PHILOSOPHY

OF NATURE By Mariano Artigas

Renewed Fourth Edition

Translation from the original Spanish: FILOSOFÍA DE LA NATURALEZA

Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A. (EUNSA)

Spain-1998

Translated by Carlo Annoscia

CONTENT

PROLOGUE

PART ONE

I. INTRODUCTION:

NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

1. General Introduction

2. Historical Panorama of the Scientific and Philosophical Study of Nature

3. The concept of Nature

II. THE NATURAL ENTITIES

4. Natural Systems

5. Natural Substances

6. How to Identify Natural Substances

III. DYNAMISM IN NATURE

7. Natural Processes

8. The Becoming: Act and Potency

9. Unitary Processes in Nature

IV. ORDER IN NATURE

10. The Natural Order

11. The Physico-Chemical Structure

12. Unity and Order in the Universe

V. THE BEING OF NATURE

13. Levels of Understanding Nature

14. Material Conditions and Formal Determinations

15. The Hileo-Morphic Structure

VI. QUANTITAVE DIMENSIONS

16. Properties Of and Relations Between Material Entities

17. Dimensional Extension

18. Plurality of the Physical World

19. Quantification in Science

20. Philosophy of Mathematics

VII. SPACE AND TIME

21. Localization and Space

22. Duration and Time

23. Unity between Space and Time

VIII. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

24. Qualitative Properties

25. Quantity and Qualities

IX. ACTIVITY AND CAUSALITY OF NATURAL ENTITIES

26. Causality and Physical Activity

27. Contingency of Nature

X. THE LIVING BEINGS

28. Characterization of the Living beings

29. Origin of Life and Evolution of the Species

XI. ORIGIN AND MEANING OF NATURE

30. Origin of the Universe

31. Finality in Nature

32. Nature and the Human Person

33. Nature and God

Prologue

I am very pleased to present this book by Professor Mariano Artigas on the Philosophy of

Nature. The book covers objectives, which have been of common interest to both of us for quite some

years now in our work of investigation and teaching. This is not the place to speak at length of the

uninterrupted dialogue between us over this time on these objectives and on the preparations of this

publication. It is enough to mention the previous manual, published in two successive editions since

1984.

This book is the continuation and development of the first one. The fact of not being appearing

as one of its authors does not mean that I have dissociated myself in absolute from its content (and even

less from my studies on this matter). On the contrary, I believe that this manual is a full response to

what is needed. As one who now receives the text of this book, I would really like to thank Artigas

above all – and I would dare say in the name of all his readers – for the nice and deep synthesis, which

he offers to us, of the philosophy of nature (which was anticipated in a different way in his work “La

inteligibilidad de la naturalez”). His well-known competence as a philosopher of science, and as a

physicist as well, explains, for me, such a promising result. However, what pleases me most, if I am

allowed to use this verb of subjective nuances, is the fact that a book like this will ensure a future for

the philosophy of nature.

And here we touch, at least in part, those common objectives I was speaking of at the

beginning. I do not believe that nowadays one may develop a speculative and metaphysical philosophy

(including anthropology) disregarding science. The task of leading the scientific and philosophical

thought back to a unity of comprehension (definitely analogical) passes necessarily through the

philosophy of nature.. Only in this way it will be possible to repair the great breach which was

produced in the ancient worldview, when traditional metaphysics witnessed the arrival of modern

science. Artigas manages to give in this book, and with notable amplitude of horizons, a basic

philosophical view of the natural realities of the material world, which reconciles the perennial aspects

of the classical approach with a new worldview on nature, which arises from modern science. Artigas

does this without an extrinsic kind of reconciling, but by re-thinking the issues from their roots.

Moreover, he takes into account, in this task, epistemology as a necessary mediator between science

and philosophy, evidently because the presence of the gnoseological element cannot be neglected in a

realistic Aristotelian approach (not Platonic).

Philosophy of nature, a bit forgotten by academician philosophers, has been on its way to

revival for some time now, not in a systematic way, yet very effectively, in the notes at the margin in

the work of present-day scientists, in the informal presentations, as a synthesis, which time and again

appear in thousands of ways in magazines, books and other mass media. All people averagely educated

are receiving nowadays philosophical ideas about the world, life, man, which become progressively

crystallized in a specific perception of nature. On this basis, the great technological projects of mankind

are being elaborated nowadays, while at the same time a view of man is being shaped up, which is not

exempt from problematic issues.

The intervention of the philosopher can cast a lot of light on this natural process, which is full

of lights and shadows. The most desirable method to do this is, in my opinion, very similar to the one

used by Aristotle in his own times. In consists in giving metaphysical importance to what comes to us

from the natural being through the various theoretical and experiential accesses, which the world in

which we live offers. Artigas’ book is definitely placed in this route. I look at a work like this as an

important contribution to the whole field of philosophy and to the present-day debate, which seeks

harmony between the Christian faith and the scientific knowledge, not to talk about its evident

usefulness for the students owing to its great capacity of presenting topics.

JUAN JOSÉ SANGUINETI

Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy

Pontifical University of the Holy Cross,

Rome

PART ONE

I. INTRODUCTION:

NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

he study of nature can be carried out in two ways: scientifically and

philosophically. Science looks for explanations of the natural phenomena in

relation to other phenomena and causes, and it does this from specific points

of view. On the other hand, philosophy of nature looks for explanations rooted in the

«being» and «ways of being» of the natural entities and processes. These two

approaches are autonomous although related to each other. They are different in their

focuses although science leans on some philosophical assumptions and philosophy

needs to take into account the progress of scientific knowledge.

This chapter contains a general introduction to the philosophy of nature (Section

1), followed by an historical panorama (Section 2) and by considerations about the

character of nature (Section 3) which will form the base for reflections contained in the

rest of the book.

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of nature is that branch of philosophy whose task is to reflect upon the

natural, or physical, world. We shall now consider the nature of this reflection and its

value. This consideration shall prompt us to analyse also the achievements of natural

sciences, since there is a close relationship between these sciences and philosophy of

nature.

1.1. Philosophical reflection on nature

The object of philosophy is the whole reality studied in the light of the natural

reason. Philosophy goes much further than the specific knowledge provided by science

and looks for the most radical explanations. This is the reason why it is said that

philosophy studies the reality in the light of its ultimate causes, or that it asks questions

about the being of reality.

According to a classical distinction, the philosophical reflection has three main

objects, i.e. the world, man and God. Philosophy of nature is the philosophical reflection

on the world, where world stands for the natural, or physical, world and this includes the

inanimate beings (stars and planets, the physico-chemical components of matter, the

physico-chemical compounds) as well as the living ones.

1.2. Relationship with other branches of philosophy

T

Anthropology studies the human person. Man, though, is also part of nature while, at the

same time, he transcends it. Because of this, there is a close relationship between

anthropology and philosophy of nature. Unquestionably the human person has spiritual

dimensions which are irreducible to matter. However, man is a being characterized by

an internal unity and, therefore, the study of the human person needs to take into

account the conclusions of philosophy of nature. On the other hand man is, so to say, the

ultimate aim of philosophy of nature owing to the central place he occupies in the

natural world.

It is worth noting that the main difficulties met with by anthropology derive from

philosophy of nature. Actually, the tendency of explaining the human person in terms of

his physical, chemical and biological components is an effect of the enormous progress

of natural sciences. It is an illegitimate type of reductionism, consequence of unlawful

extrapolations of scientific knowledge into areas that do not fall under the scope of

science. Philosophy of nature plays an irreplaceable role in clarifying these issues.

Philosophy of nature also supplies half of the basis on which natural theology is built.

Our natural knowledge of God is not immediate: with the help of our natural powers we

can know God only through created things. There are naturalistic stands according to

which the world could be explained without making recourse to God. This mistake

requires a reflection on what nature is, and this is the object proper to philosophy of

nature.

In the same way philosophy of nature provides the basis for metaphysics; metaphysics

studies the ultimate principles of being as being which can be applied to material as well

as to spiritual realities. We climb up to the general laws of being through a reflection on

nature. It is actually quite difficult, not to say impossible, to build a rigorous

metaphysics without taking into account an equally rigorous reflection on the physical

world.

1.3. Philosophy and natural sciences

Natural sciences have a common general goal: they look for a knowledge of

nature which can be submitted to experimental control. Any explanation which asks for

admission into the world of experimental science needs to fulfil this minimum pre-

requisite1.

Philosophy of nature has the obligation of taking into account the knowledge

acquired by the different branches of experimental science. Its focus, though, is

different: as already mentioned, it looks for the ultimate causes of nature and proposes

general explanations which go much further than what is usually looked for in the

experimental sciences. For instance, it proposes concepts such as substance, or act and

potency in order to explain specific characteristics of nature. Such concepts are objects

1 For a more detailed analysis of the objectivity and truth in the experimental science see M. ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la

ciencia experimental. La objectividad y la verdad en las ciencias, 2nd

ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1992.

of no scientific discipline: science studies substances and the potentialities of nature, but

they do not ask the same questions as philosophy does about substance and about

potentiality.

Philosophy of nature needs the aid of science in different measure according to

the issue which is being considered. At times ordinary experience provides a basis

which is sufficient for a philosophical reflection. However, it is interesting to know what

science has to say even in these cases in order to make sure that our interpretation of

ordinary experience be correct.

Conversely, science is constructed on some assumptions which, of themselves,

are not objects of a scientific study: these, nevertheless, are their necessary premises.

Concretely, science presupposes the existence of a natural order which can be known

through arguments in which experiments play a central role. The success achieved by

science justifies the validity of such premises, it expands them and it makes them

clearer. For instance, scientific progress enables us to construct images of the world,

worldviews which unify the different types of knowledge we obtain about nature in one

image only. In order to construct a worldview, it is necessary to interpret and unify the

various data of scientific knowledge, and this requires a certain dose of philosophical

reflection.

A rigorous use of philosophy of nature helps prevent the risk of extrapolating

scientific methods and results into other areas of knowledge which are not properly

scientific. Scientific progress can be easily and erroneously interpreted if one is not

equipped with a good knowledge of philosophy of nature. For instance, at its very birth

in the 17th

century, modern experimental science was already accompanied by

mechanism, a sort of philosophical reductionism according to which what is natural can

be completely explained by the displacement of material parts. In reality, mechanism is

not a science, but rather a bad philosophy. Nevertheless, mechanism has been notably

influential by presenting itself, quite arbitrarily, as a consequence of the scientific

progress.

Philosophy of nature and natural sciences have different focuses, albeit

complementary. Actually, such a complementarity was acknowledged and respected

until the 19th century, when idealism invaded the field of science and, at the same time,

scientists felt that philosophy was an obstacle rather than a help to their work. The result

of this anti-philosophical reaction was the birth of the so-called scientism according to

which experimental science is the only valid knowledge of reality. Positivism, one of its

off-shoots, held the reductionist stand according to which the task of science consists in

establishing relations among observable phenomena, avoiding anything which goes

beyond this limit. Actually scientism is contradictory: the thesis according to which no

knowledge is valid unless scientifically acquired, is not a conclusion from any science.

Positivism also establishes limits which cannot be respected by science, whose progress

depends on steps which need to be taken beyond mere experience.

1.4. Value and achievements of the philosophy of nature

Experience plays an important role within the philosophical method. Philosophy

of nature does not seek a detailed knowledge in the way science does. Nevertheless

philosophy of science leans on the knowledge provided by ordinary experience as well

as by science. It is not possible to verify philosophical conclusions experimentally as it

is done with the scientific ones. Such conclusions, though, will be abandoned if they do

not correspond to the particular knowledge founded on experience and science.

The value of the philosophical conclusions depends on two factors. First, these

conclusions should correspond to genuine and well-founded problems; second, these

problems should be adequately resolved by such conclusions.

The existence of genuine philosophical problems is denied by those who claim

that it is sufficient to explain what things are made of and how they work. There is no

doubt that these two questions are important and they form the main theme of natural

sciences. However, they do not exhaust all the problems presented to human mind. For

instance, it is pertinent to ask for the ultimate explanation of the order present in the

nature. The various types of science provide us with ever more detailed explanations

about this order; they tend to cause, though, an increasing interest about radical

questions rather than satisfying it. The progress of science reveals an order in nature

which is ever more astonishing. Other problems refer to general explanation of entities,

processes and properties of nature which go beyond the specific knowledge provided by

science.

Once established that genuine philosophical problems exist, how can we assess

the solutions that philosophy gives? It is clear that philosophy cannot make use of the

experimental control in the same way science does. Nevertheless the validity of the

solutions is to be assessed in relation to the same basic canons, i.e. according to logic

and experience. It has already been pointed out that the solutions must be coherent with

the available data and satisfactory from the logical point of view, i.e. they should not be

contradictory and they should be useful to solve those problems one tries to solve.

Actually there is no automatic criterion for philosophical validity: the value of the

explanations has to be established in each individual case.

The achievements of philosophy of nature are different in different cases. In

principle, we may expect that the most important concepts be relatively few, since

philosophy of nature does not seek a knowledge as detailed as science does. The given

explanations will have a permanent value inasmuch as these refer to essential

characteristics of nature. We shall be able to see how philosophical concepts, proposed

many centuries ago, still retain their validity, although they need to be explained in a

way which is more consonant with our present knowledge. On the other hand, it is

assumed that many explanations of philosophy of nature will need a periodical revision,

owing to the enormous progress of science. In any case, we shall focus our attention on

the most basic problems and on the most permanent explanations, by examining both in

the light of the present scientific knowledge.

1.5. Themes and problems

Philosophy of nature has a wide scope: it actually deals with topics such as the

atom and the universe and it includes man and living organisms inasmuch as they are

natural beings. It seeks an answer about the meaning of nature and about its ultimate

foundations. It represents therefore the logical bridge between ordinary knowledge,

science and metaphysics.

We shall study the basic themes of philosophy of nature in the light of the

present worldview. We propose here two fundamental characteristics of nature: its

dynamism and its space-time framework. We shall show how these two distinguish

what is natural from what is spiritual and what is artificial. This starting point is

coherent with the present worldview, and allows us to tackle the problems of philosophy

of nature from a new perspective. This approach reveals the fact that in nature physical

dimensions (in relation to its space-time framework) co-exist with ontological ones (the

ways of being and of operating) and metaphysical ones (which are the foundation of its

being and of its operations).

In the five chapters of the first part of this treatise we shall examine the concept

of nature, the natural entities, the natural dynamism, the order in nature and the hileo-

morphic structure of the natural entities. In the six chapters of the second part we shall

expand by considering the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the natural entities,

their causality, the living entities and the origin and meaning of nature.

2. HISTORICAL PANORAMA OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDY OF NATURE

We shall consider in this section the development of the philosophy of nature

along history. The birth of experimental science in the 17th

century marks a key moment

in this development. We shall examine the ancient times, in a broad sense, until the 17th

century followed by an analysis of the subsequent development of philosophy of nature

in relation to the progress of science.

2.1. Science and philosophy in ancient times

The Greek philosophers emphasised fundamental philosophical problems and

gave corresponding answers to them which are still important, although limited by the

scarce development of science of those times. The validity of the Greek achievements

lasted some 20 centuries (and some are still valid nowadays), until the birth of the

modern experimental science in the 17th

century.

The very beginning witnessed the confrontation of opposing views: the

metaphysical one which considered nature as a divine work and the human person as

endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul; and the materialistic one which tried to

explain the whole reality in terms of its material components. The first view was held by

philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, whose ideas were

inherited by the Christian tradition. The second view was held by the Atomists such as

Leucippus and Democritus and their followers Epicures and Lucretius.

The dilemma between the two perspectives was clearly stated by Plato in his

dialogue “Fedo” whose protagonist is the same Socrates awaiting death in a cell in the

year 399 BC. Socrates’ friends propose an escape from prison to him. Socrates, in his

dialogue, explains how his ideas about nature have evolved. He says that in his youth he

studied the opinions of the previous thinkers (Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximenes,

Heraclitus, etc.) about nature, moved by a desire of knowing the cause of all

phenomena. He was not convinced, though, by their explanations. He adds that those

thinkers had proposed explanations in terms of components and actions, without even

mentioning the essences of things or finality. Actually these latter are the ones that

provide the true reasons for understanding why something happens, why is it convenient

for this thing to happen and what is the relation that this thing has with the divine

foundation of everything.

In this way Socrates pointed out two central problems concerning philosophy of

nature and its relationship with science: What kind of relationship exists between these

two levels of explanation? Is it sufficient to consider physical causes? Is there any

finality in nature? Is there any superior plan which can account for the natural

phenomena? Socrates and Plato were strongly in favour of metaphysical explanations,

i.e. nature explained in terms of essence, finality and divinity.

On the contrary, Democritus’ atomism leaned on the physical aspects as centres

of explanation, i.e. the local movement of matter and atoms, of which matter is made, is

enough to explain everything without making recourse to metaphysics. In ancient times

this approach was followed by Epicures in Greece and by Titus Lucretius Caro in Rome.

Aristotle re-considered these problems and proposed a new perspective which

lasted 20 centuries. Aristotle’s physics is a mixture of scientific problems in modern

terms and of philosophical problems, and it is the latter ones that mark the pace.

It would sound anachronistic to blame Aristotle (or Plato, or the Stoics, or the

people of the Middle Ages) for not having built a kind of science in modern terms. For a

systematic rise of any experimental science, more than good will and interest for nature

were needed: actually all this already existed. For instance, within the limits imposed by

the means available in those days, the Biology of Aristotle is important and rigorous.

Aristotle’s worldview corresponds, in a fairly adequate way, to ordinary

experience. Part of it (the theory of the four elements, of the heavenly bodies and their

movements and of the natural places) received its death sentence at the birth of modern

science. People felt at that time that the whole Aristotelian philosophy had crumbled to

pieces. However, the central ideas of Aristotle’s natural philosophy still preserve their

value: the concept of substance, the hileo-morphic theory, the explanation of the

processes in terms of act and potency, the four causes and finality are a set of bridge-

ideas between physics and metaphysics. They are masterpieces of achievement and

constant points of reference, notwithstanding the discredit into which Aristotelianism

fell in some historical times. However, the enormous progress of science in modern

times makes it necessary to revise these concepts in the light of such progresses.

Aristotle’s physics was elaborated by Aquinas within a new perspective. By

introducing the concept of creation (absent in Aristotle) and creationist metaphysics,

Aquinas focused his synthesis on the act of being and the concept of participation. In

this way Aristotle’s concepts acquire new life. The relationship between physics and

metaphysics is completed. God is the efficient cause of nature (first cause that creates,

preserves and participates in the action, and so accounts for the second causes), its

exemplary cause (divine ideas) and its final cause (He creates a good world, out of his

Goodness, for man). God directs the world with his providence: this explains the finality

of nature. The freedom of creation underlines the contingency of the world.

Aquinas proposed an original and very important conception of nature viewed as

the realization of a divine plan through ways of being and operating which God has

placed within the very things. In this way, things can cooperate towards the building of

nature. He compares the divine action with that of a craftsman who can grant the power

to move to the pieces he is working with, and to achieve their end by themselves. This is

his basic idea which is quite coherent with the present-day worldview; in this view,

morphogenesis and self-organization occupy a pre-eminent position. On the other hand,

Aquinas relativised some important Aristotelian theses such as the eternity of the world

and of the movement, and the astronomical theories.

Aquinas’ synthesis contains some aspects which have not yet been fully

unravelled, especially in the area of philosophy of nature. Actually, efforts have been

made in this area in order to salvage the most metaphysical aspects of Aquinas’ doctrine

separating them from the ancients’ worldview. These aspects, once revised in the light

of a modern context, are most adequate for a deep integration of the present scientific

knowledge with a philosophical perspective.

2.2. The modern experimental science

Modern science was born in Christian Western Europe in the 17th

century, thanks

to an intense preparatory work done in the Middle Ages which lasted various centuries

(for instance in the Universities of Oxford and Paris). Modern science, though, appeared

on the stage with an attitude of polemic against the previous tradition. A lack of balance,

difficult to achieve in those days, caused valid aspects of the classical thought to live

together with erroneous ones. Previously, the balance had leaned towards philosophy,

now it started leaning in the opposite direction, owing to the success achieved by

experimental science. The persistence of the initial polemic, as well as the accumulation

of further equivocal stands, contributes to a poor interpretation of the relations between

science and philosophy and, as a consequence, of the philosophy of nature.

Work done in the Middle Ages has ploughed the furrow for the seed of modern

science. It has been customary to refer to the Middles Ages as the Dark Ages, meaning

an age completely uninterested to science, actually opposed to it. This does not

correspond to truth. The pioneer work of the historian Pierre Duhem cast new lights on

this issue2. Duhem showed that many works of the Middle Ages had prepared the birth

of modern science and the University of Paris (Jean Buridan and disciples; Nicholas

Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Henry of Hesse, Marsilius of Inghen) together with the

University of Oxford (Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Richard Swineshead, John

Dumbleton, Thomas Bradwardine) were the leaders in this sense. For example, the

theorem of Merton College about the uniformly accelerated movement is equivalent to

Galileo’s law on the free fall. Nicholas Oresme offered a geometrical proof of this

theorem by using a figure which appears to be reproduced by Galileo. Also the

«impetus» theory of the physical school of Paris (Buridan, Oresme) provided the basis

for the subsequent notions of inertia and quantity of movement3.

The cultural milieu of those times was imbued with Christian ideas which also

had great relevance in the only possibly viable birth of the modern science. The doctrine

of creation, above all, had a great impact on the study of nature. Creation reveals the

contingent character of a world freely created by God, from which the need for

experience follows in order to study its characteristics. This study is possible because

the world, created by a God who is infinitely wise, is rational, and because man is

capable of knowing the world since he was created by God in His image and likeness

with a body and with a rational soul. Stanley Jaki has extensively shown with many

examples how the attempt to build a science in the great ancient cultures eventually

aborted and how, on the other hand, Christianity had a beneficial influence on the birth

of modern science4.

Thomas Kuhn has written: “From a modern perspective, the scientific activity of

the Middle Ages was incredibly effective. Actually, how else could science in the western

world have been born? The very centuries dominated by Scholasticism saw the

restructuring of the ancient scientific and philosophic traditions, their assimilation and

testing. As their weak points were discovered, they immediately became the objects of

the first investigations of the modern world. All the new scientific theories of the 16th

and 17th

centuries have their origin in the tattered clothes of Aristotle’s thought torn

apart by the Scholastic critique. The majority of these theories contain also key concepts

created by the Scholastic science. More important than these concepts, though, is the

mental framework that modern scientists have inherited from their medieval

predecessors, i.e. an unlimited faith in the power of the human reason to solve problems

related to nature. This point was beautifully expressed by Whitehead when he says that

“faith in the possibilities of science, born before the development of the modern

scientific theory, is an unconscious result of the medieval theology”5. This sounds

totally opposed to those platitudes endlessly repeated, for instance, by the positivists

according to whom theology and metaphysics had rather been a sort of a brake to the

scientific progress.

2 See P. DUHEM, Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, 10 volumes,

Hermann, Paris 1913-1917 and 1954-1959. 3 This topic is synthetically dealt with in M. ARTIGAS, “Nicolàs Oresme, gran maestro del Colegio de Navarra, y el origen

de la ciencia moderna”, Prìncipe de Viana (Suplemento de Ciencias), Year IX, No.9 (1989), pp. 297-331. 4 S. JAKI, Science and Creation. From Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh and

London, 1974. 5 T.S. KUHN, La revolucion copernicana. La astronomia planetaria en el desarrollo del pensamiento occidental, Ariel,

Barcelona 1978, p. 171.

There were other pioneers such as Leonardo da Vinci. However the modern

scientific revolution properly began with Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) when he

proposed the heliocentric theory. According to this theory the Earth does not stand still

at the centre of the universe: it rather rotates around the Sun as a planet. The theory

shook the worldview dominant at that time. Copernicus entitled his work De

revolutionibus orbium coelestium (About the revolutions of the heavenly orbits) and

dedicated it to the Pope. It goes without saying that this work did not raise any problem.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) can be considered the «prophet» of a new science

which distanced itself from the ancient methods and aimed at the mastery of nature. His

contribution to the new science was minor and his methodology is insufficient. He

nevertheless had great influence in establishing a science based on experiments.

Bacon proposed a new method based on induction. This consists in formulating

general laws from individual cases by the use of devices such as tables of presence, of

absence and of degrees. He substituted the Aristotelian and Scholastic «forms» (by

which the nature of things was expressed) with «laws». According to Bacon forms and

finality of the traditional philosophy do not have a place in the modern science. He

defines finality as a «sterile virgin», incapable of giving fruits.

Bacon’s ideas were widely accepted for quite a long time. They gave rise,

though, to some problems, with which we are still dragging along presently, such as the

sense and value of induction in science, the relationship between science and

philosophy, the value of philosophy of nature. For centuries, for instance, science has

been considered as «inductive science»; but laws such as the free fall of the bodies and

gravity are not obtainable by induction, not to talk about those complex theories of

physics-mathematics and the difficulty in verifying those theories with data provided by

the experiments which are always fragmentary.

René Descartes (1596-1650) had great influence on the new science. He insisted

on the use of the mathematical method. He also made some partial contributions. His

physics, though, was insufficient when compared, for instance, with the one of Galileo

and Newton, while his philosophical background produced great historical mistakes.

Actually, with his concept of evidence (clear and distinct ideas) he reduced the corporeal

substance to extension. In so doing, he denied the reality of qualities and liquidated that

dynamism which is so typical of matter. The new physics became firmly established

only when the concepts of «force» and «energy» were introduced, and these do not

appear in the limited Cartesian framework. Descartes rejected also the notions of forms,

of qualities and of finality. His natural philosophy is a kind of «mechanism» which tries

to explain everything in terms of displacements and impacts of matter. The interiority

disappears to the benefit of pure exteriority: this is extended also to the living beings

(with the exception of the human spirit).

Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) formulated the first scientific laws of the new

science: they refer to the elliptical trajectory of the planets. These laws are a first-class

achievement: they integrated mathematics, data from observation (with emphasis on

accuracy) and a mystical view about the order of nature. They destroyed the belief about

the circular movement of the heavenly bodies.

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was the main pioneer of the new science and the one

who best perceived its nature. He obtained great achievements, both theoretical and

observational (the law of the free fall of the bodies, the discovery of the satellites of

Jupiter and of the Venus’ phases, etc.). He actually laid the foundations for the method

of the new science. He stated that the objective of science is the formulation of laws

which refer to «changes» such as the ones in the case of place, movement, figure, size,

etc. He therefore gives up a knowledge based on essences, and the meaning of things: all

these are proper to philosophy and theology.

The famous «Galileo case» should not have occurred. It was the result of a

convergence of misunderstandings and polemical interests. On one hand, Galileo was

not in possession of conclusive demonstrations in favour of helio-centrism. On the other

hand, the theological difficulties involved were really superficial and they could have

been easily avoided, actually the geocentric view was never a part of the Christian

doctrine. There were other circumstances which contribute to pollute the issue. Galileo’s

punishment consisted in remaining confined in his villa near Florence. He kept working

until death which occurred, due to natural causes, when he was 78. The birth of the new

science was not stopped by these events6. Nevertheless, the problems about the nature

and achievements of the new science kept on producing ever greater polemics and

difficulties.

Shortly after Galileo’s death the science of physics-mathematics was born thanks

to the genius of Isaac Newton (1642-1727); this marked the crowning of ideas and

results accumulated during centuries, and of the new methods and achievements of the

modern science. Newton published his Mathematical Principles of the Natural

Philosphy in 1687: in this great work he formulated the first theory of the experimental

physics, i.e. the Newton’s Mechanics. A new era was born. Newton’s Mechanics was

easily applicable to terrestrial as well as to heavenly phenomena, it achieved great

continuous success in its theoretical as well as practical applications until the 20th

century, and it provided the main framework for the great strides made by physics and a

solid basis for the establishment of chemistry, biology and all the other branches of

experimental science.

The birth of the new science was accompanied by misunderstandings and

polemics mostly due to the fact that it was presented as a new philosophy ready to

replace the old one. The growing success of its practical applications seemed to indicate

that it was the compulsory way to face safely the problem concerning the value of the

human knowledge, central issue of modern philosophy. The new science was presented

as an alternative to the old philosophy, with the advantage of the use of mathematics

(precision and rigor in opposition to «occult qualities»), of the experimental approach

and practical applications (empirical character and usefulness in opposition to «sterile

speculations»), of its demonstrability and progress. In reality there was quite a bit of

lack of adequate understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy, i.e.

of the distinction and complementarity between the respective objectives and focuses.

6 A synthesis of the «Galileo case» and its implications can be found in M. ARTIGAS, Ciencia, razon y fe,

4th

ed., Palabra, Madrid 1992 (section «Galileo: un problema sin solver», pp. 15-36. See also W. BRANDMÜLLER, Galileo

y la Iglesia, Rialp, Madrid 1987.

The difficulties were not small because the development of science as well as of

epistemology was fragmentary. It is therefore understandable how different

interpretations have been given to explain the relationship that exists between science

and philosophy and, therefore, the philosophy of nature. The situation became clearer

only in recent times.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) gave a determining twist to the problem of

knowledge. He was convinced about the final validity of Newton’s physics. He at the

same time perceived that scientific concepts are a human construction and therefore they

are our way of representing nature. He stressed too much, though, the «subjective»

character of our concepts and interpreted the classical ideas of substance, causality and

finality from this perspective. Philosophy of nature lost therefore its objectivity and

became dependent on our subjective representations. Kant insisted on the fact that we

cannot know «things in themselves». This doctrine laid the foundation for the post-

Kantian idealism whose main representative, Hegel, accomplished the radical divorce

between science and philosophy.

Philosophy of nature was born again with Romanticism and Idealism at the end

of the 18th

century and beginning of the 19th

. It took the form of a Naturphilosophie, a

sort of reaction against mechanism while stressing at the same time the importance of

the vital, of the organic and of the system of nature. Its intuitions were mixed, though,

with a tint of pantheism and with a critique of real science: this provoked a serious

confusion between scientists and philosophers.

The Philosophy of Nature of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) forms

the second part of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. He supports an idealist

philosophy which interprets reality as the progressive unfolding of the Idea. Nature is

conceived by Hegel as a moment of this unfolding and, more precisely, the moment in

which the Idea dons «exteriority». Hegel seems to propose a somehow negative

conception of nature. Nature appears, within the idealist system, as an «unsolved

contradiction». It is also stated that «the Idea is inadequate to itself while donning this

exteriority».

It is difficult to follow Hegel when he deals with specific themes. He criticized

different aspects of the science developed up to his times, and proposed hardly

convincing alternatives. Actually, Hegel contributed in a decisive manner – as the

physicist Hermann Helmholtz said in 1862 – to the modern divorce between science and

philosophy: “The philosophers accused the scientists of narrow-mindedness, while the

scientists accused the philosophers of madness. The result was that scientists started

considering the convenience of removing any type of philosophical influence from their

work. Some, even among those more intelligent, reached the point of totally condemning

philosophy, not because useless but because positively harmful, besides being a work of

fantasy. They rejected – pity to say - not only the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian

system of dominating all the branches of knowledge, but also the legitimate claims of

philosophy about its right of criticizing the sources of knowledge and the definition of

the functions of the intellect”7. It goes without saying that this climate was favourable to

the development of a positivist mentality.

7 Cited by W.C. DAMPIER, Historia de la ciencia, Tecnos, Madrid 1972, p.318.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857), father of the Positivism, proposed his «law of the

three stages» through which, according to him, humanity had passed. The present and

definitive stage is the «scientific» or «positivist» one. In this stage we have stopped

asking questions about the ultimate causes of things and we are happy to deal with what

is accessible to the positive science, i.e. to formulate laws which are constant relations

among observable phenomena. The previous stages are therefore obsolete, i.e. the

«mythical-theological» and the «abstract-metaphysical». These last two are the result of

a lack of adequate instruments able to scientifically understand and control nature. There

is no place for a philosophy which is not a simple methodological and unifying

reflection on all sciences.

Positivism is at the extreme opposite of Hegel’s philosophy. But the extremes

touch each other: both are unjustifiable and monopolistic attempts of opposite signs.

They fail to save the complementarity between science and philosophy. It is

understandable how positivism exercises a certain fascination on the minds of those

scientists and philosophers who want to avoid fantastic lucubration. Positivism tells us

to stick to facts, to what is «positive», to what is «given» and to its relations. Positivism

ensures in this way the rigorous aspect of science which has nothing in common with

fantastic constructions. Nevertheless, positivism proposes a simplistic view of science; it

actually rejects the fact that there are always some philosophical assumptions, whether

theoretical or gnoseological which are necessary conditions for any scientific activity

(and which are backed up by the scientific progress). An interpretation of the methods

and results of science is also necessary to assess its accomplishments and to achieve a

unified world view. Besides, there are no such things as pure data (interpretations are

always there), and science goes much further than what is observable.

Finally, a «positive science» has never existed and it cannot exist: had

contemporary science followed Comte’s precepts, it would have never taken off. On the

other hand, the law of the three stages, although quite popular, follows nevertheless a

pre-conceived and quite simplistic scheme: relationships between philosophy, science

and theology have been, and keep being, much more important and complex than what

is stated by this law.

2.3. The philosophical impact of evolutionism, quantum physics and relativity

Philosophy of nature found a new challenge in evolutionism, especially from the

time of the publication of The Origin of the Species by Charles Darwin in 1859.

Evolutionism marked a very important step in the philosophy of nature in general and of

man in particular by raising the problems of naturalism and finality. Among the authors

who have centred their reflections on evolution are Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) published his Creative Evolution in 1907. He

maintains that the Greek interpreted time in function of eternity following, according to

Bergson, the natural pattern of our intellect, made for action: by decomposing real

becoming into static moments and by trying to re-compose the reality and articulating

these snap-shots. This procedure, though, very similar to that of a movie, is not helpful

in grasping authentic reality which is, in fact, becoming, process, evolution. This

procedure, on the contrary, assumes that things are already given once and for all.

Bergson’s judgment is conditioned by his basic thesis according to which

becoming is the framework of reality: it is a creative becoming similar to what happens

in the interiority of man. It is a life-impulse which crosses everything, so that its results

are always new and unpredictable.

Bergson repeats his thesis time and again, but he does not provide a serious

foundation for it. The thesis seems to be endorsed by the sound criticisms of the

mechanism which always accompany it. It seems that rejection of mechanism is

equivalent to a proof of this thesis; hardly so.

Without doubt Bergson is right when he criticizes mechanism and when he

stresses, also with reason, the importance of the becoming in the reality for explaining

nature. He perceives the importance of interiority and rebels against a way of thinking

which considers as sufficient those explanations based on the exteriority of repeatable

phenomena. The proposed alternative, though, is quite ethereal and fragmentary: it

simply consists in establishing a parallelism between the human psyche, where freedom

and creativity are found, and an evolution which is identified with the unfolding of a life

impulse. It states that the only way of understanding reality is to place oneself in the

inner of this life-stream through an intuition which goes beyond the possibilities of an

analytical intellect.

This «processualism», centred in the natural and historical becoming, has

acquired great importance in our days particularly because of authors such as Henri

Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. It stresses important aspects

of reality; nevertheless it needs to be supplemented with a more attentive consideration

about structural and stable dimensions.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) assumed evolution to be a fact and

proposed a finalist and Christian interpretation for it. Leaving aside the questionable

theological conclusions of the work of Teilhard, it is interesting to stress, within the

context of philosophy of nature, the importance attributed to the «interiority». Teilhard’s

basic thesis states that science, up to now, has considered the «exteriority» of nature.

Now it is time to complete it by considering its «interiority».

Teilhard developed this thesis around the «law of complexity-consciousness»,

considered to be well established on the basis of experience. According to this «law»,

successive levels of consciousness (interiority) correspond to progressive levels of

organization of matter (exteriority). On this ground, he claims that there is some form of

consciousness at all levels of nature (pan-psychism) and that evolution consists in the

progressive unfolding of a «spiritual energy» which, at some critical stages, produces

qualitative leaps. This is particularly evident in the case of the origin of life and, still

more, in the origin of man in whom conscious reflection appears with all its specifically

human consequences. It is a kind of evolution with an ascending direction towards

forms of superior material (exteriority) and consciousness (interiority) organization: it is

therefore a true «ortho-genesis». Finally, he projects his ideas into the future, when he

states that we are in a new kind of humanity which tends towards a new critical point of

integration around a personal centre which he calls «Omega Point», endowed with

divine characters.

Teilhard’s work is marred by a certain lack of methodological precision. It offers

a synthesis between science, philosophy, poetry and theology, and it is difficult many

times to perceive what corresponds to what, and what the foundation of the conclusions

is. Nevertheless, the ideas about the «interiority» of nature are important, although they

are found mixed together with a poorly consistent «pan-psychism».

At the beginning of the 20th

century quantum physics and relativity caused a

flood of new ideas in the philosophy of nature and in science. They clearly showed that

classical physics which had been held as the definitive edifice subject only to some

decorations here and there, was valid only for a restricted set of phenomena. Quantum

physics is to be used whenever studies on micro-physical components of matter are

involved, while the relativity theory becomes important whenever great velocities occur.

The philosophical impact of these two theories has been huge, since they provide

knowledge about aspects of nature which are very far from the ordinary experience and

which affect basic concepts of philosophy of nature.

2.4. The revival of the philosophy of nature in our times

In the first third of the 20th

century the Neo-positivists of the Circle of Vienna

proposed a philosophy reduced to a logical analysis of the scientific language. In an

openly scientist direction, they stated that natural science contains the whole valid

knowledge about nature. In this perspective there is no room, therefore, for a philosophy

of nature. However, a close analysis reveals the contradictory nature of this doctrine

since it would remain senseless if its own canons were to be applied to itself: in fact, this

doctrine is not a conclusion from natural science.

The most systematic effort to formulate a philosophy of nature in line with the

progress of science is probably the one of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) who published

his Philosophy of Nature in 1950 (as Volume IV of his Ontology). It was conceived as a

«special theory of the categories» which depends, with a neo-Kantian but realistic

matrix, on the status of the scientific knowledge at each moment, and renounces a

positive metaphysics. Hartmann completed his philosophy of nature with the

Theological Thinking, a posthumous work which was published in 1954 and where he

expounds a systematic criticism against finality.

The Hartmann of the first period is neo-Kantian. This strongly appears in his

work although later on he includes in his thinking elements of phenomenology and

maintains, against Kant, the realistic value of knowledge. He held an agnostic stand in

relation to the existence of God. Sometimes he is lined up next to Aristotle.

Nevertheless, he criticizes the Aristotelian ideas of substance, form and finality as next

to a metaphysics which he considers not valid. According to Hartmann, metaphysics

deals with issues which do not have answers, since they go much beyond what we can

actually know about things. There is only room for a kind of ontology which never

reaches a metaphysical level and definitive answers. It is a hypothetical and provisional

kind of philosophy which tries to analyze and clarify problems by using, as a method,

the analysis of the categories of our thought. In this context, philosophy of nature is

conceived as an analysis of the special categories, as a philosophical reflection on the

knowledge provided by science and which, as such, participates in the permanent

provisional character of this knowledge.

This sort of philosophy of nature contains some interesting pieces of analysis

but, at the same time, the denial of metaphysics appears quite explicitly whenever

classical themes are dealt with. The Aristotelian and Scholastic ideas about substance,

act and potency, the analysis of movement, forms, causality and finality are heavily

criticized. It is stated that these ideas correspond to an obsolete perspective which tries

to establish relations between nature and the divine. In his Theological Thinking

Hartmann unleashes a systematic criticism against finality in nature, in accordance with

his anti-metaphysical ideas.

In the last decades of the 20th

century there has been a notable revival of

philosophy of nature. Many are the publications, for instance, about the indeterminism

of nature, the appearance of new forms and self-organization, natural finality and

teleological argument, origin of the universe, creation and cosmological argument,

relations between mind and body. The protagonists of these discussions are frequently

scientists and epistemologists who conceive philosophical reflection as a rational

discussion which expands the achievements of both science and epistemology. They are

authors with very different tendencies whose works achieve, at times, great popularity8.

This new heyday of the philosophy of nature is due mainly to the existence of a

new worldview. Actually for the first time in history we are in possession of a scientific

worldview which is rigorous and complete and which has important philosophical

implications.

When we talk of a rigorous and complete worldview, we do not mean that we

already know everything. What we mean to say is that for the first time in history we

possess a well-tested body of knowledge about all the levels of nature and about their

mutual relations: think, for instance, of the microphysics, the astrophysics, the molecular

biology, and the morpho-genetic theories. There are still many question marks, true

enough, but we know an important part of the basic framework in its synchronic

(present state of nature) as well as in its diachronic (historical unfolding) aspects.

The present day worldview stresses the importance of the dynamism of matter,

the existence of special and dynamic patterns, morpho-genesis, evolution, self

organization, synergism (cooperation), emergence (in opposition to the reductionism),

directionality and information. We are in the presence of a new scientific paradigm

which makes the mechanistic one definitively obsolete. This provides, at the same time,

a very adequate basis for re-formulating the classical problems of philosophy of nature

and for the study of new problems which arise from the progress of science.

8 Some of these authors are for instance Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Ilya Prigogine, René Thom, Hermann Haken, Michael

Ruse, Stephen Hawking, John Barrow, Roger Penrose, Richard Dawkins, Karl Popper.

3. THE CONCEPT OF NATURE

The present-day worldview provides a very good basis for characterizing nature

in such a way that it will be the point of reference for all the philosophical reflections

contained in this book.

3.1 Meanings of the terms «nature» and «natural»

The substantive «nature» has two main meanings: the first refers to «the nature

of something» (this is what we call metaphysical meaning); the second refers to

«Nature» in the sense of the totality of all physical beings (we shall call it physical

meaning).

In the metaphysical sense, «nature of something» means the characteristic of

something or that which belongs to that thing in such a way that makes it different from

anything else. The «thing» spoken of may be anything. Actually one can speak of the

nature of man, the nature of a problem, the nature of a specific science, as well as the

nature of God. In this sense, the term nature is applicable to very different realities and

therefore to anything. In this case we speak of a metaphysical sense of the concept of

nature because it is not limited to the physical reality (the material, the corporeal) but it

includes the spiritual as well as the supernatural ones. In this sense, the concept of

nature is similar to the one of «essence» which also expresses, in a basic way, the being

of something.

