arnhart - aristotle's bio politics

8/6/2019 Arnhart - Aristotle's Bio Politics

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RISa"QTLE9SBIQPC4%17"1GS:A DEFENSE OF BlGtbOGICAL TELEOLOGo"GA NST 131OLC361CALNIHIL1SM

bstract Modern Darurinian biology seems to pro-e nihilism, for it seems to leach that there is nonally discoverable standard in nature for givinglife. The purpose of this article is to arguea revival of Aristotle's biological teleology a s a

"ibbioilogical nihilism. T he afli-is argued that a teleologicalnding of nature is assumed in the practice oficine, a s illustrated by one case from Oliver

s the importance of biological teleology For Aris-isen to some points of agreement and disagreementcontemporaw sociobiologists. The main part of

is then devoted to a defense of Aristotle'sbey a Dawinian biologist. Finally, the arliclepractical implications of this issue fors by considering the recent work of Engel-

be thehilism. Modern Darwinian biology seemse amongto

l o be re-in whatever way we desire, unconstrained

by any norm other than our arbitrary preferences.We thus confront the abysmal thought of nihilism-"tat there is no rationally discoverable standard innature for guiding human life.

Recent books by E. 0. ilson, M. Ruse, and H.Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., illustrate some of the futileattempts to overcome nihilism through a new moral-ity consistent with the moral and epistemologicalskepticism of modern science. Their failure forces usto consider alternatives. 1 will argue that the bestalternative is to revive Aristotle's teleological biologyas supporting the idea that we can look to humannature as a source of moral and political norms.I will begin with Wilson's vain struggle againstnihilism as an example of the moral predicament ofthe modern Darwinian biologist. I will 'then argue thatArisirotie's understanding of nature is assumed inthe ordinary practice of medicine, and 1 will use oneof Oliver Sacks'clinical cases as an iliustration.Since many readers of Aristotle's moral and politicalwritings might deny that those works depend uponhis biology, I will show how his biological reasoningenters his moral and political philosophy. AlthoughAristotle would agree with much of what has beenargued recently by the sociobiologists, I will showthat he did not make "ie mistakes that Kitcherattributes to "'pop sociobiology." I will t h e n defendAristo-iie's bioiogicai teleology against the five objec-

AND THE LIFE SCIENCES Vol 6, No 2, February 1988 iSSN 0730-93N "9% by th e Assoc:aiim for Po!rticsend the Life Saences.


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tions likely l o be made by a Darwinian biologist.Finally, I will comment on Engelhardt's theory ofbioethics; and I will maintain that he falls intonihilistic incoherence because of his denial of Aris-totle's commonsense realism.Nihilism in Modern BiologyIn On Human Nature, Wilson (1978:l-13) warns hisreader in the first chapter that modern biology hascreated "two great spiritual dilemmas." The firstdilemma arises because biology teaches us that wehave no transcendent goals. For if human beingsand all other forms of life have emerged simply asproducts of chance and necessity, we must con-clude that there is no purpose in nature beyond theinstinct of each living being to survive and repro-duce. Even the human mind, which traditionally wasthought to give man his unique status as the onlyrational animal, must be seen as a physical devicefor survival and reproduction. But if we agreed thathuman life had no transcendent meaning, wouldthere not be the danger of declining into a state ofself-indulgent hedonism? If we decided that we havenothing to do in life except to live and reproduce,would we not lose that sense of nobility that makeslife worth living? Would we not, consequently, lackany motivation for the exertions necessary to sustaincivilization? Wilson's second dilemma only intensi-fies the problem: as our biological knowledge givesus greater power to control the genetic mechanism,"we shall have lo decide how human we wish toremain" ('1978:6). We shall have to survey the menblinclinations we have inherited as elements of ourbiological nature and decide which ones should befavored over the others.

Wilson (1979:195-209) attempts to resolve thesedilemmas in the concluding chapter of his book. Hesuggests that we develop a 'Biology of ethics"based on a "more deeply understood and enduringcode of moral values" than has been possiblepreviously. He proposes three primary values: "thesurvival of human genes in the form of a commonpool over generations," "diversity in the gene pool,"and "universal human rights." But it is hard to seewhy we should accept the first two values as moralnorms. Is mere genetic survival the higheshtandardof moral worth? If so, should we honor the nobility ofthe amoeba? Similarly, Wilson's account of "univer-sal hurnan rights" is vague. He seems lo have inmind some kind of biologically based Hobbesiansocial contract (see Wilson, 1979:46, 50-51, 156-57,164, 166-67, 198-99).All individuals are equal in theirstriving for reproductive success, and therefore ev-ery community should be seen by all its members asserving the reproduc"iive interests of all. Again,however, it is hard to see how reproductioncan be asource of moral obligation.

and mythology. Wilson suggests that scientificterialism can become the new mythology. Afterthe "evolutionary epic" is the best myth andhero of the epic is the human mind. (For a siproposal see Monod, 19723-22, 166-80.) Scition of new values, and in the service of scientYmaterialism we might find some human fulbeyond animal survival. This would be aproject because it would rest upon a self-illusion. It would have to be an illusionWilson assumes "rat any belief in heroic transcdence is ultimately merely a mechanism for suwiGtand reproductive success. It is noburprising thatWilson is fond of quoting Nietzsche's remark at theend of The Genealogy of Morais: man would ratherwill nothingness than not will.

Some of Wilson's critics claim that he is so rigid inhis biological determinism that he disregards thegreat flexibility human beings have as moral andcultural beings. But many of these critics also turnout to be nihilists. Greenwood f 1984:204), for exam-ple, a biocultural anthropologist, has argued thatDarwinian biology shows us that natural laws cannotsupport moral principles. We must conclude, there-fore, that "our political and moral preferences are nomore (and no less) than preferences." To appeal toculture rather than biology as the source of moralitygives us no escape from the arbitrariness of ailvalues.If we want to look to human nature as the groundof morality, we have a good reason "r reconsiderAristotle's biological understanding of human na-ture. In fact, some students of modern biology insistthat recent advances in science should give us abetter grasp of the natural basis of morality (Tigerand Fox, 1971 232-41; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1974:l-7, 90-105; Masters, 1975, 1978, 1986; Stent, 1980). Oneexample of the Aristotelian point of view is a recentarticle by Gaylin (19841, who is president of theHastings Center. After noting that modern sciencesometimes seems to deny the traditional conceptionof human beings as uniquely noble, as set apartfrom and above all other species, Gaylin sets out lodefend the traditional belief in the special dignity ofhuman beings. He identifies at least five uniqueattributes of our species: "conceptual thought; thecapacity for technology; the range of human emo-tions; a laamarkian' genetics; and. . . freedom frominstinctual fixation" (1984:20). He does not, however,

explain or defend explicitly his fundamenbal assump-tion, which is that the traditional teleological eon-ception of nature is still rationally defensible. Meassumes "ihal species have natural ends or Fur-


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thal there is a natural hierarchy among, and that because man is the highest spe-ends are supreme by nature.recent book- Toward a More Natural Sci-85)-is a more elaborately developed de-the traditional understanding of nature. Heit in his allegiance to Aristotelian teleology.so Aristotelian in his respect for the commonnce of medical practitioners. Even if biologi-medical research seems dominated by thequest to conquer nature, Kass draws atten-he ways in which some doctors continue tohemselves, in the Hippocratic tradition, asg nature's ends. (For an assessment of Kass', see Amhart, 1987b) That can be true even in abranch of medical practice such as clinical

ure and NeurologySacks is a neurologist who has written aof popular books based on his clinical experi-In his most recent book (1985:87-96), he tellse story of a patient named Ray who suffers fromrette's syndrome. I introduce this story as anructive illustration of how the Aristotelian under-nding of nature as a source of standards cangovern medical practice.

Those afflicted with Tourette's syndrome are over-imed by nervous energy that explodes in jerks,, cursing, and a generally weird and comicnzy. Apparen"lly these people suffer from an ex-ss of dopamine, which is one of the excitorsrnitters in the brain. The drug haloperidol (ordol") can help these people because i M e -es the level of dopamine in the brain.

Sacks, however, found that Ray was reluctant toof haldol. Having been a Touretter

wit. He was an excellent ping-pong playerof his quick and unexpected shots. He

to live withhot Tourette'son haldol, he had arevolving door.) ""Supposeu could lake away the tics," he said. "'What wouldft? I consist of' tics-there'd be nothing left."Yet Ray had come "i Sacks because he feltby his disorder. So the doctor suggestedthey should meet weekly for three months to

.discuss what life without Tourette's might be like.Then the haldol was tried once again. It worked, andRay enjoyed his freedom from the confinement ofTourette's. But he also felt that he had lost some-thing. His greatest loss was that his jazz drummingbecame dull and lifeless. He decided to compro-mise. He would take haldol during the working weekbut not on weekends. From Monday to Friday hewas a calm, conservative member of his community.But on weekends he became the frenzied jazzdrummer-'kitty ticcy Ray."

Ray explained his precarious situation this way:Having Tourette's is wild, like being drunk ail thewhile. Being on haldol is dull, makes one squareand sober, and neither stale is reallyfree. . . . You "normals; who have the right trans-mitters in the right places at the right limes inyour brains, have all feelings, all states, availableall the time-gravity, levity, whatever is appropri-ate. We Toureiters don't: We are forced intolevity by our Tourette's and forced into gravitywhen we take haldol. You are free, you have anatural balance: We must make the best of anartificial balance.

