the MBA. No “generic”defensive framework characterizes the AASLT di-vision in the defense.

In an ideal defense, the AASLT division seeksand exploits every opportunity for offensive action.As much as possible, the division plans and executesraids and air assaults in the rear of advancing hostileformations, thereby dividing the enemy’s attentionand degrading the integration of his combat power.The AASLT division continues to look, think, andfight deep as much as possible during all operationsunless higher headquarters directs otherwise.

AREA DEFENSE

The enemy corps is a secondary effort. It willprobably attack in the friendly corps sector with fourinfantry divisions, one mechanized infantry bri-gade, and one armored regiment.

Terrain in the corps sector is restrictive, withnarrow valleys and many small built-up areas. Ter-rain restricts vehicle traffic mostly to improvedroads and a few wide areas in valleys.

The terrain generally allows more maneuver inthe armored division’s defensive sector. The infan-try division’s defensive sector is in the northern halfof the corps sector (Figure 4-1).

The AASLT division defends in sector in an areadominated by high rugged hills and a small built-uparea. One improved highway runs the length of thesector.

The corps commander intends to anchor his de-fense with infantry on his left defending in restric-tive terrain. The corps armored division defends indepth on the right.

The ACR is the corps covering force. The corpsreserve (a separate armored brigade) positions itselfbehind the armored division.

The ACR moves to a corps assembly area afterthe covering force fight. The corps commanderwants to defeat the enemy’s attack forward of PLDOG. The separate mechanized brigade will thencounterattack to destroy remaining enemy forma-tions in zone and to restore the FEBA. Corps deepoperations initially focus on distant, uncommittedenemy forces, targeting any mechanized or armoredunits moving forward to exploit penetrations.

Since defense in sector tends to be stationary, itis vulnerable. Deception and OPSEC are critical inpreventing the enemy from accurately templatingfriendly defensive positions and intentions. Usingdummy positions and manning alternate or supple-mentary positions will be necessary to confuse en-emy targeting.

Terrain Retention Defending forces require security, counterrecon-

In the following example, the corps defends withnaissance, and smoke operations to deny enemydirect observation. As time permits, units take addi-

one AASLT division and one armored division tional measures to protect themselves and increaseabreast and an armored cavalry regiment (ACR) their weapons effectiveness.covering force. It has a separate mechanized brigadein reserve. The corps defends against part of an A stationary defense does not directly challengeenemy corps. the enemy’s initiative until decisive combat begins.

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FM 71-100-3

Normally it occurs only when the likelihood existsof achieving a compelling advantage over theenemy.

Maneuver

The AASLT division defends in sector with threebrigades on line along PL DOG (Figure 4-2). Thedivision commander retains one infantry battalionas division reserve.

The main effort is in the south where potential foran enemy mechanized force exploitation exists. Theenemy will probably try to infiltrate around thebuilt-up areas. He will also probably conduct asupporting attack in the north.

Figure 4-3 depicts the division’s task organiza-tion. This division is the corps’ supporting effort;therefore, its share of corps supporting units issmall.

Deep Operations. The division must initially findand target enemy artillery units—the greatest threatto AASLT units’ freedom of maneuver. Target typedefines the proactive counterfire operation as a deep

operation, not distance from the FLOT or relativelocation with respect to a phase line.

Deep operations can alter the combat power ratiofor current and subsequent close operations. Theydestroy artillery, attrit infantry formations, and disruptthe enemy’s attempt to mass, attacking enemy divisionechelons in depth as they approach the FEBA.

Brigades engage leading enemy regiments in thedivision’s close fight. Follow-on enemy regimentsand reserves are division deep targets. The corpsattacks other enemy divisions as the enemy movesforward.

The corps and the division enter an agreement todefine close and deep operations areas to delineatedeep operations responsibilities for ground maneu-ver targets. Phase lines create points where the corpsand division accomplish handover coordination forresponsibilities to attack approaching enemy eche-lons. Phase lines do not create separate areas wherethe corps or division conduct uncoordinated con-cepts of operations. The corps and division coordi-nate the maneuver concept of operations, intent, andthe desired results of deep operations to ensuremutual support.

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The senior commander specifies his intent fordeep operations in the OPORD. The senior com-mander identifies minimum conditions which mustbe met before air assault operations. The subordi-nate commander supports this intent and coordi-nates his concept, intent, and desired effects withthe senior commander in the backbrief or rehearsal.Coordination of deep-operations handover andsynchronization of intent are especially importantfor intelligence collection and targeting.

The division commander reserves proactivecounterfire for the deep operation. He identifiesenemy artillery units as a specified target type.DIVARTY targets and attacks enemy artillery unitsanywhere on the battlefield, regardless of the speci-fied phase line for moving enemy infantry or ar-mored units.

The primary division deep weapons systems aretube artillery, fixed-wing air interdiction (AI), at-tack helicopters, and MLRS (if available). These aredivision assets or corps-provided support.

Close Operations. The AASLT division con-ducts close defensive operations with mutually

supporting positions and integrated obstacles con-structed in depth. Defensive operations must keepenemy infantry formations and movements in place.The division can then engage and destroy them witha combination of massed artillery, mortar, attackhelicopters, USAF aircraft, and/or AT weapons.

Attack helicopters and CAS counter enemy ar-mored forces, especially when massed formationsdeploy to exploit success. Enemy tanks principallyact as infantry fire support because of limited ma-neuver space.

Brigades position tube-launched, opticallytracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles andDRAGON weapons systems to destroy tanks sup-porting infantry attacks. Because the enemy com-mits tank and mechanized units to exploitpenetrations, the defending force plans antiarmorfires in depth.

Area defense, focused on terrain retention, relies onusing terrain, obstacles, and massed fires to stop anddestroy an attacking enemy. Fires in depth disrupt theenemy’s attack plan, but the defender achieves suc-cess by overwhelming massed fires at the FLOT.

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If, because of the terrain, the AASLT divisioncannot use its helicopters to move faster than canthe attacking enemy, initial defense at the FLOT iscrucial. Thorough reconnaissance to situate the de-fense is critical.

The division, brigades, and battalions must repo-sition units to alternate or supplementary positionsbefore the enemy’s main body arrives or beforepreparation fires. Deep-intelligence operations re-sults trigger repositioning of forces. A decisionsupport template (DST) assists the decision-makingprocess.

The corps and division consider this type of de-fense high risk since it orients on retaining terrain.The corps and division can only minimize risk byensuring the maximum possible depth for defensein front of retained terrain.

All friendly units must mass fires in coordinationwith the proper positioning of obstacles to create

engagement areas which will hinder the enemy’smomentum and initiative. Effective obstacle em-placement causes the enemy to mass, thereby in-creasing the effectiveness of fires.

Rear Operations. The division reconnaissancesquadron initially screens forward of the LC behindPL WATCH. On withdrawal, it screens behind com-mitted brigades to locate infiltrating and penetratingenemy units. On order, it defends to block or containthe enemy and directs the attack by fires to destroyenemy forces.

Division CS and CSS units locate in mutuallysupporting base clusters. Each must establish cred-ible defenses against infiltrating enemy infantryunits. Support units locate away from routes suitablefor enemy mechanized or armored exploitation.Combat service support elements the division can-not adequately protect locate in the corps rear area.

Security Operations. The corps ACR conductscovering force operations forward of PL WATCHuntil withdrawn. Initially, the division reconnais-sance squadron screens forward of the main effortbehind PL WATCH. The division tasks the northernbrigade to screen forward along PL WATCH.

The mission is to screen because the AASLTdivision cannot deploy a suitable covering force.This screening force lacks sufficient size, strength,and ground maneuver capability to prevent its beingdecisively engaged or bypassed by large infantryforces. Therefore, it establishes a screen first forearly warning and second for attrition. Units planfor artillery fires and CAS to attrit, disrupt tempo,and support the covering forces’ retrogradeoperation.

The northern brigade defends in rough terrainwhere dismounted movement is the norm. The di-vision directs the brigade to conduct its own screen.

The division reconnaissance squadron conductsits screen in the center and south where the terrain,though rough, allows more movement by large unitsand vehicles. The screen mission includes counter-reconnaissance to detect and destroy enemy recon-naissance units within the squadron’s capabilities.

The division cavalry squadron concentrates itseffort forward of the division’s main effort—the 3dBrigade. This sector has the most favorable enemyavenues of approach in the division sector. If em-ployed against the division, the enemy armored

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attack will probably occur in the 3d Brigade areawhen it attempts to bypass the city to the north.

The battle handover line (BHL) for the screeningforce is PL CLOSE. The defending brigades sendsecurity elements as far out as PL CLOSE. Theymark routes and provide fire support for the retro-grade. The BHL partially defines the division’sforward security area.

The enemy will probably attempt infiltrations insupport of every attack to bypass or penetrate themain defenses and to attack friendly reserves, C2,and CSS elements. Friendly security operations in-clude combinations of OPs, patrols, and surveil-lance systems. Maneuver brigades secure thedivision flanks in sector.

After withdrawing from the screening mission,the division cavalry squadron moves to the divisionrear and conducts a screen behind the brigades. Themission is to discover, contain or block, and destroyenemy infiltrations or penetrations into the divisionrear area.

In this scenario, the enemy infiltrates and by-passes resistance in every attack. The division mustconduct reconnaissance and security operations inthe division rear area.

If the division gives control of the cavalry squad-ron to the aviation brigade, it should also give themthe mission to screen behind the defending brigades.The division’s intent is to employ attack helicoptersin support of the brigades and the deep operation.

Reserve Operations. It is difficult for the AASLTdivision to maintain a large reserve in this mission.The division reserve receives an assault helicopterbattalion for dedicated movement capability to reactin a timely manner. The division also has one infan-try battalion in reserve as well as dedicated liftassets.

The division carefully plans movement of re-serves because of its vulnerability to indirect firesand air attack while moving. Selected reinforcementroutes provide cover and concealment while reararea R&S operations decrease the probability ofenemy stay-behind or special forces observing re-serve locations. Electronic warfare, or fires directedat enemy C2 or fire control headquarters, mightdegrade the enemy’s ability to attack the reserve.Finally, reserve deployment and employment mightrequire artillery and smoke fires.

IntelligenceMilitary intelligence assets are task-organized

into three company teams, one in direct support toeach AASLT brigade. Each company team includesSIGINT, HUMINT, and GSR or REMBASS sensorassets. METT-T factors determine the final mix.

In the following example, one platoon-size teamsupports the secondary-effort brigade’s companyteam; the company (-) supports the division’s main-effort brigade’s company team. One GSR squad isattached to each brigade.

The fourth GSR squad is attached to the cavalrysquadron. It initially supports the cavalry screeningforce, then the rear area screen. The GSRs orient onsupporting brigade operations by detecting enemyinfantry infiltrations.

The LRSD is deployed to observe NAIs, TAIs, orDPs for targeting purposes, Based on the G3’s guid-ance, the division G2 plans and prepares intelli-gence-collection tasks and guidance.

The G3 deploys LRSTs with the cavalry screen-ing force. The teams also infiltrate to assigned dis-persal areas and select positions that providelong-range observation of assigned areas. The re-mainder of the I&S company locates at the divisionEPW collection point.

The division G2 coordinates intelligence handofffor enemy units from corps to division and divisionto brigade. The collection plan establishes prioritiesfor friendly units to observe and monitor enemyunits, NAIs, and TAIs.

The division G2 at the TAC CP tracks enemyunits into brigade AOs for targeting and situationdevelopment. In this example, in order of priority,priority intelligence collection requirements are—

Locations and movements of enemy artilleryunits.Locations and movements of follow-on divisions.Locations and movements of enemy armored ormechanized forces.Locations of enemy division-level C2 facilities.

Fire SupportThe organization of artillery, EW, and TACAIR

support enhances each’s capability to provide

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FM 71-100-3

massed fire support to defeat enemy attacks in boththe main and supporting efforts areas. The divisionweights artillery support to the main effort. Thecorps positions its MLRS and 155-millimeter, SPbattalions to support the main effort.

The division establishes PL WATCH as a coor-dinated fire line (CFL). The division cavalry squad-ron is forward of the division’s main body.

After the division cavalry squadron withdraws,PL CLOSE becomes the division CFL. The corpsfire support coordination line (FSCL) then movesto PL COLLAR from PL TURTLE (Figure 4-4).

The division establishes EA IOWA as the bestlocation for a JAAT or CAS attack on enemyarmored forces before they reach brigade AOs.The division establishes, from terrain analysis,that TAI 11 and TAI 21 are likely areas for enemyinfantry units to occupy or move through to theirLD. Engagement area OHIO is a likely artilleryfiring area.

The IPB indicates specific terrain the enemymight use but intelligence-collection operationsmust confirm or deny enemy movements before or

early in the battle. Targeting handoff from corps todivision must clearly indicate enemy lines of opera-tion two echelons down.

The LRSD is the best means to target infantryunits moving through rough terrain with cover andconcealment. The correct use of sensors augmentsLRSD efforts. The G3 establishes RFAs aroundLRSDs.

Mobility and SurvivabilityThe division specifies obstacle zones to influence

enemy tempo by turning, blocking, disrupting, orfixing enemy formations as part of maneuver. Thecommander specifies any obstacle-restricted areas.Brigade commanders plan obstacle belts to supportthe division commander’s concept.

Locations of obstacle zones should allow maxi-mum flexibility to subordinate commanders andshould facilitate future operations. Obstacles for-ward of the BHL facilitate the battle handover.

In this example, engineers task-organize with ar-mored-light engineer mixes in the 1st Brigade(north) sector and in the 3d Brigade (south) sector

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(Figure 4-5). The 3d Brigade has one reinforcedcorps wheeled (W) engineer battalion and a lightengineer company.

As the main effort, the 3d Brigade has the mostengineer work to execute. It receives priority ofdivision engineer support from the CS equipmentcompany and the one combined engineer battalion.

The 1st Brigade, as a supporting effort, receivesone corps engineer wheeled battalion and anAASLT engineer company (-) in support. The2d Brigade, in the center, has an AASLT engineercompany plus one AASLT platoon from the engi-neer company with the 1st Brigade. This platoon hasan on-order mission for attachment to the divisionreserve AASLT battalion.

Priority of effort in the division’s close operationis to survivability, then countermobility, then mo-bility. Behind the division engineer work line(EWL) to the division rear the priority of effortis to mobility (to facilitate movement), thensurvivability.

Priority of support forward of PL STAR is to the3d, 1st, and 2d brigades, then to DIVARTY. Priority

of support behind PL STAR is to the aviation bri-gade, DISCOM, then the reserve.

The division commander designates turn, block,and fix obstacle zones for his brigade commanders.These areas graphically convey the division com-mander’s intent for tempo and maneuver.

The brigades establish turn, block, fix, or disruptobstacles as needed. The total effect of their zonesmust satisfy the division commander’s intent for theobstacle area.NOTE: The corps or division did not identify anydisrupt obstacle areas in this scenario.

The division directs placement of fixing areas atthe trailing edge of EAs or TAIs to hold enemyforces and increase their vulnerability to deep at-tack. The division specifies a turning area and re-serve target for the one hard-surface road or armoredapproach.

The division commander wants to influence theenemy to move into the built-up area and away fromthe economy of force brigade. The division specifiesone large blocking area along PL DOG to stop theenemy short.

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The division also establishes a second defenseline in the 1st and 3d Brigade areas forward of PLSTAR. These must contain enemy penetrations. Thedivision then specifies obstacle-restricted areas(ORAs) to cover planned LZs for the divisionreserve.

Situational obstacles include ground- and air-emplaced FASCAM. The division and brigades usethese obstacles (if they have release authority orgain release approval from the appropriate com-mander) to react to unexpected enemy initiatives asthe battle unfolds. If the corps commander delegatesrelease of these obstacles, he can direct that therelease authority not go below a certain level ofcommand.

The DST reflects situational obstacles. The G3,engineer, and assistant fire support coordinator(AFSCOORD) develop FASCAM Class V require-ments during COA war-gaming. If requirementsexceed the established controlled supply rate(CSR), the division must ask the corps to change theCSR. If the corps disapproves or the division failsto ask, the division will not have the requiredamount of munitions.

Obstacle zones to the rear of PL CASTLE (theEWL) are for subsequent positions to contain en-emy tactical successes. The two areas between PLDOG and PL STAR provide defense in depth. Thedivision plans these areas to support the division-level maneuver and tempo concept for both friendlyand enemy units.

Air Defense

Stinger teams provide protection to critical assetssuch as reserve forces, artillery radars, supportingMLRS, the DSA, or attack helicopter staging areasdeep in the division’s rear area. They lack support-ing organic ADA support and, therefore, must relyon overlapping incidental corps ADA coverage,passive AD measures, and counter air operations forprotection against enemy air attack threats.

Combat Service Support

The DISCOM headquarters, MSB, and corps sup-port units locate in the DSA. Units may clustertightly when the enemy poses a significant specialoperations or infiltration threat; they normally dis-perse widely when the threat potential is lower.Supply distribution is throughput when possible.

Corps support units, such as a mobile army sur-gical hospital (MASH) or a corps support battalion,may locate in the division’s rear area. They providearea support to the division and other corps units indivision AOs.

The FSBs locate in brigade rear areas near speci-fied MSRs. (See Figure 4-6.) In the defense, FSBsstockpile large quantities of Classes I, IV (BarrierMaterial), V, and VII supplies on pallets or trailersin brigade support areas (BSAs). Battalions stock-pile supplies on the ground in their areas.

Consumption of small arms munitions in an areadefense will be high. Resupply by vehicle will bedifficult during the fight because of the terrain,limited road networks, and enemy fire. Units thatstockpile supplies assume the risk of losing them ifthe unit is overrun by the enemy.

The B Battery (-) supports the 3d Brigade, whichis the division's main effort. One of-its Stinger Air assault battalions on the ground do not havesections is initially in DS to the cavalry screening the transportation assets to move excessive stock-force and, on order, becomes attached to the division piles of supplies. Resupply by air, using prepack-reserve battalion. aged push packages, to unit supply points (SUPPTs)

The 1st Brigade, as a supporting effort, receivesADA support from Battery A (-) in a DS role. Onetask-organized platoon consisting of anAvenger/Stinger section from A Battery is in DS tothe 2d Brigade. One Stinger section from A Batteryis OPCON to DIVARTY.

Avenger systems and the majority of the Stingersections locate well forward in the brigade areas.Stingers counter enemy CAS and attack helicopteroperations at the FLOT.

is the norm.

Landing zones serve as SUPPTs, patient collec-tion points, and ambulance exchange points forMEDEVAC. They should be close to road networksso resupply and evacuation can continue despite theweather or enemy actions. This type of operationrequires prior aeromedical evacuation planning andcoordination.

The MSB and FSB maintenance teams go for-ward to brigade and battalion AOs to repair

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weapons systems and vehicles that can be quicklyreturned to operation. Evacuating equipment to theMSB in the division rear area or directly to the corpsoccurs expeditiously for equipment that requiresextensive repairs. When possible, units receivemaintenance floats to maintain maximum combatpower. Units recover and move nonrepairableweapons and vehicles to maintenance collectionpoints in the BSAs.

The rear CP establishes and monitors road move-ment in the division rear area. When the terrainoffers few roads, the DTO has to consider the re-pair-forward concept and air resupply when he de-velops the plan. The DTO tightly controls road useto support the division’s concept of operations. Al-though strict, the plan allows for vehicle infiltrationsfor C2, signal, medical, and engineer purposes.Container delivery system techniques using tacti-cal airlift (C-130 aircraft) or medium-lift helicop-ter support allow for steady CSS flow.

The division G4 develops a road network to sup-port CSS operations. He then coordinates with theG3 for tactical movement route requirements.

The G4 develops a traffic circulation and controlplan and a sustainment construction list for roads,helipads, and airfields. The G3 approves the planand the G4 coordinates it with the DISCOM, PM,and supporting corps engineers. Necessary helipadand road upgrade, repair, or construction begin asearly as possible.

Nuclear, Biological, and ChemicalIn this example, the corps attaches one corps

smoke-decontamination chemical company to theAASLT division for the defense. The enemy pos-sesses artillery and rocket-delivered chemical mu-nitions. Therefore, decontamination is the NBCpriority.

Division units establish alternate sites to supportdecontamination operations if the enemy achievescontamination success in the division’s main effortarea or DSA. The dual-purpose platoon prepares thealternate sites as platoon sites for deliberate decon-tamination by the dual-purpose platoon in the divi-sion rear area.

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One chemical decontamination squad operateseach alternate site to support hasty decontamina-tion operations. Infantry units conduct personal andhasty decontamination operations, undergoing de-liberate decontamination when time and situationpermit.

Units that have medical treatment facilities sup-port perform patient decontamination. Medical per-sonnel supervise patient decontamination proce-dures while providing care to casualties.

One chemical platoon provides smoke support ina DS role to the main effort. The brigade com-mander develops and coordinates smoke supportrequirements with division and adjacent brigadecommanders. Class V smoke pots meet require-ments for other brigades, DISCOM, aviation ele-ments, artillery, deception, and OPSEC. Units canalso use artillery or mortar-delivered smoke muni-tions. The smoke plan should consider smoke op-erations for OPSEC reasons.

Battle CommandThe division TAC CP locates forward in the

MBA. Its location should be near the brigades’ rearboundary and be masked by terrain for OPSEC anddeception.

The TAC CP will not always locate with the maineffort if the enemy has a significant SIGINT capa-bility. From a position between the main effort andthe supporting effort brigades, the TAC CP cancontrol and support the main fight.

The main CP locates near the aviation brigade(the alternate division CP) and reserve, whichenhances security against enemy infiltrations. Fromthere, it can adequately support synchronization,concurrent operations activities, and deny enemySIGINT collection. It is also beyond the range ofmost enemy artillery. The rear CP collocates withthe DISCOM CP in the DSA.

MOBILE DEFENSE

Defending to Defeat Enemy ForcesThe AASLT division has the ability to defend in

depth to defeat enemy forces. This differs fromterrain retention in that the focus is on attriting the

enemy force. The defenders can use terrain withinthe sector to obtain an advantage, but terrain reten-tion is not the defense goal.

As the defender, the AASLT division retainssome initiative because it does not become deci-sively engaged on a specified line. It accepts deci-sive combat when and where it will support thedestruction or defeat of the enemy force.

The division uses terrain, reinforced by preparedpositions and obstacles in depth, to canalize the bulkof enemy combat, CS, and CSS assets into EAs.Ground, artillery, and aerial fires initially destroythe enemy throughout the depth of his avenues ofapproach. Direct fires and obstacles fix enemyforces for destruction by artillery, mortar, attackhelicopter, and USAF aircraft fires.

Decisive engagement between infantry forces isnot the desired method for defeating the enemy.Friendly units become decisively engaged onlywhen needed to influence enemy movements.

The AASLT division can defend against an ar-mored force, an infantry force, or a combination offorces. The AASLT division defends in depth fromprepared positions.

Against armored units, prepared positions orienton the principal avenues of approach. Rough terraincanalizes heavy forces on the roads, precludingenemy bypass or envelopment of defensive posi-tions. Alternate and supplementary prepared posi-tions compensate for different enemy COAs orunforeseen penetrations. Assault helicopters givethe defending division a mobility advantage whenthese assets can be employed.

The AASLT division conducts a mobile defenseas a division operation by positioning approxi-mately one brigade forward as the fixing force. Itthen uses the remainder of its combat power as thestriking force.

The division can also participate in a corps or JTFmobile defense in one of three ways:

1.

2.

The AASLT division can be forward in an areadefense.

The AASLT division can be the corps or JTFreserve with a mission to air assault a force on acounterattack mission.

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FM 71-100-3

3. The AASLT division can be the corm or JTFstrike force (they would best do this with anarmored or mechanized force).

Properly using NAIs and decision points (DPs)make possible long lead times for repositioningforces before enemy contact. Once units come incontact, repositioning units becomes difficult andrisky. Repositioning is feasible against armoredforces only between prepared positions, using heli-copters. This requires a large engineer force andlengthy preparation time and places the helicoptersat higher risk levels. Therefore, AASLT units usu-ally disperse to numerous prepared positions andseldom move after contact. Because helicoptersmay not be able to reposition these units, they mayfind that enemy forces bypass or isolate defendingforces.

Against enemy infantry forces, AASLT forcesmay prepare strong forward defenses with reservesin a second line or in blocking positions. This is aclassic linear defense tending toward heavy lossesor disaster if ruptured or penetrated.

If the enemy infantry force significantly outnum-bers the defender, the AASLT division may adopta defense in depth oriented on destruction of theenemy force. Defense in depth is also effectivewhen tanks support a larger enemy infantry.

At times, defenders may establish blocking posi-tions with smaller defensive positions. Security op-erations, with indirect or aerial fires support, coverall gaps.

Units plan for but minimize movement betweenpositions to prevent subordinate units from beingoverrun and destroyed. Planning for these movesincludes coordination and synchronization of coun-terfires, disengagement, and movement fire plans.

Repositioning supports deception plans andshapes battlefield engagement conditions. The fea-sibility and number of prepared subsequent posi-tions depend on time available, engineer assets, themaneuver headquarters’ ability to plan and desig-nate positions in depth, and the infantry division’smovement capacity or ability. Helicopters, tanks, ortracks move troops when possible.

Defending units usually allow the enemy to movealong designated routes from one EA to another. Airand artillery fires are the primary means ofdestruction. Division and brigades emphasize

massed fires such as time on target (TOT) and JAATmissions.

The AASLT division normally conducts this de-fense in terrain which affords infantry forces cover,concealment, and protection but which also hasopen maneuver space for armored forces. Terrainand obstacles force the enemy into EAs.

Prepared defensive positions around EAs fix en-emy forces so air and artillery fires can effectivelyengage them. As surviving enemy forces move intosubsequent EAs, the division reengages them withfire.

Units select final blocking positions just forwardof brigade rear boundaries, designating some keyblocking positions as strongpoints. If necessary, thedivision may reorganize selected engineer units asinfantry for additional strongpoints to strengthen thedefense.

Once engineer units receive the mission to reor-ganize as infantry, they will have difficulty in re-versing the process during combat operations. Theymay have to move to the division rear area to recon-stitute as an engineer unit.

The division commander envisions a tempo andoverall conduct for the battle through the depth ofthe battlefield. He specifies large general areas asblocking positions for the brigades.

Division-specified general areas do not requirebrigades to physically locate all forces in battlepositions. But, they must position adequate forcesin battle positions to accomplish the commander’sstated intent for maneuver.

Operations overlays reflect general fortificationsymbols to establish a primary orientation for thedefense and to graphically establish engineer workpriorities. The division may specify strongpointswith or without a minimum unit size when deemedcritical to division operations.

The brigades still plan battles in their sectorsbetween lateral boundaries and designated divisionengagements. General blocking positions for bri-gades are not meant to be restrictive. They expressthe division commander’s vision for tempo andmaneuver.

Blocking positions also synchronize the brigadesfor division fights and facilitate planning of air- and

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FM 71-100-3

ground-delivered fires. Fires are critical; they are The threatened country formally requested USthe primary method of destroying the enemy. military intervention under the provision of a

The division plans EAs to focus on timed and long-standing treaty agreement. In response to thecountry’s request and the potential adverse conse-massed artillery, aviation, and USAF fires. The

division commands the brigades but does not mi- quences of the hostile country becoming the re-cromanage their plans or the battalion’s gional dominant power, The National Command

Authority (NCA) directs the deployment of a JTFoperations. into the crisis area as a show of force.The division does control the brigades so they The JTF’s maneuver forces consist of an AASLTconform with the division’s maneuver, tempo, and division with an attached armored brigade. Thesynchronization. This may appear to be restrictive

to the brigades, but it is necessary to gain benefits AASLT division, executing its emergency deploy-from synchronization and synergy. ment sequence, begins air deployment into the host

nation within hours of notification.The real danger lies in a division plan which

fixates on one enemy COA. Intelligence must con-firm or deny all possible enemy COAs.

The division plan focuses on the most probableenemy COA, then determines easy transitions toother possible COAs. Division G2 personnel playthe uncooperative enemy during COA developmentand war-gaming.

Mobile defense orients on destroying the enemyby using a combination of fire, maneuver, offense,defense, and delay. The defender places minimumforces forward and creates powerful strike forcesthat catch the enemy as he attempts to overcomedefense forces.

The defender delays the enemy, causing him tofocus on the wrong objective, overextending hisresources, and exposing his flanks. This leads theenemy into a vulnerable posture in terrain that di-minishes his ability to defend against a larger, mo-bile strike force’s counterattack.

The mobile defense sets up large-scale counter-attacks that allow the defender to do four things:destroy enemy forces, gain and retain the initiative,transition to the offense, and move into exploitationand pursuit operations.

In the following example, a neighboring hostilenation is threatening to invade a developing countryfriendly to the US. The invasion appears to beimminent.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve a long-term borderdispute are at a stalemate. The hostile nation hasalready begun mobilization and continues to esca-late armed forces along the adjoining border.

The attached armored brigade closes into thedivision lodgment area within days of notification,using strategic sea and air lift capabilities. The lodg-ment is near the only airport capable of handlingC-141 and C-5A aircraft within the disputed area.Forces currently are preparing to move forwardfrom the lodgment area to establish defensive posi-tions in support of HN forces.

Intercepted high-level message traffic revealsthat the hostile country is planning to begin itsinvasion after mobilization. The invasion force’smission is to rapidly push as far forward into thedisputed area as possible and secure selectedobjectives.

On securing objectives, the government intendsto appeal quickly to the United Nations (UN) for acease-fire to negotiate a favorable border settle-ment. The hostile government is gambling that thisaction will result in obtaining new territory rich innatural resources, demonstrate its country’s defi-ance of US support, and establish it as the dominantregional power.

The hostile country has significantly increased itsoffensive capability over the host nation in the pastfour years. Its ground forces comprise four activeinfantry divisions, a border defense force, and oneseparate tank regiment that recently received anupgrade of T-72 tanks.

Each infantry division includes two infantry regi-ments and one motorized rifle regiment (MRR) withsupporting artillery at both regiment and divisionlevels. A small, aging fleet of aircraft (fixed wing)limit the air force, at best, and should not present asignificant obstacle to deployed JTF forces.

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FM 71-100-3

However, hostile forces have enough helicopters tolift two battalion-size units in a single lift.

The host nation has three infantry divisions andan internal border security force. Two of the threedivisions are active. The third, an auxiliary division,receives reserve personnel manning during nationalemergencies.

Border security forces have limited quantities ofarmored vehicles. The country’s air force is compa-rable to that of the hostile air force.

Anticipating an invasion, the host nation has de-ployed both of its active divisions along the threat-ened border to reinforce border security forces.Increasing incidents of border violations have in-creasingly resulted in engagements. These viola-tions appear to have been probing missions toidentify force density and unit locations along po-tential invasion routes.

Terrain between the two countries is mountain-ous. One major valley system has natural mobilitycorridors that support motorized vehicles. Vegeta-tion varies from sparse in low, open areas to double-and triple-canopied forests in jungle and mountainareas.

The JTF commander intends to defeat the inva-sion force by establishing his AO to the rear of thehost nation’s existing border defensive positionsalong the main invasion corridor. He intends forthe host nation to establish initial contact withlead invasion forces before committing JTFground forces in direct contact. This action willdemonstrate the invading country’s aggressionand the host nation’s resolve against the invadingcountry.

Once the invasion begins, the JTF commanderintends to quickly develop the situation, containthe main invasion force, and destroy enemy unitswith swift, overpowering forces. After they stopthe invading forces, JTF elements will quicklytransition to the offense, forcing the enemy towithdraw and reestablish the recognized borderwithin the JTF’s area of operations. Quick successwill defeat the enemy’s will to continueaggression.

During this operation, activities must not inter-rupt airport activities within the lodgment area.Once the JTF reestablishes the border and all

countries cease hostilities, the JTF will rapidlydeploy.

ManeuverTo destroy the invasion force, the division com-

mander establishes a mobile defense along themain invasion corridor behind the host nation’sborder defensive positions. One brigade positionsforward into two battle positions to defend insector to delay advancing forces, to prevent infil-tration within the division’s sector, and to attritthe enemy. This will slow the enemy’s advance,commit his reserve forces early, and overextendhis main attack (Figures 4-7 and 4-8).

The 3d Brigade establishes a blocking position tothe rear of the forward brigade. This fixes enemyforces, creating the opportunity for the 2d Brigadeand the armored strike force to maneuver to destroythe contained forces.

Lodgment security is vital to the JTF operation; asecurity force of two AASLT battalions with aug-mentation from host forces protects it. The desiredend state is to destroy the attacking enemy’s inva-sion forces and quickly transition to the offense,forcing withdrawal to the hostile country and rees-tablishing the border.

The mobile defense strike force consists of the 2dAASLT brigade (-), the armored brigade, and twoAHBs. The force locates behind the blocking bri-gade to rapidly attack and destroy enemy forces indesignated objective areas forward of the blockingpositions. Two infantry battalions provide lodgmentsecurity during the operation.

The JTF initially limits the depth of division deepoperations because of the JTF-imposed “no cross-border operations” restriction. Close coordinationwith in-place HN border forces results in designat-ing EAs forward of the division.

Deep fires neutralize enemy artillery support, de-creasing follow-on forces’ OPTEMPO. This pro-vides time for defending brigades to concentratecombat power without interference by follow-onreinforcements. The aviation brigade disrupts anddestroys enemy follow-on motorized and armoredforces supporting forward defending brigades.Deep fires and obstacles provide time and help sealoff the contained enemy force, supporting strikeforce attacks.

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The division cavalry squadron screens forward of mortar fires. Available CAS and attack helicoptersthe two defending brigades, establishing contactwith the HN border security forces forward of thedivision’s sector. The cavalry gains contact withadvancing invasion forces that penetrate border se-curity and maintains contact to provide early warn-ing for the lead brigades.

As the enemy approaches the division’s sector,the division initiates deep fires to disrupt, attrit, andalter the lead regiments’ tempo. Maintaining con-tact with the enemy, the cavalry delays to the BHL,moves through the defending brigades, and estab-lishes a rear flank screen. This screen locates behindthe forward brigade sectors to detect infiltratingenemy forces that threaten the lodgment area.

Designated EAs within the brigades’ defensivesectors facilitate massing of combat power duringthe delay to attrit the enemy. The 1st Brigadeestablishes mutually supporting positions con-structed in depth in its sector to detect and impedeenemy movement.

Defensive positions and integrated obstacles cre-ate EAs, allowing massing of available artillery and

augment supporting fires.

The 3d Brigade contains penetrating forces byoccupying blocking positions to the rear of theforward brigade and sealing off the division sector,This causes the enemy to focus and concentrate hisforces on the 3d Brigade’s blocking positions.

As the enemy attempts to penetrate the blockingpositions, his flanks become exposed and vulner-able for counterattack. The 2d Brigade and thearmored brigade then conduct a swift counterattackinto the enemy’s flank, destroying the forces for-ward of the blocking positions in designated objec-tive areas.

The two AASLT battalions, one each from the 2dand 3d brigades, provide lodgment security, whichprevents interruption of airfield and lodgment sup-port activities from infiltrating forces. One companywithin the lodgment is the division reserve.

After destroying the enemy’s main attack in thedivision sector, the division rapidly transitions tothe offense, clearing the sector of remnant units,

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forcing enemy withdrawal, and halting his invasion.Once the existing border is reestablished, the divi-sion closes in the lodgment area and prepares fordeployment.

Intelligence

Intelligence for the mobile defense focuses ondetermining the enemy’s precise location, strength,and intent. This information increases the effective-ness of the striking force.

The long-range surveillance teams (LRSTs) lo-cate to observe NAIs, TAIs, and DPs. Ground sur-veillance radar teams provide early warning andsupport forward maneuver brigades and units pro-viding lodgment security.

The division’s collection plan supports the devel-oped PIR critical to the targeting process and theenemy’s destruction. The intent is to confirm theenemy’s main attack and the location of his follow-on forces.

Fire Support

Fire support assets mass fires to disrupt and de-stroy moving enemy units in EAs. The division FSEcoordinates the positioning of all fire assets somassed fires and TOT missions are possible acrossthe division front.

Fire support weights the main effort. (The maineffort in a mobile defense is the striking force.)When striking forward of conventional artilleryrange, the commander plans for the forward dis-placement of artillery assets or the incorporation ofartillery into the striking force.

Mobility and Survivability

The division commander specifies general obsta-cle zones to fix the enemy, increase attrition, causeenemy supporting artillery to deploy, and to set andslow the enemy’s tempo. The division specifiesdisruption zones behind EAs to enhance targeting

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FM 71-100-3

and deep fires and to slow the tempo of follow-onforces.

The commander designates one fixing zone for-ward of the 3d Brigade to assist in the enemy’scontainment. The obstacle plan facilitates delayingenemy forces and develops the conditions that willcause the enemy to expose his flanks, providingopportunity for strike-force attacks.

Priority of effort for the striking force is normallymobility, then countermobility. Priority of effort forthe more static defending forces is normally surviv-ability, then countermobility.

Air DefenseThe division is operating in a low air threat envi-

ronment. The division attaches Stinger teams toeach maneuver brigade, and the battalion (-) locateswithin the lodgment area. These assets provide in-tegrated ADA coverage against potential enemyheliborne operations.

Combat Service SupportThe more intensely the striking force attacks the

enemy from the main defensive positions, the greaterwill be their need for supplies. In this example, FARPscan be in the division’s AO, but the armored force mayneed logistic support forward in the EA.

Battle CommandDivision rear and main CPs locate within the

lodgment area. The rear CP controls division activi-ties within the lodgment, including security. TheTAC CP locates forward in the division sector be-hind the blocking brigade.

Forward positioning helps synchronize the delayof the two forward brigades and the control of thearmored brigade, when committed. The echelonexecuting the mission (normally the TAC CP) re-tains command of the striking force.

Transition to the DefenseWhile the defense’s immediate purpose is to

defeat an enemy offensive operation, a force mayhave to defend because it is unable to continue theattack. According to FM 100-5, this is a point wherethe strength of the attacker no longer exceeds that

of the defender and beyond which continued offen-sive operations risk overextension, counterattack,and defeat.

A force normally defends to develop favorableconditions for an attack or to provide an economyof force in one area to mass overwhelming offensivecombat power in another. Specifically, the defendermay have to—

Buy time.

Hold a piece of terrain to facilitate other opera-tions.

Keep the enemy preoccupied in an area.Build up forces.

When attacking units cease their attack and mustdefend, they have two basic options. One, commitforces and push forward to claim enough ground fora security and or CFA (that is, beyond the majorityof enemy artillery range fans) from which to defend.Two, fall back to defensible terrain to establish asecurity area, establishing the FLOT generallyalong the attacking force’s line of advance of finalobjectives.

In both options, the FLOT is the forward edge ofthe security area. The FEBA is the forward edge ofthe main defensive area.

Unfortunately, the first option results in loss ofadditional personnel and equipment and expendi-ture of more resources. The security area often lacksdepth. In addition, the enemy force will probablyaccurately template the friendly FEBA trace andengage with artillery. These actions increase loss tofriendly personnel and equipment.

In many cases, option 2 is better. Commanderspull back the bulk of their forces to defensibleterrain. They establish the MBA on ground theattacking force already owns rather than under thethreat of enemy artillery.

The forward edge of the security area, which isthe FLOT, remains along the line of contact.METT-T and the operational plan determine thedepth of the security area.

The AASLT division has the capability to be acorps or JTF counterattack force or to conduct adefense forward in the corps’ AO. (See Chapter 4of FM 71-100-2.)

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Chapter 5

CONCURRENT OPERATIONS

Units routinely conduct concurrent operations aspart of all division operations. They contribute tooverall combat effectiveness but are not standaloneactions as are offensive or defensive operations.Concurrent operations enhance overall division op-erations. This chapter provides some examples oftechniques for planning and executing concurrentoperations.

REAR OPERATIONS

Division rear operations include all activitiesfrom the rear boundaries of forward brigades to thedivision’s rear boundary. Such activities ensurefreedom of maneuver, continuity of sustainment,and continuity of command and control.

Rear operations include four interrelated func-tions: sustainment, movement, terrain management,and security. Area damage control, addressed sepa-rately, supports all four areas. The rear CP synchro-nizes these activities.

The division conducts rear operations within thedivision rear area, which contains a large number ofCS and CSS units, C2 headquarters, and noncom-mitted combat units. It may also contain joint facili-ties, such as air bases, and HN facilities andpopulation centers.

The ADC-S is the rear operations commander.He is responsible for directing and synchronizingsustainment operations. He and the rear CP staffplan and execute all rear operations thereby ensur-ing that sustainment operations respond to divi-sional needs.

The rear commander commands and controls rearoperations through the division rear CP. The rearCP has three cells: a headquarters cell, an operationscell, and a CSS cell.

The rear CP is normally collocated with theDISCOM CP for security, life support, and ease ofcoordination. However, both CPs are separate anddistinct. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion ofthe rear CP.)

Sustainment

The basic mission of CSS units is to sustain thebattle. Tactical logistic functions consist of actionsthat man, arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiersand their systems before, during, and after opera-tions. The rear commander integrates the rear op-erations functions of movement, security, andterrain management as well as area damage control(ADC) with sustainment to provide synchronizedlogistic support.

Sustainment planning is the responsibility of co-ordinating staff officers, who have personnel andlogistic responsibilities, and special staff officers,who have CSS responsibilities. The G1 or adjutantgeneral (AG) plans and coordinates measures nec-essary to man the force. The G4 plans and coordi-nates (with DISCOM) measures to arm, fuel, fix,and sustain soldiers and their systems.

The DTO plans movement control and highwayregulation. The assistant CofS, G5, (civil affairs)helps obtain HN resources such as civilian labor andsupplies. He also helps coordinate these activities.

Personnel, logistic, and combat medical staff of-ficers perform planning and supervisory functionsprimarily from within the CSS cell of the rear CP.They collocate with the DISCOM CP to aid inlogistic planning, coordination, and execution.Their location also helps integrate the functions ofterrain management, movement, security, andADC.

DISCOM, the division’s logistic operator, trans-lates logistic planning into logistic support. It pro-vides supply, maintenance, CHS, and transportationassets to the division.

The DISCOM S2/S3 section is the commander’sinterface with the division rear CP. The S2/S3 sec-tion develops the DISCOM critical assets list andrecommends its priorities to the commander in con-cert with the DMMC. Once the commander ap-proves the list, the S2/S3 section gives it to the rearCP operations cell where it is continually monitoredand adjusted.

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The S2/S3 sectionsupporting criminal

is also the key interface withinvestigation division (CID)

elements for the command’s logistics security(LOGSEC) operations. As the DISCOM link withthe rear CP, the S2/S3 section maintains an opera-tions map and updates other staff officers on thecurrent situation. (For detailed discussions of CSSsustainment operations, see FM 63-2-1.)

MovementMovement includes planning, coordinating, and

synchronizing mode operations, terminal opera-tions, and movement control. It is inherent in allcombat, CS, and CSS fictions. There are gener-ally two categories of movements—tactical andadministrative.

Tactical movements are movements or maneuverto make contact with the enemy or during whichcontact is anticipated. Elements are organized forcombat.

Administrative moves are movements in whichtroops and vehicles are arranged to expedite theirmovement and to conserve time and energy whenno interference, except by air, is anticipated. Ad-ministrative movements are characterized by maxi-mum effective use of transportation assets.

The rear CP operations cell—

Controls administrative movements in the divi-sion rear area.

Controls the tactical maneuver of response forcesand the TCF.