In the physical sense «Nature» refers to the totality of all natural beings and

processes which, for this reason, are identified with what is corporeal or material. This

meaning is clear enough in ordinary language; nevertheless problems arise when this

meaning is used in rigorous terms depending on what one understands for «natural

being», or rather on what one understands for «natural». We should therefore move

from the analysis of the substantive «nature» to the one of the adjective «natural». What

do we call «natural»?

The term «natural» may mean the following:

a) natural in the sense of spontaneous which corresponds to an internal

principle. Something is considered «natural» if it corresponds to the

proper way of being of a subject. It can be a property or a way of

behaving. In the first case, for instance, it is natural for man to be

rational, since rationality is a specific characteristic of man. In the second

case, natural is that activity which has an interior origin so that, although

conditioned by the circumstances, it corresponds to an interior core

which unfolds autonomously. In both cases, that which is natural

corresponds to that which is spontaneous and is opposed to that which is

violent or compelled. In this sense, the term natural is applicable to what

is material as well as to what is spiritual.

b) Natural as distinguished from artificial: that which is artificial is a

product of man’s activity, unlike that which is natural.

c) Natural as distinguished from spiritual: in this case the term natural is

identified with what is material or corporeal, i.e. with what belongs to

the physical level. Consequently, terms with spiritual connotation, such

as «rational» and «free» are not referred to as natural.

d) Natural as distinguished from supernatural: it is natural for man to have

spiritual dimensions; in fact, these belong to his proper way of being,

although they are the result of a divine action. On the contrary, a miracle,

for example, or any thing beyond that which corresponds to the proper

way of being of things, is supernatural. Ordinarily, that which is spiritual

and that which is supernatural are confused.

The above analysis shows that the terms «nature» and «natural» are not

univocally determined. We shall propose a characterization of the natural to distinguish

it from the artificial and the spiritual9.

3.2 Characterization of the physical world

We shall focus our attention on two basic aspects of the natural, i.e. the existence

of an autonomous dynamism and of structural patterns. They are real dimensions of the

natural; actually they constantly show up in the ordinary experience as well as in the

scientific knowledge. That which is natural has its own dynamism whose unfolding

obeys time patterns and produces space structures which, in their turn, are the source of

new unfoldings of the natural dynamism. Hence, that which is natural can be

characterized by an intertwining between dynamism and space-time structuring in such

a way that space-time structures revolve around specific patterns which are repeated.

Nature possesses its own dynamism independently from man’s action on it. Such

dynamism unfolds through a great variety of processes in accordance with space-time

patterns. Dynamism and structuring are basic and closely inter-related aspects of nature.

Structures are the result of the unfolding of the dynamism and, in their turn, they are the

sources of new unfoldings of the same dynamism. Such an intertwining between

dynamism and structuring provides a decisive key for interpreting nature in a realistic

way.

a) The dynamism of nature

Nature has its own consistency. Man can interfere with the natural processes but

he cannot change their laws. Autonomy of the natural implies, in a negative way, that it

is independent from man’s intervention and, in a positive way, that it has its own

dynamism.

9 This characterization is original and it was first published in M.ARTIGAS, La inteligibilidad de la naturaleza, 2

nd ed.,

EUNSA, Pamplona 1995. The first chapter of this book analyzes the proposed characterization, while the other chapters

deal with its implications.

Dynamism comes from the Greek dynamis which means force, power, capacity.

When we say that natural things have their own dynamism, we imply that they are not

mere passive subjects whose movement is something added to them from outside but

that they have their own activity, an internal dynamism which is only in part dependent

on the actions suffered from outside.

This nature’s dynamism is experienced at ordinary level as well as at scientific

level.

Before the ordinary experience, this dynamism appears at all levels: in the living,

in the stars, in the atmospheric phenomena, in the air, in water and on earth, with its

earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, shows very clearly that natural

dynamism is a basic characteristic of the natural entities at all levels (microphysical –

subatomic particles, atoms and molecules – as well as macro physical – observable

entities). Microphysical entities are neither passive nor immutable. Physico-chemical

compounds (from the minerals to the stars, passing through the liquids and gases) have a

dynamism which sometimes passes unnoticed owing to the presence of states of

equilibrium. These, though, are dynamic states which can undergo changes whenever

appropriate conditions are present. This dynamism is ultimately evident in the living

beings.

The previous considerations show the fact that there is no such a thing as a

purely inert or passive matter. If sometimes material entities appear to be inert or

passive it is so only in relation to certain conditions or particular points of view. They

are realities found in a state of equilibrium and their components have a dynamism

which can unfold in other circumstances. In a condition of equilibrium, though, the

forces involved compensate one another and do not produce detectable effects.

Philosophy has always been acquainted with the dynamism of natural entities

and therefore it is not a new idea for it. It is present in Aristotle’s conception of the

world, and Leibniz10

speaks clearly about it: it has been stressed in recent times from the

scientific as well as from the philosophical standpoint11

.

In view of the fact that life is usually defined as self movement, the previous

statements about autonomous dynamism of the natural may seem to dilute the difference

between the living and the non living beings. Actually, life not only presupposes an

autonomous dynamism but also an organization of its components which cooperate as a

10

See G.W.LEIBNIZ, De primae philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae, in C.J.GERHARDT (publisher),

Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Georg Olms, Hildesheim 1965, vol.4, pp. 469-470. 11

For instance, Antonio Millán Puelles claims that “no entity is absolutely inactive…. An absolutely inactive entity would

be one which does absolutely nothing, not even to keep oneself in being. It would therefore be an entity kept in being by

another or others. Moreover, the whole of its being would be reduced to «to be kept» and therefore to pure passivity, a

complete «being-made-by-others»” : A.M.PUELLES, Léxico filosófico, Rialp, Madrid 1984, p.436. Juan Enrique Bolzán

has proposed a re-formulation of the philosophy of nature in which he gives first priority to the dynamism of the physical

entities: J.E. BOLZAN, “Fundamentacion de una ontologia de la naturaleza”, Sapientia (Buenos Aires), 41 (1986), pp. 121-

132.

whole and make it possible for the functions proper to life to be actualized.

Consequently, to have an autonomous dynamism does not necessarily mean to have life.

b) Structural patterns

Structuring is the second, but not less important, fundamental characteristic of

the natural entities12

. Nature appears to the ordinary experience as constituted by time-

space structures; scientific progress entails therefore an always wider and deeper

knowledge of the natural structures. Hence, it is essential to take structuring into account

in order to make a realistic characterization of nature.

The meaning of the term structure is wide13

. In general, a structure is a

distribution of parts mutually related which form a whole.

The characteristic structure of the natural possesses space and time dimensions:

natural entities are configured in space, and their dynamism unfolds in time. Although

ordinarily the term «structure» is used in the sense of space dimension, here we refer

also to the time dimension, i.e. both the entities and their processes.

There is a great variety of structures in nature and many times they have

common and repeatable characters. Nature is built around characteristic repetitive

structures which we will call here patterns. Patterns are of paramount importance for an

adequate representation of nature.

Nature appears to ordinary experience as a totality of well define structures. The

clearest example is the one of the living organisms: these have a type of structure

organized as a whole in which the different parts perform specific functions and work in

accordance with characteristic temporal rhythms. Non-living organisms also appear to

be characterized by space and time structuring.

Scientific progress widens our knowledge of the space and time structuring of

nature, and this includes also those areas which are very far from ordinary experience.

The examples can be easily multiplied; it is not even necessary to make recourse to

specific cases: any scientific achievement is an example of this type. Actually, the

knowledge sought after by the experimental sciences is the one which can be related to

experimental control. Such control, though, is possible only when there are aspects

which repeat themselves, at least at the beginning, and therefore, when there are

patterns. Consequently, the more scientific progress advances, the wider becomes the

area of phenomena which can be related to experimental control, and the wider becomes

our knowledge of the space and time patterns. Nature is not only deeply marked by

structuring, but also by the existence of structures which are repeated, i.e. of patterns14

.

12

Jean Marie Aubert stresses the importance of structuring of the natural entities as a solid basis for the reasoning of the

philosophy of nature. See J.M.AUBERT, Filosofia de la naturaleza, 6th

ed., Herder, Barcelona 1987, pp. 301-319. 13

See J.C.CRUZ, Filosofia de la estructura, 2nd

ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1974. 14

“Our world is made of patterns. If we had to describe the fundamental property of the matter of the universe, we would

have to say that matter is made –or created- in such a way that it shows a continuously accelerated development of

The term structure is wider than pattern. Actually any space and time

arrangement of natural has a structure. Therefore, structuring is not equivalent to

existence of a pattern. We talk of patterns whenever we come across structures which

are repeated. In principle any natural structure is repeatable provided that the conditions

which have caused its existence, are repeated. However, we talk about patterns only

when structures are actually repeated.

Our world is not one among the many possible: ours is a very specific world

which is marked, at all levels, by equally specific patterns. The structure of nature is

deeply marked by the existence of patterns. Not everything in nature is pattern, but

everything rotates around patterns. This statement has profound scientific as well as

philosophical implications; it actually expresses the highly specific and singular

character of our world.

Space structures refer to the order which the components of the natural entities

have: they can be called configurations. Time structures refer to the processes, i.e. to the

unfolding in time of natural dynamism. Many natural processes unfold according to

characteristic patterns which can be called rhythms.

c) The intertwining between dynamism and structuring

It has been shown how natural entities possess their own dynamism and a space-

time structure: the two are also intertwined.

Dynamism and structuring are constantly present in nature and condition each

other. Their relationship is not only external but deeply intertwined, so that one can

speak of their interpenetration or co penetration. Because of this, it can be stated that the

unfolding of dynamism produces space structures, while space structuring is the origin

of new dynamisms. Natural dynamism is somehow stored in space structures with their

own potentialities or virtualities whose unfolding depends on the external

circumstances.

There is proportionality between space organization and dynamism: the

unfolding of the dynamism of natural entities depends on the configuration of the latter.

The structure of organs and systems in the living organisms is responsible for their

specific activities and functions.

What is natural is characterized by the intertwining between dynamism and

structuring, which is the same as saying by its activity. Actually, this intertwining

expresses the type of activity that corresponds to natural entities: natural activity is the

result of an inner dynamism whose unfolding depends on the circumstances, but not

only on them. The unfolding of this dynamism is intertwined with space-time

structuring in such a way that dynamism and structuring are mutually conditioned, as it

has already been explained: this dynamism unfolds in accordance with time patterns,

and space structures are not only the result of this dynamism, but also the source of new

patterns”: CARSTEN BRESH, “What is Evolution?”, in S.ANDERSEN – A.PEACOCKE (publishers), Evolution and

Creation, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus 1987, p.36.

dynamisms. Therefore, what is natural can be characterized as the intertwining between

dynamism and structuring.

To characterize the natural realm in this way means that strictly speaking it is not

possible to really distinguish matter from the laws of its behaviour. Such a distinction is

legitimate in science which uses a particular methodological perspective. Properly

speaking, though, laws are found somehow incorporated or inscribed in matter and their

formulation corresponds to an abstraction. It is necessary to limit oneself to

experimental situations able to control the intervening factors in order to formulate

scientific laws. Such laws correspond to reality, but they are valid only in very specific

circumstances, and they do not exhaust the richness of the being of the natural entities.

3.3. The boundaries of the natural

Characterized in this way, what is natural can be distinguished from what is

artificial and what is rational.

a) Natural and artificial

Strictly speaking what is artificial lacks its own dynamism, while its natural

component parts have it. What is artificial has a space-time structure which corresponds

to an external plan conceived by a maker. Therefore, the structure of an artificial object

is not the result of its own dynamism. Natural dynamism has its own consistency which

is independent from the human will. In manufacturing, man makes use of the natural

dynamism, but he cannot modify it.

It is important to distinguish between ways of producing something and the final

result. It may happen that man’s action on nature produces entities which are identical to

natural entities; these may either exist already or not, yet have the structural and

dynamic unity characteristic of the natural entities. What is artificial in this case is our

intervention in the process of producing such entities. Even in this case, though, we are

unable to modify the original dynamism of nature: we can only channel it. We may say

that there is gradualness in what is natural and in what is artificial because there are

intermediate levels which participate in being in both ways, besides the pure extreme

cases. However, all processes lean ultimately on the inner dynamism and structuring of

what is natural.

b) Natural and rational

Man’s activity is the result of a dynamism which transcends those space-time

structures with which it is related. Intellectual knowledge includes evidence and truth,

the capacity of reflecting on the acquired knowledge, the possibility of building

arguments and examining their validity. Rationality implies establishing goals and

choosing means, i.e. the exercise of the will which includes freedom, capacity of loving

and ethical behaviour.

The exercise of these capacities is related to what is natural (we are natural

beings and not pure spirits). Yet rationality transcends what is natural. While natural

dynamism is conditioned by space-time patterns, rational activity can overcome them, at

least with the intelligence and the will.

Man’s relationship with nature is unique. Although subject to natural laws, man

can nevertheless contemplate them from without, know them and use them. Man is

immersed in nature while at the same time he transcends it, contemplates it,

conceptualises it, objectifies and controls it.

3.4. Properties of what is natural

When we usually say that natural entities are corporeal, sensible, material,

spatial-temporal, quantitative and necessary (as opposed to free) we actually refer to

their properties. The following analysis will try to show how the proposed

characterisation of nature as intertwining between dynamism and structuring perfectly

includes these properties, and how its use may also avoid the inconveniences which may

arise whenever one defines what is natural in function of those properties.

a) The corporeal property

What is corporeal is usually defined as that which has space dimensions, i.e.

extension. Although extension is a very important characteristic of natural entities, it is

nevertheless dangerous to identify what is natural with what is corporeal because in this

case the dynamism, fundamental characteristic of what is natural, would be left out.

Moreover, since the term body is usually employed to indicate the solid state of

matter, the identification of natural with corporeal would inevitably leave out the

aqueous and gaseous systems, as much natural and important as the solid ones. The

fields of forces in physics are also left out from the definition of corporeal, although

they are natural and play a very important role in the sciences of nature.

There is a more serious difficulty: although extension is something that belongs

to what is natural, it does not really connote its proper way of being; actually even

artefacts are bodies. Therefore we can say that the adjective «corporeal» is not sufficient

to distinguish what is natural from what is artificial.

On the other hand, the proposed characterization of nature in terms of dynamism

and structuring does not offer the same shortcoming. Actually, it includes the dynamism

proper to what is natural, it applies to entities as well as to properties and processes, it

covers all the states of matter, it includes not only corporeal entities but also fields of

forces which are also natural, it makes it possible to distinguish between natural and

artificial.

b) The sensible property

In other occasions what is natural is said to be sensible. Here a very important

aspect of our ordinary experience is being stressed, i.e. the physical world as perceived

by our senses. Definitely such a characterization is incomplete and lacks depth.

It is incomplete since it leaves out many natural entities such as the

microphysical ones which are accessible to our observation only indirectly. This

problem could be easily sorted out by expanding the notion of sensible so as to include

anything which is causally related to what we can perceive with our senses. This

solution is legitimate, though it requires precision for a rigorous meaning; the objection

arises, for instance, that human intelligence and will act on physical realities without

themselves being physical realities.

It lacks depth since natural entities have sensible as well as intelligible

dimensions. Moreover, the sensible refers to our possibilities of observation which are

external to the natural entities. Therefore, the term sensible does not reflect the

characteristics proper to the what is natural.

These shortcomings are avoided if what is natural is characterized through

dynamism and structuring. Dynamism does not make reference to our knowledge; it is

actually found in reality. The material character of what is natural is sufficiently

expressed if we include space-time structuring; at the same time we avoid defining what

is natural in terms of our capacity for knowledge.

c) The material property

What is natural and what is material are frequently made to mean the same

thing. In this way one stumbles into a plurality of meanings included in the concept of

matter.

Sometime the terms sensible and corporeal are identified with the term material.

In this case, we shall meet with the difficulties already mentioned with regard to these

two properties.

In other occasions, the term material indicates everything which acts as a

component, i.e. that of which something is made. It is one of the most classical

meanings of matter in philosophy as well as in ordinary life. It is, though, quite

inadequate to characterise what is natural.

Besides, what is material is different from what is immaterial. Actually, what is

immaterial can be natural: for instance, there is a certain degree of immateriality in the

sense knowledge which, nevertheless, belongs to the natural level.

The material is also distinct from the rational or spiritual. In this case, it will be

necessary to explain the nature of this distinction by using other explanations.

In its most philosophical meaning, material is distinct from formal; moreover,

what is formal is also found in nature so that it can also be considered a characteristic of

what is natural natural. What is formal is more important than what is material since it

makes reference to the determination of the way of being of natural entities.

It seems preferable, then, to characterise what is natural in terms of dynamism

and structuring. This makes it possible to distinguish what is natural from what is

rational, and helps avoid the misunderstandings previously mentioned; it can actually

include, without any shortcomings, the immaterial as well as the formal dimensions of

what is natural.

d) Space-time properties

The term natural includes space-time structuring and, consequently, makes

reference to space and time. Space and time express basic dimensions of the natural

entities.

Although they belong to the natural entities they are only dimensions and, as

such, insufficient to characterize what is natural. Actually, even what is artificial

possesses space-time dimensions. They are necessary conditions, albeit insufficient, for

the conceptualization of what is natural natural.

As already seen, space-time structuring is intertwined with the dynamism of

which it is the result and condition. Therefore, space-time structuring alone is

insufficient for the characterization of what is natural.

e) The quantitative property

The quantitative property makes reference to those dimensions which stem from

quantity (extension, divisibility, localization, etc.). As such, it is a primary characteristic

of the physical world.

Actually, any definition of nature should include a reference to the quantitative

characteristics. Like space-time properties, though, (closely related to quantity)

quantitative aspects are a condition, albeit not sufficient, to express the characteristics of

the natural since it is also characteristic of the artefacts. Actually, quantitative aspects

are unable to express the existence of a dynamism proper to what is natural.

On the other hand, the proposed space-time structuring includes reference to the

quantitative without reducing the natural to the quantitative.

f) The property of necessity

What is natural is usually referred to as necessary in opposition to what is

rational, the area of freedom. Here reference is made to the activity which is proper to

what is natural: an activity whose unfolding follows necessary patterns.

Although it seems legitimate to oppose natural necessity to the free activity

proper to a rational being, this ultimately means denial of freedom. To say that, unlike

free beings, natural entities act in a necessary way, simply means that the latter lack that

freedom which is proper to rational beings. If, on the other hand, one wants to clarify

what natural necessity consists in, one has to tackle the problem of determinism, an issue

which is far from trivial.

On the other hand, neither dynamism nor space-time structuring lead to a

determinist conception of what is natural; they actually leave open the problem of

indeterminism. The proposed characterisation of what is natural makes it possible to

distinguish what is natural from what is rational and avoids, at the same time, the

shortcomings which may arise when it is said that what is natural behaves in a rigidly

determinist way.

3.5. The Aristotelian characterization of the natural

The proposed characterisation of what is natural in terms of dynamism,

structuring and their intertwining contains the essential aspects of the same

characterisation proposed by Aristotle who presented nature as inner principle of

activity.

To cite Aristotle’s text: “Among the existing things, some exist by nature, while

some by other causes. Animals and their parts, plants and the elementary bodies (earth,

fire, air ,water) all exist by nature……nature is principle and cause of movement and

rest for those things in which it is present immediately per se and not per accidens”15

.

With these last words, Aristotle stresses the fact that natural is distinct from accidental

(understood as that which results from the fortuitous occurrence of causes or casual).

Nature, according to Aristotle, is an inner principle of activity, only present in

natural entities (usually called substances)16

. Natural entities par excellence are the

living ones, whose development and activity are the result of inner tendencies.

According to Aristotle, natural is distinct from artificial; the latter as such does

not have inner tendencies (those tendencies are present only in their natural

components). Natural is distinct from casual which is the result of the accidental

coincidence of natural causes and which, therefore, does not have determined ends.

Natural is distinct from the violent which proceeds from external causes preventing the

realisation of its natural tendencies and, therefore, the achievement of its natural end.

What is natural is found closely related to tendencies towards determined ends. The

Aristotelian philosophy of nature is teleological, since it is centred in the finality of the

substances, each with its own inner tendencies which are also cooperatively organised to

form the different system of nature.

Aristotle’s ideas are contained within a worldview which is partly obsolete

owing to the progress of science. This is the reason why they are usually said to have

lost value17

. Without doubt the Aristotelian worldview includes theories about the four

elements, natural movements and heavenly bodies: all this does not hold water

nowadays. However, the Aristotelian characterisation of nature does not depend on this

type of worldview and preserves its value in its essentials18

.

15

ARISTOTLE, Physica, II, 1, 192 b 8-23. 16

Ibid., 192 b 33-34. 17

A. Mansion, for example, who is one of the main modern scholars of Aristotle has stated that the Aristotle’s definition is

too fragile since it is based on a very superficial analysis of the daily experience and of the ordinary language. He adds that

the weakness of this definition has repercussions on his entire natural philosophy: see A.MANSION, Introduction à la

physique aristotélicienne, 2nd

ed., Vrin, Paris 1945, p.101 18

See A.PREVOSTI, La Física d’Aristòtil. Una ciència filosòfica de la natura, Promociones Publicaciones Universitarias,

Barcelona 1984, pp.207-239; A.QUEVEDO, «Ens per accidens». Contingencia y determinación enAristóteles, EUNSA,

Pamplona 1989, pp.219-261.

Is there any relationship between the Aristotelian characterisation of nature and

the one we have proposed? Both stress the internal dynamism of what is natural as

opposed to what is artificial. Besides, in claiming that such dynamism unfolds according

to patterns, we have also stressed its directionality, and this concept is also related to

Aristotelian finality. Although Aristotle does not mention space-time structuring in

defining nature, nevertheless, when he describes entities and activities, he makes it

understood that these exist in space and time situations. The two positions actually

coincide in their general essential lines.

II. THE NATURAL ENTITIES

Dynamism and structuring do not have existence of their own; they are present

in subjects which are the natural entities. There is a wide variety of natural entities with

different degrees of individuality, unity and organization.

Natural entities are represented by concepts such as substance with a long

standing philosophical tradition, and system which is very much in use nowadays. We

shall use both concepts and we shall try to show how the characterisation of natural

entities as systems makes it possible to represent the great variety of entities in nature

and to apply the concept of substance to individual unitary systems.

The first section of this chapter analyses the notion of system, its implications

and the types of natural systems. A notion of substance is proposed which corresponds

to the natural individual unitary systems. The last section deals with the topic on how

substantiality is actualized at the different levels of nature.

4. NATURAL SYSTEMS

We shall use the notion of system to represent individual entities, their groupings

and their articulation in the global system of Nature. We shall continue examining its

meaning and the different types of entities to which it is applied, focusing our attention

on natural systems.

4.1 The notion of system

The term system comes from the Greek syn (with, together with) and hístemi (to

put, to place). It expresses the idea of an object placed next to another, or others,

constituting an order, a succession, a whole. It is related to the term synthesis which

means composition, ordination, adjustment, harmony. It is used to designate a set of

intertwined rules or principles (for instance, a system of government), a combination of

bodies and movements which, although different, yet form a whole (for instance, the

solar system), a set or organs or similar parts which work together in the same function

(for example, the nervous system). In general, any series, or ordination, or succession is

a system (political, philosophical, metric, etc.). A system is concatenation, order,

correlation, harmony.

Without any further detailing, the notion of system is so general that it can be

applied somehow to any set whose components bear some relation to one another.

However, it is a term used in those cases in which there is a very strong unity,

particularly from the time in which the general theory of systems was formulated19

.

19

This theory is based on the works of Ludwig von Bertalanffy: General System Theory, George Braziller, New

York 1969; Perspectivas en la teoría general de sistemas, Alianza, Madrid 1986. An analysis of the central concepts of this

It is necessary to distinguish between the scientific and the philosophical use of

the notion of system. In the experimental sciences each branch adopts a particular

perspective and defines systems, their properties and states in function of this

perspective. For instance systems in thermodynamics and their states can be defined in

terms of pressure, temperature and volume. Therefore, these systems are not a complete

representation of the natural entities; they actually refer to some aspects which are

selectively considered by that branch of science. On the other hand, philosophy

considers systems as they are in nature but from the point of view of their fundamental

way of being (without presuming to exhaust this knowledge). Our reflection will

logically take into account the knowledge provided by science directing its attention,

though, to the natural systems with the purpose of determining their way of being from a

philosophical perspective.

4.2. Types of natural systems

There is a wide variety of systems in nature. We shall not exhaust their

classification; this would involve a mammoth task and the results would not have much

philosophical interest. Philosophy is interested in analysing some general types of

systems and in studying the peculiar characteristics of those which present a stronger

unity. It is thanks to these types of systems that nature possesses a very special

organisation.

We distinguish two main groups of systems in function of the integration of their

components. We call unitary systems those whose components are integrated in such a

way that they present the characters of unity and individuality. We distinguish these

systems from those which, although possessing certain unity, do not show characters of

individuality, i.e. mixtures, aggregations, systems of order and ecosystems.

a) Unitary systems

It is generally admitted that there are many natural entities at all levels in nature

which are authentic unitary systems. They are systems in which structural and dynamic

novelties appear (emergence of new characteristics). New structural patterns are formed

as a result of the interaction of their components, and the characteristics of the system

are not reducible to a mere sum of the characteristics of its components. These systems

are individual, have a new unitary structure and possess their own dynamism.

Unitary systems have different degrees of unity and organization. Some show

unity at structural as well as at dynamic level: these are systems with a high level of

integration, cooperation and directionality among their components. This is particularly

the case of the living beings.

theory can be found in S.S.ROBBINS – T.A.OLIVA: “The Empirical Identification of Fifty-one Core General Systems

Theory Vocabulary Components”, General Systems, 28 (1983-1984), pp. 69-76.

Although unity and individuality are the main characteristics of unitary systems,

this does not mean total independence of these systems from other entities, but yes a

certain degree of independence, since they have their own structure and dynamism.

Unity refers to the effective integration of the components of the system and it is

manifested in its structuring (holism or character of totality) as well as in its dynamism

(cooperation).

b) Other systems

Other systems have some character of unity, but they lack individuality: this

seems to be the case of mixtures, aggregations, systems of order and ecosystems. In this

case, the components preserve their individuality and their basic characters, while the

system acquires a lesser level of individuality as compared with the one of unitary

systems. Here the notion of system becomes weak, but still applicable since there are

structural relations which imply a certain unity.

In the case of mixtures, the components preserve their individuality without

forming a new unitary system. This feature admits various levels; at the lowest it is a

mere juxtaposition and the term system is loosely applied to it without much interest.

However in some cases this unity is greater and the term system is used in a weak way.

For instance, the natural aggregations of water in the seas and rivers are sufficiently

homogeneous and, although there are no new chemical patterns in it, there are

nevertheless structures and dynamisms in it of a systemic type.

In the systems of order we find that their components are individual and

completely differentiated systems which are ordered through stable relations so that

their mutual interactions produce situations with stable characteristics. This is the case

of the solar system in which the various planetary orbits follow regular patterns.

Ecosystems are the object of ecology. An ecosystem is a complex system with a

set of subsystems of different types. They have a certain unity since there are relations

of mutual dependence among their components, and their own dynamism20

.

5. NATURAL SUBSTANCES

Since ancient times the concept of substance has been used to connote natural

entities. It is one of the central philosophical concepts and an object of different

20

The notion of ecosystem was formulated by Arthur G. Tansley in his article “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational

Concepts and Terms”, Ecology, 16 (1935), pp. 284-307, where he stated: “Las tramas de la vida, ajustadas a determinados

complejos ambientales, son verdaderas unidades a veces muy integradas, que constituyen los nucleos vivientes de sistemas,

en el sentido que dan los fisicos a esta palabra…Dentro de cada sistema tienen lugar intercambios de muchas clases, no solo

entre los organismos, sino tambien entre el mundo organico y el inorganico. Estos ecosistemas, como preferimos llamarlos,

puede ser de muchas clases y tamaños, formando una de las categorias de los distintos tipos de sistemas fisicos del

Universo, que van desde el Universo como un todo hasta el atomo”. See P.BECO, voz «Ecosistema» in VV.AA.,

Diccionario de la naturaleza, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1993, pp.198-202.

interpretations in every époque. We shall show how the previous considerations about

natural systems cast new lights on the concept of substance and of its applications in our

times.

5.1. Notion of substance

We shall first propose a characterisation of substance which will be our basis for

further reflections.

Substances can be characterised as entities whose way of being has three

characteristics: subsistence, subjectivity and unity.

Subsistence means that a substance has its own being. This makes it different

from accidents, such as the size and colour which do not exist separately: they only exist

as determinations of a subsistent subject.

Subjectivity means that the substance is the subject of attribution of properties

and activities. The term is closely related to subsistence; actually the subject to which

properties and activity are attributed is the entity which has subsistence, or its own

being.

Unity, characteristic of the substance, consists in having an essence, or a way of

being which is organised as a whole. This makes it possible to identify the subject and

persists throughout the accidental changes.

These characteristics summarise the classical characterisation of substance as

that entity whose essence is to be in itself and not in another. Substance has a way of

being organized as a whole, an essence, whose characteristic is to subsist with its own

being. On the contrary, it is proper to accidents to be in another: they do not have their

own being, since they are determinations of the substance.

5.2. Substance in Aristotle’s philosophy

The concept of substance is a central topic in Aristotle’s philosophy, and the way

in which he characterises it still preserves a privileged position nowadays21

, in spite of

the criticism it has received in history.

Aristotle poses the problem of substance as the key problem in philosophy, since

it corresponds to establishing what an entity is, what reality is made of, and what reality

is properly speaking.

21

The importance of Aristotle’s idea about substance for the study of nature has been stated in many present day

studies, from perspectives which our quite different from ours. See for instance: M.ESPINOZA, “Critique de la science

antisubstantialiste”, Theoria, 5 (1990), pp. 67-84, and “La catégorie naturelle ultime”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,

98 (1993), pp. 367-393.

According to Aristotle, being (ens) is spoken of with different meanings, i.e.

essence, quantity, quality, etc. Its first meaning, though, is essence which signifies the

substance. The fact is that when we ask: “what is this”? we do not say “this is white” or

“this is hot” or “this is three meters long”. We actually say: “This is a man” or “this is a

tree”. All the rest is said to be ens because it is either quantity or quality or effects of the

substance. That which is not substance does not have its own existence, nor can it be

separated from the substance, so that ens, in its primary meaning, is the substance. Only

the substance has its own existence; moreover, all the other categories presuppose the

substance and we know something in particular when we know what it is. Therefore, the

substance is the first object of the philosophical study22

.

The term substance speaks ultimately of the way of being of those beings (entes)

which have their own being (esse). For instance, to be a plant or to be a man implies a

substantial way of being, different from what is expressed by the accidents, such as to be

white or to be two meters long. A substance does not inhere in another and therefore is

not predicated of another (the verb to inhere means that something has its being (esse)

in another, that it is an accident of a substantial subject). A substance is a being (ens)

capable of subsisting separately, autonomously, in itself and by itself; it is something

determined, neither universal nor abstract; it has intrinsic unity, it is not a mere

aggregate of multiple parts; it is act, actuality, and not potentiality without

actualization23

.

When Aristotle applies the notion of substance to concrete entities he does so in

answer to the question: “what are substances”? He emphasises the fact that

substantiality is more clearly defined in animals, plants and their parts, and in the natural

bodies (fire, water, earth and similar) with their parts and what makes them up (the

heavens and their parts, the stars, the moon, the sun)24

.

According to Aristotle, in the material realm, only natural entities are

substances. Substances are distinct from mere aggregations in which parts preserve their

essence. They are also distinct from artificial entities, or artefacts, which do not have an

intrinsic unity but only a functional one.

Aristotle’s view does not include the concept of creation and, as such, is unable

to give an ultimate explanation of substance. According to him, the first mover moves as

a final cause, without producing being (esse). Aquinas made use of Aristotle’s ideas

integrating them within a different perspective which rotates around creation. The

material substance becomes intelligible because its reason d’être is found in creation, in

the divine intelligence and will. Creation is the ultimate foundation of being in nature.

The divine plan of creation is seen as the diffusion of the divine perfection and goodness

with their consequent participation by the creatures (especially by man, rational creature

capable of knowing and loving God), and this plan makes the created reality intelligible.

22

See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, VII, 1, 1028 a 10 – b 7. 23

Ibid., VII, 3, 1029 a 7 ss. 24

Ibid., VII, 2, 1028 b 8-13.

Aquinas’ perspective on substance makes use of Aristotle’s ideas integrated,

though, into a new one which notably enriches them. Aquinas’ doctrine rotates around

the actus essendi (the act of being) of creatures: this is received by participation from

the divine Being. God does not have being (esse), He is Being. His way of being, or

essence, consists in the fullness of Being, and He produces the being of creatures by

creation. Created substances, in their entity as well as in their intelligibility, remit to

their being (esse) which they have as their own although received by God. Their being

(esse) is realised in accordance with their concrete way of being which is expressed by

the essence.

5.3 Substances and unitary systems

We have characterised unitary systems as having a clearly differentiated

individuality and a strong unity. Actually, substances also have these two

characteristics: they are individual subjects with a structural unity. Therefore, one can

say that unitary systems correspond to the notion of substance. Substances are

individual systems which have that unity characteristic of a whole, have their own

organisation and, ultimately, a way of being organised as a whole. For this reason we

claim that unitary systems correspond to the notion of substance.

There is a great variety of systems in nature and many of them are not organised

as a whole. However, even these are the result of a dynamism which unfolds around

unitary systems; they are made of unitary systems and are produced as a result of the

interactions of the latter. We can claim that not everything in nature is substance, but

everything is organized around substances.

5.4. Characteristics of natural substances

We now refer to the three basic characteristics of substance which have been

already mentioned (subsistence, subjectivity and unity). They will be analysed in the

light of the identification made between substances and unitary systems.

a) Substances are the natural entities in their full meaning

Living beings occupy a privileged position among natural entities because they

are systems which show forth the organisation of nature in a most clear way; they are

individual systems organised as a whole whose components cooperate in a functional

way. Other natural entities have also such a strong unity as to be classified as unitary

systems. The notion of substance connotes being (ens) in a primary way: this is

expressed by the identification made between unitary systems and substance. Substance

is that natural entity which has its own and characteristic way of being. To be a

substance is the basic way of being and to be subject of accidental modifications.

Substance as being (ens) in its primary meaning, expresses what a natural entity is par

excellence.

For this reason, the notion of substance is a basic category needed in order to

conceptualise the physical world: it expresses being (ens) in its proper sense, and

everything else is referred to it. To say that substance is the central category is the same

as saying that all the other aspects of nature presuppose it and refer to it.

The real existence of natural unitary systems shows the fact that substance is not

a simple mental need, it actually reflects real ways of being. The natural substance is not

an object of fantasy added to the data provided by experience (as Empiricism teaches); it

is a real entity, the centre of the intertwining between dynamism and structuring.

Substance is the primary way of being and all the other ways of being make reference to

it, i.e. aggregations of substances and accidents.

b) Substances are the subject of natural dynamism

Natural unitary systems are in no way passive subjects; on the contrary the

dynamism of nature unfolds in them in a specific way: they are the source of specific

activities. Dynamism is not a mere movement added from without to the unitary

systems; it is rather the result of an energy which unfolds from within according to

certain patterns. Following the identification of substance with natural unitary systems,

one can say that substances are the subjects of the natural dynamism.

Substances are the centre of dynamism and structuring; this fact is clearly shown

by science whose method of investigation is specific and different from the

philosophical one. Actually, the quest for organizations characterised by unity which are

at the origin of processes, and which are the natural results of these processes, occupies

a very important place in science. Such organisations are the unitary systems. The

intertwining between dynamism and structuring is clearly evident in them; their

dynamism, characterised by a unity of efforts, bears relation to their structure which, in

its turn, is the result, as a whole, of natural processes.

Unitary systems, and therefore substances, are the results of the unfolding of

natural dynamism. Their existence depends on specific conditions and, if these are not

present, systems fail to come into existence and, if they exist, they would stop existing.

This is equivalent to saying that natural substances do not have absolute consistency,

independent from the circumstances. Their being and activities are contingent since they

depend on contingent conditions. Therefore natural substances are not immutable,

indestructible and absolutely permanent subjects.

Substances are ultimately immersed in the natural dynamism of which they

are source and result. They keep in existence as long as suitable conditions persist, and

unfold their dynamism through processes usually called accidental changes since the

substance is not radically affected by them. On the contrary, when those conditions

suitable to their existence disappear substantial changes intervene in which the whole

substance is transformed. The system then loses its characteristic consistency and

another system, or others, is produced. The consistency proper to each substance is

related to its structural unity.

c) The substance is a structural unity

It was pointed out that the term substance refers to the structural unity; if there is

no unity there is no true substance but a mere aggregation. Again, this characteristic

becomes evident when the substance is identified with the natural unitary systems, so

called because of their structural unity.

Structural unity implies a certain order. This unity is particularly strong when

there is an authentic organization and not just a generic type of order. In this case the

components cooperate towards the existence and activity of the system in a functional

way. This is particularly evident in the case of the living beings in which the structure

prevails over the components: considered in their specific materiality, the components

change continuously while the basic structure persist throughout these changes.

Moreover, the existence and activity of each component is conditioned by the

cooperative functionality of the other components within the structural organization as a

whole.

The natural substance has, therefore, its own way of being and this is

characterized by a specific structural unity; it is a basic core which persists throughout

multiple changes which do not manage to modify it (accidental changes). Its way of

being can nevertheless be changed into another way of being when suitable conditions

cease to be present (substantial change).

5.5. Mechanism, subjectivism, processualism

We shall consider some conceptions about the substance which are quite

different from the one so far considered: the Cartesian mechanism, the Kantian

subjectivism and the processualism.

a) The Cartesian mechanism

Mechanism had already been proposed by the ancient atomists (Leucippus,

Democritus, Epicures, Lucretius Caro). With the systematic birth of modern physics-

mathematics in the 17th

century, mechanism was defended by scientists and

philosophers as a philosophy pretty coherent with the new science. It became very

influential in the 18th

and 19th

centuries.

The mechanistic philosophy was explicitly formulated by Descartes. The central

tenets of the Cartesian mechanism are the following: a corporeal substance is nothing

but extension, all the properties of a substance are aspects of quantity, (i.e. dimensions,

form and movement), the whole movement is nothing but local movement (i.e.

displacement of parts of matter)25

.

In this perspective, nature is left without internal dynamism. More precisely,

Descartes considered the movement of the bodies as the result of an original impulse

communicated to them by God when He created them. He added that, owing to the

divine immutability, the quantity of this movement would remain constant in time26

.

On the other hand, the Cartesian mechanism eliminates the distinction between

the natural and the artificial: everything corporeal can be explained in accordance with

the same principles. For instance, living beings would basically be like any other

machine. The only distinction admitted by Descartes is between the corporeal-material

and the spiritual. In accordance with this radical dualism, the human being is composed

of two complete substances, soul and body which communicate between themselves in

an extrinsic way, without ever establishing one substance only.

Descartes defined substance as “that thing which exists in such a way that does

not need any other thing in order to exist”27

. This definition, though, is quite confusing.

Actually, the same Descartes immediately realized that, strictly speaking, this definition

can only be applied to God while creatures need divine intervention in order to exist.

Descartes claimed that the existence of the thinking I is the basic certitude and

the foundation of any other certitude. The “I” thinks, doubts, understands, conceives,

states, denies, wants, imagines and feels: it is a thinking substance or res cogitans. The

material substance, on the other hand, is a res extensa: its essential character is

extension, while qualities are nothing but modifications produced by the matter in a

knowing subject. Substances have a principal attribute which constitutes their essence:

in the case of the soul, it is thought, and in the case of the bodies, it is extension28

.

The identification of the corporeal substance with extension presents difficulties,

since extension is an accidental characteristic and, as such, unable to be the foundation

of that unity required by the substance. Descartes claims that extension corresponds to

the clear and distinct idea one has about bodies; actually, it is an image which can be

studied in a geometrical way. In his efforts to provide a philosophical basis for the new

mathematical science of nature, Descartes reduced the corporeal substance to its

geometrical aspects. This reduction cannot be founded rigorously and presents serious

difficulties. For instance, one of the difficulties is related to the knowledge of

substances: “how can we know a corporeal substance after stripping it of all its

properties and reducing it to pure extension? It is an issue at loggerhead with reality.

Within the perspective of Descartes, the corporeal substance lacks internal

dynamism and tendencies and is reduced to a kind of passive and inert substratum. The

25

See R.DESCARTES, Principia Philosophiae, 1st part, No. 53 (in Oeuvres, published by C.Adams and

P.Tannery, Vrin, Paris 1964, Vol. IX-2, p.48), and 2nd

part, No. 23 (ibid., p.75) 26

Ibid., 2nd

part, No.36 (in Oeuvre, Vol. IX-2, pp.83-84). 27

“Une chose qui existe en telle façon qu’elle n’a besoin que de soi-même pour exister”: R.DESCARTES,

Principia Philosophiae, op.cit., 1st part, No.51 (in Oeuvre, op.cit., Vol.IX-2, p.47).

28 Ibid., No.53 (in Oeuvre, op.cit. Vol.IX-2, p.48).

consideration of this fact sparked the subsequent criticisms against the concept of

substance in general and the rejection of the concept of natural substances in particular.

Critics have not realized, though, that what they rejected was the Cartesian concept of

substance.

The mechanistic image is just a partial explanatory model with serious

limitations also in the field of physics-mathematics. The basic mechanistic ideas are

now obsolete. Actually, even in the classical physics there were already topics (such as

forces and fields of forces) which could hardly be compatible with a mechanistic view.

Nevertheless, the success of the new physics was frequently used as a proof in favor of

mechanism. Many centuries had to pass before the limitations of mechanism appeared in

the scientific field. The scientific revolutions of the 20th

century (quantum physics and

relativity theory) have clearly shown how the mechanistic models are just one type

among many possible ones: they represent only some aspects of nature and are not

applicable to the study of many phenomena.

The identification of the corporeal with an inert and passive kind of matter,

reduced to pure extension and exteriors, is a residue of the Cartesian mechanism which

has played a very important role in the western thought.

b) The Kantian subjectivism

According to Kant substance is one of the a priori categories and, as such, it

does not have its origin in experience but it is condition and possibility of experience.