According to Sacks, Ray has achieved a full life"despite being deprived of the birthright of naturalfreedom which most of us enjoy."This story illustrates some of the moral-and

ultimately political-issues that arise in the practiceof modern medicine and biology. It's one example ofhow recent advances in our biological knowledgegive us an unprecedenked power over nature, in-cluding power over that most distinctive part of ourhuman nature-the brain. Even the capacity thatmany people have traditionally thought must tran-scend the physical mechanism of the body-the"soul" or "self," the source of willing and thinking-even that seems open now to neurological explana-tion and control. We must wonder, however, whetherthis new scientific knowledge includes a knowledgeof the ends for which its power will be used.Sacks assumes in his neurological practice thatthe end comes from nature. There is a natural orderor balance in any normal human life. He can there-fore recognize Tourette's syndrome as a ""disorder"or ""disturbance" of the natural functioning that isthe healthy condition of a normal human being.Although in Ray's case he cannokompletety repairthe damage, he can at least strive for an "ar";ficialbalance'?tha"rapproxirnates the "natural balance" ofnormal life.All of Sacks' patients have lost contact with some

part of reality because of some neurological defect.His job is to help them find some road back toreality. So, for example, if an autistic patient cannotcomprehend the world in an abstract, in"ieiiectuai


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way, perhaps he can learn through music or danceto experience the world in its concrete immediacy.Sacks thus assumes that nature is purposeful andthe doctor's duty is to assist nature in fulFilling itspurposes. Although the patient must consent to thetreatment, the doctor is not merely a sewant of thepatient's wishes, because the standard of health isfixed by nature even if there is flexibility in decidinghow best to approximate nature's norm. Moreover, Isuspect that Ray's final assessment of his situationas quoted above was largely a result of Sacks'gentle persuasion. Isn't it iikely that Ray's subtleunderstanding of the "natural balance" betweengravity and levity reflects Sacks' wise judgmentabout what constituks psychic health? And doesn'tthat idea of "natural balance" conform to whatAristotle would call a natural mean between excess

and defect?Sacks in his writing often admires the wondrousinsights and exhilaration experienced by peoplewith neurological disturbances. But he never yieldsto the sentimental relativism that would deny thedistinction between the normal and the abnormal,the healthy and the diseased. In short, Sacks as-sumes, at least implicitly, a teleological conceptionof nature.Yet it has been widely assumed thal modernscience-and certainly modern biology-cannotsupport the idea of nature as teleological. Beginning

with Descartes and Bacon, modern science hasapparently been devoted not l o discovering nature'sorder so that we can conform to it, but lo studyingnature's mechanism so that we can control if (Berns,1978; Kass, 1985; lsaacs, 1987). We cannot discoverour proper goals or purposes as features of nature.Rather we must create our own ends and thenimpose them on nature. Therefore, to understandhow nature might guide the practice of those likeSacks, we must revive the premodern account ofnature found in Aristotle's biology.But surely some readers would wonder at this

point about the reievance of all this for politicalthought. As important as Aristotle's teleologicalbiology may be for medical practice, it might still beunclear whether his biology is critical for the sort ofpolitical thinking found in his Nicornachean Ethicsand Politics. Do we find in Aristotle's work a funda-mental connection between biology, medicine, andpolitical science?

For Arisbotle, biological explanation requires twosteps. We must first specify the functional organiza-tion of a normal adult of the species being consid-ered.Thenwemust show how each organic processor pattern of behavior contributes to t h e functional

organization of the being in question. We exp

of a mature human life.We are not disembodied intellects. We are notmachines. We are animals. But we are a special kindof animal: We are rational animals. That is OL,rnature. From birth, therefore, we have the natinclinations that identify us as rational animals.to fulfill or complete those inclinations we nmaterial resources, proper habituation, and intetual stimulation. For example, we are naturallydowed with a capacity for language, but we cannotexercise that capacity unless we are taught a lan-

guage. Thus we need culture to complete our na.ture. We can say, therefore, that whatever enhancesthe flourishing of our nature is good, and whateverimpedes that flourishing is bad. By this standard wecan judge as good or bad, better or worse, the life ofan individual human being or the life of a politicalcommunity. In this way Aristotle looks to our biologi-cal nature as rational animals for guidance in hismoral and political reasoning.The firsoprinciple of Aristotle's ethics is thathappiness is the activity of the soul according tovirtue throughout iife (NE 1097a26-98a22, 1099b32-

1100a5, 1102a14-3a10). Weflection on the biologicalnature of human beings is critical to "re establish-ment of this principle. We see that all human beingsseek happiness as the fulfillment of their desires.But since people disagree about what true happi-ness is, we must reflect on the kind of beings thathuman beings are to see if there is some work orfunction distinctive to them thal would define theirhappiness. All human beings seek to preserve them-selves. But the capacities for nutrition and growthare found in all living things and are not thereforedistinctively human. Similarly, the capacities forsensation, desire, and movement are possessed byother animals. But "re capacity for purposeful con-duct guided by rational deliberation is uniquelyhuman. Therefore, human happiness must be theactive exercise of this capacity. Other animals can-not be truly happy in this sense. Even humanchildren can be said to be only potentially happy.The flourishing of a human being that constituteshappiness is attained only by normal, mature adults.

Consequently, the political scientist must havesome knowledge of the human soul as one form ofanimal life (M 1102a18-25).Of course it is appropri-ate for him to pursue this study only as an aid topolitics, which means thathe will not need thedetailed knowledge of a physician or a naturalscientist.


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Id emphasize that although Aristotle oftens happiness with the exercise of those activ-t are uniquely human, he also insists thatss includes the satisfaction of those needsbeings share with other living things., since human goodness coincides withecessary conditions for human life, absolutes is impossible because an absolutely badbeing would self-destruct. Insofar as anual knows how to stay alive even the worst ofn beings must know something about what isfor him or herself. Likewise, any politicale that endures for long cannot be absolutelyical (NE 1126a12-13, 1153b25-54a2, 1172b35-. P 1302a4-7, 1309b15-10al2, 1315b5-39,-34). On this point-that moraliv must se-conditions of hurnan life-Aristotle woulde with David Hume.

e first condition of life is food. Animals arenature for different kinds of life corre-the different ways of acquiring food (P). Some, for example, are carnivorousfrugivorous. Similarly, human beingse different ways of life as determined by theirurce of food. Some are nomadic shepherds, somenters, some farmers, some merchanis.Human community arises First, Aristotle explains,om the urge for sexual union.By necessity, then, there is first the coupling ofthose who cannot exist without one an-other. . . male and female lor the sake of repro-duction (and this is not from moral choice but,just as with the other anirnals and plants, there isa natural longing to leave behind another of thesame sort as oneself). . . (P 1252a26-30)

The coupling of husband and wife is even morenatural than political bonding because the sexualunion is prior and more necessary, and procreationis more common in animals (ME 1162a17-29). Unlikeother animals, however, "human beings live to-gether not only for the sake OF reproduc"ron but forother things in life as well."When Aristotle speaks of friendship as one of thenecessary elements of a good life, he explains it as abiological need that human beings share with otheranimals.

It seems that by nature parents show a friendlyfeeling for their offspring, and the oMspring fortheir parents, not only among hurnan beings butalso among birds and most anirnals, and thesame is felt among those of the same kindtowards one another, and especially among hu-man beings, so that we praise those who arefriendly to one another. . . . Moreover, friendshipseems to hold a city together. (NE I t 55al7-23)The desire for bonding is one of th e motives fore movementof animals. And one of t h e clearest

links between Aristotle's biological work and hisethics is his explanation of animal movement (DM698a1-7, 700b4-2a21; NE 1141b14-23, 1142b23-33,1142a35-b6, 1146b31-47b19; Nussbaum, 1978). tlnthe Movement of Animals provides a general expla-nation for any animal movement, including hurnanaction. Aristotle's most important idea is that thestructure of animal movement resembles the stnto-ture of a syllogism. The idea of a "practical syllo-gism" allows Aristotle to explain all animal move-ment teleologically. The syllogism unites cognitionand desire in two premises. The major premiseposits a goal as desirable. The minor premise stateshow the goal can be attained in the particularcircumstances at hand. He uses this same expiana-tory model in the Micomachean Ethics to explainprudence and incontinence. So, although Aristotlebelieves moral action is uniquely human, he alsoregards it as one kind of animal movement in that itdisplays the same general structure. And the mostimportant feature of that structure is its teleologicalcharacter. "For all animals both move and aremoved for the sake of something, so this is the Iimitof all their movement: the thing-for-the-sakeof-which" (DM700b14-16).

Human movement can differ from that of otheranimals in that, while human beings can act throughdeliberate judgments about general principles, olheranimals are moved only by perceptual imaginationand memory of particular things. That is why onlyhuman beings are capable of 'horai choice"(prmiresis)defined as "a deliberate desire of thingsin our power" (DA 428a20-25, 433b31-34a22; Me&980b25-27; NE 11 1 1b4-18, 1113a10-13, 1139al9-20,1147b4-6).

As with the movement of all animals, humanbeings are moved initially by innate biological drsgo-sitions, which constitute the fundamental structureof human motivation. But to develop their naturaldispositions into moral conduct, human beings nsedthe proper habituation and the proper intellectualjudgment. Aristotle distinguishes between naturalvirtue (based on innate dispositions), moral virtue(based on habituation), and virtue in the strict sense(based on prudential judgment). Nature and habitcome first and are sufficient for most people. Only afew people possess the prudential knowledge ofwhaurighl reason dictates in each case (NE 1095~12-4, 1095b2-8f, 1103a14-26, 1144bl-45a2, 1179b4-31;P 1332a39-b8, 1334b15-17).