Monitors and deconflicts movement of nondivi-sional forces through the division rear area.Ensures necessary routes are cleared and thatadditional CSS support is available as needed.Coordinates CS resources, including engineer,NBC, reconnaissance, and chemical decontami-nation support.Coordinates MP support with PM operations formovements within the division rear area.Deconflicts tactical and administrative move-ments.Enforces movement priorities and directs the useof alternate routes to-lower priority traffic.

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The operations cell closely coordinates with theG3 at the main CP and with the DTO, DISCOMmovement control officer (MCO), and PM to ensuretactical movements are not hindered. The G4, withthe G3, designates MSRs and determines MSR con-ditions (red, green, and yellow). He maintains thestatus and expected recovery time of routes whichare not green. A timely exchange of informationbetween MPs, engineers, and the G4 is essential.

The DTO plans and establishes movement priori-ties based on the division commander’s overall mis-sion priorities. The division G3 assigns motortransportation mission priorities for tactical support.The G4 is responsible for logistic support.

The DTO is the staff’s communications link fortransportation between the division and the corps.The DTO gives the DISCOM MCO broad policyguidance and basic plans and policies. He alsoprovides staff supervision and assistance in trans-portation matters concerning all modes oftransport.

The MCO controls motor transportation assetemployment and allocated CSS air assets within thedivision. The DTO coordinates with the G3 and thedivision aviation officer to allocate division airassets.

All users forward transportation requirementswithin the division to the MCO. Transportationcapabilities are then balanced against requirementsand division-level priorities. When routine require-ments exceed available division motor transportcapabilities, the MCO requests additional transportsupport through a supporting MCT. The DTO willstill request all required nondivisional air supportand nonroutine motor transport requirements fromthe MCC (if a supporting MCT cannot meetrequirements).

The DISCOM MCO controls division motortransport assets for CSS. He ensures the force fol-lows established movement priorities. The MCOrequests additional transportation from the DTO ifrequirements exceed DISCOM assets. In turn, theDTO recommends tasking other assets, or he re-quests COSCOM support to resolve the shortfall.

Combat support and CSS units execute adminis-trative movement and assist with tacticalmovements. Through coordination with the DTO,

FM 71-100-3

MCO, and the rear operations cell, CS and CSSunits—

Ensure that convoys receive necessary security.

Road congestion is minimal.

Supplies reach their required locations at the righttime.

If the division does not coordinate tactical andadministrative movements, road congestion can foilthe best plans. This would degrade the ability todeliver supplies and replacements to maneuver unitsor the ability to evacuate casualties and damagedequipment.

Tactical movements normally receive priorityover administrative movements. (Field Manuals55-2 and 55-10 discuss movements planning andexecution in greater detail.)

The division rear CP establishes a process oftracking convoys in the division rear area from thedivision rear boundary to their destination in thedivision area. It also—

Develops alternatives to ensure movements re-main constant.

Keeps transportation users informed of availableassets.Programs back-haul availability to cut down ondelayed returns.

Directs MSR maintenance and security.

Processes convoy clearance requests for unitmovement on division MSRs. -

Terrain ManagementTerrain management demands highly centralized

planning and control. The major problem, in posi-tioning units within the division rear area, comesfrom the competing demands of mission and secu-rity. Positioning units in the division rear area re-quires a fine balance between unit needs, therequirement to support the concept of operations,and the need to provide security to units.

Terrain management should facilitate current andfuture operations. Faulty terrain management canresult in congestion, interruption of rear area trafficpatterns, and degradation of support operations.

The rear CP is responsible for terrain manage-ment in the division rear area. The operations cellmanages terrain in coordination with the CSS cell,MSCs, and separate units. The situation map con-tains all locations of bases, base clusters, MSRs, keyfacilities, risk areas, traffic control points (TCPs),and target reference points (TRPs).

There may be METT-T driven examples thatdictate that the main CP be responsible for terrainmanagement for support units, as during LABand/or FOB operations. The AASLT division SOPmust clearly outline these responsibilities and howthe decision is made, based on METT-T, to give themain CP or rear CP this responsibility.

The importance of the units’ missions to the divi-sion mission is also a key consideration. Once thestaff completes units’ missions and contributions tothe division operation analysis, they can resolveconflicts between units and position them effec-tively.

A continual IPB of the rear area provides muchof the data for accurately assessing terrain manage-ment needs. The rear CP operations cell uses theintelligence estimate and other intelligence productsfrom the main CP to analyze enemy capabilities andto determine possible threats.

If a significant AASLT threat exists, the rearoperations cell positions CSS units away from likelyLZs or DZs. Combat units, such as the divisionreserve or TCF, may locate close to likely enemyLZs (usually monitored by MPs when they conductarea security) to counter the threat at its most vul-nerable time-during insertion.

Field artillery units must be within range of in-tended targets. Transportation units should be nearroad networks; supply units, near LOCs.

Unless the mission dictates otherwise, the rear CPoperations cell should not position units within en-emy air or ground avenues of approach or adjacentto likely threat objectives. However, it should posi-tion units to provide reconnaissance and surveil-lance of these avenues as part of security andcounterreconnaissance actions.

Combat service support units have unique terrainrequirements. When possible, they locate near es-tablished air, road, rail, and water LOCs to aidmission accomplishment.

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FM 71-100-3

Positioning must simplify receipt of supplies andmateriel, ease their movement forward to the MBA,and make evacuation, repair, and return of damagedequipment easier. The G5 coordinates facilities withthe host nation and the rear CP.

All CSS units require transportation networks andalternate routes which connect them with sources ofsupply and support and with their customers. Duringoffensive operations, the operations cell chooses unitlocations to extend supply routes and minimize changesto division and corps CSS transportation plans.

The G3 allocates terrain by establishing AO, des-ignating AAs, and specifying locations for certainunits or activities. Once the rear area has beendesignated, the rear CP manages the use of theterrain within the AO.

After initial positioning, the operations cell moni-tors the tactical situation. It directs or responds torequests to position and reposition units in the divi-sion rear area to enhance continuous support andsurvivability. This centralized management processprevents positioning conflicts, maintains an inte-grated security plan, ensures unit survivability, andimproves OPSEC.

When the division moves, either forward or to therear, the rear CP plans for gaining additional terrainwithin the division rear area as the tactical situationdictates. The G3 at the main CP establishes phaselines during offensive operations to indicate futuredivision rear area boundaries. He coordinates withthe corps G3 for additional terrain during retrogradeoperations.

Close coordination with the corps rear area op-erations cell through the corps rear CP LO is essen-tial. This ensures a logical handover of terrainmanagement responsibilities.

Numerous units and activities occupy terrain andconduct operations in the division rear area. Fig-ure 5-1 shows many of the units and activities whichcompete for usable terrain and facilities.

The rear CP operations cell plans for units twoechelons down and incorporates corps or JTF unitswhich require space. For rear operations, theseechelons are base clusters and bases. This meansplacing units together to form multiunit bases.

The rear CP operations cell designates base com-manders. Normally, the base commander is the

senior unit commander when more than one unit ispresent.

A medical unit commander, even if senior, cannotcommand a base or base cluster containing non-medical units (AR 600-20). In addition, accordingto the Geneva Convention, medical units cannottake offensive action of any kind except to defendpatients.

Many factors influence which units the rear op-erations cell will group into which bases and wherethey will locate. The rear operations cell must con-duct a thorough METT-T analysis, including eachunit’s size and composition.

Medical units should not collocate with units thatmay be priority enemy targets. They should, how-ever, collocate with units capable of assisting intheir defense.

Situation maps depict bases by drawing a linearound them similar to an assembly area. This es-tablishes the base commander’s AOR.

The base receives a numeric label designator. Therear CP maintains lists of units occupying specificbases, including types of units, personnel strength,major weapons available, and other information noton the situation map.

The base commander’s AOR should allow suffi-cient space for subordinate units to operate, estab-lish perimeter defenses, and conduct surveillanceand counterreconnaissance. The line denoting the

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FM 71-100-3

base should be drawn far enough from its internalinstallations to allow artillery use without endanger-ing the base. For example, the DANGER CLOSErange for cannon artillery is 600 meters. The linedesignating the base should be at least 600 metersfrom subordinate units.

Most bases are in a base cluster. However, somemay operate separately. These separate bases reportdirectly to the rear CP which integrates them intorear security plans.

SecurityThe rear operations cell must thoroughly under-

stand the threat to the rear area. It must ensure a goodIPB for the division rear area to further proactivesecurity operations. The IPB for the division reararea determines the potential effects of enemy ca-pabilities and weather and terrain on rear operations.

The specific focus of rear IPB is the enemy’s airthreats, airmobile and AASLT threats, SOF threats,and the CI threat (agents, sympathizers, and terror-ists). This IPB becomes the basis for initial patrolplans and a consideration in selecting base clusterlocations.

Continuous IPB ensures the rear operations com-mander has current intelligence and information fordecision making. (Field Manuals 34-8 and 34-130contain thorough discussions of the IPB process forrear operations.)

Security of the division rear area is a commandresponsibility extending from the division com-mander through the rear operations commander, tobase cluster and base commanders, to unit com-manders. It includes all actions from local defensivemeasures through commitment of TCFs.

The rear operations commander exercises opera-tional control over all assets operating in or transit-ing the division rear area for security and terrainmanagement. The rear CP operations cell supportsthe rear operations commander’s efforts by—

Grouping units into bases.

Forming base clusters when necessary.

Designating base and base cluster commanders.

Collecting, analyzing, and approving base de-fense plans.

Developing an integrated division rear area secu-rity plan.

Approving and coordinating obstacle and firesupport plans.

Positioning response forces and fire supportassets.

Providing continual METT-T analysis of the di-vision rear area.

Providing continual information on the enemyand other matters to units within the division reararea.

Security operations in the division rear area arecharacteristically economy of force measures andare designed to provide a graduated response tothreat activity. There are three levels of response:

Level I. Response to threats which base defenseforces can defeat.

Level II. Response to threats which are beyondthe capabilities of base defense forces but whichresponse forces can defeat.

Level III. Response to threats which necessitate acommand decision to commit TCFs.

These guidelines should not restrict a com-mander’s response to a threat. He must apply thenecessary force to destroy the threat. Any giventhreat may require one or all three levels of response(sequentially or simultaneously).

Base Defense Forces

Bases have clearly defined defensible perimetersand entry and exit points. By grouping units to-gether, they share responsibilities for security, capi-talizing on each unit’s strengths while minimizingweaknesses.

A viable base includes a mix of weapons systems,sufficient personnel for planning and supervising,and adequate communications assets. Positioningsimilar units in different bases, unless it is absolutelynecessary to collocate them in the same base, en-sures a degree of dispersion.

Every unit or base is responsible for its ownsecurity. It must be capable of detecting and defend-ing itself against enemy forces. Bases must use bothactive and passive measures to avoid detection. The

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FM 71-100-3

base, if detected, must be able to defeat the threat orwithstand attacks until assistance arrives.

Base defense is the cornerstone of rear securityoperations. The unit or base commander—

Prepares a base defense plan.

Rehearses all personnel and units within the baseon the effective execution of the base defenseplan.

Organizes a reaction force.

Recommends movement or repositioning of thebase to enhance security.

Coordinates mutual support from other bases orthe base cluster commander.

Coordinates response force operations.

Adjusts base defenses as the threat changes.

Determines the base defense status.

Unit and base commanders are responsible fordeveloping and implementing comprehensive secu-rity plans to defend their sites and protect theirsustainment capability. In establishing a base de-fense, the base commander employs the same pro-cedures and techniques maneuver commanders usein developing a perimeter defense.

Units establish security for 360 degrees and placethe bulk of combat power on the outer edge of theposition. They use interlocking fields of fire toprevent penetrations of the perimeter. They alsoestablish perimeter defenses in either urban or ruralterrain.

Base commanders ensure they and their subordi-nate units are aware of other units and bases in theirareas of interest and establish limits of fire to pre-vent fratricide between units. To coordinate indirectfires, base commanders may establish RFAs aroundsubordinate units and restrictive fire lines (RFLs)between units.

Base commanders coordinate with their basecluster commander or the rear CP to ensure theyhave sufficient terrain to establish OPs and patrolsoutside their perimeter. Commanders integratethese locations with NAIs that the base cluster com-mander or the rear CP establish. Figure 5-2 outlinesthe elements needed for a viable base defense.

Units conduct defensive operations concurrentlywith normal support operations. These include hard-ening and dispersal actions, cover and concealment,deception, and immediate reaction to enemy threator attack. Extensive use of obstacles, sensors, sur-veillance devices, and OPs enhances theseoperations.

Base and base cluster commanders identify short-ages in materiel and weaknesses in their defenses.Protective obstacles (wire, demolitions, and mines)are essential to each base’s defense.

Commanders consider repositioning when aunit’s defensive posture is inadequate to defenditself. The rear CP coordinates the relocation of aunit with its parent unit. Military police may assistin the movement of units by providing TCP orconvoy escorts.

Base defenses should not automatically engagehostile forces. The first line of defense is to avoiddetection.

Base and base cluster commanders should imple-ment counterreconnaissance actions with those therear CP establishes. Base commanders prepare todefend the base, report the hostile force, and observeit.

The base commander establishes a base defenseoperations center (BDOC) in support of securityoperations. The BDOC plans, coordinates, and su-pervises base defense operations.

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FM 71-100-3

Personnel from the base commander’s unit nor-mally form the BDOC. However, the base com-mander may draw personnel and equipment fromhis own unit and tenant units to form a fictionalBDOC.

The BDOC may be a relatively small element,possibly as small as two personnel per shift (an NCOand a clerk-radio operator). The BDOC—

Defines the base perimeter and establishes sectorresponsibilities.

Establishes and maintains communicationswithin the base and key locations such as entryand exit points, OPs, and the base cluster opera-tions center (BCOC).

Increases or decreases defensive postures basedon the threat condition (THREATCON).

Develops and monitors the base defense plan.

Monitors and reports the base defense status.

Develops levels of survivability required in thearea.

Coordinates fire support, obstacles, reactionforce, and response force plans for the base.

Maintains a current situation map of base units,OPs, patrols, and other friendly and enemy dataas required.

Base Clusters

The rear operations cell establishes base clustersby placing geographically contiguous bases underthe control of a headquarters and designating it abase cluster. Abase cluster is a mission grouping ofbases and/or security requirements lacking a clearlydefined perimeter.

The base cluster has OPCON of all units withinthe cluster for security and terrain management.Normal mission taskings and priorities remain theparent unit’s responsibility.

The rear CP may also establish a base cluster fora CSG operating in the division rear area. The CSGthen assigns bases within its cluster to its subordi-nate units and informs the rear CP of these locationsand the information required by the rear CP as totype, composition, and weapons.

When possible, the rear CP operations cell desig-nates a battalion- or brigade-level headquarters asthe base cluster headquarters. In their tables oforganization and equipment (TOE) support opera-tion sections, CSS battalions and brigade-levelheadquarters have the capability for customer mis-sion support activities. They also have a separateoperations section for C2 of internal unit operations.

The operations sections function as the BCOC. Itcoordinates terrain management planning and useand security planning and execution with the rearCP.

Base clusters on the rear operations situation mapare indicated by drawing a line around the bases andby placing an alphabetic designator within the area.(Figure 5-3 shows a typical base cluster.)

The rear CP analyzes the division rear area todevelop risk areas. Risk areas are areas of terrainthat are not useful to the division and provide noadvantage to the enemy.

By designating risk areas, the rear CP weights thelimited MP force within the remainder of the divi-sion rear area. Occasional overflights or mobilepatrols monitor risk areas.

Base clusters rely on mutual support betweenbases to enhance security. Mutual support comesfrom using reaction forces to assist threatened bases,from integration of MP patrol and surveillanceplans, or from coordinated and interlocking fires ifthe bases are close together. There are no fire sup-port personnel on a base cluster commander’s staff.Units direct requests for fires to the division rear CP.

Base cluster commanders, like base commanders,exercise positive clearance before initiating firemissions in the division rear area. Positive clearancemeans asking the right questions of the unit request-ing fire. Can you actually see and positively identifythe target as enemy? Is the target doing anythinghostile that requires fire now rather than maneuveraction a little later? As a general rule, the rear FSEshould require “eyes on target” before initiatingfires in the division rear area.

The base cluster commander coordinates basedefense force operations and conducts security op-erations by using the reaction forces of each base inthe cluster if response forces are unavailable. Basecommanders must have a plan to reestablish their

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FM 71-100-3

reaction force if the primary reaction force is un-available.

Each base cluster commander forms a BCOC tomonitor the status of subordinate bases and to re-ceive and pass information to or from the rear CP.Ideally, the base cluster commander is a battalion orhigher commander with a staff that can accomplishunit and base cluster functions.

Base cluster operations center tasks include—

Integrating and/or coordinating base defenseplans.

Developing and monitoring the base cluster de-fense plan.

Establishing and maintaining communicationswith all assigned bases, separate units in the basecluster, and the rear CP.

Receiving and passing on threat and base defenseSTATREPs.

Adjusting defense posture based on the threat.

Coordinating fire support, obstacle, reactionforce, and response force plans.

Maintaining a current situation map.

Response Forces

Normally, response forces are MP units sup-ported by fire support assets (Figure 5-4). Fire sup-port for MP response forces may consist of artilleryor mortars, CAS, or Army aviation.

The rear operations cell may commit MP ele-ments to other priority missions or they may beunavailable for commitment in sufficient strengthfor response-force operations. If so, back-up or al-ternative response forces from base CSS units; en-gineer, chemical, or transiting combat units; andelements of the reserve (or HN assets, if available)must accomplish security operations. The rear CPcoordinates with the division G3 before committingother than MPs to response-force missions.

Under certain circumstances, committing theTCF maybe preferable. It avoids risking degrada-tion or destruction of critical CS assets. However,this must be a METT-T decision. Field Manual100-15 cautions against premature commitment ofthe TCF, because doing so would rob the

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commander of flexibility and the initiative requiredto counter the overall enemy threat to the rear.

Performing response force operations requiresextensive planning and coordination before com-mitment against an enemy. Success depends on theresponse force knowing and properly using terrainto gain advantage over the enemy. It also dependson massing sufficient combat power to destroy theenemy.

When possible, commanders who organize re-sponse forces should ensure bases and base clustersorganize their own response forces instead of oneresponse force. This reduces level I reaction timefor the response force and facilitates coordinationbetween the response force commander and base orbase cluster commanders.

In addition to knowing the location of bases in hisAO, the response force commander must knowwhich bases are most critical and most vulnerable.The response force commander should have thefollowing information available for each base andbase cluster in his AO:

Defensive capability.

Base defense status.

Location of any obstacles near the base.

Location and direction of fire of crew-servedweapons.

Signal for final protective fires.

Location of TRPs and preplanned fires.

Method of contacting the BDOC or BCOC, in-cluding call signs and frequencies.

Location of OPs and patrols, if employed.

The response force commander must also be ableto mass supporting fires and facilitate TCF opera-tions, if committed. Therefore, he must know thecall signs and frequencies for supporting artillery,Army aviation units, the TCF, and the rear CP. Hemust also know the approved division rear area firesupport target list.

The purpose of response force operations is tohasten a base’s ability to return to mission accom-plishment as quickly as possible. This avoids devot-ing sustainment resources to self-defense or limitedtactical operations.

Response forces must rapidly commit in order toforce an enemy to disengage from an attack beforehe causes significant damage. Once the enemyabandons his attack, the response force fixes anddestroys him with fire support or in close combat.

When the commander commits the responseforce, the response force normally has OPCON ofan AO. The base cluster commander and rear CPshould develop on-order graphics to implementwhen they commit a response force or TCF.

Base commanders support the efforts of the re-sponse force by lifting or shifting base defense firesto support the response force’s maneuver. If thecommander subsequently commits a TCF, the TCFcommander has OPCON of all bases and responseforces within the TCF’s designated AO.

Response forces are only effective if they canreact swiftly. They must be familiar with the loca-tions and dispositions of bases in the threatenedarea.

Military police platoon leaders and companycommanders normally coordinate with BCOCs toensure unity of effort. When threats materialize, therear CP conducts an assessment and, if appropriate,commits additional response force assets.

If the threat exceeds the capability of responseforces, the commander may commit a TCF. Re-sponse forces maintain contact with threateningforces and render SPOTREPs to the rear CP andTCF commander until the TCF arrives to engage thethreat.

Tactical Combat ForceA TCF’s primary mission is to defeat those enemy

forces in the division rear area that exceed the

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capability of response forces. To counter the manypossible threats to the rear area, a TCF must beflexible, capable of either day or night operations,and able to obtain an advantage in mobility. It doesthis either by positioning or by speed of movement.

The division TCF is normally a combined-armstask force. METT-T factors and the amount of riskthe commander is willing to accept influence TCFdesign and size.

Air assault infantry, augmented with attack andassault helicopters, may conduct TCF operationsagainst similarly equipped enemy forces. Air as-sault infantry requires armored and attack helicopteraugmentation if committed against armored forces.If drawn from the aviation brigade, the TCF shouldbean AHB.

Division rear area IPB and METT-T analyseshelp determine the TCF’s size and composition.Under the division commander’s guidance, the G3designates one or more forces as TCFs to provideflexible responses to competing needs.

The TCF maybe dedicated or given an on-ordermission. A fully committed TCF should not begiven an on-order mission (such as reserve forces,for example).

The commander organizes the TCF under the rearCP if he feels the threat to his rear area is sufficient.The rear CP plans, coordinates, and controls TCFoperations.

The division rear area defense plan incorporatesbase and base cluster self-defense measures, re-sponse force operations, and TCF operations. Therear CP provides copies of the division rear areadefense plan, including fire support and obstacleplans, to the TCF.

The TCF coordinates possible response planswith the rear CP, response force commanders, andbase and base cluster commanders. The TCF posi-tions LOS with the rear CP to help with contingencyplanning and TCF employment.

requests corps assistance. The corps TCF, or a por-tion of the corps TCF, can be either OPCON to thedivision or remain under corps control, based ontactical needs. If the corps TCF is dedicated ardortask-organized under the division rear CP, it revertsback to corps rear CP control after missioncompletion.

Area Damage Control (ADC)

Area damage control consists of measures takenbefore, during, and after hostile action or naturaldisasters to reduce the probability of damage and tominimize its effects. Area damage control within therear area affects all rear operations. The division rearoperations commander is responsible for ADCwithin the division rear area.

The ADC process includes continuous planningand action to minimize damage and a systematicapproach to resolving the impact of damage onoperations. Damage control teams must accuratelyassess damage to determine its extent and impact onoperations. They must set alternatives and prioritiesfor repairs.

Damage control plans consider rescue, firefight-ing, lifesaving, and communications. Every echelonconducts ADC planning.

Each base commander identifies available re-sources within his base and assesses its ability toconduct ADC operations. The continual upgrad-ing of base defenses includes measures to reducethe effects of damages sustained. Detailed ADCplanning is an important part of the base defenseplan.

Each BCOC compiles ADC capabilities fromeach subordinate base and develops a comprehen-sive damage control plan that it forwards to the rearCP. The base cluster plan identifies availableresources within each base to direct assistance fromone base to another as required.

The rear CP is C2 headquarters for the TCF if it The rear CP reviews each base cluster ADC ca-is dedicated and/or task-organized under the rear pability. It maintains a status of the damage controlcommand. When the rear CP task-organizes TCFs. posture of each independent base and base cluster.it positions them in assembly areas based onMETT-T requirements. The rear CP coordinates directly with MP, engi-

neers, chemical, and medical treatment facilities toWhen a threat in the division rear area exceeds ensure compatibility with subordinate plans. The

the division’s capability to defeat it, the division rear CP ensures each base’s capabilities are clear

5-10

and that they identify all available resources, includ-ing HN assets.

Planning Considerations for Area DamageControl

Military police support ADC by conducting refu-gee and straggler control and NBC detecting andreporting. They also conduct local physical securitywhen required.

Engineer support includes constructing fortifica-tions and obstacles which reduce the impact ofdamages. Engineers also clear debris and rubble,including MSR maintenance.

Commanders should exercise caution in commit-ting engineer assets to every incident. Engineersfulfill critical mobility, survivability, and counter-mobility missions. Division light engineers nor-mally require external support from nondivisionalengineers to perform ADC missions.

Medical units accept casualties from units neartheir locations. All units must know the exact loca-tions of the nearest medical facilities so injuredpersonnel can receive prompt treatment.

Civil affairs or G5 elements identify HN support,especially engineer assets, to augment resources.They coordinate civilian involvement with ADCoperations.

Chemical units support ADC operations throughdecontamination of personnel, equipment, supplies,key sites, and LOCs. Survey teams from the divisionchemical company assist units on a priority basis asthe rear CP directs.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is neces-sary because of the presence or suspected presenceof unexploded ordnance. The possibility of detona-tion can pose a threat to operations.

Explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents ineach unit assist in reducing hazards and reportingunexploded ordnance to the rear CP. Explosiveordnance disposal training ensures agents can assistlocal commanders. Training teams should includeall MPs and at least two soldiers from each com-pany-size unit.

Aviation assets may assist in transporting casual-ties. Utility helicopters can provide emergency

FM 71-100-3

resupply, communications relay, and aerial assess-ment of damages.

OperationsOnce an event causes or has caused damage,

specialized personnel must simultaneously—Treat and evacuate casualties.Control damage.Identify and mark unexploded ordnance.Secure critical assets.Reestablish operations.Conduct a damage assessment.Report assessment of damages and status of op-erations.The rear CP evaluates the information it receives.

If necessary, it directs further damage assessmentby aerial observation, MP patrol, its own experts, orDISCOM experts.

In developing alternatives, the rear CP or theDISCOM must determine—

What has been damaged (facilities, supplies, andequipment).How extensive the damage is.Whether engineer assets will be needed.Whether the unit can continue its mission.Whether the unit can relocate and still perform itsmission.Whether other facilities, supplies, and equipmentare available in sufficient quantity to accomplishthe mission.The rear operations cell develops damage assess-

ments and alternatives for repair or support. Basedon the evaluation, the rear operations cell developsrecommendations for the rear operations com-mander. He then directs actions to repair damagesor pursue alternatives.

Field Manual 71-100-2 contains a sample base,base cluster, or rear area defense plan. The plancontains minimum essential elements. Field Manual101-5 (D) contains an expanded list of what may gointo the OPLAN or OPORD. Division SOPs shouldexpand on the plan to enhance their own needs.

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RECONNAISSANCEOPERATIONS

Reconnaissance is an essential and continuous op-eration the division conducts to collect informationand to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. TheG2 processes information into intelligence and pro-vides combat information to the commander.

Commanders and staffs should not confuse re-connaissance with security operations, nor should aunit have both reconnaissance and security missionsat the same time. Reconnaissance is a mission un-dertaken to obtain, by visual observation or otherdetection methods, information about the activitiesand resources of an enemy, or potential enemy, orabout the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geo-graphic characteristics of a particular area.

Security operations provide reaction time, ma-neuver space, and protection to the main body. Theyare characterized by aggressive reconnaissance toreduce terrain and enemy unknowns, gaining andmaintaining contact with the enemy to ensure con-tinuous information, and providing early and accu-rate reporting of information to the protected force.

The G2 or S2 has staff responsibility for recon-naissance at respective levels. They assign recon-naissance tasks to subordinate units in the collectionplan and coordinate with the G3 to allocate re-sources and assign specific reconnaissance mis-sions to subordinate commanders when required.

Reconnaissance of some type should always pre-cede commitment of forces. Time available deter-mines the extent of reconnaissance. Failure toconduct a thorough reconnaissance may result inloss of initiative, unacceptable losses in personneland equipment and, in its worst case, a catastrophicdefeat.

Reconnaissance enables the G2 or S2 to confirmor deny enemy templates and the enemy’s mostprobable COAs (developed during the IPB process).Reconnaissance by ground or air maneuver ele-ments confirm information that IEW assets develop.It provides detailed information and verificationthat IEW assets cannot.

The three traditional types of reconnaissance areroute, zone, and area (Figure 5-5). A route recon-naissance is a reconnaissance along a specific lineof communications, such as a road, railway, or

waterway. It provides new or updated informationon route conditions and activities along the route.

A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort toobtain detailed information concerning all routes,obstacles (including chemical or radiological con-tamination), terrain, and enemy forces within a zonedefined by boundaries. It normally is assigned whenthe enemy situation is vague or when informationconcerning cross-country trafficability is desired.

An area reconnaissance is a form of reconnais-sance that is a directed effort to obtain detailedinformation concerning the terrain or enemy activitywithin a prescribed area, such as a town, ridge line,woods, or other feature critical to operations. Re-connaissance may be aerial, ground-based, or acombination of both.

A fourth type of reconnaissance operation isforce-oriented reconnaissance. It is a precursor tomaneuver and tire and accomplishes much morethan simply providing information. The objective ofthe force-oriented reconnaissance mission is for thereconnaissance unit to find and maintain contactwith a specified enemy force.

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Reconnaissance elements may be required tomaintain contact with the enemy, develop the situ-ation, and forewarn maneuver units before initialengagements. For example, a cavalry unit canquickly conduct reconnaissance by sifting throughenemy reconnaissance and security elements untilit finds the enemy’s main body. The cavalry unit canthen do whatever it has to do to maintain contactwith the enemy force. When the enemy forcemoves, the cavalry unit also moves.

PlanningDuring the IPB process, the G2 identifies gaps in

intelligence information and develops a collectionplan to fill the information gaps. He plans the divi-sion reconnaissance effort using the collection plan.

The G2 integrates division assets into the recon-naissance effort. He considers availability and ca-pability of units, IEW assets, air and groundmaneuver capabilities, FA radars, and TACAIRreconnaissance.

The G2 normally tasks SIGINT or imagery intel-ligence (IMINT) assets. However, he recommendsto the G3 the missions the reconnaissance squadronor aviation brigade are to conduct, such as deep areareconnaissance. He may also forward requests forintelligence information to the corps or JTF.

The G2 prioritizes the reconnaissance effort usingthe commander’s PIR and information require-ments (IR). He coordinates the reconnaissance ef-fort by assigning intelligence-acquisition tasks tounits through the intelligence annex to the divisionOPORD.

During the execution of the division’s mission,the G2 coordinates specific reconnaissance mis-sions with the G3 and synchronizes thereconnaissance effort by sequencing reconnais-sance tasks. He considers the times for informationrequirements in the decision-making process as wellas the acquisition time required.

In close operations or the MBA, the G2 mayassign intelligence acquisition tasks to committedforces (Annex B of the OPLAN/OPORD). Thesetasks are collateral to the unit’s assigned mission.He may assign intelligence acquisition tasks in thereserve area to the reserve brigade, MPs, or engi-neers. In the division rear, he may assign intelli-gence acquisition tasks to CS or CSS units.

The G2, with the G3 and the MI battalion com-mander, resources the reconnaissance effort. On thebasis of intelligence gaps, the collection plan, assetsavailable, and sequencing, the G2 recommends taskorganization of IEW assets to support the divisionreconnaissance effort as well as those of subordinatecommands.

When required, the G2 may recommend assign-ing reconnaissance missions to subordinate com-mands. However, he must make reconnaissancetasks specific (where to look, what to look for, andwhat information he requires). Mission-type orderswill not suffice.

When planning AASLT operations during recon-naissance missions, planners must develop potentialLZ and PZ locations, air corridors, LRS locations,FARP locations, attack positions for attack helicop-ters, and refinement of the enemy ADA picture toassist route selection and SEAD planning.

The G2 also provides specific tasks to subordinatecommanders for their own mission planning. TheG2 ensures the plan does not spread available recon-naissance assets too thin. It is not wise to dispersereconnaissance elements across wide frontages tosimultaneously accomplish multiple tasks. The ca-pabilities of IEW assets and moving-target-locatingradars should be part of the reconnaissance effort.

Reconnaissance should include specialists suchas engineers and chemical personnel. The G2 shouldassign reporting schedules to the assets conductingthe reconnaissance. This allows him to monitor theprogress of the reconnaissance and redirect effortsas required.

Routine reports pass through the division intelli-gence or operations and intelligence nets. Unitssubmit critical information using the divisioncommand net. This combat information, althoughunevaluated, may have immediate tactical signifi-cance to the commander.

In offensive operations, the commander shouldbase his plan for maneuver on reconnaissance. Re-connaissance determines which routes are suitablefor friendly unit maneuver, where the enemy isstrong or weak, and where gaps exist.

In the AASLT division, reconnaissance of airavenues is a critical requirement. Thus, reconnais-sance should pull the main body toward and along

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the path of least resistance. This enhances the divi-sion’s initiative and agility.

Reconnaissance is also valid in defensive opera-tions. It determines which routes the enemy is using.It also enhances agility by identifing opportunitiesand by pulling the division along the path of leastresistance to mass the division’s combat power atthe critical time and place.

The G3 tasks approved reconnaissance missionsto units (paragraph 3 of the OPLAN/OPORD). Healso assists the commander in controlling thesemissions. The G2 discusses the reconnaissance ef-fort in Annex B. Staff sections must closely coordi-nate reconnaissance needs and activities.

Techniques

Reconnaissance missions inherently place unitsin harm’s way. Units strive for stealth, but stealth isnot assured. The division should expect the unitassigned a reconnaissance mission to do more thanjust find the enemy.

There is a spectrum of reconnaissance operationsthat units conduct depending on a METT-T analy-sis. Reconnaissance operations at the division levelrange from deploying LRSD or unit scouts to em-ploying the division’s cavalry squadron (rein-forced) to committing a brigade-size task force ifnecessary.

At the division level, depending on METT-T andthe tactical situation, units develop the situation byreporting either the lack of enemy activity or enemyactivity such as —

Penetrating or disrupting the enemy’s securityforces.

Fighting through and uncovering enemy decep-tion schemes.

Forcing the early uncovering of artillery.

Determining the depth and width of the enemy’sdisposition.

Reconnaissance operations develop the situationto the tactical depths of the opposing enemy forma-tion. The cavalry squadron is the division’s primaryreconnaissance unit, but all units can performreconnaissance.

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Reconnaissance prevents the decisive commit-ment of main force units. By locating the enemy,developing the situation, and discovering or creat-ing weakness, the squadron improves the division’sability to mass combat power at the right place atthe right time.

The G2 integrates reconnaissance missions withother division intelligence-collection assets for acohesive battle picture. When possible, the cavalrysquadron coordinates and integrates with the LRSDand combat net radios (CNR) of the intelligence andelectronic warfare support element (IEWSE).

SECURITY OPERATIONS

The division conducts security operations to pro-vide maneuver space and reaction time and to pro-tect the main body. It incorporates security as partof the battlefield framework in planning all offen-sive or defensive operations.

The G3 develops and recommends the concept ofoperations, including assigning security responsi-bilities and missions to subordinate commanders.The subordinate commanders then plan, prepare,and execute security operations. Every unit has acontinuous security role.

Types of OperationsSecurity operations include screen, guard, and

cover operations. Screen missions maintain surveil-lance, provide early warning to the main body,conduct counterreconnaissance, and harass and im-pede the enemy through indirect fires. Guard mis-sions include everything in a screening mission andalso protect the main body from ground observationand direct fire.

Cover missions include screening and guardingoperations but also help develop the situation. Covermissions deceive, disorganize, and destroy enemyforces.

Planning ConsiderationsAs the G3 and other staff members incorporate

security requirements into the planning of divisionoperations, they consider—

Adequate support to security forces.

FM 71-100-3

Ranges and capabilities of IEW, fire support, andcommunications systems.Time-distance relationships.

Economy of force factors.Passage of lines.Formation of the main body.The covering force, especially inoffensive opera-

tions, operates well forward of the division’s mainbody. The G3 allocates resources to the coveringforce so it functions as a tactically self-sufficientforce.

Guard forces operate within the main body’ssupporting artillery range. The G3 and other staffelements consider METT-T factors to determinerelationships between the main body and the guardforce.

The staff considers the range, capabilities, andavailability of weapons systems and ammunition asit assigns security missions to subordinate com-manders. Similarly, staffs consider IEW assets thatmay range to 30 kilometers. However, terrain,weather, and enemy electronic counter-counter-measures (ECCM) actions may significantly reducethe range.

The staff considers time-distance relationshipswhen using screens or guards. Screens provide earlywarning to the main body. Planners consider thetime required for the main body to counter a threat.They then compute the distance the enemy couldmove during that time. This helps determine thescreen’s location.

Planners consider economy of force factors inassigning security responsibilities and missions.Fewer forces can screen a force than can guard it.The considerations of adequate support, time anddistance factors, and the threat affect this decision.

Planners consider the requirements for passage oflines by security forces. The division may requirean offensive covering force when conducting a for-ward passage as it begins a movement to contact orwhen exploiting or pursuing.

Similarly, a defensive covering force may exe-cute a rearward passage into the MBA. Screens orguards may conduct a passage with main bodyforces. This helps the G3 determine which head-quarters provides and controls the security force.

A brigade passing through an advance guard whichit controls is easier to coordinate than one passingthrough adivision-controlled advance guard.

The staff must also consider the division forma-tion. Each formation has its own strengths, weak-nesses, and planning considerations for security.

Screen Missions

Screens provide early warning and harass andimpede the enemy with indirect fires. When suffi-cient maneuver space exists, the division positionsthe screen far enough away from the main body toallow time to identify and counter the threat.

Screen forces normally operate within fire sup-port range of the main body. Depending on thesituation, the division assumes risk and positions thescreen force outside the range of supporting artil-lery. If the division does this, they must assignadequate attack helicopter and CAS sorties to sup-port the screen force.

The screen commander combines reconnais-sance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissancetechniques to identify threats to the main body. Heuses the IPB to identify enemy avenues of approachand to establish NAIs for his forces to observe.

After identifying a threat, the screen commanderreports to the TAC CP and uses all available assetsto impede the enemy. This may require the screento leave stay-behind forces to direct the attack.

Helicopter scouts (aeroscouts) may also direct theattack. As the screen withdraws into range, it em-ploys main body artillery.

Guard MissionsThe advance guard and the offensive covering

force differ in their scope during movement and intheir zone of operations. The advance guard orientson the movement of the main body and providessecurity along the main body’s specific routes ofmovement.

The advance guard operates within supportingartillery range of the main body and protects it fromground observation and direct fire. The divisionmay command and control the advance guard orgive this mission to a maneuver brigade.

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The G3 operations in the TAC CP monitors theadvance guard’s operations if it is controlled by thedivision. The G3 monitors its advance and opera-tions as with any other committed force. He inte-grates the actions of the advance guard with thoseof the covering force and main body.

The advance guard conducts route reconnais-sance in front of the main body. The TAC CPcoordinates its movement with the main body toensure it remains within supporting range. Phaselines control this movement and allow the advanceguard to speed up or slow down, depending on themain body’s status.

Artillery moves to provide support to the advanceguard (as well as flank and rear guards) and torapidly occupy positions when the main body mustdeploy. Priority of tires is to the advance guardduring movement.

The advance guard FSE plans fire support muchlike the covering force’s, emphasizing simple fireplans with as much detail as possible. He plansgroups, series, and smoke missions to support themaneuver commander’s scheme of maneuver.

Engineers, when part of the advance guard, focuson mobility of the force conducting the followingmissions: engineer reconnaissance, obstacle report-ing to the main body, breaching obstacles, andmarking breaches or bypasses. The security forcecommander sets the priorities.

The TAC CP coordinates IEW support for thedivision-controlled advance guard. The G2 opera-tions at the TAC CP disseminates combat informa-tion and intelligence from the covering force andfrom the main CP to the advance guard. The TACCP G3 coordinates engineer and AD support for thedivision-controlled advance guard along with theAD battalion and the engineer battalion.

Flank GuardThe main body’s trail maneuver brigade normally

provides and controls flank guards. This missionentails conducting security operations to the flanksto prevent ground observation and to protect themain body against direct fire.

The flank guard establishes defensive positionsto the flanks for stationary or moving forces (Figure5-6). To secure the moving force, the flank guard

leapfrogs forces to successive positions along themain body’s flank.

The flank guard normally focuses on battalionmobility corridors. This allows the battalion con-ducting the flank guard to occupy two positionswhile one company team leapfrogs to a forwardposition.

The AT company of the AASLT division acts asa counterattack force. The scout platoon conducts ascreen to the flank or to the front of the task force.

Similarly, the brigade S2 closely coordinates IEWsupport for the flank guard. Intelligence and EWassets such as GSRs must be part of this plan forearly warning, monitoring of threats, and economyof force.

The flank guard S2 establishes NAIs and TAIs.Counterreconnaissance actions assist in providingsecurity to the flank guard and, ultimately, the mainbody. They may also provide the first indication athreat is developing to the flank.

The focus of engineers with the flank guard iscountermobility. They plan and emplace situationalobstacles to protect the-main body.

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The maneuver brigade controlling the flank guardplans for reinforcement or withdrawal. To reinforcethe flank guard, it becomes the fixing force whileother brigade elements engage the enemy with fireand maneuver. To withdraw the guard, the brigadeestablishes a hasty defense and passage points toallow the flank guard to withdraw into brigadepositions.

Rear Guard

The rear guard protects the main body from therear during retrograde operations or from bypassedunits during exploitation and pursuit (Figure 5-7).The rear guard orients on the movement of the mainbody to prevent gaps from developing and frombeing cut off.

Main body forces position supporting elementstoward the rear of the main body to support the rearguard. This is particularly true of artillery. Duringretrograde operations, CAS’s first priority is to therear guard.

The rear guard commander prepares to conduct aseries of delays from subsequent battle positions(BPs). He must not decisively engage unless thecontrolling commander approves. The main bodymay not be in a position to reinforce the rear guard.

During offensive or retrograde operations, therear guard occupies the BPs. It leapfrogs to newpositions toward the main body.

Rear guard elements closest to the enemy shouldnot be outside the main body’s supporting range.This requires close coordination between the rearguard and its controlling headquarters. The rearguard commander closely monitors subordinateunits to allow displacing forces to occupy newpositions before in-place units vacate theirs.

The rear maneuver brigade or TAC CP controlsthe rear guard. During the exploitation and pursuit,the rear maneuver brigade controls the rear guard.During retrograde operations, the TAC CP controlsthe rear guard.

Main body forces identify and assist in preparingBPs for the rear guard force. Engineers preparesurvivability positions. They also conduct counter-mobility operations to delay, disorganize, and limitthe enemy force.

In retrograde operations, engineer units coordi-nate obstacle-free areas (OFAs) and lanes throughobstacle belts with the rear guard. Artillery, helicop-ter, and USAF-delivered mines can rapidly closethese lanes and reinforce breached obstacles.

The use of FASCAM in the exploitation andpursuit can help the rear guard delay the enemy andblock rear approaches. The DFSCOORD ensuresthat appropriate units plan fires to help the rear guarddisengage and move to subsequent positions.

Offensive Covering ForcesCover missions differ between offensive and de-

fensive operations. A division offensive coveringforce may be a brigade TF. The division commanderestablishes objectives to support his scheme of ma-neuver based on the IPB and available intelligenceabout the enemy.

As with all security operations, the covering forceorients on the main body. However, the G3 anddivision commander may establish additional

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objectives on which they want the cover force tofocus, such as defeating and destroying the enemy’sreconnaissance capability. This requires the cover-ing force to use a two-team method. One teamlocates the enemy reconnaissance in the securityzone; another destroys it. Locating enemy recon-naissance normally requires a mix of ground, aerial,and electronic reconnaissance.

Another objective of a covering force maybe todetermine routes through enemy defensive belts.The covering force uncovers enemy strengths,weaknesses, gaps, locations, and dispositions andserves as a reconnaissance-pull for the main body.It may conduct limited objective attacks or probesacross a wide front.

If the covering force successfully negotiates thefirst defensive belt, it continues to the second belt.If it is not successful, it establishes a hasty defenseand waits to pass the main body. It maintains contactwith the enemy and coordinates the passage of themain body with the TAC CP.

