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Port Said, The "Ultras" football fans and the Egyptian Revolution

Extrait du Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières

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Interview

Port Said, The "Ultras" football

fans and the Egyptian

Revolution- English - International - Africa (North) & Middle-East - Egypt -

Date de mise en ligne : Tuesday 18 March 2014

Date de parution : 1 March 2014

Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières

Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières /7




Last month marked the one year anniversary of the massacre at Port Said in Egypt. Thoughmuch was made in the North American media of the so-called "Arab Spring," attentionquickly turned away as the politics became demonstrably more complicated than a simplenarrative of liberal, democratic demonstrations (using twitter and facebook, we are alwaysreminded) against military dictatorships. Ali Mustafa is a Toronto-based journalist who hasspent much time in Egypt covering the ongoing and complicated Egyptian Revolution, andhere he answers some questions about the role of football fans - the "Ultras" - in themovement in Egypt.

Left Hook: The Arab Spring is read by most people in the West as a pro-democracy movement that usedsocial media to organize protests to oust a military dictator. Hosni Mubarak was removed from power morethan two years ago. Can you give a bit of background on the political situation in Egypt right now? Howmuch has really changed?

Ali Mustafa: Firstly, Egypt's revolution is part of a long and ongoing process that is far from complete. More than twoyears after former dictator Hosni Mubarak was toppled, ordinary Egyptians are still taking to the street en masse tofight for bread, freedom, and social justice. Nothing has changed at all in that regard. In fact, mass protests, labouractions, and ongoing clashes with state security forces in opposition to the ruling regime have only intensified inrecent months.

Despite the transition to liberal democracy finally completed last year, many of the underlying structural flaws thathave plagued Egypt for decades are not only still in place but arguably worse than they were before: vast inequality,widespread corruption, grave human rights abuses - all of the problems that originally led Egyptians to rise up againstMubarak in the first place.

Since taking office as the first ever democratically elected president in the country's history, Mohamed Morsi haslargely failed to capitalize on the historic opportunity before him. His top priority has clearly been to consolidate hisown grip on power. As a result, his presidency has signaled far more continuity than actual change.

Yet it is a mistake to treat any new democracy as some sort of a blank slate, ignoring just how much of the dynamicsat play are inherited rather than decided. In Egypt, the so called 'deep state' - a longstanding legacy of deeplyentrenched elite interests, including but not limited to those of the military - remains firmly intact. As a result, thetransition from dictatorship to democracy is by no means an easy one. Elections alone do not signify a major breakwith the prevailing political and economic order. Without any meaningful level of structural reform, they only serve tofurther consolidate the status quo.

Egyptians, however, refuse to let up pressure. They have made it very clear that they are no longer willing to acceptpolitics as usual, merely having one autocrat replaced by another. Too much has been sacrificed over the past twoyears to simply turn back now.

That being said, many serious challenges still lie ahead. The inspiring sense of unity found in Tahrir Square duringthe original 18 day uprising that finally toppled Mubarak actually concealead far more than it revealed. Egypt is morepolarized now than ever before. The result has been one major political crisis after another with virtually no end insight. How exactly everything will play out is still difficult to say at this point, but the fault lines are clear.




LH: On February 1, 2012, over 70 people were killed in the 'Port Said massacre' at a football match. Manypeople have argued that this attack was orchestrated from the top as a reprisal against the 'Ultras.' Whathappened in Port Said and who are the Ultras?

AM: Ultras are a group of avid, typically young football fans united by a very strong sense of loyalty to their club.Generally, each team will have its own dedicated following of Ultras supporters. Aside from style of clothing, like ahoodie or scarf bearing their team's colours, Ultras are otherwise distinguishable from ordinary fans by the animateddisplays of support they bring to football matches in the form of chants, flare shows, and other theatrics. Theseactivities are meant to inspire a unique sense of belonging among the participants involved, awe spectators, as wellas intimidate supporters of the opposing side.

What many people may not know about the Ultras is just how sophisticated they are organizationally. They have acentralized leadership structure, smaller subgroups divided by region, and regular meetings attended by localrepresentatives where key decisions concerning the group's activities are made. The reason so little is known aboutthem is because of their somewhat secretive nature and reluctance to talk to media.

