art 147 and 148 family code

8/20/2019 Art 147 and 148 Family Code

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MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by OfrecinioSantos; and LC!LLE MAXEY" petitioners, vs.T#E #ONORA$LE CORT OF A%%EALS and T#ES%OSES $EATO C& MACAYRA and ALACO%E MON'AY" respondents.

GT!ERRE(" )R&" J.:

This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through

the eorts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.

The facts of the case are briey stated in the decision of the ourt of !ppeals as follows"

The record reveals that #elbourne #a$ey and %egina #orales &both deceased' livedtogether as husband and wife in (anganga, )avao* that out of said union were born si$ &+'children, among them are the herein plaintis, namely" ohn or arlos, -ucille, #argaret,lorence, red and /eorge, all surnamed #a$ey* that during the period of their elbourneand %egina' cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late #elbourne #a$eyacquired the parcels of land described under 0ar. of the com*plaint as evidenced by thedocuments of sale mared as 3$hibits 4a and 541 &same as 3$hibits acts', #elbourne#a$ey, through his attorney4in4fact ulia 0amatluan #a$ey, sold in favor of the defendants4spouses in 1956 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not controvertedby the perties &0ar. 1, 7stipulation of acts'* that since thereof, the defendants4spouses havetaen immediate possession thereof continuously up to the present.

0laintis instituted the present case on anuary 2+, 19+2, before the ourt of irst 8nstanceof )avao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subect parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants4spouses,alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents,having been acquired during their lifetime and through their oint eort and capital* and thatthe sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants4spouses in 1956, after the deathof their mother, %egina #orales, was e$ecuted by their father, #elbourne #a$ey, without

their nowledge and consent* and that they came to now of the above mentioned salesonly in 19+1.

:n the other hand, defendants4spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint andassert by way of a;rmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners andpossessors of the properties . (oth the trial court and theappellate court reected this claim of a >military fashion> marriage.

The couple had several children. ohn arlos was born in 19=6, followed by -ucille, #argaret, lorence,red, and /eorge. 3$cept for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed propertieswere acquired. The father, #elbourne #a$ey, was a member of the 1?99 !merican occupation forces whoafterwards held high positions in the provincial government and in the 0hilippine public schools system.

!s earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and1912 before the 1919 church marriage. %egina #orales #a$ey died in 1919 sometime after the churchwedding. The husband remarried and in 1956, his second wife ulia 0amatluan #a$ey, using a power ofattorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, #r. and #rs. (eato . #acayra.

The trial court applied !rticle 1 of the ivil ode which provides"

@hen a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of themthrough their wor or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules onco4ownership.


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The court stated that >when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, ustice demands thatthe woman should be entitled to the share of the property. ertainly she cannot be considered mereadornment or only for man The dispositive portion of the decision reads"

3vidence, testimonial and document considered the ourt hereby rendered udgment infavor of the plaintis and against defendant declaring that"

1. )eclaring the abovementioned sales as null and void*

2. :rdering defendant4spouses to return the said lands, and to pay for the value of the useof the same at the rate of 01,===.== a year from 1956 until delivered, together with interestscorresponding thereto at the legal rate*

6. :rdering defendant4spouses to pay to plainti actual damages in the sum of 05==.== andattorney fees in the sum of 06,===.==.

)efendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.

The ourt of !ppeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be e$clusive properties of the late #elbourne#a$ey. 8t set aside the decision of the trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that theappellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.

The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the respondent spouses"

0laintis< evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these properties in questionwere acquired through the oint eorts of #elbourne #a$ey and %egina #orales. 8ndeed, if atall, plaintis< evidence tend to establish the fact that #elbourne #a$ey by virtue of hispositions as )eputy /overnor of Aamboanga &p. 6+, t.s.n. de la Bictoria' Cchool Cupervisor inthe 3ast oast of )avao &p. 6+, t.s.n., Id.' was more than in a position to purchase theseproperties by his own eorts, his own earnings and without the help of %egina #orales. :nthe other hand, we have the declaration of uana !. #orales, a widow of +? years of age

when she testiDed, the sister4in4law of %egina #orales E uana !. #orales conDrmed the factthat #elbourne #a$ey held the positions of teacher, provincial treasurer, deputy governor,district supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools, respectively &p. 2=6, t.s.n., de laBictoria'. (ut more important is her declaration that her sister4in4law %egina #orales had noproperty of her own whence she could have derived any income nor was %egina gainfullyemployed. &pp. 2=642=, t.s.n., Id.' 8t must be remembered that the showing must be -3!%that %egina #orales contributed to the acquisition of these properties. Fere the evidence isnot only G:T -3!%, indeed, there is no evidence at all that %egina #orales contributed tothe acquisition of the properties in question. 8n the case of

Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et al,

supra, the Cupreme ourt had before it the common4law wifethere appears no evidence to prove heralleged contribution or participation in the, acquisition of the properties involved therein.>&Id. p. 1=+9'. 8n the case at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing that %egina#orales contributed by her eorts to the acquisition of these properties in controversy, bothplaintis and defendants< evidence show that it was through #elbourne #a$ey


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The ourt of irst 8nstance and the ourt of !ppeals correctly reected the argument that !ct Go. 6+16, the

%evised #arriage -aw, recogniMed >military fashion> marriages as legal. #a$ey and #orales were legallymarried at a church wedding solemniMed on ebruary 1+, 1919. Cince !ct Go. 6+16 was approved on)ecember , 1929 and too eect si$ months thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationshipcommenced in 19=6 and legitimiMed in 1919 through a marriage performed according to law. The marriagelaw in 19=6 was /eneral :rder Go. N=. There is no provision in /eneral :rder Go. +? as amended nor in !ctGo. 6+16 which would recogniMe as an e$ception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called>#ilitary fashion> ceremony or arrangement.

The ourt of irst 8nstance and the ourt of !ppeals both ruled that #elbourne #a$ey and %egina #oraleswere married only in 1919. This is a Dnding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. Thereis no showing that this factual Dnding is totally devoid of or unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it isinconsistent with the evidence of record.

The other issue raised in this 0etition questions the ourt of !ppeals< Dnding that the parcels of land inquestion were e$clusive properties of the late #elbourne #a$ey.

The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of #elbourne #a$ey and %egina #orales tooplace only in ebruary 1N, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to thetwo because the acquisition of the said properties was through their oint eorts and industry. The secondand third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given bythe ourt of !ppeals to the phrase >oint eorts>. The petitioners suggest that their mother


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profession from which she could derive income unlie their father who held the positions of teacher deputygovernor, district supervisor, and superintendent of schools.

@e are constrained to adopt a contrary view. onsiderations of ustice dictate the retroactive application of !rticle 1 of the ivil ode to the case at bar. ommenting on !rticle 2252 of the ivil ode whichprovides that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the ode which may preudice orimpair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive eect, theode ommission stated"

-aws shall have no retroactive eect, unless the contrary is provided. The question of howfar the new ivil ode should be made applicable to past acts and events is attended withthe utmost di;culty. 8t is easy enough to understand the abstract principle that lawshave no retroactive eect because vested or acquired rights should be respected. (ut whatare vested or acquired rightsP The ommission did not venture to formulate a deDnition of avested or acquired right seeing that the problem is e$tremely committed.

