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SLCU NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2012

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT

TEAM CODE SLCU- 16


SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST U NIVERSITY

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

S.L.P. NO. : ____ 2012

IN THE MATTER OF:

GIRIVANDHAN TRADERS

PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

R ESPONDENT

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED U NDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA, 1950

SUBMISSION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF I NDIA

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT

MOST R ESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSEL FOR THE R ESPONDENT




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………….….I

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………… III

STATUTES

BOOKS

DICTIONARIES

ARTICLE, R EPORTS AND JOURNALS

WEBSITES

TABLE OF CASES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………….…..VI

STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………….… VII

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………......IX

QUESTIONS PRESENTED……………………………………………………………….……X

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS…………………………………………………………………..XI

PLEADINGS…………………………………………………………………………………1

I. THE ACT IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE

STATE……………………………………………………………………………….

1II. THE IMPUGNED ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 301 TO 304 OF THE

CONSTITUTION……………………………………………………………………5

i. The tax imposed is a compensatory tax

ii. I n the alternative, the tax imposed fu lf il ls the requi rements of Section 304(a)

III. THE CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAX IS VALID AND

CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 14……………………………………………….9




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT ii

IV. THE ACT CONSTITUTES A VALID DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE

STATE GOVERNMENT……………………………………………………………11

V. THE TAX COLLECTED UNDER THE IMPUGNED ACT BY THE STATE

GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE REFUNDED BACK ……………………….15

PRAYER FOR R ELIEF………………………………………………………………………XIII




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. STATUTES

1) INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ANDR EGULATION ACT, 1951

2) MAHARASHTRAVALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2002

3) THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

II. BOOKS

1) ANIRUDH PRASAD, CENTRE-STATE R ELATIONS IN INDIA (1st ed. 1985)

2) ARVIND. P. DATAR , C OMMENTARY ON T HE C ONSTITUTION OF I NDIA, 2NDEDN.

(WADHWA AND COMPANY LAW PUBLISHERS: 2007)

3) B.K. SHARMA, INTRODUCTION TO THECONSTITUTION OF INDIA (4th

ed. 2007)

4) D.D BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA vol.2 (14th

ed. 2010)

5) DR . NARENDER K UMAR , C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF I NDIA, 8TH

EDN. (ALLAHABAD

LAW AGENCY: 2011)

6) DURGA DAS BASU, C OMMENTARY ON THE C ONSTITUTION OF I NDIA, VOL. I, 8TH

EDN.


7) DURGA DAS BASU, C OMMENTARY ON THE C ONSTITUTION OF I NDIA, VOL. II, 8TH

EDN.


8) H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONALLAW OF INDIA vol.3 (4th

ed. 2004)

9) I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7th

ed. 2008)

10) J.B.L, HANSARIA, WRIT JURISDICTION (3rd

ed. 2005)

11) P.K. MAJUMDAR & R.P. K ATARIA, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

vol. 2 (10

th

ed. 2009)12) PROF M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW (5

th ed. 2005)

13) V.N.SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (10th

ed. 2004)

III. DICTIONARIES

1) D.S. CHOUDHARY, UNIVERSAL’S LAW DICTIONARY (1ST

EDN. 2010)

2) GARNER BRYAN A., BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY, (7TH

EDN. 2002)

3) P. R AMANATHA AIYAR , ADVANCED LAW LEXICON VOL.4 (3RD EDN. 2007)




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT iv

IV. ARTICLE, R EPORTS AND JOURNALS

1) NIRANJAN V., INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE; THE DOCTRINE OF

PROPORTIONALITYR EAFFIRMED (2011)

2) SRIKANTH HARIHARAN, A FEDERATIONALPROSPECTIVE OF INTERSTATE TRADE,

COMMERCE AND INTERCOURSE(2008)

3) GUPTA SUNIL, A COMMENT ON MAFATLAL V. UNION OF INDIA (2003)

4) K UMAR ARVIND, SHORT ESSAY ON INTER -STATE TRADE AND COMMERCE(INDIA)

(2010)

V. WEBSITES

1) http://www.bcasonline.org/ContentType/Contentin.asp?1401

2) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (last accessed: 30-8-2012)

3) http://www.indlaw.com/display.aspx?58B0AEB6-20B3-46BA-8CEF-21E8411C23EF

4) http://www.taxmann.com/fileopener.aspx?surl=http://www.taxmann.com/taxmannfl

ashes/flashart22-3-10_6.htm&searchid=2691

VI. TABLE OF CASES

1) A.V. Nachanev. Union of I ndia , AIR 1982 SC 1126

2) ACC v. State of Chattisgarh AIR 2007 (NOC) 669

3) Agr icul tural Market Committeev. Shali nmar Chemical WorkAIR 1997 SC 2502

4) Ajay Kumar Baner jeev. Union of I ndia AIR 1984 SC 1130

5) Andhra Sugar v. Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 599

6) Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Raj asthan, AIR 2002 SC 15337) Atiabar i Tea Co. L td.v. State of Assam , AIR 1961 SC 232

8) Automobile Transport L td.v State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406

9) Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AI R 1979 SC 321

10) Banarasi Dasv. State of M .P.AIR 1958 SC 909

11) Chiranjit L al Chowdhuri v. The Union of I ndia and Others.1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR

869

12) Consumer Action Groupv. State of Tami l NaduAIR 2000 SC 3060

13) Devidas v. State of Punj ab AIR 1967 SC 1895




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT v

14) Food Corporation of I ndiav. Bhanu Lodh AIR 2005 SC 2775

15) Gammon I ndia L td.v. Union of I ndia AIR 1974 SC 960

16) Girnar Tradersv. State of Maharashtr a , 2011(3) SCC 1

17) Govt. of AP v. PL Devi (2008) 4 SCC 720

18) I .R.Coelhoe v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861

19) Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 2008, 119

20) Jindal Stainl ess L td.(2)v. State of H aryana (2006) 7 SCC 241

21) Ki shan Prakash Sharma v. Union of I ndia AIR 2001 SC 1502

22) M.C. of Delhi v. Birl a Cotton S. & W. M il ls AIR 1968 SC 1232

23) Mohan Dasv State of Karnataka , AIR 2005 SC 2178

24) Orissa Cement L td And Ors.v. State Of Orissa 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 692

25) Orissa Cement L td And Ors.v. State Of Orissa 1991 SCR (2) 105

26) Ram Kr ishan Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538

27) Re, Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC 33228) S.P. Industr ies Company Ltd.v. Electri city Inspector , AIR 2007 SC 1984

29) Sardar I nder Singh v. State of Raj asthan AIR 1957 SC 510

30) St. Johns Teachers’ Training Institute v. Regional Directo, N.C.T.E AIR 2003 SC 1533

31) State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial , AI R 1970 SC 2079

32) V.M .Sanjawala v. State of Bomba,AIR 1961 SC 4

33) Vijay Lakshmi v. Punj ab University and Others (2002) 8 SCC 440

34) Zameer Ahmedv. State of Maharashtr a AIR 2010 SC 2633




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Hon’ble……………………………………………………………………………..Honorable

S.L.P…………………………………………………………………….Special Leave Petition

V. ………………………………………………………………………………………...versus

R/W…………………………………………………………………………………...read with

AIR………………………………………………………………………….…All India Report

SC ………………………………………………………………………...…….Supreme Court

Co…………………………………………………………………………………..….company

Ltd………………………………………………………………………………….……limited

P………………………………………………………………………………………...….page

St…………………………………………………………………………………………...saint

M/S……………………………………………………………………………..………Messers

SCR………………………………………………………………………Supreme Court Cases

SCC………………………………………………………………………Supreme Court Cases

Etc………………………………………………………………………………………Etcetera

A.P.……………………………………………………………………….....…Andhra Pradesh

Int…………………………………………………………………………………International

i.e. ……………………………………………………………………………………....that is




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT vii

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

1. Background

Around 2009, when internal government reports were predicting a steady rise in

inflation, the Government of Maharashtra noticed a rather strange trend: limestone

prices for local limestone were seen to fall consistently.

Being slightly alarmed (considering that limestone was a nascent industry, and also

perhaps considering that limestone units were being set up in marginal constituencies in

the state and were seen as having prospects for substantially increasing employment)

the Government of Maharashtra constituted a committee to study the sector.

In early 2010, an internal note was circulated indicating that the fall in prices of local

limestone was caused in a substantial part by increased cement being brought in to the

state from outside.

2. First Bill

After greater study, the State Government was of the view that restricting the entry of

cement was the only realistic way of controlling the rise of 'external' cement in the

domestic market. Accordingly, the State Government tabled a Bill titled the

"Regulation of Cement Markets Bill, 2010", which sought to impose restrictions on the

quantity of cement which could be brought in to the state from outside the state.

There were some concerns raised (particularly by bureaucrats from the law ministry)

that such a Bill would offend federal principles and the Chief Minister thought it best to

refer the Bill to the Advocate General for his Opinion. The Advocate General opined

that the bill as framed ran the risk of unconstitutionality as violating the principles of

freedom of inter-state trade and commerce.

3. Impugned Act

Having regard to the Advocate General's opinion, the Bill was withdrawn. Pressure

from the “limestone lobby” however mounted, and the State Government felt it was

critical to address the problems of the sector. Accordingly, in early 2011 the state

government introduced the "Maharashtra Local Industries (Regulation and Promotion)




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT viii

Bill, 2011". This Bill was enacted and came into force on April 1, 2011 as the

Maharashtra Local Industries (Regulation and Promotion) Act, 2011.

Immediately, “cement, to the extent such cement is sold within Greater Mumbai or the

Districts of Pune, Ahmednagar or Chandrapur” was notified as a 'notified good' under

the Act, and the notification was duly laid before the legislature.

4. Challenges and the Appeals

Shortly after the coming into force of the Act, several manufacturers of cement based

outside Maharashtra challenged the constitutional validity of the Act. Around 11 writ

petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court in June 2011. These petitions were

consolidated, with the lead matter being taken up as Girivandan Traders v. State of

Maharashtra.

The Bombay High Court granted ad-interim stay on collection of tax till August 2011.

In August 2011, the ad-interim stay was not extended. The writ petitions were admitted

and posted for final hearing in December 2011, but interim protection was not granted.

The Bombay High Court finally dismissed the writ petitions in January 2012.

Meanwhile, a Special Leave Petition against the Bombay High Court’s Order was filed

in the Supreme Court. The grounds were much the same as before the High Court. The

Leave was granted and is presently posted for final hearing before the Hon’ble Supreme

Court of India.




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT ix

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioners Girivandan Traders have filed a Special Leave Petition to the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India under Article 136(1) of The Constitution of India against the order of

the Bombay High Court.

Article 136(1) of The Constitution of India, guarantees that notwithstanding anything

in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to

appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or

matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

It is humbly submitted that in conformity with the above provision, the State of Maharashtra

submits to the jurisdiction of the Court. Pursuant to Article 136, the Court has jurisdiction to

decide all matters referred to it for decision. The State of Maharashtra agrees to act

consistently with the Court’s decision.