The Ultras phenomenon originally has its roots in Europe, and really only made its way to Egypt and other parts ofthe Middle East in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the impact has been unmistakable. The youthful spirit and energythey bring with them to the matches, much like we find elsewhere, including Europe, naturally creates a highlycharged atmosphere inside the stadium. As a result, tension tends to run very high during most matches,occasionally leading to minor skirmishes or sometimes even larger outbreaks of violence between rival Ultras. Theycertainly have no problem taking on the police as well.

Actually, despite some notable variations from one region to another, one of the basic, underlying themes of theUltras culture globally is a deeply held contempt for the police and authority more generally. This type of intensehatred can be best summed up by the motto made popular by the Ultras, which you will find, for example, spraypainted on walls all over downtown Cairo: All Cops Are Bastards (or ACAB). This kind of longstanding feud thatexists between Ultras and the police in Egypt has only grown worse in recent years.

During the start of the Egyptian revolution on January 25 2011, Ultras were at the forefront of the clashes against thepolice in Tahrir Square, especially during the now infamous Battle of the Camel. Since then, the Ultras have played amajor, indispensable role in the ongoing struggle against the regime and become renowned among Egyptians fortheir bravery and fighting skills. Basically, they have brought their years of experience in fighting against police fromthe stadium to the streets.

All of this provides really important context for understanding what happened a year later in Port Said, which, as yousay, saw over 70 people brutally killed and 1,000 more injured in a stadium riot after a match between Al Ahly and AlMasry on February 1, 2012. The incident is recognized as the deadliest sporting disaster in Egypt's history. After thematch, fans from the hometown Masry side stormed the pitch and began attacking visiting Ahly supporters in thestands with clubs, knives, and other types of weapons. Most of the individuals killed, however, actually suffocated todeath after being trampled in the ensuing chaos - it was later revealed that the gates of the stadium had in fact beenwelded shut, leading to a deadly stampede at the exit that could have otherwise been avoided.

Several important questions immediately come to mind, which until now have not really been sufficiently answered.First of all, why were the gates of the stadium welded shut, making any sort of safe exit virtually impossible? Whywere so many people not searched by security before being allowed to enter the stadium as per standard protocol?Why did the police do nothing to intervene and instead just stand idly by watching the massacre unfold?




The whole incident just begs too many questions to be dismissed away as a random act of football 'hooliganism'.Suspicion immediately turned towards the Ministry of Interior and even higher up the chain of command to theSupreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling military junta at the time, who the Ultras accused oforchestrating the attack as an act of revenge against them for their role in the uprising. Whether or not the authoritiesactively colluded in the attack and to what degree is still unclear, but I think it is safe to say, based on the evidence,they were at the very least willfully negligent.

Last month on January 26 2013, 21 individuals - all of them residents of Port Said - were sentenced by a judge todeath for their role in the massacre. Interestingly, no police or government officials at any level were convicted. Thecity of Port Said immediately erupted into violence over what many locals claim was a politically charged verdict. Theargument is not entirely without merit. Ultras Ahlawy, who are supporters of Ahly, the country's biggest club in Cairo,had for weeks been threatening retribution if a swift guilty verdict was not handed down.

I think it is certainly possible that the ruling was made as an attempt to appease Ultras Ahlawy. Of course, no onewas counting on Port Said erupting the way it did. Some 30 more people were killed in the ensuing clashes withpolice over the verdict. Actually, the fallout is still being felt until today. Whoever claims that there is no relationbetween sports and politics clearly understands neither.

LH: It may come as a surprise to North American observers that sports fans could be such central politicalactors, especially in a progressive cause, given that North American sporting culture has become soapolitical or, worse, so deeply conservative. Can you talk a bit about the way that sporting culture is morecomplicated in Egypt, and how football fans/clubs can come to represent important and progressive politicalideals?

AM:The Ultras phenomenon in Egypt, like elsewhere, cannot be isolated from its broader social, political, andeconomic context. In the case of Egypt, these are largely marginalized urban youth who until the revolution really hadno outlet to channel their frustration except through sports. The specific internal dynamics at play are necessary tolook at.