If the covering force conducts a movement tocontact against a moving enemy, it performs a seriesof limited objective attacks and uses the objectivesto orient its movement. The battalions of the cover-ing force seize each objective and continue untilthey establish contact. After establishing contact,the covering force conducts a hasty attack or hastydefense to pass the main body.

The G2 considers IEW support for the offensivecovering force. He provides a full complement ofmultidisciplined MI resources to the covering force.To ensure effective coordination and control, the MIbattalion normally task-organizes into an MI com-pany team. They operate in pairs to leapfrog be-tween positions and to maintain continuouscoverage.

Aerial intelligence assets, such as Quick Fix,habitually support the offensive covering force.They provide continuous long-range coverage overwide areas forward and to the flanks of the coveringforce. They also cue other systems to confirm ordeny information other agencies provide and toprovide coverage while ground-based systems dis-place.

Signal intercept systems identify and collect tech-nical data on key enemy C3, target acquisition, andfire control systems. Ground support radars provide

early warning, information on enemy movement,and targeting information.

Interrogators ask civilians for information untilEPWs, who have more valuable information, arrive.Intelligence teams conduct hasty screening and in-terrogations for information of immediate tacticalvalue, such as information about enemy forces,obstacles, the terrain, and enemy plans andintentions.

Fire support planning includes both supportingand deceptive fires. If sufficient artillery is avail-able, each battalion in the covering force shouldhave a DS battalion.

Counterfire radars are part of the artillery taskorganization. The covering force establishes criticalfriendly radar zones around the main effort to expe-dite reactive counterfire.

The fire support coordination plan uses permis-sive control measures planned along PLs. Thesemeasures are on-order control measures plannedwell ahead of the covering force.

Fire plans are simple but as detailed as possible.The FSE plans groups and series of targets to sup-port the rapidly moving maneuver forces. It alsoplans FASCAM on flank avenues of approach.

The FSE includes jamming, especially against theenemy’s fire support and reconnaissance nets in thefire support plan. Quick Fix provides a relativelydeep capability to jam enemy C2 nets.

The DFSCOORD integrates CAS into the firesupport annex and, when possible, preplans for it.Even when the enemy is moving, the G2, G3, andFSE projects when they expect to make contact.War-gaming this event provides an approximatelocation and time for preplanning CAS.

The G3 task-organizes AD assets to the coveringforce based on the ADA battalion commander’srecommendation. Assets may include a mixture ofVulcan/Stinger (V/S) systems.

Teams can also be reconnaissance assets. Placingthem with IEW assets assists in local protection andAD for IEW assets and simplifies terrain manage-ment and movement control. The covering forceengineer plans M/S support.

Engineers with the covering force identify routesfor forward movement and lateral routes to provide

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the commander flexibility as he develops the situ-ation. With the FSE, the engineer plans situationalobstacles on avenues of approach into the flanks ofthe covering force. Engineers prepare for earthmoving, rapid obstacle breaching, and assault bridg-ing (if required).

Defensive Covering Forces

In the defense, the corps, not the division, nor-mally provides the covering force. This allows thecorps to control the covering force battle and shapethe battlefield rather than allowing each division tofight an independent battle. If required, however,the division’s covering force operates well forwardof the main body to develop the situation and de-ceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces.

The covering force’s mobility is normally equal toor greater than that of the main body and, preferably,to the opposing force as well. The defensive coveringforce mission may be to delay enemy forces forwardof a given phase line for a specified period of time untila specific event occurs, such as when the coveringforce is 70 percent combat-effective.

The division plans for the rearward passage of thecovering force by establishing passage points withthe MBA brigades and the BHL. A phase linedepicts the area in front of which the covering forceis to delay and forward of the BHL.

Main body defensive units have LOS and direct-firecapability to the BHL, yet the BHL should be farenough out for the defending force to protect thecovering force’s rearward movement. This wouldgive the covering force commander the depth to com-plete the delay and yet retain enough maneuver spaceto conduct an orderly passage. This also would aid thecovering force’s staggered withdrawal. Maneuverforces in the covering force should execute detailedcounterreconnaissance plans.

Intelligence and EW assets supporting the defen-sive covering force are much the same as those inthe offensive covering force. In the defense, IEWresources leapfrog to the rear, withdrawing in amanner that facilitates their use in the MBA.

Fire support assets organize and function inmuch the same manner. The FSE’s detailed firesupport plans are an integral part of the scheme ofdefense.

The FSE plans artillery and other fire supportassets to mass at critical times and places. Observerswatch obstacles and plan fires to cover them.

Fire support measures are permissive and closeenough to the covering force to facilitate engaging theenemy. This is especially critical as the covering forcewithdraws into the range of artillery in the MBA.

Units plan CAS for EAs. The LRSTs observe andmonitor DPs for initiation of these attacks. Engi-neers with the covering force conduct countermo-bility and survivability tasks as their first priority.

Air defense assets provide coverage on likely airavenues of approach. This is critical as the coveringforce tends to mass during the withdrawal. The cov-ering force coordinates coverage of passage points andlanes into the MBA with MBA air defense forces.

Note that counterreconnaissance is not a distinctmission; rather, it is a result of security operations.Units conduct traditional security actions (includingscreen, guard, cover, and area security missions) aswell as a variety of other activities (such as OPSEC,deception, and physical security) to counter theenemy’s reconnaissance. In doing so they defeat ordestroy hostile reconnaissance forces.

TARGETING

The division conducts targeting to mass combatpower at critical times and places. The targeting proc-ess results in integrating all means of lethal and non-lethal fires, including artillery of all types, freed-wingaircraft, and attack helicopters, EW, PSYOP, andNGF.

Targeting aids the division commander in seizingthe initiative and synchronizing combat power in deep,close, and rear operations. It is an integral and continu-ous part of planning and executing division operations.It begins with mission receipt and continues throughoperation completion. Field Manual 6-20-10 is thedivision’s base manual for targeting operations.

ConsiderationsThe targeting methodology is decide, detect and

track, deliver, and assess (D3A). The targeting proc-ess supports synchronization by focusing detection,tracking, and delivery capabilities on high-payofftargets (HPTs).

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Successfully engaging HPTs is tied to the divi-sion’s successful execution of the commander’sintent. The key to understanding targeting in anAASLT division is the understanding that attackingHPTs is what establishes conditions for maneuveragainst an opposing force.

When possible, the division conducts AASLToperations where an enemy is weakest. When re-quired by the mission, the division must create avulnerable enemy by attacking it relentlessly, butmethodically, with fires. The targeting process de-fines and directs this relentless method.

Targeting begins at the earliest phase of plan-ning—mission analysis. During the planning se-quence, initiated by the receipt of a warning orderfrom higher headquarters, the division plans ele-ment establishes a targeting time line and schedulesspecific times for the targeting team to meet.

During COA development and war gaming, theplans element identifies critical times and events,proposes PIR, and conducts target-value analysis(TVA), in support of the restated mission and thecommander’s intent. During operations, targeting isa major part of the division’s battle rhythm. Plannerspropose, detect, track, and assess HPTs in a continu-ous and carefully timed operational cycle. The com-mander approves any update.

Time is a critical resource. The targeting processcreates time-sensitive opportunities for division andsubordinate commanders. Using the time available,they position assets to detect, track, and engagecritical enemy units and capabilities.

Without the targeting process to focus the target-ing effort, the division might conduct an air assaultto the wrong place or at the wrong time. Intelligenceand maneuver assets may incorrectly focus on theenemy’s critical targets. This may result in notsupporting the division or subordinate command-ers’ intent and concept of operations. In the absenceof the targeting process, synchronization is likely tobe lost during AASLT operations.

Methodology

Targeting methodology is to decide the HPT (thatis, to identify which HPT targets to attack and whatweapons systems to use to attack the target), detectand track it until delivery, deliver lethal or nonlethal

fires, and assess the effects subsequent to delivery,and reattack as necessary.

The decide portion is the planning phase. Thedetect and track, deliver, and assess portions are theexecution phases.

The G3 has general staff proponency of the decideand deliver phases; the G2 has general staff propo-nency over detecting and tracking and assessingHPTs. The commander makes the final decision andapproves all changes.

The targeting cell or board is the official body thatdevelops targeting products in the division. TheCofS serves as the CG’s representative on the boardand is the approving authority for all targeting cellproducts.

Because many members of the division staff playsignificant roles in the planning and execution oftargeting, the targeting cell membership is broad.Normally the CofS chairs the targeting board. Anexample of targeting cell membership includes thefollowing representatives:

The G3.The G2.The FSE and DIVARTY.The aviation brigade.The EW section.The ALO.The engineer battalion.The ADA battalion.The NBC section.METT-T may dictate staff representation from—The staff judge advocate (SJA).The G5.The ANGLICO section.The special operations command and control ele-ments (SOCCE) section.The maneuver brigades.The PSYOP section.The LO.

NOTE: See also Figure 5-8.

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The targeting board convenes at least once dailyto validate the current high-payoff target list(HPTL), high-value target (HVT), and attack guid-ance based on current METT-T analysis and futureplans. One technique is to hold a cell meeting in theevening with full membership, then conduct a sec-ond meeting midmorning the next day with asmaller, executive group. A standardized targetingboard agenda for each session focuses the member-ship on events that may affect the HPTL or attackguidance.

There are many ways to validate an HPTL. Onetechnique is to review future operations in blocks oftime (H-hours, operational phases, and so on), thenvalidate the HPTL against each time block. What-ever technique is used, the targeting process is dy-namic, requiring constant validation and updatingby the coordinated efforts of those charged withexecution. To ensure that changes are communi-cated effectively, all targeting products are postedin division FRAGOs and distributed as orders.

DecideThe decide phase of the targeting process includes

developing an HPTL, target selection standards, andattack guidance. Air assault operations require adetailed accounting of enemy artillery, AD, and

maneuver targets that might influence the AASLTobjective. Therefore, HPTLs in support of suchoperations are usually as specific as possible,

The G2 section conducts the first step in thedecide phase. Using TVA, the G2 identifies HVTs,including units or capabilities critical to the successof the enemy’s most probable and most dangerousCOAs.

From the HVTs and the friendly COAs, the tar-geting team determines which HVTs to engage toensure success. The G3 normally expresses these astarget sets, such as maneuver, fire support, air de-fense, or other categories. The attack of these targetsets must be possible in the context of the conceptof operations.

The targeting team then determines critical nodeswithin these categories that the division or support-ing assets can detect and attack. The plans officerand DFSCOORD consider HPTs in terms of impor-tance to the division plan and then develop a priori-tized list.

Priorities are likely to change with the division’sbattle rhythm or because of nightly attack helicopterraids. Also, the effectiveness of observed artillery,CAS, and AI increases during daytime and causeconditions which could change priorities.

The targeting team also determines the desiredresults of an attack on HPTs. The team measures theresults in terms of delay, disruption, or limitation ofthe enemy force and expresses delay in terms of timeor events.

The team expresses disruption in terms of theenemy’s capability. Disruption is less precise thandelay or limitation. In defensive operations, theresult may be to disrupt the enemy’s reconnais-sance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA)capabilities in the main effort’s defensive sector.

Finally, the team expresses limitation in terms ofgeographical approaches. In rear operations, thedesired result might be to limit the enemy’s capabil-ity for air assaults on the division rear area.

Achieving the desired results requires the divisionto integrate several actions into one coordinatedeffort against the HPT. Limiting the commitment ofan enemy force into a given area requires integratingmaneuver, fire support, and engineer assets.

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In rear operations, limiting the enemy’s capabilityfor air assault requires integrating engineers to cre-ate obstacles on likely LZs, for MPs to monitorlikely LZs while conducting area security, and forAD assets to control likely air avenues of approach.The commander may have to position fire supportassets to range likely LZs and assign R&S tasks torear operations units. He may also position thereserve and TCF to enhance response time to airassaults.

The targeting team also develops target selectionstandards (TSS) during the decide portion of thetargeting methodology. It defines what sources oragencies will identify targets or suspected targets.

The G3 and the FSCOORD use the standardsduring execution to determine which target infor-mation warrants commitment of attack assets. Dis-criminators to determine target-selection standardsinclude—

The system’s inherent target-location error.

The susceptibility to deception.

Previously demonstrated reliability.

The weather.

The enemy’s direction-finding and jamming ca-pability.

The ROE.

The time since acquisition.

The targeting team then develops attack guidancewhich helps in synchronizing engagement of HPTsduring execution. Attack guidance gives the G3 andFSCOORD a predetermined priority of targets touse during the battle. It assigns each HPT a targetselection standard. (See FM 6-20-1.)

The targeting team determines the requirement toconduct a combat assessment during the decideprocess. The BDA shows if the HPT attack achievedthe desired results. The division SOP must clearlyidentify who is responsible for the combat assess-ment.

During a combat assessment the first decision iswhether or not the division requires a BDA againstthe HPT. Some HPTs may not be suitable for devel-oping timely BDAs. The division may achieve thedesired result at the critical time and place.

There may be no requirement or capability toconduct a combat assessment. If a requirement ex-ists to conduct a BDA, the plans element allocatesresources and determines its conduct.

During the COA briefing and orders approvalprocess, the targeting team (with the DFSCOORD)presents the results of the decide portion to the CofS,G2, G3, and division commander for approval. Thecommander ultimately approves HPTs, TSS, andattack guidance.

During the COA and orders development proc-ess, the CofS coordinates the actions of the G2 andG3 operations elements at targeting board meet-ings, providing for parallel planning. Targetingmeetings occur as units transition from one planto its sequel or at periodic intervals as listed in theunit SOP. It allows elements to make decisionswhich support the current operation and facilitatefuture operations, providing continuity to the tar-geting effort.

Detect and Track

The detect portion of the targeting process in-cludes developing the collection plan, allocatingresources, assigning intelligence-acquisition tasks,processing information into target intelligence, anddisseminating target intelligence to attack systems.The more specific the HPTs, the more likely the G2can identify, locate and track, and accurately targetthem.

The detect portion of targeting has a relationshipto the attack system. If EA assets are to attack thetarget to disrupt C3, then the detect process not onlyincludes a location but also technical data thatelectronic surveillance (ES) collected to effectivelyjam the target. If surface-to-surface indirect fires areto engage the target, detect includes an accuratetarget location and projected loiter time.

If helicopters are to attack the target, the need forlocation accuracy is less than for artillery. However,because of reaction time, the G2 must project andclosely track the target’s location. This allows theaviation brigade to conduct final preparations andupdate locations before the attack. The HPTs tar-geted for attack by AI require early identification,nomination, and continuous tracking because of thelong lead times AI requires.

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The G2 identifies, locates, tracks, and targetsHPTs in his recommendation for IEW task organi-zation and the division collection plan. Because ofthe limited range of division intelligence assets, hemust coordinate with the corps collection managerto request intelligence targeting assistance for deepHPTs. This is a major reason for coordinating corpsand division targeting meetings.

The G2 operations and ACE detect HPTs forclose and deep operations, relying heavily on corpsand EAC intelligence products. The division detectsHPTs with LRSTs, Quick Fix, Q-36 and Q-37 coun-terfire radars, and TACAIR.

Within the division intelligence system, the G2ensures all personnel are aware of HPTs. The HPTLdistribution includes the G2 operations and the ACEas a ready reference, particularly as soldiers becomefatigued.

The field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) as-sists the G2. He ensures personnel are aware of theHPTs. He coordinates with intelligence managersto screen all intelligence for targeting information.He also serves as a conduit to disseminate targetinginformation to the FSE.

The heart of the detection phase is the IPB proc-ess. The ACE continuously updates the IPB to con-firm or deny situation and event templates, usinginformation which organic, supporting, higher, ad-jacent, and subordinate assets provide.

The EW section of the ACE develops the elec-tronic preparation of the battlefield (EPB) portionof the IPB which supports HPT detection. It inte-grates information and intelligence from corps andEAC to assist in HPT development.

Reconnaissance reports support targeting in closeoperations. Intelligence acquisition tasks in the col-lection plan, or specific reconnaissance missions theG3 assigns to units, provide this information.

The DIVARTY counterfire officer routinely passesradar acquisitions to the G2 special compartmental-ized information facility. Fire support assets may havealready attacked these targets, depending on theirpriority and division attack guidance. However, theirlocations may help the ACE adjust and update situ-ation and event templates and to locate other HPTs.

Terrain analysis helps detect HPTs for rear opera-tions. The rear CP identifies likely LZs and

integrates assigned surveillance responsibilitieswith the air IPB.

The G2 synchronizes HPT detection in deep,close, and rear operations using situation, event, anddecision support templates. These help him coordi-nate and integrate resources at critical times to pro-vide required targeting information.

Committed forces detect HPTs in close opera-tions. These forces and assets detect both divisionHPTs and those of respective subordinate maneuvercommanders.

The division commander and subordinate com-manders may have different HPTs. The G2 may taskthe 1st Brigade to identify and locate enemy AD inits sector in support of a cross-FLOT aviation mis-sion. However, air defense may not be an HPT forthe 1st Brigade commander. His priority may beartillery and mortars arrayed against his main attackor reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, andtarget acquisition (RISTA) elements.

Conversely, a subordinate commander’s HPTmay duplicate those of the division commander.Coordination between echelons precludes duplicat-ing effort and resources.

The G2 operations at the main CP coordinates thecollection effort with the subordinate commander’sS2, integrating it into the division collection plan.Likewise, the G3 operations at the main CP coordi-nates the attack plan with the subordinate com-mander’s S3 and integrates it with the division’sattack.

The G2 operations at the TAC CP coordinatesHPT detection in close operations. He coordinateswith S2s of committed forces and the G2 at the mainCP to ensure collection assets focus on HPTs. Asthe G2 receives HPT detection reports, he informsthe FSE and G3 for commitment of attack resources.

The G2 operations in the rear CP coordinatesdetection of HPTs in rear operations with the G2 inthe main CP and base and base cluster S2s. Hisprimary means of detecting HPTs are R&S effortsof base and base cluster commanders.

Detecting HPTs in an enemy force requiring alevel II or III response to a rear area threat dependson contingency planning between the rear and mainCPs’ G2 operations. The rear G2 may task IEWassets to detect HPTs quickly and accurately to

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FM 71-100-3

engage them with the TCF, supporting artillery,attack helicopters, or CAS. The G2 operations at themain CP coordinates, integrates, and synchronizesreallocation of assets.

Often HPTs are not engaged despite detection.Perhaps the target is low on the priority list, orperhaps assets are initially unavailable for attack.Sometimes it is not merely the attack of an enemytarget that is advantageous, but the timely attack ofthe target—such as the attack of enemy C2 at theoutset of friendly counterattack.

Any time an HPT is detected but not engaged, anagency must track the target. Often the agency is inthe G2 fictional area. At times, however, a maneu-ver or other subordinate commander may receivethe mission.

DeliverThe deliver phase is the execution of the attack

against the target. The focal points are the G3 op-erations and DFSCOORD. Using the prioritizedHPTL, target intelligence from the G2, target-selec-tions standards, and attack guidance, they direct theattack.

The G3 operation’s role in the deliver phase is toconfirm HPTs and to direct their attack by maneuverforces. The FSE directs attack of HPTs by firesupport assets once the G2 confirms detection andthey meet attack guidance.

TACAIR and/or attack helicopters normally at-tack HPTs in deep operations. The range of divisionattack assets normally does not reach uncommittedenemy forces. Deep maneuver, though an attackoption, is a high risk.

The aviation brigade plans and executes attack ofHPTs by attack helicopters. The division main CPintegrates this attack as part of the concept of opera-tions.

Using the DST, the main CP G3 coordinates theattack time and location with the aviation brigade.He aids planning and execution by allocating re-sources and changing intelligence and fire supportpriorities.

The DFSCOORD and G3 operations in the mainCP coordinate and integrate the joint force air coor-dination center’s (JFACC) attack of HPTs. TheDFSCOORD submits AI, CAS, and tactical air

reconnaissance (TAR) nominations to the corpsFSE before the desired attack in accordance with thecorps’ SOP (generally from 24 to 36 hours beforeexecution).

The division FSE submits periodic updates on thelocation and status of targets to the corps FSE. TheG2 operations provides information for these up-dates.

The division FSE informs G3 operations of theimpending attack. The G3 operations either con-firms the attack or requests diversion to a differenttarget.

The USAF approves requests to divert after con-sidering—

The types of aircraft.

The effectiveness of munitions against the newtarget.

Enemy air defense in the vicinity of the target.

The effects of weather on target engagement.

Target distance from the old target.

Committed forces attack HPTs in close opera-tions. Committed forces’ CPs, the division TAC CP,and the main CP coordinate and synchronize at-tacks. Attack assets include maneuver, fire support,and engineers.

Maneuver forces may attack enemy reconnais-sance as part of counterreconnaissance efforts. Theymay conduct limited objective attacks to disrupt ADduring aviation operations.

Units may use smoke to disrupt enemy reconnais-sance and target acquisition. Fire support may attacka range of targets, including enemy AD, artillery,and maneuver forces.

Assess

Combat assessment is the determination of theoverall effectiveness of force employment duringmilitary operations. It includes three major compo-nents: battle damage assessment, munitions effectsassessment, and reattack recommendation.

The objective of combat assessment is to identifyrecommendations for the course of military opera-tions. The J3 is normally the single point of contact

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for combat assessment at the joint force level, as-sisted by the joint force J2.

The last phase in the targeting process is assessingthe damage to the target after attacking it. This phaseis the most critical when the division is preparing anobjective for an air assault.

The BDA requirement is determined during thedecide phase of the targeting process. Generally, theHPTs, which the CofS approves, are critical to thesuccess of the division’s mission and do require aBDA. Such targets are nominated with the realiza-tion that there are a limited number of resourcesavailable to conduct a BDA. Approved HPT nomi-nations trigger the division collection manager toupdate the division collection plan and to focuscollection assets on those targets.

The division is extremely limited in its ability tocollect BDAs. It must rely heavily on unmannedaerial vehicles (UAV) and BDAs from the corps andEAC.

There are two resources at division level that arereliable and responsive when collecting informationon deep targets. They include the six LRSTs (ifpre-positioned in a location where they can observethe target) and division aviation assets.

All BDAs are fed into the ACE where the intelli-gence analyst makes objective assessments. Timepermitting, he verifies conclusions, identifying andresolving discrepancies between analysts at variousheadquarters.

The degree of reliability and credibility of assess-ments relies largely on collection resources, whosequantity and quality significantly influenceswhether the assessment is highly reliable (concrete,quantifiable, and precise) or has a low reliability(best guess).

The best BDAs use more than one collection assetto verify each conclusion. An example of an assess-ment of high reliability would be a pilot report(PIREP) from an Apache helicopter flying over astruck target and a UAV report from corps thatconfirms the kill. An example of an assessment oflow reliability would be a civilian HUMINT sourcestating that a target was destroyed.

As soon as the intelligence analyst make hispostattack assessment of the HPTs, he feeds theinformation to the targeting cell. The results may

cause changes in battle plans and earlier decisions.If necessary, the targeting cell reexamines the deci-sions made during the decide phase. The IPB prod-ucts, the HPTL, the TSS, and/or the entire plan mayhave to be updated.

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIRDEFENSE (SEAD)

SEAD is paramount to AASLT operations. Lethalfriendly fire support suppresses, neutralizes, anddestroys known and suspected threat AD weaponsand affiliated radars, warning, and CPs. Nonlethalfriendly EW aircraft, such as the electronic helicop-ter (EH)-60A Quick Fix IIB aerial jammer, contrib-ute to SEAD programs by suppressing warning andCP communications systems.

There are three categories of SEAD: localized,complementary, and campaign. (See FM 6-20-30for a detailed discussion.) The Army has primaryresponsibility for SEAD out to the limits of ob-served fires. Beyond that the USAF has primaryresponsibility.

The Army must plan for localized SEAD forevery mission. It must consider artillery (cannonand rockets) and attack helicopter and EW assets. Ifpossible, it conducts missions to receive the benefitsof sister service SEAD activities. When the Armyand another service combine SEAD activities, theybecome joint SEAD (JSEAD).

United States Air Force, US Navy (USN), and USMarine Corps (USMC) on-board passive and activecountermeasures (such as chaff and radar jammers)and EW aircraft combine to defeat enemy AD alongflight routes and near LZs and objective areas. Thedivision routinely plans and executes SEAD alongmultiple air routes to provide several options toaircraft and to confuse enemy attempts to focusantiaircraft combat power.

The corps or JTF may task the division to supportSEAD activities for USAF, USN, and/or USMCaviation missions. SEAD provides combat multipli-ers to cross the FLOT.

Division aviation assets must survive to contrib-ute their full combat potential. Units must accom-plish SEAD quickly and efficiently to supportaviation operations. Night-capable AHBs excel in

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identifying and destroying enemy AD positions,artillery units, headquarters, and vehicle parks.

When the division commander decides to committhe aviation brigade, the aviation brigade plansSEAD support for the mission. The division sup-ports the aviation brigade commander and his staffand synchronizes overall operations, includingSEAD. The division concept of the aviation missiondetermines the complexity of the supporting SEADoperation.

The division’s primary responsibility is to sup-port suppression of ground-based enemy AD weap-ons to the limits of observed fire. The division hassecondary responsibility out to the range limit of itsindirect-fire weapons. In most situations, when re-ported target locations are accurate, the division cansuppress targets with unobserved indirect fire.

By coordinating cross-FLOT operations with thecorps or JTF and/or the USAF, the division mightbenefit from SEAD already planned and dissemi-nated in the air tasking order (ATO) and/or theairspace control order (ACO). Any residual benefitthe division can obtain from other SEAD operationsacts as a combat multiplier.

The division supports SEAD with specific criticalcombat and CS elements to synergize combat poweragainst enemy AD. Unity of effort is essential andrequires detailed planning, close coordination, andprecise timing.

SEAD EffectsWithin each category, SEAD effects maybe de-

structive or disruptive. Destructive SEAD destroyssurface-to-air defenses or personnel.

Destructive SEAD’s effects are cumulative andsteadily reduce aircraft attrition. When employedalone, it places large demands on combat powersuch as artillery pieces and ammunition. The com-mander must integrate destructive SEAD with dis-ruptive SEAD, such as jammers, which aregenerally reusable resources.

Disruptive SEAD can temporarily degrade, de-ceive, delay, or neutralize surface-to-air defenses orpersonnel. There are two types of disruptiveSEAD—active and passive.

Active suppression includes jamming, chaff,flares, and tactics such as deception, avoidance, or

evasion. Passive suppression includes camouflage,infrared shielding, warning receivers, and materieldesign features.

Disruptive SEAD complements destructiveSEAD. It—

Degrades jammable threats.

Assists destructive airborne suppression systemsin suppressing surface-to-air defense systems.

Temporarily degrades or neutralizes enemy ADsystems when their destruction is not possible orfeasible.

Sustains suppression effects achieved by destruc-tion once threats are at levels commensurate withJSEAD objectives.

The division conducts localized SEAD to supportcross-FLOT operations as part of its scheme ofmaneuver. Indirect-fire support weapons and IEWassets are the primary systems the force uses to opencorridors or to suppress specific attack objectives.

Suppression begins before aircraft arrive andshould continue as long as aircraft are in range,unless the system suppressing the ADA would en-danger the aircraft. The division establishes egressroutes and suppresses them in a similar manner.

Coordination, synchronization, and timing arecritical to the success of suppression operations.Fire support, A2C2, and TACAIR control systemscoordinate these aspects with aviation elements con-ducting cross-FLOT missions.

It is important for the division staff and aviationunits to know to what extent the division com-mander wants to commit resources to the destruc-tion of enemy AD systems versus how important itis to simply disrupt them. If the division intends todestroy all enemy AD along the flight route, it mustcommit the following for each enemy AD system:

Acquisition assets to detect enemy AD locations.

Observers to confirm AD locations, to adjustfriendly destructive fires, and to submit a targetdamage assessment (TDA) report after themission.

Combat assets to engage the enemy AD system.

Class V munitions to destroy each enemy ADsystem.

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Logistic assets to support the committed combatsystems.Such missions are resource-intensive operations

when the enemy has several AD systems. The divi-sion probably will not attempt to destroy everytarget it detects. In all probability it will issue guid-ance that provides parameters for a mixture of de-structive and disruptive SEAD.

The division continuously conducts complemen-tary SEAD. SEAD attacks enemy AD targets ofopportunity that might adversely affect current orfuture aviation operations when units and/or sensorsidentify and locate them or when attacks are consis-tent with available resources and commander’spriorities.

The FSE may prioritize complementary SEADefforts in specific areas to facilitate a future aviationmission. When this exceeds the division’s capabili-ties, the G3 requests support from corps.

If the division attacks AD targets of opportunityas they find them, they do so with destructive fires.Disruptive fires would only let the enemy know hisposition was found. If the division cannot, or de-cides not to, immediately attack the enemy ADsystem, the division maintains the location of thistarget so fires can suppress it at the earliestopportunity.

Division SEAD OperationsThe best protection against air defense is to select

routes that avoid ADA. The routes selected deter-mine the resources required to conduct an effectiveSEAD program.

The G3 must consider METT-T factors as hedevelops COAs for cross-FLOT or near-FLOT em-ployment of the aviation brigade. Key considera-tions in staff estimates which may impact divisionsupport of SEAD operations include—

What is the enemy force and status (not just theenemy ADA)?Is the enemy attacking or defending?Is the division facing the enemy’s main or sup-porting effort?Can the division divert attack assets to conductthe SEAD without accepting unnecessary risk inother areas of the close battle?

How much can the division commit to SEAD atthe required time?

Does the division have adequate Class V muni-tions to conduct destructive SEAD operations?

Can the division logistically support resupply ofSEAD operations along with other operations?Does terrain reinforce nap-of-earth (NOE) flightsor have the effect of isolating enemy ADA?Does terrain result in radar blind spots the divi-sion can exploit?

Does weather favor use of aviation assets?What current division operations will impacttroops available to support the SEAD program forthe aviation mission?

What, if any, intelligence collection will the divi-sion have to reduce or terminate to support thedevelopment of SEAD targets?Is ADA an HPT?

Did the G2 develop and maintain a good enemyAD database or will he have to redirect collectionassets to target ADA? (An electronic intelligence(ELINT) or communications intelligence(COMINT) report on ADA used for situationdevelopment may be insufficient for artillery tar-geting.)

What attack assets are available to support theSEAD program?Are adequate FARPs and Class III supplies avail-able to support SEAD operations?

Will they have to reposition?Do attack assets have the correct amount and

types of munitions?

What kind of mission is this? An attack mission?A raid? An air assault? An LRSD insertion?

StaffResponsibilities

SEAD is a force-protection requirement inherentin aviation operations. The division aviation brigadeplans, prepares, and executes SEAD with divisionstaff cells in support of its operations. The divisioncommander and staff synchronize SEAD support

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for aviation operations with the division’s currentand future operations.

The division G3 coordinates with the aviationbrigade’s S3 during mission development, He coor-dinates, integrates, recommends, and synchronizeschanges to priorities and task organization to sup-port the aviation brigade. The aviation brigade S3integrates and synchronizes these assets and capa-bilities into the aviation brigade plan.

The aviation brigade S3 A2C2 element plans,coordinates, and submits air corridors to the G3operations A2C2 element for synchronization anddivision commander approval. The G3 may syn-chronize a ground attack with an air operation toopen a corridor. A forward thrust by maneuverforces may effectively disrupt the enemy and hisFAAD system.

Maneuver units’ direct-fire weapons are the mostresponsive and effective means of attacking close-inAD targets. Because the enemy may locate signifi-cant AD near the FLOT, planners should look foropportunities to bring ground and air penetrationstogether in time and space to benefit from each.Maneuver units engaging enemy AD systems reportthem through operations channels in accordancewith unit SOPs.

The aviation brigade S3 coordinates FARPs, for-ward assembly areas (FAAs), and other terrain re-quirements with committed maneuver brigades.The G3 resolves conflicts or recommends solutionsto the division commander.

Situation and target development is critical inSEAD. Working closely with the aviation brigadeS2, the G2 directs intelligence organizations to iden-tify and locate enemy AD order of battle. He alsofinds critical nodes which, if interdicted, wouldsignificantly degrade enemy capabilities. He inte-grates the aviation brigade commander’s PIR, IR,and requests for intelligence information into thedivision collection plan.

Based on the aviation brigade mission, the G2may recommend changes to the division com-mander’s PIR and IR. However, he must ensure theysupport division operations, not just the aviationbrigade’s SEAD.

The aviation brigade S2 forwards requests forintelligence information to committed maneuverunits to determine enemy AD locations in their

AOs. He integrates this information with intelli-gence from the G2 and develops and disseminatestarget information to the aviation brigade FSE.

The FSE recommends to the G3 required changesto the artillery task organization and priority of firesto support the aviation brigade. It may recommenda mix of DS, reinforcing (R), or GS-R artillery, orit may assign the aviation brigade priority of firesfor a specific mission. METT-T factors influencethe choice of method.

The FSE also may recommend changes to thedivision HPTL, attack-guidance matrix, and target-selection standards. Depending on the time avail-able, he may direct repositioning of fire supportassets to support the overall mission as well as toprovide SEAD support for the aviation brigade’smission.

Artillery units support the operation with pre-planned fires and on-call missions. Electronic war-fare assets degrade the effectiveness of enemy airdefense by jamming key C2 nets.

The FSE coordinates additional fires for the avia-tion brigade at the request of the brigade tire supportofficer (FSO). The FSE also coordinates SEAD fortargets outside the division’s boundaries but whichare capable of ranging air corridors.

The opening of a corridor is a major operationrequiring a heavy commitment of resources. Thedivision can only establish a limited number ofcorridors in a given time. Therefore, the divisionFSE must coordinate with adjacent and subordinateunits to ensure all division suppression operationsare mutually supportive and to capitalize on enemyvulnerabilities.

Using artillery smoke in SEAD operations is bothan advantage and a disadvantage. Smoke hides air-craft from enemy AD weapons that use visual ac-quisition. However, it is ineffective againstelectronic sensor-guided AD systems. Also, smokeobscures targets and prevents friendly aircraft fromidentifying enemy AD weapons. Smoke is a limitedresource; units must carefully plan and coordinatesmoke usage,

The MLRS, if available to the AASLT division,is an effective SEAD weapon. It can create corridorsat the FLOT or engage several targets with its mul-tiple-aim point capability.

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Jamming enemy AD system C2 nodes has twoobjectives. First, it can force enemy firing units toactivate their radars to acquire targets rather thanrelying on the C2 system, thus exposing themselvesto acquisition and attack. However, this is usefulonly if systems are poised to attack when the enemyactivates its radars. Second, jamming also degradesC2 systems during friendly air operations. This typeof suppression requires close coordination of flightand jamming schedules. Because of the limitednumber and capabilities of division jammers, theEW staff officer in the FSE synchronizes jammingof SEAD targets with the total division electronicattack (EA) effort.

ARMY AIRSPACECOMMAND AND CONTROL

(A2C 2)

Successful division operations and engagementsmay depend on the effective use of airspace over theAO. Within this airspace, a high density of friendlyweapons systems and aerial platforms with overlap-ping operating envelopes and flight profiles mustcontribute to combat effectiveness without interfer-ing with one another, hindering the efforts offriendly combatants, or causing fratricide.

Division A2C2 consists of all actions required tosynchronize airspace use. The division A2C2 ele-ment performs these actions under the G3 air’ssupervision.

The A2C2 element coordinates airspace user re-quirements with the commander’s plan for effectiveairspace use over the division’s AO. The A2C2

element is a separate cell in the division main CP,normally located near the division fire support cell.Its primary tasks include—

Identifying and resolving airspace user conflicts.Coordinating and integrating airspace user re-quirements within the division’s AO and withother services and adjacent units.Maintaining A2C2 information displays andmaps.Developing and coordinating airspace controlSOPs, plans, and annexes to the division’sOPORD and OPLANs, and disseminating ACOs,messages, and overlays.

FM 71-100-3

Approving, staffing, and forwarding to corps re-quests for airspace control measures requiringairspace control authority (ACA) approval andspecial-use airspace.To accomplish these tasks, A2C2 elements con-

tinuously update G3 air and A2C2 displays andmaps. This coordination helps synchronize combatpower within the limited airspace over the division’sAO.

Airspace Control MeasuresTo retain simplicity and flexibility, A2C2 element

methodology stresses procedural control. Unitsmaintain control by using airspace control measuresand SOPs (air axis, air corridor). Figure 5-9 depictsairspace control measures available to provide pro-cedural control.

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Airspace control measuresproval are forwarded throughment. (See Figure 5-10.)

requiring ACA ap- The division A2C2 element includes the G3 airthe corps A2C2 ele- element, ADA element, aviation element, and the

ALO. The A2C2 element often includes an MI bri-NOTE: See FM 100-103 for a detailed discussionof the A2C2 system.

Command Post FunctionsThe division A2C2 element is under the G3. The

G3 air supervises A2C2 element operations.The A2C2 element conducts 24-hour operations

and is the focal point at the main CP for all airspacecontrol activities related to division operations. Itmaintains close coordination with the TAC CP, therear CP, and the corps or JTF A2C2 element. Thisensures that airspace requirements (which changeas the tactical situation changes) are timely andeffectively met.

No formal A2C2 element exists at the TAC CP.

gade LO and an air traffic service (ATS) LO.

The A2C2 element coordinates with—

The FSE.

The G3 air.

The aviation brigade.

The G4 airlift.

The ADA battalion.

The naval aviation liaison element (NALE).

The ATS unit assigned to the division.

The G2 section.

The G4 section and, when required, theSelected TAC CP staff and liaison elements perform ANGLICO.airspace control as collateral functions.

The A2C2 element and the brigade S3 air.

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Army airspace command and control staff sectionsand liaison element representatives are only withinthe main CP.

Personnel assigned to A2C2 accomplish two pri-mary tasks. First, they assist in coordinating theirparent units’ assets, provide technical expertise, andserve as liaison between the commander, his head-quarters, and their parent units. Second, they syn-chronize their parent units’ airspace requirementswith other airspace users of the combined-armsteam and services. As an additional task, the A2C2

staff often obtains and passes BDA informationfrom A2C2 channels to the G2 staff.

Personnel performing A2C2 staff functions re-quire an in-depth knowledge of A2C2 doctrine andprocedures, corps or JTF and division airspace con-trol plans, and division airspace control SOPs. Thisrequires assigning personnel to perform staff dutiesin the A2C2 on a fill-time basis. It is recommendedthat A2C2 personnel receive formal training (forexample, attending the Air-Ground OperationsSchool (AGOS)) to perform their duties duringtraining and real-world missions.

The Tactical CP

The G3 operations cell responds to airspace con-flicts and changing requirements during close op-erations based on committed forces information andon reports, requests, and coordination with the mainCP A2C2 element. The operations section maintainsand displays unit locations down to battalion level.Committed forces provide OPLANs and OPORDs,graphics, and FRAGOs to the operations section.

The fire support cell receives and maintains loca-tions of artillery and AD units and their coverageand range fans. The ALO has information concern-ing sorties-how many, when, and where. He alsohas information on MRRs, CPs, and initial points(IPs) that are in effect. The A2C2 element at the mainCP provides the TAC CP with effective or plannedair corridors affecting the close AO.

The A2C2 cell uses automated deconflictionmethods when possible to expedite the deconflic-tion process. The G3 operations cell then requeststhe A2C2 element to resolve the conflict with af-fected units. In time-critical instances, the TAC CPmay issue directives to resolve an immediate

conflict and then pass overall synchronization to theA2C2 element at the main CP.

The Main CP

The A2C2 element at the main CP is the focal pointfor A2C2 in the division. It synchronizes airspaceuse for current deep, close, and rear operations andprovides input and technical expertise to the planscell for future operations.

Various organizations and CPs provide the infor-mation required to synchronize division airspace use.The A2C2 element keeps this information on one A2C2

map. The G3 air keeps up to date on branches andsequels to current deep, close, and rear operations.

Support to current deep, close, and rear operationsbegins with planning and coordinating airspace con-trol measures that the division or ACA implement.In the case of LLTRs and MRRs, the A2C2 receivesinput from committed unit S3 airs, correlates theinformation, and provides it to the corps A2C2

element.

The A2C2 element normally plans, coordinates, andcorrelates information in cycles, every 8, 12, or 24hours. It then makes recommendations based on divi-sion and brigade missions, concepts of operations, andintent. The objective is to prevent airspace controlmeasures from restricting ground operations-espe-cially artillery, mortar, and AD operations.

War-gaming the concept of operations, branches,and sequels should indicate artillery, AD, and Armyaviation locations to avoid. The A2C2 element de-velops on-call airspace control measures to supportvarious branches and sequels.

During operations, the A2C2 element anticipatesactivating airspace control measures to precludeairspace conflicts. Members of the A2C2 elementreview the ACO as they receive it to identify con-flicts. For example, GS AD assets positioned in anLLTR may require repositioning.

Artillery units positioned in a division air corridoror positioned so their trajectory crosses an air corri-dor may have to reposition to fire SEAD missionsin support of aircraft using the corridor. In each case,there are other options besides repositioning. (Onesuch would be establishing airspace coordinationareas for the artillery or changes to AD units’ weap-ons control status (WCS)). The A2C2 element

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informs the G3 of conflicts which it cannot resolveat division level or through coordination with thecorps A2C2 element.

The Rear CPThe rear CP does not have an A2C2 element, but

it does have an aviation cell to provide A2C2 inter-face with the division main CP or aviation brigade.The rear CP G3 operations cell responds to airspaceconflicts as required and coordinates with the A2C2

element in the main CP. The A2C2 element plans,coordinates, and monitors A2C2 for rear operations.

During rear operations, tactical changes may re-quire changes to airspace control in the rear. A levelIII response to a rear area threat primarily affectsLLTRs, SAAFRs, and other air corridors that transitthrough the rear.

Army A2C2 PlanningThe division should limit A2C2 plans and associ-

ated control measures to those necessary to ensureconformity with the tactical plan and aircraft safety.They should make maximum use of proceduralcontrol measures. The scheme of maneuver andcommander’s intent determine and govern theirdesign.

The division plans as much detail as the situationand time allow. The situation’s urgency and the timeavailable dictate whether to produce an A2C2 annex.If used, the annex includes only information whichclarifies or amplifies unit SOPs or which specifiesactions and procedures necessary to synchronizeairspace use.

In many situations, the fast-paced and dynamictempo of combat operations may cause the A2C2

staff to use an A2C2 overlay and to issue verbaldirectives to subordinate forces. Using field SOPs,ACOs, and an airspace control plan standardizesprocedures, reduces the amount of coordination,provides implementing instructions, and in manysituations, reduces the need for an A2C2 annex.

Army A2C2 in BattleOnce the battle is in progress, the A2C2 element

at the main CP continues to monitor subordinate andparent units and to modify plans as required. Effec-tive coordination, rapid exchange of information,

timely decision making, and rapid issuance of or-ders promote agility and initiative.

Army airspace command and control actions dur-ing the battle are the same as those performed duringthe planning phase. During the battle, emphasis ison—

Anticipating and reacting to changes in the tacti-cal situation.Anticipating future requirements based on thebattle’s progress.Facilitating the ability of the commander to influ-ence the battle with air assets (identifying poten-tial airspace conflicts and taking immediateaction to resolve them).The following activities require actions to change

current operations:Conflicts that develop in the division rear area.Corps-directed specific operations such as a deepoperation.Changes to the corps OPORD affecting airspaceusage in response to the tactical situation.The division A2C2 element cannot resolve a con-flict at its level.The division A2C2 element maintains data on

ATS facilities, current and planned restrictive meas-ures, and special joint-use requirements. The A2C2

element assists the commander by making recom-mendations concerning the impact ADA weaponscontrol status has on air operations.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

Electronic warfare is the means through which thedivision commander protects his own electronicsystems while attacking those of the enemy. Elec-tronic warfare—

Exploits, disrupts, and deceives the enemy C2

system.Protects friendly use of communications and non-communications systems.Enhances the division’s agility and initiativewhile limiting the enemy’s.May be offensive or defensive and is an essentialelement of combat power.