Nature does not impose a strictly predeterminedpattern upon human action, bu t the naturai inclina-tions of human beings do provide them with thematerials that habitand reason can perfect. "Hencevirtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary tonature; but by our nature we can receive them andperfect them by habituation" (N E "iO3a.14-25). in-


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like other animals, therefore, the nature of humanbeings is not compieted automatically, becausehuman nature depends upon the right cuitural con-ventions. And in being thus open to a perfection ofwhich other animals are incapable, human beingsare also open to a corruption into which otheranimals cannot fall. "For just as man is the best ofanimals when completed, when separated from lawand adjudication he is the worst of all" (P1253a31-33). As 6 . K. ChesGrton observed, human beingsare the only wild animals because by comparison allother animals are tame. Consequently, the properformation of human character requires a complexand delicate combination of natural dispositions,social habituation, and external circumstances.(That this Aristotelian understanding of human na-ture can still be a powerful tool for the contemporarysocial scientist is evident in Wilson and Herrnstein's(1985:508-29) Aristotelian analysis of criminal con-duct. Compare Aristotle's criminology in his Rheto-ric, 1368b1-I373bk and see Arnhart, 1981 87-101.)Human beings are especially vulnerable to corrup-tion through ?he allurement of improper pleasures.But Aristotle's recognition of the natural ends ofhuman beings as a distinct species allows him todistinguish natural and unnatural pleasures.

Some things are by nature pieasant, and ofthese some are pleasant to certain genera ofanimals and men, but others are pleasant not bynature but through habit or through naturaldepravity. (NE 1148b15-18)It seems that each animal has a proper pleasure,just as it has a proper function; for a pleasure isproper to the corresponding activity of a func-tion. This will appear to be so if we study eachspecies; for the pleasures of a horse, of a dog,and of a man are dilierent. . . .So whether thereis one or more than one activity thal beiongs tot h e complete and blessed man, it is thepleasures that complete those activities that willbe said to be in the fullest sense the distinctivelyhuman pleasures. (ME 1176a4-33)

Now that 1 have indicated some of the ways thalAristotle's biologicai claims enter the NicomacheanEthics and Politics, surely some readers wouldobject that, insofar as Aristotle's biological observa-tions in the moral and political works are based oncommon sense, his strictly biological works are notessential for our understanding of his political phi-losophy. I would argue in response, however, thatAristotle's biological works are critical in providingtheoretical support for the biological assumptions ofmoral practice. This becomes clear if one comparesAristotie and Locke on this point. An importantprinciple for Locke's argument in the Sa on d Trea-tise (1970:secs.4, 6) is thal all men are equal in theirhuman dignity insofar as they are ail members of thehuman species as distinguished from " the inferior

ranks of creatures." But in his An Essay ConceHuman.Underslandir?g (1959:bk. 3, chap. 6, s20-39), Locke denies that we can really knwhether there are any essential differences behuman beings and other species of animals.the political teaching of Locke seems to lackretical support. But this is not the case for Aristotl

Furthermore, we can see in the work of Hobbehow the rejection of Aristotle's teleological biologleads to the rejection of his teleological ethics. In ~3Corpore (1839:viii-ix, 406-8), Hobbes uses the con-cept of "vital motion" to extend Harvey's explan%tion of the motion of blood. "Now vital motion is themotion of the blood, perpetually circulating (as bathbeen shown from many infallible signs and marksbDoctor Hamey, the first observer of it) in the veiand arteries." By identifying life with the motionblood, Hobbes explains life as a mechanistic motiowith no end or purpose. He can then begin ThLeviathan ([I 6511 n.d.) by declaring that "life is but amotion of limbs." The only natural inclination of aliving creature is the striving to continue its motion,which for human beings becomes a desire for sell-preservation and its attendant fear of death. Sincethere are no final ends in nature, life must be anendless pursuit of the desires. So if we decided thatHobbes was right in rejecting Aristotle's teieologicalbiology, we would find it hard to defend Aristotle'steleological ethics.

1 suspect that the primary reason why many ofAristotlek readers today are reluctant to accept thelink between his biology and his ethics is their fearof "biological reductionism." To say that Aristotlelooks to biology for ethical guidance makes himsound like a sociobiologist. But surely Aristoliewould not accept the sociobiological claim thalethics is simply a mechanism for promoting repro-ductive success. Arisboe would agree with somefeatures of sociobiology while rejecting those thatcan be rightly criticized.Ar i s l s t l e and Sociabi~IogyPerhaps the most persuasive critique of sociobi-ology is Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition (1985). Unlikemost other critics he acknowledges the accomplish-ments of sociobioiogy in applying bioliogicai insightsto explain the behavior of nonhuman animals. Mealso concedes that in tlhe future this research couldbe extended to cover human behavior. He does notdeny that human beings have biological procIivitiesthat influence their behavior. Vet he criticizes thosehe calls "pop sociobio)ogists" for moving tooquickly to grand speculations about human nature,speculations that have neither the theoretical rigornor the empirical support found in the best sociobio-logical studies of nonhuman behavior, The subjectssf his attack include E. Wilson, R. Alexander. R.


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of the reviewers of Kitcher's book havehim for being more meticulous and fair-

1986; Whitney, 1986. See also Alexander,0-1 , 30-33.) Nevertheless, I think he can be

Pop sociobiologists assume that evolution coin-des with natural selection, which optimizes thedaptation of traits for fitness. But as Kitcher indi-ates (1985:213-39, 288), evolution does not alwaysromote optimal conditions. Sometimes natural se-ection favors the survival of the fittest. Yet some-times it favors the demise of the fittest. Moreover,er mechanisms of evolution can interfere with theimizing effects of evolution. Regrettably, how-ever, Kitcher exaggerates the extent to which soci-obiologists rely on unreasonable adaptationism. (Forthe debate on this issue, see Dawkins, 1982:30-54;Gould, 1986; Lewontin, 1979; Mayr, 1983a.)Although, of course, Arisloile does not rely onevolution by natural selection, his teleological biol-ogy might seem to display "re same "'Panglossianoptimism" that Kitcher sees in the pop sociologists.After ail, doesn't Aristotle insist that nature doesnothing in vain, that everything serves some naturalpurpose? On the contrary, as I shall show later,Aristotle does not believe 'that nature's ends arealways perfectly attained. in rnany cases, thingshappen by chance or by necessity for which thereare no explanations in terms of final ends.

Perhaps the primary claim of pop sociobiology isthat as a consequence of human evolution, individu-als always strive (even if unconsciously) to maximizetheir reproductive fitness. Behavioral traits such asaggressiveness, male dominance, male and femalesexual strategies, and parent-offspring conflict areall explained as ultimately serving reproductive suc-cess. Although conceding that in rnany cases this isf rue, Kitcher (1985180, 196-201 258-69) notes situa-tions where this explanation is tnsuflicient. Particu-larly in modern urban societies, the complex interac-lion of cognitive, cultural, and environmental factorscan induce human beings to act In ways that do notenhance their reproductive fitness. It is not alwaystrue, for example, that those who are most socially

successful fin wealth, prestige, and so on) are alsomost successful in reproduction. (On this point seeVining, 1986 and the accompanying commentaries.)Obviously, this is not a problem for Aristotle. As wehave seen, he recognizes the desires for sexualcoupling and the rearing of children as powedulinclinations. But reproduction is not the only endeven of familial bonding.

Although sociobiologists such as Wilson admitthat hurnan behavior arises from the interaction ofgenetic inclinations and environmental conditions,Kitcher criticizes them for giving too little weight tocultural and cognitive factors and too much weightto genetic determination. Again, this criticism wouldnot apply to Aristotle. As we have seen, he explainshuman conduct as guided by a combination offactors-natural inclinations, patterns of habituation,and cultural learning. Aristotle would agree withKitcher's claim (1985:328-29) that "human beingshave propensities that lead them, when they growup in certain social and physical environments, toacquire as adults the desires and aspirations withwhich we are familiar." t-le would agree with Kitcher(1985:268-69, 288, 297-98) that we are born withbiological propensities, but that these innate drivesshape our conduct only in combination with ourculture, our reasoning, our physical circumstances,and other factors.One of the most common criticisms of the popsociobiologists is that they want to find biological

support for their ideological prejudices. I wouldagree with Masters (1982) that this criticism is notcompletely fair. But some sociobiologists do sug-gest, for example, that sexual inequality is groundedin biological differences (Wilson, 1978:f 21-48; Ba-rash, 1981 46-131). Even Darwin (1874:873) as-serted, without supporting evidence, that "the aver-age of mental power in man must be above that ofwoman." Aristotle would seem to make the samemistake when he speaks of sexual inequality andslavery as being biologically determined. I believe itis incorrect, however, to read Aristotle as endorsingthe Greek exploitation of women and slaves. AI-though prudence dictated that he could not openlycondemn such exploita"ton, his remarks are ambigu-ous in ways that suggest he saw the need for moralreform.

Aristotle "thought there were some natural differ-ences between men and women that influencedtheir conduct. But he argued that women were notto be exploited as though they were the slaves ofmen. While the man's rule over his children ismonarchic, his rule over his wife is ""political." And"political" rule means ruling over those who are freeand equal ( P 1255b18-2l, 11259bI-3). Aristoilethought male and female were two parts ~i humannature. He therefore believed marriage was impor-


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tant as a friendly union of male and female virtuesthat expressed complete humanity. Marital friend-ship is such that "by contributing to the commonstock whatever is proper to each they supply eachother's needs." At its best, it is a friendship of virtue,"for each sex has its virtue" (NE 1162a17-29).Aristotle's thinking resembles that of Gilligan (1982)in her work on the subtle differences between menand women in their moral reasoning. (The complex-ity of Aristotie's understanding of male and femaleroles has been made clear by Salkever, 1983.)