Knowledge proceeds as follows: senses provide only incoherent impressions, while

thought gives order to them. At first, this ordering takes place in space and time which

are a priori forms of the sense knowledge. Afterwards, concepts are formulated which

are also a priori and which make experience intelligible. Substance is one of these

concepts, a pure form which does not correspond to any thing real, but to our way of

conceptualizing. One cannot think without the notion of substance which expresses that

which remains throughout the changes. Such a notion enables us to organize experience

in an intelligible way. It is impossible to represent changes without a subject of change,

and this subject is what we call substance.

In the Kantian perspective substance is an a priori condition of knowledge

which enables us to think the phenomena as permanent in time, and makes it possible to

determine time. Substance is conceived as an inert and passive substratum, without its

own life: it is a notion which refers to the permanence of phenomena in time.

Kant’s ideas are conditioned by the definitive value that Kant attributed to

Newton’s physics for which he tried to give a philosophical justification. Substance,

then, became Newton’s matter: its quantum (or quantity) remains, and this corresponds

to the constancy of Newton’s mass conceived as quantity of matter. The scientific

progress has shown the limits of the Newtonian physics and therefore the limits of the

Kantian stand which intended to justify the definitive validity of this type of physics.

Kant correctly realized that science would become constructive if based on

mathematics. This is very important: actually the concepts of physics-mathematics are

not only obtained by abstraction, they are also constructed by us. It is understandable,

then, that, in using the concept of substance as the foundation of science, Kant also

claimed this concept to be our construction. Kant’s merit consists in having pointed out

the fact that, in order to assess our knowledge of nature, it is necessary to consider the

way in which we conceptualize. Nevertheless, he failed to explain how our knowledge

could have a real validity.

The Kantian stand is conditioned by a false dilemma: “is our knowledge totally

derived from sense experience, or is it totally a work of our intellect”? Senses and

intellect, totally separated from each other, would be united through intellectual

categories whose value is difficult to justify. In reality, there is a deeper continuity and

interpenetration between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, so that we know

the natural substances intellectually through their sensible accidents. There is no doubt

that the substance is a mental category, yet it ca be used to represent reality.

c) Processualism and energysm

Since the 17th

century experimental sciences have emphasized the importance of

concepts such as force and energy which refer to the natural dynamism. In our own

times, doctrines such as dynamism, energysm, and processualism have had an even

greater impact in emphasizing the relevance of forces, energy and processes as dynamic

aspects of nature.

These doctrines represent a healthy reaction against mechanism. However, in

some cases they are a bit exaggerated, since they seem to grant the status of substance to

dynamism, and to deny the structural aspects of nature. For instance, according to some

forms of processualism, stability in nature is nothing but a moment within a continuous

flux, and the latter would be the authentic natural reality.

Henri Bergson is one the classical representatives of processualism. The

background of all his work is a kind of dualism which opposes the static to the dynamic,

and in which the dynamic is the winner. Bergson successfully emphasized the

importance of the dynamic aspects against mechanism. He went so far, though, as to

grant the status of substance to change. Bergson criticized, with reasons, the

characterization of some aspects of reality as absolute stillness. He claims that

dynamism is not something which is added to a still reality. He reached the conclusion

(difficult to be accepted) that “although changes occur, nevertheless things do not

change, in other words, change does not need a subject. There is movement but there is

no inert and invariable moving object: movement does not imply something that

moves”29

. Bergson may have held this stand owing to the polemical character of his

reflections. Actually, it is true that there is no inert and invariable object behind any

change, but it is also true that there is an active and variable subject.

29

H.BERGSON, El pensamiento y lo moviente, La Pleyade editions, Buenos Aires 1972, pp. 120-121.

Following Bergson’s thinking, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) represented

nature as a process, as a continuous becoming. He defines substance as an activity

process: the existence of a real entity is its own activity of becoming. Duration is

inherent to the nature of substance. Hence he states : “a real entity is a process and

cannot be described in terms of morphology of some stuff”30

. A real entity is active, and

the ultimate nature of things is activity. The substance is activity. Whitehead sees his

thesis justified by physics.

Like Bergson, Whitehead adopts an evolutionary type of worldview in which

nature is creative. The category of ultimate is creativity or creative action; it is pure

activity which lacks its own characteristic (like the matter of Aristotle) but does not

appear without some characteristic. For Whitehead, substance is a kind of acting which

has a particular form, or characteristic. There cannot be any acting without some form or

characteristic, and vice-versa. There is proportion between creativity (or activity) and

characteristic (or form) similar to the one between matter and form in Aristotle.

According to Whitehead, activity becomes the ultimate condition of nature.

Acting cannot be separated from the one which acts; there cannot be acting agents

without actions, the essence of an acting agent implies its acting. The nature of the

acting agent will be determined by the characteristic of its actions. In this perspective,

the acting agent is the result of its own actions. The being of a real entity is determined

by its own acting. To be and to become are not separable. Being includes becoming, the

former is determined by the latter. The way in which an entity becomes determines what

that entity is: this is the principle of the process. The metaphysics of Whitehead is an

elaboration of what is implied in the principle of the process.

In this way we reach a philosophy of the process. The activity of the real agent

has to be self-creative. The ultimate ontological nature of a real entity – or substance – is

self-creative activity. Any activity is the self-establishment of an agent. The self-

creation is not something isolated or self-sufficient. The substance needs to be internally

related with other entities, from which it obtains its own characteristics: it has an

emergent character. This perspective is also a philosophy of the organism which stresses

the interconnection among all the real entities. The result is an evolutionary process

from which new emergent syntheses are created.

Whitehead’s worldview is evolutionary, organicist and emergentist. These are

characteristics which have acquired great importance in our present times in accordance

with an evolutionist image of nature. These aspects, emphasized by Bergson, are

integrated by Whitehead in a kind of philosophy which is difficult, somehow confused

and with some pantheist trends, but with a lot of prestige nowadays.

It is worth noting how this kind of worldview emphasizes the following ideas:

a) the real unity of each entity and of all entities as a whole;

b) the characteristic of the reality as a process;

c) the central place occupied by action;

d) the rejection of the mechanistic-atomistic point of view.

30

A.N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology, Harper & Row, New York 1960, p.55.

Processualism presents difficulties, though, because it gives little importance to

that consistency which is proper to each substance; and because of the unilateral

criticism of the classical notion of substance, of self-creation and of the pantheist

tendencies. At the same time, the structural and stable aspects of reality seem to

evaporate.

Some times it is said that the natural is ultimately nothing but energy: this would

consist in an ultimate substratum of dynamic type whose concentration would produce

the bodies (sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules and bigger bodies). This energysm is

in line with dynamism and processualism: the equivalence between mass and energy

which is a consequence of the relativity theory, is often mentioned as an argument in its

favour. This equivalence would show up, for instance, in the production of sub-atomic

particles starting from energy, and of energy from sub-atomic particles in the reverse

process. An attempt is made to identify energy with the proto-matter of philosophical

tradition, as if this concept could now find a physical realization. In this case, everything

would be made of energy and the physical particles would be nothing but concentrated

energy31

. Sometime it is added that matter has the nature of a process32

, since the

different forms of energy can be transformed into one another.

These statements should be understood within the framework of the critique

against the atomistic mechanism and are somehow valid within this context. The

atomistic mechanism claimed that matter is made of indivisible particles and, as such,

unable to undergo transformations: they could only change place. However, the

microphysical world is in reality an extremely dynamic one.

This, though, does not justify the reduction of matter to energy. Actually, energy,

and the particles dealt with by physics, does not correspond to either intuitive or

philosophical concepts; they are theoretical constructions which, although very much

related to reality, establish this relationship by conceptual and experimental means

whose meaning cannot be directly extrapolated to philosophy33

.

Energysm is particularly suggestive when a metaphorical, rather than literal,

meaning is attributed to it. Energysm and processualism emphasize, with reasons, the

fact that dynamism is inscribed within the very heart of nature, and that the individual as

well as the structural aspects of nature are lumped together in the unfolding of a natural

31

Werner Heisenberg is one of the physicists who formulated the quantum mechanics in the 20’s. He maintained

that “All the elementary particles are made of the same substance, i.e. energy. They are the forms that energy needs to

acquire in order to be converted to matter”: W. HEISENBERG – E. SCHRÖDINGER – M. BORN – P. AUGER,

Discussione sulla fisica moderna, Einaudi, Turin 1959, p.17. 32

Karl Popper says that: “Matter is not a substance, since it is not preserved. It can be destroyed and created again.

Even the most stable particles, the nucleons, can be destroyed by collision with their anti-particles, and their energy is

transformed into light. Matter appears to be a very compressed kind of energy which can be transformed into other forms of

energy and, consequently, has the nature of a process, since it can be converted into other processes such as light and, of

course, movement and heat”: K. POPPER – J.C. ECCLES, El yo y su cerebro, Labor, Barcelona 1980, p.7. 33

Actually the Einstein’s equation is a mathematical relation established between physical magnitudes: the mass

(and not matter) and the energy. The equation means that the values of the magnitudes involved are related through the

formula E=mc2 where E is energy, m is mass and c is the speed of light in the vacuum. Here, therefore, we are not dealing

with statements on the concepts of matter and energy in a philosophical sense, but of magnitudes which are defined in

accordance with the procedures of the physics-mathematics.

dynamism which produces a big cosmic process. However, in some cases they appear to

reduce nature to its dynamic aspects and deny the consistency of the structural aspects.

In reality, only the combination of the dynamic and the structural can provide an

adequate representation of nature.

6. HOW TO IDENTIFY NATURAL SUBSTANCES

Up to now we have dealt with the existence of entities which can be called «unitary

systems» or «substances», we have analyzed their main characteristics and we have used

some illustrative examples. In order to achieve a wider perspective, we shall now ask

ourselves which of the natural entities can be actually considered substances. We shall

answer while keeping in mind that, according to our way of setting the problem, this

question can be formulated in a different way, i.e. which systems can be actually

considered natural unitary systems.

There is no doubt that this question is philosophically interesting for three reasons.

First, the notions of system and substance would remain at an abstract level unless we

actually apply them to natural entities. Second, the study of these examples provides a

solid basis for a faithful representation of nature, on which a further philosophical

reflection can be carried out. Third, since this study compels to apply the notions of

system and substance to real entities, the former will be enriched in their meaning.

We have already stressed that the basic characteristics of the natural unitary systems

are individuality and unity. We have also said that unity can be referred to structural

aspects (structural unity) as well as to dynamic aspects (operational unity much related

to directionality). Therefore, such characteristics will be used as criteria of

substantiality. We shall now consider how these characteristics appear to ordinary

experience and to the scientific knowledge.

6.1. Substance and ordinary experience

The ancients used the concept of substance when dealing primarily with living

beings. As far as inorganic matter is concerned (elements and compounds), the

application of the same concept differed variously according to different ideas which

were quite weak. The consolidation of the physics-mathematics in the 17th

century and

of the mechanism (its self-appointed philosophical ally), meant the abandonment of the

notion of substance. The focus was diverted onto the quantitative properties of matter

which could be studied with the aid of mathematical concepts. Even living beings were

now considered as mere aggregations of physical components.

There was no well-founded knowledge of the microphysical structure of matter up to the

first part of the 20th

century, and a detailed knowledge of the physico-chemical aspects

of life had to wait until the middle of the same century. Scientific progress was

accompanied by a progressive awareness of the fundamental role played by the holistic

and directional aspects of the systems. This is to say that at present we are able for the

first time to determine rigorously the way of being of the natural systems.

With the present scientific knowledge available, we can actually claim that only

the living beings, among the natural entities accessible to our ordinary way of knowing,

are natural unitary systems: other entities are either aggregations or fragments. This

explains the fact that there were many perplexities in the past when one wanted to apply

the notion of substance to non-living beings. Actually, there are other unitary systems in

nature, but they do not appear as such to our ordinary experience: they do so only after

being scientifically investigated. The non-living unitary systems are microphysical

entities (atoms, molecules, and macromolecules) with a notable structural unity; they

exist, though, only as parts of aggregates or of greater systems.

In any case it is evident that only the ordinary experience is insufficient to

determine with rigor which systems may be considered unitary systems. We shall

therefore consider the types of unitary systems present at the different levels of nature in

the light of the knowledge provided by science.

6.2. Substance and science

We shall distinguish three levels in nature: the biological which includes the

living beings; the microphysical which includes the non-living entities of very small size

that cannot be observed directly; and the macro-physical which includes the non-living

entities of bigger size.

a) Substance at a biological level

Living beings are natural systems with a high degree of individuality. Some exist

in colonies with divisions of functions among the individuals. The majority, though,

have a well-defined individuality when compared with entities. There is also a great

structural as well as dynamic unity in living beings. The parts of a living being are

components of an organism which is structured according to a unified plan, and they

carry out cooperative functions which support one another and contribute to the unified

activity of the living being.

Therefore, living organisms can be said to be natural unitary systems (although

in some cases their individuality appears to be reduced, or their organization is

rudimentary) and the concept of substance can be properly applied to them. Actually, we

are in the presence of the most clear case of natural substances.

Reducing living beings to cybernetic systems has introduced scepticism on the

possibility of considering living beings as substances. Descartes claimed that living

beings are machines and, as such, mere combinations of physical components exactly in

the same way they are in a mechanical machine. Such mechanistic ideas are actually

inadequate to explain the characteristics of living beings. Nevertheless, in our times they

have been reconsidered in a more sophisticated way, taking into account our present-day

knowledge about cybernetic systems. Such systems have properties such as feedback

and homeostasis which are also properties of living beings. Since there should be no

need to attribute to living beings characteristics which go beyond what is material, it

seems possible to claim that living beings are just cybernetic systems with a highly

sophisticated type of organization34

.

There is no doubt that living beings are cybernetic systems: many of their

aspects are being clarified as the understanding of these systems progresses. This is,

though, perfectly compatible with our characterization of the natural, i.e. natural entities,

unitary systems and natural substances. However, it is not compatible with a mechanism

of Cartesian type which reduces living beings to a simple aggregation of parts; in this

perspective, these parts are unable to form a new structural and dynamic unity, or a new

way of being35

.

b) Substance at a microphysical level

The substances found at this level are sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules and

macromolecules. We shall consider them in this order.

The sub-atomic particles which are the constituents of matter, are, according to a

well-proved model called «standard model», six types of leptons (or light particles) and

six basic types of quarks which constitute the heavier particles by couples or triads.

These particles, as well as the ones made of quarks (such as the proton and the neutron),

correspond to four fundamental interactions (strong nuclear, weak nuclear,

electromagnetic and gravitational). Many of these particles are very ephemeral (they last

just for a small fraction of a second), and it is very difficult to determine the nature of all

of them although in many cases their behaviour is very well known. For instance, they

exhibit properties of waves as well as of particles without a clearly established status.

New theories are being proposed in order to solve this issue; they are much deeper than

the present ones and their experimental verifiability is, at present, very difficult.

In this situation, it is possible to say that the more stable particles (such as the

proton, the neutron and the electron which have well-established properties of mass,

charge, spin, half-life, way of interacting) can be considered substances, at least when

they exist in an independent way. These three particles can exist as free particles. They

are also the components of the atoms: when considered in this state, they are definitely

parts of a new unitary system, i.e. the atom36

.

34

This thesis is widely defended from a perspective which presumes to be in accordance with a Thomistic

philosophy in P.CHALMEL, Biologie actuelle et philosophie thomiste, Téqui, Paris 1984. 35

Actually in the work mentioned in the previous note Chalmel reaches the same conclusion; he states that living

beings are cybernetic systems, and criticizes some «vitalist» ideas. At the same time, though, he rejects the Cartesian

mechanism and holds that living beings are substances. Cf. ibid., pp. 312-313 and 318-319. 36

One can find a more detailed discussion on this topic in M.ARTIGAS, El problema de la substancialidad de las

particulas elementales, Pontifical Lateran University, Rome 1987. Another realistic perspective, different though from the

previous one, can be found in R.HARRÉ, Varieties of Realism, Blackwell, Oxford 1986 (with many points in common with

the «experimentalism» maintained by IAN HACKING, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge 1983).

There are ninety-two basic types of atoms in nature which have well-defined

structures: a very stable nucleus made of protons and neutrons, and a peripheral area

occupied by electrons at different energetic levels determined by quantum laws. When

on their own, they can be said to constitute true unitary systems (and therefore

substances), since they show a characteristic unitary structure with a corresponding

unitary dynamism; this structure, as well as the set of properties which depends on it, is

fairly stable.

Molecules are made of atoms: they also have their own structuring and

dynamism proper to the unitary systems and are different from a mere aggregation. In

order to separate their components it is necessary to trigger processes able to alter the

forces which keep the same components together. Something similar happens with the

macromolecules (e.g. the biochemical components of the living beings: proteins, nucleic

acids, etc.) whose structure and dynamism are very specific since they have a very

complex organization. It is an easy job to apply the notion of unitary system and of

substance to molecules as well as to macromolecules.

In summary, microphysical systems have a structure and a dynamism proper to

unitary systems and therefore they can be properly referred to as substances, at least

whenever they have an independent existence. This last clarification is important

because in many cases they form part of other systems. In these cases, although

preserving many of their properties, they become parts integrated in higher structures

which are new unitary systems

c) Substance at a macro physical level

With the exception of the living beings, the new states of matter are formed as a

result of aggregations of microphysical systems. It is understandable, therefore, that

these states are not properly speaking unitary systems although our ordinary experience

may be deceived. This makes it difficult many times to apply the concept of substance to

the non-living entities.

There are systems at meso physical levels (i.e. visible entities but not too big)

and macro physical levels (big sizes) of the inorganic world which show different

degrees of unity, integration, dynamism and functionality. For this reason they are

considered as aggregations of different substances in a heterogeneous kind of

combination. We shall show some examples out of many.

At geophysical level, minerals are, in many cases, aggregations of different

chemical substances in a more or less pure state. It is necessary to process them in a

complex way in order to obtain chemical substances in a pure state; even in this case,

though, the solids obtained are atoms or molecules bound together by forces. The earth

as a whole, together with the atmosphere, forms a system which is heterogeneous but

specific at the same time, so that life in it becomes possible. There are a great variety of

systems and sub-systems within the earth and among these we find the ecosystems

which encompass peculiar combinations of inorganic and living beings37

.

At astrophysical level, stars have a nucleus which is the core of their structures

and activities (i.e. nuclear fusion reactions which condition the characteristics of each

star). Because of their huge size, there are many components in the periphery of stars

whose union with the whole system is relatively weak. The structure of the sun, with its

corresponding activity, is an essential factor for the existence of life on earth. It not only

determines the temperature and many related characteristics of our planet, but also the

food-chains and food-webs in which some organisms feed on others whose existence

ultimately depends on their capacity of utilizing solar energy to produce chemical

compounds.

6.3. The analogical concept of substance and its degrees

The concept of substance cannot be applied univocally (i.e. exactly and always in

the same way) but analogically (i.e. according to a meaning which is partly the same

and partly different).

Actually, it is possible to apply the concept of substance to entities so different

from one another, like living beings and microphysical entities, because all of them

show a certain degree of individuality and unity. It is also clear, though, that the concept

of substance is not used in the same way in all of them.

The notion of unitary system has a well-defined content but, at the same time,

broad enough to be applied to very different systems. These systems may have common

characteristics, but also differences which can be very important.

The concept of substance is predicated analogically because there are different

degrees of individuality and unity. We have already pointed out how living beings show

a kind of unitary organization which is particularly consistent. It is because of this that

substantiality is realized in them in an eminent way. Even among living beings, though,

there are different degrees of individuality and unity. There is a strong unity in many

entities of the microphysical world which, nevertheless, do not always show a clearly

differentiated unity, since they happen to exist as components of higher systems.

All this hair-splitting is not trivial at all: it helps us understand better the

philosophical meaning of substance in nature. The concept of substance which rotates

around those of individuality and unity, points at the existence of holistic systems which

have a way of being characterized by unity. Their components, although partially

retaining their own characters, are nevertheless integrated in a new system with a new

type of unity in which emergent properties and a cooperative dynamism exist. The ways

37

Following the Gaia hypothesis proposed by James Lovelock, some hold that the biosphere (the environment of

water, land and air where life around us develops) is one system only, like a big organism. In reality, it does not seem

possible to consider it as an individual unitary system, i.e. as a substance.

of being holistic are greatly various, but they always reflect a common characteristic:

they are entities which have an essence, or a way of being, characterized by unity. They

are therefore the subjects of a natural dynamism.

The denial of the reality of substance leads to an atomized representation of

nature which is then left as a disconnected collection of particular qualities or processes.

On the contrary, nature is a huge system made up of particular systems which, in one

way or another, articulate around the unitary systems or substances. The application of

the notion of substance shows the fact that there are many unitary systems in nature:

they are mutually related and integrated in more general systems up to reaching the

global system of nature, and these unitary systems, or substances, are subjects with

specific ways of being. This representation of nature is the basis for a metaphysical

reflection in which the notions of essence and act of being occupy a central place, and

which finds its ultimate meaning in the participation in being.

6.4. Anti-substance stands

The empiricist and processualist critiques are two among many which have

attacked the notion of substance and which are especially important nowadays.

a) The knowledge of substances

David Hume (1711-1776) developed a radical critique against the concept of

substance from his empiricist stand. He claimed that the idea of substance actually

corresponds to a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination; it is a

simple name which we give to this collection in order to remember it38

.

The empiricist theory of knowledge, on which Hume leans in order to criticize

the concept of substance, claims that only the qualities which appear to the sensible

experience, have an objective value. Developed in a coherent way, the theory is forced

to state that qualities may exist without a subject and that, therefore, qualities may have

a certain existence of their own. Actually, this conclusion is found in Hume’s writings39

.

This is equivalent, though, to granting a status of substance to qualities without any

solution to the problem. On the contrary, a new insoluble difficulty is introduced since it

is difficult to understand how there can be qualities without a subject-substance.

Some other critiques, much related to empiricism, accuse the notion of substance

of scientific emptiness: it is a useless concept hardly used by science. As a matter of fact,

biology takes it for granted, chemistry uses it in quite a proper way although it does not

characterize it philosophically, and physics-mathematics uses ideal models with

concepts equivalent to those of substance when applied to the study of concrete matter.

38

Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, p.16. One may find a clear exposé

and a penetrating critique of Hume’s ideas in R.J. CONNELL, “An Empirical Consideration of Substance”, Laval

théologique et philosophique, 34 (1978), pp.235-246. 39

Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, op.cit., p.222.

The concept of substance does not appear usually in scientific formulations.

Nevertheless the existence of substances and accidents is implicitly admitted in science.

At times (e.g. in chemistry) the characterization and classification of substances

corresponds exactly to their philosophical notion. At other times (e.g. in microphysics)

this correspondence cannot be established unequivocally. It is logical that the concept of

substance is not studied philosophically in scientific formulations, since science does not

claim a philosophical perspective. Nevertheless, science takes the notion for granted:

actually, the study of nature is based on the existence of unitary systems, or substances,

and the scientific progress provides an ever more detailed knowledge of such entities.

The empiricist critique gives us the opportunity to point out the fact that the

substance is known through the accidents: they are the ones which reveal the substance

and its essential way of being. That which directly appears to the experience is the

accidents: they are accidents though which belong to a subject. In order to know the

proper way of being of substantial subject one needs to study its properties and, because

of this, it seems that we are only able to know properties, never substances. However,

the denial of the notion of substance inevitably leads to granting the accidental

properties the status of substance: this is actually impossible.

b) Substances and processes

The notion o substance is also criticized and accused of fixism in certain

philosophical stands such the processualist one. Processualism considers processes as

the only core of nature and nothing is found which is not a process. In this perspective,

the notion of substance seems to imply the existence of some subjects which are found

outside the continuous flux of changes present in nature.

This accusation is unfounded since it has nothing to do with the idea of

substance which has been considered so far. This accusation of fixism, though, offers

another opportunity to clarify what is the consistency in being proper to the substances

and what type of relations exists between substance and processes.

The permanence in being, or temporal duration, cannot be used to characterize

the substance philosophically. The concept of substance refers to the consistence in

being. Nevertheless, this permanence unveils, in many cases, such a consistence:

stability accompanies substantiality in many instances. This, though, does not happen

necessarily: actually, there may be truly substantial entities with a more or less

ephemeral duration. A substance has a relative stability according to the type of natural

system considered in each case and to the circumstances in which it is found.

Consistence in being does not depend on duration or permanence in being.

On the other hand, the substance is not unalterable. Natural substances are

subjected to accidental changes in which the substance remains the same since a entity

continues being the same while changing accidentally. The substance is the subject of

the change and is something changing, not immutable. During accidental changes the

substance changes in an accidental, and not substantial, way. The substance can also

disappear and become a different one: this happens in the substantial changes. All this is

easily understood when one relates the substances to the natural unitary systems, in the

way we have done here. Unitary systems are the result of processes and source of new

processes, and therefore they are not left outside the flux of changes.

In accordance with the characterization of the natural made here as an

intertwining between dynamism and structuring, we shall emphasize once again that a

substance is not a passive and inert substratum. On the contrary, it is the first subject of

being, articulating centre of structuring and dynamism. The whole activity of an entity

originates from the substance.

Physical substances are at the same time source and product of the natural

dynamism. The dynamic aspect of the reality which is very much related to the present-

day scientific knowledge, has to be emphasized against any mechanistic type of

reductionism,. The natural dynamism unfolds around the substances and it is never

opposed to the latter. The dynamic activity of the substances produces other substances

with their own dynamism. To counterpoise being to becoming and stability to dynamism

is meaningless. They are complementary aspects which need each other.

From a scientific point of view, natural entities are equilibrium systems. Stability

is the result of energy balances and these can be upset. Stable systems are found at each

level of the composition of matter, and they are the result of energy balances. An

energetic unbalance is a source of processes, and equilibrium is not a synonym of

absence of forces or of dynamism: equilibrium means balanced forces. One can, then,

understand how stability and dynamism are combined in natural entities. States of

equilibrium always refer to specific conditions. Therefore, the stability of the physical

entities is never absolute and ceases to exist if the conditions are not kept within the

margins required by each situation of equilibrium.

III. DYNAMISM IN NATURE

Change is a characteristic of nature at all its levels: none of its aspects can escape

it in the various ways it takes place. As a matter of fact, the transformations which occur

in nature rotate around specific dynamic patterns, so that our world shows a very

singular type of organization. This organization consists of many unitary processes with

coordinated steps whose unity can only be explained by the existence of specific

potentialities, and of an information which directs the unfolding of the natural

dynamism.

There are specific potentialities in nature whose actualization leads to a

hierarchy of levels with a progressively increasing complexity of organization. The

building of nature appears, then, as a huge global process of self-organization in which

authentic emerging novelties are produced. All this is made possible thanks to the

storage and the unfolding of information.

The first part of this section shall consider the natural processes and the

existence of dynamic patterns. The second part shall explain the same processes in terms

of potentiality and actuality, after analyzing the modalities of the natural becoming. The

third part shall illustrate with examples the knowledge we have of the unitary processes

at present. Some aspects of the natural becoming related to the emergence of novelties

are also examined in the light of the previously developed ideas.

7. NATURAL PROCESSES

Natural systems are never encountered in a completely isolated situation. Moreover,

since they have their own dynamism, they interact among themselves. Changes are the

results of these interactions in which the intervening dynamisms are integrated to

produce common results. The basic structure of any change consists in interactions

whose result is a state of equilibrium.

There is a great variety of interactions; nevertheless, all of them proceed

according to patterns through highly specific processes.

7.1. Notion of natural process

The cataloguing of the different changes which occur in nature would result in a

mammoth enterprise. Here we shall analyze only the main modalities of these changes,

focusing our attention on the unitary processes in a special way. This choice is

important since unitary processes consist of a coordinated succession of steps which

clearly reveal the specific character of the nature in which we live.

Although sometimes any type of change is referred to as «process», here we

shall use this term only in relation to those types of changes which consist of a series of

articulated steps that lead to a final state starting from an initial state. This implies

therefore that the steps of the process are coordinated and characterized by a certain kind

of unity. In this sense, a process can be defined as “the totality of the gradual steps of a

natural phenomenon or of an artificial operation”40

. It can also be defined as a “gradual

series of operations that lead to a specific objective” or to the “transformation of a

system”41

.

It is easy to see why we focus our attention on processes. Actually, if one

considers the becoming in a general way, what appears before his eyes is a wide variety

of changes whose detailed study is the task of science. Change in a general way is

studied in many philosophical treatises; the actual object of its philosophical

investigation, though, is the study of unitary processes with their specific characteristics,

although one may not always realize it.

There is a great variety of processes in nature. Most of them are very complex

and can be divided into sub-processes. Moreover, they unfold in a continuous way so

that to determine where one process stops and where another begins depends, somehow,

on the point of view one takes. From a philosophical perspective, particularly interesting

are those characteristics of the processes which permit to understand the basic properties

of our world together with its highly specific organization which makes life on it

possible. Consequently, philosophy is particularly interested in those processes with

holistic and directional characteristics.

There are many processes in nature with a high degree of unity and directionality

in their starting point as well as in their final point and during their unfolding. Their

beginning and their end consist in well-established situations, and the transit from the

initial state to the final one unfolds in a characteristic way. This is clearly evident in the

living beings: their development from the early stages up to maturity is a great process

clearly holistic and directional, and its way of progressing is full of functional relations

which manifest also the unity and tendencies of the organisms. The scientific progress

has made it possible to know also many unitary and directional processes at physical and

chemical levels.

It is evident, though, that the directionality of natural processes is different from

those processes guided by human reason. Rational and artificial processes are guided by

the conscious quest of an end: this does not happen in the case of natural processes.

Rational processes consist in a mental linking of ideas, and the artificial ones correspond

to a project and therefore both have a directionality deliberately imposed by the agent.

On the other hand the natural processes originate from irrational agents and therefore the

same finality of the rational processes cannot be attributed to them.

40

Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, 21st ed., Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1992, p.1185.

41 Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, Vocabulario científico y técnico, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1990,

p.566.

Nevertheless, the natural processes develop in a directional way and lead to

results with a high degree of organization. Although non-rational in a strict sense, yet

they manifest a certain type of rationality in their results and ways of achieving them.

These are the aspects which appeal most to a philosophical reflection.

7.2. Natural processes and dynamic patterns

We emphasize the fact that natural processes do not unfold in an erratic manner;

on the contrary, everything in them rotates around specific patterns. Hence, it is

necessary to consider such patterns in details in order to present a veritable picture of the

natural processes. We shall call these patterns dynamic patterns in order to distinguish

them from patterns related to space configurations.

The use of the concept of information comes in very handy in order to

understand such patterns. Actually, our knowledge of the dynamic patterns is

represented by laws which are equivalent to operational programs. In this sense, laws

contain an information on the possible course of the process; this information speaks of

the possibility of the unfolding of a natural dynamism whenever some specific

conditions are present, and it corresponds, therefore, to something real.

The concept of information is used in three contexts which, although related to

one another, are nevertheless different. First, information is related to the concept of

communication of messages in ordinary life as well as in the science of information, and

therefore to the action of informing someone about some meaningful contents. Second,

the theory of information studies technological aspects of transmission and handling of

messages by the use of mathematical concepts related to the theory of probability. Third,

a concept of information approximately equivalent to a program guiding the natural

activity is more and more used in the experimental science. Biology started using this

concept when the existence of genetic information was discovered. It was more and

more used, since then, in physics and chemistry. Here we shall use the concept of

information in the third sense42

.

We are able to detect the typical elements of information, i.e. signals, codes,

storage, communication, interpretation and integration, in observing natural

interactions. We are far from knowing these elements in a complete way; nevertheless,

they are sufficiently known in some cases and it is possible to confirm their existence in

some others.

42

An interesting analysis of the concept of information in biology can be found in P.SCHUSTER, “Biological Information.

Its Origin and Processing” in C. WASSERMANN–R. KIRBY–B. BORDORFF (publishers), The Science and Theology of

Information, Labor et Fides, Geneva 1992, pp. 45–57. About the extension of the concept of information to other scientific

areas one may read G. DEL RE, “Complexity, Organization, information”, in G.V. COYNE – K. SCHMITZ–

MOORMANN (publishers), Origins, Time & Complexity, part I, Labor et Fides, Geneva 1994, pp. 83–92. Doubtlessly there

is a danger of using the concept of information indiscriminately and in an inaccurate way. However, the remedy is not in

abandoning the concept but in using it appropriately.

Information is stored in the space structures whose configuration is equivalent to

a program, or instructions which determines the action to be initiated before each type of

signal. The structure of each system determines some internal organization whose

actualization depends on the interactions occurring in any specific case.

The respective pieces of information are integrated or combined in one result

only in the interactions; dynamisms and structures are combined and the result is the

appearance of new information patterns.

It is difficult to avoid an anthropomorphic feeling when using concepts such as

signals, codes, communication and interpretation of information. However, this

difficulty can be overcome by keeping in mind their metaphorical character. For

instance, physico–chemical entities do not have a knowledge or a language similar to

ours. Nevertheless they know and communicate with one another in a metaphorical but

real sense: an electron «knows» that it is within an electromagnetic field, «knows» that

the field has specific characteristics and consequently it knows its possible ways of

behaving. In the same way, when a particle reaches an atom with a specific energy, the

atom detects it, «knows» its characteristics and reacts accordingly with the

corresponding patterns. All this has nothing to do with a sort of «pan-psychism» which

attributes a kind of consciousness to the physico–chemical entities. It is a way of

expressing aspects of the reality for whose conceptualization we are forced to use a

metaphorical language. This way of expressing such aspects of reality is also equivalent

to acknowledging the fact that there is no matter which is purely inert or passive:

actually, every material entity contains an information which guides its interactions.

Any dynamic pattern corresponds to the unfolding of an information structurally

stored, and can therefore be called «information pattern». We can actually distinguish

two big types of dynamic patterns, i.e. the dynamic laws which represent the behaviour

of different systems in specific conditions, and the information patterns in a more

restrictive sense which correspond to the unfolding of more complex processes with a

sequence of successive stages and with a higher degree of organization.

There are many dynamic laws in any branch of science: this emphasizes the

importance of the dynamic patterns in nature. Although these laws correspond to reality,

yet they do not exist «separately». They are «incorporated» in the natural systems and

we abstract them from their behaviour. It should not be surprising therefore that,

although very precise, they have only an approximate character.

There are processes made of a complex series of successive stages which are

mutually coordinated, in those systems with a higher degree of organization, particularly

in the living ones. In this case, we are in the presence of information patterns with a full

program of action. Information patterns are basically instructions which guide the

unfolding of the natural dynamism. The genetic information is the typical case: it is

equivalent to an information pattern stored in a structural pattern (the space structure of

the DNA) which guides the unfolding of so many particular dynamic patterns

(transcription and translation of the DNA), whose results are new structural patterns

(the proteins) which, in their turn, unfold other dynamic patterns (the processes which

are controlled by the proteins) and so on and so fort. Hence, in the genetic information,

dynamism and structuring intertwine through information patterns.

In the activity guided by the genetic information, each step unfolds in

accordance with particular physico–chemical laws (dynamic laws), as part of the

processes, though which unfold according to a program. During this unfolding (which

lasts for the entire life-span of the organism), many processes are produced in which a

regeneration of biochemical substances, cells, tissues, organs and systems takes place. It

is actually a global process which includes cooperative, holistic and directional aspects.

7.3. Synergism, organization and tendencies

The existence of information patterns demands actually the joint actions of many

components; only in this way it is possible to obtain a space structure containing stored

information, and to have this information unfolded along a series of coordinated steps.

The existence of a synergism, or cooperative action, is a necessary condition for the

existence of information patterns only if it has very specific characteristics, so that a

simultaneous as well as successive coupling of very many factors is made possible.

A cooperative action of this type can be given only if there is a high degree of

organization, and this has to be very stable. Presently, we already know many aspects of

the organization of living beings and of the cooperation of its components. This

knowledge shows clearly how subtle all this is.

Synergism and organization clearly show the existence of tendencies. The issue

of finality will not be tackled now in a detailed way; however it is important to point out

that directionality is not only hinted by the existence of dynamic patterns, but also, and

much more, manifested by the existence of information patterns which guide the

unfolding of the unitary processes whose stages appear to be coordinated.

8. THE BECOMING: ACT AND POTENCY

Natural processes can be explained as actualizations of potentialities. We shall

now examine how Aristotle presented this explanation which is still central in the

philosophy of nature.

8.1. Being and becoming

Nature contains structural as well as dynamic aspects: it is a combination of the

being of what already exists, and of the becoming in which changes are produced.

Already before Aristotle, philosophers had tried to reconcile being and

becoming. Aristotle proposed to resolve the problem through the concepts of being in

potency and being in act.

To be in potency means that a being has a capacity, or virtuality which, in the

appropriate conditions, can lead to a being in act. The development of living beings

from eggs and embryos can illustrate this concept. Actually, the initial stages, or

embryonic stages, of the development of a living being are very different from its later

stages; this means that the living being has real capacities which are progressively

actualized in time and whose aim is to produce the new being. The present-day concept

of information appears to give a special significance to this example. The presence of

information in a living being makes it easier to understand how its initial stage does not

resemble its final stage of development; this is made possible by the existence of

instructions which lead it to the production of a new being.

The Aristotelian explanation applies very fittingly to the already mentioned

unitary processes. However, it is possible to apply it to other ways of becoming. This

will be the object of our next consideration before going ahead with the analysis of act

and potency.

8.2. Ways of becoming

The dynamic aspects of nature have different names with different meanings, but very

much related among themselves such as «becoming», «change», «movement»,

«transformation», «mutation», «process». The use of these terms varies with different

authors and contexts.

The term «becoming» is used in a general way to express the fact that all the

natural entities are subjected to change. The term «change» is used to indicate any type

of variations. The term «movement» at times means any type of change, but habitually

has a more restrictive meaning to indicate change of place or location, i.e. the local

movement. The terms «transformation» and «mutation» emphasize the fact that change

affects a subject. Finally the term «process» refers to the totality of the successive stages

which lead from an initial state to a final state.

Obviously the terms «becoming» and «change» have a much wider meaning

than the other terms. Both are related to «movement» since they always imply some

movement, or change of location. The term «process» indicates an articulated type of

reality: it implies a series of steps which lead to a final result. Any process is then

characterized by the presence of a series of changes and movements.

We have already considered the distinction between different types of change:

accidental changes occur without affecting the identity of a substance which, on the

other hand, changes in relation to some accidents. Substantial changes occur with the

disappearance of a substance and the appearance of a different one. Moreover, we may

distinguish three types of accidental change: change of place also called local movement

or simply movement; changes in the accident quantity resulting in an increase or

diminution; changes in the accident quality which are called alterations.

There is a hierarchical order among changes. The first is the local movement,

since this only implies displacement and can occur without deeper kinds of change. On

the other hand, any change in nature necessarily implies the existence of local

movement: it is impossible for any natural thing to change without any of its parts

somehow moving. Change in quantity comes after movement which presupposes local

movement only. Change in quality comes next which presupposes the previous two.

Substantial change, which has deeper implications, comes last.

A substance changes during an accidental change but only accidentally, i.e.

without affecting its identity or its essential way of being. This includes, for instance, all

those changes which a living being undergoes without losing its identity. A substance

changes radically in a substantial change since it ceases to exist while a new substance

begins to exist: this is what happens when a plant dies.

A substantial change is being prepared by a series of accidental changes: when

these become too intense they cause the change of substantial identity.

That a change is accidental does not mean that it is unimportant: it only means

that the subject of change does not cease to exist according to its essential way of being.

It is true that there are accidental changes which are very superficial. There are others,

though which can seriously affect the substance of a subject.

These Aristotelian ideas can be easily integrated in a contemporary perspective

of the material world which is actually compelled to take into account the concepts of

substance and accident. We have already seen how the concept of substance is easily

applied to living beings and to the microphysical systems. Substantial changes will also

be more easily detected in those entities which can be more easily recognized as

concrete substantial subjects.

It will be interesting to consider the aspect of processes and the articulation of

their different stages when focusing on the organization of nature (and therefore on its

rationality). One perspective, though, does not exclude the other; actually, natural

processes consist, in the last analysis, of substantial and accidental changes. We can also

say that the Aristotelian explanation of change in terms of potency and act corresponds

mainly to those processes which we have called unitary processes.

8.3. Act and potency

The doctrine of act and potency is, without doubt, one of the most important

achievements in Aristotle’s philosophy and in philosophical thinking in general; it is

also used by those who do not share other aspects of the Aristotelian philosophy.

Aristotle made use of this doctrine in order to explain the becoming. It is a

doctrine, though which is applied to many other problems. We shall now consider this

topic, examine some meanings of act and potency which are of specific interest to the

philosophy of nature, and show how the explanation of the processes as actualization of

potentialities acquires a new meaning when considered from the point of view of the

concept of information.

a) The becoming as actualization of potentialities

We have already seen how some of the early philosophers denied the reality of change.

They argued that change presupposes a novelty in being, and that this novelty cannot

rise from nothing but from something pre-existing. They concluded that change does not

exist, it is just an appearance. Granted that such conclusion is incompatible with

experience, it should be added that experience does not provide an authentic knowledge

of the reality; therefore there seems to be a dichotomy between true reality – accessible

only to the intellectual knowledge – and the world of the sensible appearances. This was

the line of thought followed by Parmenides.

The Greek atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) tried to give an explanation of

nature as a combination of atoms and the vacuum. They held that atoms are immutable

and indivisible entities («atom» in Greek means indivisible), ultimate entities of nature’s

framework. The only real change is local movement, and nature is explained through

displacements and combination of atoms. Natural entities are the result of the

combination of atoms, and processes are reduced to displacement of material parts.

Aristotle endeavoured to reconcile the demands of reason and senses by

explaining change in terms of act and potency. To be in act means to have a certain

determination, while to be in potency means that, although such a determination is not

possessed, nevertheless there is a real capacity of getting it. In this perspective, change

is the actualization of a potentiality. To be in potency is to be somehow in-between the

pure non- being and being in act, since there is a real capacity of being what one is not

yet. To be in potency has, moreover, a teleological or finalistic connotation since it

means that some capacities, or predispositions, are possessed with respect to specific

types of acts, i.e. there is a kind of directionality. When adequate conditions are present,

potentialities are actualized: change is actually a process of actualization.