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT x

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. WHETHER THE CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAX IS VALID

AND CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 14?

II. WHETHER THE IMPUGNED LAW VIOLATES ARTICLE 301 TO 304 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?

III. WHETHER THE ACT IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF

THE STATE?

IV. WHETHER ACT CONSTITUTES A VALID DELEGATION OF POWERS TO

THE STATE GOVERNMENT?

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE TAX COLLECTED UNDER THE IMPUGNED ACT

BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT BE REFUNDED BACK OR NOT?




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT xi

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

THAT WHENEVER THE VIRES OF AN ACT IS CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION

OF CONSTITUTION, THERE IS ALWAYS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE

ACT.

I. THE ACT IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE STATE.

That the impugned Act is within the Legislative Competence of the State.

That Doctrine of Pith and Substance or the Doctrine of Incidental

Encroachment is applicable to the present scenario. That in pith and substance, the impugned Act is a regulatory measure for the

promotion of industries in the State, which is the exclusive domain of the State

Legislature

II. THE IMPUGNED ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 301 TO 304 OF THE

CONSTITUTION.

That the impugned does not violate Article 301-304 of the Constitution of India.

That the tax levied by the State Government is compensatory in nature.

In the alternative, the tax imposed fulfills the requirements of Section 304(a)


CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 14.

That the classification for the purpose of tax is valid and consistent with Article 14.

That the doctrine of reasonable classification has been followed.

That the State has wide powers to determine the subject and the rate of tax.

IV. THE ACT CONSTITUTES A VALID DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE

STATE GOVERNMENT.

That the delegation done the Act is not hit by doctrine of excessive delegation.

That requirement of laying down the notifications made by State Government before

each house of the Legislature is an adequate safeguard.

That the govt has changed its position by actually disbursing 50 Crores out of total

taxes collected.

V. THE TAX COLLECTED UNDER THE IMPUGNED ACT BY THE STATEGOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE REFUNDED BACK.




MEMORIAL FOR PRESONDENT 1

PLEADINGS

Most respectfully showeth;

1. Before I proceed to the various issues in concern, it is essential to point out that the Bombay

High Court has in its order passed in January 2012, upheld the constitutional validity of the

impugned statute, Maharashtra Local Industries (Development and Promotion) Act. This

Hon’ble Court has over a period of time, settled various principles of interpretation for

determining the validity of a statute and the first among them is “Presumption of

Constitutionality”. The High Court having upheld the statute, it raises an extremely strong

presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the impugned Act and this Court should be

extremely cautious in declaring otherwise. Further the burden of proving the alleged

unconstitutionality lies on the petitioner and in view of the various infirmities in the

arguments of the petitioners, it is submitted that the no question of declaring the said law as

unconstitutional arises, as will be proved through the subsequent points on the merits on the

case:

I. THE ACT IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE STATE.

2. The Indian Constitution contains a very elaborate scheme of the distribution of powers and

functions between the Centre and the State. Article 246(3) of the Constitution empowers the

State Legislature to make laws with respect to any of the matters which fall within their fields

of legislation as enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule, referred to as the State List.

Entries in the lists are themselves, not powers of the legislation, but fields of legislation.

1

3. The Constitution gives autonomy to the States to legislate within their respective fields. 2 In

the present case the impugned legislation falls well within the legislative competence of the

State as the subject matter of the Act is within Entries 26,27,52 and 54 of List II.These are

reproduced as under for the convenience of the Court:

“26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List

III.

1 S.P. Industries Company Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector , AIR 2007 SC 1984

2 Prof M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (5

th ed. 2005) at 967





27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33

of List III.

…….

52. Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein.

…….

54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the

provisions of Entry 92- A of List I.”

4. It is well established that the Entries in the three Lists are not always set out with scientific

precision or logical definition. The Court has to keep in mind that function of these

constitutional lists is not to confer power, but to merely demarcate the legislative heads or

fields of legislation and the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate. These

Entries have always been construed liberally as they define fields of power which spring from

the constitutional mandate contained in various clauses of Article 246.3

5. This Court in the case of Jijubhai Nanbhai Kachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp.(1) SCC

596], referring to the principle of interpretation of Entries in the legislative lists, held as

under:

“7. It is settled law of interpretation that entries in the Seventh Schedule are not powers

but fields of legislation. The legislature derives its power from Article 246 and otherrelated articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to make the Amendment Act is

derived not from the respective entries but under Article 246 of the Constitution. The

language of the respective entries should be given the widest scope of their meaning,

fairly capable to meet the machinery of the Government settled by the Constitution. Each

general word should extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and

reasonably be comprehended in it. When the vires of an enactment is impugned, there is

an initial presumption of its constitutionality and if there is any difficulty in ascertaining

the limits of the legislative power, thedifficulty must be resolved, as far as possible in

favour of the legislature putting the most liberal construction upon the legislative entry so

that it may have the widest amplitude….”

6. The primary object of applying these principles is not limited to determining the reference of

legislation to an Entry in either of the lists, but there is a greater legal requirement to be

3 Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, 2011(3) SCC 1





satisfied in this interpretative process. A statute should be construed so as to make it effective

and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat.4 .