Similarly, Aristotle's comments on slavery suggestthat his biological understanding of the unity of thehuman species would deny the arguments for slav-ery. His cautious reluctance to express this openly,however, has made it difficult for readers to discernhis intent. Nevertheless, it should be clear to anycareful reader that his distinction between "natural"and "conventional" slavery is such that slavery asactually practiced in antiquity would have to beconsidered merely "conventional" (P 1254a18-19,1254b20-22). For slavery to be natural the slavewould have to be an irrational animal. But Aristotlesays that although some slaves may be intellectuallyinferior to their masters, all slaves possess therationality that identifies them as human beingsrather than brute animals (P 1254b15-25, 1259b29,1330a26-34).

In the Poiitics j1255b9-15), Aristotle says thatnatural slavery would require 'kommon interest"and "friendship" between master and slave. But inthe Nkomachean Ethics (1161b5-B), he argues thatsince friendship is possible only between humanbeings, "there can be no friendship with a slave as aslave, though there can be with him as a humanbeing." He leaves the reader free to draw theobvious conclusions. To enslave a human being isunnatural because it denies the fact of his humanityas a rational being, To justify slavery as natural, amaster must try to be a friend to his slave, but thevery possibility of friendship presupposes the hu-manity of the slave and therefore the injustice of hisenslavement. Thus does Aristotle po inuo the absur-dity that was indicated by Lincoln in his argumentsagainst slavery (1953, 2222-23, 2:264-66, 2:271,2:274-75, 2:281-81, 2:405-7, 393, 3:204-5). All humanbeings are equal by nature insofar as they are allequally members of the human species (Jaffa,%?3:308-29, 1975:149-60).

We can condemn slavery as unjust because itdenies our shared humanity in treating some humanbeings as if they were brute animals. But if we dothis, we assume thawwe can properly appeal tobiological facts to support moral judgmenk. Kitcherand other critics of sociobiology argue that thiscannot be bone. To derive moral norms from biologi-

cal facts is to commit the "naturalistic falla(Kitcher, 1985:421-34).Kitcher points to the moral theory of Rawls (1as an illustration of how we might avoid this fain our moral reasoning. But, in fact, RawlshOrtheory illustrates the impossibility of making marjudgments without appeaiing to human nature assource of norms. For instance, Rawls maintains thequal liberty takes precedence over other principlbecause of '"he central place of the primary good ofself-respect and the desire of human beings toexpress their nature in a free social union withothersw (1981 543). And more generally, Raw1claims that the principles of justice allow people t''express their nature as free and equal rationilbeings subject to the general conditions of humlife" (1981:252-53).I f our moral judgments inevitably depend on someconception of how human nature can be best ful-filled, then we must reconsider Aristotle's teleologi-cal ethics. But if his teleological ethics presupposeshis teleologicai biology, then we must wonderwhether his teleological understanding of biology isdefensible.

Aristotle" Teleological BiologyTo defend Aristotle's teleological biology I will re-spond to the five most obvious objections of theDarwinian scientist. One objection is that Aristotle'sbiological teleology is anthropomorphic or theologi-cai in its personification of nature as a rational artistwith a cosmic design. A second objection is that asa result of Darwin's work, we can no longer acceptthe eternity of fixed species, which Aristotle as-sumes. A third criticism would be that Aristotle'spreoccupation with final ends violates the mechanis-tic spirit of modern science in its search for physicalcauses. As a fourth objection, modern critics wouldsay that Aristotle's teleology confuses natural lawsand moral laws. Finally, it would seem that whenDarwin denied that human beings were different inkind from other animals, he challenged Aristotle'sclaim that humans are at the highest peak in thenatural order. 1 will draw ideas from Aristotle'sbiological works to answer each of these criticisms. Iwiil rely primarily upon his Parts of Animals and hisGeneration of Animals. But l will also refer in a fewcases to his History of Animals and De Anima (Onthe Soul).IsNature an A ~ i s l ?To explain the artfulness of nature, Aristotle com-pares nature to a prudent human being, a carpenter,a clay-modeller, a cook, a housekeeper, a painter,and a runner (PA687~17-13;A 730b5-30,741 17-24,7432317-27, 743b13-25, 744b12-27, 776al-8).But Ar-istotie clearly intends this to be inlerpreked mela-


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rically rather than literally. (On metaphor, seetotle's Rhetoric 141Ob6-13bl.) Darwin employs ametaphor. ''ln the literal sense of the word,"(1872:M) concedes, ""natural selection is aerm." But it is a useful metaphorical expres-lo personify nature although strictly speakingword nature means "only the aggregate actionproduct of many natural laws." Aristotle andrwin agree, therefore, that in some manner naturetates art. For Aristotle that means that natures through four causes.Near the beginning of the Parts of Animals (639b8-6b5), Aristotle argues that of the four causes ofatural phenomena, the final and formal causes areimportant than the escient and materials. Just as in art we rnust first know the end orpose of the artist, so in nature we must first knowoal for which nature works. This is the finalowards which a formative process moves,the sake of &ich it advances. Once weis, then we can study the efficient cause, theent by whiGh some natural object is made. Sirni-ly, the formal cause, which is the distinctiver essence of something, determines whatthe thing is. And therefore it is more important thanthe material cause, which is the matter out of whichthe thing is formed. The form of any living thing is its"soul" (psyche).All plants and animals are movedby some part of soul. But only humans are guided byintellective soul (nous).That nature conforms to this order of causes isevident in the development of living beings. Growthis not by chance. When individual living beings actas efficient causes in producing seeds, nature deter-mines the end towards which the formative processof growth will move. Yet this growth from potentialityto actuality is governed not only by the final causebut also by material necessity. If the end is to beattained, then "re necessary conditions for theemergence of that end must be present. For exam-ple, the growth of any animal to maturity dependsupon nourishment as a necessary condition.f is last point is important if we are to appreciatethe reasonableness of Arisiotie's biological teach-ing. According to his teleological conception ofnature, final and formal causes are primary. But hedoes no"reglect eRicient and material causes. Theform and end of a living being are first in thought,but the matter and the formative process come firstin time (PA 46a25-4SblO).Although living things are not eternal, they are stillwonderful in their beauty because each is orderedby nature for a purpose (PAWb22-45b20). ristotleeven speaks sometimes of this natural order as

somehow reflecting the divine. And, of course, bibii-cal theologians have interpreted this as evidence ofGod's handiwork, But Aaislotle never draws this

conclusion. For example, he notes that the sense-organs (eyes, ears, nostrils, and tongue) are locatedwhere they can best perForm their proper functions.Traditionally this was cited as evidence for a divinecreator (see Xenophon, Memorabilia I, 4). But Aris-totle says nothing about this. He does not posit aPlatonic demiurge (Meta 1079b24-27). His teleologi-cal biology should not be confused with the Genesisaccount of creation. Aristotle does seem to agreewith the Bible, however, on some points, such as thefixity of species.Is There Any Fixity in the Flux of Nature?Aristotle distinguishes those things that are eternaland divine from those things 'that come into beingand pass away. Altt-rough the latter cannot be strictlyeternal, they can in some manner participate ineternity. Living beings are not eternal as individuals,but the species of which they are members areeternal (DA41 5a26-15b8; GA731 b18-32a3). Throughthe reproduction of offspring, living beings attain akind of immortality. Individual identity passes away,but the specific form exemplified in the individualendures. Human beings are mortal, yet humanity isimmortal.

But if we accept Darwin's teaching about thedevelopmenhf species out of other species, wewould have to reject Aristotle's belief in the perma-nence of the species. What prevented Aristotle fromseriously considering the possibility of the evolutionof the species? Does this show that Aristotle wasless rigorous in his science than Darwin? if weaccept Darwin's teaching, must we reject Aristotle'steleological conception of nature?Most of the bioiogical phenomena interpreted byDarwin as evidence of evolution were observed byAristotle. Most impor"rMy, Aristotle was aware ofhow slight the differences are between similar spe-cies. Sea-squirts, he observed (PA 681 a10-Is),

differ but slightly in their nature from plants, andyet they are more like animals than are thesponges, for these completely have the charac-ter of plants. For nature passes in a continuoussequence from lifeless things to animals, throughliving things that are not animals, so that thedifferences between neighboring groups seemvery small because they are so close.

He recognizes many intermediate species t ha tstand between water-animals and land-animals(such as dolphins, whales, and seals) or betweenland-animals and birds (such as bats and ostriches)(PA 697a%-97b26). After comparing humans asbipeds with the quadrupeds, he observes ihat apesare intermediate between the two, being like a bipedin having no tail but like a quadruped in having nobullocks (PA 689b32-34).