@hat constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined by the courts as eachparticular issue is submitted to them, by applying the transitional provisions set forth, and incase of doubt, by observing !rt. 9 governing the silence or obscurity of the law. 8n thismanner, the ommission is conDdent that the udiciary with its and high sense of ustice willbe able to decide in what cases the old ivil ode would apply and in what cases the newone should be binding This course has been preferred by the ommission, whichdid not presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide for each and every questionthat may arise. &%eport of the ode ommission, pp. 1+541++'.

Cimilarly, with respect to !rticle 2256 which provides inter alia that if a right should be declared for theDrst tune in the ode, it shall be eective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise theretomay have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does notpreudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin, the ode ommission commented"

... (ut the second sentence gives a retroactive eect to newly created rights provided they

do not preudice or impair any vested or acquired right. The retroactive character of the newright is the result of the e$ercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the lawmaingbody is persuaded that the new right is called for by considerations of ustice and publicpolicy. (ut such new right most not encroach upon a vested right. &%eport of the odeommission, p. 1+N'.

The requirement of non4impairment of vested rights is clear. 8t is the opinion of the ourt of !ppeals thatvested rights were preudiced. @e do not thin so.

0rior to the eectivity of the present ivil ode on !ugust 6=, 195=, the formation of an informal civilpartnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in

properties acquired through their oint eorts and industry during cohabitation was recogniMed throughdecisions of this ourt. &!Mnar et al. vs. /arcia, 1=2 0hil. 1=55* lores vs. %ehabilitation inanceorporation, 9 0hil. 51* #arata vs. )ionio, -429, )ecember 61, 1925* -esaca v. -esaca, 91 0hil. 165.'

@ith the enactment of the new ivil ode, !rticle 1 codiDed the law established through udicialprecedents but with the modiDcation that the property governed by the rules on co4ownership may beacquired by either or both of them through their wor or industry. 3ven if it is only the man who wors, theproperty acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a Dfty4Dfty sharing to the two ofthem.

This new article in the ivil ode recogniMes that it would be unust and abnormal if a woman who is a wifein all aspects of the relationship e$cept for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home

and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in businessbefore the rules on co4ownership would apply. This article is particularly relevant in this case where the>common4law> relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage 6 years before the properties weresold.

The provisions of the ivil ode are premised on the traditional and e$isting, the normal and customarygender roles of ilipino men and women. Go matter how large the income of a woring wife compared tothat of her husband, the maor, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with thewoman. Che is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were notlegally married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. 8t is the woman who


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traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to Dlling that purse with funds. !spointed out by )ean 8rene %. ortes of the Hniversity of the 0hilippines, >in the ilipino family, the wifeholds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checs and get an allowance in return and the wifemanages the aairs of the household. . . . !nd the famous statement attributed to /overnor /eneral-eonard @ood is repeated" 8n the 0hilippines, the best man is the woman.> &ortes, >@omens %ights Hnderthe Gew onstitution>. @:#!G !G) TF3 -!@, H.0. -aw enter, p. 1=.'

The >real contribution> to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. orres &2? C%! ?9'

must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also hercontribution to the familyJes> because there is noshowing that vested rights would be impaired or preudiced through its application.

! vested right is deDned by this ourt as property which has become D$ed and established, and is nolonger open to doubt or controversy* an immediately D$ed right of present or future enoyment asdistinguished from an e$pectant or contingent right &(enguet onsolidated #ining o. vs. 0ineda, 9? 0hil.N11* (albao vs. arrales, 51 0hil. 9?'. This cannot be said of the >e$clusive> right of #elbourne #a$eyover the properties in question when the present ivil ode became eective for standing against it wasthe concurrent right of %egina #orales or her heirs to a share thereof. The properties were sold in 1956when the new ivil ode was already in full force and eect. Geither can this be said of the rights of theprivate respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this wasstill open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of %egina #orales to a share under theapplicable law.

The disputed properties were owned in common by #elbourne #a$ey and the estate of his late wife,%egina #orales, when they were sold. Technically speaing, the petitioners should return one4half of the01,6==.== purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals fortheir use of one4half of the properties. 3quitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one

hand and return of 0+5=.== on the other.

@F3%3:%3, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The udgment of the ourt of !ppealsis reversed and set aside insofar as one4half of the disputed properties are concerned. The privaterespondents are ordered to return one4half of said properties to the heirs of %egina #orales. Go costs.

C: :%)3%3).

ANTON!O A& S& *AL'ES" petitioner, vs& REG!ONAL TR!AL CORT" $RANC# +,-" .E(ON C!TY" andCONSELO M& GOME(/*AL'ES" respondents&

' E C ! S ! O N

*!TG" J&0


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The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the%egional Trial ourt in ivil ase Go. L492412569. 0etitioner avers that the court a !uohas failed to applythe correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage isdeclared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties tothe contract.

The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.

!ntonio Baldes and onsuelo /omeM were married on =5 anuary 19N1. (egotten during the marriagewere Dve children. 8n a petition, dated 22 une 1992, Baldes sought the declaration of nullity of themarriage pursuant to !rticle 6+ of the amily ode &doceted ivil ase Go. L492412569, %egional Trialourt of LueMon ity, (ranch 1=2'. !fter hearing the parties following the oinder of issues, the trial court,Q1R in its decision of 29 uly 199, granted the petition* viz "

>@F3%3:%3, udgment is hereby rendered as follows"

>&1' The marriage of petitioner !ntonio Baldes and respondent onsuelo /omeM4Baldes is hereby declarednull and void under !rticle 6+ of the amily ode on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity tocomply with their essential marital obligations*

>&2' The three older children, arlos 3nrique 888, !ntonio Luintin and !ngela %osario shall choose whichparent they would want to stay with.

>Ctella 3loisa and oaquin 0edro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent onsuelo/omeM4Baldes.

>The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of theother.

>&6' The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedins on the li!uidation of their common properties as deDned by Article #$% of the amily ode, and to comply with the provisions of Articles&',

and & of the same code, within thirty &6=' days from notice of this decision.

>-et a copy of this decision be furnished the -ocal ivil %egistrar of #andaluyong, #etro #anila, for properrecording in the registry of marriages.>Q2R &8talics ours'

onsuelo /omeM sought a clariDcation of that portion of the decision directing compliance with !rticles5=, 51 and 52 of the amily ode. Che asserted that the amily ode contained no provisions on theprocedure for the liquidation of common property in >unions without marriage.> 0arenthetically, during thehearing on the motion, the children Dled a oint a;davit e$pressing their desire to remain with their father,!ntonio Baldes, herein petitioner.