7. Thus in the present case the impugned statute falls well within the legislative competence of

the State in the following manner:

i. The Act is aimed at consolidating and amending the law relating to the regulation,

promotion and protection of certain industries, which matters are exclusively domains

of the State Legislature under Entry 26 and 27 of List II.The State is empowered to

enact any laws for the regulation of trade and commerce (Entry 26)and to regulate the

production, supply and distribution of goods within the State(Entry 27). Hence the

state has rightly utilised its power under Article 246 read with List II, Seventh

Schedule of the Constitution.

ii. Secondly, the Act aims at levying certain taxes and fees for orderly development in

the State of Maharashtra, whereby taxes are sought to be imposed on certain goods as

notified under the Act. A proper construction of entries 52 and 54 keeping the view

the principles enumeratedaboveindicates that the State Legislature has a power to

impose these taxes on goods produced inside or outside the State. The tax can be

imposed on goods produced inside the State through a liberal interpretation of Entry

54 read with Entry 26 and 27 and on the goods produced outside the State and sold

within the State through a joint reading of the taxation entries under Entry 52, 54 with

Entries 26 and 27. The state is empowered under Entry 54 to impose taxes on the sale

of goods within the state. The said tax is also being levied at the time of sale of goods

in the State. As far as goods coming from outside the State are concerned, it is

submitted that the Doctrine of Territorial Nexus is applicable to the sale of those

goods taking place in the State and hence, the state is empowered to tax those goods

within the State of Maharashtra.

8. So far as the question of encroachment of any Union entry is concerned, it is submitted that

the Doctrine of Pith and Substance or the Doctrine of Incidental Encroachment is

applicable to the present scenario.

9. Explaining this key doctrine designed to test the validity of legislation challenged on grounds

of lack of competence, the Supreme Court in a recent decision Zameer Ahmed v. State of

Maharashtra5 has revisited the doctrine of pith and substance as a time tested test for

4

Supra note 14. Maxim implies “that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed” and is one of theadvanced and widely accepted principles for determination of validity of statutes.5 AIR 2010 SC 2633





interpretation of Schedule VII of the Constitution which delineates the legislative subject-

matter between Centre and States.

10. Applying the same to examine the validity of MCOCA, the Bench explained the doctrine in

the following terms;

“One of the proven methods of examining the legislative competence of a legislature

with regard to an enactment is by the application of the doctrine of pith and

substance. This doctrine is applied when the legislative competence of the legislature

with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in

various lists. If there is a challenge to the legislative competence, the courts will try to

ascertain the pith and substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the Act in

question. In this process, it is necessary for the courts to go into and examine the true

character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the

enactment in question is genuinely referable to a field of the legislation allotted to the

respective legislature under the constitutional scheme. This doctrine is an established

principle of law in India recognized not only by this Court, but also by various High

Courts. Where a challenge is made to the constitutional validity of a particular State

Act with reference to a subject mentioned in any entry in List I, the Court has to look

to the substance of the State Act and on such analysis and examination, if it is found

that in the pith and substance, it fallss under an entry in the State List but there is only

an incidental encroachment on any of the matters enumerated in the Union List, the

State Act would not become invalid merely because there is incidental encroachment

on any of the matters in the Union List.”6

11. It is submitted that in pith and substance, the impugned Act is a regulatory measure for the

promotion of industries in the State, which is the exclusive domain of the State Legislature

under Entries 26, 27, 52 and 54. The enactment as a whole, its main objects, its scope and

effect are directed towards the regulation and promotion of trade and commerce within the

state, which are matters under Entries 26 and 27 of the State List. Any implications on

interstate trade and commerce is merely incidental and ancillary to the primary purpose of the

Act, viz, regulation, protection and promotion of certain industries in the State and orderly

industrial development in the state of Maharashtra. As far as taxes on interstate trade is

governed, the same continue to be governed by the Central Government under the Central

Sales Tax Act, 1956 and the said Act nowhere impinges upon the Union Government’s

6 Ibid.





Powers. Even if any impingement is purported to be caused, the same is entirely incidental

and an incidental cause cannot be allowed to override the primary cause. The primary cause

continues to be the orderly development of the State of Maharashtra.

12. Hence, it is submitted that in view of the various tests and principles propounded by this

Court, the Legislature of Maharashtra has made a valid Act for the regulation, promotion and

protection of certain industries within the state of Maharashtra.

II. THE IMPUGNED ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 301 TO 304 OF THE

CONSTITUTION.

13. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the impugned Act does not violate

Articles 301-304 of the Constitution of India.

14. Part XIII of the Constitution contains provisions on ‘Inter -State Trade and Commerce’.

Article 301, the omnibus provision, declares that ‘trade, commerce and intercourse’ shall be

free throughout the territory of India. Article 302 authorizes Parliament to impose restrictions

on this freedom if necessary in the public interest. Articles 303(1) and (2) restrict this power

of Parliament by providing that it may not be used to discriminate between States, except in

cases of scarcity. Article 304(a) allows the State Legislature to impose non-discriminatory

taxes on goods, while Article 304(b) allows it to impose other reasonable restrictions (with

Presidential consent), notwithstanding Articles 301 and 303.7

15. Article 301 provides that trade, commerce and intercourse shall be free. The word ‘free’ in

Article 301 cannot mean absolute freedom or that each and every restriction on trade and

commerce is invalid. This Court explained in Atiabari 8 that freedom of trade and commerce

guaranteed by Article 301 is freedom from such restrictions as directly and immediately

restrict or impede the free flow or movement of trade. Thus, a restriction which is indirect or

inconsequential impediment on trade, commerce or intercourse is not hit by Article 301 and

this has been reaffirmed recently by a 5 Judge Bench of this court in Jindal Stainless Ltd .v.