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It cannot be said that Aristotle is less empirical inhis biological studies than Darwin. Aristotle insiststhat the study of living things must begin withdetailed obsewations of the sort collected in hisHistow of AnimsJs, which is a massive work. Onlyafter that has been done can one properly begin toconsider the causes through which each animal isas it is observed to be (PA 640a10-20, 644b22-45al I , 646a8-12). Typically Aristotle seeks to con-firm the conclusions of logical deduction (kata tonlogon) by reference to empirical deduction (kata tenaisthesin) (PA 666a19-20). In those cases where hehas only a limited knowledge of the relevant facts,Aristotle refuses to draw firm conclusions. Aftersurveying the many difiiculties concerning the gen-eration of bees, he (GA 760b28-33) remarks:

From reason, therefore, such appears to bethe way it is with regard to the generation ofbees, and from what are believed to be theevents related to them. But the events have notbeen sufficiently grasped, and if they aregrasped at some time, then credence must begiven to the senses more than to reason, and toreasons if they show results agreeing with theobservations.in 1651 l-farvey quoted this passage to indicate thalhis own empirical method for biological researchconformed io Aristotle's practice (Harvey [I65111965: 158-63).

The fruitfulness of Aristotle's method is evident inhis embryology. He carefully compares the differentkinds of embryonic development for different spe-cies. He understands that the sex of the embryo isdetermined at the beginning of its growth. Hecorrec"ry identifies the major stages of embryonicdeveiopment. tie also recognizes the functions ofthe placenta and the umbilicai cord. 0 1 course hemakes some mistakes. But most of these are due tohis limited access lo evidence. For example, sincehe relies on direct observation without the aid of amicroscope, he never sees the mammalian egg,which is a single cell of microscopic size.Even when Aristotfe makes a mistake, we canoften see the plausibility of his reasoning. For in-stance, he believes the senses of touch and tasteare connected to the heart rather than the brain, andone reason for this is thathe knows that the matteror' the brain has no capacity for sensation. Arislotle'sclaim that the female provides "re matter for repro-duction and the male the form is often ridiculed asan example of male bias. But ihshould be noted "rateven the female's matter contains form in potential-ity, and thus "the residue provided by "re female ispotentially the same in character as the futureanimal will be" (GA 740a19-21).Aristctlle infers that

the fernale contributes a nutritive soul while " r e malecontributes a sensitive soul. He regards this as a

741a441b25).1 am emphasizing the empiricism of Aristotlbiological reasoning because I think this explainsbelief in the fixity of species and his failure

can see that apes are essentially different: frohuman beings, but we cannot see apes and humbeings evolving from common ancestors.Aristotle's biological work is much more empiricaland much less speculative than Darwin's. Repeal-edly Darwin has to concede that his theory ofevolution either lacks factual support or even seems

lo contradict certain pertinent facts ('1872:13, 62 ,102, 133-35, 138-39, 145-46, 151; 1874:495, 908-91,His usual rhetorical strategy in such cases is toshow that his theory is not logically impossible andthat the reader can at least imagine how evolutionmight have occurred (I 872:62, 70, 134-35, 248, 254,353). Failing to show the probability of his theory,Darwin ([I8921 1958:234) can only show its merepossibility, as though thawere sufiicient. One of themost obvious pieces of evidence against his theoryis the absence of a finely graduated organic chain inthe geological record. Indeed, this continues to be asubject of controversy among contemporary biolo-gists. Darwin's answer is that the geological recordmustbe too imperfect to provide the proper evi-dence. But he admits that he did not suspect howpoor the geological record was until he found thatthe record did not confirm his theory (1872:249). l amnot asserting that the evidence for Darwin's theoryis unpersuasive, but l am suggesting that Darwin'scase cannot offer us much more than plausibility ofthe sort that we might find in a legal brief (Darwin,118923 1958:55-56; Ruse, 1973:96-121).

Even if we accept the evolution of species as afact, we must still accept the essential differencesbetween species as an even more obvious fact.(Anthropologists have found a remarkable uniformityacross cultures in the way people classify species(Berlin, Breediove and Raven, 1974; Brown, 1984).)Even if species are not eternally fixed but haveevolved From ancestral species, that does not makethem any less real during the time of their existence.As Gouid ( I980:213) would say, "Species are stableentities with very brief periods of fuzziness at theirorigin."

But do those natural diMerences among the spe-cies manifest t h e purposefulness of nature? Orshould we see them as simply products of nature'smaterial and mechanical laws'?


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NatureWork through Necessity or throughle would answer this question by arguing thatactually works in both ways. Although insense natural purposefulness is more impor-for Aristotie's biology than is natural necessity,are essential to his biological reasoning. "Ev-ing that occurs is done either because it iscessary or because i t i s better" (GA 717a15-16)."necessary nature" certain things occur by ne-sity, things that "rational nature" can use forme purpose (PA 663b23-24). Therefore, we cancept Aristotle's biological teleology while still giv-physical causes their proper weight.

Aristotle seeks to avoid the mistake of the "my-ologists" (like Herodo"rs)# on the one hand, ande mistakes of the ""pysiologers" (like Democii-n the other hand (GA 736a10-15,741b37-42a1,1 57a12, 778a33-78b19, 788blO-89b22). Thelogists tell traditional fables about animal life,may be based on unreliable reports, andhich may even be physically impossible. Theiologers deserve more respect insofar as theyfor material and efficient causes, but theirations are incomplete because they ignoreformal and final causes.While affirming nature as form and purpose, Aris-toile also affirms nature as matter and necessity.When by some natural necessity nature's end is not

reached, this is contrary to nature in one sense butaccording to nature in another sense (GA 770b10-16). So, for example, a deformity in the developmentof an animal is unnatural in that the usual end ofsuch development has not been fulfilled, but it isnaturai insofar as even a deformity has naturaiphysical causes. ""A monstrosity is not necessarywith reference to the purposive or final cause, but asan accident it is necessary" (GA 767b13-14).Aristotle does not think that every variation isperfectly adapted to some purpose. Nature some-times has to make awkward adjustments (PA

648a14-19, 658b26-59a37, 662b23-63a17, 694a14-94b12f. For example, elephants are so large andheavy that their feet can serve only as supports, andtherefore they must use their trunks to do somethings normally done by forefeet. Thus a nose mustbe used like a foot. (Compare Gould, 1980:19-26.)Some biological processes and entities arise asnecessary effects wi"rouI serving any definite pur-pose. The excretions of the stomach and intestineillustrate this. "For although nature sometimes useseven residues for some benefit yet we ought not Forthat reason to look for some purpose in ail cases"(PA 677a15-18). AristotIe would agree, therefore,with those bioiogisis who warn against the assump-tion that nature always achieves perfect adapta-tions,

, "Hypothetical necessity" is part of a teleologicalexplanation, but "simple necessity" is not. The"'hypothetical necessity" by which an eye is formedwith the capaciv for sight serves a natural end. Butthe "simple necessity" by which an eye is deter-mined to be blue or brown need not serve any end(GA 778a16-35).

D'Arcy Thompson, an important biologist as wellas a student of Aristotle's works, concluded thatAristotle saw nature as both mechanical and teleo-logical. In On Growth and Form, Thompson (1961 1Ofsought to show that "in general no organic formsexist save such as are in conformity with physicaland mathematical laws." But he regarded ihissearch for mechanical explanations as consistentwith the search for teleological explanations.Arisiotle can be defended even against FrancisBacon's criticisms of teleological reasoning. Bacon(1955:254-61) distinguishes between physics asconcerned with material and efficient causes andmetaphysics as concerned with formal and finalcauses. His complaint is not that metaphysics isuntrue, but that it is incomplete when it excludesphysics. Explaining nature requires inquiry into finalcauses as well as physical causes, "both causesbeing true and compatible" (1955:260). Aristotlewould agree. In fact, Bacon illustrates his point withan example drawn from Aristotle's Parts of Animals(658b14-26). Aristotle explains eyelashes as serving

the purpose of protecting the eyes. But he irnmedi-alely adds that this is caused by necessity sincehair forms around orifices of moisture.The wisdom of Aristotle's combination of ieieoiog-ical and mechanistic analysis is confirmed by thesuccess of many oF his biological theories. Oneparamount example is his explanation of how thedevelopment of an embryo is guided by a pattern inthe embryo from its earliest existence.

11 is clear that there is something that makesthe parts of the embryo, but this does not existas a definite individuai, nor does it exist in thesemen at first already perfect. Bu t how doeseach part arise? We must answer ihis by takingas our starting point the principle that, whateverarises by nature or by art, arises by somethingaciuaily existing out of that which i s potentialiysuch a being. (GA734b17-22)

To explain how parents act as efficienhauses indetermining the development of an embryo, Arisiotiemakes an analogy with mechanical puppets (734b9-17). Even at rest the automaton has a potentiality fora pattern of motion fixed by its internal mechanism.From these remarks, we can understand why onemodern biologist was able to give a lecture with t h etitie i i H ~ w risfofie Discovered DNA" (Delbruck,1976).


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One of the greatest controversies in the history ofembryology was the conflict between the theory of'preformation" and the theory of 'epigenesis." Ac-cording to the first theory, a fertilized egg contains atiny adult that grows in size without any structuralchanges. According to the other, the egg is amor-phous at the beginning, and the development is agradual differentiation of parts leading to the adult.Modern biologists finally resolved this controversyby finding some truth in both theories. Mayr(1982:106) has explained, "the epigenesists werecorrect in stating lhat the egg at its beginning isessentially undifferentiated, and the preformationistswere correct that its development is controlled bysomething preformed, now recognized as the ge-netic program." So after thousands of years ofdebate, biologists now agree that Aristotle wasessentially correct: we cannot explain the develop-ment of unorganized matter into a complex organ-ism unless we see that some potential "form"(eidos) is thereby actualized as the "end" (tefos) ofthe growth.