8n an :rder, dated =5 #ay 1995, the trial court made the following clariDcation"

>onsequently, considering that !rticle 1N of the amily ode e$plicitly provides that the propertyacquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to havebeen obtained through the oint eorts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiand defendant will own their 8n the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plainti and defendant, theprovisions on co4ownership found in the ivil ode shall apply.> Q6R &8talics supplied'

8n addressing speciDcally the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said"

>onsidering that this ourt has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as nulland void ab initio, pursuant to !rt. 1N, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall begoverned by the rules on coo*nership.

>The provisions of !rticles 1=2 and 129 of the amily ode Dnds no application since !rticle 1=2 refers tothe procedure for the liquidation of the conjual partnership property and !rticle 129 refers to theprocedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property .>QR

0etitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 6= :ctober 1995.

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8n his recourse to this ourt, petitioner submits that !rticles 5=, 51 and 52 of the amily ode shouldbe held controlling* he argues that"

1!

>!rticle 1N of the amily ode does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.

1!!

>!rticles 5=, 51 and 52 in relation to !rticles 1=2 and 129 of the amily ode govern the disposition of thefamily dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void byreason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.

1!!!

>!ssuming aruendo that !rticle 1N applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of thepsychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with !rticle 129.

1!*

>8t is necessary to determine the parent with whom maority of the children wish to stay.>Q5R

The trial court correctly applied the law. 8n a void marriae, regardless of the cause thereof, theproperty relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of !rticle1N or !rticle 1?, such as the case may be, of the amily ode. !rticle 1N is a remae of !rticle 1 of the ivil ode as interpreted and so applied in previous cases* Q+R it provides"

>!%T. 1N. @hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live e$clusively with eachother as husband and wife without the beneDt of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages andsalaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through theirwor or industry shall be governed by the rules on co4ownership.

>8n the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their oint eorts, wor or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.or purposes of this !rticle, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of anyproperty shall be deemed to have contributed ointly in the acquisition thereof if the formerGeither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquiredduring cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination oftheir cohabitation.

>@hen only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in theco4ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. 8n case of default of or waiver by any orall of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective survivingdescendants. 8n the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. 8n all cases,the forfeiture shall tae place upon termination of the cohabitation.>

This peculiar ind of co4ownership applies when a man and a woman, suering no legal impediment tomarry each other, so e$clusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without thebeneDt of marriage. The term >capacitated> in the provision &in the Drst paragraph of the law' refers tothe leal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any >male or female of the age of eighteen years orupwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in !rticles 6N and 6?>QNR of the ode.

Hnder this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their *or+ and industry shallbe governed by the rules on e!ual co4ownership. !ny property acquired during the union is primafacie presumed to have been obtained through their oint eorts. ! party who did not participate in theacquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto ointly if said partyeorts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.> Q?R Hnlie the conugal partnershipof gains, the fruits of the couple


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&a' Geither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co4ownership property,without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation* and

&b' 8n the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co4ownership in favor of their common children* in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the commonchildren, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof,to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall tae place upon the termination of the cohabitationQ9R ordeclaration of nullity of the marriage.Q1=R

hen the commonla* spouses su-er from a leal impediment to marry or *hen they do not live

eclusively *ith each other (as husband and *ife ',only the property acquired by both of them throughtheir actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportionto their respective contributions. Cuch contributions and corresponding shares, however, are primafacie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolutecommunity or conugal partnership, as the case may be, if so e$isting under a valid marriage. 8f the partywho has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in themanner already heretofore e$pressed.Q11R

8n deciding to tae further cogniMance of the issue on the settlement of the parties< common property,the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately* a court which has urisdiction to declare themarriage a nullity must be deemed liewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequentialmatters. Gor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the>family home> and all their common property in e!ual shares, as well as in concluding that, in theliquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co4ownership underthe ivil ode, not !rticles 5=, 51 and 52, in relation to !rticles 1=2 and 129, Q12R of the amily ode, shouldaptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conugalpartnership of gains, the property regimes recogniMed for valid and voidable marriages &in the latter caseuntil the contract is annulled ',are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co4ownership that e$ists betweencommon4law spouses. The Drst paragraph of !rticle 5= of the amily ode, applying paragraphs &2 ',&6 ',&'and &5' of !rticle 6, Q16R relates only, by its e$plicit terms, to voidable marriages and, e$ceptionally,to void marriages under !rticle =Q1R of the ode, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage

contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is udicially declared void. The latter is aspecial rule that somehow recogniMes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are ine$istentfrom the very beginning and no udicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. 8n now requiringfor purposes of remarriae, the declaration of nullity by Dnal udgment of the previously contracted voidmarriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the secondmarriage. 8t is not then illogical for the provisions of !rticle 6, in relation to !rticles 1 Q15R and 2,Q1+R of theamily ode, on the eects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistenceof a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. 8n all other cases, it is not to be assumed thatthe law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in validand voidable marriages &before annulment' and, on the other, between common4law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co4ownership subect to theprovision of !rticle 1N and !rticle 1? of the amily ode. 8t must be stressed, nevertheless, even as itmay merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the amily ode on the >family home,> i.e., theprovisions found in Title B, hapter 2, of the amily ode, remain in force and eect regardless of theproperty regime of the spouses.

2#EREFORE, the questioned orders, dated =5 #ay 1995 and 6= :ctober 1995, of the trial court are!8%#3). Go costs.

SO OR'ERE'&

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G!LLERMA TMLOS" petitioner, vs. S%OSES MAR!O FERNAN'E( and LOR'ESFERNAN'E(" respondents.

Hnder !rticle 1? of the amily ode, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry eachother, but who nonetheless live together conugally, may be deemed co4owners of a property acquiredduring the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Fence,mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co4ownership.

he /ase

(efore us is a 0etition for %eview under %ule 5 of the %ules of ourt, assailing the Govember 19, 199?)ecision of the ourt of !ppeals 1 &!', which reversed the :ctober N, 199N :rder of the %egional Trialourt &%T'. 2 The dispositive part of the ! )ecision reads"

@F3%3:%3, the instant petition is /%!GT3), and the questioned orders of the court a !uo dated:ctober N, 199N and Govember 11, 199N, are hereby %3B3%C3) and C3T !C8)3. The udgment ofthe court a !uo dated une 5, 199N is hereby %38GCT!T3). osts against the private respondents.6

The assailed :rder of the %T disposed as follows"

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@herefore, the decision of this ourt rendered on une 5, 199N a;rming in toto the appealed udgment of the Q#TR is hereby reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision ofthe Q#TR and dismissing the complaint in the above4entitled case.