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Electronic warfare is any military action involv-ing the use of electromagnetic and directed energyto control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attackthe enemy. The three major subdivisions withinelectronic warfare are electronic attack (EA), elec-tronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare sup-port (ES).

Electronic warfare is the use of electromagneticenergy to determine, exploit, reduce, or preventhostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum andto ensure friendly use thereof. Electronic warfaresupport and EA are offensive EW components.Electronic protection is the defensive portion ofEW. Electronic warfare support is that division ofelectronic warfare involving actions tasked by, orunder direct control of, an operational com-mander.

Electronic warfare support is used to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentionaland unintentional radiated electromagnetic energyfor the purpose of immediate threat recognition.Thus, ES provides information required for imme-diate decisions involving EW operations and othertactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting,and homing. Electronic warfare support data can beused to produce SIGINT, COMINT, and ELINT.

Electronic attack involves the use of electromag-netic or directed energy to attack personnel, facili-ties, or equipment with the intent of degrading,neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capabil-ity. Electronic attack includes preventing or reduc-ing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagneticspectrum, such as manning and electromagneticdeception, and employment of weapons that useeither electromagnetic or directed energy as theirprimary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio fre-quency weapons, particle beams).

Electronic protection involves actions taken toprotect personnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemy employment of EWthat degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combatcapability. It protects the friendly use of the electro-magnetic spectrum and the location of critical in-stallations and systems. It consists of anti-ES andanti-EA. Anti-ES prevents the enemy from inter-cepting, locating, and identifying friendly electronicsystems. Anti-EA precludes jamming or electronicdeception of friendly forces. (See also FM 90-2, (S)FM 34-40, and FM 34-1.)

FM 71-100-3

Roles and RelationshipsThe G3 exercises staff supervision over EW ac-

tivities along with the G2 and the ADSO. The EWstaff officer—

Is responsible to the G3 for planning and coordi-nating EW.Coordinates electronic deception and integrates itinto the deception plan.Prepares both the EW estimate and the EW annexto the division OPORD and/or OPLAN.The G2 conducts ES. The G2 operations is re-

sponsible for planning, coordinating, and integrat-ing ES in division operations. He coordinates ESrequirements with the EW staff officer and the ACE.

The EPB occurs within the ACE. Units coordinateguarded frequencies with the EW staff officer topreclude jamming.

The ACE maintains the status of EW assets, col-lects supporting technical data, and assesses theeffectiveness of division EW operations. He alsoconducts the mission management of EW assets.

The division signal officer (SO) is responsible forEP. The ADSO, at the division main CP, plans,coordinates, and integrates EP into division opera-tions. He coordinates with the EW staff officer andthe G2 and G3 operations to determine and dissemi-nate the restricted frequency list consisting of taboo,guarded, and protected frequencies and to identifynegative effects of EA on division operations.

The division DFSCOORD in the FSE integratesEA into the division fire support plan. Hecoordinates with the EW staff officer to ensure EAuse is consistent with the division commander’sconcept and intent for fire support and the capabili-ties and availability of EA assets.

The EW staff officer—Identifies HPTs and uses the HPTL, AGM, anddivision synchronization matrix to plan the attackand coordinates EA taskings with the ACE, FSE,G3 operations, and SO.Coordinates with the ACE to ensure he directsassets to the proper positions and that they areavailable to accomplish EA taskings.Coordinates with the FSE to ensure EA targets arevalid and require attack.

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FM 71-100-3

Coordinates with the G3 operations to ensure thedivision attacks EA targets according to the syn-chronization matrix.

Coordinates with the SO to ensure EA targets arenot on the protected or guarded frequencies list toensure EA operations do not interfere withfriendly operations or target frequencies that areproviding significant intelligence.Coordinates with the G3 and ADSO in the mainCP to plan EW support of deception operations.At division level, electronic deception consists

primarily of manipulative or simulative electronicdeception. Manipulative electronic deception altersthe friendly electromagnetic profile or deliberatelytransmits false information. Simulative electronicdeception simulates nonexisting units or capabili-ties or units and capabilities at false locations.

The ADSO conducts EP planning at the divisionlevel. Threat evaluation and integration during theIPB indicate the enemy’s capability to conduct EWagainst the division. The ADSO, with the G3, deter-mines which critical friendly emitters to protect. Heplans EP by assigning taboo and guarded frequen-cies; frequency allocation; use of meaconing, intru-sion, jamming, and interference (MIJI) reports;terrain masking; and attack of enemy jammers.

Electronic warfare planning differs little betweenoffensive and defensive operations. The primarydifference is proximity of systems to the FLOT. Inboth offense and defense, the division employs EWassets as part of MI company teams and leapfrogsfrom position to position to maintain coverage.

Planning ConsiderationsThe EW staff officer, G2 operations, ACE, and

ADSO consider EW priorities as they plan andcoordinate EW in support of division operations.Priorities include—

Protecting friendly C3 systems.Attacking critical fire support capabilities.Degrading (or locating for destruction) criticalenemy AD elements.Disrupting critical enemy C3 links.For EA, planners consider the target-link distance

(the distance between the enemy transmitter and

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receiver) as well as the distance between the jammerand enemy receiver. They consider radio LOS, an-tenna polarization, jammer power and enemy trans-mitter power, band-width compatibility, and terrain,weather, and vegetation.

In ES, planners consider system accuracy anddistance to the target. A minimum of three lines ofbearing (LOBs) is necessary to accurately locate atarget through direction-finding.

Planners consider the enemy’s capability to con-duct electronic deception against the division. In EPplanning, planners consider the protection inherentin division communications equipment and proce-dures as well as the enemy’s capabilities and thedivision’s ability to quickly locate and attack enemyjammers.

Based on the division commander’s planningguidance, the G2 and the MI battalion commanderrecommend the task organization of IEW assets tothe G3. This task organization incorporates supportto division deep, close, and rear operations as wellas to committed maneuver brigades. The task or-ganization incorporates ES support to situation andtarget development and to EA and EP targetingaccording to the division’s HPTL and attack guid-ance matrix (AGM).

The ADSO conducts EP planning. Planning be-gins with identifying essential friendly emitters andsensitive communications to protect.

The staff evaluates friendly electronic emitters,signatures, and profiles based on their vulnerabili-ties to EW and SIGINT capabilities. They then planEP to overcome these vulnerabilities.

The G2 integrates ES planning in the overall IPB.While terrain and weather both impact friendly andenemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum, ESplanning begins during the threat evaluation phaseof the IPB.

The ACE in the main CP conducts an EPB. Thisprocess identifies the electronic template of theenemy force, is part of overall situation develop-ment, and is the initial step in developing ES require-ments for EA.

Electronic warfare support assets confirm or denythe EPB. The EPB supports development of situ-ational, event, and decision support templates dur-ing the threat integration phase of the IPB process.

FM 71-100-3

The EW staff officer and the ACE also use thisinformation to identify and plan targets for EA.

Electronic attack planning incorporates the re-sults of IPB and EPB into the commander’s conceptand intent through the targeting process. The com-mander and G3 identify EA HPTs.

DECEPTIONOPERATIONS

Deception is an important combat multiplier. Itenhances the conditions that allow the commanderto effectively mass forces at decisive times andlocations. It should be a consideration in everydivision operation.

The ultimate goal of division-level deception op-erations is to manipulate enemy behavior and createopportunities for exploitation. Battlefield deceptionenables the commander to conduct operations witheconomy of force characteristics, mass at a decisivepoint, and conserve and protect the force. Well-planned and executed deceptions, not luck, achievesurprise and its benefits.

Units cannot plan deception operations inde-pendently of tactical operations. The primary con-sideration in any deception is the corps’ mission anddeception plan. When possible, units should con-duct centralized execution of deception operations.

Units must synchronize deception operationsfrom the top down. Failure to fully synchronizedeception operations can result in wasted combatpower and possible disaster.

Higher and, when necessary, adjacent head-quarters should be aware of division deceptionoperations. Failure to coordinate these operationscan damage other units’ operations or deceptions.

A deception must be plausible. The enemy mustbelieve the division’s actions reflect doctrine andthat it is capable of doing what the deception indi-cates. The deception effort must feed the enemyinformation in a coordinated, redundant effortthrough multiple channels to ensure the enemy seesthe deception.

Deceptions should be adaptable and flexible.As the plan changes, the deception may alsochange. However, the division must portray the

deception for as long as it is feasible and beneficial.

Integration is vital to successful deceptions. Itmust extend into every facet of the plan, includingthe logistics, fire support, air defense, signal, engi-neer, and other plans.

The target of any deception is the enemy decisionmaker. He has the authority to react. It does no goodto design elaborate deceptions if the enemy cannotcollect, analyze, or react to the information or if thedeception is contrary to normal operatingprocedures.

Feedback is important. The division must estab-lish the means to verify the deception. Usually, thedivision’s normal intelligence infrastructure can ac-complish this. However, it may not always be pos-sible. Therefore, all plans, including deceptionplans, must be flexible.

Finally, the division must consider cost of a de-ception in terms of resource expenditure. For adeception to appear real, the division must dedicateadequate resources. The cost depends on the type ofdeception (demonstration, display, feint, or ruse)and its objective.

The division must also measure costs in risk andflexibility. Flexibility is built into the plan by usingbranches, sequels, or executable deceptions.

The five components of battlefield deception arethe objective, target, story, plan, and event. Theobjective is what the division wants the enemy todo. The target is the enemy decision maker. Thestory is what the division portrays to the enemy. Theplan is the concept of how the story is portrayed.The event is a specific action performed as part ofthe plan. Since deception is inherent in planning andconcurrent with current operations, the division G3has overall responsibility for deception (with sup-port from other staff agencies).

If the intent is to induce the enemy to do some-thing the division can exploit, the commander andstaff address deception early in the planning proc-ess. The division wastes its time and resources if itbegins work on the deception operations after thedivision has developed, war-gamed, and decided ona COA. It becomes an afterthought, ill-planned be-cause of lack of time, and ill-resourced because thedivision has already allocated its assets in the wargame of the chosen COA.

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FM 71-100-3

In providing his deception guidance, the divisioncommander considers—

What he wants the enemy to do.How the division can best make the enemy do it.What forces and materiel he will dedicate to theeffort.How he expects the enemy to behave.How the division can benefit from that behavior.These guidelines require the deception to do more

than just alter or reinforce enemy perceptions. It mustmanipulate enemy behavior and then exploit it.

The staff uses this guidance to develop a decep-tion plan or COA in the same manner it developsand analyzes other COAs. The G2 provides normalinput, identifying enemy weaknesses, vulnerabili-ties, and collection assets that can detect the decep-tion.

Done properly, a deception is part of a COA. Likeany COA, deception development involves the en-tire staff with developed and implemented OPSECmeasures.

COUNTERFIRE

The enemy may employ fire support to createopportunities for maneuver forces to exploit. Thedivision should establish conditions for decisivecombat maneuver through destruction of the en-emy’s fire support system. Effective and efficientcounterfire requires integration of intelligence, tiresupport, and maneuver.

Counterfire consists of fires targeted throughoutthe battlefield that attack the enemy’s entire firesupport system. Counterfire—

Assists the division in achieving and maintainingagility and initiative.Gains freedom of action and protects the force.Deprives the enemy of freedom of action.

Components of CounterfireCounterfire maybe proactive or reactive. Proac-

tive counterfire is the detection and attack of enemyfiring and nonfiring systems before they engagefriendly forces. Units must link proactive

counterfire with the targeting effort. As the nameimplies, reactive counterfire is a response to theenemy’s engagement of the division.

Proactive counterfire requires the intelligencesystem to identify, locate, and accurately targetelements of the enemy fire support system. Thecorps normally conducts the proactive portion ofcounterfire. Still, the division may conduct proac-tive counterfire against enemy fire support systemswithin range of organic and supporting intelligenceand fire support systems.

Reactive counterfire requires integration of intel-ligence, target acquisition, fire support, maneuver,and C2. The intelligence system must use the IPB topredict likely locations of enemy fire support sys-tems. Using the prediction, the division positionsand tasks intelligence sensors and target-acquisitionassets to confirm the IPB and provide target infor-mation. Fire support assets engage enemy fire sup-port systems on the basis of this information.

Maneuver elements provide information fromR&S. They also may engage enemy target-acquisi-tion assets located on or near the FLOT. The C2

system provides the reporting network for counter-fire and identifies priorities for force protection.

Planning Considerations

Division planning considerations for counterfireinclude—

The corps counterfire plan.

The capabilities of friendly and enemy fire sup-port.

The capabilities of friendly and enemy targetacquisition.

Command and control capabilities.

The division must understand its role within thecorps’ counterfire plan. The corps commander’sconcept and intent define the corps’ counterfireplan.

Corps fire support and artillery support plansfurther define corps and division roles. The corpsdelineates responsibilities, establishes priorities,and allocates resources based on the corps missionand the part counterfire plays in the mission.

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FM 71-100-3

Within the division, the first counterfire consid-eration is the enemy’s capabilities. The G2 providesthis information as part of the IPB and targetingprocess.

Counterfire considerations include the enemy’smission and whether the division is facing the en-emy’s main effort, enemy mortars and artillery,enemy EW, and fixed- and rotary-wing assets. TheG2 includes ranges, echelons, and types of artilleryin the estimate.

The G2 must also consider the munitions capa-bilities of the enemy’s fire support system. Forexample, weapons that fire improved conventionalmunitions (ICMs) are a greater threat than thosecapable of firing only standard high-explosive (HE)munitions.

The G3 and DFSCOORD must consider the ca-pabilities of friendly weapons systems. The corps’155-millimeter and 203-millimeter howitzers canfire 30 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles(RAP). However, these munitions do not have theeffectiveness of dual-purpose, improved, conven-tional munitions (DPICMs) which have a maxi-mum range of 18 kilometers for the 155-millimeterhowitzer and 23 kilometers for the 203-millimeterhowitzer.

Normally, the MLRS is the counterfire weapon ofchoice. It has a maximum range of 30 kilometers, buta minimum range of 10 kilometers. If positioned wellforward to range deep into the enemy formation, itmay not be capable of ranging counterfire targets onor near the FLOT.

Enemy target acquisition capabilities also impactdivision counterfire planning. The division mustplan to attack and destroy enemy artillery reconnais-sance elements, counterfire radars, and commandOPs through an aggressive counterreconnaissanceeffort. The division must also strictly employ andenforce EP to negate or limit enemy direction-find-ding capabilities.

Similarly, the commander and staff must considerthe division’s and corps’ target acquisition capabili-ties. These capabilities include the Q-36 Fire Finderradar, Q-37 radars, IEW systems, UAVs, forwardobservers, and combat observation/lasing teams(COLTs) employed with maneuver forces. The di-vision must also consider the threats to each of these.

The C2 organization of friendly artillery is also aconsideration. The division must decide whether tocentralize or decentralize artillery counterfire. Aug-menting the division with a corps artillery detach-ment and a target-acquisition detachment providesadditional flexibility.

Centralization facilitates massing of artillery andprecludes duplication of effort. It also enhances useof counterfire radars (Figure 5-11).

However, centralization places a heavy burdenon the headquarters responsible for executing artil-lery counterfire. If the division has a reinforcingcorps FA brigade, it may direct the reinforcing FAbrigade to execute artillery-delivered counterfire(but the DIVARTY commander still has the overallresponsibility to execute the division’s counterfire

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FM 71-100-3

efforts. This allows the corps FA brigade to focuson counterfire while the DIVARTY headquartersfocuses on artillery support to committed forces.

TechniquesThe corps should delineate counterfire responsi-

bilities between the corps and division. This allowseach echelon to focus on a specific area of thebattlefield and prevents duplication of effort.

Counterfire planning begins with the targetingprocess during COA development and war-gaming.The targeting cell identifies HVTs and refines theminto HPTs for the division. It recommends whattargets to attack, how to detect and engage them, andhow to determine the results (through the BDA),The targeting cell does this as part of the division’stotal targeting process, not as a separate action.

Generally, the division conducts reactive coun-terfire against enemy mortars and artillery. Thecorps normally engages enemy artillery and otherfire support assets. Maneuver brigades may havecounterfire responsibility against mortars and artil-lery of committed regiments, while the divisionconducts counterfire against enemy divisionartillery.

The commander prioritizes counterfire targetswithin the division’s zone. Normally, enemy firesupport facing the division’s main attack or maindefensive effort receives priority for counterfire.However, when the division employs a unit in aneconomy of force role, that unit may receivepriority.

Once the commander decides what to attack withcounterfire, his staff can plan how to detect targets.Again, the IPB process is the first step.

Using situation and event templates from the IPBprocess, the G2 and FSE focus IEW sensors andtarget-acquisition assets on likely enemy fire sup-port positions. The division uses the engineer terrainteam, computer software, or other methods to de-velop visibility diagrams which assist in the place-ment of acquisition radars and observers.

Units establish call-for-fire zones (CFFZs)around likely enemy firing positions. Ground sur-veillance radars may provide combat informationon enemy firing units occupying likely firing posi-tions. They may also provide a degree of BDA

indicating that units are displacing after counterfireshave engaged a likely firing position. They may alsocue other target-acquisition assets such as the aerialfire support observer (AFSO).

Similarly, with direction finding, ES assets maylocate key fire support headquarters for lethal attackor jamming. Units may also use ES assets to identifyand locate artillery reconnaissance elements orcommand OPs as part of the division counterrecon-naissance effort.

The division employs a variety of techniques toexecute counterfire. It uses the counterfire programwhen there is little movement of enemy fire supportassets and sufficient time available to identify, lo-cate, and target them. This technique allows thedivision to disrupt enemy fire support systems atcritical times, such as during a counterattack or apenetration.

Another technique is strictly reactive counterfire.It involves attacking enemy fire support assets dur-ing or immediately following enemy engagement offriendly forces. A cuing agent normally initiates thistechnique. The FAIO, or any other person desig-nated by the FSCOORD, directs the counterfireradar to radiate, acquire the target, and transmit afire mission to its reporting headquarters.

Using counterfire radars requires several deci-sions. First, the division examines the threat todecide if radars will operate in a continuous orcommand-cued manner. If the threat of acquiringthe radars is low, the commander may direct con-tinuous cuing. If the threat is high, the divisionnormally employs command cuing.

Command cuing requires cuing agents to directthe radar to radiate. These agents are normally bat-talion or brigade FSOs, but may include fire supportteam (FIST) chiefs or even individual forward ob-servers.

The controlling headquarters assigns zones ofsearch to individual radars. Each radar may estab-lish four types (up to nine zones) of search, includ-ing—

Critical friendly zones (CFZs).

Call-for-fire zones (CFFZs).Artillery target intelligence zones (ATIZs).

Censor zones.

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FM 71-100-3

Units establish CFZs around the highest priorityfriendly locations. Typical CFZs include maneuverassembly areas, headquarters, and other troop con-centrations, The CFZ provides the most responsivepriority of fires from radars.

The CFFZs designate locations beyond the FLOTthat are likely enemy artillery or mortar positions.Enemy fires from a CFFZ result in the second mostresponsive priority of fires from the radar.

The ATIZs allow the commander to monitor alikely enemy firing position, but give higher priorityto other locations. The division can evaluate enemyfires from within an ATIZ for attack, but do notautomatically generate a fire mission as do the CFZand CFFZ.

Censor zones designate areas from which thecommander does not want to attack targets. Unitsfrequently use these zones to prevent overlap andduplication. Censor zones are particularly criticalduring cross-FLOT air assaults in which friendlyartillery units at the FLOT and at the objective canbe firing toward each other at an enemy caught inthe middle.

Units can digitally link counterfire radars to oneof several artillery headquarters. One technique isto assign a Q-36 radar to each DS artillery battalionto provide the maneuver brigade commander a re-active counterfire capability he would not otherwisehave. It allows the brigade commander to orient theradar and establish zones of search that best supporthis concept of operations.

DIVARTY may direct the two Q-37 radars to linkto DIVARTY headquarters concurrently to providereactive target acquisition at division level. Thedivision may use this technique if maneuver bri-gades have the counterfire responsibility againstregimental artillery and mortars.

A second technique is to have all counterfireradars report to DIVARTY headquarters to allowcentral C2 of radars and artillery counterfire. It alsoenables DIVARTY to maintain continuous cover-age of the division sector by leapfrogging counter-fire radars. The complexity of this technique maycause DIVARTY to lose visibility of other func-tions. In addition, if the division does not havesufficient GS or GS-R artillery, radars may quicklyoverload available artillery at the division level.

Counterfire radars may report to a reinforcingartillery brigade if the corps assigned one to thedivision, This allows DIVARTY to monitor coun-terfire execution while focusing on its other func-tions.

Even if the reinforcing artillery brigade has thecounterfire mission, the DIVARTY commandermaintains overall responsibility. He augments thereinforcing FA brigade with assets from the targetacquisition battery to enable the FA brigade to ef-fectively accomplish this mission.

The division may employ—Maneuver forces against enemy fire support sys-tems, including using small maneuver elementsto engage RSTA elements (such as artillery re-connaissance or command OPs).Attack helicopters against artillery groupings atregiment, division, or army levels.A mix of these techniques.Ground maneuver forces may attack target-acqui-

sition elements while EW assets jam key fire sup-port nets. The division may use mortars againsttarget acquisition assets or fire direction centers(FDCs) while artillery and attack helicopter andCAS aircraft engage artillery.

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Chapter 6

OTHER OPERATIONS

RELIEF IN PLACE

A relief in place is a combat operation in whichone unit replaces all or part of another unit in acombat area. Secrecy and speed characterize thisoperation.

A corps or JTF headquarters may direct theAASLT division to conduct a relief in place duringthe course of combat operations. Centralized plan-ning by the division staff and decentralized execu-tion by major subordinate commands are the key toits success.

A relief in place may serve one or more of thefollowing purposes:

To relieve a depleted unit in contact.To relieve units stressed by prolonged operationsin adverse conditions.To rest a unit after extended periods at highmission-oriented protective posture (MOPP)levels.To decontaminate a unit or to avoid excessradiation.The AASLT division’s higher headquarters di-

rects when and where to conduct the relief andestablishes appropriate control measures. The corpsor JTF may require the AASLT division to conducta relief in place under enemy pressure or withoutenemy pressure.

A relief in place conducted without enemy pres-sure normally entails a one-for-one “swap out” oflike type units and equipment from occupied po-sitions. The division performs the relief in placeas nearly as possible on a unit-for-unit, man-for-man, weapon-for-weapon basis. This operation istime-consuming and requires detailed coordina-tion and supervision.NOTE: See FM 71-100-2 for a detailed scenarioexplaining a relief in place.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONSAND SCENARIO

The AASLT division may have to disengage froman enemy force by conducting retrograde opera-tions. Units conduct retrograde operations to-

Preserve combat power by gaining time.Avoid combat under unfavorable conditions.Reposition forces to eliminate exposed flanks orto shorten LOCs.Conform to other units’ movements.Draw the enemy into an unfavorable position.Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and damage theenemy.Clear areas for friendly use of nuclear or chemicalfires.The three types of retrograde operations are de-

lays, withdrawals, and retirements. In a delay, adivision under enemy pressure trades space for time,inflicting maximum damage while avoiding deci-sive engagement. A division in contact with theenemy conducts a withdrawal to break contact. In aretirement, a division not in contact moves awayfrom the enemy.

Figure 6-1 shows that the AASLT division hasconducted defensive operations as part of a corpsdefensive operation. The corps conducted a defensein sector with a mechanized division on the left andthe AASLT division on the right in restrictive terrainin an economy of force role. The enemy main effortwas against the mechanized division.

To preserve the fighting strength of both divisionsand to reduce a developing exposed flank betweenthem, the corps commander directs the divisions towithdraw to more defensible terrain along PLALPHA. There the corps reestablishes defensiveoperations against the attacking enemy.

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FM 71-100-3

The current tactical situation and intelligence- corps’ deep operation is to create conditions underreporting of the AASLT division indicate that thedivision is maintaining an effective capability toconduct close operations. However, it has limitedability to identify, locate, and engage deep targets.The enemy is not currently attempting to penetratedefensive positions in the division AO, but contin-ues to apply pressure through indirect fires andsmall-unit attacks.

ManeuverThe AASLT division commander’s concept for

the withdrawal involves organizing a covering forceand a main body (Figure 6-2). The covering force’smission is to prevent interference with the with-drawing main body and to deceive the enemy as tothe division’s intent.NOTE: See Figure 6-3 for the covering force’s taskorganization.

Deep Operations

The corps continues to conduct deep operationsto support withdrawing forces. The intent of the

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which the divisions can withdraw while avoidingdecisive combat under unfavorable conditions. Thecorps must prevent enemy forces from exploitingthe opportunity that withdrawal of friendly forcespresents.

Close Operations

The AASLT division covering force is a compos-ite organization with three maneuver battalions,three AHBs, two artillery battalions, and two assaulthelicopter battalions under the aviation brigadeheadquarters. The three battalions come from thethree brigades in contact, rather than all from onebrigade, to minimize movement across the defen-sive front.

The covering force simulates normal activity todeceive the enemy and to protect the withdrawal ofthe main body to the rear. Covering force unitscontinue aggressive patrolling, normal radio traffic,and vehicle movement.

The covering force prepares to fight a delay topermit withdrawal of the main body. Attack heli-copter battalions use mobility to make limited

FM 71-100-3

objective spoiling attacks to disrupt enemy offen-sive operations, enabling the withdrawal to proceedwith minimum interference.

Units forming the division main body retirewith as much stealth as possible to designatedassembly areas behind the covering force. Theymove on designated routes from the assembly areasto PL ALPHA and begin preparing positions toresume the defense.

The division uses air and ground transportation(division assets and corps augmentation) to speedthe withdrawal while maintaining secrecy. The di-vision controls movement of withdrawing units bydesignating priorities, times, and routes of with-drawal from assembly areas. The withdrawal se-quence is—

Combat service support units.

Field artillery not in support of the covering force.

The main body.

The covering force.

Withdrawal operations normally occur at night,The withdrawal plan includes a corps deception

plan which portrays the force continuing the defensein current positions. The withdrawal plan also in-cludes contingency plans (CONPLANs) for thecovering force or main body to delay or defend shortof PL ALPHA.

On order, the covering force withdraws by con-ducting a series of delays after the main body dis-engages or at a predesignated time and place. If thedeception is successful, the covering force remainsin position, delaying its withdrawal to prolong thedeception.

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When the covering force withdraws, it conductsa rearward passage of lines through the new defen-sive positions and moves to a designated reserveposition. Since there is a significant mobility differ-ential between the adjacent division’s coveringforces, synchronizing the withdrawal is critical.This minimizes the possibility of creating a gapbetween the divisions which the enemy couldexploit.

Rear Operations

Combat service support elements displace early,leaving only those elements necessary to support themain body’s withdrawal and the covering force’sfight. Units already in the rear move to new posi-tions while conducting routine operations. Militarypolice conduct reconnaissance of withdrawal routesand establish TCPs, as required, to controlmovement.

Security Operations

The cavalry squadron screens the coveringforce’s flanks if there is no friendly adjacent unit forthe covering force to tie in to. If there is a friendlyadjacent unit on the flank, the cavalry squadronassists the covering force’s requirement to maintaincontact with the adjacent covering force. This pre-vents gaps between defending friendly forces.

Reserve Operations

Normally, divisions do not designate a reserveforce for the withdrawal, although brigades maydesignate reserves. The division attaches the battal-ion initially designated as the division reserve to abrigade and moves during the withdrawal to PLALPHA to establish the new defense. After thecovering force conducts a rearward passage of lines,it moves to an assembly area and assumes the mis-sion of division reserve.

Intelligence

The G2 focuses his efforts initially on monitoringindicators that provide early warning for the com-mander if the enemy discovers the withdrawal be-fore it is complete. He adjusts collection and R&Splans as needed and provides intelligence updatesto the covering force S2.

The G2 ensures division intelligence asset cover-age includes both covering force and new defensiveposition requirements. Division-controlled EW as-sets are well-forward to support the covering forcefight and the deception plan.

Electronic warning assets include communica-tions interceptors and direction-finders. The G2plans Quick Fix C&J and coordinates with the MIbattalion to execute the plan.

Before withdrawing, the division emplaced twodivision LRSTs as stay-behind elements. They po-sitioned REMBASS strings on avenues of approachinto the division sector and along potential parallelflanking routes.

Together, these assets assist in early warning andtargeting for the main body’s withdrawal and for thecovering force. They aid defense and future offen-sive operations.

Information from LRSTs and in-place sensorsgoes directly to the covering force S2. All other MIassets support defensive operations at PL ALPHA.The G2 coordinates with flanking units and corpsfor additional intelligence and sensor coverage.

Fire SupportFire support assets provide a combat multiplier to

the division covering force. Two 105-millimeter FAbattalions and the 155-millimeter battery providesupport.

The covering force FSE plans and coordinatesfires to support the battle. Should the enemy attackbefore the withdrawal is complete, the FSE uses firesupport assets to slow the enemy’s advance, coverobstacles with fire, support spoiling attacks, andprovide final protective fires. The FSE also planssmoke to mask the movement of friendly forces and

After receiving the warning order to withdraw, places FASCAM along enemy avenues of approachthe G2 directs an update of the IPB. The IPB iden- into the division sector.tifies NAIs, TAIs, DPs, and a series of delay posi- The corps smoke and decontamination companytions that maximize the natural defensive value of provides smoke support along withdrawal routes,available terrain. flanks, and in assembly areas. Covering force

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artillery disengages by echelon. The division FSEcoordinates with the corps for fires during disen-gagement, including TACAIR and GS-R artillery.

Air Force CAS aids the withdrawal and the cov-ering force by engaging and disengaging the enemy.Close air support helps in limited objective counter-attacks and provides the covering force commanderresponsive air support to influence close operations.The division also plans for use of EA to deceive theenemy and to disrupt his C2, slowing his reactionsto the withdrawal.

Mobility and SurvivabilityThe engineer priority is to mobility and survivabil-

ity during the withdrawal and at new defensive posi-tions. Engineers also prepare point obstacle targetsbehind the covering force to support the withdrawal.

Corps smoke assets provide smoke support to theobstacle emplacement. Engineers also prepare suc-cessive hasty firing positions for covering forceartillery as it withdraws. They also maintain routesto the rear to aid the withdrawal.

Covering force engineers include an attachedlight engineer company and an OPCON corps com-bat engineer company. Their priority is to mobilityfor the withdrawal and survivability to close pre-pared obstacles as the covering force delays to therear.

Air DefenseThe ADA battalion provides area protection to

support withdrawal of the main body and the cov-ering force. In this example, the ADA battalionprovides a DS Stinger battery to the covering force.

Remaining ADA assets are in GS to the mainbody. The ADA battalion coordinates coveragewith corps and adjacent divisions to ensure continu-ity of ADA protection.

Combat Service SupportPriority of CSS is Class V supplies and

MEDEVAC support to the covering force. Divisionand brigade CSS elements displace to the rear be-fore combat elements begin the withdrawal.DISCOM positions evacuation equipment at criticallocations along withdrawal routes.

As possible, the division evacuates command-controlled items and destroys other supplies andequipment (except medical) which cannot be with-drawn. Units evacuate wounded personnel as earlyas possible.

Battle CommandThe TAC CP remains forward to control and

support the covering force. As the covering forcewithdraws, the TAC CP withdraws. The TAC CPmaintains the status of the division’s withdrawal, thesituation of adjacent units, and the corps’ situationto ensure continuity of effort during the corpsoperation.

The main CP—Commands and controls the withdrawal of forcesnot in contact.Displaces by echelon with the main body.Supports the withdrawal.Plans for the resumption of the defense.Manages the execution of actions necessary toresume the defense.Synchronizes corps and division assets (includingfire support, ADA, engineer, and smoke supportfor resumption of the defense).Coordinates for the withdrawal of the coveringforce.The rear CP displaces to the rear early in the

withdrawal. It manages terrain and controls move-ment in the division rear area and behind PLALPHA. The division exchanges liaison personnelwith corps headquarters and flank units to maintainsynchronization.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

During tactical operations, the AASLT divisionmay have to conduct a forward passage of linesthrough another division. The division normallyconducts passage through another unit—

To perform an infiltration.To exploit tactical success.To serve as a corps counterattack force when thetactical and/or environmental situation is not

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conducive to the division’s use of its tremendousaviation capability.The passage of lines is an operation designed to

facilitate another tactical operation. The division’stask organization supports the primary tactical mis-sion. Centralized planning and execution charac-terize passage of lines operations.

When required to move via ground transporta-tion, the division normally uses multiple passagelanes through a defending unit. This technique sup-ports decentralized movement of units and the divi-sion’s capability to infiltrate and remain undetected.In-place unit assets support the passage.NOTE: See FM 71-100-2 for a detailed descriptionof a forward passage of lines.

LINKUP OPERATIONSAND SCENARIO

The division plans, coordinates, and synchronizeslinkup operations to join other friendly forces. Bothforces may be moving toward each other, or onemay be stationary.

Linkup operations may be part of an offensive ordefensive operation. The division conducts linkupoperations—

To complete encirclement or envelopment of anenemy force.To assist in the breakout of an encircled friendlyforce.To join an attacking force with a force inserted inthe enemy rear. -

In Figure 6-4, the AASLT division conducts asupporting attack by infiltration and air assault intothe enemy rear. Its mission is to seize key terrainand disrupt the enemy’s C2 and logistics supportingthe corps attack.

The mechanized division attacks through enemydefenses, links up with the AASLT division, andpasses through it. Following linkup, the mechanizeddivision continues the attack and the AASLT divi-sion conducts follow and support operations.

Intelligence reporting indicates the corps is at-tacking a depleted enemy force whose supportingfires are lessening in intensity. (Friendly forces have

air superiority.) The enemy is having difficultymaintaining a coherent defense. The enemy cancounterattack with up to a regimental-size force.

The corps order designates control measures for thelinkup. The corps establishes PL FAR, PL MIDDLE,PL NEAR, PL CLOSE, and PL AWAY as well as firecontrol measures, including FSCLs and an RFL.

The mechanized division establishes CFLs. TheAASLT division, as the stationary force, designatesand coordinates primary and alternate linkup pointson the boundary where the forces meet. Linkuppoints are on identifiable and defendable terrainwhich provides escape routes.

The two divisions exchange as much informationas possible before the tactical operation. Repre-sentatives meet to coordinate—

Command relationships before, during, and afterthe linkup.

Fire support.

The implementation of control measures.

Planned routes to linkup points.

The location and description of primary and alter-nate contact points, linkup points, passage points,passage lanes, and release points.

Recognition signals and communicationsprocedures.

Exchange of liaison personnel.

Maneuver

The division coordinates, synchronizes, and exe-cutes the linkup operation concurrently with otheroperations without losing momentum. The divi-sion’s primary mission is to seize key terrain toexpedite and facilitate the forward passage of thecorps main attack.

Following linkup, the AASLT division passes themechanized division through its sector and reorientsfor its follow and support mission. The linkup is notthe primary mission of either division, but is criticalto the corps operation’s overall success.

The AASLT division commander designates onebrigade to coordinate and conduct the linkup. Thedivision authorizes the brigade to coordinate

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divisions prepare to conduct a hasty defense at anypoint throughout linkup, passage, and subsequentoperations.

directly with the mechanized division’s cavalrysquadron, its designated linkup unit. Units should—

Exchange liaison personnel.

Coordinate communications.

Exchange signal operation instructions (SOIs).

Verify day and night and near and far recognitionsignals.Provide their division the specifics of linkupplans.

Coordinate fires, intelligence, and obstacles.As the mechanized division reaches PL

MIDDLE, its cavalry squadron moves to linkuppoints and initiates linkup with the AASLTbrigade (Figure 6-5). The AASLT brigade expe-dites the passage of lines by opening lanes orcorridors, breaching selected obstacles, and fur-nishing guides.

The mechanized division completes the passageand moves toward the corps objective while theAASLT division secures the corps LOC. Both

IntelligenceTo support the linkup, the division G2 employs

sensors near linkup points to identify enemy move-ment toward the division’s position. Both divisionsand corps must closely coordinate EW plans topreclude interference as the mechanized divisionconverges with the infantry division.

Fire SupportFire support coordination measures are critical to

the linkup of converging forces. In this example, asthe mechanized division moves closer to the linkuppoints, both divisions increase positive fire controlto avoid firing on each other.

The mechanized division establishes an initialcoordinated fire line (CFL 1). As it nears PL FAR,it terminates CFL 1 and puts CFL 2 into effect(Figure 6-6A). The mechanized division

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coordinates CFLs with the AASLT division to con- restrictive control measures for FASCAM neartrol AASLT division fires in the direction of themechanized division.

As the mechanized division approaches PLNEAR, the corps establishes an RFL at the bound-ary between the two divisions. The mechanizeddivision terminates CFL 2 and establishes CFL 3,which includes both division areas (Figure 6-6B).

Mobility and Survivability

The AASLT division and its engineers coordinatewith the mechanized division before emplacing ob-stacles between PL CLOSE and the AASLT divi-sion boundary in case maneuver within the areabecomes necessary. The division engineer plansFASCAM (if available) on enemy avenues of ap-proach into the division’s AO.

However, during planning the division engineermust ensure FASCAM employment will not inter-fere with the mechanized division’s linkup, passage,or future operations. He must also coordinate

friendly forces.

Air DefenseThe corps establishes ADA coordination and re-

strictive fire measures by phase line as the divisionsconverge. Converging ADA systems coordinateidentification requirements and cover the gap be-tween forces. On linkup, both divisions coordinateADA coverage for area protection.

Battle CommandThe divisions integrate coordination and planning

for linkup into their planning for the offensive op-eration. The corps order establishes command rela-tionships, control measures, and responsibilitiesbetween the linkup units. The mechanized divisioncommander assumes tactical control (TACON) ofthe AASLT division when the mechanized divisioncrosses PL MIDDLE.

Following successful linkup of the convergingforces, the linkup operation becomes a passage of

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lines for the mechanized division. The divisionsmust plan equally well the specifics of this criticaloperation to provide for the continuous protectionof both forces.

BREAKOUT FROMENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS

AND SCENARIO

Because of the nonlinear nature of the modernbattlefield, the division may have to fight whileencircled. Encirclement occurs when the enemycuts off the division’s ground routes of evacuationand reinforcement or forces an AASLT into theenemy’s rear area.

Combat operations for an encircled division aredifficult. The division may respond in several ways.

First, the division can stay in position and defend.It may be able to inflict damage on the enemy, divertan enemy attack, restrict enemy maneuver and lo-gistic support, acquire intelligence, or even captureobjectives to support other operations. However,these may have only limited effect, and the enemymay render the division combat-ineffective or de-stroy the division completely.

Second, the division can attack to breakout of theencirclement and link up with friendly forces. Thisallows it to support a corps deception plan, interferewith the enemy’s C2 structure or allow the corps touse it elsewhere. However, the division may link upin a depleted condition and be of no use until thecorps reconstitutes it.

Third, the division can exfiltrate by small groups.This is the least preferred option, but it is preferableto capture and may divert the enemy’s attention andprovide intelligence for higher headquarters.

The division’s response to encirclement dependson the situation and the higher commander’s intent.The corps commander (or division commanderwhen communications fail) makes an early decisionas to the encircled division’s mission and objectives.

Figure 6-7 shows the division defending in re-strictive terrain as an economy of force operationfor the corps. Enemy maneuver elements bypasseddivision defensive positions and pushed back othercorps elements. Enemy infantry cut division groundroutes of evacuation and reinforcement. The

encirclement contains most division maneuver, CS,and CSS units.

The corps commander directs the division to con-duct a breakout from encirclement and to link upwith other corps forces. This keeps the division asan intact maneuver unit for future corps operations.The division plans, organizes, and executes a break-out from encirclement with available forces beforethe enemy can analyze intelligence information andreact by reinforcing the encirclement and perhapstaking away the breakout option.

Current division tactical situation and intelligencereporting indicate the enemy used minimum combatand CS forces to fix the division. He may not knowhis force has encircled the division and has insuffi-cient forces to completely encircle the division.

Gaps currently exist in the encirclement. Thesituation and intelligence also indicate that—

The enemy is moving forces to reinforce hisoperation, and enemy reconnaissance elementsare actively conducting R&S operations.The division can communicate with higher andlower units.Weather is marginal, but allows use of AF andAH assets.The corps will conduct a supporting attack at thesame time as the division breakout.

ManeuverThe division commander’s concept is for the di-

vision to attack as soon as possible by employing arupture force to infiltrate enemy positions and toattack to create a gap (Figure 6-8A). The remainderof the division defends the perimeter during therupture, fights a delaying action, then withdrawsfrom the perimeter through the rupture (Figure6-8B). The division continues the attack through theenemy to link up with other corps assets.

While planning for the breakout, the divisiondefends on the most defensible terrain, holding theentire perimeter. The division may reduce the pe-rimeter to maintain a strong defense; however, itmust maintain room for maneuver.

The division employs reconnaissance elementsto determine enemy strengths and weaknessesnear the planned breakout point. It conducts

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FM 71-100-3

counterreconnaissance operations to deny the en- sionary attack before the real breakout attempt. Theemy information on friendly breakout plans.

The division selects the rupture location androutes of march that avoid enemy strengths, increas-ing the chance for surprise. The route selected maynot be direct; it may be over less favorable terrain.

The division avoids the most obvious route to-ward friendly lines unless there is no alternative.However, the division may use the most obviousroute for a diversionary attack.

The division coordinates with the corps for sup-porting attacks by other available corps forces tosupport the breakout. The division coordinateslinkup points before the breakout or during thebreakout by lead or security elements.

Early on, if possible, the division orders theevacuation of the aviation brigade to the corps reararea. If it is still a viable force, the division uses itto support the breakout and movement to link up.

The division plans for and, if available, employsTACAIR support for the breakout operation. If ithas sufficient forces, the division organizes a diver-

division uses the task organization in Figure 6-9 forthe breakout.

Deep Operations

The division relies primarily on corps artillery andaviation assets to conduct deep operations. Whenpossible, the division attacks enemy uncommittedforces and rear installations to disrupt enemy opera-tions. The corps must prevent enemy reinforce-ments from linking up with enemy encircling forcesor attacking into the flanks of the division as itbreaks out.

Close Operations

A rupture force, a two-battalion infantry brigade,infiltrates enemy defenses. It attacks enemy posi-tions, creating and widening a gap, and holds theshoulders of the gap until all encircled forces com-plete their move through the rupture. An assaultforce follows the rupture force and moves throughthe gap to continue the attack to the linkup point.

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The main body, made up of the remaining combatforces, CP elements, and CS and CSS elements,follows the assault force. The rear guard providessecurity, following and protecting the main body.

The division must mass overwhelming combatpower to generate momentum at the breakout point.It takes risks at other points on its perimeter toensure the breakout’s success.

If the division does not maintain the momentumof the breakout, it will be more vulnerable to de-struction than before. Breakout forces use all routesavailable.

The breakout plan should exploit darkness andlimited visibility. However, the division should notwait for conditions of reduced visibility if it wouldallow the enemy to consolidate or reinforce thecontainment. If available, smoke from the corpschemical company should conceal the breakout orsupport the deception plan.

Rear Operations

The division integrates CS and CSS elements thatdid not evacuate earlier throughout the main bodyfor protection during the movement.