Not only in embryology but in every area ofbiology, Aristotle would insist, the scientist cannotfully understand living beings unless he asks abouttheir natural purposes or goals. Modern biologistssuch as Mayr would agree. "'Aristotelian why-ques-tions have played an important heuristic role in thehistory of biology. Why?' is the most importantquestion the evolutionary biologist asks in all of hisresearches" (Mayr, 1982:89).

Surely some modern biologists would object thatprogress in molecular biology will eventually make itunnecessary for biologists to rely on Aristotelianteleology. The breaking of the genetic code andsubsequent research at the molecular level wouldseem to suggest the possibility of explaining biologi-cal phenomena in terms of the laws of physics andchemistry, laws ihat do not depend upon teleologi-cal concepts. But the molecular biologist, unlike theorganic chemist, will always have to ask about thefunctions of natural phenomena, and thus he willalways have to look for teleological explanations.This explains a recent public lecture by Kornberg(1987),a chemist at Stanford University. Assertingthat all biological phenomena should be explainedby the laws of chemistry, he complained that sincemolecular biologists have rejected this reductionistpremise, "chemistry and biology are two distinctivecultures," each having its own language.

Rosenberg (1985) has provided a good exampleof his. DNA is composed of four different molecules:adenine, quanine, cytosine, and thymine. RNA isalso constructed out of four bases, which includeadenine, quanine, and cytosine. But "re fourth basefor RNA s uracil. Why does DNA eonbin thymine,whereas RNA contains uracil? The organic chemist

can explain ail the chemical reactions involved.8the molecular biologist must assign functiphenomena. The biologist wants to knthymine does for the proper functioning ofuracil cannot do. The chemist is satisfied Iexplain the chemical causes of the diRerencetween DNA and RNA. But the biologist wantsexplain the purpose of this difference. In chemistnjcauses explain their effects; in biology effects ex-plain their causes. The biologist asks m/hy there is adifference between DNA and RNA.

In the chemist's view of ihe matter, it is not therefor any further reason whatsoever, or at any rateit is no business of chemistry to find a furthercause not already mentioned in the complexcausal chain of chemical interactions it has eluci-dated. So far as chemical theory is concerned, ifall samples of DNA contain thymine and ailsamples of RNA contain uracil then this is anentirely accidental fact about the universe. Forbiology, it is very far from mere happenstance.(Rosenberg,1985:41-42)

The pattern of organic bases in DNA and RNAwhich functions as a genetic code cannot be re-duced to physics and chemistry. In its control ofmorphogenesis, DNA acts like an engineer design-ing a machine for some purpose. Like an engineer,DNA harnesses the laws of inanimate nature toserve goals that are themselves irreducible to thoselaws (Polanyi, 1959:41-70; 1968). Thus the latestresearch in molecular biology confirms Aristotle'sinsight lhat we cannot fully explain living beingsunless we find their final and formal causes as wellas their efficient and material causes.This is even more clearly true in the practice ofmedicine. It is not enough for Sacks to explainTourette's syndrome as an effect of certain biochem-ical reactions. He must recognize it as a failure ofthe brain to achieve its natural end. He must under-stand how the proper amount of dopamine promotesthe normal functioning of the brain. In his writingsSacks insists that the neurologist must consider notonly the physical mechanism of the brain but alsothe psychic identi"; inseparably tied to that mecha-nism. He recognizes Ray's suffering not only as aphysical effect but also as a psychic failure toachieve a healthy balance in his soul,But even if we accept Aris'loile's teaching thatbiological nature has ends or purposes, we mightstill resist his assump";ion that these naturalends aremoral ends. Should we see morality as a culturalproduct that "ianscends the laws of nature?

Are Nature's Laws Moral?T. H. Huxley (f888:79-831,n his famous Rornaneslecture of 1893, 'Zvolution and Ethics," conciudedthat evolution could notguide ethics at all since


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cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral': "the thief and the murderer follow nature justuch as the philanthropist." He suggested,fore, "that the ethical progress of society de-s, not on imitating the cosmic process, still lessunning away from it, but in combating it," thebeing 'Yo set man to subdue nature to hiser ends." While Aristotle would see ethics asehow the fulfillment of human nature, HuxleyId see ethics as the assertion of human will

s it not absurd to say that the cosmic processduces a being that must combat the cosmiccess to survive? If moral ends have "no sort oflation" to the cosmic process, then do they comebeyond the cosmos? If Wuxley's "cosmic pro-" is not the source of everything in the cosmos,must we not wonder whether his understandingthis process is defective? Huxley" assumptionthe cosmos is purely mechanistic and thereforeno relation to moral ends forces him to accept aa1 Kantian dualism. This dualism is incoherentbecause, if the moral world has no relation at all tothe natural world, then it is inexplicable how thesetwo worlds could even occupy the same universe.

Do we not judge the goodness of a person's lifeby how well he or she has fulfilled the essential endsof human nature?Do not moral principles commonlypresuppose some conception of what is essential tohuman nature? In response to Wuxley, we might saythat the thief and the murderer do not follow naturejust as much as the philanthropist. Prohibiting unjus-tified killing and protecting properly are not justarbitrary human choices. Rather they secure certainnatural human needs as suggested by the fact thatmurder and theft are universally prohibited in everyculture (Davitt, 1978; Finnis, 1980; Linton, 1952,1954; Lopreato, 1984; Murdock, 1945).

One of the clearest of Aristotle's examples of anatural moral law grounded in our biological natureis parental care for the young (GA 753a7-17). Amongsome animals this attachment may last only untilbirth. But among the more inteiiigent animals theattachment endures until the young have matured.And those endowed with the greatest intelligenceexhibit "'intimacy and friendship" jsunelheia kaiphi/ia)with their oRspring even after their full devel-opment. Of course, how parents care for their chil-dren will vary from one family to another and fromone culture to another, but the familial bond as anatural inclination is universal despite the variationin its practical expressions. (On the natural need ofinfants for paternal iove to fulfill lheir biologicalpotentiaii"ies, see Spilz, 1965; Kagan, '1981; andGoodali, 1986:101-4,203-6,76-86,68-69.)

We do not have l o lake one side or the other in th e"'nature-nurture" debate. Aris'iotle supports t h e corn-

monsense view that moral character is both naturaland cultural. The biological nature of human beingsconsti"rtes the necessary condi"ron for that distinc-tive dignity of human beings as moral agents. Butalthough this is a necessary condition, it is notsufficient. This biological capacity is fulfilled throughcultural habituation. This is the teaching of Aris-toile's Nicomachean E;lhics (1103a24-27): "The vir-tues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary tonature; but by nature we can receive them andperfect them by habituation. Again, of things whichcome to us by nature, we first bring along thepowers and later exhibit the corresponding activi-ties."

Human nature is malleable to the extent that it isopen to formation through habituation, yet humannature is fixed insofar as human beings have certainnatural tendencies or capacities from birth. But ifbiomedical technology gives us the power to alterthe genetic nature of hurnan beings, does thatcreate the possibility of human nature becomingcompletely malleable? Would our moral choicesabout the use of this technology be unconstrainedby any fixed natural standard? That conclusion hasbeen drawn by Blank (1984:lO-12) n his recent bookon the political impiications of reproductive technol-ogy. The character of human nature has been aphilosophic question for thousands of years. But thequestion has become more complicated in recentyears, Blank argues, because now we can changethe very nature of the human species. We can nolonger assume, as Aristolle did, a fixed humannature.

But I would point out that the latest reproductivetechnology as described by BIank (1984:31-71) isguided by a distinction between what is normal andwhat is defective in human development. In speak-ing of how genetic technology can be used todiagnose and treat genetic "defects," "disorders,""deformities," and "diseases," Blank implicitly ap-peals to our common sense (and Aristotelian) under-standing of healthy human development, which pre-supposes a fixed human nature. When an infant isborn with a genetic disorder that will create perma-nent mental retardation, we can argue aboutwhether the doctor or the parents did enough loprevent this from happening. But we would neverargue about whether or not medical knowledgeshould be used to create mental retardation. Ifhuman nature is no longer fixed, if there are nonatural norms for human development, then someparents might properly preier lo produce mentallyretarded children. (Of course they would probablyscorn the word "re'rarded" as reflecting a merelysubfective value judgment favoring a complex men-tal capacity.) Parenis rnighi prefer such childrenbecause of their docility. And these children rnighimake good workers for certain types of menial jobs.


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After all, A. Huxley's Brave New World shows ushow a rational eugenics policy could arrange thingsso that people would be suited from birth for theirvarious places in society, and thus all would behappy. We dismiss this as absurd because werecognize the worth of full mental development as afixed end of human nature. We sense the truth ofAristotle's claim that we are by nature the sort ofbeings for whom to live means to think. Therefore,Blank's reliance on "informed consent" and "theprevailing values of society" is insufficient in theabsence of any appeal to such a natural norm ofwhat it means to be a human being. After all, doesn'teven the worth of "informed consent" depend uponthe natural human capacity for moral choice?