0etitioner also assails the ebruary 1, 1999 ! %esolution denying the #otion for %econsideration.

he 0acts

The ourt of !ppeals narrates the facts as follows"

QFerein respondentsR were the plaintis in ivil ase Go. +N5+, an action for eectment Dled before(ranch ?2 of the #T of BalenMuela, #etro #anila against Qherein 0etitionerR /uillerma Tumlos, Toto

Tumlos, and /ina Tumlos. 8n their complaint dated uly 5, 199+, the said spouses alleged that theyare the absolute owners of an apartment building located at !%T3 CH()8B8C8:G 888, -awang (ato,BalenMuela, #etro #anila* that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants4privaterespondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven &N' years, since 19?9, without thepayment of any rent* that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant /uillerma Tumloswill pay 01,+==.== a month while the other defendants promised to pay 01,===.== a month, both asrental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants* that they have demandedseveral times QthatR the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property forthe construction of a new building* and that they have also demanded payment of 0?,===.== from

Toto and /ina Tumlos representing rentals for seven &N' years and payment of 016,+==.== from/uillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven &N' years, but the said demands went unheeded. Theythen prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay thestated unpaid rentals, as well as to ointly pay 06=,===.== in attorneySs fees.

Q0etitionerR /uillerma Tumlos was the only one who Dled an answer to the complaint. Che averredtherein that the ernandeM spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co4owner ofthe subect premises as evidenced by a ontract to Cell wherein it was stated that she is a co4vendee of the property in question together with Q%espondentR #ario ernandeM. Che then ased forthe dismissal of the complaint.

!fter an unfruitful preliminary conference on Govember 15, 199+, the #T required the parties tosubmit their a;davits and other evidence on the factual issues deDned in their pleadings within ten&1=' days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the %evised %ule on Cummary0rocedure. Q0etitionerR /uillerma Tumlos submitted her a;davit7position paper on Govember 29,199+, while the QrespondentsR Dled their position paper on )ecember 5, 199+, attaching theretotheir marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the ontract to Cell over thedisputed property. The #T thereafter promulgated its udgment on anuary 22, 199NQ.R

Hpon appeal to the Q%TR, Qpetitioner and the two otherR defendants alleged in their memorandumon appeal that Q%espondentR #ario ernandeM and Q0etitionerR /uillerma had an amorous

relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their >love nest.> 8t was furtheralleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two &2' children for aroundten &1=' years, and that /uillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lesseesof the other apartments, until she discovered that Q%espondent #arioR deceived her as to theannulment of his marriage. 8t was also during the early part of 199+ when Q%espondent #arioRaccused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless QealousyR.

8n the same memorandum, Qpetitioner and the two otherR defendants further averred that it wasonly recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subectpremises while /ina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. 8n short, their presence there QwasRonly transient and they QwereR not tenants of the ernandeM spouses.

:n une 5, 199N, the Q%TR rendered a decision a;rming in toto the udgment of the #T.

The Qpetitioner and the two other defendantsR seasonably Dled a motion for reconsideration on uly6, 199N, alleging that the decision of a;rmance by the %T was constitutionally awed for failing topoint out distinctly and clearly the Dndings of facts and law on which it was based vis1vis thestatements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred that theontract to Cell presented by the plaintis which named the buyer as >#ario 0. ernandeM, of legalage, married to -ourdes 0. ernandeM,> should not be given credence as it was falsiDed to appearthat way. !ccording to them, the ontract to Cell originally named >/uillerma ernandeM> as thespouse of Q%espondent #arioR. !s found by the Q%TR in its udgment, a new ontract to Cell was

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issued by the sellers naming the QrespondentsR as the buyers after the latter presented theirmarriage contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee4wife. Cuch facts necessitatethe conclusion that /uillerma was really a co4owner thereof, and that the QrespondentsRmanipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enoy and use the property asrecogniMed by law.

The Q%TR, in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession,ruled therein that the ontract to Cell submitted by the ernandeM spouses appeared not to be

authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of Q%espondentR #ario ernandeM.Fence, the contract presented by the QrespondentsR cannot be given any weight. The court furtherruled that /uillerma and Q%espondent #arioR acquired the property during their cohabitation ashusband and wife, although without the beneDt of marriage. rom such Dndings, the courtconcluded that Q0etitionerR /uillerma Tumlos was a co4owner of the subect property and could notbe eected therefrom.

The QrespondentsR then Dled a motion for reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the same wasdenied by the Q%TR. 5

!s earlier stated, the ! reversed the %T. Fence, this 0etition Dled by /uillerma Tumlos only. +

2ulin of the /ourt of Appeals

The ! reected petitioner


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dwelling. !s previously discussed, such Dnding has no leg to stand on, it being based on evidencepresented for the Drst time on appeal.

3ven assuming aruendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the %T failed to consider that theneed for support cannot be presumed. !rticle 2=6 of the amily ode e$pressly provides that the obligationto give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs itfor maintenance, but it shall not be paid e$cept from the date of udicial or e$traudicial demand. . . .#3*phi#.n4t

8n contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Cupreme ourt, the %T instead presumed that /uillermaand her children needed support from Q%espondent #arioR. @orse, it relied on evidence not properlypresented before the trial court T'.

@ith regard to the other QdefendantsR, /ina and Toto Tumlos, a close perusal of the records shows that theydid not Dle any responsive pleading. Fence, udgment may be rendered against them as may be warrantedby the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for in Cection +of the %evised %ules on Cummary 0rocedure. There was no basis for the public respondent to dismiss thecomplaint against them. N &emphasis in the original'

he Issues

8n her #emorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of the ourt"

8. The ourt of !ppeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not outrightly dismissing thepetition for review Dled by respondents.

88. The ourt of !ppeals erred in Dnding that petitioner is not the co4owner of the property in litis.

888. orollary thereto, the ourt of !ppeals erred in applying !rt. 1? of the amily ode in the caseat bar.

8B. The ourt of !ppeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of support vis1vis the remedyof eectment resorted to by respondents. ?

8n resolving this case, we shall answer two questions" &a' 8s the petitioner a co4owner of the propertyP &b'an the claim for support bar this eectment suitP @e shall also discuss these preliminary matters" &a'whether the ! was biased in favor of respondents and &b' whether the #T had urisdiction over theeectment suit.

he /ourt5s 2ulin

The 0etition has no merit.

6reliminary 7atters

0etitioner submits that the ! e$hibited partiality in favor of herein respondents. This bias, she argues, ismanifest in the following"

1. The ! considered the respondentsS 0etition for %eview 9 despite their failure to attach severalpleadings as well as the e$planation for the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Cection11 1= of %ule 16 of the %evised %ules of ourt and despite the ruling in 8olar eam 9ntertainment,Inc. v . 2icafort . 11

2. 8t allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not attached.

6. 8t considered respondents< %eply dated #ay 2=, 199?, which had allegedly been Dled out of time.

. 8t declared that the case was submitted for decision without Drst determining whether to givedue course to the 0etition, pursuant to Cection +, %ule 2 of the %ules of ourt. 12

The !, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise"

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8t is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error after we have rendered thedecision. #ore importantly, when the private respondent Dled their comment to the petition on !pril2+, 199?, they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Geither have they questioned all theresolutions issued by the ourt after their Dling of such comment. They should, therefore, be nowconsidered in estoppel to question the same. 16

@e agree with the appellate court. 0etitioner never raised these matters before the !. Che cannot beallowed now to challenge its )ecision on grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an

afterthought. 8n this light, she cannot invoe 8olar 1

because she never raised this issue before the !.