Security Operations

Main body elements provide flank security. Therear guard fights a vigorous delaying action on theperimeter to ensure no part of the division is cut off.The rear guard disengages from the defense andpasses through the rupture.

The rupture force secures the penetration untilpassage of the rear guard. It then disengages andassumes the rear guard mission.

Reserve Operations

The division designates an AASLT battalion asreserve for the breakout. Initially, the reserve is inthe center of the encirclement to allow it to quicklyreact to a penetration at any point in the perimeter.It then moves with the main body through therupture.

Intelligence

The G2 employs all available intelligence assetsto obtain current information on enemy strengths,dispositions, and intentions around the division andespecially between the encircled division andfriendly forces. He also determines potential break-out points based on both terrain and weaknesses inthe enemy’s encirclement.

To expedite operations, LRSTs infiltrate wherethey can observe specified NAIs before the breakoutbegins. All encircled units conduct counterrecon-naissance to mask friendly intentions and actions.

Fire Support

Fire support assets must rapidly react to changingconditions in the encirclement. They must supportthe defense, the breakout, rear guard operations, andthe movement to linkup. Field artillery battalionscontinue to provide support to brigades, but must beresponsive to division requirements.

The division establishes on-order missions tomaximize firepower at critical times and establishesfire support execution matrixes for key events suchas breakout and disengagement fires. During thebreakout, fire support must be centralized to ensurethe maximum amount of combat power is focusedat the breakout point.

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In the initial defense, the division positions artil-lery to allow rapid shifts of fire and DS for largeparts of the defensive perimeter without displacingto new positions. DIVARTY distributes artillerythroughout the encirclement to limit its vulnerabil-ity to counterfires.

During the breakout, the division employsmassed, continuous fires to open the rupture point,suppress enemy direct-fire systems, and isolate thebreakout from the enemy. Once the rupture brigadeachieves the rupture, priority of fires shifts to therear guard action if sufficient fires are available tosupport the momentum of the breakout. Field artil-lery assets provide continuous fire support to eachbreakout force during the breakout and subsequentmovement to link up with friendly forces.

The division—Coordinates fire support from outside the encir-clement.Establishes an RFA around encircled forces andthen a series of CFLs as it moves toward thelinkup point.Coordinates electronic attack to disrupt enemycommunications during the breakout.Plans disengagement fires for the rear guard;TACAIR support and Army aviation assets sup-port the disengagement.

Mobility and SurvivabilityInitially, the priority of engineer work is surviv-

ability, then mobility. Engineer assets reinforce de-fensive positions and plan and emplace obstacles tosupport both the defense and the breakout. Theyplan FASCAM on the shoulders of the rupture pointand along the most dangerous enemy avenues ofapproach.

The division task-organizes engineers intoobstacle-breaching teams under the control of ma-neuver units. Engineers support the rear guard byemplacing obstacles during the reduction of thedefensive perimeter. Engineers with the rear guardclose obstacles.

Air DefenseDivision ADA elements protect key assets ac-

cording to priorities the ADA commander and G3

develop and the division commander approves. Pri-orities for breakout include fire support assets andaviation support areas.

Within these specific priorities, an ADA batteryprovides DS to the rupture force. A gun platoon anda Stinger section provide DS to the rear guard. TheADA employment plan complements SEAD opera-tions in support of the breakout.

Combat Service SupportAs soon as encirclement by the enemy appears

inevitable, the division uses open LOCs to evacuatecasualties and all nonessential staff, CS, and CSSpersonnel and equipment. The division places or-ganic and supporting encircled CSS assets undercentralized control. When required, elements of CSand CSS units increase the strength of divisionfighting units.

Unit personnel bury the dead they cannot evacu-ate before encirclement in hasty, properly markedgraves. Wounded soldiers have priority on transpor-tation assets. If they cannot be moved, criticallywounded soldiers are left behind with limited medi-cal personnel, supplies, and equipment.

The division breaks out with only those items ofequipment and supplies essential to the mission thatcan be transported on available vehicles. Units de-stroy all weapons and equipment (except medical)they cannot fully man or support.

Military police enforce traffic control within thedefensive perimeter to ensure order and disciplineand to prevent panic. Strict rationing and supply-economy conserve limited resources and combatpower. The division distributes Class III and Vsupplies weighted to the priority of effort.

Battle CommandThe commander directs subordinate commanders

to reestablish or reinforce the chain of command asnecessary before the breakout. Subordinate com-manders reorganize to form tactically strong units.

If possible, the division coordinates before thebreakout for linkup and passage through friendlyelements. It maintains liaison and coordination withhigher and lower headquarters. The division estab-lishes measures to control movement and to handover rear guard responsibilities to the rupture force.

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The TAC CP locates behind assault forces. Re-maining elements of the rear and main CPs collocatewithin the main body.

The commander must recognize the importanceof morale and the potential for despair encircledsoldiers will experience. In turn, soldiers must trustin their leaders’ competence. The commander mustdisseminate information quickly throughout thecommand, ensure command presence at DPs, andensure that an effective casualty evacuation systemis in place.

Encircled forces will likely suffer significantcasualties and loss of equipment while encircled,during breakout, and during movement towardfriendly forces. Detailed planning and swift, violentexecution minimize losses.

INFILTRATION

Infiltration is a valuable offensive capability insupport of tactical operations. Units conduct infil-tration operations to posture a unit for an attack orin support of deception, guerrilla tactics, and intel-ligence collection.

Forces use infiltration to move through enemy-held areas to positions of advantage in the enemy’srear. From there, they use other forms of maneuverto attack assigned objectives.

Infiltration is not like a penetration where unitsexert maximum combat power to pass through anenemy defense. Infiltrating units seek to avoid en-emy defenses and pass unnoticed through gaps intheir defense. Units then posture to attack LOCs,support units, installations, or other objectives in therear of the forward defense areas, or to seize keyterrain to facilitate other operations.

Units also infiltrate to conduct raids, block orcontrol key communications nets, destroy bridges,erect barriers, harass enemy logistic operations,conduct feints or demonstrations for deception, orengage in any of a number of intelligence-collectionactivities. Units may use infiltrating forces to pro-vide accurate target information or an eyes-ontargeting capability.

NOTE: See FM 71-100-2 for a more detailed dis-cussion.

MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

Division movements ensure units arrive at theright place at the right time and can accomplish theirmissions. The AASLT division, without augmenta-tion, normally conducts most of its tactical move-ment via organic helicopters. When augmented withcorps or JTF assets and/or an armored force, groundmovement plays a larger role.

Divisions deployed to a combat theater of opera-tions execute either administrative or tactical move-ments. Between a point of debarkation and a corpsor JTF rear area, units conduct administrativemovements.

Units organize troops and vehicles to expeditemovement through an area to conserve time andenergy when no enemy interference, except by air,is anticipated. Between the corps or JTF rear areaand the forward units, or when contact with theenemy is anticipated, units conduct tactical move-ments.

In a tactical movement, elements are organized tofacilitate combat. The G4 plans and supervises ad-ministrative movements. The G3 plans and super-vises tactical movements.

The division moves in five phases. Phase oneincludes movement of reconnaissance squadron ele-ments, the MP company, the ADA battalion, and theengineer battalion. They conduct reconnaissanceand prepare the route for movement. Phase twoincludes movement of C2 elements, ground maneu-ver brigades, DIVARTY, and battalion quarteringparties of subordinate units. Phase three includesmovement of the rear CP, and quartering parties ofthe DISCOM, aviation brigade, and their battalionsand companies. Phase four is the movement of thedivision main body. Phase five is closure of supportelements along the march route.

Tactical Road March

The AASLT division normally executes tacticalmovements via organic aviation assets. However,there may be times when, based on METT-T, thedivision conducts a ground tactical movement. Onthese occasions, the division plans, prepares, and exe-cutes tactical road marches as part of a corps or higherechelon operation.

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Planning considerations for a tactical road marchinclude—

Missions on arrival and dispositions that bestaccomplish those missions.The nature and extent of probable enemy inter-ference.The present unit disposition.Available routes.March rates of elements.Time intervals between units.Obstacles and choke points along the route.The impact of darkness or limited visibility.The flexibility and vulnerability of the drawnformation.Route sweeps and clearances needed.The degree of tactical control.The mission following the move affects routes

selected as well as march organization. Followingthe tactical road march, units either move into as-sembly areas or tactically deploy to complete fol-low-on missions. Selection of routes and marchorganization expedite this.

The nature and extent of probable enemy inter-ference impacts the organization of march units andsecurity operations during the march. For example,an air threat may require pre-positioning AD assetsalong the route and at choke points.

A threat of route interdiction may require pre-positioning additional engineer assets along theroute of march. A threat from bypassed units or thethreat of ambush may require units to increase re-connaissance and/or security forces along routes.

Routes and march organizations allow units toconduct an orderly move from their current loca-tions to march routes. Units form into march organi-zation and attain prescribed rates of march beforeentering the march route. Commanders and staffsmust consider any changes to task organization, unitlocations, and dispositions when selecting routesand march organization.

Available routes impact the march organization.The division normally plans multiple routes to allowmore rapid completion of the move, to enhance

dispersion, and to aid security. If multiple routes arenot available, the division adjusts its march organi-zation to a single route.

The division develops standardized march or-ganizations for both single and multiple routes andincludes these in the division SOP. Standardizedmarch organizations increase speed and simplicityin planning, preparing for, and executing tacticalroad marches.

Route planning includes selecting a start point(SP) and a release point (RP). The SP provides acommon point for beginning integrated movement.When the division uses multiple routes, each has anSP.

The SP should be easily recognizable on both amap and on the ground, but not be in a defile, on ahill, or at a sharp curve. It should be far enough fromassembly areas to allow units to organize and attainthe prescribed march rate when they reach it. Unitsmust not move early or late to SPs; doing so willcreate congestion.

The RP provides a common point for units torevert to their commanders’ control. Like the SP, theRP should be easily recognizable on both a map andon the ground. It should not cause a unit to counter-march or go through other units to reach. Guidesmeet units as they arrive at the RP to guide them intotheir assembly area, or units deploy tactically for thefollow-on mission if applicable.

When selecting routes, the G3 selects criticallocations along the route for checkpoints and TCPsfrom which to monitor and control progress alongthe route or routes of march. The G3, with the G4,plans halts and refueling points.

The G3 allows time for refueling, maintenance,and rest halts, selecting areas large enough to ac-commodate multiple march units. He also specifiesalternate (on-order) holding areas for emergencies.Doing so simplifies moving march units off theroute of march if necessary.

Rates of march are important and vary with roadand terrain conditions. Wheeled vehicles in columntravel at the optimum speed of the slowest vehicles.

Factors determining rates of march are-

Grades, sharp turns, cities, towns, and other re-strictions.

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Surface conditions, such as dust, ice, mud, andsnow.

The condition of drivers and crews, includingtraining and experience.

The condition of vehicles.

Visibility conditions.

Units temper rates of march for foot troops byconsidering soldier loads and the terrain. As a rule,the total distance soldiers march in 6 hours de-creases by 2 kilometers for every 10-pound increasein soldier load over 40 pounds (Figures 6-10 and6-11).

A second factor affecting rate of movement isterrain gradient. March gradients in excess of 10percent reduce distances traveled by up to half.Exceeding these guidelines decreases unit effec-tiveness. Field Manual 21-18 provides additionalinformation on speed marches.

The G3 controls the march by organizing thedivision into march columns, march serials, andmarch units. When planning the tactical road march,march units should be of a roughly uniform size.

Air assault battalions are the division’s basiccombat elements and are the principal buildingblocks for tactical planning. They are the first ele-ments to consider when organizing for movement.To simplify planning, they march as serials in nearlyequal-size time blocks. Some supporting units mayprecede the main body to establish refueling points,install communications, or prepare forward bases.

A serial of from 55 to 65 vehicles is about the sizeof an AASLT infantry battalion moving in 5-tontrucks and organic vehicles. The 55- to 65-vehicleserial is divisible into company-size march units. Itssize is manageable for CSS commanders, move-ment planners, and traffic controllers.

Tactical control depends on the chain of com-mand. The G3 organizes the force into manageableechelons which preserve unit integrity as much aspossible. Movement groups, composed of vehiclesfrom more than one unit, have a single commander.

The TAC CP controls division road marches.Division transportation and PM representativesnormally augment the TAC CP during road marchesto help with control.

Types of Marches

The G3 also considers the type of tactical roadmarch to use—the day march, limited visibilitymarch, forced march, or shuttle march. Each has itsown strengths, weaknesses, and planning considera-tions. The division conducts each type eithermounted or dismounted.

The division conducts the day march when thereis little enemy threat. It permits faster movement andis less tiring for soldiers. Ease of control, dispersedformations, and reconnaissance characterize the daymarch. However, it is more vulnerable to enemyobservation and air attack.

Closed formations; more difficult command, con-trol, and reconnaissance; and a slower rate of marchcharacterize the limited visibility march. However,it provides good concealment from enemy observa-tion and air attack and exploits darkness to gainsurprise.

Speed, exertion, and a greater number of hoursmarched characterize forced marches. They nor-mally increase the number of hours marched ratherthan the rate of march. The division conducts forcedmarches only when tactically required because theydecrease unit effectiveness.

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Shuttle marches alternate riding and marching.Shuttling requires vehicles to transport troops,equipment, and supplies by a series of round tripswith the same vehicles. Divisions can accomplishthis by hauling a load an entire distance and thenreturning for another, or by carrying successiveparts of a unit for short distances while conductinga foot march.

PlanningThe G3 has staff responsibility for tactical road

marches. The plans element at the main CP planstactical road movements, and the TAC CP controlsthe march.

The rear CP supports the main CP during plan-ning and the TAC CP during execution of the marchby temporarily providing transportation and PMrepresentatives to help control movement. The rearCP, with DISCOM and CSS representatives at themain CP, plans and coordinates march logisticsupport.

March Warning Order

Planning for tactical road marches begins withreceipt of the corps order. As soon as possible, theG3 issues a march warning order alerting units ofthe impending move. The warning order contains asmuch information as the G3 can provide.

Based on the warning order, MSCs begin to plan,prepare, and conduct reconnaissance for the march.As additional information becomes known to thestaff, they issue additional warning orders andFRAGOs.

Plan development for the tactical road marchfollows established planning considerations andculminates in a road movement plan or OPORD.The OPORD contains instructions for moving unitsfrom one location to another within a stated time. Ifconditions and time permit, information in the orderincludes—

The destination and routes.

The rate of march, maximum speeds, minimumspeeds, and the march order.

Start points and times.Halts, vehicle distances, and release points.

Communications means.The commander’s location.

Strip maps.The order also includes route or unit markers, TCPs,and checkpoints.

Staff ResponsibilitiesThe G3 has staff responsibility for planning, pre-

paring, and conducting tactical road marches. Heprioritizes and allocates routes and resources andsynchronizes the march.

When the corps or a higher headquarters directsthe division to move, a corps order normally pro-vides routes, times, assembly areas, and follow-onmissions. The G3 plans element develops the divi-sion plan and movement tables, and determinesmovement priorities. Using standard march and taskorganizations in the division SOP reduces time re-quired to plan, prepare, and distribute orders.

The G3 dispatches liaison teams to units whoseAOs include the final location to which the divisionis moving. Liaison officers obtain information andcoordinate movement and terrain requirements.

The G2 conducts an IPB for the march. He iden-tifies possible enemy interference and key terrainfor likely interdiction points during the march.

With the engineer terrain team, the DTO, and PM,the G2 develops and recommends to the G3 loca-tions of TCPs. He also presents the effects of terrain,weather, and visibility on the rate of march.

The division FSE plans and coordinates fire sup-port for the march. The FSE also coordinates withthe rear CP of units through which the division willmove and obtains existing and planned FSCM. Itprovides this information to the TAC CP’s FSE tocoordinate and clear fires during movement.

The ADA representative at the main CP coordi-nates AD protection with the corps and with unitsthrough which the division is to move. The air IPBand early warning frequencies and procedures fromthose units are key considerations. The division ADofficer recommends to the G3 AD coverage to pro-tect the division during the march.

The assistant division engineer (ADE), workswith the G2, corps engineers, and the engineer

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FM 71-100-3

element of units through which the division willmarch. They develop and recommend mobility re-quirements for the march, including pre-positioningof engineer assets along the march route.

The ADSO integrates communications and infor-mation systems requirements to support the march.Requirements include signal support precedingmarch units for C2 of the march and the follow-onmission.

The PM coordinates MP support for road move-ment, including placement of traffic control ele-ments to assist in movement through choke pointsand critical areas where units could easily get lost.Military police may also assist in route signing toassist unit marches.

The NBC element coordinates NBC support, in-cluding using smoke in deception or concealment atchoke points and route reconnaissance. The NBCelement plans for locations and priorities of hastyand deliberate decontamination points. It coordi-nates with engineers against the effects of enemynuclear or chemical attack on primary and alternateroutes and route decontamination.

The A2C2 element coordinates airspace for themarch, including the use of airspace to support routereconnaissance, aviation brigade displacement, andincorporation of existing and planned airspace co-ordination measures into the division order.

The rear CP coordinates logistic support. It pre-positions CSS assets before movement and arrangesfor support from the corps, from units throughwhich the division will march, and from the hostnation. The rear CP also coordinates and integratescivil affairs.

Preparation

Preparation for the tactical road march beginsduring the planning process. After receiving themovement order from higher headquarters, the di-vision begins reconnaissance, dispatches liaisonteams to units through which the division willmarch, and requests required support and suppliesfrom the corps. Other preparations include—

Moving DTO and PM representatives from therear CP to the TAC CP.

Moving the TAC CP to control the march.

Designating TCPs and the release point.Executing any task-organization changes.Unit preparations, including refueling vehicles,receiving and distributing supplies, and receivingand integrating any external support into marchserials and units.Dispatching communications support packagesto support C2.Dispatching engineers; maintenance; and petro-leum, oils, and lubricants (POL) support, if re-quired.Reconnaissance by unit commanders from theirpositions to the start point.Dispatching unit quartering parties or guides.

ExecutionThe division executes the tactical road march

according to its movement OPORD or SOP. Unitsmove according to the movement tables minus thetime required to reach respective SPs. Serial com-manders monitor the march and submit reports tothe TAC CP according to the division’s SOP,OPORD, and/or tactical situation.

March discipline is necessary for uninterruptedmovement and reduced vulnerability. Traffic con-trol points monitor traffic flow along routes, report-ing to the TAC CP and adjusting the march asdirected.

Movement on multiple routes during periods ofreduced visibility increase traffic control problems.Major intersections, defiles, and detours alongroutes also add to the problem.

The G3 requests additional MP support whenorganic assets are not sufficient. Army aircraft pro-vide an efficient means of monitoring tactical roadmarches.

The TAC CP monitors movement through unitsand TCP reports. Based on the movement orOPORD, the TAC CP commands and controls thedivision’s movement and submits any required re-ports to the corps.

At the RP, guides assist units in clearing the route.The road march terminates when all units clear themarch route and occupy their assigned positions forthe follow-on mission.

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Road Movement Table

Normally, the road movement table is an annexto the movement order. It contains information andinstructions on march serials, including identifica-tion serial numbers, rates of march, start points,crossing times, critical points, and other details.

A march column may have difficulty maintaininga constant density, speed, and uniform distancebetween march units, depending on the state of unittraining, weather, light, road conditions, and thetactical situation. Adding a safety time factor tocalculations is often necessary.

Standard AASLT Division March TablesThe division uses the AASLT battalion as the

basic building block for planning tactical roadmarches. If road space or time is critical, plannersconduct a detailed road movement order.

The following data is the basis for the road move-ment planning formula to expedite movement:

Gaps between vehicles are 100 meters for daymoves and 50 meters for night or limited-visibil-ity moves.Rate of march is 30 kilometers per hour for daymoves and 15 kilometers per hour for night orlimited-visibility moves.Pass time for a march unit (up to and including20 vehicles) is 5 minutes. (Actual pass time is lesswhen there are fewer vehicles. To simplify plan-ning and execution, this example uses the 5-minute pass time per march unit. The pass timeincludes a 1-minute gap between march units.)

The unit plans a 5-minute time gap betweenmarch units and a 10-minute gap between serials.Pass times for serials include pass times of all itsmarch units plus the 5-minute gap betweenserials.A serial with five march units has a pass time of

30 minutes. This is a 5-minute pass time for eachmarch unit and the 5-minute gap following the lastmarch unit and the next serial. (Five march unitstimes 5 minutes equals the 5-minute gap.)

Figure 6-12 details standardized march units foreach division unit. The figure indicates pass timesfor each march column. It applies for either day (at

30 kilometers per hour) or night (at 15 kilometersper hour) marches.

To obtain the total time for a route add the passtime to the time-distance factor for the route (Figure6-13). (See also FM 55-10.) Figure 6-14 showsstandardized march columns on three routes andmarch units, serials, and pass times.

The G3 inserts remaining division units intomarch columns as the situation and movement orderrequire. Such units include division headquarterselements, DIVARTY, DISCOM and the MSB, andthe remaining portions of the separate battalions.

NOTE: See FM 21 -18 for more information on footmarch planning.

ASSEMBLY AREAOPERATIONS

The division occupies an AA for a variety ofreasons, including preparation for offensive opera-tions, reserve operations, or reconstitution. Thecorps or JTF assigns the division its AA. The divi-sion organizes the AA based on IPB and METT-T.

The division normally occupies its area task-organized for a follow-on mission. The G3 makessure the assigned area contains sufficient space forthe division to occupy to prepare for future opera-tions.

The division establishes two separate and distinctAAs within its assigned area—the division forwardassembly area (FAA) and the division rear assemblyarea (RAA). Normally these areas are from 10 to 15kilometers apart.

Division forces occupy the area according to theSOP. Units usually use the clock method to occupyan AA. During the occupation of all AAs, 12 o’clockis always the side nearest the enemy.

The main CP controls the FAA and the rear CPcontrols the RAA. The elements in Figures 6-15and 6-16 normally occupy the FAA and the RAA,respectively.

The division occupies AAs in phases. (See theTactical Road Marches section.) Guides meet unitsat RPs and direct them to their positions. Units movefrom the RPs to their positions without stopping.

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Each CP ensures occupying units establish pe-rimeter security. The division’s plan and graphicsestablish coordinating points between units to en-sure gaps do not exist on the perimeter and tocoordinate fire support.

The AA perimeter is similar to the FEBA in adefensive sector. It is where elements of the divisionconduct close operations.

The division’s security area is outside the perime-ter to the limits of the AA higher headquartersassigns. The division conducts counterreconnais-sance actions to protect the force from enemyground reconnaissance and to detect threats.

Units in the FAA and RAA secure all routesthrough their assigned areas. The division

occupation plan establishes NAIs and assigns sur-veillance responsibilities. The main CP in the FAAcoordinates and synchronizes security actions forboth areas.

As in rear operations, each unit in the AA preparesto conduct level I responses to rear area threats. Bothareas designate a level II response.

The division designates a level III (TCF) responseto significant threats. The division employs its intel-ligence assets to support division OPSEC and AAsecurity. The division employs GSRs, communica-tions interceptions, and direction-finding systems aspart of the counterreconnaissance effort.

The intelligence system also continues to updateIPB products for the follow-on mission. The ACE

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coordinates with higher and adjacent units to updatethe enemy situation. Depending on the situation, thedivision may use its division-level reconnaissanceassets to further develop combat information andintelligence for the follow-on mission.

The division directs maneuver forces to conductsecurity operations. If the division is occupying anAA in the corps rear, the corps may require it toprovide a response force for the corps rear. The mainCP coordinates this action with the corps rear CP.

Fire support for the RAA is a concern, The divi-sion may position artillery with the RAA to provideresponsive fires or position artillery, especially 155-millimeter artillery, in the FAA to range the RAAand beyond. Attack helicopters from the aviationbrigade in the RAA may also provide fire supportto the RAA.

Engineers continually improve survivability po-sitions within the AA. They also help conduct re-connaissance for follow-on missions.

The division engineer and the ADE coordinatewith higher and adjacent units to ensure the divisionknows the locations of obstacle zones and belts.They coordinate with CSS elements to ensure MSRsare clear and swept daily. For defensive operations,the engineers, with the G2, determine the locations

and status of enemy obstacles and send this infor-mation to division elements.

The assistant division air defense officer(ADADO) coordinates AD of the AA with the corpsAD effort. The division employs FAAD assetsthroughout the AA. Normally, the division directspriority of coverage to the RAA and the aviationbrigade.

The air defense officer (ADO) and/or ADADO,with the G2, prepares and coordinates the air IPB.The division positions its FAAD assets and employsthem to counter the threat.

Division CSS assets continue to man, arm, and fixthe division. Depending on the follow-on mission,priority is to the distribution of Class V supplies.The division continues to refine its plan for thefollow-on mission. Units conduct follow-on mis-sion rehearsals in the AA to the extent possible.

RECONNAISSANCE INFORCE

Units receive a reconnaissance in force missionwhen enemy disposition is unkown and the infor-mation provided from reconnaissance outweighsthe risk of obtaining it. The AASLT division movesforward to perform limited reconnaissance in forcein rugged or compartmentalized terrain. It findsenemy strong points and weaknesses in main defen-sive positions and creates gaps. Keys to the mis-sion’s success are coordination and speed.

An ASSLT unit cannot sustain itself for longperiods. So, the corps or JTF must limit the scopeof the reconnaissance. The division expects thecorps to take advantage of what information it ob-tains. The reconnaissance in force finds the enemyand sets the stage for his defeat.

The reconnaissance in force may develop a situ-ation more rapidly than other movement-to-contactmethods. When deciding to conduct a reconnais-sance in force mission, the commander considers—

His knowledge of the enemy situation.

The efficiency and speed of other intelligence-collection assets.The extent to which the reconnaissance in forcemay divulge the plan of action.

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The possibility that the reconnaissance in forcemay lead to a general engagement.The AASLT divison has sufficient firepower to

cause the enemy to react to probes and limitedobjective attacks. This discloses enemy locations,dispositions, strengths, planned fires, and use ofreserves.

The corps commander must anticipate the enemyreaction to a reconnaissance in force operation. Hecan then plan either to exploit weaknesses or with-draw the division pending the assembly of sufficientcombat power to destroy or defeat the enemy force.

With the exception that the AASLT division hasmore attack and assault aircraft with which to ma-neuver forces, the division conducts reconnais-sance-in-force operations similar to that of the lightinfantry division. (See FM 71-100-2, Chapter 3.)

ARMORED-LIGHTOPERATIONS

The AASLT division accommodates airborneand/or light infantry battalions and brigades withoutparticular difficulties. Integrating armored forcesposes greater challenges for the division.

Employing light units with armored units can bea combat power multiplier. Armored-light unit op-erations effectively use the AASLT division’s abil-ity to operate in restrictive terrain, such as urbanareas, forests, and mountains, which maximizes theforce’s survivability and capabilities.

The armored-light force should be mutually sup-porting and based on the commander’s concept ofemployment to ensure total integration and synchro-nization of assets from both forces. To make themost of these potent formations, AASLT command-ers must know armored capabilities, limitations,special task-organization considerations, and howto employ armored forces during AASLT divisionoperations.

Theforces

Employment Considerationspurpose of employing armored and lighttogether is to capitalize on the unique

strengths of each while minimizing their limitations.To accomplish this, commanders and staffs mustsynchronize all combat, CS, and CSS assets.

Attaching an armored brigade to the AASLT divi-sion is a combat power multiplier for the divisiononly if it meets three conditions.

First, armored-brigade employment must supportthe division’s mission. Division commanders en-sure the comparability of the tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs) their forces and the armoredbrigade use. Commanders and staffs properly inte-grate all AASLT division assets with the armoredbrigade to support armored-light operations.

Second, the armored brigade must bring its ownlogistic support. The armored brigade is normallyunder the division’s OPCON. This relieves theAASLT division of supporting the brigade.

The AASLT division has significant assets withwhich it can support an armored force. However, itsFSBs cannot support armored brigade fuel, ammu-nition, and maintenance requirements without ad-versely impacting its ability to sustain its organicunits.

Third, the commander must know the differencesin tempo between AASLT and armored forces anduse these differences to his advantage. Differencesin mobility change the way the AASLT divisionfights. The armored brigade’s agility allows it tomove quickly. It depends on mobility and firepowerto survive. Integrating speed and mobility is vitalwhen conducting operations as an armored-lightforce.

The commander employs a mixed force based onsound METT-T analysis. By maximizing capabili-ties and minimizing limitations, he can effectivelyintegrate armored and light forces.

Armored Force CapabilitiesArmored forces emphasize firepower, mobility,

and protection. They rely on tracked, armored vehi-cles to maneuver cross-country through enemy shellfragments and small-arms fires. These combined-arms organizations include tanks, mechanized in-fantry, self-propelled artillery, and other CS andCSS capabilities, much of it armored.

Like AASLT forces, armored forces fight offen-sively. They strive to punch through opposingforces to drive deep into enemy rear areas.

In the offense, armored forces press the fight tocreate a favorable situation. They keep the enemy

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off balance and in disarray until it accomplishes itsmission objectives. Ideally, all armored attacks be-gin as hasty attacks against an unprepared or poorlyprepared enemy force with friendly force actionsdictating the tempo and timing of each engagement.

If required to conduct a deliberate attack, thecorps or JTF and/or division commander task-organizes the armored force to include all the nec-essary combat, CS, and CSS assets to conduct asuccessful mission. As soon as friendly armoredforces penetrate the enemy’s defense, armored unitsquickly secure objectives and, METT-T dependent,transitions to pursuit and exploitation operations.

In the defense, armored units seek a mobile of-fensive battle and are always alert for opportunitiesto counterattack. As with the AASLT division, ar-mored brigades work well in the covering force, indelays, and in withdrawals. Their ability to fire onthe move under enemy fire and to delay againstlarger enemy armored forces makes them an idealdetachment Ieft in contact.

Armored forces fight around the clock in all en-vironmental conditions. They prefer to operate atnight, making use of thermal gun sights, infraredviewers, and a vast family of passive-image inten-sifiers (such as starlight scopes). Armored forcescan continue to conduct combat operations in cer-tain weather extremes (such as fog and thunder-storms) that would ground Army aviation.

The armored brigade brings armored protection,ground mobility, and firepower to the AASLT divi-sion. The division uses these capabilities to exploitsuccess or reinforce the defense. Integrating andsynchronizating capabilities can overwhelm a nu-merically superior force,

Armored forces operate as attack or counterattackforces and accomplish rapid movement in exploita-tions and pursuits. They—

Seize terrain and penetrate or envelop enemydefenses or strongpoints.

Conduct defensive operations by dispersing overgreat distances and by concentrating rapidly.(They can also defend from strongpoints.)

Rapidly exploit success in the offense or defense,including the effects of nuclear, chemical, andconventional fires.

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Conduct delaying actions against larger enemyarmored forces.

Conduct security missions.

Provide organic AD against low-altitude, hostileaircraft.

Armored Force Limitations

Armored forces depend mainly on radio commu-nications. This makes them vulnerable to EW. How-ever, understanding the commander’s intent,doctrine, drills, and control measures ensures thatexecution of plans is less disrupted when radiocommunications break down.

Armored forces have a high consumption rate ofsupply items, especially of Classes III, V, and IX.Anticipating these supply needs, integrating supplyassets into the brigade support area at optimumtimes, and extensively using logistics packages(LOGPACs) reduces this burden.

Armored forces are vulnerable to antiarmorweapons and mines. Proper integration of dis-mounted infantry, use of artillery, terrain driving,and extensive reconnaissance to locate and targetenemy antiarmor positions and minefield reducethis vulnerability.

Armored units have difficulty defending posi-tions against enemy infantry because of the limitednumber of dismounts available. When armoredforces position to defend on mechanized avenues ofapproach, the infantry augments them to reducevulnerability.

The formidable armored force has correspondinglimitations. Just as with the AASLT division or anyother Army organization, prudent commanders en-deavor to accentuate strengths while lessening ef-fects of limitations. Therefore, plans and operationsmust take the following into account:

Armored forces require large amounts of suppliesand services, particularly fuel, ammunition, andvehicle and/or armament maintenance.

Combat and CS forces in an armored and/ormechanized TF move in tracked vehicles. How-ever, an armored TF contains up to twice as manywheeled vehicles as tracked vehicles. Thesewheeled units, many of them vital for CSS, re-

FM 71-100-3

quire roads or passable trails to keep pace withthe armored combat teams.

Rough, densely wooded, flooded, or urban terrainrestricts both tracked and wheeled vehicles. Ar-mored forces must negotiate the terrain in itssector or circumnavigate adverse terrain (such asrivers). However, wherever armored forcestravel, they must be able to fight and defeat enemyforces kilometer by kilometer. Certain adverseweather or weather-caused conditions (mud,deep snow, dust) may seriously degrade cross-country and road rates of movement.

Strategically, armored forces deploy into newtheaters of-operations slowly, usually by sea.Although pre-positioned equipment acceleratesthis process, armored forces arrive over weeksand months, rather than the hours and days asso-ciated with the intercontinental movement oflighter brigades and divisions.

Task Organization Considerations

The AASLT division must consider armoredforce strengths and support requirements when de-termining the best way to task-organize. TheAASLT division may receive OPCON or attach-ment of an ACR, a separate armored or mechanizedbrigade, a division armored or mechanized brigade,or an armored or mechanized battalion TF. In almostall cases, the division assumes authority over acombined-arms structure, rather than a “pure” for-mation.

Sustaining a large armored force can strain theAASLT division’s logistic units. Fuel, ammunition,and supply needs can overwhelm the logistics net-work of a light, airborne, or AASLT division. Eithercorps or JTF and/or the parent division must signifi-cantly augment the AASLT division to support anarmored brigade’s CSS requirements.

The AASLT division’s more robust CSS systemcan better support the armored force. It requires lesscorps or JTF augmentation. Its DISCOM habituallysustains a large aviation fleet.

The AASLT division includes experienced sol-diers and sufficient, proper equipment to move andstore substantial fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.DISCOM’s supply and transportation assets helpsustain armored forces with less augmentation than

other light divisions as long as the AASLT divisionreceives a flow of armor-peculiar items to distribute.

The AASLT division commander weighs the po-tential reduction in CSS for his aviation if part ofDISCOM diverts to sustain an armored or mecha-nized brigade. Additional CSS, especially transpor-tation assets and DS automotive and turretmaintenance elements, accompanies the armoredforce. Otherwise, the armored brigade exerts such adrag on the AASLT division’s sustainment effort itmight adversely affect the tempo of air assaults andraids.

With CSS the central issue, the principal ques-tions become evident. How much armor should thecorps or JTF assign to the AASLT division? Shouldthe corps or JTF attach or retain OPCON of thearmored force?

Commanders should thoroughly consider suchquestions when assigning an armored brigade to theAASLT division. They must consider METT-T fac-tors in the capabilities and limitations of the com-bined force with respect to-

The force’s size and mission.

The deploying unit’s location in relation to itsparent unit.

The deploying force’s support capability.

The deploying force’s source of support.

The armored force’s self-sustaining capability.

When requesting the support of an armored bri-gade, the division routinely expects to receive abrigade task-organized as in Figure 6-17. The ar-mored division provides additional assets to thearmored brigade within its capability.

Additional division assets are from 6 to 8 heavyequipment transporters, ten 5,000-gallon tankers inthe MSB, two MSE nodes, and one MP platoon.This is the minimum-essential organization re-quired to support the AASLT division. This is whatthe parent armored division should provide the ar-mored brigade while remaining capable of conduct-ing and supporting armored division operations.Normally, additional augmentation for the armoredbrigade comes from the corps if the brigade’s parentarmored division cannot support its detached unit.

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Corps Transportation AssetsThe AASLT division attains increased ground

mobility when it has dedicated transportation assets.Ideally, the AASLT division always moves tacti-cally via organic helicopters.

The normal TOE for ground movement is onelight-medium truck company per AASLT brigade.This organization has sixty 2 1/2-ton trucks, and ten5-ton tractors with stake and platform beds. Thecompany has a haul capacity of 1,700 people or1,300 people and 276 short tons (STON) of suppliesin one lift. METT-T may dictate overloading eachtruck, based on safety and mission requirements.

The flexibility gained by attaching these compa-nies to the AASLT division is extremely important.With this single attachment, the AASLT divisioncommander increases his ability to tailor his forcesand his tactics.

The division also requires recovery and mainte-nance augmentation to support the truck companies.In terms of firepower, each truck carries a ringmount and a .50-caliber machine gun. Units usethese to provide additionalmovement.

Brigades Versus BattalionsCorps or JTF commanders

firepower during

tailor divisions bybrigade. A brigade is the most typical armoredorganization assigned to the AASLT division. Insome cases, when constrained by a compressed timeschedule or limited means of deployment, the corpsor JTF elects to allocate an individual armoredbattalion TF.

Brigade-size combined-arms armored forces, in-cluding ACRs, are the ideal forces for integration

into AASLT operations. These forces’ task organi-zations incorporate a normal FSB, augmented withadditional transportation, maintenance, armor-peculiar supplies, and armored MEDEVAC assets.The brigade sustains combat operations for ex-tended durations, depending on arrangements forpersonnel and equipment replacements.

Independent armored or mechanized battalionTFs rarely serve with the AASLT division. Theylack the necessary CSS structure to sustain opera-tions for more than a day or two. Commandersremedy this only by resorting to an improvised CSScomponent, such as a multidisciplined forward sup-port company with extra transport trucks.

These CSS limitations affect the division com-mander’s flexibility in employing the armored TFand could become a liability during a protractedoperation. If he delegates command of the TF to asubordinate AASLT brigade, he must provide addi-tional CSS to assist that brigade’s FSB.

Should the division retain direct authority over thearmored TF, the battalion’s staff may lack the expe-rience to synchronize operations with AASLT bri-gades. Before choosing one alternative over theother, the division assesses METT-T, with specialinterest in the exact composition of the TF (espe-cially its logistic trains) and the talents and depth ofits battle staff.

Though these challenges argue for using brigade-level armored forces, METT-T could dictate other-wise. In a short-notice crisis deployment, anarmored TF might represent the largest availablecomponent. Consequently, the AASLT divisionevaluates the most effective ways to employ bothtypes of forces during combat operations.

OPCON Versus Attached

The corps or JTF commander can direct OPCONor he can attach armored organizations to theAASLT division. METT-T factors determine whichcommand relationship the corps or JTF establishes.

The anticipated duration of the assigned missionand the source of the armored force’s CSS affect thedecision. An OPCON relationship works well forshort periods (under 48 hours) and in theaters wherethe corps, JTF, or armored brigade’s parent divisioncan provide reliable logistic support.

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By definition, OPCON excludes CSS. However,AASLT division logisticians make provisions tosupply fuel, ammunition, food, and similar staplesin the event the OPCON relationship converts toattachment because of a change in METT-T.

Attachment characterizes longer missions orcases in which the corps or JTF augments theAASLT division with appropriate CSS. A forced-entry strike operation after a rapid deploymentwould also favor attachment.

In any situation, allocating an armored force to anAASLT division implies potential development ofan attached relationship, The division plansappropriately.

The AASLT division may retain OPCON or mayattach armored battalion TFs to subordinate bri-gades. The division makes the choice based on thesame METT-T considerations that affect identicalcorps or JTF decisions. In either case, when itbecomes necessary the division adjusts the relation-ship as operations progress.

Planning ConsiderationsEffectively employing a force with both armored

and light elements requires detailed planning. Mu-tual planning and developing orders, rehearsals, andcoordination between respective commanders andstaffs must occur.

Critical areas in the planning process include thecommand and support relationship, the compositionof CS and CSS support, and the effective use ofterrain. A common SOP or understanding of eachunit’s SOP is essential to synchronizing all combat,CS, and CSS units.

Intelligence

Detailed intelligence is critical to the success ofarmored-light force integration. Commanders andstaffs must understand and integrate each force’sintelligence requirements into the IPB process.

Armored forces orient on unit concentrations,tank and AT locations, counterattack routes, ar-mored obstacles, engagement areas, and artilleryand AD assets. The division staff combines, com-pares, and explains in detail both forces’ PIR andDSTs to both staffs.

Staffs jointly develop and coordinate R&S plansfor both units. The armored force mainly uses itslong-range observation devices to conductreconnaissance.

Armored force systems provide enhanced groundmobility, range, and protection when contrasted toAASLT division assets. The intelligence plan inte-grates these enhancements.

Maneuver

Either the armored or AASLT force fixes theenemy while the maneuver force attacks. In eithercase, the armored force requires adequate terrain tomaneuver.

Armored forces are best suited to open and mixedterrain. Mobility and organic firepower make iteasier for mechanized and armored forces to dis-perse and rapidly concentrate at the decisive pointon the battlefield.

The difference in OPTEMPO between AASLTand armored units is always a consideration, includ-ing the scheduling of rehearsals. It may dictate anearly rehearsal time to allow both forces to take part.

Both units’ direct and indirect fires mutually sup-port each other. The armored brigade uses its long-range, direct fires to provide suppression andoverwatch fires for the AASLT division.

The AASLT division integrates the armoredforce’s long-range, antiarmor fires. In armored-lightoperations, differences in equipment may dictatedifferent techniques in marking TRPs.

Fire Support

The armored force must recognize that when theAASLT division operates dismounted its operationsfocus on stealth, which could preclude preparationand other preliminary fires. Planners integrate avail-able fire support for each force into the fire plan.

Staffs jointly develop and ensure everyone under-stands restrictive fire control measures. They mustensure all TACFIRE systems interface. This is acritical rehearsal issue.

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Air Defense

Air defense artillery requires centralized planningto orchestrate ADA support for armored-light or-ganizations. The division can consolidate ADAunits to provide more dense coverage around criticaltargets. Armored forces provide excellent coverageand capability in AD and can carry the resupply ofStinger missiles.

Mobility and SurvivabilityThe division G3 and the engineer develop a com-

mon obstacle plan and consider using dismountedAASLT infantry to clear choke points and obstaclesfor the armored force. Division planners also con-sider weapons’ disparities in range, their impact onprepared obstacles, and the use of terrain duringbattle handover to an armored force.

Mobility and survivability priorities may be dif-ferent for each force. The AASLT force coordinatesto take full advantage of the armored force’s engi-neer assets. When AASLT forces breach obstaclesfor armored forces, the breach must be large enoughfor the widest vehicle in the operation.

Combat Service SupportField Manuals 17-18 and 63-2-1 detail CSS plan-

ning information for armored-light operations.Combat service support requires an understandingof both forces’ current, ongoing, and forecastedneeds.

Commanders must be able to cross-level CSS tosupport overall support requirements and prepare toreceive CSS augmentation from the corps supportgroup. The division coordinates use of the armoredforce’s transportation assets to facilitate cross-leveling.

The AASLT division emphasizes replacing parts;the armored unit emphasizes repair. For example,the addition of a heavy force requires the AASLTdivision to develop and deliver LOGPACs to sup-port the heavy force. These factors require continu-ous attention throughout the operation.

The armored force continuously performs main-tenance. The AASLT commander understands thisrequirement and provides opportunities for mainte-nance. Also, armored forces provide the AASLTforce with limited water, resupply, and casualty

evacuation. Combat service support planners in theAASLT division must give special attention to re-supply of systems in the armored brigade.

Command and ControlThe directing headquarters designates armored-

light force command relationships. Armored andlight forces also exchange LOS. The staffs jointlyconduct the planning process and coordinate devel-opment of orders and overlays.