We can see a natural norm at work in Sacks'practice. He reports cases of severely retardedpeople who display a dignity in the very simplicity oftheir immediate perception of the world (Sacks,1985:163-223). Nevertheless, he recognizes this as aresponse to a genuine loss: the intensification ofsense experience compensates for a defect in thecapacity for abstract thought. We cannot imaginethat Sacks would ever use his scientific knowledgeto create mental retardation. Nor can we imaginehim using his understanding of Toureite's syndrometo promote that condition. We accepts Ray's deci-sion to allernaie between five days on haidol andtwo days off, but only because this seems the onlyway to approximate artificially the natural balanceexperienced by normal human beings. He would notchoose to induce the effects of Tourette's syndromein normal people who wanted to improve theirperformance as jazz musicians. But if we mustappeal to the rnorai dignity of human beings as anatural fact, we must wonder whether we are justi-fied in our irnplicit claim that human beings stand atthe peak of nature. Is there any support for this inbiological science?Has Nature Created Humans to be Its NoblestCreature?In one of the most famous passages of the Poiitics(1253aB-191, Arisbtle declares that human beingsare by nature the only political animals because theyare by nature the only truly rational animals asmanifested in their unique capacity for rationalspeech. Some other animals can wilh their voicessignify to one another their sensations of pleasureand pain, but only human beings can through sym-bolic speech share with one another their conceptsof expediency, justice, and goodness. Human be-ings can achieve a more intimate community amongthemselves than is possible for other creatures,because only human beings can found their associa-tion on mutual understanding through speech. Likemany sf the fundamental assumptions of Arislolle'smoral and political writings: this one is grounded

upon his biological studies (see, for example,488a7-10, PA 653a27-31, 656a3-14, 686a24-87bGA 731a24-31b13,786b20-26).And the latest biolical research supports his claim that human beinare uniquely endowed biologically with a capacfor human language (Lieberman, 1984).Can this asserlion of the biological uniqueneand superiority of the human species be defendedagainst Darwin's argument (1874:445-528) that hu-man beings differ in degree but not in kind fromother animals? Darwin offers evidence that eve^attribute traditionally thought lo be uniquely humancan be found in at least some rudimentary form inother animals. Yet I think almost all of DarwinIsevidence was known to Aristotle. Like Darwin, Aris-totle was aware of the remarkable similarities be-tween human beings and other animals, but hecorrectly saw that only human beings are capable ofsymbolic speech and conceptual abstraction. Someother animals can express their sensations throughsigns, but only human beings can understand anduse symbols. Other animals are capable of percep-tual thought, but only human beings are capable ofconceptuaf thought. I will not lay out here all theevidence and arguments for these distinctions (seeAmhart, 1984:506-15, 1987a:57-60, 220-25). But I canoffer one illustrative comparison of Aristotle andDarwin on the issue of animal communication.

To show that the capacity for speech is notuniqueiy human, Darwin draws attention to thesinging of birds (1874:462-63).

The sounds uttered by birds offer in severalrespects the nearest analogy to language, for allthe members of the same species utter thesame instinctive cries expressive of theiremotions; and all the kinds which sing, exerttheir power instinctively; but the actual song,and even the call-notes, are learnt from theirparents or foster parents. These sounds, asDaines Barrington has proved, "are no moreinnate than language is in man." The firstattempts to sing "may be compared to theimperfect endeavor in a child to babble.". . . Nestlings which have learnt the song of adistinct species, as wilh the canay-birds edu-cated in the Tyroi, leach and "iansmit their newsong to their ofispring. The slight natural differ-ences of song in the same species inhabitingdifferent districts may be oppositely compared,as Barrington remarks, "to provincial dialects";and the songs of allied, "tough distinct speciesmay be compared with the languages of distinctraces of man. I have given the foregoing detailsto show that an ins"rinctive tendency to acquirean art is not peculiar to man.

Just as hurnan beings can acquire a language as acultural product, so it seems that birds can iearnsongs and pass on this learning as a cuitural


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r otherwise convey information throughut only human beings have a capacityage as articulate speech. Birds, however,notices, do have something like articulatehey use their voices not only for matingg but also for leaching and learning.ome birds teach their young to sing, and conse-uently the singing differs according to locality.

ristotle's comments suggest that he wouldree with Darwin and other biologists who arguet some animals other than man have at least amentary capacity for communication and culturaling (Bonner, 1980). But Aristotle would say thathis falls short of the uniquely human ability fornal speech" (logos)(GA 786b20-26).This muste uniquely human because it manifests the "iniel-ect" (nous) that only human beings possess.ugh the intellect human beings have a capacityother animals have for perceptual ab-ple, we could train a chimpanzeea triangle as a perceptual sign (per-

Republic (521b-26b), thec. Is this because in counting we move from

Insofar as we are the only animals capable off moral and poiitical judgment, in which weconceptuai patterns of action. The proponentsf "'animal rights" would object to this claim thatwe

of grasping or expressing the rnoral argumentsisof their inferior status.Ofcourse even if wetha"inonhuman animals have righis, we mightbe obligated to respect them by avoiding anycruelly.

. Aristotle places humans at the top of the ladder ofsouls fDA 413a4-16b32, 427a76-29a9, 431b20-35b26; PA 6Qla15-41b10, 650b19-23; GA 731a24-31b14, 736a25-37a35). At the lower level is thenutritive soul of plants. The nutritive functions-principally nourishment and reproduction-harnessthe laws of inanimate nature to sustain the simplestforms of life. At a higher level is the sensitive soul ofanimals, which encompasses functions such as io-comotion, sensation, imagination, and appetite. Thehighest level is reserved for the human's intellectivesoul. (For modern defenses of such a hierarchy, seePolanyi, 1968; Lorenz, 1966:220-40.)

Aristotle believes that this ranking of levels is notan arbibary judgment but a discovery of a naturalFact. Each higher level depends upon the functionsat all the lower levels, but the higher levels areindeed higher in the sense of being more compre-hensive than the lower levels. A human's periectionas an intellectual being lies in being a microcosm ofthe whole. "The soul is in a way all things, for allexisting things are either sensible or knowable" (DA431 b19).

The Darvvinian biologist might object, however,that Aristotle's image of a ladder of being movingfrom "lower" to "higher" forms of life implies acosmic teleoiogy that Darwin rejected. The Dawin-ian view is well stated by Gould (1977:62): "Homosapiens is not the foreordained product of a ladderthat was reaching toward our exalted estate fromthe start. We are merely the surviving branch of aonce luxuriant bush." Mayr (1983b) and other evolu-tionary biologists would agree. In defense of Aris-totle, 1 would argue that his biological teleology isnot cosmic-that is Lo say, he does not assume thatnature as a whole has some end beyond the ends ofthe various species. For Aristotie a teleologicalexplanation claims that something is "better thus-not simply but with reference to the substance ofeach kind of thing" (PH 198b8-9). tiis teleologyapplies to the goal-directed functioning of eachspecies of living things. It is not a cosmic teleologybecause nonliving things are not explained teieologi-cally and living things are not explained as servingany universal goal. (On this point I agree with t h eargument of Nussbaum, '1978:93-99.) Aristotle's tele-ological account of the forms and functions ofexisting species does not depend upon a teleologi-cal account of the origin of species, because t h eexistence of species is taken for granted. Nor doeshis teleological biology require a teleological physics(Masters, 1986).

Darwinian evolution denies phylogeneiic teleol-ogy, because there is no predetermined path ofevolution from ancestral species to later ones. Butthe Darwinian bioiogisWduid still affirmt h e ontoge-netic "Eeloolggy (or teleonony) in the goal-directed


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activity of an individual organism as guided by itsgenetic program (Dobzhansky et al., 1977:497-504;Mayr, 1976, 1982:48-51; Arnhart, 1984:498-500). Itcan be argued that "the only iteieology' Darwincriticized was that represented in creationist ideasof special divine providence," and therefore hisbiology does not deny "the empirical teleology ofself-organizing beings" (Corneii, 1986:420).

Aristotle speaks of the ranking of species with thehuman species at the top. And in the Politics(1256b15-26) he says that plants exist for the sake ofanimals and nonhuman animals for the sake ofhumans, !+ow can this be reconciled with his appar-ent denial of a cosmic teleology? It should be notedfirst that this is also a problem in interpretingDarwin. Although in his notebooks and in somecorrespondence Darwin insisted that we shouldnever speak of "lower" and "higher" forms of life, inhis published writings he often ranked species andspoke of humans as standing at the peak. There isno contradiction, however, if we assume that bothDarwin and Aristotle were speaking of "lower" and"higher" in terms of specific criteria such as levelsof complexity and from their perspective as humanbeings. Even if we see the human species not as thehighest step of a ladder but as one branch of abush, we can still look at the living world from theperspective of human life and judge other forms oflife for their closeness to us. From the vantage pointof f i e human species, the vegetative life of nutritionand growth and the animal life of perception areincomplete. For human beings to pursue the end oftheir species, they must seek the comprehensivehurnan life that includes the ends of plants and otheranimals but also the ends thahnty human beingscan attain. Thus, the end infernal to the life of thehuman species must be more comprehensive-andin that sense highei-than the ends of plants andother animals. And that which is unique to humanbeings and thus the highest end is the capacity forintellectual thought.

in the De Anima Aristotle insists that, as a princi-ple of life, thinking is as inseparably bound to thebody as form is to matter, and thus it is open tobiological investigation. But in a few crypticpassages (e.g., DA 430af 7-23; GA 736a24-37a18),he suggests that "active intellect" might be separa-ble from the body and thus beyond the biologicalrealm, i will not try to clear up %hs matter except toquote the following comments by Grene (1963:244)on why Aristotlie might have considered thought assomehow separable from the body.Perhaps it springs from the biologist's sensethat his own knowledge, his own elaboration ofsets of propositions and arguments about otherliving things, is a very strange addition lo lifeitself, so strange thatit must have a foreignsource,an origin all its own. . . . Perhaps then ,

Aristotle's nous is. . . a concept necessary toguard the knowledge of life against the collapseinto mere life.Thinking is a form of living. But living as such issuccessful or unsuccessful, not true or false. Thisis one aspect, in fact, of Plato's argument in theTheaeteius:what he is arguing is that on thisbasis knowledge is not possible at all.