Each finger shows off a shotgun shell used on protesters over the course of the clashes in and around Tahrir Square.November 2011. Photo: Ali Mustafa Importantly, Ultras groups in Egypt have not developed the same type ofneo-fascist political ideology we find steadily taking root among their Western European counterparts. I think thereason is largely because Egypt has historically been far less polarized than, for example, Greece, the UK, or manyof the Eastern bloc countries where this specific brand of far right-wing hooliganism has become particularlyprominent over time. There are many other factors.

That being said, I do not want to overstate or romanticize at all the progressive political ideals, as you say, of Egypt'sUltras. For many years, they were in fact quite explicitly apolitical and shied away totally from the arena of politics.Even today to a large degree, Ultras will insist that their role in the revolution is not so much political per se, butrather part of a longstanding and bitter rivalry with the Ministry of Interior, police, and other state security forces.

What is clear, however, whether it is acknowledged or not, is the degree to which the revolution has actually played apart in politicizing the Ultras in the first place - and that is true for large sectors of the society in general. Although theUltras in Egypt have for a long time avoided politics, a basic notion of freedom, justice, and dignity has always beenat the core of its values. These sort of core values, together with an already pronounced anti-police sentiment, I thinkhelped provide a firm basis for the Ultras' overall development politically.

By the time the revolution started, Ultras members were already participating as individuals, although not yet formally




as a group. They were for the most part not acting on any sort of deeply held political convictions but more so agrowing sense of indignation towards their hated enemy, the police, and increasingly the government itself. Althoughthe sense of anger, outrage, and injustice they felt still lacked any clear political coherence, it was not very difficult forthem to make a connection with the goals of the revolution at a basic emotional level.

Martyrdom, memory, and memorialization are also all very central aspects of the Ultras spirit. They have a very strict'eye for an eye' mentality. When Ultras members started dying in the clashes, their relationship to the revolutionchanged - it became intensely personal. As a result, the focus for them immediately turned to avenging their martyrsat any cost. In fact, one of the main criticisms against the Ultras is that they care far more about their club and fellowmembers than anything else. I think it is difficult to dispute that claim.

Yet there is no doubt that the Ultras have played an incredibly important role in the ongoing revolution to date. Like Isaid, they have taken a lead role in most of the clashes against the regime over the past two years, not to mentionthe many times they have helped defend Tahrir Square from attacks by thugs loyal to the government. Exactly howeffective the clashes have been to the overall goals of the revolution is still very much in dispute, but in reality nothingelse has done more to raise the price of dictatorship, make the status quo untenable, and generally disrupt politics asusual.

What is interesting, however, is the way the Ultras as a movement has evolved over time - not only politically buttactically as well. In the early stages of the revolution, we only really saw them engage in street fighting with police -which they still do - but they now also employ a wide variety of other strategies to achieve their demands, includingmass sit-ins, road blocks, and other forms of direct action. In the lead up to the Port Said verdict a few weeks ago, forexample, Ultras Ahlawy staged a sit in at one of the largest metro stations in Cairo to demand justice for theirmartyrs. They held up traffic for several hours, making it very clear the scale of disruption they could cause in thecountry if the verdict did not go their way.

Youth watch nearby clashes atop a street lamp holding a sign that reads: "raise your head, you are Egyptian".November 2011. Photo: Ali Mustafa Another important development linked directly to the revolution is the decision byUltras Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights, supporters of the two biggest clubs in Egypt, and former heated rivals, to putaside their differences and join forces in the fight against the regime. The move is very significant, especiallyconsidering the historic rivalry between the two teams. For me, it definitely demonstrates just how much the Ultrashave matured as political actors since the start of the revolution.

LH: Can you talk a little bit about the way that gender plays out in the context of the Ultras and its role in themovement?

AM: Yes, that is a very important question. There is definitely a clear macho mentality that permeates the Ultrasculture, whether in Egypt or elsewhere. The same can also be said of sports in general. Yet I think the glaring genderdivide found in Egypt's Ultras movement is really just a symptom of a much larger systemic problem. The Ultrasculture of hyper masculinity cannot really be addressed until it has been confronted in Egyptian society as a whole.