According to the classical definition given by Aristotle, change is the act of the

entity in potency insofar as it is in potency43. This means that the starting point is an

entity which does not have a certain determination in act, but it has the potentiality, or

capacity, to acquire it. It also means that change appears when this potentiality is

actualized and, more specifically, while it is being actualized. That is why in the

definition it is not only said that change is the act of the entity which is in potency, but it

is also specified that it is this act as long as the entity is still in potency, i.e. while it is

actualizing its potentiality. Once the determination is acquired, the change stops.

The difficulty met with in trying to conceptualize movement consists in the fact

that it is a clear reality which consists, though, in a transition from a potentiality to an

actuality. It is difficult to conceptualize a reality in flux. Aristotle expressed this

difficulty when he said that change “is an actuality of descriptive type, difficult to frame

but not incapable of existing”44

. The reality of change is a dynamic reality difficult to

capture conceptually. It is also important to stress the fact that becoming is a real flux

and not a simple sum of successive static stages.

43

ARISTOTLE, Physica, III, 1, 201 a 10. 44

Ibid., 2, 202 a 1-3.

In every entity there are different potentialities. A concrete potentiality is

actualized, though, only if specific factors are present. The existence of a potentiality is

a necessary but not sufficient condition for the unfolding of a certain process; even

though it is not actualized, it remains nevertheless as a real capacity; it is somehow

equivalent to a tendency since it means that there is a specific possibility which may

lead to a specific result if it were actualized.

The idea of potentiality is quite a general one. It is not a substitute for the

physical mechanisms through which processes take place; nor is it a philosophical

diversion in order to avoid detailed investigation. It is the conceptualization of a way of

being, necessary to be admitted in order to explain the possibility of change in a rational

way. Aristotle focused on the explanation of becoming at an ontological level by

considering it as a way of being in function of being in potency and being in act. The

becoming, understood as actualization of a potentiality, is the way of being proper to

that which is on its way to be something that was not before. In this light, it is possible

to understand Aristotle when he says that “there are as many types of movement, or of

change, as there are meanings of the word is”45

, and that “there are as many species of

movement, or change, as there are entities”46

b) The real meaning of act and potency

The detailed study of act and potency is reserved to metaphysics. However, it is here

convenient to make three clarifications which may help us understand better the reach of

this doctrine and its application to the study of the philosophy of nature.

i) It is more accurate to speak of being in potency and being in act rather

than of «potency» and «act». Actually, «potency» and «act» do not

indicate things or aspects of things, but ways of being: something is

either in potency or in act or in-between potency and act (when it is in

movement).

ii) «Potency» and «act» are relative concepts, i.e. they make reference to

some determination, quality or perfection: something is either in potency

or in act with respect to some determination. Consequently it will always

be correct to make reference to the determination respect to which an

entity is either in potency or in act.

iii) «Potency» and «act» are also relative respect to each other. Something is

in potency respect to an act, i.e. it has the capacity to become what this

act signifies. A potency always refers to an act. However, the other way

around is not always certain; actually, although there is always a

transition from potency to act in any natural change, yet there may be an

act which is not the result of a process of actualization of potencies. This

case does not exist in nature, but the metaphysical reflection shows that

45

Ibid., 1, 201 a 8-9. 46

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, XI, 9, 1065 b 13-14.

nature ultimately points at a Being which is Pure Act, without mixture of

potency which has being by himself. This way which leads to God, has

its basis in the philosophy of Nature of Aristotle and was used by

Aquinas in his first way to demonstrate the existence of God.

c) Types of potency and act

There are two types of potency and act, one in relation to being and one in

relation to operating.

In relation to being, one speaks of passive potency and first act. Passive potency

refers to the possibility, or capacity, of coming to be in a certain way, while first act

refers to having actually achieved that way of being.

In relation to operating, one speaks of active potency and second act. Active

potency is the capacity of operating in a certain way, while second act refers to the

actual operation by which that capacity is exercised.

First act always refers to a corresponding passive potency, while second act

always refers to a corresponding active potency.

An active potency always belongs to a subject which already has a determined

way of being, and which therefore has this way of being in first act. Moreover,

operating always follows being (operatio sequitur esse) as the old aphorism says. The

second act (operating, operation, activity) is proportional to the active potency (the

capacity of operating in this way), and the latter is proportional to the way of being (that

which is in first act, its way of being).

9. UNITARY PROCESSES IN NATURE

Experimental sciences use an analytical method which consists in taking phenomena

apart. It is because of this that many times the character of the whole is easily missed in

the study of the processes. This risk may even go as far as forgetting about the unity of

the processes, and therefore about their holistic and directional characters. This risk

becomes even bigger because science progresses in a fragmentary way, i.e. by studying

particular phenomena and formulating progressively more general theories which

establish relationship among different areas of nature.

As a matter of fact, it took a long time to obtain reliable knowledge of unitary processes:

these in general include laws and theories which belong to different areas. Only in

recent times, a detailed knowledge of these processes has been obtained, thanks to the

contribution of the many specific pieces of knowledge obtained from various sciences.

We shall now consider some examples of unitary processes with the intent of showing

the central place they occupy in nature, and the vast panorama they open to the present

philosophical reflection. These examples will show how the different levels of nature

are actually related to one another in the present worldview, and how the emergence of

new levels is the consequence of a huge process of self-organization of nature, in which

information plays a central role.

9.1. Unitary processes and the ordinary experience

Two big types of unitary processes appear to an ordinary observer: those related to the

living beings and those related to the biosphere and the heavens.

The precise mechanisms of the processes which take place in the living beings, have

become more and more clear only in the last decades. Some have always been known

such as generation, development, the different functions of the organisms, the

regeneration of damaged parts and reproduction. These are all unitary processes.

It is also very easy to acknowledge the existence of many processes around us which

have a unitary character, although less evident than the ones observed in living

organisms, such as, for instance, air and water circulation, the processes of evaporation

and condensation, rains and thunderstorms, seasons and tides. People have always been

able to admire the movement of the celestial sphere and of the planets whose detailed

study led eventually to the consolidation of the modern experimental sciences.

In ancient times, all these processes were regarded as manifestation of mysterious

forces, since the specific mechanisms involved were unknown. Scientific progress

introduced «disenchantment» about nature. Phenomena were being explained more and

more in terms of natural forces. The disenchantment consisted mainly in reducing the

natural processes to the sum of mini-processes explainable in terms of laws which were

progressively discovered by science. The stage was set for the loss of the unitary

character of the processes being studied. Nature, contemplated with an analytical eye,

appeared as gigantic machine whose functioning, like the one of a clock, could be

understood through the behaviour and assembly of its parts.

However, the most recent scientific advances have emphasized the fact that natural

processes have a unitary character which is much greater than the one observable in the

ordinary experience. This fact is at the basis of the present-day resurgence of the

philosophy of nature. The situation can be summed up in the following way: if we could

visualize what science reveals about the natural processes, we would be more amazed

than the ancients would, before the unusual spectacle offered to our sight. Actually,

behind any plant, or animal, or star, or the soil where plants live, or the waters of the

rivers and seas, or the air which surrounds us, we would discover an infinity of

interlinked mini-processes actually presenting an astounding spectacle. It comes with no

surprise, then, that those metaphysical and theological questions which seemed to have

been liquidated by the scientific progress, are now asked once again. We shall now

illustrate this new situation created by science at present.

9.2. Unitary processes and science

Various types of unitary processes will be now considered that shows the

interconnection of the different levels of nature.

a) Holistic processes

The reality is that any unitary process has holistic characters. In this section, though,

only those processes which are related to the organization of unitary systems will be

considered; the reason is that, thanks to such processes, unitary systems can develop and

operate. There is no shortage of examples, and some shall be mentioned.

Processes related to homeostasis are very important. Homeostasis refers to the

maintenance of all those conditions that make it possible for an organism to keep its

internal environment constant against the fluctuations of the external environment. It

operates through processes of feedback regulation. One can distinguish between

physiological and developmental homeostasis. The former refers to the tendency of an

organism to preserve its physiological conditions against the fluctuations of the

environment, while the latter refers to the tendency of the patterns of development of an

organism to produce a normal phenotype against fluctuations in the circumstances. It is

interesting to note the relationship between homeostasis and directionality: actually

homeostasis signifies the existence of tendencies towards certain states. The

mechanisms which make homeostasis possible, explain the holistic and directional

character of the processes involved.

There is coordination among the successive stage of the holistic processes. This appears

not only in the organisms but also in many of their components which, frequently

behave as unitary systems; this is the case of the cells of a multicellular organism. They

are coordinated structures, but each of them shows a certain autonomy represented by

the continuous unfolding of unitary processes within it which make it possible for the

cell to function and to establish relationship with the other cells. It is known, for

instance, that the human body has more than 10 billion cells distributed in more than

250 types (nerve cells, blood cells, muscular fibres, etc.). Each cell is made of a nucleus

and a cytoplasm. The nucleus contains the genetic information within the chromosomes.

The cytoplasm contains organelles which perform multiple functions, each of which

presupposes different unitary processes. One of its permanent activities is the

biosynthesis, a process through which biological material is manufactured with the

materials that reach the cell. Mitochondria are the power stations where useful energy is

produced. Ribosomes manufacture proteins according to instructions which come from

the nucleus. Through the cell membrane, processes of communication are established

with the external environment, and this takes place through highly specific procedures

(diffusion, active transport, osmosis, facilitated transport).

Each one of the above-mentioned activities is made of processes with their own unity,

and is coordinated with many others. In all of them information plays a very important

role. To give an example, the communication among cells is carried out in a very

specific way through an information which is stored, transmitted, processed and

integrated. It is one the cases in which the metaphor «lock-and-key» is used in order to

express the specific and coordinated character of the interactions47

There are many unitary processes in each of the cells of a multicellular organism, and

moreover, are coordinated. The same occurs in the tissues, organs and systems which

have a higher degree of organization and which therefore have more complex and more

coordinated processes. For example, the nervous system is the system of integration par

excellence. Its complexity increases with the complexity of the respective animal

species. In man, it is the most complex: only in the cerebral cortex there are some

30,000 million neurons, each of which ends with some 3,000 synaptic joints (or

connections with other cells). The human brain has an astounding organization: it

coordinates the whole body (senses, language, movement…) through information

processing. It is estimated that in the brain cortex of a human being there are between

1014

and 1015

synaptic joints. Brain functioning is made possible only because of the

existence of a very sophisticated coordination among a huge variety of processes at

different levels of organization.

In conclusion, the present-day knowledge about organisms shows the existence of a

great variety of unitary processes, coordinated among themselves at cellular level as

well as at higher levels (tissues, organs, systems, the whole body). These processes

unfold through physico-chemical mechanisms. Therefore, the existence and

coordination of unitary processes is extended also to the physico-chemical level. The

horizons opened by science in this direction are quite astounding, yet we are just at the

beginning of the exploration.

b) Functional processes

The term functionality refers to the activity of the parts in function of the whole. Among

the various functions of living beings one finds respiration, nutrition, transport,

excretion, nervous coordination, hormonal coordination, immunological defence. Some

have been known from ancient times, others were discovered in modern times. Only in

recent times, though, the detailed knowledge of their mechanisms was unveiled.

The systems and the machinery of living beings are characterized by their functions.

These are integrated by organs, and organs by tissues. The different functions reveal the

existence of multiple unitary processes coordinated by unitary processes at higher

levels; this highlights the importance of information in the unfolding of functions.

47

“Biologists accept the fact that cells recognize one another thanks to the existence of couples of complementary structures

found on their surface: one structure located on the surface of the cell carries an information which can be deciphered by

the other one, an idea which generalizes the lock-and-key hypothesis, formulated in 1987 by Emil Fisher, in order to

describe the specificity of the interactions between enzymes and substrata. Paul Ehrlich expanded it in 1900 in order to

explain the high specificity of the reactions in the immunological system. In 1914, Frank Rattray Lillie, of the University of

Chicago, used the same hypothesis in order to point out the mutual recognizing of the egg cell and of the spermatozoon.

Around the ‘20s, the lock-and-key hypothesis became one of the central postulates of molecular biology”: N. SHARON –

H. LIS, “Carboidratos en el reconocimiento cellular”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 198, March 1993, p. 20 (italics added).

The importance of information appears clearly in all those systems which, through

unitary processes, coordinate the various aspects of the organism. The nervous system is

just one of the many available examples we can mention. Explanations of this system

make recourse, many times, to ideas borrowed from the science of information when it

is said, for instance, that “the nervous system is a communication network which makes

it possible for the organism to interact with its environment in an adequate manner. It

has sensory components which detect stimuli proceeding from the external environment,

integrating components which process the sensory data, information stored in memory

and motor components which generate movement and other activities….The functional

unit of the nervous system is the «neuron»…The activity of the neurons, and of the

whole nervous system, is codified and information moves from one neuron to the next

through synaptic transmission”48

. When the activities of the nervous system are

analyzed in detail, one discovers an amazing level of coordination of unitary processes

which involve storage, coding and de-coding, transmission and integration of

information. A similar picture is presented by the endocrine system, also closely related

to coordination49

.

These examples are sufficient, without any further detail, to realize that there is great

cooperation and coordination of unitary processes. In many cases the agents that trigger

such processes are well known: they play the role of signalling agents. These agents

transport information and communicate them to receptors which act in accordance with

the information received. New knowledge has unveiled the existence, for instance, of

the so-called neuro-transmitters and regulatory genes among others which have been

known for a long time. The whole physics and chemistry is wrapped in mechanisms

which, through information processing, are at the basis of the functions of the living

organisms. Again, one can appreciate the existence of holistic and directional

dimensions in the functional unitary processes.

c) Morphogenetic Processes

Morphogenesis refers to the formation of the unitary systems and their parts. One of the

main cases of morphogenesis is reproduction, or replication of living beings. Another

one is development of the living beings from the early stages of existence.

Our knowledge about this area of investigation has advanced in a spectacular way from

the time in which James Watson and Francis Crick discovered in 1953 the double helix

structure of the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), the macromolecule responsible for the

genetic program. The DNA in the chromosomes contains a genetic program coded in its

structure. It is amazingly vast and its information unfolds according to the

circumstances. The processes depending on the DNA affect not only the individual

functions of the organism but also its constitution since they regulate the manufacturing

of its components.

48

R.M. BERNE - M.N.LEVY, Fisiologia, 2nd

reprint, Editorial Medica Panamericana, Buenos Aires 1987, p.56 49

Ibid., pp. 478-479.

The functioning of the genetic program is based on the elaboration of information50

.

The program is like a written text which uses only four letters (the four nitrogen bases

orderly arranged along the DNA chain) whose sequence determines the types of

products at the end of the program. Each cell contains in its nucleus the complete set of

chromosomes characteristic of the species. In each chromosome there is DNA made of

portions called «genes». Human cells contain more than 100,000 genes: this

presupposes the existence of 3,000 millions nitrogen bases (the letters of the genetic

alphabet). Writing only the letter corresponding to each one of the bases, in the case of

the genetic code of a virus which codifies 8 proteins, would occupy one page, in the case

of a bacterium, with 3,000 genes, it would occupy 2,000 pages, and in the case of man,

with 100,000 genes, it would take one million pages. This is a real library with a lot of

information, together with the instructions necessary for the execution of the multiple

functions of the program.

The information of the genetic code undergoes transcription, translation,

regulation and error correction. Some genes are regulators: they guide the expression of

other genes, are related to the plans of the organs and body structure. Actually, only a

fraction of genes is activated and transcribed in each process, in accordance with the

orders received from the cytoplasm or from messengers produced by other cells.

Nucleus and cytoplasm interact in a coordinated way, and so constituting a cybernetic

system. There is a hierarchy of levels of control and execution which are coordinated at

each stage of the processes and which are being progressively known at present51

.

Only some aspects of the morphogenesis – which includes regeneration - have

been considered. They are enough to show the existence of many unitary processes,

coordinated in a succession of organizing levels, whose dynamism is guided by

information stored in structures.

d) Cyclic processes

Cyclic processes are unitary processes of special interest since they develop in

periodical temporal sequences; they reveal a type of unity found at the basis of all

activities in nature: the unity of the time rhythms. Patterns related to the unfolding of

time – i.e. time rhythms – have at least the same importance as the ones related to space

patterns: the unfolding of the natural dynamism depends essentially on them.

One finds time patterns everywhere. For instance cell division, a process by which new

cells are produced, proceeds according to time patterns. In the last decades, the first

strides in the knowledge of the development of the cell cycle of some simple organisms

50

“ The main functions of the nucleus are directly related to the treatment of information; they encompass also the

preservation and, if necessary, the restoration of the genetic library and, especially, the transcription which is a very

selective and complex process. Through transcription, stored instructions are read where information is found, and this is

sent afterwards to the cytoplasm for expression. Genes exercise their domineering influence on the cell through these

mechanisms”: Christian DE DUVE, La célula viva, Labor, Barcelona 1988, p. 19. 51

One may read in this respect: E.M. DE ROBERTIS – G. OLIVER – C.V.E. WRIGHT, “Genes con homeobox y el plan

corporal de los vertebrados”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 168, September 1990, pp. 14-21; T. BEARDSLEY, “Genes

inteligentes”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 181, October 1991, pp. 76-85.

have been made. The alternation of the various phases is directed by self-generating

chemical reactions in the cytoplasm; it is a kind of an «oscillator», a «clock» which

provokes periodical contractions with great regularity52

.

Great progress has been made in the knowledge of the biological rhythms. They are not

isolated phenomena; on the contrary, the whole activity of a living being is closely

related to the existence of rhythms. It is understandable why this should be so; actually

time organization is absolutely indispensable for the different functions to take place in

a successive and coordinated way.

The study of these time structures (the biological rhythms) has originated a branch of

science called «chrono-biology». The functioning of the organisms includes, on one

hand, internal rhythmical mechanisms and, on the other, some other mechanisms which

make it possible to adjust the internal rhythms to the external conditions. Some rhythms,

such as the respiratory and the cardiac, have external manifestations which are easily

observed; some others have been discovered with the progress of science. There are

low-frequency rhythms (with periods from 6 days to various years), medium-frequency

rhythms (with periods between 30 minutes and 6 days) and high-frequency rhythms

(with periods from 0.5 milliseconds to 30 minutes). High-frequency rhythms, such as

respiratory and cardiac, are highly temperature-sensitive and their generation depends

on the property of the neurons and neural network with an oscillating and resonant

character53

.

Biological rhythms are very important, few of them have been really studied in their

detailed mechanisms; they are unitary processes with a high level of coordination and

are based on physico-chemical mechanisms which are also coordinated unitary

processes. Such mechanisms are known as oscillators, i.e. systems with a periodical

behaviour in which the same movements are repeated time and again. It should be

pointed out that single and isolated oscillators are unable to explain natural phenomena;

many of these can only be understood with the coupled oscillators in which there is an

inter-linking that makes it possible for the oscillators involved to be synchronized54

. In

these cases, a crucial role is also played by the so-called synergy or cooperative action,

bridge between the physico-chemical and biological phenomena which manifests the

holistic and directional character of the unitary processes.

52

One may read: A.W. MURRAY – M.W. KIRSCHNER, “Control del ciclo cellular”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 176,

May 1991, pp. 26-33. On page 33, one finds the following statement: “Yeasts, as well as the somatic cells of the

multicellular organisms, have mechanisms to delay the beginning of mitosis until the DNA is replicated, and until any

damage suffered is repaired”; “We already know that, in somatic cells as well as in embryos at an advanced stage, the

decision of replicating the DNA in the interphase is subjected to a very fine regulation, as it is the decision of beginning the

mitotic process …(for this second decision) the cell assesses if it has grown enough and if it can proceed without fears, to

the replication of the DNA and ,therefore, to mitosis…The steps to the starting point are as controlled as the steps to mitosis

are…they are also subjected to the control of nutrients, hormones and growth factors” (italics added). 14

Cf. J.M.DELGADO, “Ritmos biologicos” in J.A.F.TRESGUERRES (publisher), Fisiologia humana, Interamericana-

McGraw Hill, Madrid 1992, pp. 1170 and 1174. 54

“We can find coupled oscillators at both extremes of the natural world; however, they are particularly conspicuous in the

living organisms: the pace-maker cells in the heart, the cells that secrete insulin in the pancreas, the neuronal network in the

brain and in the spinal cord which control the rhythmic behavior such as respiration, race or mastication”: S.H. STROGATZ

– I. STEWART, “Osciladores acoplados y sincronización biológica”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 209, February 1994, p.

54.

There are many other particular processes with an oscillating or periodical character,

although they are not found so well cooperatively organized as the ones previously

mentioned. Actually, it would be impossible to understand the functioning of nature if

periodical phenomena were not there. Of great importance are also the so-called bio-

geo-chemical cycles, i.e. the routes followed in nature by the main elements involved in

the constitution of living organisms; these play a central role for understanding, in an

ecological perspective, the cooperation of the multiple factors which integrate the

natural systems.

9.3. Genesis of nature

Nature is made of levels hierarchically organized, and in each of them there are

characteristic patterns.

In the present-day worldview the building of nature can be contemplated as the result of

a vast process of self-organization in which successive levels of organization are

produced and in which information plays a very important role.

a) The emergence of new realities

How do new types of organization arise?

One may think that a new reality is nothing but the unfolding of something which pre-

existed, like a carpet which was rolled up. Nothing may come into existence which did

not exist somehow previously. There is no doubt that some changes are of this type.

Other changes really produce something new. Potentiality does not mean pre-existence

to the produced act. As Aristotle had already pointed out, in explaining the emergence of

new realities all the causes and conditions intervening in the process need to be taken

into consideration.

In order to explain new realities one needs to take into account all the

interactions existing among the entities which take part in the process. For instance, in

those processes in which new chemical compounds are formed, interactions develop

which did not exist when the components were isolated; this explains how new

properties can arise. A water molecule has properties which cannot be reduced to the

sum of the properties of hydrogen and oxygen. As a matter of fact, new properties arise

in a natural way when oxygen and hydrogen interact in certain circumstances.

Moreover, the information contained in the components of the processes can

become integrated into new unitary patterns. One may well understand therefore that

new realities may arise which are really unpredictable if one takes into account only the

intervening factors, and forgets about their capacity of being integrated into new unitary

realities.

Some authors have emphasized, in this sense, the creative character of the

natural processes. However, it is very important to try to avoid a too anthropomorphic

way of interpreting the term «creative». The term only means that the natural processes

can lead to new results, different from what existed before. On the other hand, no one is

entitled to say that any result may arise from natural processes, as if nature acted with a

sense of freedom. One cannot even say that the unfolding of natural processes takes

place in a totally self-sufficient way. A deeper understanding of the term «creativity» of

nature can be achieved only by taking into account nature’s ultimate foundation, i.e. its

relation with divine action.

Consequently, an explanation of the natural processes as actualization of

potentialities, understood as unfolding of a natural dynamism directed by information

which becomes integrated into new patterns, shows how new realities can actually be

produced at the end of the same processes. New light is cast upon the important problem

of the «emergence», although the metaphysical questions about the ultimate explanation

of the processes involved remains pending.

b) Self-organization of nature

When considering the integration of patterns at successive levels, one comes face-to-

face with the issue of spontaneous self-organization of nature. It is a fascinating issue

for the scientific as well as the philosophical study. Actually it encompasses a variety of

themes55

, including a series of problems which in physics go under the name of

complexity56

.

The topic is fascinating because on one hand it reveals the internal and

directional dynamism of nature and, on the other hand, it feeds those hopes of extending

the explanations in physical terms up to the human realities.

The experience of the self-organization of nature is not something new, but it

goes back in time. Actually, the field of biology is rich of this type of experiences: it can

actually be said that the world of living beings is the world of self-organization. The

seeds that become trees, the conception and development of animals, the different

biological functions, etc. are all manifestations of the capacity of nature of organizing

itself. The issue of self-organization has special interest nowadays because more light is

cast through the knowledge of its basic mechanisms. It is possible therefore to claim the

existence of a self-organization at a physico-chemical level and to relate it to the

biological one57

.

Phenomena of self-organization manifest the internal dynamism of the natural

entities, their intertwining with structuring, and the cooperation among the different

elements and levels. They show the existence of an information which is stored in the

natural structures and which unfolds and is combined in the processes.

55

This vast subject, together with its themes, was pointed out in the Coloquio de Cerisy held from the 10th

to the 17th

June,

1981 about the self-organization. The texts of the oloquio were published with the title: L’auto-organisation: de la physique

au politique, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1983. 56

The main themes related with the problem of self-organization in physics are dealt with in: P.DAVIES (publisher), The

New Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989, Ch. 7 to 12. 57

A synthesis of the main themes related to self-organization in physics can be seen in M.ARTIGAS, La inteligibilidad de

la naturaleza, Ed. EUNSA, Pamplona 1995, Ch. II.

Knowledge of the self-organization does not eliminate, though, the metaphysical

problems involved; on the contrary, it is an invitation to pose them anew. For instance,

how do physical entities know their own identity and the way they should behave? (the

metaphorical meaning of the verb to know should be obvious in this particular context);

how are such sophisticated patterns formed through the interaction of purely natural

forces? It is in this sense that Paul Davies refers to the “singular propensity of matter

and energy to organize themselves into coherent structures and patterns” and states: “It

is one of the universal miracles of nature how huge numbers of particles, subjected only

to blind forces of nature, are able to organize themselves in patterns of cooperative

activity”58

.

Science with its progress is unable to give exhaustive answers to these questions.

Finally, the study of the activities of nature suggests the existence of a kind of

unconscious intelligence. It is important to emphasize that this is again a metaphor;

actually, the expression is literally a contradiction. The metaphor refers to the existence

of an information which directs and controls. This is an evident fact which goes beyond

the limits of science.

c) Processes as unfolding of information

Unitary processes and information patterns are closely related since both need each

other.

On one hand, it is difficult to understand how a unitary process could exist without some

type of program guiding the unfolding of the process itself which consists in a

coordinated succession of steps. This program is what we call information pattern.

On the other hand, an information pattern consists of structurally stored instructions

from whose unfolding a series of dynamically coordinated patterns originates which is

what we call a unitary process.

The typical method of the experimental sciences is analytical. Processes are

disassembled so that their component parts can be isolated and studied in a systematic

way. Investigations are carried out to monitor how the various factors change under

controlled experimental conditions. Aspects which are of interest, are isolated and

studies while aspects of minor interest are left aside. It is an extremely fruitful method

which makes it possible to obtain a detailed knowledge otherwise very difficult to

obtain. However, there is a risk of reductionism from a philosophical point of view

which consists in reconstructing nature as a simple sum of particular transformations

capable of being studied in an analytical way. In this way, what is most characteristic in

nature is being overlooked, i.e. the existence of an organization which appears, in its

dynamic aspect, through unitary processes made of an articulated series of steps that

lead to a specific final stage from an initial one, in a directional manner.

58

Cf. P.DAVIES, «The New Physics: A Synthesis», in P.DAVIES (publisher), The New Physics, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

The recent scientific advances have shown how it is possible to study in a scientific way

many unitary processes which correspond to information patterns, without lessening the

importance of the analytical perspective, and acquire a knowledge of particular dynamic

patterns (laws). This new panorama has been clearly opened in the last decades, thanks

to the progress made in the morphogenetic theories. In the light of these new advances,

the philosophical reflection carried out earlier on in history on the problem of becoming

acquires new relevance. The explanations offered by the analytical method appear now

to be insufficient, while at the same time more importance is given to those which stress

the holistic, synergic and directional aspects of the natural processes. Moreover, the

concept of information makes it possible to understand in a better way those aspects

which, up to now, have appeared somehow mysterious.

The actualization of potentialities is better understood when considered in the light of

the concept of information, as a program, or as a set of instructions which is stored in

the natural structures and which is the origin of specific types of behaviour in each

specific situation. The Aristotelian explanation is still valid and seems quite adequate, in

the light of the present-day scientific knowledge, to harmonize the scientific and

philosophical perspectives.

Actually, the existence of a structurally stored information whose unfolding depends on

external factors which intervene in each case, makes it possible to understand how the

effect may somehow pre-exist without existing in miniature and without the processes

being univocally determined. The existence of information patterns makes it possible to

understand how the results are produced through the unfolding of a pre-existing plan. It

is possible to understand, at the same time, how this very unfolding is compatible with

the production of true new entities, since it implies the convergence of multiple factors

which will hardly be always the same.

IV. ORDER IN NATURE

Nature is a huge system; it is made of different levels of organization which are

interrelated through multiple connections. Order is therefore a basic, and one of the most

important, characteristic of nature. Science presupposes this order and tries to know it in

details. Philosophy of nature, on the other hand, mostly reflects on this order.

However, nature is not ordered from any point of view: it is not difficult to come

across disorder together with order. Therefore, the philosophical reflection on the

natural order needs to be preceded by an analysis in order to pin point its real

characteristics.

10. THE NATURAL ORDER

Our reflection on the natural order begins with some clarifications on the concept of

order and on the main ways in which order exists in nature.

10.1. The concept of order

Order is one of the classical concepts which has not only survived up to our

modern times, but which also occupies a central place in the present scientific and

philosophical discussions59

.

The concept of order connotes unity in the diversity: it refers to different parts

which obey a specific arrangement. However, in speaking of unity and arrangement one

is already using terms which are related to order. Any attempt to define order without

using concepts which somehow include it already, is going to be unsuccessful; actually

anything without any kind of order would be absolute chaos. A chaos of this kind,

though, would be unthinkable: we cannot represent any reality whose components are

not somehow related to some kind of order. When we talk of chaos, we talk always of a

relative chaos, a reality which has a high level of disorder and not an absolute disorder:

this last type of situation cannot exist.

Therefore, order encompasses the whole reality. Because of this, order has been

called a quasi-transcendental60

concept. Consequently, the concept of order cannot be

59

A philosophical analysis of the concept of order can be found in J.J.SANGUINETI, La filosofia del cosmo in Tommaso

d’Aquino, Ares, Milan 1986, pp. 29-48. 60

Cf. H. KUHN, «Orden», in: H. KRINGS – H.M. BAUMGARTNER – C. WILD and others, Conceptos fundamentales de

filosofia, Herder, Barcelona 1978, tome II, pp. 693-694.

defined without using previous ideas which somehow already presuppose it. It is

nevertheless possible to pin point some of its most important characteristics.

One of these characteristics is the relational one. The concept of order is

relational: order is always said in relation to something, it is relative to some criterion

taken as reference element. Different degrees of order can be attributed to the same

situation according to the selected point of view. For instance, the books in a library can

be classified according to the subject, catalogue number, size, colour, or by combining

this factors and others. In the case of personal books, everyone uses his own criteria, and

it happens sometimes that an apparently disordered arrangement is the most ordered and

useful to the owner of the books. Therefore, order is a relative concept: order is always

spoken of in relation to some specific criteria.

Consequently, there are many types of order. Since we are studying the natural

order, we shall now analyze the basic types of order found in nature.

10.2. Types of order in nature

Clearly, there is a high level of order in nature: it is shown in our every-day life,

and science constantly discovers many of its aspects which are inaccessible to ordinary

experience.

The natural order appears in three successive degrees of complexity: structuring,

patterns and organization.

a) Order in structuring

The space-time structuring is a basic dimension of nature. Natural entities show

a space configuration. Processes unfold in a time succession. Space configurations, as

well as time successions, presuppose some kind of order, i.e. a distribution of

components, or stages which are related among themselves. In this sense, all natural

realities have some kind of space and time order, including those which appear to be

disorderly.

Space-time structuring is a general characteristic of the natural realities and

admits several modalities. Two of them, particularly important, are the patterns and

organization.

b) Order and patterns

We use the term «pattern» to indicate all those space or time structures which are

repeated in nature. We call the space patterns «configurations», and the time patterns

«rhythms».

Patterns are then repetitive and repetition is a central aspect of order. We state

that there is order every time there is something which repeats itself. It may be the case

of a space configuration realized in different systems, or a time rhythm found in

different processes.

Patterns are also regular. A configuration or a rhythm presupposes the existence

of natural processes or systems which have a specific structuring produced in a natural

way. Because of this, they are repeated in different individual cases.

Patterns play a very essential role in nature. We may imagine worlds which, in

theory, have less patterns than our world has. However, the nature we actually know,

and which makes our existence possible, is marked by patterns at all levels and in all its

phenomena. We have already pointed out that, although not every thing is pattern in

nature, nevertheless everything rotates around patterns. Science actually seeks the

detailed knowledge of these patterns. Any new step in the scientific progress means

finding new patterns in nature.

Ultimately, the natural order is centred on space-time patterns: space

configurations and time rhythms.

c) Order and organization

There is, however, another fundamental level in the natural order which is

organization. Order is not synonymous with organization. The idea of organization

contains an active meaning which is not always found in the idea of order; it suggests

something more elaborate than a simple generic order. Organization is a particular case

of order, a strong kind of order which appears with structured components that

cooperate in a functional way, i.e. when there is unity and cooperation among the

components of a system. This is the kind of order found in those systems whose

components cooperate towards its maintenance and activity, by carrying out specific

functions which contribute towards this end.

The typical case of natural organization is the one of the living organisms, whose

physical systems are called organisms. Here one finds a typical individuality together

with unity, cooperation and function. In reality, organization is not exclusive of the

biological level, it is found also at a physico-chemical level.

The distinction between order and organization is a key issue in the study of

nature. Actually, what is more important in nature is not the fact that it has a certain

order (a universe without order is unthinkable), but the fact that it has a high level of

organization. This is witnessed by ordinary knowledge, while science expands this

knowledge in an amazing way.

10.3. Order and organization in nature

Because of the scarcity of specific knowledge, ancient philosophy lent itself to

ambiguities and was seriously limited. The fragmentary way in which science developed

after its systematic beginning in the 17th

century did no facilitate a reliable

representation of nature in its totality. Tanks to the present-day knowledge, we are in a

better vantage point than our predecessors were, and for the first time in history it has

become possible to formulate a global worldview which includes the basic aspects of the

organization of nature.

We shall now consider how nature is organized. We shall first describe its

different levels of organization and then analyze how these are integrated with each

other to form the characteristic unity of nature.

a) Diversity of levels of organization in nature

Three broad levels of organization can be described in nature: physico-chemical,

astrophysical, biological.

The physico-chemical level

This level consists of the microphysical components which cannot be observed

directly owing to their small size, i.e. the subatomic particles, atoms (made of particles),

molecules and macromolecules (made of particles and atoms). This is the stuff which

compounds are made of usually referred to as aggregates. Aggregates can be found as

solids, liquids or gases, depending on the strength which binds the microphysical

components. We shall consider later the knowledge available about the composition of

matter and the problems arising from it.

The astrophysical level

This is the level of stars, galaxies and planets. Stars have a nucleus with a

temperature of millions of degrees, with nuclear fusion reactions in which hydrogen

nuclei produce helium nuclei with a great release of energy. Because of this, stars have

their own light which can be seen from the earth, although they are very far. On the

other hand, planets are simple aggregates of matter in a solid, liquid or gaseous state and

do not have their own light.

There are approximately 100,000 million galaxies and each of them contains

between 1000 million and 1 billion stars. The distance between them varies in terms of

millions of light-years. The galaxies which are closer to the earth, are the Clouds of

Magellan: the Great Cloud is 170,000 light years away, while the Small Cloud is

200,000 light-years away (one light-year is the distance covered by the light in one year

at the speed of 300,000 kilometres per second). The Andromeda galaxy is the next one

in proximity to the earth: 2.2 million light-years.

Our galaxy contains some 150,000 million stars. The diameter of its disc is some

90,000 light-years long and the thickness of the central core is 10,000 light-years. Its age

is calculated at 12,000 million years.

Galaxies are made of stars whose origin lies in the gravitational contraction of

interstellar gases, principally made of hydrogen and helium. One can easily see some

6,500 stars. The closest visible star is found in the constellation of Centaurs at a distance

of 4 light-years. There are only 11 stars which are less than 10 light-years away from the

earth. Of the easily visible stars the greatest is “epsilon Aurigae” with a diameter of

3,000 million kilometres and at a distance of 3,400 light-years away from the earth.

Although huge, it is observed from the earth as a small dot because of the enormous

distance.

The sun is a medium-sized star. It has a radius of 696,000 kilometres and it is

150,000 million kilometres distant from the earth. As a consequence of the

thermonuclear reactions which occur in its nucleus, the sun loses every second some 5

million tons of matter which is being converted into energy. The sun has been fully

active for about 5,000 million years: in spite of this, it still has fuel for some 20,000

million years.

Stars contain almost all the types of known matter. They are huge aggregates of

matter which obey quite simple physico-chemical principles. The phenomena occurring

in the stars develop around the stellar core which is basically a huge oven of

thermonuclear fusion.

Formation, development and disintegration of the stars are cyclic processes. Their life

span is quite long, it goes, nevertheless, through different stages and eventually ends. In

the processes which develop within the stars, the basic materials are formed which are

needed for the building of the planets as well as of living beings. Moreover, the life as

we know it depends on the energy provided by one star only, the sun.

The conditions of a planet such as the earth obey physico-chemical laws. We

tend to think that the conditions in which we live are absolutely stable. Nevertheless, at

a cosmic level the present conditions of the earth are quite unique and correspond to a

stage which had a beginning and will have an end. It is likely that these conditions

underwent drastic changes in the past owing to impacts with other objects. In any case,

the present conditions which make life possible depend on the intensity of the energy

coming from the sun; when this will change in future, not all the forms of life we now

know – including ours - will be able to find the necessary conditions for their

preservation.

One of the most striking aspects at this level is the immensity of the universe

and, at the same time, the similarity of the physico-chemical processes which unfold in

the stars. It is a relatively simple level of organization. There is no doubt that many

different processes go on in the enormous volume of the stars; however, the basic

principles which govern them can be understood pretty easily on the basis of the

knowledge of the physico-chemical level of organization.

Before the development of nuclear physics in the 20th

century, very little was understood

about the authentic nature and activity of the stars.

Biological level

The highest degree of organization is found at biological level whose subtlety is

being known more and more thanks to the huge strides of molecular biology.

It is important to emphasize here the continuity between the biological and the

physico-chemical level. The peculiarity of the biological level is found not in its

components but in the type of organization.

We have here a new opportunity to emphasize also the highly specific character

of the physico-chemical level. Actually, the life we know is made possible thanks to the

existence of very specific physico-chemical properties. The properties of carbon, for

instance, make it possible for this element to combine with itself and with other

chemical elements in an immense variety of ways. As a consequence, the existence of

bio-molecules is made possible together with all the biological phenomena associated

with them.

The biological structures form a long chain with many branches of systems and

sub-systems with a very specific organization and with a highly cooperative dynamism.

They obey structural principles which are relatively simple yet very efficient. For

example, the genetic information of each organism is stored in the genes and coded

through a simple “alphabet” of four “letters”: the four nitrogen bases which are found

along the DNA of the genes. The activity of the proteins which play many roles in the

organism depends on their specific tri-dimensional structure, and this last one is

determined by the components of the protein whose sequence explains the structure the

system adopts. The biochemical world is made of a relatively small number of

components, sufficient, though, to form very specific and sophisticated structures.

In this area, the intertwining between dynamism and structure is particularly

evident. Actually the biological activity depends on the specific structures which make

up the organism, from the molecular level to the level of tissues, organs and systems.

b) Stratification of the natural levels: continuity and gradualness

From what has already been said, it is clear that there is in nature a basic unity of

composition and a stratification of the various levels. The physical level (microphysical)

is present at all levels, followed by the chemical one. The levels after the physico-

chemical branch into two different series of entities: the major entities such as the stars,

the earth and the planets, and the living entities.

It is also clear that the different levels are related among themselves. We have

just stated that the physico-chemical forms the basis of all the other levels. There are,

moreover, other types of relationships, e.g. living beings depend on the energy supplied

by the sun and on the physico-chemical conditions which make the earth inhabitable. As

a matter of fact, there is no level which is completely independent from the others.

At the same time, there is distinction and continuity among the different levels.

Levels are stratified: this means that the inferior levels are integrated in the superior

ones. It is therefore possible to speak of continuity, gradation and hierarchy.

Each level can be considered as a condition of possibility for the other levels,

according to the respective order. This does not mean that everything included in one

level is a necessary condition for the following levels, however, the basic aspects are.

The basic aspects of the physical level make the chemical one possible. The same occurs

with the chemical ones respect to the astrophysical ones, with the astrophysical respect

to the geological, and with the geological respect to the biological.

One level may be a condition for the possibility of another in two ways: either

because it provides the constituent elements or because it provides the external

conditions which make the existence of the latter possible. In this way, the basic

physico-chemical entities (particles, atoms, molecules) are at the basis of everything else

as their constituent elements. The astrophysical level provides the constituent elements

for the geological one. The geological level provides the constituent elements for the

biological one, and both – the astrophysical and the geological – provide, moreover, the

external conditions which make the biological level possible. There are many

relationships of both kinds in the biological level among the different organisms. For

instance, plants are irreplaceable links for the existence of animals and of man, since

they are the only ones which are able to manufacture organic compounds from inorganic

material. Organic materials produced by plants are, in turn, necessary to the other living

organisms, (the heterotrophs depend on the autotrophs which in turn “feed” directly on

the sun energy and on the soil).

On the other hand, there is a hierarchy of organization among the different

levels. It would not make much sense to ask whether a star is more perfect than the

earth, or if an elephant is more perfect than an eagle. One may say, though, that the

physico-chemical compounds present a greater organization than the basic elements, and

that the organisms at biological level have a much superior organization than the entities

of all the other levels. Clearly, man occupies the supreme place in this hierarchy. This

statement is usually criticized by labelling it as “anthropocentric”. It is claimed that the

earth does not occupy any privileged place in the universe and that man, as a biological

being, is not superior to the other beings in all their aspects. This does not affect the

obvious and incontestable fact that man is supreme, from the organizational point of

view, respect to the other beings (this superiority becomes essential if the spiritual

dimension of man is taken into account).

11. THE PHYSICO-CHEMICAL STRUCTURE

The physico-chemical components are the basis of all natural entities and

processes. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the physico-chemical composition of

nature.

11.1. The composition of matter

The ancients had already proposed theories about the composition of matter.