For Aristotle's reader the relationship between thebrain and the mind remains a mystery. That thiscontinues to be a controversial issue for modernscientists suggests that they have not solved themystery. (Compare, for example, Eccles, 1979:210-37; Stent, 1987; and Churchland, 1986:315-47.)The Darwinian bio1ogis"right want to insist,however, that even the human mind, along with all

the other products of evolution, was ultimately de-signed to be a tool of survival. But Aristotle wouldargue that nature promotes not just life but also agood life. The tongue illustrates how nature securesboth the necessary conditions for living and thepurposeful conditions for living well (DA 420617-23).lnsofar as the tongue helps an animal to taste, it isnecessary for life. lnsofar as it is a tool for articulatespeech, the tongue is an aid to the good life. Thesame sort of duality can be seen in t h e teeth (GA788b2-9). Similarly, the brain "is present in animalsfor the preservation of the whole body" (PA 652b7).And Aristotle goes on to expiain how the braincontributes some of the conditions necessary forsurvival. That the brain promotes physical suwivaldoes not detract from the brain's capacity forthought as a noble end in itself. And with respect l oevolution, we could say that what originates for thepurpose of physical preservation and reproductioncan have uses that go beyond preservation andreproduction. Darwin used his brain to formulate anddefend the theory of evolution. Since evolution is acosmic principle, the consistent evolutionist mustaffirm the capacity of the human mind for graspingthe truth about the cosmos. Such a capacity presup-poses that the mind transcends the brain in that themind harnesses neurophysiological mechanismswithoui being determined by them. Thus the humancomprehension of the truth of Darwinian evolutionshows tha"iYhe soul is in a way ali things." "Man isthe only animal that stands upright," Aristotle de-clares, "because his nature and essence is divine,and the work of that which is most divine is to thinkand to judge" (PA 686a27-29). Similarly, Darwinf1874:920) observes that the "lowly origin" ofhumans need not detract from the nobility of their"god-like intellect," which places them at "the verysummit of "re organic scale."

To assume that the hurnan mind can grasp thetruth about reality is to assume a metaphysicalrealism.And although Arislotie would accept that as


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fundamental presupposition, there is some evi-ence that Dar-win would hesitate. In a letter inhich Darwin described his gradual move fromligious belief to agnosticism ([I8921 1958:66), hemarked: "But then arises the doubt-can the mindman, which has, as I fully believe, been developedm a mind as low as that possessed by the lowestnimals, be trusted when it draws such grandonclusions?" The same question, however, coulde raised about the human mind when it draws"grand conclusions" about the truth of evolutionarytheory, or of any scientific theory for that matter. A~arwin ian ndorsement of metaphysical scepticismwould become self-defeating in its nihilistic denial ofscientific knowledge.This is evident in Ruse's recen"rook, Takingarwin Seriously ( 1986). According to Ruse, Darwin-an biology, in both epistemology and ethics, sup-the metaphysical scepticism of David Hume.

it would seem disastrous for modern biologyIf taking Darwin seriously means rec-

then we canno"iake him seriously if hee have no power to see the truth or

Moreover, we cannot dismiss this threat or' nihilist

a practical, political issue becausef recent developments in biomedical technology. Ifin vitrosurrogate parenting, and all the tools ofic engineering, we face political controversiesh we are forced, in Wilson's words, "to

Some commentators, such as Leon Kass andsome conception of the moral dignity of human

of nature, which assumes anFoundations ofBioethics jl986), one of

on the premise that modern sciences refuted Aristotelian teleology. Even Engelhardt*cannot defend his '"secular pluralist moral-wwi"ihout covertly assuming th e very 'reieology

he professes to deny.

Bioelhics for NihilistsEngelhardt accepts Nietzsche's teaching that mod-ern science promotes nihilism. Science must do thisbecause it deprives us of any appeal to humannature as a guide for morality. For we must admit"that we are shaped not by design but by the blindforces of mutation and natural selection" (Engel-hardt, 1986375). We then see that no conception ofwhat is good for human beings is rationally justifi-able. So in a modern liberal society, which permitsdiverse ways of life to flourish, we can never expectrational agreement about the best way of life. Howthen can we live together in peace? What do we do,for example, when we cannot agree about whetherparents should be free to use all the tools of genetictechnology to determine the nabre of their progeny?

Engelhardt (1986:33) seeks a middle ground "be-tween a dictatorial imposition of a particular view ofthe good life and a nihilist apathy that abandons allvision of the good." He finds that ground in the ideaof a "secular pluralist society" as founded on a"developed habit of the will to respect the freedomof others. . . to attempt to achieve their good," forwhich the cardinal virtues will be "tolerance, liberal-ity, and prudence" (1986:382). Although we cannotagree on the particular content of the good life, wecan agree on a general procedure of toleration asthe necessary condition for the peaceful exercise ofmoral freedom.Why must we agree on toleration as a moral virtueeven when we disagree about the substantive con-tent of morality? Engelhardt's answer-inspired byKant-is thal if we wish to engage in rnoral activityat all, we must respect one another's moral choicesbecause "'the very conditions of morality aregrounded in our character as persons" (1986:Mj."Secular pluralist morality" rests on ' a ranscenden-tal mooring: persons as the center and source ofmeaning" (1986:376). Yet if we cannot appeal tohuman nature as a source of norms, then how canwe appeal to the nature of human beings as per-sons? Human beings are said to deserve specialrespect because of their capaciQ for moral agency.But that would seem to infer a moral norm from anatural fact about human beings.Engelhardt (1986:s-6, 166) denies the validity ofAristotelian teleology but he must implicitly assumesuch a teleology when he speaks of 'the biotogicaiconditions of moral personality. The "biological char-acteristics" of human beings as a unique species""tak on moral significance only insofar as theysupport "re special characteristics of persons"(1986:107). So, for example, his ""hgher-brain-cen-ters definition of death" rests son his claim that "if

the cerebrum is dead, the person is dead"(1986:215).And since human letuses and infants donot have the cerebral capacity necessary for per-


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sonhood, they do not have the moral standing ofnormal human adults (1986:216-17). t-luman beingshave moral dignity, it would seem, only insofar asthey fulfill their natural end as rational animals. Butat the same time Engelhardt insists that such teleo-logical reasoning is improper.Engelhardt recognizes that doctors implicitlymake a normative judgment whenever they speak ofa disease, deformity, or disability. Vet since hedenies that such a judgment can be grounded innature, he regards it as arbitrary. He concludes fromthis that in a "secular pluralist society," peopleshould be free to reject medical judgments aboutwhat is health and what is disease. This wouldpermit a "democratization of reality" (Engelhardt,1986:194). But if language is an arbitrary humancreation with no fixed correspondence to nature, asEngelhardt claims, then it would seem that his talkabout the moral freedom of "persons" onlymanifests his purely subjective preferences. Inadopting metaphysical scepticism, he deprives him-self of any ground tor speaking coherently aboutethics or anything else.

The practical consequences of Engelhardt's scep-ticism become clear when he comments on theprospects for genetic engineering. He foresees-and endorses-the possibility that we could soradically alter our nature that our descendantswould become a new species (Engelhardt,1986:377). To exercise such a power might seem tothreaten the freedorn of those new human beingswho would be created by the engineers. Engelhardt(1986:376)denies this, however, by indicating that inchanging our nature as humans, our nature aspersons would remain fixed?There is a distance between us as persons andus as humans. This distance is the gulf betweena reflective and manipulative being and the ob-ject of its reflection and manipulation. From ourperspectives as persons with particular viewsand hopes, we can decide whether this is thebest of places in the cosmos. . . .We can decidewhether this is the best of natures and seekways to refashion it if we find it wanting. We aspersons can make our bodies objects. We candiscern ways in which we could have been betterfashioned.

But if we were "r so radically alter ourselves 'ashurnans" that we become a new species, wouldn'tthat also influence our existence ""as persons"?doreover, if we are completely free in our ""reflec-tive and manipulative" power, could we turn thatpower against itself? 1C human nature as it nowexists is not normative, what's wrong with abolish-

ing our nature as persons'? If we must be free tochoose to live as we pleasei why may we not freelychoose to obliterate our capacity lo: free choice? it

seems that Engelhardt would have no objectionsthe society depicted in Wuxley's Brave New Woin which people were taught to love their servitudeto a bureaucracy overseeing projects in geneticengineering.

Wilson's "two great spiritual dilemmas"-the appar-ent lack of transcendent meaning for human iife andthe terrifying power of modern science to reshapehumanity-force us to choose between nihilist scep-ticism and Aristotelian teleology. To choose nihilismwould be moral and intellectual suicide. When pea-ple like Wilson, Ruse, and Engelhardt deny thatmorality and knowledge can ever have any objectivegrounding in reality, they deny the rationality ofhuman Ihought and action, including their own.But in practice we are all Aristotelians in ourcommonsense belief that we can know what realityis like and act accordingly. From that standpoint, wecan identify human beings as creatures with distinc-tive capacities, and we can see that human lifeflourishes only insofar as those human capacities arefulfilled. We can therefore admire the medical prac-tice of someone like Sacks, who helps peopleovercome those disabilities of body and mind thatimpede the human striving for a normal life.The nihilist would regard such a view of the worldas a comf

arnhart - aristotle's bio politics

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