#ore important, we Dnd it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitionerSs part to rely, on the one hand, onthese procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed )ecision and, on the other hand, assert that the%T may consider the new evidence she presented for the Drst time on appeal. Cuch posturing onlybetrays the futility of petitioner


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correctly held by the !, the applicable law is not !rticle 1 of the ivil ode, but !rticle 1? of the amilyode which provides"

!rt. 1?. 8n cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding !rticle,21 only the propertiesacquired by both of the parties through their actual oint contribution of money, property, orindustry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 8n theabsence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to beequal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to oint deposits of money and evidences of

credit.

8f one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co4ownership shall accrueto the absolute community or conugal partnership e$isting in such valid marriage. 8f the party whoacted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the mannerprovided in the last paragraph of the preceding !rticle.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall liewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

!rt. 1 of the ivil ode applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are notincapacitated to marry each other, 22 or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void 26 from thebeginning. 2 8t does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would beabsurd to create a co4ownership where there e$ists a prior conugal partnership or absolute communitybetween the man and his lawful wife. 25

(ased on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the%T, it is clear that #ario ernandeM was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally marriedto -ourdes ernandeM. 8t is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with #ario in astate of concubinage. Therefore, !rticle 1 of the ivil ode is inapplicable.

!s stated above, the relationship between petitioner and %espondent #ario ernandeM is governed by!rticle 1? of the amily ode. ustice !licia B. Cempio4)iy points out 2+ that >QtRhe amily ode has Dlledthe hiatus in !rticle 1 of the ivil ode by e$pressly regulating in its !rticle 1? the property relations of

couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.

Fence, petitionerSs argument E that the amily ode is inapplicable because the cohabitation and theacquisition of the property occurred before its eectivity E deserves scant consideration. Cu;ce it to saythat the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not preudice vested or acquiredrights. 2N 8n this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. #oreover, toresolve similar issues, we have applied !rticle 1? of the amily ode retroactively. 2?

;o 9vidence of Actual >oint

/ontribution

!nother consideration militates against petitionerSs claim that she is a co4owner of the property.8n Aapay , 29 the ourt ruled"

Hnder !rticle 1?, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual jointcontribution of money , property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion totheir respective contributions. 8t must be stressed that the actual contribution is required by thisprovision, in contrast to !rticle 1N which states that eorts in the care and maintenance of thefamily and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by onewho has no salary or income or wor or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not

proved, there *ill be no coo*nership and no presumption of equal shares. &emphasis ours'

8n this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchasethe subect property. 8ndeed, she anchors her claim of co4ownership merely on her cohabitation with%espondent #ario ernandeM.

-iewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. 8n anyevent, this fact by itself does not ustify her claim, for nothing in !rticle 1? of the amily ode providesthat the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.

learly, there is no basis for petitionerSs claim of co4ownership. The property in question belongs to theconugal partnership of respondents. Fence, the #T and the ! were correct in ordering the eectment ofpetitioner from the premises.

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8econd Issue"

8upport versus 9jectment

0etitioner contends that since %espondent #ario ernandeM failed to repudiate her claim regarding theDliation of his alleged sons, #ar /il and #ichael ernandeM, his silence on the matter amounts to anadmission. !rguing that #ario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrenSs right tosupport, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eect her.

@e disagree. 8t should be emphasiMed that this is an eectment suit whereby respondents see to e$ercisetheir possessory right over their property. 8t is summary in character and deals solely with the issue ofpossession of the property in dispute. Fere, it has been shown that they have a better right to possess itthan does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.#3*phi#.n4t

#oreover, %espondent #ario ernandeM< alleged failure to repudiate petitioner


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medical and burial e$penses. (oth petitioner and respondent Dled claims for monetary beneDts andDnancial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. 0etitioner Cusan Gicdaowas able to collect a total of 01+,===.== from U#(!8, 0H8, ommutation, G!0:-:#, QandR 0ag4ibig,V 6 while respondent Cusan Jee received a total of 021,===.== from U/C8C -ife, (urial &/C8C' and burial&CCC'.V

:n )ecember 1, 1996, respondent Cusan Jee Dled the instant case for collection of sum of money againstpetitioner Cusan Gicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one4half of

the one hundred forty4si$ thousand pesos &01+,===.==' collectively denominated as Udeath beneDtsVwhich she &petitioner' received from U#(!8, 0H8, ommutation, G!0:-:#, QandR 0ag4ibig.V )espiteservice of summons, petitioner failed to Dle her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

%espondent Cusan Jee admitted that her marriage to the deceased too place during the subsistence of,and without Drst obtaining a udicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and thedeceased. Che, however, claimed that she had no nowledge of the previous marriage and that shebecame aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herselfas the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contendedthat the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemniMedwithout the required marriage license. 8n support thereof, respondent presented" 1' the marriagecertiDcate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number* 5 and 2' a

certiDcation dated #arch 9, 199, from the -ocal ivil %egistrar of Can uan, #etro #anila, which reads W

his is to certify that this


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8t is clear therefore that the ourt is clothed with su;cient authority to pass upon the validity of the twomarriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to thesubect Udeath beneDtsV of the deceased.

Hnder the ivil ode, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Cusan Gicdao and thedeceased was solemniMed in 19+9, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absencethereof, subect to certain e$ceptions, 16 renders the marriage void ab initio. 1

8n the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fallwithin the marriages e$empt from the license requirement. ! marriage license, therefore, wasindispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriagecontract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certiDed by the -ocalivil %egistrar of Can uan, #etro #anila, their o;ce has no record of such marriage license. 8n 2epublic v./ourt of Appeals, 15 the ourt held that such a certiDcation is adequate to prove the non4issuance of amarriage license. !bsent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certiDcation issued bythe local civil registrar enoys probative value, he being the o;cer charged under the law to eep a recordof all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Cuch being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has beensu;ciently overcome. 8t then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and thatthey secured the required marriage license. !lthough she was declared in default before the trial court,petitioner could have squarely met the issue and e$plained the absence of a marriage license in herpleadings before the ourt of !ppeals and this ourt. (ut petitioner conveniently avoided the issue andchose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in eopardy. Fence, the presumedvalidity of their marriage cannot stand.

8t is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Cusan Gicdao and the deceased, havingbeen solemniMed without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages e$empt fromthe marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. 8t does not follow from the foregoingdisquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, theUdeath beneDtsV under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Cusan Jee. To reiterate, under !rticle

= of the amily ode, for purposes of remarriage, there must Drst be a prior udicial declaration of thenullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, thesecond marriage would also be void. !ccordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of theprevious marriage of the deceased and petitioner Cusan Gicdao does not validate the second marriage ofthe deceased with respondent Cusan Jee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemniMed withoutDrst obtaining a udicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Cusan Gicdao and the deceased void.Fence, the marriage of respondent Cusan Jee and the deceased is, liewise, void ab initio.