Backbriefs are mandatory at the brigade level ofcombat and at CS and CSS units to ensure timing,synchronization, and understanding of intent. Unitsuse standard operational terms and symbols, codes,recognition signals, and they exchange SOIs. Thedirecting headquarters may need to setup a retrans-mission site to compensate for the shorter range ofthe AASLT unit’s communications equipment.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

The AASLT division’s decontamination capa-bilities are significantly less than that of the armoredforce. The need for soldiers to carry protectiveclothing in addition to their standard load affectsmobility.

The division should plan the transport of NBCequipment. An armored battalion has expedient de-vices and water-haul capabilities that can offsetAASLT force shortfalls.

Tactical MobilityAir assault units use mobility and terrain to attack

when and where the enemy least expects. This willforce him to fight at a disadvantage.

Augmenting the AASLT division with an ar-mored brigade occurs when the division com-mander decides terrain provides an advantage orwhen he needs an armored brigade to overcome aterrain disadvantage. An armored brigade’s capa-bilities to move rapidly, penetrate enemy defenses,and destroy armored opposition with its firepowerare the greatest abilities it brings to the AASLTdivision.

To obtain synchronization of AASLT and ar-mored forces, the AASLT commander coordinatesthe armored brigade’s movement with the division’s

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manuever units. He provides maneuver space forthe armored brigade to the objective if it is part ofthe attack. If it is not possible to attack simultane-ously with other maneuver forces, the AASLT di-vision commander must decide—

How much separation to accept before commit-ting the armored force.How much of the armored force to commit andhow much to keep close to the infantry.What obstacles or fortifications along the ar-mored maneuver route require infantry to expe-dite movement of the armored force.

Infantry Mounted on a Tank UnitMounting infantry on an armored unit is a viable,

but last-resort, solution. Safety is an obvious con-cern. (See FM 17-18.)

Continuous exposure to the elements is debilitat-ing to soldiers riding on tanks. Retrograde opera-tions make it difficult to mount and dismountinfantry on armored vehicles.

When mounted on an armoredunit, infantrymen areextremely vulnerable to AT, artillery, small-armsfires, ambushes, and the movement of the tank’s turret.However, when trucks are not available, or in emer-gency circumstances, dismounted infantry can mounton armored vehicles to avoid having to march overlong distances.

Foreign National Support (FNS)If tactical constraints degrade CSS requirements,

the preferred method for closing the gap is to getappropriate goods and services locally. In sustainedwarfare, CSS capabilities seldom meet supply andservices requirements.

Acquisition may be accomplished through FNS.Foreign national support refers to the identificat-ion, coordination, and acquisition of foreign na-tional resources such as supplies, material, and laborto support division operations.

Tactical EmploymentAssigning complementary missions to each force

is the guiding principle for employing armored andlight forces. The AASLT division can expect to

conduct tactical operations with armored units in allcombat environments.

The most common employment of armoredforces by the AASLT division occurs when terrainand vegetation favor use of infantry. Under theproper circumstances, the AASLT division nor-mally receives one armored brigade from the corps.

The armored-light force conducts a multitude ofmissions and tasks. (See FM 71-100.) Armored-light operations in the offense include AASLT in-fantry missions of movement to contact, attack, andraid. They are supported by armored tasks such asreserve, overwatch, counterattack, attack by fire,covering force, and deception.

During the planning phase of the deliberate attackthe AASLT commander might perceive the possi-bility of an enemy counterattack. He might thenrequest augmentation of an armored brigade to be areserve or counterattacking force to counter thispotential threat.

The corps commander might then agree to aug-ment the AASLT division with an armored brigade.The AASLT commander would then position thearmored brigade forward and coordinate for therapid movement of the armored brigade with thecorps and the attacking armored division.

If the enemy attacks the initial objectives, theAASLT TAC CP directs the armored brigade topositions to counter enemy efforts. Success dependson the armored-light forces’ ability to ensure theuninterrupted conduct of air assault to secure river-crossing sites and movement of the corps’ mainattacking force.

Offensive OperationsArmored brigades contribute significantly to

AASLT division offensive operations. Five roles, inorder of priority, stand out:

1.

2.

3.

The brigade conducts a supporting ground attackto link up with a deep airhead.

The brigade penetrates the enemy FLOT tosecure ground for aviation FARPs, artillerybattery positions, and MI-collection devices.

The brigade attacks along the FLOT to fix anddeceive the foe’s front-line formations. Inpursuit, the brigade provides direct pressure

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4.

5.

while an AATF secures an objective to trap thefleeing enemy.The brigade fights in the rear to destroy hostileparachute landings and heliborne raids.

The brigade conducts security operations on avulnerable flank.

Armored battalion TFs do not have as much ca-pability as do brigades. If enemy dispositions allow,a TF conducts a ground attack to link up withAASLT forces and FOBs. More likely, the TF se-cures a flank, conducts feints along the FLOT, orperforms rear operations.

Defensive Operations

Light tasks in armored-light operations in thedefense include defending, delaying, and with-drawal missions. Armored tasks include counter-attack, reserve, covering force, overwatch, reinforc-ing, and detachment left in contact (DLIC)missions.

When planning the defense, the commandermight recognize a weakness and request an armoredbrigade from the corps to provide a reserve. Thearmored brigade, if sent, is OPCON to the AASLTdivision. The commander positions the armoredbrigade to rapidly counterattack enemy penetrationsor to reinforce infantry positions as required.

Armored brigadesdefensive operations.in order of preference,

strengthen AASLT divisionThey offer six means, notedto aid in defense or retrograde

situations:1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The brigade counterattacks as part of a mobiledefense, ideally to link up with an AASLT force.The brigade serves as a DLIC (in the CFA, adelay, or a withdrawal). Armor units withmobile, protected firepower stand a far betterchance of breaking decisive contact thandismounted or AASLT task forces.The brigade conducts spoiling attacks and feints.

The brigade defends in sector in a wide or deepMBA.The brigade conducts rear operations to destroyhostile parachute landings and heliborne raids.The brigade screens a vulnerable flank.

Armored battalion TFs do not possess the combatpower necessary to execute the more demandingarmored brigade missions. Usually, they serveOPCON or attached to the covering force or rearguard AASLT brigade where they fill the DLICrequirement.

Armored TFs may reinforce the main effort in theMBA. They may also work directly for the divisionin rear operations or as a flank screen.

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Chapter 7

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter discusses military operations in avariety of environments. Such operations includemilitary operations on urban terrain and amphibi-ous, cold weather, and jungle operations.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ONURBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)

The tremendous growth of urban areas worldwidecontinues to reduce the amount of open, maneuver-able terrain available to attacking or defendingforces. Many areas form giant urban obstacles ex-tending many kilometers.

Generally, giant urban areas are located on ornear traditional movement corridors in regionsrich in natural or industrial resources. They playimportant roles in the economic and political lifeof many countries. Consequently, there are manyareas where units may have to attack or defend acity.

Division commanders and staffs must understandthe complexities and problems of MOUT. Doctrineapplicable to the open battlefield is equally applica-ble to the urban battlefield. The decision-makingmethodology for developing and war-gamingCOAs remains the same. Only METT-T factorschange.

Isolation characterizes the urban battlefield.Therefore, urban battle requires psychologicallystrong leaders with positive attitudes. The MOUTbattle is the type of fighting at which properlysupported infantry units excel.

Field Manuals 90-10 and 90-10-1, the currentdoctrinal references for MOUT, focus on battalionand lower levels. This section provides division-level commanders and staffs a summary of MOUTTTPs.

The AASLT Division’s Role

The AASLT division conducts both offensive anddefensive operations in urban areas. The division

can conduct operations against a combination ofarmored and light forces to-

Control avenues of approach.Act as a combat multiplier by freeing more mo-bile armored forces to act as a reserve force as partof a corps or Army plan.Retain key transportation or economic centers.Protect or hide the force.Deny strategic or political objectives to theenemy.Commanders and staffs conducting mission

analysis for MOUT consider—Diverse IPB requirements.Special C2 requirements.Unique task-organization requirements.Fire support capabilities and limitations.

Weapons effectiveness.Special considerations for CHS and logisticsupport.Special equipment for urban operations.Control measures.

Intelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldThe IPB process for the urban battlefield follows

standard doctrinal methodology. However, the na-ture of urban warfare requires additional informa-tion the IPB process does not normally generate,including—

Information on underground passages, such assewers, subways, heating tunnels, water, andelectrical conduits, which the enemy or friendlyforces might use for intracity movement.Information on water supplies and electricalpower generation and distribution systems.City maps and aerial photographs denoting build-ing heights, overhead obstacles, bridges (and

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their locations and capacities),other special-purpose buildings.

hospitals, and

Detailed building and bridge analyses and data onbuilding survivability and structural integrity.

Grid or area shutoffs for power, water, gas, andother utilities.

Information on factories and other types of indus-try that might impact operations, including refin-eries, rail yards, heavy equipment suppliers,industrial complexes, and medical facilities. (TheG2 conducts a careful analysis to determine if useof these facilities will assist or hinder operations.)Information on communications systems thatmight aid C2 or the control of which might denya hostile populace or enemy the ability to rapidlydisseminate information. (Systems include tele-phone systems, radio and television transmitters,and microwave and satellite relay facilities.)Information on local civil authorities, politicalleaders, and the population. Planning for refugeeproblems and evacuation is critical to both offen-sive and defensive operations. A detailed civilaffairs action plan is essential.

Command and ControlUrban combat is one of the most difficult mis-

sions infantry forces execute. Centralized planningand decentralized execution is critical. Terrain iso-lation, the dominant characteristic of urban combat,and difficulties in communicating by tactical radiohinder C2.

Planning for C2 includes using all communica-tions systems, including existing telecommunica-tions systems and TACSAT radios, to linkdivisions, brigades, and battalions; FM radios; andtactical wire, Using other devices, such as remotelypiloted vehicles (RPVs), sensor strings, or remotevideo links, provides the commander real-time in-telligence as well as the means for calling for andadjusting fires.

Task Organization for Combat

In developing effective task organizations forMOUT, commanders and staffs recognize urbanwarfare’s unique challenges. Conventional task or-ganizations may not be effective. Combat and CS

7-2

assets, such as engineers and MI, may receive non-standard missions.

Fire Support Capabilities and Limitations

Urban terrain increases the difficulty of fire sup-port planning and execution. Man-made structurescan be obstacles to effective artillery fire support bymasking effective fire (even when artillery useshigh-angle fire).

DIVARTY may have to limit positioning of DSartillery to large parks and athletic fields and mayrequire positioning outside of a city to providemassed fires inside or on avenues of approach to thefront. Batteries may have to be in nonstandard firingconfigurations to fit urban terrain. They may alsohave to operate in a direct-fire mode in the offenseto reduce enemy strongpoints. Subordinate maneu-ver units may have to rely on organic mortars formuch of their indirect-fire support.

In both the defense and offense, the division usesa standard building marking system when calling forand adjusting fire support by aircraft. In the defense,this system may actually include marking buildingtops.

Units can pinpoint building locations using theglobal positioning system (GPS) to facilitate preci-sion fire support. There may also be more RFAs,such as areas near hospitals, churches, and shrines.Division staffs disseminate information on theseareas to the lowest levels.

Weapons Systems Effectiveness

Leaders give special consideration at brigade andbattalion levels to the positioning and use of organicweapons systems. The restrictive nature of citystreets could make it impossible to employ TOWand DRAGON AT systems to achieve the 65-meterminimum arming distance and still place effectivefire on enemy armored vehicles. When fired atdefensive positions in buildings, the warhead inthese and other AT missiles makes them less effec-tive than 105-millimeter howitzers.

Time and proximity fuzes enhance the effective-ness of artillery fired at the enemy on rooftops andbehind barricades. If 155-millimeter or 203-milli-meter SP howitzers are available to the division in

FM 71-100-3

the offense, they are effective direct-fire weapons,particularly against bunkers and entry points.

Tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV) canbe extremely effective in support of both offensiveand defensive operations. Tank main guns generallydo not make good entry-point holes in buildings, butcan prove effective when tired at point targets. Unitsshould use HE ammunition in most cases.

Tanks can destroy steeples, tall chimneys, andother structures containing enemy artillery ob-servers. The tank’s greatest value may be its mobilemachine gun support to maneuvering infantry. Withtwo 7.62-millimeter and one .50-caliber machineguns, two tanks have the mobile machine gun fire-power of an AASLT company.

The division can use attack helicopters to detectand eliminate enemy strongpoints. If terrain per-mits, they can also provide precise fire support. Likearmored forces, attack helicopters play a decisiverole in interdicting attacking enemy forces and theirLOCs.

When the division defends strongpoints, ATmines will be more difficult to emplace and concealin urban areas. Consequently, they will have a de-graded effectiveness. The use of antipersonnel(APERS) mines inside buildings may be moreeffective.

Combat Service Support

Casualties are high in city battles. Evacuation,especially aerial evacuation, is extremely difficultand even impossible in some areas. Therefore, unitsposition treatment squads with physicians and phy-sician assistants well forward in the offense, orestablish them throughout the city in the defense.MEDEVAC routes and casualty collection pointsmay be more difficult to coordinate because ofobstacle belts and battle-induced rubble.

City battles greatly affect logistic support. Theycause fluctuating changes in demand for such itemsas small arms, grenades, 40-millimeter projectiles,mines, mortar ammunition, light AT weapons, anddemolition equipment.

Because of changes in consumption rates, unitsmay not properly forecast ammunition require-ments. As a result, DISCOM units must push (not

pull) resupply. Where possible, units should stock-pile supplies and ammunition in the defense.

Large numbers of displaced persons can alsoadversely affect the division supply system. Fight-ing in urban areas may increase the consumptionrate for expendable supplies such as uniforms,boots, and load-bearing equipment (LBE).

Special Equipment Requirements

A division fighting in a city may need specialequipment. At battalion level, this maybe shotguns,body armor, additional sniper weapons, and moreconcussion, smoke, and fragmentary grenades. Atthe division level, the commander and staff mayneed additional communications assets.

The AASLT division does not have enough wireand telephones to effectively wire-in a city defense.Since such assets may not be available, the divisionmay need more TACSAT radios.

Control Measures

Combat in urban areas requires the same controlmeasures as operations in other terrain. However, inthe urban fight, some control measures are easier toidentify. Others, such as frontages and zones ofaction, boundaries, checkpoints, contact points,PLs, and objectives, may be more difficult.

In the offense, the division normally assigns to thebrigade narrow zones of action based on enemystrength, size of buildings, and levels of expectedresistance. An attacking brigade TF may have afrontage of from 6 to 12 city blocks. Frontages andAOs influence formations. In the urban battle, com-manders should maintain a significant reserve wellforward.

Boundaries should be easily identifiable. No strictrules apply to boundaries, except one unit shouldcontrol approaches. In dense urban areas, boundaryplacement is most often along one side of a street.Boundary placement may also allow one unit toinclude both sides of a street. Boundaries shouldnever divide a major avenue of approach.

Street comers, railway crossings, buildings,bridges, and other easily identifiable features canfunction as checkpoints and contact points.

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Phase lines increase control. In the offense, theyassist in regulating the advance of attacking forcesand synchronizing the battle. In the defense, theyassist in reporting enemy penetrations and mayserve to trigger command decisions. Streets, rivers,trolley, and railroad lines make easily recognizablePLs.

Unit objectives can have several characteristics.They can be a specific object, such as a principalbuilding, or a specific area, such as a petroleum tankfarm. They can also be several buildings locatedaround a major intersection. If the commander’sintent is to clear in zone up to a specific point, a limitof advance may be more appropriate than anobjective.

Defensive Operations

Built-up areas present obstacles to an attackingforce while providing the defender an advantageand some protection. A small, well-prepared forcein an urban defense can defeat or hold off a muchlarger attacking force.

Strongly constructed cities give the defender adecided advantage. Each building or group of build-ings is a potential strongpoint.

With additional construction and the use of barri-cades, mines, and booby traps, an urban area canbecome a veritable fortress. Under some conditions,division elements may hold built-up areas while theremainder of the division defends from adjacentrestrictive terrain.

The following are techniques and guidelines fordefensive MOUT operations:

Establish defenses in depth in built-up areas start-ing far forward and including approaches to theurban area.Integrate adjacent terrain into the defense.Use security forces operating in depth to counterenemy ground reconnaissance and infiltration.Use restrictive missions and detailed controlmeasures to facilitate decentralized execution.Establish checkpoints to control access to theurban area.

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Employ the combined-arms team to maximize following are proven techniques and guidelines forindividual unit capabilities.

Emplace obstacles along major avenues ofapproach.

Maintain a strong, mobile reserve to counter-attack and block penetrations.

Figures 7-1 and 7-2 are examples of defensiveMOUT operations.

Offensive Operations

A detailed study of an urban area and enemydispositions in and around it forms the basis forplanning the attack. As in any attack, planning mustprovide for both maneuver and fire support. The

conducting offensive MOUT operations:

Attack a built-up area only as the last resort andonly when major advantage accrues through itsseizure or control.

Know the characteristics of urbanized terrain andthe advantages and disadvantages it offers toeither attacker or defender.

Attack where the enemy is weak, hitting his flanksand rear simultaneously.

Conduct detailed planning to enhance decentral-ized execution and to minimize C2 problems.

Employ the combined-arms team to maximizecapabilities and minimize vulnerabilities.

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Dissipate an enemy’s strength by causing him to Attacks in MOUT normally have three phasesreact to demonstrations, feints, or ruses.Maneuver over approaches to a built-up area withsmoke protection and overmatching fires.Reduce strongpoints with fires where possible,then while continuing to move, secure them withfollow-on forces.Cut LOCs and defeat the enemy throughisolation.Attack at night to gain surprise and maximize thenight technology advantage of US forces.Keep the attack continuous until attacking forcessplinter defenses once they achieve momentum.

Figures 7-3 through 7-5 are examples of offensiveMOUT operations.

7-6

(isolate, gain foothold and syystematic clearing).Phase I is isolating the city and seizing terrainfeatures dominating approaches. The division se-cures positions outside the built-up area from whichto support entry into the city itself. Tactics andtechniques are similar to those of attacks againstother well-organized enemy positions.

In phase II, the division advances to the edge ofthe built-up area and gains a foothold while elimi-nating the defender’s observation and direct fires onapproaches into the area. From the foothold area, theattacking unit penetrates on a narrow front withtanks and infantry leading, where possible.

Supporting fires on entry points focus on the frontand on preventing flank attacks. Assaulting forcescan expect to encounter barricades, AT obstacles,

FM 71-100-3

mines, booby-traps, and AT fire. The probability ofsuccess increases if assaulting forces launch-theattack from an unexpected direction during periodsof limited visibility or under cover of smoke.

Phase III varies from a systematic, block-by-block, house-to-house reduction of the built-up areato a rapid advance while clearing only critical areasand buildings. Phase III begins without pause afterphase II. Clearance and seizure techniques dependon METT-T.

When the built-up area is large and heavily forti-fied and the mission requires a methodical house-by-house, block-by-block clearance operation, thedivision divides the area into brigade zones of re-sponsibility. Each subordinate unit clears its zonecompletely, leaving no enemy to its rear.

There may be occasions, such as in Panama in1989, where light forces deploy in support of na-tional objectives to eliminate a hostile military oroppressive paramilitary force. Under such circum-stances, a large percentage of the population mayactually be sympathetic to US policy and objectives.

Restrictive ROE normally characterize such ac-tions, which may be part of a noncombat evacuationoperation (NEO). In such cases, the situation maywarrant a graduated response. This may include ademonstration using the precision fires of attackcargo (AC)-130s, AH-64s, or field artillery inproximity to, but not actually on, hostile forces inan attempt to convince them to capitulate.

Operation Just Cause provides several excellentexamples in which a graduated response resulted inthe surrender of enemy forces. In one instance, USArmy Rangers used the precision fire of an AC-130to convince a Panamanian garrison to surrender.Rangers had the garrison commander call otherPanamanian units and report what he saw. The resultwas the surrender of several other units without anydirect confrontation.

In addition to preserving life on both sides, agraduated response may also help build or retain thesympathy of a local population by limiting physicaldamage and loss of life. A graduated response maxi-mizes economy of force.

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an overview of environmental considerations forsuch operations.

WINTER AND COLD WEATHEROPERATIONS

Extreme cold weather conditions pose significantoperational problems for the AASLT division. Intemperate climates, many conditions have minimaloperational impact; in the cold, however, they are amatter of life and death. Proper equipment, training,and strong leadership can overcome cold weatherproblems and complications. World Wars I and IIand the Korean War included cold weather opera-tions. Ten German divisions operated under arcticconditions in northern Finland during WWII in anarea about 400 miles wide. The Russian Army used47 divisions in winter operations against Finland in1939. Future global or regional conflicts may re-quire division operations in winter or cold weatherenvironments.

Field Manual 90-11 is the Army’s base doctrineon cold weather operations. This section provides

The Commander

The commander must approach operations in coldweather in a positive manner, exploiting advantagesand reducing disadvantages as much as possible. Hemust emphasize the feasibility of operations andtransmit his confidence to his subordinates.

The commander faces no changes in doctrine orprinciples and, in general, uses tactics suitable forthe terrain. However, operations in cold weatherregions pose additional difficulties which greatlycomplicate C2, maneuver, fire support, and CSSmissions.

Although the fundamental principles of warfight-ing apply unchanged, special characteristics of op-erations in cold weather increase the commander’sresponsibilities. He must consider the use of special

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FM 71-100-3

clothing and equipment as well as expedients andimprovisations for living and moving in the cold.With proper training, suitable equipment, and effec-tive, resourceful leadership, the AASLT divisioncan operate in the cold without significant loss ofstrength or effectiveness.

Winter and Cold WeatherConsiderations

Whiteout

A whiteout is an atmospheric phenomenon inwhich the light from the sky is about equal to thatof the snow surface. A uniformly white glow ap-pears to engulf observers. Whiteout occurs overunbroken snow cover and beneath a uniformly over-cast sky.

Blowing snow can also cause whiteout. Shadows,the horizon, and clouds are no longer visible. Ob-servers lose depth perception and become disori-ented. They can only see dark and nearby objects.

These conditions affect observers in the air aswell as on the ground and increase soldier fatigue.Whiteout most commonly affects helicopters dur-ing slow movement close to the ground’s surface.

Grayout

Grayout occurs over a snow surface during twi-light conditions, when the sun is close to the hori-zon, or when the sky is overcast with dense clouds.Surroundings have an overall grayness.

The absence of shadows causes a loss of depthperception and increases the hazards of landingaircraft, driving a vehicle, or even walking. Undercertain grayout conditions, drivers find it almostimpossible to distinguish the road from a ditch orfrom snowbanks along the roadside.

Grayout is similar to whiteout. In grayout condi-tions, the horizon is distinguishable; during a white-out, it is not. This condition can be overcome byusing night vision devices (NVDs).

Ice Fog

Ice fog is common in inhabited areas when tem-peratures drop below minus 35 degrees Fahrenheit.At such temperatures stagnant air cannot hold the

water vapor which human activities produce; thevapor materializes as ice fog.

Sources of water vapor include vehicle and air-craft exhaust, steam from heating systems, and evenair from humid rooms. In the field such fogs mayappear over troops, bivouac areas, motor parks,airfields, convoys, and gun positions, disclosing thearea of military activity.

Ice fog can obscure a gunner’s vision even witha thermal sight. When combined with soft snowblown up by muzzle blast, the condition may requirea gunner to move to another position after the firstshot .

Ice fog can limit or negate the effectiveness ofNVDs. It also precludes both rotary- and fixed-wingaviation operations.

Snow CoverSnow cover increases the possibilities for move-

ment and operations of suitably equipped andtrained AASLT troops. However, it significantlyreduces the mobility of a force which lacks properequipment and training.

Snow over one meter deep stops all wheeled-vehicle movement except on established roads andin rear areas. Full-tracked vehicles with low groundpressures are best for moving over snow-covered ormuddy terrain.

Deep snow can also limit depth in combat mis-sions because it slows movement. Snow depths over24 inches almost entirely stop movement on footwithout the aid of snowshoes.

Reconnaissance by patrols on skis, snowshoes, orin light oversnow vehicles should precede unitmovement. Reconnaissance reports should includeinformation on snow depth and ice thickness.

Snow and ice increase maintenance requirementsof equipment and weapons systems. Snow coveralso reduces the effect of all weapons fires, includ-ing artillery or mortar tire.

Ice CoverThe freezing of rivers, lakes, and swamps can

increase the possibilities for maneuver. Waterwaysthat are normally obstacles in summer can becomefrozen routes of advance and LOCs in winter,

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making extensive cross-country movement possi-ble. However, such routes are also open to theenemy.

Extreme Cold

Extreme cold slows activities by numbing sol-diers and increasing the need for maintenance ofweapons and materiel. Activities which normallyrequire only minutes may require hours in extremecold. Oversnow movement is extremely slow andrequires periodic stops to set up warming tents forthawing water and rations and for soldiers to combatthe effects of numbing cold.

Troops require special clothing and heated shel-ters. They must also protect some equipment andsupplies against freezing temperatures.

Extreme cold makes metal extremely brittle, in-creasing breakage of parts in all types of weapons.Soldiers must winterize their weapons and vehicleswith special lubricants. However, bringing a coldweapon into a warm shelter causes condensation onthe weapon which can freeze and cause a malfunc-tion when it returns to the cold. Consequently,weapons are normally left outdoors unless broughtin for maintenance. Extreme cold also decreasesammunition velocity and accuracy.

The commander must consider the following fac-tors during planning: proper planning and suitableclothing, supplies, equipment, shelter, transporta-tion, intensified training, and any impact for con-ducting AASLT operationswhen the SOP dictates.

Daylight and Darkness

without soldier rucks

Winter in arctic and subarctic regions brings de-creased daylight and in some areas no daylight.Conversely, summer has long periods of daylight.

The commander must not regard unusually longperiods of either daylight or darkness as a bar tooperations. In some situations, these conditions canactually aid operations.

Low-Population Density and TransportationRoutes

In artic regions there will be few settlements,supplies, quartering facilities, and LOCs.

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Therefore, their control or destruction maybe criti-cal. Also, there are few roads and railroads and thosethat exist usually are vulnerable to enemy action. Inaddition, climatic conditions may greatly affecttheir use.

Lakes and waterways may either aid or hinderoperations. Units can use them as natural routes ofcommunications or airstrips if covered with ice ofsufficient thickness. However, drifted and hard-packed snow may make landing on ice difficult andrequire engineer preparation of an airstrip.

In the summer, waterways may be either majorbarriers or LOCs. Many rivers and streams areglacier-fed and carry great volumes of water and siltin summer. The amount of water may vary consid-erably during any 24-hour period. This is particu-larly true near a river’s source when daytimetemperatures are warm and nighttime temperaturesare near freezing. Units must conduct continuous,careful reconnaissance to determine water volumechanges throughout the day.

Mapping and NavigationIn some regions land navigation is difficult. Lack of

landmarks, the presence of large forested areas, peri-ods of reduced visibility, difficulty of cross-countrymovement, changes in terrain features because ofblowing sand or snow, large magnetic declinationvariations (in extreme northern and southern latitudes)increase the difficulty.

Maps may be unreliable or nonexistent. Therefore,GPS and aerial photographs become an importantsource of terrain information.

With proper planning, engineer topographic unitscan convert areial photography into photomaps. How-ever, unless aerial photographs are properly laid out,annotated, and referenced to known survey points,they will not be accurate enough for navigation andindirect-fire weapons.

Weather VariationsSharp variations in weather are common in cold

weather operations. Such include severe frosts, mildweather spells, thaws, rain, sudden freezing, snow-storms, strong winds, and dense fogs.

Rains can halt an attack by making off-roadmovement impossible. Conversely, a hard freeze

FM 71-100-3

can make a defensive position vulnerable by con-verting soft lowlands, or even rivers, into avenuesof approach.

Accurate weather forecasts are essential to guardagainst the harmful effects of weather and to seizetactical advantage. The division weather section andits weather prediction capabilities are extremelyimportant. The commander must consider favorableconditions of even short duration as a combat powermultiplier.

Seasonal Transition

Climatic changes are abrupt as seasons change.Winter field fortifications can become unusable. Afrozen river may become a major obstacle as the icebreaks. Temporary roads and airfields disintegrate;permanent ones become unusable. Rivers flood.Terrain changes rapidly. Areas underlaid by perma-frost become bogs. When possible, units should useair reconnaissance to determine possible routes formovement.

The freezing season is shorter and has less effecton movement than the break-up season. The besttime for operations is when ground and waterwaysfreeze sufficiently, but before deep snows arrive.Units must also alter camouflage patterns. Carefulplanning is essential.

In winter, clothing and shelter must protectagainst cold; in summer, they must protect againstwater, sun, and insects. Large numbers of mosqui-toes are common in arctic regions during warmermonths. They can severely impact operations iftroops are not properly equipped.

Delayed Responses

Extreme cold increases the time required to per-form even simple tasks. Everything is done at a slowpace and takes considerably more time. Troopsconducting movements require additional time toadjust clothing and equipment and, many times,they must set up warming tents en route.

In cold weather, leaders must supervise soldiersto ensure they consume sufficient quantities of foodand water. Also, soldiers often resist performingroutine hygiene functions because of the extremecold. Establishing buddy teams within an organiza-tion can assist in reducing cold weather injuries.

OperationsErrors or miscalculations in planning extreme

cold weather operations may be disastrous and cor-rective action difficult. Synchronizing air andground forces is more difficult in the cold.

Logistic support must include increased fuel,shelter, and clothing; the need for special equip-ment; and the need to modify standard items. Plansmust provide for alternate means of supply and forincreased use of air transport in supply and evacu-ation.

Soldiers will be able to move only the minimumof essentials. Austere living and self-sufficiency arecritical to economy of supplies.

Reconnaissance

Operations in extreme cold are vulnerable to am-bush and delaying tactics. Reconnaissance aheadand to the flanks of an advancing column is critical.

Detailed reconnaissance before committing themain force avoids delay, misdirection of effort,fatigue, and unnecessary exposure of troops to thecold. Reconnaissance troops must be mobile, butstill carry life support equipment. They must main-tain communications with the main body at alltimes.

Security

Short daylight hours and storms may restrict en-emy and friendly air operations. However, theweather may also limit air and ground observationof the enemy.

Dense forests provide a natural screen against airobservation for elements not using roads or familiartrails. In open, snow-covered areas, using whitecovering for clothing and equipment increases pro-tection against observation.

Extreme cold decreases the importance of waterobstacles. However, concentrated artillery fire, airbombing, or deliberately placed demolition chargescan turn frozen areas of water back into obstacles ortraps.

One foot of solid ice can support light tanks whilefrom 3 to 4 feet of ice can support virtually any load.Snow over 18 inches deep limits or completely stops

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wheeled combat vehicles except on cleared roads. Destroying enemy shelter places him in immedi-It can also hamper operation of tracked vehicles. ate jeopardy. This can permit taking the offense as

Mines improperly placed will be ineffective insoon as the situation allows.

heavy snow as tanks press them deeper into snow Wide, frozen streams and lakes afford little or nowithout exploding them. If used, personnel should cover and provide excellent fields of fire for theplace mines on a hard surface beneath the snow. defender. Under mild temperatures, keeping the iceof these lakes and streams broken up for a distance

Offensive Operations

The commander must consider climatic condi-tions and sudden weather changes in planning of-fensive operations. Heavy snow may fall during anoperation, restricting movement and mobility. It canalso hinder movement of the enemy’s reserve.

A sudden thaw may prevent cross-country move-ment and cut off troops from adjacent friendlyforces. Fog and low clouds can develop quickly andobscure observation. The commander should re-ceive frequent weather reports to aid in decisionmaking before and during operations.

If possible, attack forces should avoid heavy for-ests and snow drifts. Terrain corridors betweenwooded areas are preferable to stream valleys, asthe latter usually contain deep snow drifts.

The objectives of the attack are critical terrainfeatures which dominate the roads leading awayfrom the enemy’s position. Seizing them normallyprevents withdrawal, reinforcement, or resupplyand may cause the enemy’s eventual surrender orannihilation.

Defensive Operations

In general, reasons for assuming the defense ap-ply in all environments. Maneuver units may haveto assume the defense because of extreme coldweather phenomena such as breakup, freezing, se-vere snowstorms, and extremely low temperatures.

Units may deliberately assume the defense totempt (or compel) the enemy to attack under unfa-vorable conditions such as through long, narrowpasses, deep snow, or across obstacles where move-ment is difficult and firepower ineffective. Thiswould force the enemy to fight under exhaustingconditions while the defender occupies better shel-ter and maintains shorter supply lines.

of from 20 to 30 feet from shore creates a difficultobstacle.

Heavily wooded areas and open areas relativelyfree of snow favor the attacker. Units must payspecial attention to these areas and defend theseareas in strength and in depth.

In conditions of extreme cold, a position’s organi-zation requires special tools and explosives. Ordi-nary entrenching tools are ineffective. A defensiveposition on the crest of a hill or ridge will usually beeffective. Enemy tanks and personnel will havedifficulty ascending a steep, snow-covered slope.

The defender holds his most mobile troops inreserve. Because of difficulties in rnovement, thecommander should keep his reserves closer to theprobable area of employment.

Maneuver units normally counterattack againstthe flank of an attacker. In deep snow, the enemymay be unable to change his orientation in time tomeet a counterattack on his flank by mobile forces.

The defender continually improves LOCs. Heopens paths between front-line positions and rearareas and in the directions of reserve employment.The commander should position reserve units tocover thoroughfares to prevent enemy use.

DESERT OPERATIONS

The term desert covers a wide field of arid envi-ronments, ranging from the rolling sands of theAfrican Sahara to the mountainous and wadi-cov-ered American Mohave. All have characteristicswhich can adversely affect military operations: lackof water, limited vegetation, large areas of sand,extremes in temperature, and brilliant sunlight.Field Manual 90-3 is the Army’s base doctrine ondesert operations.

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The Desert EnvironmentMountainous deserts have scattered ranges or

areas of barren hills or mountains separated by dry,flat basins. Most of the infrequent rainfall occurs onhigh ground and runs off rapidly in the form of flashfloods. These create deep gullies and ravines anddeposit sand and gravel around the edges of thebasins.

Rocky plateau deserts have relatively slight reliefand extensive flat areas with solid or broken rock ator near the surface. They may have shallow, butsharply defined, steep-walled valleys called wadis.Although the flat bottoms and concealment of wadismay seem attractive as CP locations, they can beextremely dangerous because of flash flooding fromrains that may occur many miles away.

Sand or dune deserts are extensive flat areascovered with sand or gravel. They may be totallyflat for several kilometers or be covered by vastexpanses of slowly migrating mounds of sand.

Plant life may vary from none to scrub brush over6 feet high. Temperatures may exceed 100 degreesFahrenheit during the day and fall to near freezingat night.

Impact on OperationsMobility

The key to success in desert operations is mobil-ity, clearly evident in ground operations in Opera-tion Desert Storm. The tactics used to achievevictory over Iraq were wide, rapid flanking move-ments similar to those German Field Marshal E. J.E. Rommel and British Field Marshal B. L.Montgomery demonstrated in North Africa duringWWII.

Trafficability and cross-country movement arecritical to desert-operations tactics, and conditionsare generally good. However, salt marshes can cre-ate no-go conditions during wet seasons.

Sand can bog down traffic and make foot move-ment slow and exhausting. The steep slopes ofdunes and rocky mountains can make vehicle move-ment impossible.

Wadis, with steep and unconsolidated banks, cre-ate cross-compartmented terrain. When it rains, wa-dis become dangerously rushing streams of water,turning flat lake beds into seas of mud.

In rocky terrain, sharp angular debris easily punc-tures tires. But, overall, movement is mostly unin-hibited. With ample fuel and water resources, unitscan go around natural as well as man-made obsta-cles.

With the desert’s loose surface material, ob-servers can easily detect movement because of theflying sand and dust. In an actual engagement, thiscloud may obscure a unit, protecting it from directfire as it advances. But the element of surprise isprobably lost.

Moving at night maybe the logical choice. Thedust is still there, and vehicles (which should bewidely spaced) can get separated. But there is noworry about enemy detection from a dust columnor the sun’s rays reflecting on glass, mirrors, ormetal. These can give away movement and posi-tions at distances of up to 20 kilometers.

With the ability to make fast, wide, flankingmovements, a unit can encircle and cut off enemyforces. The Israeli forces under General ArielSharon did just that to the Egyptian Third Army inthe 1973 War. The British did the same to theItalians in North Africa in January 1941.

In Operation Desert Storm, night-fighting AH-64helicopters, combined with FA fires, were an un-beatable team. An armored force raced to theEuphrates River and attacked Republican Guardpositions, cutting off and destroying Iraqi divisions.

Land navigation is a challenge during movementin many arid regions. There are few landmarks, andmaps and even photos can become dated quickly,especially in areas where dunes migrate. The GPSwith the small, lightweight GPS receivers are amajor aid for desert operations.

Refueling and resupply operations require peri-ods in which forces assume the defense, but onlytemporarily. Compared to rocky plateau topogra-phy, the flat, sandy desert topography is not condu-cive to defense.

In mountains and canyons, a defensive posturecan be favorable. Controlling passes can essentiallyclose off vast areas and make an attack extremelycostly.

While a unit is in the defense, it needs both groundand air reconnaissance to detect movements at longrange and as early as possible. Units must place

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obstacles in allslow advances

types of topography, primarily toand channel columns. Neglecting

these security measures in flat, sandy regions canlead to disaster.

Reports from commanders in Operation DesertStorm indicate that combat units engaged the enemyearly and at the maximum ranges of weapons sys-tems. In some cases, units used observed tires be-cause the enemy could move so quickly. Theobservation helicopter (OH)-58, used with the AH-64 and long-range artillery systems, were the meansto this end. But, generally, the Iraqis moved little,and unobserved fires, using IMINT, resulted insubstantial destruction.

Observation and Fields of FireObservation and fields of fire are generally excel-

lent in most desert areas. Open terrain and a pre-dominantly clear atmosphere offer excellentlong-range visibility and permit the use of direct-fire weapons to their maximum ranges. When thereis no usable dominant terrain available, units canconduct observation from the air.

Range estimation by gut feeling may be subjectto error. Weapons can easily reach their maximumeffective ranges. Correct estimation of maximumranges is critical for all weapons, especially forwire-guided munitions.

There are two primary considerations when usingweapons in a desert environment: longer-range ob-servation and fields of fire at the maximum effectiveranges. However, rapid heating and cooling of theatmosphere can hinder these factors and cause dis-tortion of ranges to both the aided and the unaidedeye. Personnel must use mechanical and electronicmeans, such as GSRs and laser range finders toverify estimated ranges. Crews must bore sight andzero their weapons more frequently at standardranges.

Even though the landscape appears flat, closerinspection may show it to be undulating with rela-tively deep wadis and depressions. Weapons mustbe sited to provide mutual support. Dead space maybe a problem. Leaders must ensure their units coverthese areas by indirect fire.

When on the offense, units should initiate attackswith the sun at or near the attacker’s back, whenpossible. This eliminates most shadows that

degrade optical weapons guidance and make visualtarget acquisition difficult. Units must avoid shinesand reflections.

Heat distortion, resulting from heat waves at thedesert surface, causes other visibility problems. Im-ages shimmer, making positive identification diffi-cult and degrading depth perception.

Range finders can help verify correct distancesand bracketing techniques with large adjustments tohit an enemy target with artillery. If distortion ren-ders optical vision hopeless, radars can be valuableand the haze of midday heat will unlikely affectthem. However, radars are almost useless in sand-storms.

Image intensification, which depends on thephase of the moon at night, is also of limited valuein sandstorms. If there is no moon, personnel useartificial illumination outside the system’s field ofview.

Because thermal imagery devices depend on thedifference between ambient temperature and equip-ment temperature, they are more useful at night thanduring the day. Because of the distinct advantages,units should use them as the primary sighting sys-tems for vehicles so equipped.

Observation of fires, especially direct fires bytanks, may be difficult because of dust clouds. Ob-servers may encounter complications when tryingto make correction to FA fires, especially those oflarger pieces, by dust hanging in the air followingthe impact of ranging rounds. Forward observersshould consider placing initial rounds beyond thetarget rather than short of the target.

Cover and ConcealmentCover and concealment are generally scarce in the

desert. Flat, sandy deserts provide little if any natu-ral cover or concealment, especially from aerialattack or reconnaissance.

Ground concealment and protection from fire canbe found behind dunes or in wadis. When usingwadis for ground concealment, soldiers must beaware of the potential for flash floods. Camouflagecan be effectively employed to improve on naturalcover and concealment.

Some arid regions have vegetation that can pro-vide limited concealment from ground observation.

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In rocky, mountainous deserts, cover and conceal-ment are best behind boulders and in crevasses.

Daytime vehicle movement eliminates nearly anypossibility of surprise, as enemy observers can spotdust trails for miles. Therefore, vehicle movementshould occur mostly at night.

At night, noise and light discipline is critical.Sounds and light travel great distances across theunobstructed flatness and through the clear desertair.

Obstacles

Natural obstacles do exist in the desert, and man-made obstacles are effective in arid regions. Wadisand the steep slopes of escarpments, mountains,hills, and dunes hinder cross-country movement.

Sand dunes may stretch for miles and preventdirect movement across their length. Sand dunes areoften more than 100 feet high and consist of loosesand with high, steep downwind faces that makevehicle traversing next to impossible.

In some areas, desert salt marshes have crustedtops that deceive vehicle drivers. These dry lakebeds can become obstacles, especially in the wetterseasons when the water table is higher.

At times a top crust may form on the surface of adry lake, but below the crust the soil is moist andsimilar to marsh conditions. The surface looks likeit will have good trafficability, but the crust col-lapses with the weight of a vehicle, which becomesmired.

The high premium on fuel and time makes itcostly to go around natural obstacles. Thereforeaerial reconnaissance immediately before any largemovement is highly advisable. For example, be-cause sand dunes migrate with shifting winds, theymight not be where maps or photographs showthem.

Sandy deserts are ideal for employing minefields.Although windstorms can reveal previously buriedmines, these mines can still channel movement anddeny access to certain areas. (Minefields influencedthe battles of the Bi’R Hacheim Line and ElAlamein in Iraq.) Other obstacles include ditches,revetments, and barriers made by bulldozing sandmounds or by blasting in rocky, mountainous areas

to close passes (the Bar Lev Line along the SuezCanal for example).

Key Terrain

Key terrain in the desert can be any man-madefeature, a mountain pass, or a source of water, andof course, high ground. Because there are few man-made features in the desert, those that do exist canbecome important, perhaps even key.

Roads and trails are scarce in the open desert.Complex systems beyond simple commercial linksare not necessary.

Routes joining oil or other mineral deposits tooutlet collection points supplement road systems.Wells, pipelines, refineries, and quarrying andcrushing plants may have strategic and tactical im-portance. Pipelines are often raised off the ground,inhibiting movement.

Rudimentary trails exist in most deserts. In manylocations, ancient posts and forts, usually in ruins,invariably command important avenues of ap-proach. They frequently dominate the only availablepasses in difficult terrain.

Passes through steep topography are also likely tobe key, again because they are so few. The NorthAfrican campaigns of WWII focused on the controlof passes, specifically the Sollum and Halfaya. Inthe Sinai Wars between Egypt and Israel, the Mitla,Giddi, and Sudar passes were key. In Afghanistan,control of the mountain passes provided the Muja-hideen safe haven from the Soviets.

Other key terrain features include oases and anyhigh ground. Oases become important for waterresupply. High ground is always a fair bet for keyterrain. For example, the relative flatness and greatdistances of some deserts, such as in Iraq, make evena large sand dune a key feature.

Avenues of Approach

Avenues of approach do not have clear definitionsin arid regions. The vast, relatively flat areas permitmaneuver from virtually any direction. This pointbecame obvious to units establishing defensive po-sitions in Operation Desert Shield. Wide envelop-ments are also possible.