Knowledge of the latter however became reliable only from the 19th

century when

sufficient information from chemistry and physics was gathered. Actually the atomic

theory was being formulated at the beginning of the 19th

century.

a) Historical review of the physics of the elements

The knowledge of the elements has been a central theme since ancient times. The

pre-Socratics proposed explanations such as the theory of the four elements whose

influence lasted two thousand years, and the atomic theory which, in some aspects, was

always present during centuries and played a certain role in the formulation of the

scientific atomic theory at the beginning of the 19th

century. The composition of matter

has always been an object of scientific investigation and accompanied, since ancient

times, by empirical work. The technique of working with metals is for instance an

example of empirical work. Empirical techniques led to the discoveries of new chemical

elements: seven metals (gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin and mercury) and two non-

metals (sulphur and carbon). Although they were not known as elements, they provided

the empirical basis for a further development of the experimental science.

The theories which established modern chemistry in a definitive way, had not

been formulated yet in the 18th

century. In this century however first class scientific

work was carried out with still poor equipment which led to the isolation of various

elements: cobalt (1735), zinc (1746), nickel (1751), manganese (1774). Three basic

gases were discovered with similar outstanding investigations: nitrogen (1772), oxygen

(1774) and hydrogen (1776). A group of other metals was also discovered: cobalt,

molybdenum, uranium, chromium, and elements such as tellurium, niobium, tantalum

and vanadium.

The atomic theory proposed by John Dalton in 1808 was based on studies on

chemistry which had been carried out already for one and half century, and firmly

established itself in the 19th

century. In 1869, Dimitry Mendeleyev formulated the

periodic table of the elements, basic types of atoms which constitute matter. In this

table, the chemical elements are listed in orderly groups with similar properties. The

periodic table aroused interest and spurred scientists to look for missing elements. It is

in this way that elements such as scandium, gallium and germanium were discovered 15

years after their theoretical prediction. The very table facilitated other discoveries such

as the artificial elements produced from 1940 onwards.

The use of highly technological procedures made it possible to obtain transuranic

elements which are found beyond uranium in the periodic table (that is, elements with

an atomic number greater than 92). The first of these artificial elements was produced in

1940 during experiments on nuclear fission of uranium. The construction of particles

accelerators has made it possible to make new discoveries in this line.

Democritus proposed the idea of atom in ancient times. The modern atom,

however, has little to do with Democritus’ atom. The ancients called atoms the ultimate

components of matter thinking that they really were indivisible elements. On the

contrary, atoms studied by present-day science are quite complex systems and they are

not the ultimate elements. Actually, they are made of sub-atomic particles which, at

times, are called elementary particles. We know though that many of them are also

composed, and it is probable that none of them is really elementary.

Molecules are made of atoms which are bound to one another by chemical bonds

of different types. In nature there are 92 types of atoms (more can be manufactured in a

laboratory although they happen to have a very ephemeral average lifespan) and a great

number of molecules and macro-molecules.

We shall now examine the present-day ideas about the elementary components

of matter.

b) Present-day theories about the micro-physical components of matter

In accordance with the well-established and experimentally proved standard

model, the basic components of matter are the quarks and the leptons. The combination

of quarks produces the heaviest particles (such as protons and neutrons), while leptons

are light particles (such as electrons).

The nucleus of the atoms is made of protons and neutrons. Electrons are found

rotating around the nucleus, in the same number as the protons of the nucleus and at

different levels of energy. Therefore, ordinarily matter is made of three particles:

protons, neutrons and electrons. Two important characteristics need to be pointed out

about this level of composition: first, the organization of the particles is very specific. In

an electrically neutral atom, the protons are the ones that determine the positively

charged atom, while the electrons determine the negative one. Since the electrons are in

the same number as the protons, the atom is electrically neutral. Moreover, there are in

nature less than 100 atoms many of whose properties are grouped in families in

accordance with the number of electrons of the last shell (hydrogen has one proton,

helium has two, and each subsequent one has one more). The distribution of the

electrons in the various shells obeys the “principle of exclusion” of quantum mechanics

proposed by Wolfgang Pauli. According to this, no two electrons in an identical state

can be found in the same shell. Consequently, as the number of protons in the nucleus

increases, the number of electrons increases in an equal manner and their specific

organization in shells justifies the properties of the single atoms. Therefore, matter is

already organized in a very specific way at atomic level.

Another important characteristic is the fact that in reality the sub-atomic particles

do not correspond exactly to the intuitive concept of particle since in many phenomena

they behave like waves. Here therefore we are in the presence of microphysical entities

which only in part correspond to the classical concept of corpuscle. Present-day theories

about microphysical entities are “field theories”, and particles are conceived as “quanta”

of these fields, i.e. as very peculiar entities which do not correspond exactly to any

entity commonly experienced. They are highly sophisticated scientific constructions

which do not match ordinary images. Sometime they were proposed to our consideration

as “concentrated energy”. This expression does not entail an exact scientific meaning:

however, it can be useful to understand that the composition of matter does not

correspond ultimately to immutable juxtaposed particles. It is rather made of dynamic

entities which interact and, in doing so, produce in many cases new unitary structures.

The sub-atomic particles interact with one another with four types of basic

forces:

a) strong nuclear: forces which keep the nucleus of the atom together;

b) weak nuclear: forces which appear in very specific phenomena such

as radioactivity;

c) electromagnetic: forces which appear between electrically charged

particles and are responsible for the cohesion between

atoms and molecules and for many properties of

matter;

d) gravitational: forces which produce important effects in the

attraction between those bodies with a conspicuous

mass.

The scope of nuclear forces is very small; actually they act only inside the

atomic nucleus. On the other hand, the scope of the electromagnetic and gravitational

forces is very big, though the intensity of the respective interactions diminishes with the

distance between the interacting bodies.

The particles within atoms, and the atoms within molecules, are bound by forces

of electric type. Again, it is important to avoid the image of a mechanistic model since

the connections are not just a mere juxtaposition of matter. Atoms and molecules are

dynamic structures since their cohesion is due to the action of forces, and they can be re-

united to form new unitary structures. It is also inappropriate to say that atoms are

aggregates of particles, and molecules are aggregates of atoms.

Molecules are also bound to each other by electric forces. The intermolecular

forces are nil outside the sphere of molecular action, attracting within the same sphere

up to a point of cancelling each other, and repulsive from then on. These forces are of

short and wide range action.

The major compounds are made of molecules or simply of atoms which do not

manage to become molecules (e.g. ionic crystals such as sodium chloride). The

macromolecules (proteins, carbohydrates, lipids, nucleic acids) are made of many

molecules which are chemically bound to one another to form unity structures. The

smallest of these molecules contain up to 200 atoms and the bigger ones something like

thousands ore hundreds of thousands bound in a repetitive way. This is the case of the

biochemical molecules (such as proteins and nucleic acids) which play a fundamental

role in the organization of the living beings.

Finally, the following is worth noting: there are pure substances, with fixed and

well-defined composition and properties; mixtures, made of two or more pure

substances which preserve their properties; aggregates which display a variety of

features.

There are, then, successive levels of organization at physico-chemical level,

from the atoms to the molecules, macromolecules and chemical compounds which

correspond to very specific components and interactions. The physico-chemical

organization does not correspond to a simple mechanical machine whose pieces are

simply juxtaposed. It rather corresponds to systems with holistic properties, cooperative

activity, and a great capacity of integration. Therefore the physico-chemical level is

completely permeated by dynamism and structuring which intertwine in the different

types of systems.

c) Unifying theories

Experimental sciences progress in a fragmentary way; this progress is possible if

particular problems are marked out. New knowledge can always be integrated into new

theories.

It is the case with those theories which deal with the fundamental interactions.

Newton’s physics, formulated in the 17th

century, included a theory on gravity. Later on,

laws regarding electricity and magnetism were established and Maxwell unified both of

them into a theory on electromagnetism. In the 20th

century Einstein formulated a new

theory on gravity with his general theory on relativity. At the same time, theories on the

strong and weak nuclear forces were developed. It seems possible now to unify

electromagnetism and weak nuclear forces: this has recently led to the formulation of

the weak electric theory. Attempts are being made also to unify the weak electric theory

with the strong nuclear forces through the theory of great unification. Other attempts are

being made, although at a more hypothetical level, at unifying gravity with the three

above mentioned forces through the theory of quantum gravity which would link gravity

with quantum physics.

The interest in such efforts for unification is not only theoretical. Models,

presently accepted to explain the formation of the universe in the first instants after the

Big Bang, portray the four fundamental forces as united, not differentiated and in a state

which would correspond to the hypothetical theories of quantum gravity. Through

successive alterations in the symmetry, there would have been first the separation of

gravity from the other three forces still united at this stage in a state which is reflected in

the theory of the great unification. Shortly afterwards, separation would have occurred

between the strong nuclear force and the other two forces described in the weak electric

theory.

Consequently, to make progress in the theories of unification would mean to

know better how processes developed in the early stages of the existence of the

universe. The physical situation of those stages cannot be studied directly. However, if

the theories really correspond to past events, then it would be possible to test them in a

laboratory through experiments.

Such experiments are difficult to be set owing to the high energies involved. The

cost of these experiments is exorbitant. In the 90s, a circular underground tunnel with a

circumference of 80 Km was built in Texas with the idea of installing a super

accelerator of particles (SSC). The operations were shortly frustrated by the re-thinking

of politicians who revoked their previous decisions, and the project was stopped.

Presently therefore, the only centres where these studies can be carried out are the

European laboratory of CERN in Geneva and the FERMILAB of Chicago in the US.

11.2. Mechanism, dynamism and energysm

In the philosophical study on the composition of matter two stands are usually

seen as opposed to each other, i.e. mechanism and energysm or dynamism. The former

conceives matter as basically passive and reduces nature to collisions and mechanical

impulses, while the latter emphasises the basic character of forces and energies and, in

doing so, places itself at the antipodes of mechanism.

The word “dynamism” is, within this context, a theory or a system of natural

philosophy which ultimately reduces the whole nature to «forces». On the other hand,

this term has been used so far with a different meaning, to emphasize the fact that what

is natural has «its own dynamism» or an «internal dynamism» which does not depends

on external actions either only or primarily. Dynamism here does not refer to a system

of thought but to a concrete characteristic possessed by the natural which is difficult to

express with different terms.

In considering mechanism and energysm, we have previously emphasized how

partial their explanations of nature are in view of the present-day knowledge about the

composition of matter. They emphasize only some aspects of nature while leaving

others aside.

Modern science shows how matter is really equipped with an internal kind of

dynamism which does not have any thing to do with the rigid elements portrayed by the

mechanistic doctrines. However, the purely dynamist doctrines are not a valid

alternative to the mechanistic ones either; actually nature is not just pure energy. Any

reliable picture of nature must include both of its aspects, the dynamic and the structural,

closely related to each other but without confusion between the two.

Matter is found structured at different levels of organization as a consequence of

the dynamism of its components. The dynamism of matter unfolds according to patterns

and produces structures which, in their turn, are the source of new types of dynamism.

11.3. Philosophical problems related to quantum physics

At times it is said that science corrects experience or the common sense, and that it

manages to invalidate convictions which appeared well founded. Concretely, recourse is

made to quantum physics in order to claim that the classical notions about being and

causality have lost value.

At times, for instance, it is said that quantum physics invalidates the principle of

causality and also the very notion of an objective and independent reality. Some of the

pioneers of quantum physics – such as Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg – have given

credit to such interpretations in claiming that quantum mechanics shows how the

concept of causality cannot always be applied, or how terms such as «being» and

«knowing» lose their unambiguous meaning, since it is not possible to assign an

independent reality, in the ordinary physical sense, either to phenomena or to the

observer. All this is claimed on the ground that all the experiments are subjected to the

laws of quantum mechanics and, therefore, to the laws of uncertainty. It seems therefore

that physics requires the putting aside of the basic concepts of the common sense, and

that the latter cannot be used to judge whether the enunciations of physics are correct or

not. Is this true?

Yes and not. When an enunciation is formulated which goes beyond the possibilities of

ordinary knowledge, it is obvious that its validity has to be assessed through the specific

methods of the corresponding science. However, it is also true that these methods make

use necessarily of the basic resorts of any valid knowledge, that is, of experience and

logic. An analogy can illustrate this. Technical systems of control can be used in a 100-

m flat race in order to decide who came first, and at times it is necessary to do so. These

electronic controls, though, would not make any sense without the ordinary knowledge:

it is know that there is a track, that some athletes start and that the same athletes reach

the goal in a certain order. These data, provided by the ordinary knowledge, are the

indispensable basis for the use the technical systems of control. Similarly, the methods

and results of physics presuppose the existence of an external reality which is different

from the thought of the physicist. They also presuppose that there is a natural order in

this reality in accordance with objective laws so that any event has a cause that has

provoked it. It is also presupposed that the physicist has the capacity of knowing this

reality and of reasoning logically in a correct way. Without these assumptions physics

would not have any sense.

Problems related to quantum mechanics began to appear from the beginning of its

formulation around 1927. It was decided to leave aside unobservable factors, such the

trajectory of sub-atomic particles, and to use only observable magnitudes, such as

energy changes recorded in the atomic phenomena and following the quantum laws.

One should add, to all this, the impossibility of providing an intuitive representation of

the micro-physical phenomena, with the result that the corpuscular and undulatory

models are both partial. Moreover, the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg establishes

limits to the precision with which conjugated variables can be measured, such as

position and moment of a particle. Finally, according to the probabilistic interpretation,

the theory cannot provide predictions about the behaviour of individual particles in

single cases but only probabilities which refer to events as a whole.

One finds in this context the polemic flared up in 1927 between Einstein and Bohr and

its development which had at its root the imaginary experiment proposed by Einstein

and two of his collaborators – Podolski and Rosen – in 1935 (called EPR experiment

from the initials of its three authors). Einstein claimed that quantum mechanics needs to

be replaced by a new theory which can re-establish realism and determinism in the way

he intended it, while Bohr claimed the opposite. The polemic flared up again with the

appearance of inequalities formulated by John Bell in 1965, and this led to the carrying

out of experiments able to decide on the problems raised in the polemic. Although the

experiments of Alain Aspect and col. seem to have shifted the weight of the balance

since 1982 in favour of Bohr, discussions continue61

. There are problems in these

discussions which refer to the scope of the present-day quantum theories. There are also

philosophical problems about the indeterminism of nature which spring from quantum

physics. All this, though, does not affect the claims of realism and the existence of

causality, since these are purely philosophical and need to be accepted if physics must

make sense. The problems related to indeterminism and causality are different. One

thing is to claim that any event must have a real cause (causality in a philosophical

sense), and another very different one is to claim that all natural causes act in

accordance with deterministic laws (in the sense of classical physics or of the

determinism associated with it). The existence of causality is not something doubtful,

while indeterminism is an open problem.

12. UNITY AND ORDER IN THE UNIVERSE

Present-day science provides a knowledge of each of the natural levels and their

reciprocal relations. Although this knowledge is far from being exhaustive, yet it is

sufficient to elaborate a worldview which has scientific as well as philosophical

implications; the following are some aspects and consequences which stem from it.

12.1 Unity of composition and dynamism in the natural systems

The unity of nature is one of its outstanding aspects which are reflected in the present-

day worldview. This is shown first of all in the unity of composition of the natural

entities.

Actually, all natural entities have the same basic components, i.e. the microphysical

entities such as subatomic particles, atoms and molecules. They are not all present in

each system, or with the same abundance or with the same structuring. Various theories

about this unity of composition have been formulated since ancient times. However,

61

There is a wide bibliography on these issues. One may read syntheses and discussions, for instance, in: Le monde

quantique (a collective work directed by S. DELIGEORGES), Editions du Seuil, Paris 1984; Franco SELLERI, El debate

de la teoría cuántica, Alianza, Madrid 1986. In the former, B. D’Espagnat presents an interpretation which seems to be

opposed to the common sense in its ordinary understanding. In the latter, Selleri appears to be in favor of future changes in

the quantum theory, by presenting arguments that are also not very convincing.

only at present, and for the first time, an authentic knowledge of such a unity has been

obtained

The microphysical components cannot be represented as portions of an immutable or

inert matter. For instance, the very atom is present in many different states in the

different structures in which it is found (it is integrated in that structure, it shares

electrons with other atoms, etc.). One could also say that atoms and molecules which are

studied in science are general types which correspond approximately to concrete,

tremendously various and dynamic situations.

There is also a unity of dynamism since the laws which regulate the basic levels of

nature, are also in force at the levels of higher organization. Moreover, there are laws

which are applicable at all levels: for instance, the principle of conservation of mass and

energy. The four basic interactions appear in the phenomena of all levels: the nuclear

forces within the nucleus, the electromagnetic forces within a very wide area which

spans from the structure of the atoms and molecules to the cohesion of the various states

of matter, and gravity which, appears in all those phenomena in which the influence of

the mass becomes considerable.

The unity of composition and of dynamism are aspects of the unity of nature in its

twofold aspect, i.e. the dynamic and the structural ones.

12.2. The universe

Nature is not made of a collection of heterogeneous beings. One of its most notable

characteristics is unity. There is not only unity of composition and dynamism but also a

superior type of unity which allows us to speak of the universe as a huge system.

a) Notion of cosmos or universe

The ancients looked at the world as a cosmos, or universe, i.e. as a unity based on the

cooperation of different factors, and on a hierarchy in which man occupies a central

position. This is the way in which nature appears to the ordinary experience which

witnesses the central place man occupies. Nevertheless, the recent progresses of science

seem to cast doubt on a spontaneous notion of universe, and tend to replace it with a

scientific notion, a fact which would entail important implications.

Ordinary experience clearly shows the central position of man in the universe.

Everything seems to suggest that the universe exists in function of man. Nevertheless,

this idea has been criticized in the name of the scientific progress and dealt with as if it

belonged to a primitive type of mentality, but already made obsolete by the knowledge

provided by science. Two appear to be the decisive factors in this change of perspective.

The first refers to the universe: the earth is not the centre of the universe, as the ancients

used to say; it is rather one of many planets immersed in the immensity of the universe.

The second comes from the evolutionist theories according to which man would be

another animal among animals, the result of the unfolding of natural laws through a

process of biological evolution.

Nevertheless, the philosophical reflection shows that the first factor (the one which

refers to the place occupied by the earth in the universe) is irrelevant in judging the

position of man in the universe (unless one intends to determine only his physical

position). The second factor (which refers to evolutionism) is also of little importance if

one admits that, (be the origin of his organism whatever it may) man possesses

characteristics which place him well above the rest of nature. The existence of the very

science is one of the most cogent proofs of this.

In this sense, there is an absolute order in the universe which is hierarchical. The human

person is found above the rest of nature. Man is a natural being which transcends nature.

Man is a natural being which sores above nature through his intellectual knowledge, will

and freedom. It is not difficult to perceive a type of order in nature which is not relative,

if the specific characteristics of the human person are taken into account. Nevertheless,

this order is based on a hierarchy which transcends the strictly natural level. It is for this

reason that this order includes absolute aspects.

b) Finite and infinite universe

The question on whether the universe is finite or infinite has always drawn the attention

of scientists and thinkers. The ancient Greek thinkers used to relate finiteness to

perfection, so that a finite universe would be an aspect of its perfection. Nevertheless,

the birth of classical physics in the 17th

century seemed to favour the idea of a

homogeneous and infinite universe. Kant, in the 18th

century, claimed that the finiteness

or the infinity of the universe present conflicts which are difficult to resolve.

Progress made by science in the 20th

century has opened new panoramas for the solution

of this problem which can be considered in relation to space and time.

In relation to space, the relativity theory seems to support the idea that the universe is

finite but unbound, as if it were locked around itself in such a way that, no matter how

far we go in one direction, one may never find the ultimate limit. It is the case of one

who is on a spherical surface. He may walk on it in any direction without ever finding

an end. In any case, this comparison does not give a solution to all the problems.

In relation to time, the models of the universe more accepted by the scientists in the

second half of the 20th

century and later are those which see a universe of limited age of

about 15 thousand million years. The universe seems to have a history and an evolution

which begins at the origin of time. Nevertheless, even these theories do not resolve the

problem completely, since the origin of the big initial explosion remains unexplained. It

is always possible to think that its origin came from a pre-existent and different state of

matter and energy of the universe. Science alone is not able to deny such a possibility.

Even in the case of time, a theory has been proposed similar to the relativity theory in

the case of space. Concretely, Stephen Hawking suggested that, in accordance with the

hypothetical theories of the quantum gravity, it could happen that the universe may be

limited in time and yet no concrete moment for its origin could be determined since, in

getting closer and closer to this moment, the same concept of time would be altered.

From a philosophical point of view, the universe is finite since it is a whole of limited

creatures. In a strict sense, only God can be infinite. God’s eternity is not an unlimited

duration: God is outside time, and time does not exist independently from the universe.

In this respect, the space and time magnitude of the universe, whose being necessarily

depends on God, is of little importance. On the other hand, when Christians admit that

time has its origin with the universe, and that the latter does not have unlimited duration,

they do so by leaning on Revelation and not on scientific or philosophical

demonstrations.

12.3. Physical cosmos and human world

Nature provides those conditions necessary for the existence and the development of the

potentialities of the human person. One could say that with man we reach a level

essentially superior to the rest of nature to which, however, man is deeply bound. In the

present-day culture, the new science of ecology emphasizes the interdependence of all

the components of nature.

a) The earth as ecosystem of life

Although we do not have definitive explanations of the origin of life on earth, yet it is

quite evident that the very existence of life and its unfolding in such a variety of forms is

made possible because of the existence in the biosphere of very specific physico-

chemical conditions.

The biosphere consists of the earth crust together with its boundaries in the atmosphere

and in the oceans, as a carpet of many miles where life, as we know it, is found. It is

made of many different entities which depend on each other in an intimate relationship:

it is because of this that one can talk of the biosphere as one huge system. According to

the most extreme opinions represented by the partisans of the Gaia hypothesis proposed

by James Lovelock, the biosphere should be considered as an authentic unitary system,

as a true organism. We do not hold this extreme stand here. However, the progress of

science shows clearly the existence of a unity among the different levels and entities of

nature much which is stronger than what immediately appears.

One may find as many interconnections as one wish. From a physico-chemical and

geological point of view, a set of very specific conditions is found on earth able to make

the existence and development of life possible. Such conditions refer to the fundamental

laws of physics and chemistry and to the characteristics of our planet62

.

62

One may want to consider and deep and detailed study of these types of characteristics in: John D. BARROW and Frank

J. TIPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986.

b) Ecology and ecologism

Ecology is a scientific field of study which deals with ecosystems: these are natural

systems which comprise a number of living organisms with a certain unity of

interdependence.

The concept of ecosystem is very wide so that it can be applied to a huge number of

different systems: from a pond to a wood, including the biosphere as a whole. The limits

of an ecosystem depend very much on the objectives of the specific study.

Ecology is, of its own nature, an interdisciplinary branch of science: it makes use of data

provided by physics, chemistry, geology and biology. The scope of the problems

ecology deals with are also huge. However, its unifying principle is a perspective which

considers the conservation of the riches and the variety of nature of high priority, and

avoids anything which may damage it.

Ecologism appears as the defender of nature. It has gained importance from the growing

awareness of the destructive threat posed to nature by the technological progress if this

does not take place in a rational and controlled way.

There is a theoretical as well as a practical reason why the respect of nature should be

promoted. The theoretical one is founded in the unity existing among all beings in

nature. Being aware of the fact of being part of nature, leads to an attitude of respect

which is compatible with a rational use of nature for the benefit of man. This respect can

be related to a religious attitude with very well known historical manifestations. The

practical reason refers to the inconvenience for the present and future generations which

can originate from the irresponsible use of natural resources.

Frequently ecologism points at real problems. Actually the world has made great

progress in the awareness of these problems. Serious efforts are often needed to solve

them because of their difficult nature. The ecological perspective in the present

scientific worldview is strongly supported by the unity of nature and by the mutual

interdependence of its constituents. On the other hand, the divine order to dominate the

earth – as gathered by the Christian faith – cannot be taken as an excuse to foster the

indiscriminate exploitation of nature, or an attitude of despise towards other living

organisms, or an irresponsible attitude towards the future generations. On the contrary,

philosophical personalism and the religious perspective can help avoid the radicalisms

of certain ecologist stands. Sometime these stands pose unjustifiable claims such as

considering animals as subjects of rights equal, or equivalent, to human rights.

12.4 The new world view

We have so far examined some aspects of the present worldview: the central aspect of

the emergence of self organization in the genesis of nature, the continuity and

gradualness of the different levels in nature, and the unity of composition and of

dynamism in the natural systems. I shall add here some complementary considerations.

a) Theories on chaos, complexity and self organization

We have already hinted at some of the most significant advances of contemporary

science which go under the title of complexity. The term includes advances related to

morphogenesis, i.e. origin of new forms. Science explains how new modes of order

originate from states of lesser order.

The theories of the deterministic chaos, as well as the thermodynamics of the

irreversible processes and synergism, study the formation of new structures in certain

conditions which imply discontinuities or critical points. Such theories encompass many

phenomena of cooperative type, and show how the formation of new patterns depends

on the cooperative activity of different systems. One of the most important ideas of the

theory of chaos is that the systems under consideration evolve with an intrinsically

unpredictable pattern, although subject to deterministic laws. It would be possible to

determine the position of the system in a far future only if the initial conditions could be

known with total precision. Unfortunately, this is not possible according to the

uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. The impossibility is compounded by the

fact that minute differences in the initial conditions end up by evolving towards

something which is much different from the respective systems.

Therefore, these theories point at a worldview where the emergence of new things is the

consequence of some processes of self-organization which cannot be reduced to

activities of deterministic type.

At different levels, there is a true emergence of novelties in nature which are different

from their components. In each level there are new characteristics which do not exist in

the components: new holistic structures, new types of dynamism and new properties.

This is a fact which can be acknowledged without problems, independently from the

explanations one can give.

The idea of self-organization occupies a central place in the present-day worldview.

Self-organization means formation of structures as a result of the unfolding of a natural

dynamism. Therefore self-organization is closely associated with the idea of

characterization of the natural in terms of dynamism and structuring.

The new thing is the fact that today many phenomena of cooperation are already known

in physics and chemistry, and that the physico-chemical basis of the biological

phenomena is better understood. New forms of organization may appear in those

systems which exchange energy with the exterior. They are systems outside equilibrium

in which the collective behaviour of their components appears in such a way that in

specific conditions a new form of organization prevails.

Phenomena of self-organization clearly show the existence of cooperation, tendency and

directionality in nature, and these invite to reconsider the problems related to forms and

ends.

b) Cooperation, accuracy and information

The integration among the various natural levels clearly shows the existence of a co-

operation among all the natural entities and among the different levels. For instance, the

biological level requires the physical one and the chemical one for its internal

composition, the geological one for its habitat, and the astrophysical one as source of its

energy. The different levels form a compact whole in which there are many relations of

cooperation.

Besides the cooperation among the different continuous, gradual and hierarchical levels

of nature, there is another other aspect which is very important in order to appreciate its

perfection: the subtlety of its organization. Actually, there are, at each level of nature,

very specific processes which unfold in a coordinated manner and which make the

singular organization of our world possible. The unfolding of this natural dynamism can

be looked at from the point of view of an information which is stored and unveiled in a

structuring process that proceeds according to patterns.

For instance, at physical and chemical levels, an immense variety of compounds can be

obtained from very few components and basic laws. These are the compounds that make

it possible for the other levels of organization to exist. This basic level of organization

corresponds to specific patterns which can be looked at as structural principles we

already know in some details; it is not the result of some kind of chaos. There is

something we call chance, understood as accidental coincidence of different dynamisms.

However, each one of these dynamisms and their mutual integration unfolds according

to patterns. The basic structural principles are pretty simple: basic interactions, the

principle of exclusion, the principles of conservation, etc. Nevertheless, they explain the

formation of an enormous variety of very specific compounds which constitute the basis

of the other levels.

Something similar occurs in the other levels. Ultimately, the organization of nature

corresponds to an information which is coded and stored structurally, unfolds, combines

and integrates.

Therefore, the organization of nature shows the fact that there is some rationality in it

which is, moreover, very sophisticated. As science progresses, we come to know more

and more of the structural principles of the natural order, and its rationality and accuracy

appear more and more clearly.

c) Fortuitous factors in nature

Order, as well as disorder, are relational concepts: they are defined in each case

according to particular criteria. The order found in nature is not absolute. Order is

present with disorder, and latter also is not pure disorder, or absolute chaos. A mixture

of order and disorder (which are relative), is the normal situation at the different levels

of nature.

For example, the concept of regularity refers always to some aspects and not to others.

The regularity of space configurations is always relative: matter in its crystalline state

has specific geometric properties which can be considered orderly when looked at using

certain types of criteria and not others. Something similar is true with the regularity of

processes: a uniform movement has order, while the accelerated one and the movement

along a circumference do not have it. However, the opposite is also true. These

considerations can also be applied to laws.

Natural forces are not simply cooperative forces; in many cases they are opposed to one

other and originate concurrent dynamisms. The resulting order depends on the

prevailing forces and, in general, on how the various dynamisms integrate with one

another.

Moreover, fortuitous factors are present in the natural processes. The complexity of the

intervening factors in most processes is enough to realize it, and the concurrence of

specific dynamisms is not a necessary consequence of any of them. In this sense, the

existence and the relevance of fortuitous factors is unquestionable: there is chance in

nature, if by chance we understand concurrence of independent causes (we do not refer

here to divine providence which is found at a different level and which covers

everything, since God is the first Cause of the being of all that is).

However, it is not appropriate to attribute causality as such to the chance. Chance

belongs to the so-called improper or accidental causes. This means that whatever

happens has its proper causes, even those things that we say to happen by chance. If we

focus only on the natural causes of phenomena, we can claim that not only there are

fortuitous factors but also that there is plenty of them, and that they contribute in a great

deal to the production of the order which we observe in nature. This, though, does not

mean attributing any causal role to disorder, or chaos. It is also possible to think that

sometimes disorder is the consequence of an excess of order: this happens when various

different types of order concur in the same process63

.

These reflections want to point out the fact that we do not forget that there are many

aspects which are disorderly or chaotic, when we claim that nature has a very subtle and

sophisticated organization. They also help us dismiss some misunderstandings which are

based on too simple ideas about order and disorder; this happens, for instance, when it is

claimed that natural order would have come about by chance from a primordial chaos,

by identifying some violent physical conditions with a chaotic situation64

. In reality, the

fact that some effects could be produced as the result of collisions of millions of

particles in constant motion cannot be referred to as chaos in a strict sense, unless one

says that these collisions, and their effects, do not follow any natural pattern. Science,

though, shows the opposite.

d) The peculiarity of the natural order

63

Cf. P. WEISS, “Some Paradoxes Relating to Order”, in: P.G. KUNTZ (publisher), The Concept of Order, The University

of Washington Press, Seattle-London 1968, p. 16. 64

Cf. E. MORIN, El Método. I. La naturaleza de la Naturaleza, Ediciones Cátedra, Madrid 1981, pp. 76-78 and 82.

Nature appears before the ordinary experience with a very specific type of order.

Scientific progress leads to a much more amazing and precise knowledge about this

order.

Something can be considered specific, in a broad sense, when it refers to a species or to

a particular type. In this sense, everything that exists is specific, since it has a defined

way of being. A more interesting problem is to know whether nature is specific in a

more strict sense, i.e. whether it has singular or exceptional characteristics. To find it

out, the characteristics of the different levels of nature need to be considered, since these

are specifically different from one another.

The astrophysical level. Stars are the result of the same types of processes: thermo-

nuclear reactions of fusion in which hydrogen nuclei are united to form helium nuclei.

The basic pattern is common to all stars; its magnitude, stratification and other processes

depend on the conditions present in each case, and they obey the same physico-chemical

laws. Therefore, the behaviour of almost all matter of the universe concerns the stars and

follows an order that is nothing singular: the same types of processes are repeated in

millions of stars. Moreover, the distribution of the stars in the galaxies follows certain

simple principles: it depends fundamentally on the gravitational forces. The same occurs

with the distribution of the galaxies.

The geological level. Here there is a more specific type of order, at least

according to our present-day knowledge. We do not know of any other planet with the

same characteristics as the ones of the earth. This does not mean that such planets do not

exist; however, even if they existed it would be very difficult to spot them, since they

would be very far and lacking their own light. Consequently, we can truly speak in this

case of a very singular type of order and, for the time being, unique. However, the

existence of other planets similar to the earth would not present a real surprise from the

point of view of the scientific laws. The singularity of the earth consists in the fact that

here there are conditions that are tuned for the thriving of living beings: just small

changes in some of these conditions would be enough to make life, as we know it, non-

viable.

The biological level. This level is even more singular. In this case, the

singularity is not so much in the variety of the living organism, but in the same existence

of life. Just one cell is something much more complex and organized than any entity at

the physico-chemical level. The more developed organisms are the most complex

entities of our universe, and the physico-chemical conditions that make life possible are

very singular.

In the case of man this singularity is huge. Human life is made possible within a

very restricted set of conditions, and the human organism has an enormously singular

character.

The conclusion of this brief excursus may sound amazing. Actually, we can

conclude that our world is very simple from the point of view of its composition and

basic laws; it is very repetitive in the macro-entities of the astrophysical level; it is very

singular in relation to our immediate habitat, and enormously sophisticated in the

organization of the living beings and, especially, of man. Therefore, there are in our

world some basic and relatively simple aspects which co-exist with some enormously

singular results.

We can truly say that our universe is very singular; this is so because its

components and fundamental laws are on one hand relatively simple and, on the other

hand, they make it possible to obtain enormously varied, organized and cooperative

results. In fewer words, it seems that more cannot be done with less effort. Even in

supposing that there are no other intelligent beings in the whole of the universe, even in

supposing that the conditions which make our life possible are the result of an

evolutionary process, yet the existence of thousand of millions of galaxies and stars

would be a very simple and chip expenditure, and maybe even indispensable, for the

possibility of those processes necessary for our existence.

V. THE BEING OF NATURE

We come to know nature through its manifestations in space and time, i.e.

through space-time structures perceived by our senses. Nature, though, cannot be

reduced to these dimensions: it has a kind of power, or energy which is stored in its

structures and which unfolds with time.

We have previously mentioned these two aspects in relation to the

characterization of the natural; we perceive them as intertwined aspects, and it is

precisely this intertwining which is peculiar to the natural. The natural dynamism does

not exist by itself: its existence and its unfolding are intimately related to space-time

structuring.

There is no doubt that the characterization of the natural through dynamism and

structuring is a philosophical approach. We shall proceed with this analysis and use the

concepts of matter and form which, after many centuries, are still a very valuable

instrument for a philosophical analysis of nature.

13. LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING NATURE

Science provides a detailed knowledge of nature. Philosophy takes this knowledge,

together with the one provided by the ordinary experience, as a basis for its reflections

on nature. Philosophy uses an approach which is different from the one used by the

experimental sciences; however, both complement each other.

13.1 Scientific analysis and metaphysical reflection

a) The scientific perspective

Experimental science was firmly established in the 17th

century with its own

proper methods which implied renouncing to a knowledge of essences and adopting a

perspective that combines the use of mathematics and experiments.

In spite of the huge success of the experimental sciences, one still finds

nowadays widespread interpretations of instrumentalist and conventionalist nature

according to which science would only provide conceptual instruments able to master

nature in a controlled way. Such instruments, they claim, could be considered at best

only as more or less plausible conjectures on the characteristics of the reality.

Problems concerning the scope of science arise from three main issues. First, the

use of mathematics seems to limit the scientific knowledge to the quantitative aspects.

Consequently, some conclude, science would not provide an authentic knowledge of the

reality. Second, the validity of the scientific theories is verified by experimental data

which refer to concrete factual conditions. Hence, some conclude, the truth of theories

can never be established in a definitive way, and these theories will always have a

hypothetical or conjectural character. Third, in order to formulate theories and interpret

the experiments, it is necessary to use man-made constructions which, at least in part,

are conventional and revisable. Hence, some conclude, it seems that theories would have

only an instrumental value.

Nevertheless, experimental sciences provide an authentic knowledge of nature.

Actually, we have plenty of well-proven knowledge which is the basis for high-

precision technology. The difficulties mentioned above, though, are real. Yet, in many

cases a practical certainty can be achieved; this happens for instance when a certain

theory provides good explanations and predictions, especially if they are exact, if they

refer to independent phenomena and if they are coherent with the results of other well-

proven theories.

When we have at our disposal constructions whose formulation and verification

are rigorous in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria, then we can actually claim

that these constructions correspond to reality and therefore are true. However, this

correspondence does not mean that the constructions are an exact replica of nature; we

are here before a truth of contextual type since these constructions make sense only

within a theoretical and experimental context which we define and which implies the

adoption of a particular point of view. It is therefore a partial truth which does not

exhaust all that can be said about nature. This does not stop it from being an authentic

truth which makes us know real aspects of nature. We can therefore understand how

experimental sciences provide a kind of knowledge which is at the same time authentic,

partial and perfectible65

.

Knowledge acquired through experimental sciences does not exhaust all that we

can know about nature: it is limited because of the intentional limitation imposed by the

scientific perspective. The reason which explains the success of experimental sciences is

the very reason which explains its limitations. Actually, the scientific perspective

deliberately excludes those dimensions which cannot be subjected to experimental

control. Therefore, dimensions such as the ontological one which refer to the way of

being of the natural, and the metaphysical one which refer to the ultimate foundation of

nature, the general laws governing being, spirit and freedom of the human person, are

all left out of the scientific perspective.

b) The philosophical perspective on nature

It may seem that science has the monopoly of the study of nature, since

philosophy does not have special methods for achieving a knowledge which is

inaccessible to the scientific method. It would seem that experimental sciences occupy

65

A broader explanation of these problems can be found in Mariano ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la ciencia experimental. La

objetividad y la verdad en las ciencias, op.cit. Ch 6.

the place of the old philosophy of nature, or that the former have absorbed the latter

within their own sphere of competence.

The 19th

century positivism and the 20th

century neo-positivism tried to reduce all

valid knowledge to that obtained from natural sciences, and understood the scientific

laws as simple relations between observable phenomena. However, it is commonly

accepted nowadays that positive science, i.e. science as defined by positivism, does not

exist. One needs creativity, interpretations and evaluations at each step of the scientific

activity. A positivist scientist could be replaced by a computer; however he could only

work under the direction of a non-positivist scientist. Science seeks an authentic

knowledge of nature, and the latter cannot be obtained through automatic procedures.

Experimental science works on some philosophical postulates, and the scientific

progress back feeds on these postulates. Science and philosophy adopt different

perspectives, though they constantly interact with each other at all levels.

Within this context a philosophical reflection becomes necessary first and

foremost in order to evaluate the scientific knowledge. Actually, a reflection on the

scientific methods, on the general postulates of science and on the particular ones in

each case, and on the interpretation of the obtained results, has to take philosophy into

account. A philosophical reflection is also necessary if one wishes to propose any

worldview, i.e. a representation of a nature in which its fundamental characteristics are

reflected. Again, a philosophical reflection becomes indispensable when ontological

problems are tackled which refer to the basic characteristics of the way of being of

nature.

Ontological questions about nature are nowadays posed with the same vigour as

they were in the old times. Broadly speaking, they coincide with the classical problems

of substantiality, causality, qualities, space, time, teleology, and the origin of the

universe. As well as in other epochs, typically metaphysical questions are posed about

spirit, freedom and transcendence. No one would deny the fact that these genuinely

philosophical questions are constantly posed nowadays.

13.2 The metaphysical understanding of the natural

We are now going to tackle some of the problems which the philosophical

reflection on the being of the natural runs into, especially when these are related to

matter and form which are the objects of this chapter.

a) Unity and plurality

Unity and plurality are philosophical problems. We repeat that what

characterizes the natural, in our way of presenting it, is a space-time structuring and the

fact that patterns, or repetitive structures, have a special importance in this perspective.

Actually, the natural order rotates around these patterns which repeat themselves

in numerically different cases. This plurality of realizations of unitary patterns leads us

to investigate the characteristics of a pattern, of its unity and of its concrete realizations

which can be manifold. This again leads us to distinguish the formal determinations

which correspond to the defining notes of the patterns, from the material conditions

which correspond to the numerically different realizations of these patterns.

A particular case is the individual realization of specific ways of being common

to many individuals. Specificity and individuality lead again to the concepts of form and

matter.

b) Dynamism and interaction

We have highlighted the dynamism as a fundamental characteristic of the

natural. Nature is a world of interactions, and what appears to be static is in reality a

state of equilibrium.

Interactions are the result of the dynamism of the natural entities. Dynamism

pertains to the way of being of these entities and unfolds in accordance with this way of

being which is marked by materiality. The being and the activity of the natural are

rooted in material conditions and are realized in space and time. In this sense also, the

consideration of matter and form is important to understand the way of being of the

natural and the activity which is proper to it.

c) The four causes and the con-causality

We are able to understand something if we can answer the questions

characterized by why: this means that we know its causes. Something is intelligible in

the measure in which there are causes which can explain it.

In this context, the Aristotelian theory on causality provides important

guidelines, because it covers the different types of questions that can be posed about the

natural entities. Actually, the material and formal causes refer to their composition and

way of being, the efficient cause refers to their dynamism and the final cause refers to

their directionality. Our questions about nature correspond to aspects of these four types

of causes.

Experimental science provides a broad knowledge about the composition of

matter in relation to the component elements as well as in relation to their structuring

within systems. It also provides knowledge about the activity of matter through the laws

which regulate the processes, and about the directionality of entities and processes in its

twofold aspect of tendency and cooperation. It is therefore a kind of knowledge which

refers to the four Aristotelian causes. In this sense one can say that science provides

authentic explanations about the natural phenomena and that, consequently, manifest the

intelligibility of nature, reaching dimensions which are inaccessible to the ordinary

knowledge. Philosophy, on the other hand, examines this causality in a thematic way

and determines the concept of cause, the different types of causes, and the modality of

their acting.

14. MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND FORMAL DETERMINATIONS

The concepts of matter and form have being employed since ancient times

particularly by Aristotle in relation to the natural. We shall examine them in the light of

the present worldview.

14.1. Dimensions of material type in nature

Let us first consider dimensions of material type, the concept of matter and the

characteristics of what is material.

a) Extension, duration, mutability

Material dimensions are proper to space-time structuring. These are extension

which constitutes the basis of space structuring, duration which constitutes the basis of

time structuring, and movement which establishes a relationship between space and

time66

. We refer now to these three notions because we consider them to be the

fundamental conditions of matter.

In the first place, everything material has extension and therefore a magnitude.

One can imagine material points; actually, this is a widely used device in science.