State of Haryana9.

16. Hence, it is settled that imposition of a duty or tax in every case does not tantamount per se to

any infringement of Article 301 of the Constitution. Every case must be judged on its own

7http://www.indlaw.com/display.aspx?58B0AEB6-20B3-46BA-8CEF-21E8411C23EF

8 Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232

9 (2006) 7 SCC 241





facts and in its own setting of times and circumstances.10It may also be pointed out that in

Andhra Sugar v. Andhra Pradesh11, this Court has held that sales tax does not normally

constitute a restriction on the freedom of movement, since it is an indirect restriction. A sales

tax law would thus not have to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of Article 301.12So

whether in the present case whether said tax falls within the ambit of Article 301 is a question

which in itself is prone to doubt. It is submitted that since the said tax , being a sales tax

having an indirect and inconsequential restriction on the freedom of trade cannot be said to be

violative of Article 301 of the Constitution in view of the ratio of the said decision.

17. Even if the said ratio is not acceptable to the Court , it is our humble submission that the

impugned Act imposes a compensatory tax which is intended to facilitate trade, rather than

impede it and hence cannot be said to be violative of Article 301 of the Constitution.

i. The tax imposed is a compensatory tax

18. It is well settled that regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes will not

attract part XIII of the Constitution and that in that case there can be no question of violation

of Article 301.

19. This theory of Compensatory Taxes was formulated by a 7 Judge Bench of this Hon’ble

Court in the landmark case of Automobile Transport Ltd. v State of Rajasthan13 , which held:

“Regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading

facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301.”

20. The Court defined what a compensatory tax or regulatory measure was. A tax imposed

ontraders is compensatory if it actually facilitates trade, by improving tradefacilities. In the

words of Das, J.,

“…[a compensatory tax is] making a charge for the use of tradingfacilities, such as,

roads, bridges, aerodromes etc. The collectionof a toll or a tax for the use of a road or for

the use of a bridgeor for the use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden ordeterrent to

traders who, in their absence, may have to take alonger or less convenient or more

expensive route. Such compensatorytaxes are no hindrance to anybody’s freedom…”

10State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079

11A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 599

12 Niranjan V., Interstate Trade and Commerce; The Doctrine of Proportionality Reaffirmed (2011)13

AIR 1962 SC 1406





21. More recently, the 5 Judge Bench which was called upon to decide the scope of

compensatory taxes vis-à-vis Article 301 upon a reference under Article 145 in Jindal

Stainless Steel Ltd(2) v. State of Haryana14 stated that “Compensatory tax is a compulsory

contribution levied broadly in proportion to the special benefits derived to defray the cost of

regulation or to meet the outlay incurred for some special advantage to trade, commerce and

intercourse.”15

22. In other words, since a compensatory tax actually benefits trade, there is no question of it

violating a provision that states that trade shall be free. It follows that the crux of a

compensatory tax is the robust relationship between the quantum of the levy, and the benefit

to trade as a result of the levy.16In Automobile Transport, it was said, "A working test for

deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not is to enquire whether the trade is having the

use of certain facilities for the better conduct of its business.”The second test established by

the Court was that the tax imposed must confer approximately as much benefit on trade as the

tax the traders are asked to pay, in others words, the tax must satisfy the principle of

proportionality. This test has recently been reaffirmed by a 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd.(2) v. State of Haryana17 whereby the Court again stated that “it

is of the essence of compensatory tax that the service rendered or facility provided should be

more or less commensurate with the tax levied.”

23. In the present case, as rightly held by the Bombay High Court, the tax collected by the

impugned Act is compensatory as the State government is not using the tax for augmenting

its revenue. Instead a specific provision has been inserted in the Act, i.e., Section 5, for the

creation of a Fund for the promotion of industries dealing with the same goods as the notified

goods, including for the development of adequate markets in such goods. In furtherance of

the said provision, a “Package Scheme of Incentives for Limestone and Cement Industries”

was launched by the Government of Maharashtra in June 2012, which provided for the grant

of capital subsidies to local limestone and cement units. It is submitted that the Government,

in conformity with the criterion for compensatory taxes, allocated an amount of Rs. 350

crores towards these scheme which is equivalent and commensurate to the tax collected by

the Government.

14 Infra note 12

15http://www.bcasonline.org/ContentType/Contentin.asp?1401

16http://www.taxmann.com/fileopener.aspx?surl=http://www.taxmann.com/taxmannflashes/flashart22-3-

10_6.htm&searchid=269117

(2006) 7 SCC 241





24. Thus it is contended that the said tax is a compensatory tax, conferring special benefits to

trade and therefore it is immune from challenge under Article 301. It may be pertinent to

point out the observations of this Court in Automobile 18

, whereby this Court held that it is not

necessary to put the money collected from the tax into a separate fund so long as the facilities

for the trades people are provided and the expenses incurred in providing them are borne by

the state out of whatever source it may be. Since in the present case the requisite facilities or

advantage to the concerned industries has been provided in proportion to the amount

collected, thus the said tax constitutes a compensatory tax and is immune from challenge

under Article 301.

ii. I n the alternative, the tax imposed fu lf il ls the requi rements of Section 304(a)

25. Section 304(a) constitutes an exception to Section 301 and where there is no violation of

Section 301, the question of violation of Article 304 does not arise. 19 In the present case the

said Act providing for the levy of a compensatory tax does not violate the provisions of

Article 301. Even if , arguendo, it is presumed that the said Act is violative of Article 301, it

is submitted that this Act stills stands owing to its conformity with the provisions of Article

304(a). Article 304(a) authorizes the State Legislature to impose on goods imported from

other States or the Union Territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or

produced in that State are subject so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so

imported and goods so manufactured or produced.