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Modern sensor technology, limited natural con- picks for use in vehicle recovery. Winch-equippedcealment, and improved observation make the ele- vehicles should not normally lead movements; theyment of surprise a challenge. Yet, the coalition did should locate near the rear.achieve surprise during Operation Desert Storm.The presence of US tanks in defensive perimetersshocked Iraqi commanders. JUNGLE OPERATIONS

Fuel is the major limitation when consideringavenues of approach. The great distances a unit musttravel to outflank enemy positions require hugeamounts of fuel and complicate resupply.

In mountainous and canyon topography, avenuesare much more limited; wadis and valleys are likelyto be the only possible access routes. Any roads thatdo exist are probably in valleys. Nevertheless, noneof these considerations preclude the use of suchtactics.

Techniques for Operating VehiclesThe best time to drive on sand is at night or early

morning when the sand is damp and traction isbetter. By reducing tire pressure, vehicles may gainsome traction. However, prolonged driving on par-tially deflated tires overheats tires and breaks downsidewalls.

Evenly distributing loads helps operators controltheir vehicles. Also, operators must apply gooddriving skills to avoid harsh jolting of tires andextreme wear on tracks, wheels, springs, and shockabsorbers.

Crossing dunes requires careful reconnaissance.Units should stay on the upwind side if possible. Thewind may have built up sand around small scrubsforming small hills. Because of poor traction,wheeled vehicles should not attempt to movethrough areas where this has occurred.

Salt marshes are normally impassable, especiallythose with a dry crust of silt on top. A surface crustmight cover sandy areas, which could impedetravel.

To extract a sand-trapped vehicle, units shouldcarry at least enough pierced steel planking or gal-vanized iron to put under, and allow traction for, thedriving wheels. Also effective are canvas sand mats,preferably with lateral strips of metal for strengthand traction.

Other essential emergency equipment includesjacks, jack blocks, tow ropes, shovels, axes, and

The US Army has a long history of fighting injungles—in WWII, Vietnam, and most recently,Panama. Because Army contingency plans includeoperations in jungle areas, jungle warfare for theAASLT division remains a distinct possibility. FieldManual 90-5 is the Army’s base doctrine for jungleoperations.

Jungle EnvironmentDense vegetation, high temperatures (averaging

from 78 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit), high humidity(90 plus percent), and heavy rainfall (1,000 centi-meters or 400 inches per year) characterize jungles.In jungles close to the equator, seasons are nearlyalike. Further from the equator there are distinct wet(monsoon) and dry seasons.

Types of JunglesPrimary jungles are tropical forests with well-

established trees. Primary jungles include tropicalrain forests and deciduous forests.

Tropical rain forests have large trees whosebranches interlock to form canopies. Canopies mayform at two or three different levels and preventsunlight from reaching the jungle floor. As a result,there is little undergrowth. This makes movementby foot easier than in other types of jungles. How-ever, extensive above-ground roots, hanging vines,and soggy ground makes vehicle travel difficult.Observation from the air is nearly impossible andground observation is difficult.

Deciduous forests are found in subtropical zones.In wet seasons, trees have their full foliage; in dryseasons much of the foliage dies. Trees are lessdense than in a rain forest, with more sunlight andrain filtering to the jungle floor and, consequently,more undergrowth.

In the wet season, limited observation from theair and ground is normal and movement is moredifficult. In the dry season, observation and traffi-cability improve.

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Secondary jungles occur when the ground repeat-edly gets exposed to the sun, such as at the edges ofa primary jungle and in areas where humans havecleared and abandoned the jungle. Secondary jun-gles are overgrown with weeds, grasses, canes, andother vegetation. Foot movement is difficult, andthe maximum ground observation is only a fewmeters.

Common Jungle Features

Jungle areas are not characterized solely by treesand undergrowth. In the tropics and subtropics,local jungle areas have special characteristics, in-cluding swamps, savannas, bamboo thickets, andactive or abandoned cultivated areas.

Swamps occur in low jungle areas or depressionswith poor drainage where water can gather. Move-ment is normally limited to foot and small boats. Airand ground observation is limited.

Savannas are broad, open grasslands where treesare scarce and grasses are thick and broad-bladed.Vehicle movement is easier in savannas than otherjungle areas, but movement by foot is slow andtiring because of the tall, dense, sharp-edged grass.Observation varies from poor to good.

Bamboo grows throughout the tropics. Largebamboo thickets obstruct vehicle movement, andtroop movement through bamboo is slow, tiring,and noisy.

Cultivated areas include rice paddies, plantations,and small farms. Generally, observation is less re-stricted in cultivated areas. Ease of movementvaries.

Rice paddies are flat fields that are flooded duringpart of the year through a series of dikes and irriga-tion ditches. Paddies hinder foot movement whenwet and generally prevent vehicle movementwhether wet or dry.

Plantations are large farms where tree crops likerubber and coconut grow. The ordered rows of treesgenerally allow easy movement.

Small farms are created by cutting down andburning off existing jungle vegetation. Crops aregrown for a few years, then the farms are typicallyabandoned. These abandoned farms may hindermovement when they become overgrown.

Jungle Operations ConsiderationsJungle combat is characterized by long periods of

developing the situation and looking for the enemyfollowed by short periods of violent and sometimesunexpected fighting. Jungle combat involves fewerconventional attacks and defenses and more am-bushes, raids, and meeting engagements.

Heavy vegetation reduces observation and fieldsof fire, which makes high ground less significant askey terrain. Roads, rivers and streams, fording sites,and LZs are likely key terrain. However, operationalorientation remains on the enemy rather than onretaining or controlling terrain.

The range of TOWs and DRAGONs is limited indense jungle vegetation. Artillery fire support isdifficult to observe and adjust. TACAIR and heli-copter weapons systems provide an alternative toconventional artillery fire support.

Navigation and MobilityTopographic survey of jungle areas is mainly by

air. Jungle maps show large terrain features, but donot always show smaller features such as gullies,small swamps, and intermittent streams.

Older maps may be inaccurate, especially in de-picting trails and clearings which can rapidly be-come overgrown. Aerial photographs andinformation from patrols, local inhabitants, and oth-ers who have been in the area can help update maps.

Heavy vegetation makes land navigation diffi-cult. Moving through a jungle is difficult and slow.Thick vegetation and lack of roads hinder vehiclemovement.

Dense vegetation, heat, and rugged terrain causetroops to tire quickly. Using a compass and anaccurate pace count are vital.

If available, the best source of navigation is theGPS. However, dense jungle canopies may causesignal interference and limit GPS effectiveness.

CommunicationsThe jungle environment has a negative effect on

communications. The dense foliage reduces therange of both visual and sound communications.

Radio range is reduced, typically from 10 to 25percent, because of thick foliage and rugged

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terrain. Rain and humidity can cause communica-tions equipment to fail. -

Laying communications wire in a jungle takestime. Aircraft may be needed to assist in wire-layingoperations.

Offensive Operations

The jungle environment poses several challengesfor the attacker. Thick foliage hinders control. See-ing the battlefield is difficult and requires the

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coordinated use of security patrols, air and groundreconnaissance, and movement.

In a jungle, the momentum and speed of an attackare difficult to maintain. Thick vegetation makes itdifficult to move and accurately fire heavy weapons.The jungle does, however, provide concealment forinfiltration (Figure 7-6).

Defensive Operations

The density of jungle foliage impedes the detec-tion of approaching enemy forces and slows

FM 71-100-3

movement in reaction to an attack. Because foliagelimits fields of fire and decreases visibility, defen-sive positions normally must be carefully selected.The defending force must use OPs and NVDs toprovide early warning, especially against infiltra-tion attempts (Figure 7-7).

Combat Service Support

Lack of roads in the jungle hinders resupply andevacuation. In a jungle environment there are morelitter cases than in other environments; even lightlywounded soliders may be unable to walk throughdense undergrowth. Litter teams may be required toinitially evacuate the wounded.

Air transport is critical, but not always available.Soldiers must be able to move with only minimumessential supplies. Austere living and self-sufficiency may be critical to jungle operations.

RETROGRADE RIVERCROSSING OPERATIONS

Many locations throughout the world have riversthat function as obstacles to military operations.Therefore, US forces may need to conductretrograde river crossing operations. This sectionsummarizes these operations. For more informationsee FM 90-13.

A retrograde river crossing is a special operationthat requires detailed planning and support. Nor-mally, the extent of the water obstacle and theenemy situation dictates just how to accomplish thecrossing.

The force usually conducts a retrograde rivercrossing when enemy advances threaten to over-whelm the division. The commander responds bydirecting some form of retrograde operation.

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While executing a retrograde operation, the divi-sion may be subjected to possible enemy pursuit. Ifso, the force conducts a retrograde river crossing toaccomplish one of two objectives—to establish anew defense on the exit bank of the river, and/or tocontinue the retrograde to new defensive positionsdesignated beyond the obstacle.

Retrograde river crossings are not merely offen-sive river crossings conducted in reverse. They arecharacterized by the following:

They require detailed planning and centralizedcontrol.The enemy controls maneuver initiative.There is a high risk to friendly forces.Delaying forces must impede the enemy’s ad-vance to trade space for time at the crossing sites.Forces on the exit bank must provide defensiveand overmatching fires.The same amount of detailed planning associated

with a deliberate offensive crossing must also beapplied to a retrograde river crossing. For planningpurposes, the crossing operation has three distinctactions-delay, defense, and crossing. They occurconcurrently.

The delay’s primary purpose is to trade space fortime. Time gained allows the corps’ main body tomove across the river.

Corps elements not engaged in the delay executea planned retirement or withdrawal and cross theriver as quickly as possible. These elements areassigned various missions within the crossing areaor in the defense which is established on the exitbank. Moving these elements toward and across theriver must be consistent with the overall retrogradethe entire corps is conducting to preclude the en-emy’s early detection of actual crossing sites.

The commander directs delay operations to con-tinue until delay forces reach the battle handover orholding line. Repositioned units occupying as-signed defensive positions on the exit bank thenassume responsibility for the battle. Finally, thedelay force disengages and begins its rearwardcrossing.

Establishing a strong exit bank defense in eachdivision sector occurs at the same time as the exe-cution of delay operations. The defense of the exit

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bank must be as strong as possible with the availabletroops. The defense’s primary mission is to over-watch the crossing of the forces remaining on thefar side of the river.

Once the commander directs defense forces toassume responsibility for the battle, they are ex-pected to defeat, or at least contain, the enemy in aspecified area. This is essential for successfullycompleting the crossing. As units engaged in delayoperations negotiate the crossing, they are incorpo-rated into the defense or prepare to assume the delaymission if further retrograde operations arewarranted.

Because friendly forces control both banks of theriver for some time before the operation, they shouldcontinually improve and repair existing bridges andcrossing sites. They install or pre-position to the rearall available tactical bridging and rafting within thecorps to supplement existing crossing means.

The activity begins with the actual crossings ofCSS elements. These units evacuate all nonessentialsupplies and engage in prestocking delay and de-fense forces. Crossing sites within the rear areashould be fully operational early in the retrograde toallow elements not involved in the delay to cross theriver at the earliest possible time consistent with thetactical situation.

Characteristics of operations within the retro-grade crossing area include—

Rapid and controlled flow of traffic across theriver.Maximum use of concealment and dispersal.Coordinated crossing of equipment and supplies.Coordination between defense and delay forcesfor use of crossing sites by the latter. -

The difficulty of command, control, and coordi-nation of retrograde crossings requires a clearlyunderstood delineation of missions and tasks be-tween delaying, defending, and support forces.

Because the enemy has the maneuver initiative, itis essential to employ deception operations as anintegral part of the plan. Deception should beplanned and executed to deceive the enemy regard-ing the retrograde. The deception story should con-ceal the locationoperations.

and the extent of crossing

DEEP ATTACK

Chapter 8DEEP OPERATIONS

Field Manual 100-5 states that ASSLT infantryunits have great tactical and operational mobility.They train to fight across the range of militaryoperations.

Air assault infantry units’ significant antiarmorcapability, AASLT artillery, and attack and lift avia-tion, joined with their strategic deployability, makesthem particularly well-suited as an early deployingforce in contingency operations against heavyforces. They can penetrate deep into enemy territoryto cut LOCs, seize airfields, destroy C2 nodes, blockreinforcing units, or seize key terrain. Because oftheir agility and mobility, AASSLT infantry unitsare also well-suited for covering force operations.

The purpose of deep operations is to deny theenemy freedom of action and to disrupt or destroythe coherence and tempo of his operations. Deepoperations can also isolate the close battle by pre-venting the enemy from concentrating his forces. Itsdepth expands the battlefield in time, space, andresources.

Attacking enemy formations in depth destroys,delays, disrupts, or diverts enemy combat capabil-ity. Simultaneous attacks in depth cause confusion,destruction, and demoralization.

Going deep characterizes AASLT operations.Regardless of the overall situation, offensive ordefensive, AASLT commanders look for opportu-nities to go as far behind hostile forward forces aspossible to attack key enemy ground forces, com-mand facilities, logistic areas, and/or AD systems.

SynchronizationSynchronizing simultaneous attacks in depth re-

quires commanders and staffs to think in terms ofcommander’s intent, battle space, time, and opera-tional capabilities. For future operations, divisionsconsider each of these dimensions beyond the deep,close, and rear framework of previous doctrine.

Division deep operations include tactical activi-ties directed against enemy forces not in contact.

The division commander must envision his battlespace as his personal domain. Battle space is thephysical volume determined by a commander’s ca-pability to acquire and dominate the enemy. He doesso by reviewing the corps or JTF commander’sintent and concept of how the corps or JTF will fightthe battle.

The corps or JTF commander envisions a seriesof smaller battles where subordinate divisions de-feat and destroy the enemy piecemeal. The corps orJTF commander articulates this vision as an implicitcontract with division commanders as to what theymust do, a concept of time or events, and how thecorps or JTF creates favorable battlefield conditionsfor divisions to defeat enemy forces. He sees acombination of simultaneous operations, a series ofdivision battles by time or event windows, locationsin depth, combat power ratios, and specific desiredresults. Units use deep operations to influence en-emy forces so divisions can destroy them.

The division commander envisions the battlefieldin terms of depth and time to develop simultaneousoperations via a series of engagements for brigade-level units. He develops a deep operations plan toconduct simultaneous operations in depth.

Deep operations normally impact close opera-tions. (See the deep attack synchronization matrixin Figure 8-1.) To ensure an effective system, thecommander and G3 plan, control, and synchronizedeep operations. The G3 is the primary staff officerresponsible for deep operations. He tasks fire sup-port and intelligence BOS targeting and execution.

Destruction of enemy forces in the deep operationis not always the intent and is difficult to achievebecause it requires massive resources. However,lethality of ICMs in an air superiority environmentmake destruction possible.

Limiting enemy movements is an asset-intensivegoal requiring significant reinforced terrain obsta-cles. Therefore, disruption is probably the mostrealistic goal. Disruption reduces the enemy’s cor-relation of forces by desynchronizing or delayingsubordinate elements.

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The commander cannot just target a unit for de-struction or specify an unreasonable delay period.Deep operations include the cumulative effects ofmany different actions on the enemy.

Tangible actions include attrition, destruction,and delay of combat formations that generally altercombat force ratios. Intangible actions alter combatpower multipliers by degrading or disrupting enemycohesion, synchronization, massing, sustainment,or control.

The division plans and directs deep operations,such as AI, deception, PSYOP, EW, direct-actionSOFs, counterfire, complementary SEAD, and ma-neuver within the close battle. They produce effectsat specific points of attack, counterattack, ordefense.

Deep operations are not continuous, nor do unitssustain deep operations at constant levels of effort.Planning for deep operations is a continuousprocess.

Units develop deep operations to achieve specificresults based on METT-T. Units schedule limitedassets to support deep and close operationsexecution.

Close operations should never totally depend onthe results of deep operations. The effect of deepoperations on combat power ratios is a key factor indetermining when and where to accept or initiatedecisive close battle. The unit conducting deep op-erations creates favorable conditions before riskingpotential critical losses in decisive close battle.

TargetingThe commander develops his deep operations

concept when war-gaming COAs. Either echelonmay reserve specific targets or missions as deepoperations. Examples are counterfire against spe-cific artillery echelons or mission-capable units, orcounterfire into one specific area, reserve units, anddivision C2 facilities.

Units may also attack specific targets reserved bytype anywhere on the battlefield when a unit re-serves these targets. However, the unit must iden-tify these targets by means other than mapreconnaissance.

The commander makes the decision to fire ontemplated locations while war-gaming. Units

reduce risk when the target is under surveillance byHUMINT or SIGINT sources.

Corps deep operations normally—Interdict enemy operational reserves (regiment-or division-size forces).Degrade C2 facilities.Destroy sustainment facilities and distributionassets.Destroy enemy rocket and tube artillery assets.The division normally—Attacks uncommitted forces.Disrupts movement of reserves or counterattacks.Destroys enemy division C2 facilities and ADAsystems.Conducts counterfire against DS and GS artilleryopposing brigades. -

Units plan deep operations using the estimate ofthe situation. (See FM 101-5 (D).) The estimate ofthe situation process also incorporates targetingmethodology. (See also Figure 8-2.)

The AASLT division can conduct large-scale,deep operations over time. Because of this uniquecapability, the AASLT division plans large opera-tions to support deep operations to support a corpsor JTF scheme of maneuver.

DECIDE, SET CONDITIONS,EXECUTE

The AASLT division uses a "decide, set-the-conditions, execute" methodology for planningdeep operations and a “decide, detect, track, de-liver, and assess” methodology for deep targeting(Figure 8-3). The result is an effective, division-con-trolled, brigade-scale deep operation.

Commanders state desired damages (destroy,suppress, or neutralize) and associate them withenemy units to achieve desired results. Targetingteams use this targeting guidance to evaluate targetsaccording to attack criteria.

Direct attacks attrit enemy combat forces. Indi-rect attacks attrit assets, facilities, or systems whichsupport enemy forces.

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Evaluation begins with the development of theHPTL. The targeting team matches systems to thedetection means and target effects.

The targeting team is a fill-time organization.The commander is present for planning and war-gaming. The members are readily available duringthe operation.

The team functions as a fill-time decide, detect,track, deliver, and assess targeting team. They de-velop the decide phase and control the execution ofthe detect and track, deliver, and assess phases bysubordinate and supporting units or headquarters.

The G3, G2, and DFSCOORD and/or assistantdivision or corps aviation officer continuouslymonitor the current battle, deep operations BDAresults, intelligence assessments, and sequel mis-sion requirements. The G3 issues FRAGOs tochange decide guidance or to provide new guidancewhen required.

The G2 is the principal controller for the detectand track and assess phases. The DFSCOORD is theprincipal controller and coordinator for technicalplanning and the tasking of the deliver plan and forexecuting long-range fires (including USAF mis-sions). The aviation brigade commander is the prin-cipal controller and coordinator for technical

planning and the tasking of the deliver plan andexecution by aviation assets (Figure 8-4).

Cross-FLOT operations encompass the highestrisk of combat missions—making it through enemylines and going deep with the intention of staying.The AASLT division offers the corps or JTF com-mander a force that conducts raids and air assaultsin great depth. To go deep, the AASLT divisionworks through three sequential steps: deciding, set-ting conditions, and executing.

Deciding

Deciding the deep operation’s mission comesfirst. The task is offensive in nature, revolvingaround seizure of key terrain or defeat of a specificopposing formation. Deep attacks usually aim tointerdict enemy LOCs, block enemy reinforce-ments, destroy crucial service support facilities andCPs, or cut off withdrawals.

When formulating a deep mission, planners con-stantly consider the degree of risk to friendly forces.By their nature, cross-FLOT operations present sol-diers with a “win big/lose big” proposition.

A successful deep operation might decide theentire campaign. On the other hand, a brigade thatgoes deep may well be cut off and lost forever.Every cross-FLOT operation risks the prospect ofthousands of soldiers dead, wounded, and missingin a single night.

With its mission and the higher HQs’ mission orintent in hand and risks assessed, the division de-signs a proposed concept and designates CCIR thatsupport the concept. These are the products of thedecision phase. The division commander deter-mines if the mission justifies a raid or an air assaultand how much force to commit.

Deep operation division CCIR reflect and sum-marize conditions the division sets. The CCIR is aguide for setting conditions.

As operations continue, the division adjustsCCIR. The division may not fulfill or reliably satisfyall CCIR. Such gaps and uncertainties increase thedegree of risk.

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Setting Conditions demand extraordinarv interest as the division works

The division may make a good mission decisionbased on only a map and intuition. But the bestdecision will not hold up unless the division, andsometimes the corps or JTF, works hard to set theconditions for victory.

Setting conditions involves combat operations,including deception operations and all types of raidsand perhaps even battalion-scale air assaults. Thor-oughness reduces risks and increases opportunitiesfor a decisive cross-FLOT success.

With aggressiveness and some luck, condi-tion-setting operations can defeat the enemy be-fore the actual raid or air assault. The divisionadjusts the mission’s final scale, composition,and destination based on conditions set for it.

Battlefield operating systems receive attention toprepare for successful cross-FLOT missions. Intel-ligence, fire support, C2, CSS, and maneuver

to answer the CCIR and to set conditions for battle.Intelligence rightly holds primacy. Air assault

forces planning to go deep need to find out fivethings about the foe:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

They look for the enemy’s AD array, which candestroy deep aviation operations.

They try to pinpoint hostile artillery.

Intelligence experts search for the opponent’s C2

nodes and networks.

The division locates enemy maneuver-defending forces on or near prospective LZs.Intelligence sections identify those mobile reserves in position to threaten deep maneuverforces.

All of these efforts validate the detailed IPB situ-ation template through steady collection work byaviators, long-range scouts, electronic scanners

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target-acquisition detachments, and national assets.Deep targeting means, such as JSTARS, UAVs, andSOF, prove especially helpful for far-rangingAASLT forces. The desired outcome is a reliablepicture of the threat, including a reasonable basis forassessing damage inflicted by preoperation fires.

Compiling accurate BDA data creates a tremen-dous challenge for intelligence analysts. Intelli-gence elements employ every means possible toverify target kills and to adjust the number of re-maining enemy ADA weapons, artillery tubes, ortanks to clarify the CCIR. Particularly good sourcesinclude TACAIR and Army aviation gun cameravideotapes, UAV videotapes, reports from SOF andLRSTs, and overhead aerial and space imagery.

Order of battle specialists should also remain alertto overall enemy patterns of activity, such as dra-matic reductions in hostile artillery barrages orADA fires, which could indicate breakdowns inthese complex coordinated systems. Even in the bestof circumstances, the BDA may simply offer aveneer of numerical certainty over otherwise moresubjective estimates.

Fire support destroys and suppresses what intel-ligence finds. Air assault forces rely heavily onsupporting JFACC sorties to strike far beyond theFLOT. TACAIR, Army attack aviation, reinforcingcorps artillery (particularly MLRS batteries) com-bine with organic artillery, artillery raids, and elec-tronic jamming to destroy key components in theenemy’s AD grid.

SEAD is paramount. Lethal friendly artillery firessuppress, neutralize, and destroy known and sus-pected threat AD weapons and affiliated warningposts and CPs.

Nonlethal friendly EW aircraft (such as the EH-60A Quick Fix IIB aerial jammer) contribute toSEAD programs. Air Force, Navy, and Marineflak-suppression and EW aircraft combine to defeatenemy AD along flight routes and near LZs.

The division routinely plans and executes SEADor JSEAD along multiple air routes to provide op-tions and help confuse the enemy. SEAD andJSEAD provide the capability to cross the FLOT.

Once the division opens the enemy’s ADA um-brella, fire support concentrates on freeing Armyattack aviation to operate in the opposition’s rearareas. Night-capable AHBs excel in identifying and

destroying enemy AD positions,headquarters, and vehicle parks.

artillery units,

Command and control of an AASLT operationundergoes its greatest test during condition-setting.Substantial intelligence and fire support means, in-cluding aviation and maneuver battalions fightingfor combat information or battling enemy gunners,are already deep. Yet, the main effort remains 90miles distant, waiting to go.

Micromanaging all of the moving pieces in anAASLT operation cannot happen. Command solu-tions include mission orders, detailed rehearsals andbackbriefs, and most important, mutual trust basedon shared experiences and an open commandclimate.

Control includes a reliance on a few simple butaccurate reports twice a day, well-disseminated pro-cedural controls for congested airspace, and smartuse of available HF and satellite communications.For cross-FLOT missions, success in the C2 systemamounts to centralized planning and decentralizedexecution.

Combat service support feeds the ravenous intel-ligence and fire support efforts to sustain thepressure. Logisticians also echelon their ele-ments to project support forward 90 miles alongtenuous air lines of communications (ALOCs).

Planners in the DISCOM designate tailored, mul-tifunctional forward logistic elements (FLEs) toaccompany the AASLT brigade into initial LZs.Follow-on aviation lifts build this austere logisticassault base into a full-blown FLB capable of serv-icing and sending forth additional AASLT and at-tack aviation raids.

Ideally, a ground supply route opens within72 hours of the landing. This becomes the pri-mary LOC.

The struggle to man, arm, fuel, fix, and sustainsoldiers and systems, once won, underwrites thesuccess of both condition-setting and executionphases. Setting up sound deep logistics is an ab-solute necessity; it has to work, or nothing flies.

The division may commit maneuver forces to rearoperations to defend vulnerable aviation avenues ofapproach, refueling sites, and ammunition dumps.Aggressive rear operations eliminate enemy stay-behinds and infiltrators and allow air assaults and

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raids to proceed unhampered by the enemy’s corre-sponding deep efforts. Because of the limitations ofassault aviation’s lift capacity, it cannot simultane-ously commit all AATFs to cross-FLOT operations.There are always some forces available to carry outrear operations.

ExecutingEven with a sound decision and the battle-

field shaped for decisive action, executing aneffective deep operation is difficult. It demandsa rapidly increasing series of targeted blowsthat peak at H-Hour—aircraft touch-downtime. A raid employs most of these same tech-niques except that attack aviation raids do notinsert ground troops.

In air assaults or raids, attack aviation playsa featured role. Having set the conditions to godeep, attack units proceed to enforce the isola-tion of objective areas, developing a double-ringed aerial cordon around LZs. The cordonincludes the following:

Attack aviation inner/outer rings. One attackbattalion, OPCON to the AASLT brigade, cre-ates an “inner ring” ranging out to tube artilleryrange from the objective. These aircraft con-centrate on finding and destroying local enemyreserves, and remain available to intervene di-rectly into the objective area proper if theground assault runs into heavy opposition.Meanwhile, the division’s aviation brigade es-tablishes and maintains an "outer ring" of at-tack helicopters, roaming out to 150 kilometersbeyond the AASLT objective. These attackhelicopters destroy enemy mobile forces androcket artillery that can influence the AASLTobjective.Preassault fires. Preassault fires include enroute J-SEAD and final preparations for allLZs and known enemy locations.Timing of H-Hour. Planning takes into ac-count the effects of weather, enemy action,and friction by synchronizing all actionsbased on an adjustable H-Hour. Ideally, H-Hour becomes a hard time based on eventsand conditions, not time.Continuous combined arms effort ("followthrough"). Close combat and immediate sustain-

ment complete the seizure of the AASLT objec-tive. All arms and services press the fight until theobjective is secured. Priority then shifts to logisticbuildup to start setting conditions for follow-onair assaults.

BATTLE RHYTHM

Decision and condition-setting phases may lastmany days, but an AASLT division can operate ata much quicker tempo—one of its true strengths.Any modern Army or Marine Corps division maymount an AASLT operation during combat. How-ever, they will probably not conduct frequent,large-scale AASLT operations and almost cer-tainly will not conduct them every 24 hours. AnAASLT division can conduct large-scale (bri-gade-size) AASLT operations every 24 hours.

During continuous operations, the AASLT divi-sion, each of the three maneuver brigades, and theaviation brigade, should expect to be working adistinct part of the three-step, cross-FLOT process.Each step takes about 24 hours.

The result is a brigade AASLT or aviation brigadeattack operation from about 48 to 72 hours after thedecision process begins (Figure 8-5). It is not un-usual to have all three maneuver brigades and theaviation brigade working through different seg-ments of the deep operations process. Each bri-gade’s current phase sets up the next one’s futureactions.

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TYPES OF DEEPOPERATIONS

The AASLT division conducts two principaltypes of deep operations: raids and air assaults.While the division may conduct raids inde-pendently, air assaults often include raiding mis-sions as subtasks in the overall operation.

Raids aim at destroying enemy forces. They en-vision ingress and egress from EAs, LZs, or objec-tives with no intention of leaving behind units onthe ground. Most typically, the division employsattack aviation raids to destroy enemy forces in EAs.

The division may order an artillery raid usingmedium assault aviation assets to emplace a battery,fire a particular high-payoff mission, and then ex-tract the battery. Finally, the division may executerifle company raids or even infantry battalion raidsto destroy especially critical targets, such as enemyCPs or logistic facilities. The AASLT division raidsin company through brigade strength.

The AASLT division conducts operations to de-stroy enemy forces, secure key terrain, or both, thatrequire insertion of a combined-arms force thatexpects to stay and fight. The AASLT division canconduct air assaults for three purposes:

1. To secure critical geographic choke points toassist friendly ground maneuver or to blockenemy movements.

2. To destroy enemy forces located in and aroundthe objective.

3. To establish an FOB for future raids and airassaults.

Raids

The AASLT division conducts raids cross-FLOT to destroy enemy forces. Raids also con-fuse and deceive the enemy by distracting hisattention from a concurrent main effort.

Raids require detailed planning to increasechances for success. The division raids daily whilein combat, often to establish conditions for airassaults.

Army Attack Helicopter Raids

Divisions and corps execute deep operations us-ing a variety of forces and systems, including EW,long-range fires, Army aviation, and Air Force AI.Because of its speed, survivability, and destructivecapability, AI paces day-to-day deep operations.But, because of the long planning times associatedwith USAF sorties, Army aviation offers a viablealternative or addition to AI.

Army attack helicopters strike deep during simul-taneous operations to overwhelm enemy forces andto make the enemy react to simultaneous multipleattacks, causing him to break his tempo and hasten-ing his defeat. In the AASLT division, Army attackhelicopters independently raid to destroy enemyforces or as part of a larger operation to set theconditions for future operations. Attack helicoptersmay raid in brigade or battalion strength, typicallyunder aviation brigade command. -

The AASLT division controls division-level deepoperations, but they require close coordination be-tween all involved service components and all in-terested commands (corps or JTF through the lowestheadquarters). This assures that deep operationsplans support the overall concept and that differentcommands do not duplicate or impede each other.Corps aviation operations, for example, may aim atthe same or similar deep EAs unless deconflicted.

The detailed planning, preparation, and coordina-tion necessary for a successful attack aviation raidrequires a well-defined task list at each level ofcommand. This task breakdown reduces duplicationof effort and prevents fratricide.

Finding enemy ADA elements and likely EAtargets drives preparations for a deep aviation raid.The IPB identifies likely threat ADA positions, thencollectors verify this template. The IPB also projectsthe likely target array in the chosen EAs, so the G3and attacking commanders can adjust the plan asneeded to accomplish the raid’s objectives.

Before the G2 develops a collection plan anddirects division collection activities, he must knowthe commander’s PIR, which include a subset of theCCIR and ADA templates. Integrating informationreceived by all collection assets, used with the IPBprocess, enables the division commander to decidewhen, where, and how to deliver combat power tothe most decisive deep locations. Effective

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coordination must occur within the elements of thedivision targeting cell, between division and corpstargeting cells, as well as between division andsubordinate commands’ collection means and op-erations sections.

The IPB process provides likely hostile ADAtargets for the division’s suppression programs. Thedivision ensures that DIVARTY, the aviation bri-gade, and division staff elements conduct SEADplanning for all cross-FLOT operations, but it de-serves special attention in aviation raids. Thesemissions often initiate attempts to penetrate enemyADA umbrellas, and so may pay an extra penaltyfor leading the way if SEAD efforts fall short ofexpectations.

During a cross-FLOT raid SEAD occurs withredundant systems at various operational levels.Corps and USAF assets execute collateral SEADagainst acquirable enemy AD systems in support ofUSAF operations. The corps may order divisionassets to join this effort.

Localized SEAD supports USAF air support, AH,and AASLT operations. Cross-FLOT operationsdepend on localized SEAD.

Suppression begins before aircraft arrive and con-tinues as long as aircraft are in range of enemy ADAsystems. Complementary SEAD operations con-tinuously seek enemy AD systems and attack todestroy or track these systems as collectors locatethem.

The division aviation brigade, supported by ap-propriately tasked artillery and USAF sorties, plans,prepares, and executes SEAD or JSEAD in supportof its operations. The division commander and staffsynchronize SEAD support for deep aviationoperations.

The FSE in the main CP plays a critical role. Itrecommends priority of fires to support the aviationbrigade and coordinates with adjacent and subordi-nate units to ensure all division suppression opera-tions prove mutually supportive. It can thencapitalize on enemy vulnerabilities.

The brigade FSE section, with the division FSE,uses airspace procedural control measures to creategeneric artillery SEAD plans. Firing units computeand store these plans in the lightweight tactical firedirection system (LTACFIRE) and disseminatethem to all FSEs planning cross-FLOT operations.

Units continually update SEAD plans as they locatenew targets.

Choosing routes to avoid enemy ADA is still thebest protection. The basic decisions on ingress andegress routes determine how much time and effort(in personnel, units, and munitions) the divisionplans to use in support of the operation. The G3carefully considers all METT-T factors as he devel-ops cross-FLOT aviation raids.

Cross-FLOT attack helicopter raids require usingTTPs that combine intelligence, fire support, andmaneuver at decisive points on the battlefield. Inte-grating and synchronizing BOS determine this high-payoff operation’s success. When correctly done,these measures considerably reduce risks.

Division Responsibilities. The AASLT divisionplans and coordinates the following tasks for anattack helicopter raid:

Receive a mission statement from corps and,through mission analysis, determine which bri-gade will conduct a mission.Establish liaison at the corps main CP, and, if theobjective lies outside division boundaries, coor-dinate with corps for authorization and adjustedcontrol measures.Issue an order to the aviation brigade.Coordinate SEAD through the division FSE andthe corps FSE.Coordinate routes into the division or corps air-space control plan and the air component com-mander’s (ACC‘s) ATO and/or the ACO asnecessary.Coordinate passage points along the FLOT withthe owning maneuver ground forces.Coordinate necessary CSS assets to supportrefueling and rearming requirements.Aviation Brigade Responsibilities. The AASLT

division’s aviation brigade plans and coordinatesthe following tasks for an attack aviation raid:

Identify air routes for the operation, and coordi-nate them with the division.Coordinate passage points and routes with themaneuver brigades involved.Issue an order to the attack battalion.

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Supervise the planning andprocess.Identify enemy AD locations

mission-execution

and provide targetinformation to the brigade FSE for SEAD orJSEAD.Develop the SEAD program from targets re-ceived from the S2:

– Incorporating lethal and nonlethal fires to sup-press enemy ADA systems.

– Incorporating jamming warnings and fire con-trol systems associated with enemy ADA as-sets.

– Coordinating other EW targets through the EWstaff officer in the division main CP.

The ADAO coordinates as required with divisionstaff elements. He works closely with the G3 air toconfirm the route structure; with the division FSEto confirm SEAD or JSEAD programs; and with thedivision G2 cell to confirm and update the enemysituation over intended routes and objectives.

Attack Helicopter Battalion Responsibilities.The attack helicopter battalion plans and coordi-nates the following tasks for its raid:

Select primary and alternate BPs.Plan routes from the RP, SP, or both to and/orfrom the BPs.Issue a battalion order.After completing the mission, provide a debriefthrough through brigade to the division G2. It is par-ticularly important for the brigade to provideBDA and to note the enemy’s size and activities.

Artillery RaidsThe AASLT artillery raid features an aggressive,

short-duration operation against an HPT. Likelycandidates might involve enemy CPs, AD radars,ammunition and fuel dumps, or unprotected troopconcentrations. The key consideration entails sub-jecting vulnerable enemy units and facilities to in-tense artillery fires throughout the depth of thebattlefield.

The ability to rapidly displace artillery forward,accompanied by enough of the correct ammunition,allows the division commander to engage enemy

targets with artillery out to his aviation’s maximumrange. In short, aircraft extend the range ofhowitzers.

Artillery raids require extensive training and crewdrill to achieve the required split-second timing. Therisks to the artillery and to medium-assault aircraftdemand precision execution. The raid requires thesame cross-FLOT planning process as an air assault,including a careful risk analysis and definite effortsto set conditions before launch.

Artillery raids work best if they avoid or suppressthreat ADA, land unopposed, and leave before hos-tile forces react and make contact. Doing so mini-mizes opportunities for enemy counterfires.

Field artillery battalions normally plan and coor-dinate raids, which usually occur in battery strength.The battalion’s responsibilities include overall plan-ning for the raid, organizing and controlling the PZ,establishing abort criteria, and conducting the airmission brief (AMB).

The firing battery commander serves as overallmission commander and ground tactical com-mander. He—

Presents the AMB.Organizes battery loads on the PZ.Employs security and friendly ADA elements.Conducts firing operations on the LZ.Calls for extraction when ready.Makes abort decisions.The AMC serves as flight leader. He also presents

the AMB to the pilots and coordinates and synchro-nizes all Army aviation assets.

Artillery raids employ up to a company of assaultor medium assault aviation, depending on weight,range, and whether the aircraft transport howitzersby slingload or if they are internally loaded in me-dium assault aircraft. Attack aircraft may providearmed reconnaissance, route verification, andarmed escort. MEDEVAC and EW aircraft often flyin support of these raids.

Other habitual attachments include MANPADStinger teams, pathfinders, and a squad of infantryfor security. Precision navigation instruments keythe battery’s emplacement and fires. There shouldbe observers available either aloft or on the ground

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to adjust fires on chosen targets and to judgedamage.

An AASLT artillery raid serves notice to the foethat his entire force lies exposed to indirect fires,regardless of traditional surface-to-surface rangefans. However, these types of raids are high-risk,high-payoff operations. The division commandermust judge the target to be worth the risk and effort.

Combined-Arms RaidsThe combined-arms raid goes deep to destroy

enemy forces and facilities vulnerable to groundattack. Possible targets include CPs, AD sites, lo-gistic bases, or transportation choke points (bridges,tunnels, and rail intersections).

The combined-arms raid works especially well incircumstances requiring seizure of equipment sam-ples, taking EPWs, or performing demolition, Justas the artillery raid uses aircraft to extend the how-itzer’s effective range, the combined-arms raidstretches the normal operating radius of groundmaneuver forces throughout the depth of thebattlefield.

The division usually conducts combined-armsraids at brigade level and below. For example, thebrigade may conduct deep raids, using several com-pany teams against widely dispersed targets, oragainst a complex of interrelated targets. It mayconduct single or multiple-battalion raids againstwidely separated targets or a cluster of targets in thesame small area.

The division may order battalion or companyraids under brigade control. Combined-arms raidsoften proceed along with attack aviation and artil-lery raids.

The key difference between a combined-armsraid and an air assault is intent. Raid forces do notintend to hold terrain.

The AATF achieves maximum destruction on thetarget, then withdraws from the objective area oncethe mission is complete. The raiding force’s plansinclude conversion into an actual air assault if en-emy action or friendly opportunity compels such asequel operation.

The raiding force uses the complete cross-FLOToperation process, including carefully establishingfavorable conditions to carry out the mission. They

follow through with a clean extraction rather thanwith the air assault’s typical buildup of forces andsupplies.

Figure 8-6 is a schematic of an AASLT brigadedeep raid against a mechanized brigade deliberateattack. The brigade orchestrates three separate bat-talion raids. One destroys an enemy CP; one demol-ishes a bridge to block reinforcing or retreatingenemy forces; the other, an attack aviation battalion,raids against an enemy reinforcing armored battal-ion in an engagement area. All disrupt the coherenceof the enemy’s defense and forces him to fight inseveral directions at once.

Combined-arms raids represent the most riskyform of raid. Commanders and staffs must prudentlyweigh these operations in light of all METT-T fac-tors and the status of the CCIR before committingforces on the ground across the FLOT. Althoughraids hope to extract the raiding troops from theobjective, the division commander implicitly ac-cepts the possibility of decisive ground engagementevery time he commits forces to a combined-armsair assault.

Air Assault

Air assaults occur when the situation offers op-portunities to go deep to defeat the enemy. Theyinvolve holding terrain, either for its intrinsic valuein view of the overall campaign, defeating an enemyformation, or establishing an FOB for future deepmissions. Air assault infantry enters the fray as amember of the combined-arms team and so enjoinsthe firepower and assistance of a host of weaponsand forces.

When an AATF goes deep it brings massivefirepower against the foe, holds its position, andsustains itself. This mission must include more plan-ning, preparation, and coordination than an attackaviation raid because of the need to synchronize anincreased number of units.

Air Assaults to Secure Terrain and/or DestroyEnemy Forces

The AASLT division conducts cross-FLOT airassaults to seize terrain and/or defeat or destroyenemy forces. The division considers all BOS as itworks through the cross-FLOT operations process.

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FM 71-100-3

Air assaults deposit relatively light forces behindenemy lines. Such forces lack rapid ground mobilitybut have the firepower to take and hold terrain.

Air assault commanders prefer to seize unde-fended or lightly held key terrain to compel a hastyand, hopefully, unsynchronized enemy counterat-tack. Air assault forces conduct direct assault ofenemy forces at increased risk to landing forces.

The battlefield framework provides structure forBOS synchronization efforts. The division organ-izes for an air assault by conducting deep operationsto set conditions, rear operations to ensure combatand sustainment free from enemy interference, andsecurity operations to blind enemy intelligence col-lectors and prevent spoiling attacks.

Close operations begin with the air assault onceconditions are set. The division may designate asmall reserve to exploit success, although the nextbrigade preparing for an air assault normally fulfillsthis role.

The CCIR define the conditions the division mustset to launch the attack. The G2 and subordinate S2scooperate to complete an IPB template to supportthe CCIR. The PIR from this careful IPB confirm

or deny the template based on thoughtful analysisof the products of a vigorous collection effort. Intel-ligence professionals look for enemy AD, fire sup-port, CPs, mobile reserves, and defenders onpotential LZs, all the while assessing how well firesupporters are setting conditions for the air assault.Battle damage assessment is critical.

The intelligence effort goes beyond merely con-firming or denying an IPB template. Units gatherand check other helpful information. Items of inter-est include—

Enemy unconventional warfare (UW) units infriendly rear areas.

Road and bridge conditions which affect friendlyor enemy movements.

Locations and directions of heavily guarded con-voys and well-protected artillery installations forpossible chemical or nuclear weapons.

Locations of enemy supply installations.

Division collectors work throughout the AO. TheLRSD, the air cavalry squadron, and EW units playespecially large roles in this effort.

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FM 71-100-3

The division’s LRSD usually receives missionsfrom the division commander based on G2 recom-mendations. The LRSD, normally inserted aboardrotary-wing aircraft, then infiltrates to conductlong-term surveillance on NAIs, LZs, and AASLTobjective aviation and maneuver brigades.

DIVARTY identifies LRSD hide locations asNFAs to make sure attack aviation battalions, firesupporters, and maneuver battalions do not inadver-tently engage LRSTs. Brigade FSEs incorporateNFAs into fire support plans. Units also coordinatean LRSD linkup plan to link the LRSD with theAATF once brigades land near LRSD hide sites.