However, in nature there are no points without extension: all material beings have

extension and magnitude. As a consequence, what is material is divisible; it can be

indefinitely divided, and the resulting parts will never be inextended (in practice, this

divisibility comes up against physical limitations which shift towards ever shorter

distances. On the other hand, it is important to point out that the different ways of being

of the natural entities are accompanied by typical magnitudes: atoms, molecules,

biological macromolecules, cells and organisms have specific magnitudes, or at least

their magnitude is found within certain limits outside which they cannot exist.

Moreover, there is continuity among the parts of the unitary systems: although they may

contain “incrustations”, there is a minimum continuity which is necessary for the

existence of the system.

In the second place, the concept of material implies duration, i.e. a temporal

extension or dispersion. Mutatis mutandis, one can apply here the conclusions of the

previous reflections on spatial extension. Concretely, natural processes have duration

and therefore a temporal magnitude; they can be divided into parts, though the unitary

66

Aristotle stated that “the science of nature deals with the extensions, movement and time”; Physics, III, 4, 202b 30-31.

processes are found in association with typical duration, and there is continuity in them.

They are processes which unfold from an initial to a final point in accordance with

natural tendencies, and depend on specific natural patterns.

In the third place, the concept of materiality implies movement. Any material

being can change and is ordinarily subjected to continuous changes, although at times

almost imperceptibly. Not only can a material being change in relation to accidental

aspects but also substantially if the conditions for its existence disappear. Everything

natural is subjected to becoming. Therefore, mutability has always been considered as

the fundamental characteristic of the material beings. The present-day knowledge

illustrates this mutability; we actually know that there are continuous changes, at least at

the microphysical level, in all entities, including the most stable ones.

b) The concept of matter

In defining matter, the use of terms becomes extremely important. Many

difficulties can be avoided if one distinguishes between the two meanings in which the

concept of matter is used, i.e. as an adjective and as a substantive respectively.

As an adjective, something is «material» if it has material dimensions: extension,

duration, mutability and all the other dimensions which are related to them. A way of

being with these characteristics can be called «material», and the totality of the

conditions which constitute it is referred to as «materiality».

Nevertheless, «matter» is used very frequently as a substantive, in ordinary life

as well as in philosophy, and this may easily create confusion: as a matter of fact, there

is no natural entity made only of a collection of material dimensions, because these do

not enjoy independent existence. They are material dimensions of subjects which have

specific ways of being, and these ways cannot be reduced to a bunch of material

dimensions. When speaking of «matter» one usually makes reference to one or various

concrete beings; these, however, are the subjects of which the adjective «material» can

be predicated: they are the material beings.

We want to emphasize the fact that materiality does not have its own proper

being which is the same as saying that there is no being which is purely material. In

speaking of material beings, we should not think that these are completely reduced to

their material conditions: such a reduction is impossible, since these conditions cannot

be substantialised, they cannot exist in an independent way. Extension, duration,

mutability and all the other conditions related to them can only exist as aspects of a way

of being which is characteristic of the natural entities, and these cannot be reduced to

such aspects.

I shall point out some misunderstandings generated by the concept of matter in

science and philosophy67

.

67

One can find a collection of studies on the evolution of the scientific and philosophical concept of matter in: E.

McMULLIN (editor), The concept of Matter, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (Indiana)1963.

In science matter designates, at times, the totality of beings which the physico-

chemical sciences study. Therefore, living beings are excluded, yet they are material

beings. On the other hand, when physicists speak of matter, they usually refer to sub-

atomic particles: here «matter» is opposed to «energy» and, in an unfortunate way, one

speaks of «materialization of energy» in order to designate processes related to the

equivalence between mass and energy. This gives the impression that energy is

something material (which is nonsense). In other situations the concepts of «mass» and

«matter» are used as if they were equivalent. This confusion begins with Newton

himself, who defined mass as «quantity of matter». It is an unfortunate definition which

has stood for centuries, is still found in textbooks and, de facto, does not find application

in any properly scientific problem. Our own epoch has heard people speaking of an

increasing «de-materialization» of science, a fact that emphasizes the increasing

importance given by the present-day science to explanations based on forces, fields of

forces and energy. Therefore, if one wishes to find out what sciences say about

«matter», it is necessary to distinguish the different uses of this concept and to be aware

of the misunderstandings that this concepts lends itself to.

In philosophy the concept of matter leads frequently to even greater

misunderstandings since the commonly accepted meaning attributed to it derives from

the Cartesian mechanism. According to this meaning, matter is identified with material

conditions on one hand, and with the natural substances on the other. The natural

substances are in this way stripped of their own dynamism. This impoverished type of

matter becomes a passive and inert subject, reduced to pure exteriority. In spite of the

criticism to which it has been subjected, this mechanistic idea of matter has been the

background of many philosophical stands, whose impact is very much felt at present.

The idea of «matter» is usually employed as a synonym of «inert matter», lacking its

own dynamism. This completely inert type of matter does not exist.

b) Proto-matter and second matter

The term «matter» is etymologically related to the Latin «mater» which means

mother and which therefore provides the elements for the formation of a new being. In

the Aristotelian philosophy the concept of matter means in general that out of which

something is made. It corresponds to the idea of the «material», or the «components»,

out of which something is made. Usually a distinction is made between «proto-matter»

and «second matter».

Specifically, the term proto-matter (or «first matter») is used to designate a

substratum common to all bodies which remains even after some substantial changes

have occurred. The term second matter is used to designate the natural substances which

are the substratum that remains after accidental changes have occurred. We shall now

see what kind of meaning can be attributed to these concepts in the light of our

characterization of the natural.

Assuming that changes that occur in nature are real changes and not a series of

creations and annihilations, it is necessary to admit the existence of a permanent

substratum in all of them which initially lacks any kind of form; this form is acquired

after the change has occurred. To determine the nature of this substratum, it is necessary

to distinguish between accidental and substantial changes. In an accidental change, a

substance acquires accidental determinations, it becomes this or that. The remaining

substratum is the substance (its essential way of being does not change, but its

accidental way does). As a subject of accidental changes the substance is called second

matter. A new substance is produced in a substantial change. This change presupposes

the occurrence of accidental changes (configuration, increase, subtraction, composition

and alteration), but through them a new being is produced. The presence of a substratum

is also required here because there is continuity between the starting and the ending

point: if this was not so there would be no transformation but only a succession of

annihilations and creations. In a way analogous to what happens in an accidental

change, the substratum of the substantial changes is called proto-matter. Again, this

substratum is known through analogy: it is related to the substance as the bronze is to

the statue, and the wood to the bed, the shapeless material to a well-shaped thing68

.

The concept of «proto-matter» is very difficult to grasp. I quote three places

where Aristotle illustrates it69

.

In the first he states: “Actually, I call matter the first subject of everything and

every being, out of which, as a constitutive element, something is made or comes to be

as some thing, and not in an accidental manner”70

. It is then an essential factor in the

constitution of substances. This definition comes about as the result of the analysis of

change. In this context, matter is the ultimate substratum of change. What are its

characteristics?

Aristotle speaks of them when he says: “I understand matter as that which by

itself is neither something, nor quantity, nor any of those things which determine an

entity. It is something which is predicated of each of these things and whose being is

different from that of each of the categories (in fact, all the other things are predicated of

the substance, while the substance is predicated of the matter). Hence, matter by itself is

neither something, nor quantity, nor anything else, nor its negations, since even those

would be accidental”71

. This definition refers to predication, and warns that matter is an

undetermined subject, to which no concrete determination can be attributed.

Finally, Aristotle emphasizes the fact that proto-matter is the ultimate subject out

which things are made: “when we say of something that it is not “such a thing”, but that

it is “made of such a thing”….for instance, the box is not made of earth nor is it earth,

but it is made of wood…However, if there is something which is very first and of which

cannot be said, with reference to another, that is made of such a thing, this then will be

the proto-matter”72

.

The Aristotelian proto-matter appears to be like an ultimate substratum related to

the composition of the bodies and to the substantial changes. It is conceived by analogy

68

Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, I, 7. 69

ARISTOTLE refers to proto-matter in other places: cf. Physica, IV, 9, 217 a23; De Firmamento, III, 6 and 7; De

Generatione et Corruptione, I, 3, 317 b 16, 23 and II, 4; De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 7, 9. 70

ARISTOTLE, Physica, I, 9, 192 31-33. 71

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII, 3, 1029 a 20-26. 72

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, II, 7, 1049 a 18-26.

with the substratum of the accidental changes. It does not have its own determinations.

Moreover, it appears to have a potential character: it is pure potentiality, and this is so

because it lacks determinations and can be subject of different acts. What meaning can

this doctrine have in the light of our characterization of nature?

It is possible to interpret proto-matter as equivalent to the materiality of the

bodies73

. Actually, proto-matter is not a determined physical component; rather it is

something which expresses the basic character that all material entities have in common.

The notion of «materiality» expresses the fact that bodies are material

entities, and therefore they have the characteristics which are attributed to matter in

general: extension, divisibility, localization, duration, accidental as well as substantial

mutability. However, bodies have these characteristics insofar as they are real bodies,

with actual determinations. Pure materiality does not exist by itself: existing entities

have a being which is realized within material conditions.

In line with this interpretation, proto-matter designates the «material

conditions» in which natural entities exist. Therefore, these conditions refer to specific

characteristics, while «materiality» simply designates the way of being within which

conditions of this type exist74

. From this perspective, although proto-matter presupposes

a substantive use of the concept of matter, its content refers principally to its use as

adjective.

Consequently, in speaking of proto-matter we refer to a way of being. It is the

way of being common to all natural entities. From this perspective, the Aristotelian

statements about proto-matter have a clear meaning: materiality is a way of being which

essentially belongs to the natural entities (constitutive aspect); it is the sphere in which

material transformations occur (substratum of the substantial changes); it refers to the

material conditions in general and not to specific ways of being (it is an undetermined

substratum); and the material entities can change in principle into any other material

things (pure potentiality).

As it was already said, the notion of «second matter» refers to the substratum of

accidental changes, i.e. to the substance. This does not imply in any way that this subject

is immutable. On the contrary, accidents are determinations of the subject and therefore,

when an accidental change occurs, the subject changes; however, its way of being does

not change essentially, it is not transformed into another type of substance: it changes

accidentally. During accidental changes the substance changes but only accidentally.

This statement is important since it refers to a problem which has led to

misunderstandings. Actually, it would appear that if a substantial substratum remains in

existence during accidental changes, one should conclude that this substratum is

immutable (since it persists throughout the change). On this basis, conclusions are easily

73

A similar interpretation has been proposed by Juan Enrique Bolzán, who concludes that “it seems adequate to speak not

of a «matter» as a substantive –as if it were one of the constituents of the being – but of its materiality as one of its

characteristics”: J.E.BOLZÁN, “Cuerpo, material, materialidad”, Filosofia oggi, 14 (1991), p. 516. 74

This interpretation coincides with the one proposed by Jesús de Garay who states that “matter simply is the relation of

some determined conditions, called material, to the form since these conditions, as such, are also formal”: J. DE GARAY,

Los sentidos de la forma en Aristòteles, EUNSA, Pamplona 1987, p. 219.

reached which empty the content of the notion of substance. Either one says that

substance is just a mental category without any reference to reality, because only an idea

can be absolute and immutable, or one simply denies the validity of the concept of

substance.

On the other hand, «second matter» refers to a natural substance, an entity that

possesses a way of being and some specific virtualities which cannot be reduced to the

material conditions. We have already noted that there are no purely material substances,

because materiality is not a complete way of being: it only expresses some dimensions

of the way of being of the natural.

The latter is also an important statement which could sound shocking if reality is

conceptualized into two completely and mutually exclusive compartments namely,

matter conceived after the Cartesian fashion, i.e. reduced to the material conditions, and

spirit conceived as a subject which will only be able to act on matter «from without».

Hence, if matter is reduced to pure exteriority, the spirit could only act upon it

exteriorly, because no other possibility would be available: in this case, the action of

God in no way would affect the interiority of the natural (since there would be no

interiority), an the action of the human soul upon the body would then be similar to that

of a horse rider or of an helmsman who can only act and guide in an external way. Such

perspective leads to serious difficulties in the fields of anthropology and natural

theology.

The same perspective is also of little satisfaction to the philosophy of nature,

because it strips the natural substances of those dimensions which are related to their

interiority; it would appear that attributing interiority to them would mean to fall into

some kind of pan-psychism or pantheism, since interiority is an exclusive attribute of the

spirit. If one accepts this, he should then forget the fact that natural entities have their

own dynamism; that, in an enigmatic but real way they «know» their own way of being

and that of other beings, and they «know» how to behave in each circumstance; that they

are subjects with tendencies; that these tendencies have sometime a cooperative

character and create the conditions for the existence of morpho-genetic processes in

which new ways of being are produced; that in many natural beings there is a stored

«information» which unfolds through complex and sophisticated unitary types of

processes. One should actually forget a very important part, and maybe the main one, of

the way of being of the natural.

c) Characteristics of the material

Some characteristics of nature and of our knowledge of them will be considered

here which are closely related to materiality.

In the first place, the material conditions are related to potentiality, since

everything material is mutable, i.e. it can change not only accidentally but also

substantially. In this sense, matter is said to be principle of passivity, since it implies the

possibility of receiving new determinations. Aristotle claims that “matter, insofar as it is

matter, is passive”75

, and that material things “if they have a principle of movement, it is

not a principle of moving and acting, but one of passivity”76

. However, these statements

are not opposed to the acknowledged fact that natural beings have their own dynamism.

The previous statements actually refer to “matter insofar as it is matter”, i.e. to the

material conditions considered independently from interiority. They refer to some

generic conditions of materiality and not to the complete way of being of the natural

entities.

Secondly, it is usually claimed that matter is the principle of individuation of the

natural substances. This seems to be problematic because individuality means

determination and realization, and therefore it seems to be opposed to uncertainty and

potentiality. However, when one speaks of matter as «principle of individuation» he

means numerical individuation of the natural entities. Each substance has its own

proper way of being, but any way of being natural is, in principle, repeatable in different

individuals: it corresponds to a generic «type». In this sense, the same «type» exists as

individualized in beings which have some concrete material dimensions in space and

time: although the «type» (the determinations of the way of being) is what characterizes

an individual, the concrete material determinations explain how the same type can exist

in numerically different individuals. Therefore, when speaking of matter as principle of

individuation, it is customary to add that what is meant here is «matter marked by

quantity» (materia quantitate signata). It is the way emphasizing that what is meant here

is not matter as undetermined material conditions but matter determined by a specific

space and time quantity.

Thirdly, it is claimed - and this is easily understood - that materiality implies

contingency, i.e. lack of necessity. This is so because what is material is mutable, and it

is actually subjected to circumstances which can cause changes; on the other hand, this

is also so because this mutability affects also the essence of the material entities which

can stop being what they are and become something else. There is no doubt that material

individuation in the Aristotelian perspective is a path which makes material beings

imitate the incorruptible ones, since the same way of being can perpetuate itself through

numerical multiplication. Living beings transmit their way of being to other individuals

through generation and in this way the species is perpetuated although the individuals

disappear. From another perspective, it is also claimed that matter implies necessity.

However, this necessity is not opposed to the contingency we have just analyzed.

Necessity refers here to determination in the way of acting, absence of freedom. We

shall not expand here on the problems of indeterminism: whatever the solutions may be,

it is evident that self-consciousness and freedom presuppose a way of being which

transcends material conditions.

Fourthly, materiality is related to the existence of chance in nature. Actually,

changes occur easily in the material conditions; in this way a kind of chance is

introduced which is opposed to perfect regularity. Experience shows that our

possibilities in acting are limited by the continuous changes in material conditions.

75

ARISTOTLE, De Generatione et Corruptione, I, 7, 324 b 18. 76

ARISTOTLE, Physica, VIII, 4, 255 b 30-31.

Fifthly, materiality implies on one hand, the existence of limitations in our

knowledge, and on the other hand, the possibility of a measurable and controlled

knowledge. In relation to the first implication, Aristotle states that “matter as such is not

knowable”77

. Actually, something is known through its operations; even properties

which appear to be passive, such as colour, correspond in reality to interactions: colour

can be perceived thanks to the fact that light is reflected by the bodies. Materiality

expresses some exterior conditions, disregarding dynamism and activity; such

conditions are not known by themselves, but by the activity which unfolds through

them. Moreover, although exteriority makes sense knowledge possible (and therefore

the whole of our knowledge), it also imposes limitations: we can know immediately

only those aspects of nature which are accessible to our sense organs; we need to make

recourse to indirect procedures in order to know other aspects.

However, materiality also has a positive aspect in our knowledge of nature, since

thanks to materiality it is possible to study nature in a quantitative and experimental way

which is the basis of our scientific knowledge. Actually, materiality provides the basis

for numbering and for the mathematical study of nature. It is related to dimensions

which have a space-time magnitude and which, therefore, can be divided, summed and

submitted to calculation. The material aspects of nature can be studied in a mathematical

way, while the qualitative ones can be studied in this way only indirectly in the measure

in which they can be related to the quantitative.

Thanks to materiality, experimentation is made possible. What is material can be

studied through experiments because its behaviour appears as a regular activity, i.e. not

free. Scientific experiments must be repeatable, so that changes may be studied in some

aspects of the phenomena in function of the changes of some other aspects, and in

controlled conditions. Obviously, aspects related to the spirit and to freedom cannot be

studied with this method.

All these considerations allow us to understand why the mathematical and

experimental methods can be used to study those aspects of nature which are related to

the materiality and not to other of its aspects which are accessible, though, to

philosophical reflection.

14.2. Dimensions of formal type

We shall now analyze the formal dimensions and the meanings of the concept of

form. One should keep into account the close relationship that exists between the

material and the formal: actually, matter and form are, in the material entities, like two

sides of the same coin. The following analysis will be a completion of what has already

been said about matter and materiality.

a) Configuration, consistency and synergy

77

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VII, 10, 1036 a 8-9.

Space extension, time duration and movement are material dimensions which

refer to the external distension, to the multiplicity of the components. Formal

dimensions, on the other hand, refer to the internal coherence, to the unity: configuration

reflects the space unity of the components; consistency is related to the preservation of

the unity throughout time processes; synergy expresses the character of cooperation of

the different components and processes.

Configuration is space structuring; it is defined as the disposition of the parts

that constitute a thing; the disposition of parts is responsible for the figure of a thing.

Natural entities are extended (partes extra partes); however, the distribution of their

parts is not casual but takes place according to the characteristic configuration (partes

extra partes ordinata) of things. The configuration of unitary systems corresponds to

typical space patterns which are repeated in different individual systems. Configuration

(formal dimension) corresponds to extension (material dimension) and both complement

each other. If there was only extension, nature would be reduced to a disconnected

multiplicity of parts randomly distributed in space. On the contrary, nature is structured

according to space patterns. Our visual knowledge depends completely on the

recognition of such patterns. Experimental science presupposes the existence of such

patterns and confirms them: it tries to know space patterns which are inaccessible to

ordinary experience, and in many cases it manages to do so.

Consistency is related to time duration; it is defined as stable duration. The

stability of natural systems depends on the connection between their parts: if this is

weak, their stability will be feeble. Consistency (formal dimension) corresponds to

duration (material dimension). There is no absolute consistency in nature: everything is

subjected to wear and tear, to interactions, to division. Stability corresponds to an

interior cohesion which is preserved throughout interactions. Living beings have a kind

of organization which make them apt to actively provoke those conditions which are

favourable to their stability.

Synergy refers to space-time organization: it means cooperation. The

organization of natural systems depends on the cooperation of their components in a

functional unity. Synergy (formal dimension) corresponds to movement (material

dimension). Synergy expresses the unity of the different movements which occur in a

system: the greater the cooperation of the component parts of a system and of the

processes which unfold in it, the greater its unity.

b) Meanings of the concept of form

Material and formal are correlative concepts: that is why we can distinguish the

adjective and the substantive uses of form, in the same way and meaning as we do in the

case of matter. There is nevertheless an important difference: within the context of the

material nature, the formal always exists in material conditions; however nothing

prevents the existence of beings which lack matter, i.e. spiritual beings. The two cases

are asymmetrical: the existence of beings reduced to pure materiality is impossible,

while that of beings that do not include material conditions (spiritual beings) is possible.

We shall not deal with spiritual beings here, because what is natural is material;

however, we shall refer to man’s spirituality, since the human person belongs to nature

although he transcends it at the same time.

As «materiality» expresses the fact that something exists in material conditions,

i.e. that it is something «material» (adjective use of the concept of «matter»), so

«formality» refers to the peculiar determinations of the way of being: to be an tom, a

protein, a plant, to be white, a good electricity conductor, etc.

These determinations do not exist outside the material conditions; they do not

exist in an independent way, nor are they united to the materiality in an external way:

the formal and the material are interpenetrated and entwined so as to form a unitary

reality. It is not a juxtaposition of two different and complete realities. There is only one

complete reality which subsists with its own being: the individual substance which has

formal determinations realized in material conditions.

Of course, when one studies the way of being human, it becomes necessary to

introduce further clarifications which may be able to reflect the peculiarities of the

human person and of his spiritual dimensions.

We have already mentioned the asymmetry between the material and the formal

in the concrete case of the spiritual beings. Such asymmetry though is much wider; this

is due to the fact that unlike material conditions which are generic and in a certain way

common to all natural beings (extension, duration, movement), the formal ones are

particular and specific. The essential as well as accidental formal determinations are

different in different beings. It is because of this that we also use a different terminology

in both cases: we speak of conditions in the case of the material, and of determinations

in the case of the formal.

It is important to stress the fact that substantial and accidental forms of the

material entities are not complete beings, they do not have their own substance, and

they are not subjects in a strict sense. If this is taken into account, there is no

inconvenience in speaking of «form» or «forms» with the substantive use. It is

nevertheless convenient not to forget the true meaning of the concept of form. Centuries

long critics of the concept of form (from the times of Descartes) are mostly based on

these misunderstandings which we are trying to clarify: the forms of the material

entities are equivocally understood as entities or parts of entities. For this reason, it

seems preferable to use a terminology, whenever possible which can avoid the danger of

substantialising the forms.

c) Substantial and accidental forms

The concept of form occupies a central place in the Aristotelian philosophy78

.

The term «form» usually refers to the external appearances of something and is related

78

A good study on this topic can be found in the already quoted work by Jesús de Garay, Los sentidos de la forma en

Aristòteles.

to its «figure». This meaning of form actually corresponds to one of the species of the

accident «quality». However, the concept of form has a much wider meaning, since it

designates any determination of the ways of being: if it is a substantial way of being, one

speaks of «substantial form»; if it is an accidental way of being, one speaks of

«accidental form».

At a physical level, form is correlative to matter, since it is what determines the

latter; consequently, a different type of form corresponds to different types of matter.

Specifically, «substantial form» corresponds to «proto-matter», and «accidental forms»

(note the use of plural, since the same substance has different accidental determinations)

correspond to «second matter».

Aristotle’s philosophy claims that the substantial form is the essential act of the

natural species. Material substances have an essence, or a fundamental way of being

which differentiates the distinct types of substances (dog, acacia, water, etc.). These

essences are not simple but composite: they exist in material conditions (proto-matter),

and include those perfections which determine their specific way of being (substantial

form). Matter and form are neither complete entities nor physical parts; they are

principles which behave like potency and act: proto-matter is the potential and

undetermined principle, while the substantial form is the actual and determining

principle.

The substantial form refers to the unitary way of being of the substance and to

the totality of its possibilities of action which correspond to its way of being. It is act,

energy, active nature.

At the same time, and precisely because it expresses its specific way of being,

the substantial form corresponds to the concept and to the definition of substance, i.e. to

the idea which expresses the specific way of being of each substance. Actually, Aristotle

uses two different terms to refer to the form: «morfé» (form) and «eidos» (idea).

Although in a first approximation there is a clear correspondence between the meanings

of these two terms, in reality they are not identical. We shall not expand here on this

exegetical problem which concerns the precise interpretations of Aristotle’s thought. It

is enough for us to note that the substantial form is a real principle, the one which

determines the essence of the material substances; that matter and form are co-

principles of the essence, as potential and actual respectively; and that the idea or

definition of an essence will have to include a reference to both co-principles.

In the Aristotelian perspective, the substantial form is «responsible» for the

unitary structuring of the substances, of their way of acting and of their tendencies.

It is important to note that the substantial form is present only in the natural

entities (which are substances). An aggregation does not have an essential unity, a way

of being one, and therefore does not have a substantial form. Artefacts also lack a

substantial form, since their unity corresponds to an external project, to a human idea,

unless in some cases an authentic substance is produced through artificial processes. The

Aristotelian substantial form corresponds to a central aspect of the reality: the way of

being characteristic of each substance.

The expression «accidental form» is used to designate any accidental

determination. Therefore, any accident can be referred to as «accidental form». Also in

this case there is a danger of «treating accidents as things», and again this danger is

related to the substantive use of the respective terms, when one speaks of «the quantity»,

«the quality», etc. as if these were subjects or entities.

Accidents are determinations of a substantial subject, of an individual substance.

Such a subject has extension, is divisible, is soft, and has a full set of qualities. It would

not make sense to treat accidents as substances or things. The use of an appropriate

terminology can help avoid this danger.

Accidental forms behave as act in relation to the substance which is in potency

respect to the accidental forms. They are determinations, accidental ways of being, and

therefore they refer to a being in act. Because the substance is a subject in act, it is in

potency respect to the different accidental forms which can change without changes in

the essential way of being of the substance. As the substantial form is the act of the

proto-matter, so the accidental forms are the act of the second matter (or substance).

d) Characteristics of the form

We shall now examine some characteristics of nature which correspond to the

concept of form.

First, the form is related to being. We have already stressed the fact that forms

are not complete beings. The classic terminology uses the term ens quod or entity which

(plural entia quae) in order to designate entities or subjects proper; while ens quo or

entity by which (plural entia quibus) is used to designate the constitutive principles of

the entity which are neither entities nor subjects. According to this terminology, the

form is an ens quo, i.e. an entity by which something is, or has being, or has a specific

way of being. This terminology is still substantive, since forms are called «entities»,

while at the same time stressing the fact that they are entities in a special sense: they are

not complete entities, but determinations of an entity. All in all, it is important to stress

the fact that forms do not exist on their own: what exists is the individual substance

which has a specifically determined way of being (substantial form) that is realized in

material conditions (proto-matter).

Insofar as forms are determinations of the way of being, one can say that entities

have being «through» their forms. The classic dictum «the form gives being» (forma dat

esse) should not be understood as if the form had its own being previous to its material

existence and at a certain point would «transmit» it to the matter or to an entity. What

has being, what acts, what is a subject of transformations is the individual substance.

However, it should be added that the form refers to a real being; we can explain how a

cell works, but the living cell has a real being which is not reducible to our explanations:

«to be a cell» is a «way of being», and it is convenient to stress that it is a way of

«being». In this sense, it is true that the form gives being, avoiding substantive

interpretations of this expression. Along the same line, it should be noted that claiming

that the form is cause (the «formal cause») does not mean that the form exercises its

causality in the same way in which the efficient cause, or agent, does. The formal cause

is what determines the way of being. It is nevertheless a real determination of a real way

of being.

Properly speaking, forms are neither generated nor corrupted. A form exists

when the entity to which it belongs begins to exist, and ceases to exist when the latter is

transformed into something else. It is usually said that the material forms are «educed»

from the potentiality of matter; this means that they do not have their own independent

being; they are «produced» in the transformations whose substratum is the matter: they

are the result of these transformations. The present-day knowledge about the «self-

organization» of matter refers to the production of new structures and patterns of

activity which arise as a consequence of the cooperative interactions of the components.

We point out once again that these considerations refer to the «material forms»,

i.e. to the forms of the natural beings which include material conditions, and which

cannot exist outside the latter. In the case of man’s spiritual soul, new considerations

need to be added which reflect the spiritual dimensions and their implications.

Second, form is related to structure. It may be appropriate to ask whether the

form could be identified with the «structure» of the material entities. It may appear

possible to do so, since the structure is related to the way of being of the natural entities,

and it is somehow an «immaterial» factor, since it refers to the organization of the

component parts.

There is no doubt that the structure of the material entities is closely related to

the classical concept of form, and even more so if one considers these entities as

systems. According to the theory, a system is characterized by the totality of the

interrelations among its components; these are integrated in a unitary type of structure.

A system is something more than the juxtaposition of its parts; it has properties which

are not found in its parts, nor do these properties result from the mere addition of the

properties of its parts; it has teleological characteristics, since there are structural laws

which favour the stability of certain of its aspects. All this is particularly evident in

living organisms but present also in some inorganic systems, and even in the atomic

world ruled by quantum laws. These characteristics favour the approximation between

the notions of structure and form.

Nevertheless, it is convenient to clarify two aspects of this relationship. First,

when we talk here of «structure» we refer to the «organization» of a system which

includes not only space structure (configuration), but also time dimensions (cooperative

processes of the parts of the system). Second, this «space-time organization» is not

identified with the form; the form is rather like the «plan» which corresponds to the

totality of space relations and interactions that exist in the system. There is no doubt that

this plan corresponds to the «way of being» of the system; however, the concept of form

refers directly to this way of being, and it is not reduced to its concrete aspects.

Third, forms are related to the ends. In the production of artefacts there is a

«model» according to which a new product is manufactured. Similarly, in nature it can

be said that the form is the model according to which natural entities are produced. In

the generation of the living beings the form of the generator is the principle of

generation in accordance with specific patterns and, at the same time, it is the end of the

generation, since a new being is produced which has the same specific form of the

generator. In the production of non living substances, the form of the product is also the

end, the terminus towards which the process tends.

Consequently, form and end can be identified in the natural processes; they are

identified in living beings since the form of the generator and that of the generated

coincide specifically. They are also identified in the non-living beings since the form is

the end of the tendencies of the components, the end of the process.

It is important to emphasize the close relationship between forms and ends since

critics of the concept of form usually, and to a very large extent, coincide with the critics

of the concept of finality. The acceptance of the reality of the form leads easily to the

acceptance of finality.

Fourth, we ask what type of necessity corresponds to the form. In the Aristotelian

philosophy, some kind of necessity and immutability are attributed to the essences and,

therefore, to the forms. This seems to be at a loggerhead with the present-day worldview

according to which natural entities are the result of contingent processes and in this

sense they are neither necessary nor immutable.

These difficulties are related to the Aristotelian worldview according to which

the world, and somehow the forms, are eternal; changes would consist in individual

generations and corruptions directed by the forms and towards the forms: they arise

from the form and are directed towards the production of forms. In this view, the

number of forms is given in a fixed number once and for all. However, the fundamental

core of the concept of form can be easily separated from these ideas. Actually, this

worldview had been criticized by the 13th

and 14th

century Christian thinkers, and it was

also condemned in the same centuries by some of the ecclesiastical authorities. These

critics referred above all to the alleged necessity and eternity of the world; contingency

and time limitation of the world were emphasized against the Aristotelian worldview.

However, the same reasons, which led centuries ago to claim the contingency of the

world, could be used nowadays to claim the contingency of the forms. Actually, from

the creationist metaphysical perspective, not only the world in its totality but also the

specific natural entities are contingent. In order to hold that the natural entities are not

dissolved in a pure flow of processes and that they have intelligibility, it is not

necessary to claim that forms are eternal. There is no correspondence either between the

eternity of the divine ideas and the eternity of the forms of the natural entities. Here we

are facing two different aspects of the problem.

The present-day world view emphasizes the contingency of the natural entities

which are the contingent result of natural processes; therefore, it emphasizes also the

contingency of the forms. Eternity and immutability of the forms do not correspond to

the present-day worldview. However, they are not indispensable in order to accept the

meaning of form as it has been explained, or to claim the intelligibility of nature, or the

existence of a natural order with a hierarchy which culminates with the human person.

They are not even necessary as a basis for a concept of human nature that may

permit us to claim the existence of stable moral dimensions. Actually, morality is related

to the existence of metaphysical dimensions in the human person, and these dimensions

seat on concrete physical conditions; the fact that these physical conditions are subject

to changes says nothing against its actual existence. In order to be able to claim the

existence of metaphysical dimensions in the human person and in the corresponding

moral dimensions, it is not necessary to claim that the physical conditions on which they

seat have always been there.

15. THE HILEO-MORPHIC STRUCTURE

We have already considered the hileo-morphic structure in relation to matter and

form. We are now going to consider it in relation to their correlation and to its validity.

15.1. Hileo-morphism

We call «hileo-morphism» the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the

essence of the material substances is composed of matte (hylé) and form (morfé); since

we are speaking of the essence of these substances, the matter referred to here is the

«proto-matter», and the form is the «substantial form».

The concept of «matter» is used by Aristotle in different contexts along his work

and it does not have a univocal meaning. There is no unanimity in the interpretation of

the different meanings79

. For instance, doubts have been raised about the authenticity of

the traditional interpretation according to which there would be one proto-matter only,

common to all bodies, purely undetermined substratum which comes into the

composition of all material beings; it has also been said that this interpretation is foreign

to Aristotle.

Along this line, William Charlton has examined the Aristotelian passages which

refer to proto-matter and concludes that they do not give evidence for the traditional

interpretation: in Aristotle’s thinking, matter would always be something concrete and

already determined. He claims that the traditional doctrine has its origin in Plato’s

Timeus80

: it would have come about by joining Plato’s language and Aristotle’s concept

about the material factor, i.e. adapting the Aristotelian substratum so as to suit the

Platonic description. This joining would have taken place with the Stoics, would have

become well established in the syncretistic philosophy of the 1st century B.C. and early

centuries A.D., would have been taken into Christian theology already at the times of St.

79

In relation to this, one can read: L. CENCILLO, «Hyle». Origen, concepto y funciones de la material en el «Corpus

Aristotelicum», Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid 1958; H. HAPP, «Hyle». Studium zum

aristotelischen Materie-Begriff, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1971; W. LESZL, “La material in Aristotele”, Rivista

Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 28 (1973), pp. 243-270 and 380-401; 29 (1974), pp. 144-170. 80

Cf. PLATO, Timeus, 50 b 8 – c 3; 50 e 4-5; 51 a 4 - b 2. In these passages Plato refers to the receptacle which receives all

things and never takes any form, and he adds that it is by nature the matrix of every thing and it is structured in different

ways by the things it receives, that it is found outside of all forms, that it is the mother of everything, invisible and without

form, receptive of everything.

Augustine, and would have become fossilized in Calcidius’ commentary to the Timeus

which was almost the only source of ancient metaphysics till the 12th

century81

.

Of course, Aquinas places his interpretation of hileo-morphism within the

framework of a creationist metaphysics. Aquinas’ concepts are taken mostly from

Aristotle; however, in this case as in many others, what is Aristotelian is interpreted

within a metaphysics which, in some important aspects, is not Aristotelian.

We mention all these problems in order to point out that the interpretation of the

Aristotelian hileo-morphism and of its historical development is not a simple task. On

our part we have examined the hileo-morphism without trying to betray either

Aristotle’s thought or the Aristotelian tradition. We shall proceed with our analysis

along the same line disregarding historical exegesis.

15.2. Correlation and unity between the material and the formal

Matter and form are correlative concepts: something is matter respect to a form

and vice versa. It should be understood that this perfect correlation exists only in

material beings, and that nothing forbids the existence of spiritual beings whose essence

would consist in a form without matter82

.

Therefore, matter and form, in the physical world (material entities), mutually

need each other and complement each other. There is no matter without form: if there

were this would mean that some material conditions (extension, duration, movement)

existed which would not affect any entity, and this is impossible. Moreover, there is no

form without matter: a purely spiritual being does not belong to the physical, or

material, level.

We have stressed the fact that the concepts of matter and form do not refer to

«things». It can be added that, somehow, they express «functions». This means that

something «plays the role of» matter respect to the form, or of form respect to the

matter. This implies that matter and form refer to a specific level: that which plays the

role of form from a specific perspective, can play the role of matter from another

perspective. For instance, the substantial form is form respect to proto-matter but is

somehow matter respect to the accidental forms which determine the accidental level.

However, there is an exception in the case of proto-matter which dose not play the role

of a form in any case. On the other hand, purely spiritual forms are still determined by

the act of being (we shall not detain ourselves in this important aspect which pertains to

metaphysics).

81

Cf. W. CHARLTON, Aristotle’s Physics Books I and II, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970: Appendix: “Did Aristotle

Believe in Prime matter?”, pp. 129-145. 82

ARISTOTLE states that “matter is something relative: since, to such a form, such a matter”: Physica, II, 2, 194 b 8-9.

On the other hand, the correlation between matter and form is the same as the

one between potency and act. Actually, form indicates determination and therefore act,

while potency signifies something undetermined which is being actualized or

determined by the form83

.

All in all, matter and form are «correlative» concepts, because one makes

reference to the other; they are «functional» concepts since they do not express things

but functions; they are «contextual» concepts since something can work either as matter

or as form in different contexts or levels of analysis. All this means that matter and form

constitute an authentic unity: they are like two sides of the same coin which correspond

to the «exteriority» and «interiority» of the natural beings respectively.

Consequently, matter and form are not joined as if they were two entities, or

physical parts. The essential way of being refers to some formal determinations

(substantial form) which exist in material conditions (proto-matter); and the accidental

ways of being refer to formal determinations (accidental forms) which affect a substance

(second matter). However, the substance together with its accidents is a unitary whole. It

cannot be said that the proto-matter, or the substantial form, or the substance, or the

accidents exist separately or juxtaposed, as if they all were physical parts.

One can say that the form «in-forms» the matter, it determines it, it actualizes it

(please note that the use of this substantive language should be interpreted with those

nuances previously indicated). It is because of this that the concept of form can be

related to the present-day concept of «information». Actually, in its present-day

meaning information can be understood as «storage» of «instructions» which are found

and expressed in material conditions. However, this presupposes one dimension added

to these conditions; this happens for instance in the case of the genetic information

contained within the structure of the genes. In this sense, information has something to

do with laws, since it is these laws which «regulate» the physical processes and their

results that are «realized» in these processes, but which are not identified either with the

entities or with the processes. The instructions contained in the different entities come to

be «materializations» of the laws.

15.3. Matter and form as causes

In the Aristotelian philosophy, matter and form are considered to be causes: the

material cause and the formal cause84

. Yet, their causal action does not correspond to

what is ordinarily understood as cause, namely the efficient or agent cause. Since they

are not complete entities they do not have their own consistency and do not exercise

their causality in the same way as an agent subject (being a substance) does.

Matter and form are causes insofar as they are «components» of the natural

entities: proto-matter and substantial form constitute the essence of the material

substances, while second matter and accidental forms constitute the substance with its

determinations. If by «cause» we understand that which affects the being of the effect,

83

“Matter is potency and form is act”: ARISTOTLE, De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 9-10. 84

Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, II, 3; Metaphysica, V, 4.

we can then claim that matter and form are proper causes, since they constitute the way

of being of the natural substances.

For the same reason, matter and form are «intrinsic» or interior causes, since

they refer to the way of being. This is not at all opposed to the fact that matter is related

to the «exteriority» of the substance. Actually, the material conditions are intrinsic or

interior to the substance, they belong to its own proper way of being; however, they

refer to space extension and time duration and therefore to the exteriority, in an through

which the substance acts85

.

The meaning of material and formal cause refers, therefore, to the causality of

two «factors» which are intrinsic constituents of things, and which relate to each other

as potency and act.

Aristotle expressed the unity and causality of matter and form with a very

explicit statement: “ultimate matter and form are the same, the former in potency and

the latter in act”86

. Matter and form do not co-exist, are not joined, are not different

realities which are related, they do not ask for a unifying bridge, they are not

components after the fashion of physically separated parts. That which has an

independent being is the individual substance whose way of being consists in some

formal determinations which exist in material conditions.

15.4. The validity of hileo-morphism

To say that matter and form are real, intrinsic and constitutive causes of the

essence of the natural substances is equivalent to claiming the metaphysical validity of

the hileo-morphic composition. In other words, such a composition is not only a mental

construction to understand nature, but corresponds to the reality of things, although

matter and form are not complete entities.

It may seem that hileo-morphism gets into trouble vis-à-vis the knowledge

provided by the scientific progress about the composition of matter. One may think that

actually science supplants hileo-morphism with explanations formulated in terms of

components and their configurations. In this case hileo-morphism would correspond to

an obsolete kind of worldview. Scientific knowledge would then be quite sufficient to

explain the natural phenomena, while philosophical explanations would become useless.

In reality we face here two different levels of explanation which are

complementary. Experimental sciences adopt a perspective which is not only legitimate

but also indispensable in order to be able to make progresses in the knowledge of the

composition of matter and of its laws. The philosophical perspective, on the other hand,

focuses its knowledge on the ways of being of the natural and conceptualizes it.

85

“Matter is that out of which something is made and which remains immanently in it”: ARISTOTLE, Physics, II, 3, 194 b

24. 86

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, VIII, 6, 1045 b 18-19.

The present-day knowledge about the composition of matter is incompatible not

only with a mechanism which strips matter of its own dynamism and interiority, but also

with a processualism which does not admit the existence of stable subjects. On the

contrary, it favours an image of nature in which a very important role is played by

patterns, dynamism, organization and information. This image is fully coherent with

hileo-morphism.

There is a great variety of patterns in nature which repeat themselves in different

concrete material conditions. Nowadays, many patterns are very well known in the

microphysical as well as in the macro physical and biological levels. All this

corresponds pretty well to the notion of form as a way of being which repeats itself in

different individual material conditions.

On the other hand, at times some claim that energy could be considered as

equivalent to the traditional proto-matter: in this case everything would be made of

energy, and the material entities would be a sort of «concentrated» energy. Some try to

base this idea on certain results in physics, such as the equivalence of mass and energy,

the importance of the «fields» of forces, the transmutation of sub-atomic particles into

one another and the equivalence of the different forms of energy. There is no doubt that

these aspects emphasize the basic character of energy. However, the energy dealt with in

physics is a magnitude which is defined in relation to the methods proper to physics;

therefore, trying to identify it with a philosophical notion is a task that falls outside the

scope of the experimental sciences. It is nevertheless a suggestive idea because there is

no doubt that many aspects of the material reality can be explained in terms of energy.

However, proto-matter, understood as «materiality», refers in a general way to the

material conditions and energy, as a physical magnitude, refers, on the other hand, to

specific characteristics of the activity of what is natural.

15.5. The degrees of the physical being

There are progressively greater levels of organization in nature which, although

realized in material conditions, have progressively accentuated formal dimensions.