26. The definition of notified goods as under Section 2(b) provides for the levy of tax on those

goods for which substantial raw materials are acquired outside the State. This tax is being

imposed on goods produced inside the State as well as outside the State at a constant rate

prescribed by the State Government. The rates of tax being the same for the manufacturer of

notified goods within the State as well as for the manufacturers from other States, the tax

fulfills the requirements of Section 304, and, in no manner, can be said to be discriminatory.

18 Supra note 14

19 Srikanth Hariharan, A Federational Prospective of Interstate Trade, Commerce and Intercourse (2008)






CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 14.

27. Equality secured by Article 1420 does not mean absolute equality, which is a human

impossibility. As has been reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions,

all persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or circumstances. The varying needs of

different classes of persons often require separate treatment.21 From the very nature of the

society, there should be different laws, applying differently in different places. Application of

the same laws uniformly to all, under different circumstances, may result in violation of the

principle of equality. The Legislature is required to deal with diverse problems resulting from

an infinite variety of human relations. It must, therefore, have power to make laws dealing

with particular problems. Accordingly, the Legislature has been given the power to make

laws distinguishing, selecting and classifying persons and things upon which its laws are to

operate. 22Thus, to apply the principle of equality in a practical manner, the Courts have

evolved the principle that if the law in question is based on reasonable classification it is not

regarded as discriminatory.23 The Court laid down the following tests to determine the

reasonableness of classification in Ram Krishan Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar :24

a) That, the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which

distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the

group

b) That, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved

by the Statute in question.

28. In the instant case, the impugned Act creates a valid classification as the notified goods for

taxation purposes u/s 2 of the Act are clearly defined and distinguishable from other goods of

the same industry. Those goods for which substantial raw materials are acquired outside the

State shall be considered notified goods. And the said classification has indubitable nexus to

the object sought to be achieved by the Statute which is reproduced as under:

20The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the

territory of India.

21Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others.1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869

22 Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533

23

Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University and Others (2002) 8 SCC 44024

AIR 1958 SC 538





“to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation, promotion and protection of

certain industries and the levying of certain taxes and fees for orderly industrial

development in the state of Maharashtra”.

29. In order to achieve the aforementioned objects, it was essential to classify the goods for the

purpose of identifying the sale of goods which shall be subjected to additional tax under

Section 3 of the Act.

30. It is to be pointed out here that the levy of tax by the State is a sovereign function and the

power to tax is one of the most extensive and searching powers. It has been explained time

and again by this Court that in the matter of taxation, the Legislature has greater latitude, to

give effect to its policy of raising revenue and for that purpose selecting persons or objects it

will tax. 25 It is open to the State to decide, the basis of taxation and to alter the same, from

time to time. Thus, a State is not obliged to tax everything in order to tax something. It can

select districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates of taxation. The power to levy tax

includes the power to pick and choose objects and persons for the purpose of taxation and to

grant exemptions.26

31. Also this Court has propounded the principle that it must be presumed that the Legislature

understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that, its laws are directed

to problems made manifest by experience and that, its discriminations are based on adequate

grounds.27 The Legislature is free to recognize the degree of harm and may confine its

restrictions to those cases where the needs is deemed to be the clearest. Also, in order to

sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court can take into consideration, matters of

common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may presume

every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.

32. Thus in the present case it is submitted that the State of Maharashtra, in exercise of its powers

of taxation under Article 246 has made a valid classification of goods in the impugned Act ,

keeping in view the problems being faced by certain nascent and underdeveloped industries

of the State. It is directly and rationally related to the object of the Act, ie, the levying of

certain taxes and fees for the orderly development in the State of Maharashtra.

25 Mohan Das v State of Karnataka, AIR 2005 SC 2178

26

ACC v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2007 (NOC) 66927

Govt. of AP v. PL Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720





IV. THE ACT CONSTITUTES A VALID DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE STATE

GOVERNMENT.

33. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Act constitute a valid delegation of

powers to the State Government.

34. Legislature, being the creative of the Constitution, must function within the limitation

prescribed by it.28 The power of delegation is ancillary to the power of Legislation. The

power to legislate carries with it the power to delegate. Scope of delegation and the

legislation, made in the exercise thereof is to be determined on the touchstone of the

Constitution. The main justification for delegated legislation is that the legislature being over-

burdened and the needs of the modern day society, being complex, it cannot possibly foresee

every administrative difficulty that may arise after the statute has began to operate. Delegated

Legislation fills those needs.29 Further this Hon’ble Court in Re, Delhi Laws Act, 1912 has

held that in view of the exigencies of the modern govt., the legislature needs to delegate the

legislative power. However, while delegating the legislative power, the legislature must retain

in its own hands the essential legislative functions and that what can be delegated is the task

of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the statute

concerned.30

35. For determining the permissible limits of delegation of legislative power, this Court

propounded certain principles in the landmark case of In Re, Delhi Laws Act, 1912 and the

same have been firmly established through series of decisions subsequently.31 These are as

follows:

that the legislature should not delegate its essential legislative function/power , that has

been expressly vested in it by the Constitution,

that, the Legislature must, itself., perform the essential legislative function,

that the essential legislative function/power consists in the determination or choosing

of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into binding rule of

conduct. It means that the Legislature should itself lay down standards or policy in the

delegating Act and the delegate would then legislate to further the legislative policy,

i.e. to execute the policy,

28 I.R.Coelhoe v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861

29St. Johns Teachers’ Training Institute v. Regional Director, N.C.T.E, AIR 2003 SC 1533

30

M.C. of Delhi v. Birla Cotton S. & W. Mills, AIR 1968 SC 1232; Re, Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC332;V.M.Sanjawala v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 431 Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalinmar Chemical Works, AIR 1997 SC 2502





that the legislature cannot abdicate or efface itself by creating a parallel legislative

body.