:ne of the eects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spousesaccording to the applicable property regime. 1+ onsidering that the two marriages are void ab initio, theapplicable property regime would not be absolute community or conugal partnership of property, but

rather, be governed by the provisions of !rticles 1N and 1? of the amily ode on U0roperty %egime ofHnions @ithout #arriage.V

Hnder !rticle 1? of the amily ode, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and womanare married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 1N 4

H...


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could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetarybeneDts. Fence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to thedeceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. (y intestate succession, thesaid Udeath beneDtsV of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. !nd, respondent, not being the legalwife of the deceased is not one of them.

!s to the property regime of petitioner Cusan Gicdao and the deceased, !rticle 1N of the amily odegoverns. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any

impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, lie theabsence of a marriage license. !rticle 1N of the amily ode reads 4

Art. #$%. hen a man and a *oman *ho are capacitated to marry each other, live eclusively *ith each

other as husband and *ife *ithout the beneEt of marriae or under a void marriae, their *aes and

salaries shall be o*ned by them in e!ual shares and the property ac!uired by both of them throuh their

*or+ or industry shall be overned by the rules on coo*nership. In the absence of proof to the contrary,

properties ac!uired *hile they lived toether shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint

e-orts, *or+ or industry, and shall be o*ned by them in e!ual shares. 0or purposes of this Article, a party

*ho did not participate in the ac!uisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have

contributed jointly in the ac!uisition thereof if the former5s e-orts consisted in the care and maintenance

of the family and of the household. hen only one of the parties to a void marriae is in ood faith, the

share of the party in bad faith in the coo*nership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In

case of default of or *aiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share

shall belon to the respective survivin descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall

belon to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall ta+e place upon termination of the

cohabitation.

8n contrast to !rticle 1?, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during thecohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, evenif only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 onformably, even if thedisputed Udeath beneDtsV were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, !rticle 1Ncreates a co4ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one4half thereof. !s there is no

allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the Drst marriage are presumed to be in goodfaith. Thus, one4half of the subect Udeath beneDtsV under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share inthe property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, tohis legal heirs, namely, his children with Cusan Gicdao. 8n a;rming the decision of the trial court, the ourtof !ppeals relied on the case of Lda. de /onsuera v. Government 8ervice Insurance 8ystem, 2= where theourt awarded one4half of the retirement beneDts of the deceased to the Drst wife and the other half, tothe second wife, holding that"

H... 8Jince the defendant5s Erst marriae has not been dissolved or declared void the conjual partnership

established by that marriae has not ceased. ;or has the Erst *ife lost or relin!uished her status as

putative heir of her husband under the ne* /ivil /ode, entitled to share in his estate upon his death

should she survive him. /onse!uently, *hether as conjual partner in a still subsistin marriae or as such

putative heir she has an interest in the husband5s share in the property here in dispute....K And *ith

respect to the riht of the second *ife, this /ourt observed that althouh the second marriae can be

presumed to be void ab initio as it *as celebrated *hile the Erst marriae *as still subsistin, still there is

need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjual partnership formed by the

second marriae *as dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, HtJhe only just and e!uitable

solution in this case *ould be to reconize the riht of the second *ife to her share of onehalf in the

property ac!uired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertainin to the conjual

partnership of the Erst marriae.K #

8t should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a priorand separate udicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the ourt

determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their e$isting property regime.

8n @omino v. /ourt of Appeals, 22 however, the ourt, construing !rticle = of the amily ode, clariDedthat a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent onlyfor purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a secondmarriage, he or she has to obtain Drst a udicial decree declaring the Drst marriage void, before he or shecould contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applieseven if the Drst marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves thevalidity or invalidity or their marriage. Fowever, for purposes other than to remarry, lie for Dling a case forcollection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate udicial


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declaration of nullity is necessary. !ll that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial ordocumentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights ow is in fact valid.

Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of themarriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicablelaws and urisprudence. Thus, in ;iFal v. :ayado, 26 the ourt e$plained"

Jhe court may pass upon the validity of marriae even in a suit not directly instituted to !uestion the

same so lon as it is essential to the determination of the case. his is *ithout prejudice to any issue that

may arise in the case. hen such need arises, a Enal judment of declaration of nullity is necessary evenif the purpose is other than to remarry. he clause Hon the basis of a Enal judment declarin such

previous marriae voidK in Article $' of the 0amily /ode connoted that such Enal judment need not be

obtained only for purpose of remarriae.

@F3%3:%3, the petition is /%!GT3), and the decision of the ourt of !ppeals in !4/.%. B Go. 512+6which a;rmed the decision of the %egional Trial ourt of LueMon ity ordering petitioner to pay respondentthe sum of 0N6,===.== plus attorneySs fees in the amount of 05,===.==, is %3B3%C3) and C3T !C8)3. Thecomplaint in ivil ase Go. L49641?+62, is hereby )8C#8CC3). Go pronouncement as to costs.#3*phi#.n4t

SO OR'ERE'&

)AC!NTO SAG!'" petitioner, vs. #ON& CORT OF A%%EALS" T#E REG!ONAL TR!AL CORT" $RANC#67" $OAC" MAR!N'.E AN' G!NA S& REY , respondents.

YNARES/SANT!AGO" J&0

The regime of limited co4ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legallycapacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies toproperties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. o4ownershipwill only be up to the e$tent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. !bsent proof

of the e$tent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.1

Ceventeen4year old /ina C. %ey was married,2 but separated de facto from her husband, when she metpetitioner acinto Caguid in #arinduque, sometime in uly 19?N.6 !fter a brief courtship, the two decided tocohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by acintoSs father. Their cohabitation was notblessed with any children. acinto made a living as the patron of their Dshing vessel >Caguid(rothers.>5 /ina, on the other hand, wored as a Dsh dealer, but decided to wor as an entertainer in apanfrom 1992 to 199 when her relationship with acintoSs relatives turned sour. Fer periodic absence,however, did not ebb away the conict with petitionerSs relatives. 8n 199+, the couple decided to separateand end up their 94year cohabitation.+

:n anuary 9, 199N, private respondent Dled a complaint for 0artition and %ecovery of 0ersonal 0ropertywith %eceivership against the petitioner with the %egional Trial ourt of (oac, #arinduque. Che alleged thatfrom her salary of X1,5==.== a month as entertainer in apan, she was able to contribute 0N=,===.== in thecompletion of their unDnished house. !lso, from her own earnings as an entertainer and Dsh dealer, shewas able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household eects, with a totalvalue of 0111,6N5.==. Che prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties andthat the amount of 0N=,===.==, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, bereimbursed to her.