Often, the division’s air cavalry conducts recon-naissance operations. It represents the unit of choicefor reconnaissance missions. Its information re-quirements include determining—

Locations and the identification of ADA and mis-siles in and around an objective.Types of enemy artillery units deployed inside ofand within range of an objective.Locations, sizes, and strengths of mobile re-serves.Movement of other infantry forces into the objec-tive.Locations of engineers, obstacles, mine fields,and other countermobility in the area.Locations of supply and ammunition storage.Locations of communications nodes or networks.Possible LZs and/or PZs.The BDA throughout the AO.The viability of air routes within the AO.Weather conditions along air routes.Ground conditions (surface composition, dust,ground fog).Observation of NAIs and TAIs.The G2, G3, and FSE coordinate a comprehen-

sive EW plan and integrate it into intelligence col-lection and fire support efforts. To support the deepattack, the AASLT division requires jamming di-rected against enemy fire support nets.

The division also works with the corps or JTFheadquarters and the USAF to use their EW assets

for EW collection and SEAD. Finally, the MI bat-talion deploys C&J units to protect the division’s C3

electronics by finding and suppressing enemy EWcapabilities.

When the AATF flies cross-FLOT, SEAD pro-grams and counterfire plans target what intelligencefinds. SEAD fires combine all available lethal andnonlethal means to degrade and destroy key portionsof the enemy AD envelope. SEAD allows condi-tions to be set and facilitates the actual air assault.

Units should always plan deception operationsthat include SEAD, and on-call SEAD, to permitmaximum flexibility in air route selection. Unitsmust integrate SEAD into the ongoing counterfirefight, and employ complementary EW, USAF,Army aviation, and surface fires to compound theenemy’s problems as he tries to react effectively.

When facing an enemy who has modem systems,units must be able to defeat its fire support systems.Fire support is the foe’s best means of rapidly en-gaging an air assault. Attack helicopters, along withUSAF AI, tube and rocket artillery, and EW sys-tems, mass synchronized cross-FLOT fires to defeatthese assets.

The combination of artillery and attack aviationcreates a synergistic effect that does not occur whenthese assets fight separately. For example, duringthe attack aviation’s ingress and egress of the targetarea, division artillery can focus fire support assetson SEAD. Division artillery must destroy reportedknown and suspected enemy AD systems; localizedSEAD programs along air routes out to the limits ofrange; and SEAD, as part of a deception effort alongfalse air routes.

Attack aviation assists fire supporters by observ-ing counterbattery preparations and other BDA.United States AF and Army aviation can providelocalized SEAD when necessary.

An effective countertire technique links the artil-lery’s radars, the digital LTACFIRE system, andattack helicopters during cross-FLOT operations.This technique locates hostile firing units and im-mediately transmits accurate locations viaLTACFIRE to the aviation brigade CP.

At the aviation brigade CP the FSE passes HPTsto the brigade S3, who coordinates for immediateattacks to destroy firing units. When attack aviationis not on-station, the division and the aviation

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FM 71-100-3

brigade plan attack aviation raids to strike selected chooses LZs and objectives to ease the transition toEAs as soon as helicopters become available. the defense.

SEAD and counterfire programs demand respon-sive fire support. Since deep missions often fly intoareas which forward artillery cannot range, attackaviation provides its own fire support.

A technique to support an air assault, dependingon the exact situation, is to air assault a reinforcingartillery battery or battalion with infantry securityinto an LZ offset from the main effort’s LZs. Thiselement provides preparatory and opportunity firesinto the objective area from its offset location. Oncethe AASLT force secures the objective, the offsetartillery flies back behind the FLOT or into thebrigade airhead.

While preparing for an air assault, priority of firesnormally goes to the aviation brigade, with targetingpriority to enemy AD systems, fire support systems,maneuver forces, and C2 nodes. Reinforcing artil-lery locates to support SEAD and counterfires nec-essary to set the conditions in support of air assaults.

During the air assault itself, priority shifts to thebrigade AATF. The DIVARTY establishes a QuickFire net between the AATF and the reinforcingbattalion to provide responsive fire support. TheFSE maximizes the use of "push CAS" (USAFattack sorties on call), if available, to maintain theattack’s momentum.

Close coordination between the AASLT divisionand the corps FSE prevents fratricide. The AASLTdivision establishes and disseminates FSCMs.

The FSE also coordinates who controls fires onthe battlefield, particularly when an AATF goesdeep into what was another brigade’s zone or sector,or even the corps’ zone or sector. All interestedFSEs must filly understand and coordinate whocontrols and clears fires.

The maneuver scheme typically envisions land-ing as many maneuver forces as aviation can deliveras close to the objectives as possible. A massedsimultaneous landing is normally ideal.

During planning, the AASLT unit, with the ALO,refines the ground plan and the landing plan tominimize the number of lifts needed to insert theAATF’s ground elements. As defense of the airheadusually follows the landing, the AASLT force

Deep operations set conditions for future closeoperations, and the AASLT division’s main effortjumps swifty from deep to close operations atH-hour. Maneuver forces land, clear LZs, and se-cure objectives that accomplish the assigned mis-sion.

Maneuver forces also secure the airhead line.Reinforcement and sustainment begins immedi-ately, even in daylight, if operations have success-fully reduced hostile ADA batteries.

The brigade usually employs all three infantrybattalions and an OPCON attack aviation battalionto accomplish its maneuver tasks. The battalions,organized as combined-arms TFs, land on multipleLZs to establish a coherent perimeter after landing.The attack battalion flies outside the airhead in thebrigade zone to engage enemy forces threateningAASLT infantry.

If AASLT forces land in contact (a hot LZ) withenemy forces, the brigade maneuvers on the groundto fix the enemy. If possible, they divert inboundaircraft to alternate LZs to envelop the enemy forceand destroy it.

Forces en route by assault aviation possess amobility advantage over enemy ground units. TheAATF can translate this mobility edge into an effec-tive maneuver advantage if it can divert followinglifts to appropriate LZs. Staffs develop these “whatif’ branches to the basic landing plan to gain addi-tional flexibility when going deep.

Allocating and task-organizing aviation to sup-port the maneuver scheme represents a crucial divi-sion decision. The division assigns aircraft from allthree organic assault battalions, reinforced whenpossible by corps aviation units under the AATF’ssenior assault aviator (normally the aviation brigadecommander), to allow a maximum simultaneouslift. Sufficient medium assault, MEDEVAC, EW,and C2 aircraft round out the aviation task force.

Attack aviation generally splits out with one innerring battalion OPCON to the AATF brigade. Therest are under aviation brigade command to conductouter ring engagements.

Maneuver capitalizes on the conditions set by firesupport. The AATF integrates and synchronizes

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FM 71-100-3

each piece of the maneuver team (infantry,antiarmor companies, attack aviation, assault avia-tion) to deliver maximum impact at the chosen timeand place.

A force so dependent on dominating the air can-not neglect enemy aviation. When the G2 developsthe IPB, part of it includes enemy rotary- and fixed-wing air avenues of approach.

Air defense artillery units operate well forward toprovide a cohesive umbrella of coverage, tied intothe corps’ HIMAD coverage. The ADA battalionsupports priorities of protection.

During AASLT operations, priorities of protec-tion go to the aviation brigade (attack, assault, lo-gistics), engineers, corps and division artillery, C2,CSS, and maneuver forces. Air defense artillerybatteries habitually air assault both man-portableand vehicular weapons systems with the AATF toensure unbroken coverage.

Once landings begin, the ADA priority may ex-pand to provide selective convoy protection to lo-gistic trains moving forward to link up with AATFson the objectives. It may also be necessary to pro-vide critical-point protection during route construc-tion or to FA assets moving forward to supportsuccessive deep attacks. The ADADO recommendspriority shifts as the fighting develops.

Mobility, countermobility, and survivability fac-tors affect air assault. Division engineers support theoperation in both setting conditions and in execu-tion. While working to establish favorable condi-tions, engineer priorities normally go to the aviationbrigade, then DIVARTY. Mission priorities revolvearound survivability of aviation, artillery, PZs, andlogistics.

When the AATF begins its attack, priority shifts.Light engineer teams breach obstacles and reduceenemy fortifications. Once the AASLT force takesthe objective, engineers quickly shift to survivabil-ity tasks to prepare for expected enemy counterat-tack direct and indirect fires.

If necessary, engineers conduct mobility opera-tions to support the reserve reinforcement plan andthe CSS support plan. Finally, they assist the infan-try in countermobility operations.

If a ground linkup establishes a resupply route,division engineers clear the routes. The ADE

recommends the priority on route clearances as wellas priority of effort and priority of support through-out the operation. These priorities shift as the battleprogresses.

The ADE also develops the division situationalobstacle plan. The division may receive employ-ment authority for long- or short-duration minesfrom the corps.

The division uses short-duration FASCAM toaffect targets projected to be in the minefield’s areain the immediate future. Air-deliverable scatterablemines contribute to the deep battle and work well toshape EAs for attack aviation. Engineers use groundmine-laying systems to help establish a secure cor-ridor along ground routes and to provide flanksecurity.

Combat service support defines the physical lim-its for all operations. DISCOM task-organizes toprovide DS to all assigned and attached unitsthroughout the operation.

As the division sets conditions, the concept ofsupport differs significantly from that used duringthe air assault. While preparing for the air assault,the DISCOM supports with the traditional MSBand/or FSB concept. The FSBs displace with theirsupported brigades and conduct logistic operations.

When supporting AASLT operations, CSS unitsoperate from a forward logistics base to ensurecontinuous support for the attacking brigade. De-pending on the size and/or the duration of theAASLT operation, units can expand the forwardlogistics base into a full-scale BSA as required.

The type and quantity of logistic support accom-panying the AATF into the deep objective dependson the exact situation. But, the most critical factorinvolves the number of lift aircraft available.

The AATF commander must apportion his assaultand medium assault aviation, dividing his resourcesbetween combat and sustainment needs. The AATFS4’s analysis of required service support greatlyaffects this decision.

Once the AATF determines the aviation CSSslice, the FSB commander tailors the forward logis-tics element (FLE). The FLE is the first element ofthe FLB to deploy.

The FLE's organization varies by mission, but itgenerally provides medical, maintenance, and

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FM 71-100-3

supply capabilities. An FSB company commandercommands the FLE (Figure 8-7).

Upon landing, the priority for aviation resupplygoes, in order, to mission-critical supplies,MEDEVAC, preplanned Class V resupply, otherpreplanned resupply, and personnel replacements.As time and assets become available, DISCOMbuilds stockage levels. The FLE builds into the fullFSB or larger unit depending on the mission.

Until the unit establishes the ground MSR, resup-ply arrives by air. Units plan and execute aerialresupply to units across the FLOT using the samecross-FLOT operation process as a raid or air as-sault, including SEAD and attack aviation.

Resupply should be in one lift. It generally goesin at night to minimize enemy ADA threat, althoughunits can conduct daylight resupply based onMETT-T and a thorough risk analysis.

Parachute airdrops from USAF aircraft also sus-tain the airhead. The division and the AATF planfor drops using the container delivery system, thelow-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES),and heavy drops of all classes of supply.

Bulk food and certain types of high-usage ammu-nition are candidates for this resupply method. TheAATF may elect to try to bring in heavier engineerequipment by these means to create or upgraderoads and flight landing strips.

Eventually, preferably within 72 hours, a groundMSR links up with the airhead. The division estab-lishes priority and controls ground movement alongMSRs heading to the objective area. A typical pri-ority for transportation support and MSR movementmight be artillery unit displacements; thenClasses V, III, and I supplies (including water);casualty evacuation from committed units, person-nel and equipment replacements, and the build upof supply stockage levels.

Aviation, paradrop, and truck resupply rely asmuch as possible on preplanned, precontiguredpackages. DISCOM develops a series of preconfig-ured loads of Class I, IV, and V supplies to satisfyresupply requests, sling-load packaging, airdroprigging, and truck loading. It expedites both plan-ning and execution of resupply into the objectivearea.

The concept of support for the attacking AATFrequires in-depth analysis and planning. Each unitplans resupply and evacuation procedures for allsupplies and services, determining the connectionsfrom the forward logistics base to the individualsoldier and return.

The infantryman is not a pack animal. His combateffectiveness directly relates to the weight of theload on his back. To reduce the soldier’s load,commanders at every level must make the CSSsystem responsive and effective.

The division normally sends the ADC-O andjump CP to fly with the AATF into the AATFobjective. The jump CP attempts to land in theobjective area and take control of the close battle.However, METT-T determines whether it remains,returns to the TAC CP, or brings the TAC CPforward. The main and rear CPs displace once theAATF secures the objective, the TAC CP becomesfictional forward, and the tempo of action permitssuch movements.

Air Assaults to Establish FOBs

The AASLT division’s ability to rapidly establisha deep FOB enables the division to project combatpower even deeper before the enemy can react.While any AASLT airhead could be built into a FOBover time, attacking strictly to secure and build oneemphasizes speed of establishment.

The true measure of a successful FOB relates tohow quickly division units conduct decisive follow-on raids and air assaults throughout enemy rearareas. Establishing an FOB requires an air assault

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FM 71-100-3

by a full brigade, delivered by the massed assaultaviation resources of the entire division.

The FOB supports subsequent deep operations inthree ways:1.

2.

3.

Refueling and rearming aviation assets for futuredeep raids and air assaults.Sustaining ground forces with all classes ofsupply and services.

Providing a secure area to establish PZs fortransiting follow-on AASLT brigades.

When the division gives a brigade a mission toair assault to establish an FOB, the brigade staffconducts a thorough estimate of the situation anddetailed mission analysis. The FOB conceptworks best by “hitting where they ain’t.” The keyinvolves getting in quickly and relativelyunmolested. (Figures 8-8 and 8-9 show howa FOB may be developed.)

If possible, the AASLT division prefers to insertits FOB 150 kilometers deep into the enemy’s sec-tor. Within hours of an initial landing in an uncon-tested FOB, the division can threaten air assaultsand raids across a 300-kilometer-diameter circle inthe hostile rear echelon.

The CCIR and PIR for an FOB seizure reflect thevital need to find a suitable location largely devoidof the enemy or local civilians. The division mightconsider restrictive terrain (including mountains,forests, and wastelands), provided a suitablenumber of LZs exist and the AATF can seize and/orbuild a ground MSR (preferably several) to theFOB. All other collection and analyses for an airassault proceed normally.

The LRSD has an especially important role in anFOB seizure. Its on-the-ground surveillance offersa final confirmation of soil consistency, LZ condi-tions, MSR status, and enemy activity. The divisionshould weigh the potential for compromise and becareful not to focus too many LRSDs or othercollectors in one place which would help the enemypinpoint the FOB site.

During the air assault and consolidation, MI GSR,LLVI, and C&J teams support the battalions. Thisplaces the division’s electronic intelligence collec-tors well forward where they can be combat multi-pliers for security and a continuation ofintelligence-collection purposes.

Fire support roles correspond to those in any otherair assault. Delaying or disrupting hostile maneuverunits threatening the FOB is a definite priority. TheFSE and ADE work together to determine possibleFASCAM targets, always mindful of the location offuture MSRs.

Because an FOB seizure aims to set conditions toeliminate opposition upon landing, fire supportmust be able to land a DS artillery battalion in theFOB early on. Counterbattery radars and this re-sponsive artillery cooperate to keep enemy forcesand gunners at a safe distance from the airhead.

An FOB’s purpose (to support future deep opera-tions) necessitates a maneuver scheme built arounddefending CSS assets, especially refuel/rearm avia-tion sites. The defense and sustainment effort worksbest when a ground attack can link up within 72hours to establish a solid MSR.

The AASLT force speedily closes sufficient com-bat power into the FOB to destroy small enemyelements, and then to immediately transition to a360-degree defense of the airhead. FARPs form thecenterpiece of the FOB; the security force mustprotect them from both direct and indirect fires.

At times, the force must establish a consolidatedrearm and refuel point to provide the massive quan-tities of fuel and ammunition the aviation brigaderequires. The elements that make up this consoli-dated point generally come from the DISCOM, theaviation brigade, and a corps support battalion,group, or both.

The airhead line marks the limit of effectiveenemy-observed indirect fire, usually 15 kilome-ters. The security force positions AT weapons indepth around the perimeter.

Scout and attack helicopters screen out to 40kilometers to provide early warning, to interdictenemy ground forces, and to assist with counterbat-tery fires. Division-controlled attack aviation assetsrange out to 93 kilometers to create an outer ring.

Early positioning of an artillery battalion into theFOB provides responsive fire support to the taskforce. Assault aircraft reposition forces, movescouts, and resupply ground forces as necessary.

DISCOM assumes control of the central circleonce combat forces secure the FOB. Even so,

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FM 71-100-3

8-20

FM 71-100-3

brigade forces coordinate for and use terrain in thisDISCOM area.

The ground convoy attacks to link up with theFOB, establish an MSR, and resupply the FOB. Itmay follow an OPCON mechanized brigade, an-other division in the corps or JTF, or carry out itsmission independently.

Choosing routes and planning the ground attackto clear an MSR cannot be afterthoughts. Without aground linkup, the FOB will only have limitedability to sustain repeated deep operations. Plannersmust work with intelligence analysts and tire sup-porters to identify the best, least-defended route.

The ground convoy does not have the combatpower to force a penetration through an enemy maindefensive belt. If this looks like the only option, thedivision commander must reassess his entire FOBseizure plan and decide if he wishes to risk resupplyby air alone.

The brigade habitually organizes for the FOBmission with three battalion TFs. an attack aviation

be the first reaction to the FOB seizure, full integra-tion of man-portable and vehicle systems offersimmediate protection. This umbrella concentrateson preserving FARPs and aviation laagers at theheart of the FOB.

Engineers air assault, with priority to survivabil-ity of FARPs. A minimum of one bulldozer landswith the initial air movement to berm FARP fuelbags or blivets. Additional engineer equipment fol-lows by medium assault, airdrop, or arrives with theground convoy.

Engineers also assist infantry TFs as they dig inand erect obstacles. The infantry and their TF attach-ments do much of this work.

The engineers in the AATF, though limited innumber, provide quality control and focus theirefforts on critical fortifications and barriers.Planning and using scatterable mines serve to em-place mines rapidly to buy time for more deliberatecountermobility work.

battalion, an assault aviation TF, a ground attackand/or convoy TF, and brigade troops. Figure 8-10 The FOB exists to provide light, tailored sustain-illustrates a task organization for an FOB seizure. ment commensurate with the tactical need. Combat

service support emphasizes—Air defense air assaults into the FOB and moves

with the ground convoy. As enemy airstrikes may Repair forward by replacement.

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FM 71-100-3

Forward stockpiles of Class I supplies (andwater).Combat service supplier, high-capacity, Class IIIdistribution at the FOB.Maximum use of all available distribution means(ground/air) to build the FOB to full capacity.The division uses push CSS to create and run the

FOB. A successful FOB CSS effort relies on—Timely and accurate reporting requirements fromunits concerning expenditures and requirements.Maximum use of all available transportationmodes by the corps and division.Distributing as many supplies as possible forwardof the FOB by aviation slingload.Backhauling sling hardware, containers, anddunnage.Fixing forward when possible.Stockpiling Class I supplies and water to sustainforces for at least 72 hours.Brigade ground, aviation, and USAF airlift pro-

ject sustainment as far forward as possible.DISCOM prepackages supplies in quantities readilyusable by individual soldiers and small units. Exam-ples would be rations by the case, water by the can,prepackaged Class IV supplies, 5-gallon fuel or oilcans, 55-gallon fuel or oil drums, ammunition bythe case, or missiles by the round.

Once the division gets the MSR open, distributingsupplies from the corps and the division rear areasto the FOB comes primarily by ground transport ona throughput basis. As AATFs launch out on sub-sequent air assaults, Class I and water, Class III, andClass V supplies are throughput directly to forwardlogistic bases, generally by Army aviationslingloading techniques.

Command and control of the AASLT portion ofan FOB seizure proceeds as in Chapter 2. Distinc-tive measures for an FOB seizure relate to commandof the ground attack convoy and command of theDISCOM CSS FLB inside the FOB.

Depending on METT-T considerations, either thedivision or the brigade forming the AATF takescharge of the ground attack. If significant enemyresistance seems likely, the ground attack shouldinvolve a brigade (an OPCON armored force, for

example). The division would then assume controlof the attack until the linkup scheme goes into effect,usually at a phase line within direct-fire range ofchosen linkup points.

Should the AATF find or make a gap in enemyforces, it may also control the ground attack fromstart to linkup. This would be a less likely case, butpreferable from the brigade perspective. In this case,the brigade designs its own linkup plan.

Command arrangements within the FOB also de-serve attention. Before and during the air assault, thebrigade TF commander positions all elementswithin the FOB.

A detailed LZ plan and early integration of ad-vance party personnel from follow-on CSS ele-ments reduces confusion. The brigade manages allterrain, including that in the CSS arena, until DIS-COM assumes control of its planned central FOBCSS area.

When the brigade secures the FOB, DISCOMassumes responsibility for running CSS facilities.Inside the center of the FOB is the FLB whereDISCOM allocates terrain and work areas, directslocal security, and operates logistics facilities.

DISCOM coordinates its security scheme withthe maneuver brigade and remains responsible forthe FOB’s external security. This gets the maneuvercommander out of the resupply business and allowstrained sustainers to carry out their tasks.

Normally, the logistics commander is the appro-priate FSB commander. However, there are in-stances when the DISCOM TAC CP, under theDISCOM commander or executive officer, maybein charge.

The sequence for a FOB seizure resembles othercross-FLOT missions until execution. The brigadebegins operations once the division sets theconditions.

Immediately before the FLOT penetration, airstrikes and artillery engage known and suspectedenemy ADA targets. With SEAD, the attackbattalion, accompanied by EW helicopters on jam-ming missions, launches toward the FOB.

Air Force CAS and jamming, if allocated, mayassist the attack battalion as it transits its flight route.During SEAD, the AATF waits in PZ posture. Theground convoy stands by to depart its assembly area.

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FM 71-100-3

The attack aviation battalion conducts an armedreconnaissance along the flight route, over the LZs,and across the objective area. The attack aviationbattalion attacks known or revealed enemy posi-tions, with priority to ADA, artillery, and mobilereserves.

If the objective area still looks favorable for land-ing, the air assault launches. Based on the time offlight, the AATF lifts off to ensure the first aircraftof the first lift lands in the objective area at H-hour.This begins the assault to seize and establish theFOB.

To maintain coverage and security during the airassault, attack aviation will most probably needsome fuel resupply. The attack battalion immedi-ately sets up its own FARP, typically by slingload-ing in a fuel blivet on lift aircraft. If the attack

helicopter fuel requirement exceeds this capacity,the AATF might allocate some medium assaultaircraft to sling in a larger temporary FARP.

By H+l, units confirm the RP location and com-plete linkup with the LRSD. Not later than H+6, allAATF units (minus the ground attack element) closeat the FOB. In addition, each battalion TF securesits initial assault objectives to establish an airheadline, after which the ground attack force crosses itsLD. Bulk fuel begins to arrive by helicopter.

By H+6, DISCOM activates the forward arearefueling equipment (FARE) and fuel system sup-ply point (FSSP) and assumes command of the CSScore. The ground column links up as soon as possi-ble, usually within 24 hours, but not later than 72hours after the first landings.

8-23

GLOSSARY

AAA2C2

AASLTAATFAATFC

AAVNAAWS-M

ABCABMOC

ACACAACCACEACOACP

ACRactADADAADADO

ADAO

ADCADC-O

ADC-S

ADEadminADOADSOAFAFMAFPAFSCOORD

AFSOAGAGMAGOSAHAHB

assembly areaArmy airspace command andcontrolair assaultair assault task forceair assault task forcecommanderArmy aviationantiarmor weaponssystem-mediumair battle captainair battle managementoperations centerattack cargoairspace control authorityair component commanderanalysis and control elementairspace control orderair control points; assaultcommand postarmored cavalry regimentactionair defenseair defense artilleryassistant division air defenseofficerassistant division aviationofficerarea damage controlassistant division commanderfor operationsassistant division commanderfor supportassistant division engineeradministrativeair defense officerassistant division signal officerAir ForceAir Force ManualAir Force Publicationassistant fire supportcoordinatoraerial fire support observeradjutant generalattack guidance matrixAir-Ground Operations Schoolattack helicopterattack helicopter battalion

AIajaALOALOCaltAMB/ambAMCAMLS

AMTANGLICO

AOAORAPERSAPRARarmdartyASCC

asltASOCASPSATATACMSATCatchdATIZatkATOATSATTNAVIM

avn

BAEBCCBCEBCOCBDAbdeBDOCBDZBFVBHLbn

air interdictionadjacentair liaison officerair line of communicationsalternateair mission brief; ambulanceair mission commandairspace management liaisonsectionair movement tableair and naval gunfire liaisoncompanyarea of operationsarea of responsibilityantipersonnelAprilArmy regulationarmoredartilleryAir StandardizationCoordinating Committeeassaultair support operations centerall source production systemantitankArmy tactical missile systemair traffic controlattachedartillery target intelligence zoneattackair tasking orderair traffic serviceattentionaviation intermediatemaintenanceaviation

brigade aviation elementbattlefield circulation controlbattlefield coordination elementbase cluster operations centerbattle damage assessmentbrigadebase defense operations centerbase defense zoneBradley fighting vehiclebattle handover linebattalion

Glossary-1

FM 71-100-3

BOSBPBSAbtlbtry

CC2

C3

CAC&EC&JCACCANCAScavcbtCBUCCIR

CCPcdrCDSCEOI

CFACFFZCFLCFZCGCHCHS

CI

CIDCINCcmdcmlCNRcoCOAComcollCOLTCOMINTCONPLANcoordCOSCOM

battlefield operating systembattle positionbrigade support areabattlebattery

cargocommand and controlcommand, control, andcommunicationscivil affairs; combined armscommunications and electronicscollection and jammingCombined Arms Centercombat aviation netclose air supportcavalrycombatcluster bomb unitscommander’s criticalinformation requirementscirculation control pointcommandercontainer delivery systemcommunications electronicoperating instructionscovering force areacall-for-fire zonecoordinated fire linecritical friendly zonecommanding generalcargo helicoptercombat health support(replaces health servicessupport (HSS))civilian internee;counterintelligenceCriminal Investigation Divisioncommander in chiefcommandchemicalcombat net radiocompanycourse of actionchief of staffcollectioncombat observation/lasing teamcommunications intelligencecontingency plancoordinatecorps support command

CPCPXCRCCsCSECSGCSRCssctr

(D)DAD3A

decndecepdeconDFDFACDFSCOORDDISCOMdivDIVARTYDLICDMCC

DMMC

DMOC

DNVTDPDPICM

DRAGONDSDSADSTDTGDTODZ

EA

EACECBECCM

ECMECOA

command postcommand post exercisecontrol and reporting centercombat supportcombat support equipmentcorps support groupcontrolled supply ratecombat service supportcenter

draftDepartment of the Armydecide, detect and track,deliver, and assessdecisiondeceptiondecontaminationdisposition formdining facilitydeputy fire support coordinatordivision support commanddivisiondivision artillerydetachment left in contactdivision movement controlcenterdivision materiel managementcenterdivision medical operationscenterdigital network voice telephonedecision pointdual-purpose, improved,conventional munitions(a weapons system)direct supportdivision support areadivision support templatedate-time groupdivision transportation officerdrop zone

electronic attack; engagementareaechelons above corpsechelons corps and belowelectronic counter-countermeasureselectronic countermeasuresenemy course of action

Glossary-2

FM 71-100-3

EEFI

EHELINTELSECengrEODEPEPB

EPWequipESEWEWLEWO

FAFAAFAADFAIO

FARE

FARP

FASCAMFAXFCMFDCFEBAFFAFFIR

FISTFLBFLEFLOTfmFM

FNSFOBFPFFRAGOFSFSBFSCLFSCM

FSCOORD

essential elements of friendlyinformationelectronic helicopterelectronic intelligenceelectronic securityengineerexplosive ordnance disposalelectronic protectionelectronic preparation of thebattlefieldenemy prisoner of warequipmentelectronic warfare supportelectronic warfareengineer work lineelectronic warfare officer

field artilleryforward assembly areaforward area air defensefield artillery intelligenceofficerforward area refuelingequipmentforward arming and refuelingpointfamily of scatterable minesfacsimilefire control measuresfire direction centerforward edge of the battle areafree fire areafriendly forces informationrequirementsfire support teamforward logistics baseforward logistics elementforward line of own troopsfromfield manual; frequencymodulatedforeign national supportforward operations basefinal protection firesfragmentary orderfire supportforward support battalionfire support coordination linefire support coordinationmeasurefire support coordinator

FSEFSOFSSPfwd

G1

G2

G3

G4

G5

gpGPSGSGS-RGSRGTC

HEhelHHB

HHC

HHSC

HIDACZ

HIMAD

HMMWV

HNhow (T)HPTHPTLHQHUMINTHVT

I&SICM

IDID (L)IEW

fire support elementfire support officerfuel system supply pointforward

assistant chief of staff, G1(personnel)assistant chief of staff, G2(intelligence)assistant chief of staff, G3(operations and plans)assistant chief of staff, G4(logistics)assistant chief of staff, G5(civil affairs)groupglobal positioning systemgeneral supportgeneral support-reinforcingground surveillance radarground tactical commander

high explosivehelicopterheadquarters and headquartersbatteryheadquarters and headquarterscompanyheadquarters and headquarterssupport companyhigh-density airspace controlzonehigh- to medium-altitude airdefensehigh-mobility, multipurpose,wheeled vehiclehost nationhowitzer (towed)high-payoff targethigh-payoff target listheadquartershuman intelligencehigh-value target

intelligence and surveillanceimproved conventionalmunitionsidentificationinfantry division (light)intelligence and electronicwarfare

Glossary-3

FM 71-100-3

IEWSE

IMINTinfinfointelIPIPB

IPW

IRISB

JAATJFACC

JOCJPJSEAD

JSTARS

JTF

kmKS

LlaagerLABLAPES

LBELCLDLECLLTRLLVILOLOALOBLOCLOGPACLOGSECLOSLPLRSLRSD

intelligence and electronicwarfare support elementimagery intelligenceinfantryinformationintelligenceinitial pointintelligence preparation of thebattlefieldinterrogation of prisoners ofwarinformation requirementsintermediate staging base

joint air attack teamjoint force air componentcommander; joint force aircoordination centerjoint operations centerjoint publicationjoint suppression of enemy airdefensejoint surveillance, target attackradar systemjoint task force

kilometerKansas

lighta camp with a defensive barrierlogistics assault baselow-altitude parachuteextraction systemload-bearing equipmentline of contactline of departurelaw enforcement commandlow-level transit routelow-level voice interceptliaison officerlogistics operations arealines of bearinglines of communicationlogistics packagelogistics securityline of sight; lines of supplylistening postlong-range surveillancelong-range surveillancedetachment

LRSTLTLTACFIRE

LZ

MmaintMANPADMASHMBAMCOMCOO

MCSmdmmechmedMEDEVACMETT-T

MIMIJI

MLRSmmMMCMOPP

mortMOSMOUT

MPmphMRBMRR

M/SMSBMSCMSEMSRMTFmvr

N/ANAINALENATO

long-range surveillance teamlightlightweight tactical firedirection systemlanding zone

mechanizedmaintenanceman-portable air defensemobile army surgical hospitalmain battle areamovement control officermodified combined obstacleoverlaymaneuver control systemmediummechanizedmedicalmedical evacuationmission, enemy, terrain, troops,and time availablemilitary intelligencemeaconing, intrusion,jamming, and interferencemultiple-launch rocket systemmillimetermateriel management centermission-oriented protectiveposturemortarmilitary occupational specialtymilitary operations onurbanized terrainmilitary policemiles per hourmotorized rifle battalionminimum-risk route; motorizedrifle regimentmobility/survivabilitymain support battalionmajor subordinate commandmobile subscriber equipmentmain supply routemedical treatment facilitymaneuver

not applicablenamed area of interestnaval aviation liaison elementNorth Atlantic TreatyOrganization

Glossary-4

FM 71-100-3

navNBC

NCANCONCSNEO RAANETNFANGFNLTno.NOENVD

objOCOKA

OFAOHOICO/OOOTWOPOPCONOPLANOPORDOPSECOPTEMPOORA

PIR

PIREPPLpltPMPOLposPPprepsPSYOPpt(s)PZ

Quick Fire

navigationnuclear, biological, andchemicalNational Command Authoritynoncommissioned officernet control stationnoncombatant evacuationoperationnew equipment trainingno fire areanaval gun firenot later thannumbernap-of-earthnight vision device

objectiveobservation and fields of fire,cover and concealment,obstacles, key terrain, avenuesof approachobstacle-free areaobservation helicopterofficer in chargeon orderoperations other than warobservation post; operation(s)operational controloperation planoperation orderoperations securityoperational tempoobstacle-restricted area

priority intelligencerequirementpilot reportphase lineplatoonprovost marshalpetroleum, oils, and lubricantspositionpassage pointpreparespsychological operationspoint(s)pick-up zone

(radio net established by HQ toreceive priority fires)

Quick Fix

RRAGR&S

RAPRECCE

reconREMBASS

resRFARFLRISTA

ROEROZRPRPVRSTA

rt

(s)S1S2S3S4S5SAAFR

SEAD

secSICPS

sigSIGINTSITREPSJAsmksoSOCCE

SOFSOI

(tactical helibornecommunications intercept,direction finding, ECM system)

reinforcing; reserveregimental artillery groupreconnaissance and securityrear assembly arearocket-assisted projectile(reconnaissance aircraftmission (USAF))reconnaissanceremotely monitored battlefieldsensor systemreserverestrictive fire arearestrictive fire linereconnaissance, intelligence,surveillance, and targetacquisitionrules of engagementrestricted operations zonerelease pointremotely piloted vehiclereconnaissance, surveillance,and target acquisitionroute

secretadjutantintelligence officeroperations and training officersupply officercivil affairs officerstandard-use Army aircraftflight routesuppression of enemy airdefensessectionstandardized integratedcommand post systemsignalsignal intelligencesituation reportstaff judge advocatesmokesignal officer; signal operationsspecial operations commandand control elementsspecial operations forcessignal operation instructions

Glossary-5

FM 71-100-3

SOPSORSPSPOTREPsptsqdsqdnSRSTATREPSTONSUPPT

TTATAAtacTACAIRTACCTACFIRETACONTACPTACSATTADTAFTAITALOTARTCFTCPTDATETFtgtTHREATCONTITLPtmtnTOCTOE

UW

topo

standing operating procedurespecific orders and requestsself-propelled, start pointspot reportsupportsquadsquadronsupply routestatus reportshort tonsupply point

towed; tontransmission analysistactical assembly areatacticaltactical airtactical air control centertactical tire direction systemtactical controltactical air control partytactical satellitetarget acquisition detachmenttactical air forcetarget area of interesttactical airlift liaison officertactical air reconnaissancetactical combat forcetraffic control pointtarget damage assessmentthreat evaluationtask forcetargetthreat conditiontheat integrationtroop-leading procedureteamtraintactical operations centertable of organization andequipmenttopography

TOTTOW

TRADOC

trkTRPTSOP

TSSTTP

TVA

(u)UAVUBLUHUNUS/U.S.USAUSAFUSMCUSN

V/S

W/wWFZWCSWOWWIWWIIWX

XO

time on targettube-launched, opticallytracked, wire-guided, heavyantitank missile systemUS Army Training andDoctrine Commandtrucktarget reference pointtactical standing operatingproceduretarget selection standardtactics, techniques, andprocedurestarget-value analysis

unclassifiedunmanned aerial vehicleunit basic loadutility helicopterUnited NationsUnited StatesUnited States ArmyUnited States Air ForceUnited States Marine CorpsUnited States Navyunconventional warfare

Vulcan/Stinger

withwheeledweapons-free zoneweapons control statuswarning orderWorld War IWorld War Hweather

executive officer

Glossary-6

REFERENCES

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

Acts:Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

Field Manuals:FM 6-20-1FM 6-20-10FM 6-20-30

FM 7-8FM 7-30FM 17-18FM 21-18(S) FM 34-1FM 34-8FM 34-40FM 34-130FM 55-2FM 55-10FM 63-2-1FM 71-100FM 71-100-2FM 71-100-3FM 90-2FM 90-3FM 90-4FM 90-5FM 90-10FM 90-10-1FM 90-11FM 90-13FM 100-1

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon BattalionTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting ProcessTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and DivisionOperationsInfantry Rifle Platoon and SquadInfantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Brigade OperationsLight Armored OperationsFoot MarchesIntelligence and Electronic Warfare OperationsCombat Commander’s Handbook on IntelligenceElectronic Warfare Operations (U)Intelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldDivision Transportation OperationsMovement Control in a Theater of OperationsDivision Support Command, Light Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault DivisionsDivision OperationsInfantry Division OperationsAir Assault Division OperationsBattlefield DeceptionDesert OperationsAir Assault OperationsJungle OperationsMilitary Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)An Infantryman’s Guide to Urban CombatWinter OperationsRiver Crossing OperationsThe Army

References-1

FM 71-100-3

FM 100-5 OperationsFM 100-103 Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat ZoneFM 101-5 (D) Command and Control for Commanders and Staff

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

Army Regulations:AR 600-20 Army Command Policy

Forms:DA Form 2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms

READINGS RECOMMENDED

These readings contain relevant supplemental information.

Air Force Manuals and Publications:AFM 2-50 USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift OperationsAFP 3-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

Army Field Manuals:FM 1-100FM 1-103FM 1-116FM 3-3FM 3-4FM 3-5FM 3-7FM 3-11FM 3-13FM 3-50FM 3-50-1FM 3-100FM 5-7-30FM 5-34FM 5-36FM 5-71-2

Doctrinal Principals for Army Aviation in Combat OperationsAirspace Management and Army Air Traffic in a Combat ZoneTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Air Cavalry/Reconnaissance TroopChemical and Biological Contamination AvoidanceNBC ProtectionNBC DecontaminationNBC HandbookFlame Field ExpedientsRiot Control Agents and HerbicidesSmoke OperationsSmoke Unit OperationsNBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame OperationsBrigade Engineer and Engineer Company OperationsEngineer Field DataRoute Reconnaissance and ClassificationTask Force Engineer and Engineer Company Operations

References-2

FM 71-100-3

FM 5-71-100FM 5-100FM 5-101FM 5-102FM 5-103FM 5-114FM 5-250FM 6-20FM 6-20-2

FM 6-20-20

FM 6-20-50

FM 6-60FM 6-121FM 7-10FM 7-20FM 7-90FM 7-91FM 7-92FM 7-93FM 7-98FM 8-10FM 8-10-1FM 8-10-3FM 8-10-4FM 8-10-5

FM 8-10-6FM 8-10-7

FM 8-10-9FM 8-15

FM 8-42

Division Engineer OperationsEngineer Combat OperationsMobility

CountermobilitySurvivabilityEngineer Operations Short of WarExplosives and DemolitionsFire Support in the AirLand BattleTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Corps Artillery, Division Artillery, andField Artillery Brigade HeadquartersTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support at Battalion Task Forceand BelowTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations(Light)Multiple-Launch Rocket System OperationsTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target AcquisitionThe Infantry Rifle CompanyThe Infantry BattalionTactical Employment of MortarsTactical Employment of Antiarmor Platoons, Companies, and BattalionsThe Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and SquadLong Range Surveillance Unit OperationsOperations in a Low-Intensity ConflictHealth Service Support in a Theater of OperationsThe Medical Company-Tactics, Techniques, and ProceduresDivision Medical Operations CenterMedical Platoon Leaders’ Handbook—Tactics, Techniques, and ProceduresBrigade and Division Surgeons’ Handbook, Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-duresMedical Evacuation in a Theater of OperationsHealth Service Support in an NBC Environment—Tactics, Techniques, andProceduresCombat Health Logistics in a Theater of OperationsMedical Support in Divisions, Separate Brigades, and the Armored CavahyRegimentMedical Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict

References-3

FM 71-100-3

FM 8-55FM 10-63-1FM 11-38FM 11-41

FM 11-54FM 11-58FM 11-71FM 11-73FM 11-75FM 12-6FM 12-50FM 14-7FM 16-1FM 17-95FM 17-95-30FM 19-1FM 19-10FM 19-15FM 19-40FM 20-12FM 20-32FM 21-10FM 21-10-1FM 21-11FM 22-9FM 22-100FM 22-103FM 24-1FM 24-10FM 26-2FM 27-1FM 31-12FM 31-70FM 31-71

Planning for Health Service SupportGraves Registration HandbookMSE System Management and ControlSignal Support: Echelons Corps and Below (ECB)Satellite Operations (Multichannel)Tactical Data Systems and InterfacesNetwork ManagementInformation SecurityBattlefield Information ServicesPersonnel DoctrineU.S. Army BandsFinance OperationsReligious Support DoctrineCavalry OperationsLight Division Cavalry SquadronMilitary Police Support for the AirLand BattleMilitary Police Law and Order OperationsCivil DisturbancesEnemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons

Amphibious EmbarkationMine/Countermine OperationsField Hygiene and SanitationUnit Field Sanitation TeamFirst Aid for SoldiersSoldier Performance in Continuous OperationsMilitary LeadershipLeadership and Command at Senior LevelsSignal Support in the AirLand BattleSignal Operations DoctrineManagement of Stress in Army OperationsLegal Guide for CommandersArmy Forces in Amphibious OperationsBasic Cold Weather ManualNorthern Operations

References-4

FM 71-100-3

FM 33-1FM 34-2FM 34-3FM 34-5FM 34-10FM 41-10FM 44-3FM 44-100FM 55-9FM 63-2

FM 63-6FM 63-20FM 63-21FM 90-6FM 90-7FM 90-8FM 90-13-1FM 90-14FM 90-15FM 90-26FM 90-29FM 100-9FM 100-10FM 100-15FM 100-17FM 100-19FM 100-20FM 100-23FM 100-23-3FM 100-25FM 100-26FM 100-27

FM 100-37

Psychological OperationsCollection ManagementIntelligence AnalysisIntelligence Collection OperationsDivision Intelligence and Electronic Warfare OperationsCivil Affairs OperationsAir Defense Artillery Employment, Chaparral/Vulcan/StingerUS Army Air Defense OperationsUnit Air Movement PlanningDivision Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized InfantryDivisionCombat Service Support in Low-Intensity ConflictForward Support BattalionMain Support BattalionMountain OperationsCombined Arms Obstacle IntegrationCounterguerrilla OperationsCombined Arms Breaching OperationsRear BattleMultiservice Procedures for Joint Suppression of the Enemy Air DefensesAirborne OperationsNoncombatant Evacuation OperationsReconstitutionCombat Service SupportCorps OperationsMobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, DemobilizationDomestic Support OperationsOperations Other Than WarPeace OperationsMultiService Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance OperationsArmy Special Operations ForcesThe Army Air-Ground Operations SystemUSA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations (AFM2-50)Combatting Terrorism

References-5

FM 71-100-3

FM 101-5-1FM 101-10-1/1

FM 101-10-1/2

FM 701-58

Joint Publications:JP 3.02JP 3.07JP 3-07.2JP 3.07.3

Operational Terms and SymbolsStaff Officer’s Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data(Volume 1)Staff Officer’s Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical DataPlanning Factors (Volume 2)Planning Logistics Support for Military Operations

Joint Doctrine for Amphibious OperationsDoctrine for Joint Operations Other Than WarJoint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for AntiterrorismJoint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations

OTHER DOCUMENTS

United States Codes:Posse Comitatus Act, 18 United States Code 1385Title X

References-6

FM 71-100-329 OCTOBER 1996

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGenera/, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Administrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

02531

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed inaccordance with the initial distribution number 115476, requirements forFM 71-100-3.

✰ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996-728-027/60023

PIN: 074965-000