36. Thus it is settled that the Legislature, before delegating discretion on the administrative

bodies, must discharge its essential legislative function.Moreover, this Hon’ble Court has, in

Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu32 , ruled that the presence of legislative

policy/guidance for the delegate is sufficient enough to compensate even the wide powers

being conferred on delegate.

37. The expression “essential legislature function” has been held to comprise the formulation of

policy and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct for the delegate.33 It requires the

Legislature to declare the policy the law, lay down the legal principles and provide standards

for the guidance of the delegate to enact delegated legislation. What is, therefore, required, to

meet a challenge against excessive delegation, is some policy-statement, which may be read

by the court to comprise or mean sufficient guidance for the delegate34.

38. Now the question arises as to where to locate or to find the legislative policy. In this respect,

it has been well-settled in a catena of decisions that the policy statement or the guidance may

be found anywhere in the Statute, i.e., in the express provisions of the Statute delegating

discretion, or other provisions of the Statute, the Preamble to the Statute or any scheme

prescribed.35 Further, the legislative policy may be gathered from the object clause, from the

history of the enactment or from the scheme of the Act, etc. 36

39. In the impugned Act, the State Legislature has clearly stated the objectives and reasons of

enactment of the Act. Further, besides the statement of objects and reasons, the entire history

which led to the creation of the Act, has also been provided by the Legislature from which the

legislative policy can be gathered and the intention of the Legislature can be understood.This

is sufficient guidance for the state government37 to work as a subordinate legislature with

regard to the certain ancillary matters and not as body parallel to the State Legislature. The

State Legislature being sufficiently guided by the objectives, reasons, policy and history of

the enactment, the delegation of certain subordinate matters in the Act falls out of the

purview of ‘Excessive Delegation’.

32 AIR 2000 SC 3060

33 Re Delhi Laws Act, 1912

34 Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 321

35Consumer Action Group v. State of T.N., AIR 2000 SC 3060; A.V. Nachane v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC

1126; Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 51036

Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh AIR 2005 SC 2775; Ajay Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, AIR

1984 SC 1130; Kishan Prakash Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 1502; A.V. Nachane v. Union of India,AIR 1982 SC 112637

Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 SC 3060





40. In Maharashtra Local Industries (Regulation and Promotion) Act, 2011(the impugned Act)

the State Legislature has delegated its power on the State Government only in some

subordinate matters. The matters left for the legislation by the State Government do not relate

to the formulation or modificationof ‘essential legislative function’ so as to affect the

provisions of the Act.

41. The various provisions in the impugned Act that deal with the delegation of power on the

State Government are: -

a) Section 2(b)

"notified goods" means "such goods which are produced either inside or outside the

State, but substantial raw materials for which are acquired outside the State, as the State

Government may notify, having regard to the objects of this Act: Provided that, every

such notification shall be laid before the State Legislature in accordance with s.5."

42. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the power delegated to the State

Government is not excessive because the inclusion of the goods for levy of tax has to be done

with regards to the objects of the Act. Moreover, the legislative policy which was to guide in

the selection of goods to be kept under the category of ‘notified goods’, was apparent on the

face of the Act, namely to regulate, promote and protect certain industries and to levy tax for

the orderly industrial development in the State of Maharashtra. This Hon’ble Court in

Banarasi Das v. State of M.P.38 in similar circumstances upheld the provision conferring

power on the Government to bring certain sales transactions within the purview of the Sales

Tax Act. It is further submitted that the latter part of Section 2(b) of the impugned Act

requiring the notifications to be laid before the State Legislature in accordance with Section 5

of the impugned Act is an adequate safeguard against the abuse of power by the delegate39.

b) Section 3(1)

“ Additional tax shall be charged on all notified goods at a rate of 12.5 percent of

market value or such other rate as may be prescribed by the State Government”.

43. Under this provision, the State Government has been given the power to fix the rate of tax to

be levied upon the ‘notified goods’. The State government having already fixed the rate of tax

@12.5% has reduced the scope of misuse of the power conferred on the State Government.

The rate of tax that can be altered by the State Government has to be in neighboring of

38 AIR 1958 SC 909

39 Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 2008, 119





’12.5%’. This Hon’ble Court in Devidas v. State of Punjab40

has held that “enabling the

government to fix an arbitrary rate might not be sustainable but it was alright to confer a

reasonable area of discretion on the government by a fiscal statute”. Similar is the case of

instant case, where after reading within the provisions of the statute41, inference can be drawn

that the power to determine the rate of tax is not an arbitrary or an unbridled power. It is

therefore humbly submitted that the Section 3(1) of the Act falls out of the purview of the

doctrine of ’excessive delegation’.

c) Section 4

“A sum equivalent to so much of the additional sales tax as may be practicable in the

opinion of the State Government, may be used for the promotion of industries dealing

with the same goods as the notified goods, including for the development of adequate

markets in such goods”.