In Egypt, not only is any kind of open interaction between the sexes still sort of taboo but there is also an entirelydifferent set of social expectations imposed on women that simply do not apply to men. As a result, women in Egyptare often castigated for failing to conform to their prescribed role in society. The problem existed long before theUltras, but I think, whether intentionally or not, they have done a lot more to reinforce these problematic gendernorms than actually confront them.

For example, during the sit in that Ultras Ahlawy staged outside the parliament building a month after the Port Said




massacre - their first major direct action - the group's leadership tried to impose several ground rules directedexplicitly at women. Firstly, they put a curfew into effect prohibiting women from being at the sit in after 10 pm. Evenmore shockingly, women were also banned from smoking cigarettes at the site. Although in the end the rules wereonly loosely enforced, I think it goes a long way to highlight the many barriers women still face to be treated as equalplayers in this revolution.

That being said, I think the revolution itself has done a lot to put a spotlight on the problem. Since the start of therevolution, women have been increasingly targeted for participating in marches, protests, or other related activities -sexual assaults in Tahrir Square have increased dramatically in the past few months alone. Yet rather than backdown or retreat from the public sphere, women have in fact only increased their presence on the streets. The fight forwomen's rights, being led by women themselves, is now a key battleground in a way it had not really been a year ortwo ago.

LH: The obsessive reification of technology and social media in North American culture has created aperception that the Arab Spring was driven by Facebook and Twitter. This seems rather superficial to me.These technologies may have influenced the shape and the specific manifestations of demonstrations, but itseems to me that social movements have to be rooted in real human, social relationships between people.Do you think sport can be a space where those kinds of connections can be formed and fostered? Does theEgyptian context suggest something that we can build on, with respect to our own movement building, andits relationship to sports?

AM: To be honest, I am not so sure that the Ultras offer the best model for anyone to replicate. Sports by itself issimply not a useful basis for effective social movement building, in my opinion. Like sports, there is also a very clear,deliberate divide between participants and spectators in the Ultras movement that should not go overlooked. Whilethe type of mass mobilization, camaraderie, and energy for which the Ultras have become renowned all make for avery awe-inspiring spectacle, it is not one that is really open to outsiders who do not embody the same type ofyouthful enthusiasm for football that they do.

Yet the factors that help explain why the Ultras have become such a powerful and influential force on the groundtranscend far beyond the realm of sports alone. There is nothing inevitable about their transformation into politicalactors. As a result, the Ultras cannot really be understood outside the context of the revolutionary process from whichthey emerged.

That being said, I think there are definitely some general lessons to be gleaned. The test for any social movementlies primarily in its ability to build and strengthen unity. Social movement are more likely to find success where thereis also a strong sense of shared identity among members. The bond may find expression in a variety of ways, likesports, for example, but it must be based first and foremost on real root grievances to have any kind of potentialpolitically.

Aside from unity of cause, most successful social movements also typically feature some sort of ritualistic componentthrough which the bond shared between individual members is not only forged but sustained over time - it is in herewhere the role of collective memory that I alluded to earlier becomes particularly important. Some examples thatimmediately come to mind include the Landless Rural Workers Movement in Brazil, the Zapatistas in Mexico, andeven, to a large degree, the Idle No More movement here in Canada. Although these social movements could notpossibly be any more different from one another, they all share a certain kind of spirituality that gets expressed,nurtured, and reinforced through the act of specific rituals. The Ultras are certainly no exception in that regard.

When thinking about building an effective social movement, the key questions for me are is it inclusive? Is itparticipatory? Is it democratic in character? Those are the questions that I find important. Whether a social movement




emerges from sports or somewhere else is a secondary matter.

Post-scriptum :

* Original title: “The "Ultras" and the Egyptian Revolution - An Interview with Ali Mustafa”. March 1:

http://lefthookjournal.wordpress.co...

Sunday, March 3, 2013: http://frombeyondthemargins.blogspo...


http://lefthookjournal.wordpress.com/2013/03/01/the-ultras-and-the-egyptian-revolution-an-interview-with-ali-mustafa/

http://frombeyondthemargins.blogspot.fr/2013/03/the-ultras-and-egyptian-revolution.html


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