Actually, there are degrees of structural integration, process integration, cooperative

action, organization, unity and active potentiality or capacity of action.

Living beings have peculiar formal dimensions. There is an unquestionable

qualitative difference between the living and non-living, and within the living there are

different degrees of life.

The taxonomic ladder shows a progress in the formal dimensions as one climbs

it, and this means a progressive distancing from the pure materiality.

If «immateriality» is understood as accentuation of the formal dimensions, it can

be said that there is an ascending ladder of immateriality. However, in the physical

world this immateriality does not refer to something independent from the material

conditions.

In the case of the human soul the problem of the relationship between

«immateriality» and «spirituality» appears since in this case the formal dimensions

transcend the material conditions. How is it possible for a spiritual soul to be the form of

a material body? In other words, how is it possible for spiritual dimensions to exist in

material conditions? The difficulties met with in trying to conceptualize this fact are not

small but, however big, they should not lead one to deny this fact which can be easily

experienced.

On the other hand, the existence of spiritual dimensions requires a kind of

causality for its adequate explanation which is far above the possibility of the material

entities. A transcendent cause is not only required in the case of the spirituality, but also

at inferior levels. In the case of spirituality though there is something special to add: the

way of being of this level is essentially superior to that which depends on material

conditions.

15.6. Materialized rationality

Hileo-morphism corresponds to different explanatory levels which, although

related among themselves, are not identical. The first of them refers to change, the

second to the constitution of the bodies, and the third to individual multiplicity.

In the first place, hileo-morphism was formulated in order to explain how change

is possible. The necessity of admitting a substratum in all changes seems obvious since

the opposite would lead to the denial of transformations and the admission of

annihilations and creations. Therefore we say that in any change there is a subject which

is in potency towards the acquisition of a form. Change then is precisely the process of

actualization of this potency. The subject plays the role of matter in relation to the form

which it acquires through the process: this subject is the proto-matter in the substantial

changes and the second matter in the accidental ones.

In the second place, hileo-morphism can be applied to the constitution of the

bodies. Natural bodies are essentially mutable or changeable and therefore they must

have the matter-and-form composition which explains, has we have just said, the

possibility of change.

In third place, hileo-morphism explains the multiplicity of individuals within the

same species. If bodies are made of matter and form, form refers to what characterizes

the species, and matter refers to the concrete conditions in which this generic type exists.

One therefore understands how the same type of form can exist in different individuals.

These three explanatory levels refer to the physical world and are related among

themselves. In a fourth place, we can consider another level which refers to the

relationship between the physical and the metaphysical world. From this perspective,

hileo-morphism reflects the existence of a gradation of perfections in function of the

distinct degrees of immateriality. Moreover, in the light of a creationist metaphysics,

nature appears as the realization of a rational project carried out through material

conditions. Information can be considered as materialized rationality, and the different

degrees of being as rungs which make the existence of nature possible, a nature at whose

peak a rational being is found: this being is the human person who exists in material

conditions but who at the same time transcends them.

PART TWO

VI. QUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONS

The being proper to the natural entities includes material conditions which are

intimately related to quantity. The natural is distended in material conditions, i.e. it has

quantity and therefore extension in space and duration in time.

Quantitative dimensions are those related to quantity, e.g. extension,

multiplicity, divisibility, measurability and numerability. We are going to consider now

these dimensions while in the next chapter we shall delve with the concepts of space and

time.

16. PROPERTIES OF AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MATERIAL

ENTITIES

Before examining the quantitative dimension in concrete, we shall do it in a

general way as an introduction. We shall emphasise their accidental character, their

importance for the knowledge of substances, and their connection with the other

properties of a substance.

16.1. The unveiling of the substance through its properties

The accidental ways of being, usually called simply «accidents» are defined in

relation to substance and essence.

Unlike the substance which is the subsistent entity and therefore has «its own

being», accidents do not have their own being and therefore do not subsist: they are

determinations of the substance. For instance, big, small, white, resistant, are not

subsistent entities: they are properties which affect a subject which is a substance. The

substance is the subject, or substratum, of the accidents.

Accidents do not belong to the definition of essence which expresses the

fundamental way of being of a substance (like being a man, a dog, a tree, a protein, an

atom). This does not mean though that accidents are of little importance or that they are

not related to the essence. There is no doubt that some accidents have a secondary

importance and are related to the essence in a distant way; however, other accidents are

closely related to the essence and are greatly relevant: this is the case, as we shall see, of

quantity and some qualities.

In any case, accidents are extremely important because through them substances

and essences are known. Actually, substances and essences are unveiled through the

accidents (magnitude, colour, resistance, etc.), and in this way we know them indirectly

and in a partial way.

Some accidents are determinations of the substance itself while others express

the relation of a substance with other substances; for instance, having a certain size does

not depend on the relation with other substances, but occupying a certain place

expresses a relation with the surrounding bodies: both cases express ways of being of

the substance.

16.2. Quantitative and qualitative

The quantitative and the qualitative are two dimensions always present in the

natural entities. They are accidental dimensions and as such they do not form part of the

essence of the substance. Truly, they cannot ever be absent, they are greatly important to

determine the way of being of the natural entities, and they are closely related.

According to Aristotle’s classification of the accidents, quantity and quality

occupy a prominent place because they are considered as intrinsic accidents, i.e. they

refer directly to the way of being (accidental) of the substances. Actually, material

substances are always extended and have qualities which determine their way of being.

a) The quantitative

The quantitative answers the question: “How much?”. It refers to something’s

magnitude: how much it measures in relation to space; how long it lasts in relation to

time; how fast it is in relation to movement; how many individuals or components or

aspects exist in a system or in a set of systems. Moreover, magnitude is related to

numbers.

Everything natural is quantified, i.e. it has quantitative dimensions and therefore

has magnitude, extension, number. Actually, what is natural is material and this implies

quantitative dimensions: materiality is characterized precisely by its reference to these

dimensions.

Space-time structuring refers to what is material and quantitative: it presupposes

distension in space and time. Therefore, in characterizing the natural in function of

dynamism and structuring, we have emphasised the basic role that the material and the

quantitative play for an adequate representation of nature.

b) The qualitative

The qualitative answers the question: “what?” in the sense of «quality», or way

of being of something: what its characteristics and its peculiarities are.

What is natural has qualitative properties. Actually, what is natural is not

exhausted in the quantitative dimensions: in fact, this is not possible because the

quantitative dimensions do not exist isolated, they do not have their own being.

Quantitative dimensions exist as aspects of the ways of being of the natural entities.

Dynamism is related to the ways of being: it presupposes the existence of some

potentialities or capacities of acting which correspond to specific ways of being.

Therefore, in characterizing the natural in function of dynamism and structuring, we

have emphasised the fact that what is natural has virtualities, i.e. specific ways of being

of qualitative type from where the natural activity arises.

c) Relation between the quantitative and the qualitative

There is asymmetry between the quantitative and the qualitative similar to the

one existing between the material and the formal (and for the same reasons): there is no

obstacle to the possibility of existence of spiritual beings, i.e. being without matter with

qualities also spiritual (and therefore qualities without quantity. On the other hand, the

existence of purely quantitative material beings without any kind of quality is not

possible; in such a case we would be in the presence of purely mathematical, and not

natural, beings.

In the sphere of the natural, the quantitative and the qualitative are

interpenetrated. Any natural entity has space-time structuring, i.e. quantitative

dimensions. The qualitative ways of being do not exist in a pure state, separated from

the quantitative ones: although they refer to aspects which are not directly quantitative,

yet they are realized in material conditions and, for this reason, they are affected by

quantity.

The quantitative and the qualitative are different real dimensions; however, they

are interpenetrated in the natural entities, in the same way in which the material and the

formal are, or the exteriority and the interiority are. Moreover, quantity, as well a

quality, is intrinsically related to the dynamism and to the relations among entities.

Actually, the activity of the natural substances depends on their ways of being

(operations follow being), and the way of being of the substances depends on their

quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Something similar can be said about the

relations of substances among themselves. One should not lose sight of this when

studying quantity and quality separately.

16.3. The quantitative and the qualitative from the mechanistic perspective

Already before Aristotle strong doubts had been cast on the objectivity of qualities. The

Greek atomists claimed that nature is completely determined by quantitative properties

such as extension, figure and local movement, whereas qualities would only be the

effects that matter produces on the sense organs, and would therefore belong to the area

of the subjective impressions. The Pythagoreans also, and somehow Plato, considered

the quantitative to be the basic constituent of nature to the extent that study of

mathematics would be indispensable for an adequate understanding of nature.

With the birth of modern experimental science in the 17th

century the problem of

the objectivity of the sense qualities acquired prominence. The newly born science went

hand-in-hand with a mechanistic perspective which presented itself as the new

philosophy of nature in polemic with the old qualitative physics. The mechanistic

explanations were quantity-based, while qualities were considered as subjective

impressions devoid of objectivity. The triumph of the new science was interpreted also

as the triumph of the mechanistic and quantitative perspective; this became the

philosophy of nature generally accepted until the end of the 19th

century, at least in those

places more related to science.

In this perspective, the reality of the so-called secondary qualities was also

denied (the «sensible proper», object of the external senses: colour, sound, etc.), while it

was claimed that only the primary qualities are real (those related to quantity:

magnitude, figure, movement). Secondary qualities would only be subjective

impressions caused by the primary qualities in subjects equipped with a specific

perceptive apparatus. The Aristotelian forms, considered as occult qualities, were

rejected as useless: they could only be considered like labels presented as explanatory

tools but in fact explaining nothing, leading rather to error and hindering the progress of

science.

The Empiricism of the same period held the same doctrine. For instance, John

Locke (1632-1704) wrote: “the ideas of the primary qualities of the bodies are

similarities of these qualities, and their models really exist in the same bodies; however,

there is no similarity whatsoever in the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities.

There is nothing in the same bodies which are similar to our ideas. There is only a power

to produce in us the sensations of bodies which we name according to the ideas we have

of them; and what is sweet, blue or hot according to an idea is nothing in the so-called

bodies but volume, form and movement of the insensible parts of the same bodies”87

.

In the subsequent epochs, the reality of the qualities continued to be denied,

basing this denial on the progress of the mathematical science of nature.

We shall focus our attention on the concrete aspects of the quantitative

dimensions. The analysis will make us appreciate the fact that the quantitative does not

exist separately from the qualitative, and this will prepare the way to determine the

objective character of the qualities.

17. DIMENSIONAL EXTENSION

87

J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book II, Ch. VIII, No. 15. The text was taken from the Spanish

version: Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano, Editora Nacional, Madrid 1980, vol I, pp. 209-210.

We shall now show how quantity is an intrinsic accident found in all natural

substances but not identified with the latter, and how its effect, or main manifestation, is

the extension which is related to the body dimensions.

17.1. Extension as the basic property of the natural substances

a) Substance, matter, quantity

Natural substances exist in material conditions. We have represented this «materiality»

through the classical concept of «proto-matter» which refers to the material conditions

in general.

Materiality is part of the essence of the natural substances, i.e. it is included in the basic

way of being of these substances.

Materiality refers to the conditions in space, conditions in time and their

combination in the movement. Materiality refers to them, though, in a general way: to

say that something is material means only that it exists in this type of conditions.

When we refer to these conditions in a concrete way we speak of extension,

magnitude, localization, duration, etc. It is easy to note that these concrete dimensions

can vary at least within certain limits, without any change in the essential way of being

of the substance. In order to represent these quantitative accidental dimensions in a

unitary way the concept of «quantity is used» and one speaks of the «quantity» of the

natural substances.

We now say that quantity is an accident of the natural substances and this

statement implicitly includes two more: quantity is a real way of being, and this way of

being is not identified with the way of being of the substances.

First, quantity is a real way of being. On the one hand, all natural substances

have space dimensions; if this were not so they would be reduced to a point without

extension: however, points without extension, such as those dealt with in mathematics,

only exist in our mind, they are never real entities. On the other hand, natural substances

also have time dimensions. Again, one can think of «instants» without duration.

However, even in this case, when we apply the concept of «instant» to becoming, we are

actually idealising a real duration. We can conclude that natural substances have real

space-time dimensions. However, when we speak of «quantity» we are actually

indicating the fact that substances have a way of being which includes this type of

dimensions: it is therefore a real way of being.

It may seem that this way of being is not only real but that it also belongs to the

essential aspect of the substances; after all, materiality is what is proper to the natural

substances. Nevertheless, we say that quantity is an accidental way of being. Actually,

we have already indicated that when we speak of quantity we refer to the concrete

material conditions of the substances, and that these dimensions can vary without a

change in the essential way of being: they are therefore found at the level of the

accidents.

It is necessary to add that, although quantity expresses an accidental way of

being, it is an accident which affects directly the way of being of the substances, and it

is always there in any material substance precisely because it refer to the concretion of

the materiality. In this sense it is usually said that quantity is an intrinsic accident unlike

other accidents (such as purely external relations, or localization respect to other

bodies). One may also add that it is an accident which derives from matter: we say this

in order to emphasise the fact that it refers to the material conditions of the substances.

It is usually said also that quantity is the first accident of the natural substances.

This primacy refers to the character of basic «substratum» which quantity has, and

signifies the fact that the other accidents affect the substance «through» the quantity. For

instance, colour, hardness, sight, or any other characteristic of the natural substances

exist in material conditions, affect extended parts, act through organs and processes

distended in space and time. In this way also the interpenetration between the

quantitative and the qualitative is emphasized.

b) Extension

According to the classic definition, that which is extended has parts outside one

another (in Latin, partes extra partes). It is easy to note that this definition is almost a

tautology, since the idea of parts mutually external explicitly states what is already

implied in the idea of extension. It is inevitable though that this be so; actually,

extension is a primary concept which can hardly be explained by more known concepts.

The idea of extension is related to sense experience, in particular to all that

which comes from sight, hearing and tact. We apply it above all to entities, but we

extend it also to all that, in the ordinary life, implies distances in space. In this more

ample sense it becomes more closely linked to the concept of space which we will

analyze later.

In this area almost all the philosophical discussions are focused on the concept of

space, while it does not seem possible to say much about the concept of extension. Yet,

we want to emphasise an aspect which is hardly mentioned in the discussions, and

which is very important, i.e. space structuring.

We have emphasised from the very beginning the fact that structuring is a basic

aspect of the natural entities and also that, although not everything is patterns, yet

everything in nature articulates around patterns. In relation to space, these patterns are

the configurations. These ideas play an important function for a faithful representation

of the natural. Actually, if we consider only extension in a general way we obtain an

undifferentiated image of nature which, on the contrary, has very specific ways of being,

and the latter appear mostly as space configurations. We shall now refer once again to

Descartes’ philosophy so as to appreciate the importance of this issue.

17.2. The Cartesian reductionism

Descartes reduced the material substance to extension since extension was, from

his perspective, the clear and distinct idea which we can have about the material

substance. Qualities, on the contrary, would be just effects produced in the knowing

subject as a consequence of the structure of his way of knowing; therefore qualities

would not really be objective in the same way quantity is, and the latter can be studied

by using mathematics.

We have already seen how the denial of the sense qualities accompanied the

birth of experimental science. Galileo denied the objective reality of the sense qualities

because they vary in the different subjects, because they are not necessary for a

mathematical study of nature, and because we can conceive the corporeal substance

without qualities, but not without figure and movement88

. For Descartes, the corporeal

substance is reduced to extension, any change is reduced to local movement, and the

only real properties of the bodies are the figures and the local movements which can all

be object of mathematical study89

.

Mechanism identified corporeal substance with extension. Consequently, nature

was reduced to the quantitative undifferentiated dimensions which had to do nothing

with the qualitative. This view led to the simple denial of qualities and their objectivity

which were reduced to alterations provoked in the knowing subject by a «qualitatively

neutral» nature. The mechanistic reduction provided the bases for the denial of any non-

quantitative dimension, and was presented as something supported by the mathematical

science of nature which, on the other hand, would be the only way to achieve an

authentic knowledge about nature.

On the contrary, we say that the reduction of the corporeal substance to

extension does not match either our experience or the progress of science. It is clear that

it does not match our experience since we know natural entities through their sense

qualities. In science we are aware that what is material adopts, at all levels of its

organization, very specific configurations; therefore this does not match the

«undifferentiated» image presented to us by the mechanism which corresponds to a

fairly poorly developed stage of physico-mathematics.

These considerations show that there is a close relationship between the

quantitative and the qualitative. They are equivalent to saying that real extension

articulates around specific patterns, and that a «homogeneous» or «undifferentiated»

extension actually corresponds to an idealization.

88

CF. GALILEO GALILEI, Il saggiatore, in: Opere, Ed. Barbera, Firenze 1899-1909, Vol. VI, pp. 347-348. 89

Cf. R. DESCARTES, Los principios de la filosofia, 2nd

part, No. 64 (in: Oeuvres, published by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery,

Vrin, Paris 1996, tome VIII-1, pp. 78-79); Meditationes de prima philosophia, med. 3, nn. 45-46 (ibid., vol. VII, pp. 43-44).

17.3. Characteristics of the extended entity

We shall now consider four characteristics related to extension: continuity, divisibility,

measurability and individuation.

a) Continuity

In studying the meaning of quantity90

, Aristotle says that what is quantitative is

divisible in integrating parts. One speaks of discrete quantity in relation to something

which is divisible into discontinuous parts; if it is finite, it is called number and, in this

case, one speaks of numerical quantity. One speaks of continuous quantity in relation to

something which is divisible into continuous parts; in this case one speaks of

dimensional quantity, because it refers to the extension of the bodies. The discrete

quantity originates the number, while the continuous quantity originates the line, the

surface, the volume, time and place; here we are in the presence of the so-called

magnitude which, in one dimension, is the longitude (line), in two dimensions, is the

latitude (surface) and in three dimensions, is the depth (body). In the case of the discrete

quantity, the parts are separated and they do not coincide in any common limit. In the

case of the continuous quantity, the parts coincide in a common limit: the parts of a line

coincide in a point, those of a surface in a line, the present time coincides in the past and

in the future.

In this perspective, extension refers to the continuous quantity. A substance has

unity, and everything which the substance is made of, constitutes a continuum.

However, the parts of a substance can be heterogeneous; think for instance of the

different tissues and organs of a living being. Nevertheless, this qualitative

heterogeneity present in the parts of a specific substance which form a substantial unity,

is not an obstacle for the case of a quantitative continuity since all the parts together

constitute the unitary way of being proper to the substance.

b) Divisibility

Since extension consists in having parts outside parts, it follows that anything

which is extended is also divisible. Actually, one cannot understand how it could be

possible to obtain non-extended parts by simple division, or how could there be a non-

extended material being.

We are obviously referring to divisibility «in principle». In practice, it is possible

to come across limits by which it becomes impossible to carry on with a dividing

process. Such practical limitations always exist although we may be able to obtain

smaller and smaller parts. It is also possible to come across some insuperable limits to

90

ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 6, 4 b 20 – 6 a 35; Metaphysica, V, 13, 1020 a 7-32.

physical divisibility; however, not even in this case one could claim the case for an

absolute indivisibility. What is material is extended and, as such, is always divisible in

principle even if in the case in which, due to physical conditions, it is not possible to

continue with the process of division.

A classical objection to the above is the following: if what is extended can be

indefinitely divided, this would mean, then, that it is made of an infinite number of parts

each of which would also have infinite extension. The statement, however, entails

contradiction. This apparent paradox is usually presented as the divisibility of the

continuum. The answer to it is also classical and consists in distinguishing «potential

divisibility» which can always go on indefinitely, and «actual division» which would

always provide a finite number of parts. We shall never reach parts which, in principle,

are indivisible so that it will always be possible to keep on dividing without ever

obtaining, at any moment, an infinite number of parts in act.

c) Measurability

What is quantitative is also extended, it has parts and, consequently, it can be

divided and also measured. Divisibility implies measurability.

Before measuring anything a unit of measure has to be established which is

taken as standard. After this, one needs to check how many times this unit is contained

in that which one wants to measure. This can always be done in principle when things to

be measured are extended.

The problem arises when one wants to measure something which, as such, is

neither quantitative nor extended. This is the case of the spiritual realities but also of

material qualities. Nevertheless, insofar as the spiritual and the qualitative can be related

to the material, they can become object of indirect measurements: what is properly

measured is the quantitative; however this measurement can provide information,

although indirectly, about those qualitative aspects associated with the quantitative.

Actually, what gave a boost to the systematic birth of the experimental sciences

in the 17th

century was also the progress in the indirect measurement of qualities during

many centuries.

d) Individuation

Any quantified reality is also automatically individuated because is extended,

and has individual parts one outside the other: this aspect is related to quantity.

The individuation of material entities depends on materiality and quantity. With

a classical expression it can be said that the principle of individuation of material entities

is matter marked by quantity (materia quantitate signata). This means that even

supposing, in a hypothetical way, that two material entities have a completely identical

way of being, they will nevertheless be different because this way of being is present in

two numerically different individuals: each of them has its own individual space-time

conditions, its own quantity.

18. PLURALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

We have already mentioned the Aristotelian distinction between discrete and

continuous quantity; the latter coincides with the dimensional quantity and refers to the

extension of the bodies which has been the main object of our reflections in the previous

section. Let us now examine the discrete quantity which we speak of in relation to

something divisible into discontinuous parts which originates the number and the

numerical quantity if this something is finite.

18.1. Unity and multiplicity

We refer to numerical or discrete quantity (here «discrete» means «separated»)

whenever we use numbers to indicate material units: for instance, when we speak of two

trees or three atoms, etc.

«Plurality» is opposed to «unity», because numerical plurality refers to a specific

number of beings and not to one. Certainly each one of these beings has a specific unity;

actually, if we can speak of two trees, this is so because both are individuals, because

each one of them is «one» three. No plurality of beings could exist unless each of the

individuals of that plurality had its own unity.

In the previous reflection we have used the term «unity» with two distinct,

though related, meanings which are usually called transcendental and predicamental

unity.

Transcendental unity refers to the unitary character of a being, to its internal

unity by which it is precisely «one» being; it is called so in metaphysics because it is

attributed to any being which really is «one» being whether material or spiritual. It is

«transcendental» since it is a concept that applies to any being and transcends the

distinction among beings. For this reason it is an object proper to metaphysics where it

is studied as one of the transcendental properties of being.

Predicamental unity is the dimensional unity which the material beings, the

substance and the unitary systems have. Each substance has its own extension which is

the predicate «quantity»; a substance has an extension which is separated from the

extension of other substances.

As it is evident, both meanings are related to each other. Aquinas, while

commenting on Aristotle, points out that the notion of unity is analogical since it is said

with partially identical and partially different meanings. Transcendental unity is

applicable to all unitary beings (and therefore also to the spiritual beings), while

predicamental unity is the principle of number in the material and quantitative field.

18.2. The number

The number is the measure of the discrete quantity (the Greek word for

«number» is «métron» which means «measure»). In order to measure a unit of

measurement is needed together with a multiplicity to which the unit is to be applied: a

number expresses how many times this unit is contained in the multiplicity which is to

be measured.

It is appropriate to ask whether the number can be used also to measure the

continuous quantity, i.e. the extension. It may seem appropriate to say ‘yes’; actually,

don’t we measure the length of lines? or the area of surfaces? or the magnitude of

volumes?

The fact is that in this case we reduce the continuous quantity to a discrete

quantity in order to measure it: we divide it into real or imaginary parts applying to them

a numerical procedure. It is because of this that the measure of the continuous is never

precise. On the contrary, when we measure a discrete quantity we just count beings

numerically different, and these can be counted exactly.

The number of things which are being counted is usually called numbered

number, while the abstract number which is used to count or to number is called

numbering number. Numbers are abstract because they do not refer to any concrete

entity; they are a procedure to count entities and maybe to measure continuous

quantities.

There are different types of numbering. The most basic one is that of the natural

numbers which are obtained by abstraction of the quantities of a group: for instance,

from the existence of three or five sheep the numbers «three» and «five» are obtained

which are used to count any type of being. Natural numbers constitute the basis for more

abstract mathematical abstractions.

Actually, mathematical constructions related to numbers have been expanded.

From the numbers more directly related to experience, such as digits and positive

fractions which refer to the number of things which exist (two, three, five) or to their

fractions, the number zero has appeared together with the negative numbers, the

irrational numbers (which cannot be expressed as digits or fractions of digits), the

complex numbers (which include a real part and an imaginary part, or «i» which is the

square root of minus one) and other types of numbers whose definition and use are

objects of mathematics.

18.3. The quantitative infinite

One of the problems related to quantity that pops up is that of the infinite. What

we find in our ordinary experience are finite quantities; however, nothing prevents us

from thinking a limitless type of quantity in the area of the continuous as well as in the

one of the discrete quantity.

Infinite can be conceived as actual or as potential. The actual infinite refers to an

infinite quantity which exists in act. The potential infinite refers to an indefinite

quantitative succession in which each of its parts is finite but with the possibility of

going on with the succession indefinitely.

There is no doubt hat there is a potential infinite: this is shown by the divisibility

of the continuous quantity. As we have already seen, in dividing an extended body we

shall always obtain extended parts and this operation can be repeated, in principle,

indefinitely, since anything which is extended can be further divided (we leave aside the

issue of the physical possibility of carrying out such divisions). This does not mean that

extended bodies have an infinite number of parts; they can be divided indefinitely but

we shall always obtain a finite number of parts.

The existence of the actual infinite has been an object of discussion from ancient

times especially in relation to extension and duration of the universe. The ancient

worldview used to represent the universe as finite; it was also thought that the fact of

having limits was a quality of the perfect physical realities. Modern experimental

science has introduced a worldview which presents the universe as infinite in extension.

Presently, the relativity theory proposes the image of a finite universe although

unlimited in extension. The scientific cosmology is also in favour of a universe which

was formed in an initial instant; however, there are discussions about the possibility of a

universe with limited duration although without boundaries in time. Truly there are

many attempts being made at completing the image of «our» universe with the possible

existence of «other» universes and in this way the problem of finiteness or infinitude

reappears time and again whether it is related to space or to time.

Such problems present great difficulties which perhaps the human mind is

unable to tackle. However, what is most important from a philosophical perspective is

the fact that the quantitative finiteness or infinity of the universe is not very important

for establishing the ultimate foundation of the universe. Actually, even though the

universe were really infinite either in relation to space or to time, this would not change

the fact that it is not self-sufficient: self-sufficiency is not a matter of magnitude but of a

distinct order of perfection. This was clearly pointed out by Aquinas when he wrote:

“Had God created a corporeal being infinite in act which would then have infinite

dimensional quantity, it would still be a nature necessarily determined in its species and

therefore limited precisely because being a natural thing; consequently, it would not be

the same as God, whose being and essence are infinite in all senses”91

. For this reason

Aquinas always claimed that a universe which had an eternal duration would still be

created by God although, by Revelation, a Christian knows that the universe had a

beginning.

91

AQUINAS, Quodl., IX, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

The infinite has an important place in mathematics where one finds a number of

theories which distinguish different types of infinity. However, when mathematics is

applied to physics, physicists have to recur to tricks in order to eliminate infinite

quantities when these appear in the results.

19. QUANTIFICATION IN SCIENCE

Experimental sciences lean in a special way on the quantitative dimensions of

nature: they make recourse to mathematics for the elaboration of their theories, and

make use of experiments which include measurements, in order to verify the validity of

the theories. We shall examine the main characteristics of this method and its validity.

19.1. Mathematics, experiments, measurement

In order to carry out a scientific experiment the system under investigation needs to be

isolated in such a way that it becomes possible to ignore any non-controlled interference

and so to observe what happens in well-controlled and repeatable conditions.

In most cases one of the most important aspects of the experiment is measuring.

In a typical experiment the intention is to determine how a variable of the system

changes when other variables change; for instance, to determine how temperature

changes when the values of pressure and volume change. Even in a simple situation, the

fact of observing something usually goes together with the determination of numerical

values, at least in those most developed branches of science.

Measuring requires the adoption of units, the establishment of rules to interpret

the results provided by the instruments and the planning of those instruments to be used

for measuring. All this demands the use of mathematics, and not in any way: it is

necessary to establish stipulations or conventions by which theoretical concepts and

rules used in practice may be formulated.

To be more specific, we are going to see what the physico-mathematical

magnitudes are and how they are used. To simplify it, we shall speak of physico-

mathematical magnitudes; however, the following reflections are valid for all those

magnitudes which are used in the experimental sciences. Therefore, they are valid not

only for physics, but also for chemistry, biology, etc.

19.2. The physico-mathematical magnitudes

A scientist asks questions to nature, but nature does not speak. It is therefore

necessary to set up a language for this purpose so that nature may answer with its own

language: with facts. The scientific language which allows us to dialogue with nature

leans on concepts which, together with their theoretical aspect, make reference to the

results of the experiments. These concepts are the so-called magnitudes.

Usually three great types of scientific concepts are distinguished: the

classificatory, the comparative and the quantitative. Through classificatory concepts,

such as cells, amino-acids, ions, potassium, etc., we divide systems and properties into

classes according to specific characteristics. Through comparative concepts we establish

an order; for instance by comparing masses with the aid of a scale we establish criteria

in order to determine when a system has a mass greater than another. By fixing scales

and units of measurement, we obtain quantitative and metric concepts, also called

magnitudes: these are defined in relation to mathematical theories and repeatable

experiments. For instance, in the case of mass one has to specify that this is a scalar and

additive magnitude (mathematical aspects), and has to specify the method of its

measurement (experimental aspect). In this way the concept of mass ceases to be an

intuitive concept and becomes a theoretical construction which can be used to define,

whenever possible, the above mentioned aspects. Concretely, we can not only speak of a

mass of the ordinary bodies, from which the intuitive concept of mass originated, but

also of a mass of ions and, in general, of the subatomic particles which are entities very

much removed from ordinary experience.

The sequence “classificatory-comparative-quantitative” does not mean that

classificatory concepts are just a first step towards the facilitation of the construction of

magnitudes. Actually, many classificatory concepts (such as the already mentioned

cells, amino-acids, etc.) are not taken from ordinary experience; they are constructed by

using the theoretical and experimental results of different disciplines, and are the

consequence of a type of work in which quantitative concepts come in. Consequently,

different definitions of potassium can be given in function of physical and chemical

properties which, in their turn, are defined in function of a knowledge which is in a

continuous state of progress. Some definitions look quite clear respect to a specific level

of problems, while at the level of basic investigation there are problems which are not

yet solved.

It is reasonable, at this stage, to ask a question: are the concepts of the

experimental sciences univocally defined in such a way that the different possible

definitions correspond ultimately to one which contains all of them? The answer

requires some detailed analysis. Actually, any discipline in its beginnings formulates

definitions which are not very precise: these become more accurate as the discipline

progresses and develops. A typical example which may illustrate this is the concept of

acid, one of the most important concepts in chemistry as well as in biology. Robert

Boyle was the first to give a definition in 1663 by making use of empirical data. Svante

Arrhenius, in 1884, proposed the first conceptual definition. J.N. Brönsted and T.M.

Lowry, in 1923, defined an acid as a molecule or an ion which can donate protons; this

concept includes the acids as defined by Arrhenius, but also cations and anions, and

characterises acids in terms of their behaviour in the chemical reactions. In that same

year, G.N. Lewis defined an acid as any substance which contains an ion, or a molecule

capable of accepting any couple of external electrons donated by a base; at the same

time, a base was defined as any substance which contains an ion, or a molecule, in

which there are a couple of external electrons which can establish a covalent bond with

another ion, or molecule. Lewis’ definition is the most general one; moreover, it

includes some acid-base processes which do not fit in the previous definitions. Each of

the above mentioned definitions is interesting from the point of view of the problems

which are intended to be resolved. This situation shows the fact that a number of

different definitions of the same term (acid, in this case) can co-exist. Different terms

could be used for each definition; however, this could create more inconveniences than

advantages for the scientific activity.

What is really important here is to understand that each concept has a meaning

which encompasses the notes which are attributed to it and a reference which indicates

what type of entities are represented in the concept. As it was shown in the concept of

acid, the same scientific term can have various meanings which coincide only partially,

and also a number of references which hardly coincide. This, though, is not a problem

for science, as long as the distinct meanings and references are delimited in an adequate

way, and as long as the way of applying each concept in the different situations is

established.

As the basic concepts of a discipline are being deeply investigated problems

become more acute owing to the fact that there are limits to the possibility of

formulating definitions at theoretical as well as experimental level. In order to define a

concept other concepts need to be used and so on and so forts until one should reach

first concepts which define themselves. These first concepts, one may say, could be

reached through experiments. Limits, though, exist also at this level since any

experiment requires certain assumptions. One then may have the impression of having

reached a road without exit so that it seems impossible to define basic scientific

concepts in a rigorous way and, therefore, also those which can be derived from them. Is

this really so?

This appears to be so from a purely logical perspective. If we try to establish the

experimental science on firm grounds, in which the simple fundamental concepts are

simple products of pure facts and of logical inferences, we actually face impassable

limits. The consequence of this is greatly important, i.e. the founding of the experimental

science necessarily entails agreements, conventions and stipulations. However, those

stipulations which are necessary for the establishment of scientific concepts are not

arbitrary.

The construction of scientific concepts requires interpretations; it does not come

as a simple result of applying formal logic to pure facts. Let us now examine in which

measure this fact affects the conclusions of the experimental sciences.

19.3. Achievements of the physico-mathematical method

We have already emphasised the fact that the construction of scientific

magnitudes requires a good dose of interpretation. Interpretation, though, does not mean

arbitrariness: the stipulations which are adopted, must lead to coherent theories and to

experimental results compatible with the data obtained from the experiment.

The necessity of making use of stipulations does not prevent the achievement of

highly rigorous demonstrations. If we limit ourselves to purely logical considerations we

could conclude that experimental science does not achieve certitude in knowledge;

actually, this slightly relativist interpretation is widely spread in the present-day

epistemology. However, it is possible to avoid this relativism if we understand that there

are criteria used by scientists, many times in an implicit way, and that these criteria

sufficiently guarantee the validity of the results obtained.

These criteria can be reduced, in the last analysis, to the following five ones

commonly used in scientific practice: the explanatory capacity, the predictive capacity,

the precision of explanations and predictions, the variety of independent proofs and the

mutual support among different theories. Though they do not guarantee the truthfulness

of the scientific constructions in all their aspects, yet it is very difficult for a false

construction to satisfy them. Their application leads to scientific constructions which

although approximate and perfectible nevertheless get progressively closer to truth.

In order to correctly interpret this approximation to truth it is necessary to keep

in mind that a scientific truth is always contextual and, therefore, partial. Actually,

although they correspond to reality our theories are not a simple copy of the reality: they

are expressed through concepts which are our own constructions. Consequently, in order

to assess the validity of a theory, it is necessary to take into account the conceptual

context in which it was formulated. Taking into account these precautions, we can state

that through experimental science we can achieve authentic truth, i.e. knowledge which

corresponds to reality.

It is not appropriate, though, to say that experimental sciences allow us know

only the quantitative aspects - and therefore accidental - of nature. There is no doubt that

they use quantitative methods whenever possible; however, we have already seen how

accidents lead us to the knowledge of substances. Actually, through quantitative

methods we have already come to know many aspects of the reality which, otherwise,

we would have never known, such as:

- the movement of the earth around the sun, a fact which implied a radical

change in the worldview and its philosophical implications;

- the nature of the stars which in ancient times were considered to belong to an

independent world identified many times with the divine one;

- the fundamental mechanisms of life which unfolds thanks to a genetic

programme. This has made it possible to dispel many misunderstandings

about similarities and differences between the living and the non living;

- the fundamental components of matter and the basic interactions;

- and many other aspects of nature which can hardly be considered as merely

accidental.

20. PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

Using the number and the dimensional quantity as starting points, arithmetic and

geometry are respectively constructed: it is here where we try to obtain new knowledge

through logical demonstrations. Other branches of mathematics have been developed

since ancient times and they continue being developed at present.

20.1. Interpretations of the nature and purpose of mathematics

The Pythagoreans in ancient Greece perceived that nature has important aspects which

can be represented mathematically; consequently, they attributed to the number and to

mathematics an essential role in the explanation of the reality. This was also the line

somehow followed by the Platonists, who considered mathematical objects as existing in

an ideal world which is participated by the sensible world. According to Aristotle,

mathematics is the abstract study of quantity which, though existing in the physical

world is nevertheless considered by the mind outside the sensible matter.

The pioneers of modern science in the 17th

century attributed a decisive

importance to mathematics. We have already seen how Descartes identified the material

substance with extension, and how this allowed him to justify the irreplaceable role of

geometry in the study of nature. Galileo claimed that nature is like a book written in a

mathematical language. After the consolidation of the experimental science in those

years mathematics kept developing, while at the same time new philosophical

interpretations were being proposed under the influence of rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism reached the point, in some cases, of attributing to mathematics an a priori

character independent from any experience, while empiricism was stressing the

dependence of mathematics on experience.

In the second half of the 19th

century some important innovations led to

reconsidering the fundamental concepts of physics as well as of mathematics. In

physics, the conviction had found its way that Newton’s physics had a definitive

character and that further progress could only add new elements to an already built

construction. New approaches were soon to undermine these ideas and prepared the

ground for the relativity theory and quantum physics which, at the beginning of the 20th

century, caused a radical change in the way of assessing the physical theories. In

mathematics, the validity of the Euclidean geometry had been admitted since ancient

times and was considered to be the geometry proper to the real world. However, it was

shown that it was possible to construct non-Euclidean geometries logically consistent

and perfectly applicable to the new theories of physics.

This renewal of mathematics, together with the development of symbolic logic,

led to new ideas in the philosophy of mathematics in which not only philosophers but

also mathematicians take their stand. Logicism tried to reduce mathematics to merely

logical principles, and so identifying somehow mathematics with logic. Formalism

stressed the importance of axiomatization, in trying to establish self-founding principles

of mathematics without need of referring to any external intuitive principles. The

famous works of Kurt Gödel around 1931 showed the limits met with every time there is

an attempt of formulating mathematical systems in a totally self-sufficient way, even in

those cases related to simple branches of mathematics. Intuitionism rejected the

Platonism of the logicist: it denied the possibility for mathematical entities to have their

own ideal existence, and stressed the fact that they are the result of our mental

constructions. Because of this, they were also at loggerhead with the formalists:

ultimately, it seems that it would be necessary to turn to certain primitive intuitions.

The above mentioned schools of thought have produced others with blended

ideas and clarifications among their defenders. In general, it is now commonly accepted

that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic; it seems also incorrect to state that

mathematics consists of a set of merely conventional constructions.

There is no doubt that mathematics is man’s construction. Some of its most

elementary notions are closely related to experience such as the positive digits and

fractions. However, insofar as we introduce an abstract mathematical notation and go on

to define operations which are not immediately related to experience, we create a world

which has its own consistency. Actually, once we have defined a specific mathematical

system we can discover many properties and conclusions which appear as they were

expected to be discovered, because they are the consequence of the system we have

constructed. It happens sometimes that conclusions are discovered whose validity is

very clear and yet do not seem to have a known basis: there is no doubt that

mathematical systems have somehow their own life.

20.2. Mathematical constructions and reality

The fact that mathematics has its own life makes it a very interesting subject. Since

ancient times until our own days mathematics was cultivated without looking in it for

something alien to its proper objectives. However, mathematics is applied with success

to the study of nature, and this confers to it a supplementary kind of value.

If we think of mathematical operations which are reduced to more or less intuitive

calculations, one can easily realize how these operations can be applied to the resolution

of practical problems. However, a certain aura of mystery seems to surround the use of

abstract mathematical theories in order to solve problems which are also quite

sophisticated. Can one say that there is isomorphism between mathematics and nature?

Nowadays it does not seem necessary to state, as Galileo did, that nature is like a book

written in a mathematical language, and that it is necessary to use this language in order

to penetrate its secrets. Actually, mathematics has acquired a greater scope since

Galileo’s times; many theories which are hardly intuitive are applied successfully to the

study of nature and it is not possible to establish a clear correspondence between them

and the reality.

It is certain that mathematics is an extraordinarily effective instrument for the study of

nature; however, to explain this success it is not necessary to claim the existence of an

isomorphism between mathematics and nature. The explanation is much simpler.

Mathematics is a powerful instrument to define magnitudes whose values can be

measured experimentally, to relate magnitudes among themselves, and to carry out

logical operations which can relate enunciations to one another. Once we have at our

service mathematical theories which allow us to do all this, the applicability of

mathematics to reality stops being a mystery.

What is really mysterious in the use of mathematics in science is the fact that, at times,

the physico-mathematical theories lead to predictions of effects whose existence would

have never been foreseen in any way, and which are nevertheless a logical consequence

of the theory that can be very easily verified. These types of forecasts are usually

considered, and with reason, one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the

validity of the theory.

When mathematics is applied to science, those aspects which are important for the

mathematician are usually left out since they would be a hindrance for those who work

in the experimental science. Frequently, pure mathematics is quite complex to be

applied as such to real problems and therefore needs to be simplified. A special ability is

required to be able to apply mathematical concepts to empirical problems; part of this

ability consists in simplifying mathematics so that, by preserving its scientific rigor, it

can be handled as a useful instrument.

This is a well know situation. For instance, in the second half of the 19th

century, John

William Strutt (Lord Rayleigh) excelled in his mathematical treatise on problems related

to dynamics, acoustics, optics and electricity. He got a degree in mathematics which he

considered only as an auxiliary tool to set the problems from a physical point of view,

and he explained this aspect in the following way: "While carrying on with

mathematical investigations I used to make use of the methods which are naturally

offered to a physicist. The mathematician will complain, and at times (one has to

acknowledge it) rightly so, because of lack of rigor. However, this issue has two sides:

although it maybe important to preserve a uniformly high level of pure mathematics, the

physicist may find it convenient sometimes to be satisfied with arguments which are

well satisfactory and conclusive from his point of view. To his mentality trained in a

different order of ideas, the more rigorous proceeding of a pure mathematician may

appear not more but less demonstrative”92

. R.B. Lindsay commented in this respect that

the mathematical education which Lord Rayleigh received in Cambridge “was not, in a

pure sense, rigorous mathematics, but a vigorous one”93

.