44. It is humble submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the history, reasons, objectives of the

enactment clearly show the legislative policy and the intention behind the enactment of the

impugned Act which is to regulate, promote and protect the new and emerging industries and

for the orderly industrial development in the State of Maharashtra. The tax proceeds have to

be used for the purpose of development of adequate markets and industries dealing with‘notified goods’. Now the question as to the what portion of funds collected from the levy of

tax has to be used for the purposes of the Act is to be decided by the State Government and

not by the State Legislature because the latter being already over-burdenedcannot see every

administrative difficulty that may arise42. Furthermore, the state government through its

concerned departments is in a better position to know the market conditions of Maharashtra

dealing with the ‘notified goods’ and the remedies for the adequate industrial developments

in the state. It is therefore submitted that the power delegated to the state govt. under Section

4 of the impugned Act is not hit by the doctrine of excessive legislation.

d) Section 6(3)

“The State Government may by notification extend any exemption or deduction

provision in force under any other law to the payment of additional tax under this

40

AIR 1967 SC 189541http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (last accessed: 30-8-2012)

42St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, N.C.T.E.,AIR 2003 SC 1533

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf







Act: Provided that such notification shall be laid before each house of the State

Legislature”.

45. It is humbly submitted that the delegation of power under this provision of the impugned Act

is validly safeguarded by the necessary requirement of laying down the notification before

the State Legislature. This is an adequate safeguard against the abuse of delegated power 43.

e) Section 7(1): Removal of difficulties Clause

46. The ‘Removal of difficulties’ clause in the impugned Act delegates the power on the State

Government to make modifications in the provisions of the Act in case any difficulty arises,

subject however to the condition that such modification shall be consistent with the provision

of the Act. This Hon’ble Court in Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India44 has held that such

provisions do not contemplate situations of excessive delegation of legislative power. The

Court also said that it being “a narrow power” cannot be exercised broadly and there is

application of the doctrine of Excessive Legislation. Further, Section 7(2) of the impugned

Act provides that any such order made for the purpose of Section 7(1) shall be laid before

each house of the State Legislature which is an additional safeguard against the abuse of

delegated power.

47. In the nutshell, it is therefore humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the provisionsof the impugned Act delegating power over the State Government are wide out of the scope

of the doctrine of excessive delegation and hence are valid in law.

V. THE TAX COLLECTED UNDER THE IMPUGNED ACT BY THE STATE

GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE REFUNDED BACK.

48. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the tax collected under the impugned

Act by the State Government shall not be refunded back to the petitioners.

49. That in the light of the arguments made in the foregoing contentions the Hon’ble Court shall

be pleased to announce that the impugned Act is constitutionally valid in law and in such a

case no question of refund of the taxes collected by the State Government arises.

43 Supra note 35

44 AIR 1974 SC 960





50. However, in the arguendo it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court in Orissa Cement Ltd And

Ors. v. State Of Orissa45 has held that the even if the levy of tax is found to be

unconstitutional, the Court is not obliged to grant an order of refund.Therefore a finding

regarding the invalidity of a levy need not automatically result in direction for a refund of all

collections thereof made earlier. The declaration regarding the invalidity of a provision and

the determination of the relief that should be granted in consequence thereof are two deferent

things and, in the latter sphere, the Court has, and must be held to have, a certain amount of

discretion. Once the principle that the Court has a discretion to grant or decline refund is

recognized, the ground on which such discretion should be exercised is a matter of

consideration for the Court having regard to all the circumstances of the case.The Court is

entitled to refuse the prayer for refund for good and valid reasons.

51. It is therefore, settled in the above submission that the grant of refund by the Hon’ble Court is

a matter of its own discretion. Further, this discretion has to be exercised with regards to the

facts and circumstances of each case in question. In the instant case, the facts and

circumstances are such that the discretion of the Court is likely to shift towards the refusal to

grant the refund the taxes already collected.

52. The State of Maharashtra had announced a “Package Scheme of Incentives for Limestone and

Cement Industries”, which provided for grant of capital subsidies to local limestone an d

cement units. This was done to give effect to the Section 4 of the impugned Act. For the

furtherance of the objectives of this scheme, the government had allotted an amount of Rs.

350 Crores and out of which 50 Crores has already been disbursed to the local industries.By

disbursing the funds allocated for the scheme, the government has changed its position. Any

declaration of the Court regarding the refund of tax shall be valid only prospectively and in

no case it should be valid with retrospective effect. In other words, the courts should not

declare taxes collected illegal retrospectively. Further this Hon’ble Court in India Cement Ltd

v. State Of Tamil Nadu Etc46 held that the declaration of the invalidity of the tax amount, if

any, be done only prospectively.

53. It is therefore, submitted before this Hon’ble Court that no tax refund be granted in the

instant case. Moreover, no grant of compound interest be allowed.

451991 SCR (2) 105

461989 SCR Supl. (1) 692




PRAYER FOR R ELIEF

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and

authorities cited, it is humbly prayed before the Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare:

(i) That the impugned Act creates a valid classification having a rational nexus to the

object and is therefore consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution

(ii) That the Act imposes a tax which is compensatory in character and hence there is

no violation of Articles 301 to 304

(iii) That the legislation was within the legislative competence of the State under

Article 246, the subject matter of the Act being within Entries 26,27,52 and 54 of

List II

(iv) That the Act provides sufficient guidance to the Executive and is not invalid for

excessive delegation

(v) That in the light of the aforesaid reasons, the Maharashtra Local

Industries(Regulation and Promotion) Act is constitutionally valid and shall

continue to have effect and no refund needs to be paid to the petitioners

And any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of justice,equity and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness Your Lordships respondents shall as duty bound ever pray.

S.D./-

Counsel for respondent

article 136 of the comstitution

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