0rivate respondent testiDed that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with irst !llied)evelopment (an.N Fer 0ass (oo shows that as of #ay 26, 1995, she had a balance of 021,=+.=?.? Chefurther stated that she had a total of 065,+5.==9 share in the oint account deposit which she and thepetitioner maintained with the same ban.1= /ina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchaseof construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.11

8n his answer12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the e$penses for the construction of their housewere defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their Dshing vessel. Fe averred that privaterespondentSs meager income as Dsh dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of saidhouse. (esides, selling Dsh was a mere pastime to her* as such, she was contented with the small quantityof Dsh allotted to her from his Dshing trips. 0etitioner further contended that /ina did not worcontinuously in apan from 1992 to 199, but only for a +4month duration each year. @hen their house wasrepaired and improved sometime in 19954199+, private respondent did not share in the e$penses because


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her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. rom his income inthe Dshing business, he claimed to have saved a total of 016=,===.==, 0N5,===.== of which was placed in a

oint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent inpurchasing the disputed personal properties.

:n #ay 21, 199N, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to Dle a pre4trial brief asrequired by Cupreme ourt ircular Go. 14?9.16

:n #ay 2+, 199N, petitioner Dled a motion for reconsideration1

of the #ay 21, 199N order, which wasdenied on une 2, 199N, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence e parte.15 0etitioner Dledanother motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied on :ctober ?, 199N.

:n uly 15, 199?, a decision1+ was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of whichreads"

@F3%3:%3, in view of all the foregoing, udgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plainti /inaC. %ey against defendant acinto Caguid"

a' :rdering the partition of the house identiDed as plaintiSs 3$hibit and ) and directing thedefendant to return and7or reimburse to the plainti the amount of seventy thousand pesos&0N=,===,==' which the latter actually contributed to its construction and completion*

b' )eclaring the plainti as the e$clusive owner of the personal properties listed on 3$hibit #*

c' :rdering the defendant, and7or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, toreturn and7or deliver the same to the plainti* and

d' :rdering the defendant to pay the plainti moral damages in the sum of Dfty thousand pesos&05=,===.==' plus the costs of suit.

C: :%)3%3).1N

:n appeal, said decision was a;rmed by the ourt of !ppeals* however, the award of 05=,===.== as moraldamages was deleted for lac of basis.1? The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order whichdeclared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the eectivity of the 199N%ules of ivil 0rocedure. 8t e$plained that the new rules now require the Dling of a pre4trial brief and thedefendantSs non4compliance therewith entitles the plainti to present evidence e parte.

(oth parties Dled motions for reconsideration which were denied* hence, petitioner Dled the instant petitionbased on the following assigned errors"

!.TF3 F:G:%!(-3 :H%T : !003!-C :##8TQT3)R ! %3B3%C8(-3 3%%:% 8G !00-J8G/ %3T%:!T8B3-J

TF3 199N %H-3C : 8B8- 0%:3)H%3 8G TF3 0%3C3GT !C3 !G) F:-)8G/ TF3 8%CT !CC8/G3) 3%%:% TF3%38G #::T !G) !!)3#8 TFHC, !8-3) T: %H-3 :G TF3 0%:0%83TJ : TF3 T%8!- :H%TSC%3HC!- T: C3T !C8)3 TF3 :%)3% : )3!H-T )H3 T: #8CT!K3 !G)7:% 3IHC!(-3 G3/-8/3G3:##8TT3) (J 03T8T8:G3%.

(. TF3 F:G:%!(-3 :H%T : !003!-C :##8TQT3)R ! %3B3%C8(-3 3%%:% 8G %3-J8G/ :G TF3 !TH!-8G)8G/C : TF3 T%8!- :H%T @F8F %338B3) TF3 3B8)3G3 : F3%38G %3C0:G)3GT :G-J 3I0!%T3.19

The issues for resolution are" &1' whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent topresent evidence e parte* and &2' whether or not the trial courtSs decision is supported by evidence.

Hnder Cection +, %ule 1? of the 199N %ules of ivil 0rocedure, the failure of the defendant to Dle a pre4trialbrief shall have the same eect as failure to appear at the pre4trial, i.e., the plainti may present hisevidence e parteand the court shall render udgment on the basis thereof.2= The remedy of the defendantis to Dle a motion for reconsideration21 showing that his failure to Dle a pre4trial brief was due to fraud,accident, mistae or e$cusable neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant hasa valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record. 26

8n the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to Dle a pre4trial brief is ustiDed because he was notrepresented by counsel. This ustiDcation is not, however, su;cient to set aside the order directing privaterespondent to present evidence e parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own ris not to be


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represented by counsel. 3ven without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to Dle a motion fore$tension to Dle answer,2 the required answer stating therein the special and a;rmative defenses, 25 andseveral other motions.2+ 8f it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the !pril 26, 199Norder directing him to Dle a pre4trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or Dled a motion fore$tension of time to Dle the brief. 8nstead, he waited until #ay 2+, 199N, or 1 days from his allegedreceipt of the !pril 26, 199N order before he Dled a motion asing the court to e$cuse his failure to Dle abrief. 0re4trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non4observance may result inpreudice to a partySs substantive rights. -ie all rules, they should be followed e$cept only for the most

persuasive of reasons when they may be rela$ed to relieve a litigant of an inustice not commensurate withthe degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

8n the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to rela$the application of the rules. There is nothing in the onstitution which mandates that a party in a non4criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to adenial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal professionis not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguardis deemed ignored or violated.

Fowever, the ourt of !ppeals erred in ruling that the eectivity of the 199N %ules of ivil 0rocedure,speciDcally, Cection +, %ule 1? thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the

plainti may be allowed to present evidence e parte for failure of the defendant to Dle a pre4trial brief.@hile the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. 3venbefore the 199N %ules of ivil 0rocedure too eect on uly 1, 199N, the Dling of a pre4trial brief wasrequired under ircular Go. 14?9 which became eective on ebruary 1, 19?9. 0ursuant to the said circular,>QfRailure to Dle pre4trial briefs may be given the same eect as the failure to appear at the pre4trial,> thatis, the party may be declared non4suited or considered as in default.

oming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that /ina and acinto were not capacitated to marryeach other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with thelatter. Their property regime therefore is governed by !rticle 1?6= of the amily ode, which applies tobigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where

both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.Hnder this regime, >Yonly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual ointcontribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to theirrespective contributions ...>61 0roof of actual contribution is required.

8n the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 19?N, which is beforethe date of the eectivity of the amily ode on !ugust 6, 199?, !rticle 1? thereof applies because thisprovision was intended precisely to Dll up the hiatus in !rticle 1 of the ivil ode.66 (efore !rticle 1? ofthe amily ode was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in astate of adultery or concubinage. Fence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the propertyoccurred before the amily ode too eect, !rticle 1? governs.6

8n the cases of Aapay v. 6alan,65 and umlos v. 0ernandez ,6+ which involved the issue of co4ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, weruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co4ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is withoutbasis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase ofthe disputed properties. !lso in Adriano v. /ourt of Appeals,6N we ruled that the fact that the controvertedproperty was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not su;cient proof of co4ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

!s in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or thenature of the case, asserts an a;rmative issue. ontentions must be proved by competent evidence and

reliance must be had on the strength of the partySs own evidence and not upon the weaness of theopponentSs defense.6? This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plainti was allowedto present evidence e parte. The plainti is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The lawgives the defendant some measure of protection as the plainti must still prove the allegations in thecomplaint. avorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by theplainti warrant such relief.69 8ndeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.=

8n the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. 0rivaterespondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed 0N=,===.== for the completion of their house.


22/46

Fowever, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the e$tent of her contribution. @hat appears in therecord are receipts1in her name for the purchase of construction materials on Govember 1N, 1995 and)ecember 26, 1995, in the total amount of 011,16.==.

:n the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal propertiescame partly from their oint account with irst !llied )evelopment (an. @hile there is no question thatboth parties contributed in their oint account deposit, there is, however, no su;cient proof of the e$actamount of their respective shares therein. 0ursuant to !rticle 1? of the amily ode, in the absence of

proof of e$tent of the partiesS respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Fere, thedisputed personal properties were valued at 0111,6N5.==, the e$istence and value of which were notquestioned by the petitioner. Fence, their share therein is equivalent to one4half, i.e., 055,+?N.5= each.

The ourt of !ppeals thus erred in a;rming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayedfor by private respondent. :n the basis of the evidence established, the e$tent of private respondentSs co4ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of 011,16.==, her proven contribution in theconstruction thereof. !nent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to theamount of 055,+?N.5=.

!s regards the trial courtSs award of 05=,===.== as moral damages, the ourt of !ppeals correctly deletedthe same for lac of basis.

2#EREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the )ecision of the ourt of !ppeals in !4/.%. B Go. +1++isAFF!RME' with MO'!F!CAT!ON. 0rivate respondent /ina C. %ey is declared co4owner of petitioner

acinto Caguid in the controverted house to the e$tent of 011,16.== and personal properties to the e$tentof 055,+?N.5=. 0etitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of 0+N,1==.5= to private respondent, failingwhich the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondentSs claim.

SO OR'ERE'.

#OMEO2NERS SA*!NGS 8 LOAN $AN9" 0etitioner, vs. M!GELA C& 'A!LO" %espondents.

) 3 8 C 8 : G

T!NGA" J.0


23/46


24/46

:G TF3 C3:G) !HC3 : !T8:G

1. The defendant to pay the plainti the sum of 0=,===.== representing the value of the car which wasburned.

:G (:TF !HC3C : !T8:G

1. The defendant to pay the plainti the sum of 025,===.== as attorneySs fees*

2. The defendant to pay plainti 025,===.== as moral damages*

6. The defendant to pay the plainti the sum of 01=,===.== as e$emplary damages*

. To pay the cost of the suit.

The counterclaim is dismissed.

C: :%)3%3).+

Hpon elevation of the case to the ourt of !ppeals, the appellate court a;rmed the trial courtSs Dndingthat the subect property was conugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebutthe presumption that the subect property acquired during the marriage of spouses )ailo belongs to theirconugal partnership.N The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subect property becauseit was constituted without the nowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with !rticle 12 of theamily ode. Thus, it upheld the trial courtSs order to reconvey the subect property to respondent. ? @ithrespect to the damage to respondentSs car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable thereforbecause it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplishthe assigned tas.9 !ll told, the appellate court a;rmed the trial courtSs @ecision, but deleted the awardfor damages and attorneySs fees for lac of basis.1=

Fence, this petition, raising the following issues for this ourtSs consideration"

1. @F3TF3% :% G:T TF3 #:%T/!/3 :GCT8THT3) (J TF3 -!T3 #!%3-8G: )!8-:, %. :G TF3 CH(3T0%:03%TJ !C :4:@G3% TF3%3: 8C B!-8) !C T: F8C HG)8B8)3) CF!%3.

2. @F3TF3% :% G:T TF3 :GH/!- 0!%TG3%CF80 8C -8!(-3 :% TF3 0!J#3GT : TF3 -:!G :(T!8G3)(J TF3 -!T3 #!%3-8G: )!8-:, %. TF3 C!#3 F!B8G/ %3):HG)3) T: TF3 (3G38T : TF3 !#8-J. 11

irst, petitioner taes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. 8t contendsthat !rticle 12 of the amily ode should be construed in relation to !rticle 96 of the ivil ode, whichstates"

!%T. 96. 3ach co4owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and beneDts pertainingthereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in itsenoyment, e$cept when personal rights are involved. (ut the eect of the alienation or the mortgage, withrespect to the co4owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division uponthe termination of the co4ownership.

!rticle 12 of the amily ode provides in part"

!%T. 12. The administration and enoyment of the conugal partnership property shall belong to bothspouses ointly. . . .

8n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration ofthe conugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do notinclude the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or thewritten consent of the other spouse. 8n the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition orencumbrance shall be void. . . .

0etitioner argues that although !rticle 12 of the amily ode requires the consent of the other spouse tothe mortgage of conugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of aspouse from e$ercising full ownership over the portion of the conugal property pertaining to him under the

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html#fnt11


25/46

concept of co4ownership.12 Thus, petitioner would have this ourt uphold the validity of the mortgage tothe e$tent of the late #arcelino )ailo, r.Ss share in the conugal partnership.

8n Guian v. /ourt of Appeals,16 it was held that the sale of a conugal property requires the consent of boththe husband and wife.1 8n applying !rticle 12 of the amily ode, this ourt declared that the absence ofthe consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conugal propertypertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guian squarely applies to theinstant case. !s shall be discussed ne$t, there is no legal basis to construe !rticle 96 of the ivil ode as

an e$ception to !rticle 12 of the amily ode.

%espondent and the late #arcelino )ailo, r. were married on !ugust ?, 19+N. 8n the absence of a marriagesettlement, the system of relative community or conugal partnership of gains governed the propertyrelations between respondent and her late husband.15 @ith the eectivity of the amily ode on !ugust 6,19??, hapter on /onjual 6artnership of Gains in the amily ode was made applicable to conugalpartnership of gains already established before its eectivity unless vested rights have already beenacquired under the ivil ode or other laws.1+

The rules on co4ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late #arcelino)ailo, r. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conugal partnership of gains is a special type ofpartnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits andincome from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their eorts orby chance.1N Hnlie the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co4ownership apply in asuppletory manner,1? the conugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership inall that is not in conict with what is e$pressly determined in the chapter &on conugal partnership of gains'or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.19 Thus, the property relations of respondent and her latehusband shall be governed, foremost, by hapter on /onjual 6artnership of Gains of the amily odeand, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the ivil ode. 8n case of conict, the former prevailsbecause the ivil ode provisions on partnership apply only when the amily ode is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the nowledge and consent of his wife,#arcelino )ailo, r. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subect property, which formed part of their

conugal partnership. (y e$press provision of !rticle 12 of the amily ode, in the absence of &court'authority or written consent of the o

art 147 and 148 family code

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