The recourse to mathematics as such has often the form of a very important strategy. For

instance, in fundamental physics which investigates the basic structure of matter,

symmetries are very important; these, at the same time, refer to physical phenomena and

receive a mathematical treatment full of subtleties in which a prominent place is

occupied by the gauge, or capacity, theories. In this way, an important role is played by

the invariances preserved in passing from a global symmetry to a local one by

introducing new fields: this mathematical operation can be physically interpreted. Such

92

Lord RAYLEIGH, The Theory of Sound, Dover, New York 1945, preface. The quotation is found in: John N. HOWARD,

“Principale contributions cientificas de John William Strutt, third baron of Rayleigh”, in: Rutherford ARIS, Howard T.

DAVIS and Roger H. STUEWER (publishers), Resortes de la creatividad cientifica: ensayo sobre fundadores de la ciencia

moderna, Fondo de cultura económica, Mexico 1989, p. 154. 93

Ibid. The phrase is taken from the introduction of Lindsay to the work of Rayleigh, quoted in the previous note. The

humorous character of this appreciation is emphasized, owing to the similarity between rigorous and vigorous.

strategies imply the adoption of a whole set of stipulations, but at the same time appear

to be very fertile. Something similar happens with the re-normalization which is a

procedure used in order to eliminate infinite quantities that appear in certain field

theories. The use of this procedure in the 40's’ made it possible to adjust the theoretical

values of certain magnitudes, such as the magnetic moment of the electron, to the

observed values with a level of precision never achieved in the history of physics.

If on the one hand such strategies appear to pose limits to objectivity because of the

conventional aspects they entail, on the other hand permit to study phenomena which are

very far from ordinary experience through inter-subjective procedures. What appears at

a first glance to limit objectivity is, in another sense, its guarantee. In other words, it is

precisely because of the use of theoretical constructions of high level, with all that is

conventionally implied in it, that it is possible to formulate theories with a high degree

of inter-subjectivity. When mathematics is applied to physical problems, some of the

mathematical rigor can be lost, yet this is not an obstacle to inter-subjectivity and to

achieving truth.

Although mathematics is not a simple translation of the reality it is nevertheless a

powerful instrument to study anything which can be related to the quantitative aspects

and, as such, is an essential part of the experimental sciences.

VII. SPACE AND TIME

We have proposed a characterization of the natural in terms of its own mutually

intertwined dynamism and space-time structuring. We shall now continue with our

consideration of the quantitative dimensions by examining other dimensions which are

related to space and others which are related to time. We shall finally consider the close

relationship existing between space and time.

21. LOCALIZATION AND SPACE

The two basic space characteristics are extension which refers to the internal

aspect of the natural entities, and localization which refers to the relationship of natural

entities among themselves. We have already studied extension and the characteristics

related to it. We shall now examine localization and also the concept of space which is

an abstract concept closely related to extension and localization.

21.1 Local presence

Localization, or allocation of a «place», involves always relation of bodies with

other bodies since «where» a body is depends on its relations with the surrounding

bodies. Nor is this localization always easy in ordinary experience; actually, we learn

how to localise bodies through a variety experiences which have a very limited value.

For example, we easily make important mistakes when we try to localise far distant

objects. Science provides procedures to establish reliable localisations in many cases in

which it is difficult, if not impossible, to do so through ordinary knowledge.

Localisation however refers always to some frame of reference. It seems logical,

therefore, to state – as it has always been traditionally done - that the accident «where»

(in Latin ubi, from which the Spanish «ubicación», or the Italian «ubicazione» for

English «localisation») is an extrinsic accident.

a) Aristotelian notion of localisation

Aristotle claimed in his worldview, according to which the earth stood still in the centre

of the universe, that the four elements (fire, air, water and earth) tend towards their

«natural places» by their own very nature. The natural region of fire is the superior part

of the sub-lunar world which borders with the stars; that of the air is the intermediate

region between the previous one and the earth; that of the water is on the surface of the

earth; that of the element «earth» is found in the centre of the earth. Each element tends

to move towards its natural place and the sub-lunar bodies, made of the four elements,

move towards one or the other places according to their composition. On the other hand,

it was commonly thought that the celestial bodies were made of a matter different from

the four elements (the so-called «quintessence»), and that they had a greater perfection

since they participated somehow in the divine. It was thought that they could not be

generated, were incorruptible and would move perpetually in a circular manner within

their own spheres; these were concentric, with the earth in the centre so that the last

sphere would be the one containing the «fixed stars». Although stars move at a great

speed, they are so far away from the earth that changes in their relative position can be

perceived only after centuries: that is why they seem to be always in the same position

on a sphere which rotates around the earth. In reality, this appearance is due to the

rotation of the earth around itself every 24 hours.

This worldview has been very influential for two thousand years; it was heavily

criticised and made obsolete by the new science of the 17th

century. From then on, the

concept of «natural place», and of «place» in general, lost philosophical interest. In

science, of course, it is very important to determine the localization of bodies; however,

it is a problem which has to be tackled with conceptual and experimental instruments

which are proper to science. What is important from the point of view of science is not

to establish an «absolute» localization but one in relation to systems of reference.

Nevertheless, the Aristotelian idea of localization corresponds to ordinary

experience and expresses a real characteristic of the natural entities. Actually, to find

oneself in a specific place is something accidental, nevertheless real. It is not the same

thing to be in one place or in another one. Even from a purely practical point of view,

localization can have very important consequences.

It is not necessary to admit the Aristotelian worldview in order to perceive that

localization is something real and that Aristotle’s idea of «place» preserves its interest

even when we disregard his four elements and their natural places.

Aristotle defined place as the still surface of the body container immediately

contiguous to the localized body94

. This concept preserves its validity, as long as one

takes into account that this definition does not presume to be in line with the scientific

ones, and that the stillness mentioned here is always a relative one. It is an idea very

close to ordinary experience. And so, a fish in water is said to remain in the same place

if it does not move, although the water which surrounds it actually moves. It is obvious

that some point of reference is always assumed for instance a rock, or the coast and the

sea bottom in the case of the fish. Therefore, the stillness of the surrounding surface is

not absolute. Without doubt, the Aristotelian definition would have great importance if

the Aristotelian worldview were true; since it is not, its importance is minor. However,

in the measure in which «localization» is real, the concept of «place» also has a certain

reality.

b) Localization as an accidental way of being

When we attribute a localization to bodies we refer to something real although

accidental. We can say that the allocation of a place, i.e. of what is traditionally called

94

Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, IV, 4, 212 a 20.

«accident ubi» (or «where»), refers to a real, accidental and extrinsic way of being

which consists in a real determination of a body in relation to the dimensions of other

bodies.

It is something real because localization presupposes the fact that a body is in

contact with the dimensions of other bodies. If one accepts the fact that the change of

place, local movement or displacement is something real, one has to accept also the fact

that localization is a reality without which it would be senseless to speak of change of

place.

It is an accidental way of being because it does not affect the essential way of

being of a substance. Of course, the fact of occupying a certain place can have important

consequences and can also be the cause of a substantial change; however, this can occur

in particular circumstances.

Besides being real and accidental, «ubi» is an extrinsic way of being, because it

is predicated of a body in relation to other bodies. What is extrinsic to a substance is the

fact of having dimensions. The fact that these dimensions are in contact with the

concrete dimensions of other bodies is something extrinsic which does not affect, by

itself, the internal constitution of a substance.

Anyhow, localization in general is a way of being proper to all material

substances. The natural exists in material conditions and one of them, and a very

important one, is the circumscribed presence in a place. By its own very nature the

natural occupies some place.

Localization is closely related to quantity and somehow can be considered as a

consequence of the latter. Nevertheless, since quantity is an intrinsic accident, it seems

more appropriate to consider localization as an accident distinct from quantity.

b) Ways of non-localized presence

Besides the circumscribed localization, i.e. the occupying of a place in relation to

the dimensions of other bodies, there are other ways of being present: some refer to the

material substances and are related to local presence; others refer to spiritual creatures

and to the presence of God in the created world. Although the study of the latter is

proper to metaphysics, we shall also mention them because their consideration helps us

obtain a more complete view of the issues we are studying95

.

In the first place, something can be present in some other thing as the

quantitative part in the whole of which it is a part: and so, the heart is contained in the

body of a man or of an animal. Obviously, this is the case of a circumscribed

localization which, moreover, refers to a superior unity that contains different parts

related among them. This is very important when one considers space-time structuring

proper to the natural. Actually, nature is organized around specific patterns, and this

95

AQUINAS treats this issue in his commentary to the Physica of Aristotle: cf. In Phys., IV, lecture 4.

implies the existence of equally specific relations among the positions which the

different parts occupy in the whole.

In a second place, something can be present in something else as an act in its

subject. For example, an accident can be said to be present in a substance in this way,

actualizing the latter in a real although not essential way. This type of presence is, by

itself, not local or circumscribed. It can also be said along this line that the substance is

in each of the parts of the body, while it is not localized in any of them concretely. In

speaking of the human soul, one can say that it is whole in the whole body and whole in

any of its parts. Therefore, it is senseless to look for a physical point in which body and

soul are united; this point, or place, does not exist since the soul, as the substantial form

of the body, informs the whole body and each one of its parts. This way of being present

is called, with a classical terminology, presence after the manner of the substance (per

modum substantiae) which indicates precisely that it is in this way that the substance is

present in all of its physical dimensions. Although it is not a kind of circumscribed

presence, it is said to be accidentally circumscribed, because it refers to a localized

body. It is therefore possible to say that the soul is present in the dimensions by which a

body is circumscribed, and that it «moves» when the body moves.

These ideas are applicable in the field of theology when the real presence of

Christ is considered in the Eucharist. Christ is present in the Eucharist with his divinity

as well as with his humanity and, therefore, with his extensive quantity. However, this

presence is not localized in a circumscribed manner: in a miraculous way the

dimensions of Christ’s body do not establish contact with the dimensions of the

surrounding bodies, and the presence of Christ is realized, in this case, after the manner

of the substance. This allows us to understand somehow how Christ can be present in a

real way, but not in a circumscribed way, in many different places under the sacramental

species, and that he is present in each part of the sacramental species when these are

divided.

In a third place, something can be present as an individual which forms part of

an orderly whole. In the case of material substances, this type of presence is closely

related to the first case already considered, and to the existence of structures and space-

related patterns. However, here we consider complete individuals and not only parts of

them; moreover, this type of presence can be applied to spiritual substances.

In a fourth place, something can be present in all that falls under its power. It

can be said that someone with authority is present somehow in that which falls under his

authority. For instance, the legislative authority is present in all that is regulated by the

laws which it enacts in the measure in which these laws make possible, or promote, the

existence of specific situations. Since the whole creation depends on God, author of the

being of all that exists, God is present in the whole of creation. This presence includes

the founding action by which God gives being to everything, as well as the providence,

or care, of all the beings in accordance with his plan.

In a fifth place, there is a presence based on causality by which the cause is

present in the effect it produces, and the effect is present somehow in its causes. And so,

the artist is present in his works of art, what is known is present in the knower, the

beloved is present in the lover and the other way around. Along this line, God is present

in the whole creation as its First Cause, i.e. as the author of being; it is the most intimate

type of presence since it extends to the whole being of all entities as cause of the same

being. For this reason, and taking into account the fact that the being of God is distinct

from the being of entities, it can be said that God is more intimate to each thing than the

latter is to itself.

Therefore, it can also be said that creatures are present in God, and the spiritual

ones in a very special way because of their close relation to God. Along this line, some

authors of our times defend a panentheism which does not have anything to do with

pantheism. Panentheism, as its name expresses it, (pan-en-theism) means that

everything is present in God. This is true and coincides with what St Paul stressed in his

discourse in Athens, provided the distinction between God and creatures is kept. On the

other hand, pantheism (pan-theism) means that somehow everything is God, or part of

God, or manifestation of the same God, and this is false and impossible. However, some

forms of pantheism do not seem to respect sufficiently the distinction between God and

creatures when, in order to explain the action of God in the world, present us with an

image of God which is confused. They speak for instance of a «bio-polar god» who,

without ceasing to be God, would be subject to change, suffering, etc. This type of

reasoning is found in some versions of the «process philosophy» and «process

theology».

In a sixth place, something is in the presence of someone when it is in his sight

or, in general, under his knowledge. Things or persons can be present to us in a specific

moment insofar as they fall under our knowledge. Even in this sense, used in ordinary

life, every created being falls under the knowledge of God, since He knows everything

perfectly well as the first cause of their being. We can also have this kind of presence of

God when we know we are seen, heard and lovely attended by Him96

.

d) The non-locality of contemporary physics

Presently, problems related to localization have reached their heyday because of

their connection with physics. Discussions about «locality» and «non-locality» in

quantum physics have scientific as well as philosophical repercussions: they are related

to the possibility of physical actions which propagate at a speed much faster than the

speed of light, and to the interpretation of quantum physics97

. The problem is to know,

in few words, up to which point and in what way events are connected which are

96

AQUINAS speaks, in this respect, of the omnipresence of the Creator in the universe by essence, by power and by

presence: cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, aa. 1, 3 and 4. 97

This is a very difficult and very discussed problem, on which there is no unanimous agreement among scientists. There is

an ample bibliography, and one can read for instance: M. REDHEAD, Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism, Oxford

University Press, Oxford 1987. Important repercussions, scientific as well as philosophical, are attributed to this problem in:

A. SUÁREZ, “Unentscheidbarkeit, Unbestimmtheit, Nicht-Lokalität. Gibt es unverfügbare Kausalverbindungen in der

physikalischen Wirklichkeit?”, in: H. REICHEL –E. PRAT (publishers), Naturwissenschaft und Weltbild. Mathematik und

Quantenphysik in unserem Denk- un Wertesystem, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1992, pp. 223-264.

apparently independent from one another. Some experiments seem to indicate that, in

some cases, there are correlations which do not correspond to intuitive ideas98

.

Although it is admitted that physics adopts a perspective different from

metaphysics and natural theology, some interpret the present-day results which refer to

the non-locality in quantum physics, as a bridge which could also shed new light on the

divine action in the world99

.

From a philosophical point of view, these are topics of debate. In any case, the

existence of such correlations seems to suggest new perspectives on the unity of nature

and on the structural connections among its components. Therefore, once again we come

across facts which are the opposite of an analytical mechanistic image.

21.2 Space

From the notion of extension of the bodies and of distance among them, we

construct a general notion of space which has been an object of several interpretations in

science as well as in philosophy. Let us consider first some interpretations of space

which have had great importance. We shall then determine what kind of reality

corresponds to space, and we shall finally examine the nature and meaning of the

mathematical spaces.

a) The notion of space

In the ancient worldview, where the universe was represented as a «locked» set

of beings

with some kind of fixed limits, the concept of space had little importance. What were

really important were the «places» that bodies occupied or tended to. However, when

physico-mathematics firmly established itself in the 17th

century the situation was turned

around: the universe was represented as contained in the homogeneous and infinite

space of the Newtonian physics and the problem of natural places stopped being

relevant.

On Newton’s authority, and on the basis of an experiment which he considered

conclusive (although it was not), the fact was commonly accepted that there was an

«absolute» space, with its own existence independent from its content. Within this

98

The most quoted experiment in this sense is the one carried out by Alain Aspect and his team in Paris, in 1982. It is a

version of the ideal experiment proposed by Einstein in 1935, in relation to the first discussions on the quantum theory, and

known as EPR experiment because of the initials of the authors of the article where it was proposed in 1935. A short and

popularized introduction to this issue is found in M. ARTIGAS, El hombre a la luz de la ciencia, Palabra, Madrid 1992, (

chapter “El microcosmo y el hombre”), pp. 47-70. 99

Cf. Alfred DRIESSEN and Antoine SUÁREZ (publishers), Mathematical Undecidability, Quantum Nonlocality and the

Question of the Existence of God. Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997.

context, the problem was presented of the possibility of the existence of an «absolute

movement» respect to this fixed point of reference. Absolute space was also identified

somehow with the divine immensity which would be a kind of divine sense («sensorium

Dei») which would perform the function of a bridge between the world and God. This

was one of the famous topics discussed in the famous correspondence Leibniz-Clarke in

which Leibniz criticized Newtonian doctrines and Clarke defended them100

.

Owing to the enormous success of the Newtonian physics, the idea of absolute

space was generally admitted in science during more than two centuries, and had

important philosophical repercussions. For instance, it had great influence in the

formulation of Kant’s philosophy. Kant perceived correctly that the absolute space could

not possibly have its own existence. However, convinced of the definitive truth of

Newton’s physics, Kant maintained that this space was one of the two «a priori» forms

of our sensitivity. According to this, our cognitive apparatus would be built in such a

way that the disorderly sensations captured by our senses would be integrated, in a

preliminary phase, by the two forms of space and time. Being «a priori» meant that their

validity did not derive from experience. Because of the influence of Kant, space was

thought to be a basic condition for our knowledge.

Towards the end of 19th

and beginning of 20th

century, serious doubts were

raised in the scientific circles about the absolute character of space (and time). The

experiment of Michelson-Morley, and the later formulation of the special relativity

theory by Albert Einstein in 1905, showed that the concept of absolute space was

inadequate. One of the consequences of the special relativity is that distances do not

have the same value when they are measured by observers who are in different systems

of reference. Moreover the concepts of space and time in relativity fuse somehow in a

space-time continuum. This new scientific situation provoked the rising of new

approaches which flowed also into the field of philosophy.

The situation got complicated once again when, in 1915, Einstein formulated the

general relativity theory. Actually, the general relativity has been interpreted as a

«geometrization of physics», because it replaces physical forces with changes in the

space-time curvature. It would seem, then, that the concept of space would not only

recover a scientific leading role but would also become the basic weave of nature.

However, one can see how it could be also possible to speak (and perhaps more

appropriately) of «physicalization of the space». Actually, the equivalence between

space-time curvature and forces shows how the space-time we are talking about is a way

of representing physical interactions.

The present-day theories on the origin of the universe are based on the general

relativity, and try to combine them with quantum physics (that is why they are called

theories of the «quantum gravity»). According to some hypotheses, space and time

would lose their intuitive meaning in the first instants of the universe: some speak of a

kind of original state of «quantum vacuum» (which is not «nothingness» but a physical

state). In this state there would have been some «topological transitions» in which for

the first time space-time structures would have been formed. It is from these structures

100

The five letters from Leibniz and the corresponding answers from Clarke can be found in: Eloy RADA (publisher), La

polémica Leibniz-Clarke, Taurus, Madrid 1980.

that matter would have originated. Such theories are very hypothetical and speculative

and it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to determine the meaning of a space-time

structure without any kind of matter, and how it could be possible for matter to arise

from structures of this kind.

b) The reality of space

In the ordinary experience the notion of space is used to designate relations of distance

among bodies. In this sense we speak of space covered by a moving body, and of space

which separates two bodies. These relations of distance are real. Bodies have extension

and therefore there are real distances among their parts and among different bodies.

If we consider the dimensions abstracting from the bodies we obtain purely

dimensional relations such as those which refer to lengths, surfaces and volumes, such

as for instance the distance between two points as a straight line, the volume of a body,

etc. These relations of distance are real; however, when considered in an abstract way,

disregarding the concrete matter, we obtain a notion of space which, although based on

reality, is an ideal concept with no direct correspondence to any natural entity.

Therefore, the concept of space arises from a broadening of the concepts of

extension and distance and properly speaking is an idealization; what exists in reality

are bodies with extension and interactions which extend up to certain distances. Through

the concept of space a kind of «container» is represented where these realities are found.

However, were this container to be a physical reality, it would also consist of bodies and

interactions, and therefore it would not be a container distinct from the latter. Hence,

space is not a physical reality independent from bodies and interactions; it is and

«ideal» entity, a «relation of reason» which exists only in our mind, though there is a

foundation in reality which allows us to construct such a concept. The foundation of the

concept of space is the real extension of the bodies and the relations of distance.

The so-called absolute space, independent from its physical content, would be a

kind of empty receptacle used to localize the bodies contained in it. This is the kind of

space presented by Newton: an empty, homogeneous and infinite space, place of the

whole corporeal universe and of each of its components. However, this kind of space

does not exist in reality; it is the result of a mental process which first abstracts the

dimensions and considers them without relation to the concrete material entities; then

constructs a notion in which these dimensions are considered as indefinitely extended.

Physics does not need this kind of space; it is sufficient for physics to define systems of

specific co-ordinates and use them as systems of reference. Moreover, there is no proof

whatsoever that can make us state its existence. From a philosophical point of view, this

space cannot be a substance since it is the container of all substances. It cannot be an

accident either; actually, space is conceived as independent from anything material. One

cannot say what kind of reality it is.

A space conceived as an a priori form of our knowledge – as Kant proposed it –

is also inexistent. Actually, space is not a notion independent from experience. It is, as

we have already indicated, a relation of reason with foundation in reality, i.e. the real

extension of the bodies and the relations of distance. Kant identified the content of the

notion of space with the space of the Euclidean geometry, endowed with the properties

attributed to it by Newton’s physics (of whose definitive truth he was convinced). The

further development of mathematics with non-Euclidean spaces, and of physics, where

these spaces have been applied, shows that Kant’s concept of space is not really a part,

or a consequence, or a demand of science.

The present-day speculations about space and time in the first instants of the

universe are, as we have already indicated, highly hypothetical. In any case, it seems

possible to make three observations. On the one hand, space, as well as time, depends on

the physical reality, it accompanies it as one of its aspects. Therefore, if the material

conditions at the beginning of the universe had been very different from the present

ones, this should have been reflected and observed in the space and time relations which

would have been different from those of our ordinary experience in our present-day

circumstances. However, and on the other hand, it does not make any sense to claim – as

it is done in some occasions – that in those conditions there could have been processes

such as time inversion (trips to the past or temporal anteriority of events known as

posterior). Finally, it does not make any sense to postulate the existence, at the

beginning, of a space-time without matter which would have come about from

nothingness as a result of a quantum process. Actually, apart from the lack of sense

implied in a creation without a Creator, it does not seem possible to attribute a character

of reality to a space-time without matter.

Space cannot be identified with a kind of ontological vacuum which, in

principle, would be nothing and could not exist as something real. The term «vacuum»

is used in experimental sciences to indicate a state in which there are hardly any

detectable properties. However, this does not exclude the existence of any material

property; on the contrary, the vacuum of science is defined in accordance with specific

properties; the term also includes different types of vacuum such as the «classic

vacuum» and the «quantum vacuum» which are studied with physical theories. The

existence of an empty space, in which there is absolutely nothing, does not make any

sense.

In conclusion, space is not a real entity: it is an entity of reason with foundation

in reality (the relations of distance which are found in reality) and does not have its own

reality.

c) The notion of space in science

Traditionally, that branch of mathematics which deals with space relations is called

«geometry». Geometrical entities, such as lines, surfaces and volumes, offer a wide

spectrum of relations which are studied in geometry. The Euclidean geometry,

rigorously formulated since ancient times, seems to describe in a special way the real

relations among the geometrical figures which exist in the physical world.

However, we have already mentioned the construction of non-Euclidean geometries

which took place in the 19th

century as an attempt to see what would happen if the fifth

postulate of the Euclidean geometry was denied. This postulate states that through a

point outside a straight line another, and only one, straight line can be drawn parallel to

the given line. It was proved that, by disregarding this postulate, different geometries

could be obtained as consistent as the Euclidean one. If for instance an infinite number

of parallel straight lines, or no straight line at all, are drawn through that point different

geometries are obtained in which the sum of the internal angles of a triangle becomes

less or more than 180o respectively.

Although these results appear to be anti-intuitive at first, it is easy to understand how

they can be fully coherent. It is sufficient to think of a curved type of geometry, for

example, a geometry in which the figures are found on the surface of a sphere. In this

case the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line but a specific curve,

and the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is greater than 180o.

This example makes us understand how it is not only possible to construct different

geometries, but also how these can incorporate, in different ways, properties of the real

world. For instance, a curved type of geometry, such as the one already mentioned, is

the geometry we need to apply on earth when we calculate long displacements along its

surface: the shortest trip from Paris to New York is not a straight line but a curved one,

and the triangles are also curved. This type of considerations became relevant when the

use of a non-Euclidean geometry in the relativity theory produced better results than the

ones obtainable with Euclidean geometry in classical physics. Moreover, it is easy to

perceive that in our ordinary experience we do not see objects as they are represented in

the Euclidean geometry, since our images depend on perspective and distances.

On the other hand, the concept of space has been generalized in mathematics in such a

way that it is applied also to constructions which do not refer to geometrical figures. For

instance, spaces of infinite dimensions are constructed, and quantum mechanics can be

formulated by using a kind of formalism which makes recourse to the «Hilbert’s space».

In these cases, the problem of establishing a correspondence between space and reality

does not even arise; such spaces are our constructions and usually very abstract ones

which, frequently, are good mathematical instruments for the study of those aspects of

nature which are very far from ordinary experience.

22. DURATION AND TIME

We have considered the space dimensions of the natural. Let us now examine the time

dimensions which also constitute an essential part of the way of being natural. Actually,

it is proper to natural entities to exist in time conditions: their being is not completely

realized in an instant, but successively.

Temporality is an accidental determination since a substance does not change its

essential way of being for the simple fact of being subjected to the passing of time.

However, it is a characteristic which deeply marks every natural entity and whose

analysis is indispensable in order to understand human life. In fact, our life is marked by

the combination of temporality which results from our belonging to nature, and

transcendence of the same temporality proper to the spiritual beings.

The two basic time-related characteristics are duration which refers to the

permanence in being of the entities as well as to the magnitude of the processes, and

temporal situation which expresses the time relations respect to some frame of

reference. We shall now consider these two characteristics together with the concept of

time which, like space in relation to extension and localization, is an abstract concept

constructed from the notions of duration and time relations.

22.1. Duration

Duration refers to temporal succession. The idea of temporal succession is based

on our immediate experience; it is a primary type of idea which cannot be explained by

having recourse to other more known ideas. The temporality of the material world,

including that of our own material being, appears immediately to our experience.

Our existence is not exhausted in one instant, it rather extends in a temporal

succession, and the same occurs with all natural entities. Duration is something real.

Moreover, duration refers to a temporal succession which has one direction only and is

determined: the present leaves behind the past which remains only in the memory and

through its consequences.

Experimental sciences find it useful to conceptualize time as a magnitude used

as a point of reference to construct other magnitudes. For example, velocity refers to a

distance covered within a certain time, and acceleration refers to the changes of velocity

in time. Many scientific enunciations express how other magnitudes change with the

passing of time. The experimental science was born in the 17th

century thanks, to a large

extent, to the fact of having found theoretical methods able to define velocities and

accelerations, and also thanks to the manufacturing of clocks able to measure time in a

reliable way. The great progress in the manufacturing of mechanical clocks from the

14th

century was one of the factors which made the further progress of science possible.

Experimental science has considered time as an «independent variable» from the

17th

to the 20th

century; time flows in a uniform manner without being affected by the

processes which unfold within it. Its direction is also indifferent: the equations of

classical physics are correct whether it is assumed that time flows from the past towards

the future or in the opposite direction. In this context, it is said that the processes

described by these equations are «reversible».

There is no doubt that such a perspective is legitimate and appears to be fruitful

when applying mathematics to the study of nature. However, real duration depends on

the physical conditions and has a direction which goes from the past to the future.

Scientific progress has highlighted the directionality of the real temporal succession,

showing that the reversibility of time is a theoretical artifice which does not reflect the

irreversibility of the real phenomena. This was already highlighted by the second

principle of thermodynamics and by the evolutionist theories of the 19th

century; it has

also been particularly emphasised in the 20th

century by scientific studies on the

irreversible processes.

In the field of philosophy, Bergson strongly emphasised the central role that real

duration plays in the representation and interpretation of nature. It is not necessary to

accept the whole philosophy of Bergson to see that he was right on this point. It is an

aspect which is acknowledged to be of great importance in the present-day worldview

and which, once again, shows the connection between the quantitative and the

qualitative. Actually, real duration cannot be reduced to a simple undifferentiated

quantitative succession; on the contrary, it presupposes physical activity, emerging of

new things, unrepeatable situations.

The intertwining between the temporal and the qualitative is shown in a typical

way in the existence of natural rhythms. Rhythms are temporal patterns, and are found

everywhere in nature, in a special way in living organisms: the processes which unfold

in the organisms depend essentially on rhythmic or periodical patterns. This means that

natural processes hinge around typical patterns. Once again, the scientific progress

shows the importance of the qualitative factors against the analytical perspective which

had reduced time to a mathematical, homogenous, undifferentiated and reversible

magnitude. However, through this perspective many particular pieces of knowledge

have been obtained. This has led, in the strictly scientific field, to a synthetic perspective

in which the qualitative characteristics of the real duration have been recovered.

22.2. Temporality, being and becoming

Temporality is a fundamental characteristic of the natural entities. Anything natural has

duration and it is found in association with processes. Let us now consider the

temporality proper to a natural being first in relation to the duration of other entities and

natural processes, and then in relation to the spiritual entities.

a) Temporal situation

One of the nine Aristotle’s accidents is quando (in English when) which refers to

the temporal situation. This category expresses the temporal way of being of the natural

entities, in relation to their being as well as to their operations. This accident makes

reference to the past, present and future. Everything which is said of the natural entities,

includes a temporal reference of this type.

Similarly to the ubi in the case of the space, quando is a relative determination

since it is possible to speak of it only respect to some reference. It is therefore an

extrinsic determination, since it does not express the proper way of being of the entities

to which it is applied. It is nevertheless a real characteristic because real are the

temporal relations which constitute its foundation.

The extrinsic and relative character of «quando», similarly to what happens with «ubi»,

is shown when considering the concrete temporal relations: we always place something

in time in relation to other processes or events. However, this fact does not diminish the

reality of the temporal situation; it simply shows that its concrete determination has to

be done in relation to what happens around.

If, moreover, we wish to measure a duration we need to define units of time and

determine how these units are used to carry out the measurement. Therefore, it is

necessary to introduce stipulations. However, the duration on which the measurement is

based, is something real, and the progress in the manufacturing of clocks and in

processes of measuring, make it possible to obtain extraordinarily accurate

measurements.

b) Levels of being and duration

In a strict sense, the accident «quando» is only found in the natural entities whose being

unfolds in a successive way through changes. However, in an analogical way it can be

applied to the created spiritual beings which also pass from potency to act according to

their peculiar way of being. On the other hand, it cannot be applied to God in any way

since He is Pure Act and does not have duration of any kind.

If we consider duration as permanence in being we can speak of degrees and ways of

duration which are correlative to the degrees and ways of possessing being.

The basic distinction is evidently in this respect that between God and the created

beings. God is his own Being and therefore is his own duration which is called eternity.

On the other hand, created beings are not their own being: they have a way of being

limited to a specific essence, and their potentialities unfold in a successive way. For this

reason they are always in potency under some aspects and different therefore from God

who possesses being totally and is the source of all being.

Eternity is proper to and exclusive of God and it is found at a level different from the

one of any created being. Even in supposing that there were a created being without

beginning or end not because of this it would be eternal. In having being in a limited and

not absolute way it would be always in potency respect to a possible change, and it

would have therefore duration according to a before and a afterwards. On the other

hand, eternity which is proper to God lacks any type of succession, since the total and

simultaneous Being is present in it without change or succession of any kind, in a sort of

«eternal present»

Ordinary language identifies «eternity» with the simple «indefinite duration»; however,

this identification easily leads to misunderstandings, since the eternity of God is then

thought of as being similar to the duration of creatures with the difference of simply

adding to it the indefinite character of such a duration. This way of thinking easily

forgets that God is Pure Act who not only possesses being but also is his own Being.

Hence, another misunderstanding is generated which affects the notion of creation when

it is claimed that the universe could have existed from always and that consequently it is

not necessary to admit a divine creation. At this point one confuses the essential

«dependence in being» of every creature respect to God with the beginning in time.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to admit God as permanent source of the whole being,

independently from the limited or unlimited duration of the created being. Aquinas

dedicated a whole brief treatise in which he keeps arguing that the temporal beginning

of the universe is something which we only know by divine revelation, and that nothing

would have prevented God, if He had wanted so, from creating the universe «from

always»101

.

When one identifies divine creation and origin of time, the tendency arises to identify

the proofs of the existence of God with the alleged proofs - that do not exist - of the

limited duration of the universe. One can easily conclude then, in an erroneous way, that

the existence of God cannot be proved. This confusion is found latent in many critics of

the proofs of the existence of God. Some ignore that this confusion had been already

denounced centuries ago: Aquinas warned the Christians in the 13th

century that, if they

intended to establish the limited duration of the universe as a basis for the proof of the

existence of God, they would become the laughing stock of the non-believers who know

that the limited duration of the universe cannot be proved, and who could think therefore

that the Christians accept the existence of God on the basis of insufficient reasons.

More confusion arises from the attempts of explaining how God can really «be

involved» in the becoming of creatures, as if the divine action on the world demanded

somehow that God changes as well. «Process philosophy» and «process theology» have

reacted against the excesses of the «deism» which reduces God to the role of provider of

the final explanation of the existence of the world and denies Him, at the same time, any

interest or intervention in the world once this is in existence. In trying to explain how

God is committed with his creation, these currents of thought claim that God, although

being eternal, must have a certain degree of mutability. If this were not so, they claim,

one could not understand how God is really involved in whatever happens in the world

and in the persons. In this context God is thought of as a «dipolar God» who would be at

the same time eternal and immutable. However, it does not make any sense to attribute

mutability to God who possesses being in a full manner. Though it is difficult to explain

the relationship between God and his creatures, it is necessary to respect, as a basis of

the explanation, the total perfection and transcendence of God; thinking otherwise

would introduce features which are incompatible with the divinity. Divine revelation

provides a new key to understand this relationship through Incarnation. However, the

mystery of the transcendence of God persists; it is in, in any case, a «logical» type of

mystery because one understands that God has to be necessarily eternal and has to be

completely transcendent to creation.

There are different degrees of being and acting among creatures and therefore different

degrees of duration. Spiritual beings participate in the eternity of God, since they are not

subjected to the mutability of what is material, and are naturally immortal. Once

created, they never lose their being. However, they are not eternal in a proper sense,

since they do not fully possess their being and experience those changes proper to the

spiritual operations (for instance, a certain succession of intellective acts). This special

type of duration is usually called eviternity by the theologians. The eviternity of the

angelic creatures is a type of intermediate duration between that of the material entities

and the divine eternity.

101

Cf. Josep I. SARANYANA, “Santo Tomás. «De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes»”, Anuario Filosófico, 9 (1976),

pp. 399-424, where one can find the text of this brief treatise with introduction and comments.

Material beings are subjected to temporal duration and to substantial changes.

Materiality precisely implies a radical potency by which any material substance can be

transformed into another one or others. Moreover, the duration of the material entities

implies the fact that it is realized successively through the actualization of potencies.

There are degrees of being and temporality within the field of material beings. Living

beings have an individuality and tendencies by which they have a history in a sense

higher than the one in non-living beings. Living beings realize their potentialities in a

successive way so that one can speak of development and perfecting process in this

context. Among living beings, those provided with knowledge have a higher level of

ontological density since they can preserve memory of the past and, in a way, foresee

the future and also anticipate it. Obviously, the human person is found at a new level of

temporality which includes at the same time the characteristics of the material and of

the spiritual. A human person participates, because of being material, in the

characteristics proper to the duration of the natural entities and, at the same time,

transcends them because of his spirituality. Being a person, man is able to discover the

radical meaning of what happens, has a moral responsibility which transcends the today

and now, formulates projects which also transcend the conditions of the present

moment, and is called to participate in the divine eternity proper to the spiritual beings.

Human temporality, whose study is a topic of anthropology, originates history in which

specifically human aspects find their place such as tradition and progress. The sense of

history is also a call to man’s responsibility, since man’s freedom implies the fact that

there are no necessary historical laws: man’s future is in his own hands and depends on

his moral responsibility. Human temporality is related to divine eternity because each

human person is called to participate in the divine life. Human temporality is found at

the border between time and eternity, and temporal realities acquire their full meaning

when contemplated in the light of the divine plan.

22.3. Time

From the temporal dimensions an abstract notion of «time»is constructed which is used

in ordinary life as well as in science and in philosophical considerations. We shall now

examine, as we did in the case of the notion of space, the notion of time in three

sections: the characterization of the notion of time, in what way this notion corresponds

to something real, and how time is used in the experimental sciences.

a) Notion of time

When we say that a certain length of time has gone by we always imply that the concept

of time refers to the measure of some movement, and this is true in ordinary experience

as well as in science. In ordinary life, a reference to a subjective feeling may be

sufficient to say that a certain duration «has been short or long». Frequently, though, it is

necessary to refer to objective measurements of time. This is always done in the

experimental science because only in this way it is possible to use an inter-subjective

concept of time.

In order to measure time it is necessary to choose a movement characterized by uniform

regularity; from this movement units are taken to which any other movement is going to

be referred. The division of time in years, days, etc., for instance, is based on the

rotational movement of the earth around itself, and around the sun, although presently

recourse is made to more regular and more precise procedures based on movements

related to atoms102

.

Aristotle defined time as the number of movement according to a before and an

afterwards («numerus motus secundum prius et posterius»)103

. This definition

emphasises the fact that time measures how long a movement lasts; therefore, as a

measure, time corresponds to something real (the duration of a movement) and, at the

same time, it implies the presence of a subject who carries out the measurement104

.

Movement possesses a certain quantity which flows, i.e. is continuous and successive: it

is not the dimensional quantity related to the extension but a plurality of successive

parts.

Insofar as it is a continuum, time shows analogies with space. As space is related to

extension so time is related to duration; extension, as well as duration, is something real

and continuous which can be divided indefinitely. It is always possible to identify

smaller parts in extension as well as in duration, and this does not imply that there are an

infinite number of parts in act.

Time can be said to be an accident of movement since it is its measurement in which

movement has successive quantity.

The history of the concepts of space and time largely coincide105

. In some sense, the

concept of time is analogous to that of space. And so, Newton defined an absolute time

which, the same as the absolute space, was independent from any material content. Kant

allocated to this absolute time, together with space, the function of a previous and

permanent condition for all sensible experience. The relativity theory assumed the

concepts of time and space to be relative. Presently, there is a notion of space-time

structures in circulation according to which these structures would have their own kind

of existence, independently from matter. We shall now examine what type of reality can

be attributed to the reality signified by the concept of time.

102

Presently there is a web of artifacts distributed all over the world: they are atomic clocks made of cesium which are

controlled through procedures involving radio signals, television and satellites. The data are received and analyzed by the

International Office of Weights and Measures of Sèvres, nears Paris, and from there the signals are transmitted which are

received and transmitted by the radios. 103

ARISTOTLE, Physica, IV, 11, 219 b 1-2. 104

Cf. J. CONILL, “¿Hay tiempo sin alma?”, Pensamiento, 35 (1979), pp. 195-222; El tiempo en la filosofía de Aristóteles.

Un estudio dedicado especialmente al análisis del tratado del tiempo (Physica, IV, 10-14), Facultad de Teologia San

Vicente Ferrer, Valencia 1981. 105

Cf. G.J. WHITROW, Time in History: Views of Time from Prehistory to the Present Day, Oxford University Press,

Oxford 1989.

b) The reality of time

Time is a general and abstract concept which presupposes a broadening of the concepts

of duration and temporal relation: it encompasses all the durations and all the temporal

relations. Abstract time has a certain character of totality since the mind relates to it all

the events, past, present and future.

In this context one can say that only the present exists; actually, the past does not

exist any more and the future does not exist yet. We can conceive past and future in our

mind; yet outside our mind only the present exists. It is evident that past events have

repercussions on the present ones, and present events have repercussions on the future

ones. However, what exists now, independently from any mental consideration, is the

present with some relations respect to the past and future events.

Taking into account the parallelism, partial though important, between the

concepts of space and time along history, we can apply some reflections, already made

in connection with the concept of space, to the concept of time with the appropriate

clarifications,.

Concretely, time does not correspond to a real entity: what is real is duration and

temporal relations, and time does not have an existence independent from them.

Therefore, the observations made regarding the concept of space in relation to Newton’s

physics, are valid also for the concept of time. Newton claimed that together with an

absolute space there is an «absolute time» independent from its content. We claim that

this absolute time cannot exist because, in order to define it, it would be necessary to

rely on a kind of movement also absolute, and this is really impossible.

On the other hand, time is not a condition (after Kant’s fashion) of our

knowledge because there is no such a thing as homogeneous time conceived as an empty

receptacle where events are placed. Kant stated that space and time are a priori

conditions of the sensible knowledge. Kant perceived that the absolute time of Newton

could not possibly exist in reality; however, being convinced of the truth of Newton's

physics, he transferred this absolute time, together with its properties, from the reality to

our knowledge. Time, in this view, would not depend on experience since it would be

one of the conditions of possibility of this experience. It is true that we always place our

experience within a time-framework; however, there is no reason to identify this time

with the properties that Newton and Kant attributed to it. There are reasons, on the other

hand, to think that our concept of time corresponds to real experiences and that this time

depends on the latter.

Nor does it seem possible to speak, as it is done in some present-day theories, of

a space-time independent from matter, as if this were an entity with own existence

which could have begun to exist when nothing material yet existed. Even in supposing

that a scientific theory along this line could be formulated, one should still admit the fact

that duration and temporal relations have a kind of reality which is not identified with

physico-mathematical models. This consideration leads us to examine how the concept

of time is used in the experimental sciences.

c) The use of time in the experimental science

As in the case of space, time is conceptualized in experimental science in

accordance with the general objective of this type science, i.e. achieving a knowledge of

nature which can be submitted to experimental control. Consequently, since the 17th

century time has been defined as a magnitude which can be an object of mathematical

treatment and can be measured in an empirical way.

Newton in his mechanics distinguished between «absolute» time which flows in

a uniform way independently from the material world, and «relative time» which refers

to specific processes. Owing to the great success that Newton’s mechanics had enjoyed

for many centuries, this distinction was preserved in physics until 1900, at the time

when it started facing a crisis. In 1905 it became obsolete because of Einstein’s special

relativity theory where time appears to be a magnitude whose measurement does not

always give the same value since it depends on the system of reference which is

adopted. Moreover, the relativity theory is interpreted in such a way that space and time

are not completely independent magnitudes any more; it is admitted, on the contrary,

that phenomena unfold in a space-time where the three space dimensions are united to

the time dimension.

The relativity of the measurements of time in relation to the systems of reference

(and therefore in relation to the physical state of the subject who measures and of the

object being measured) seems to highlight an aspect which had already been emphasised

in ancient times and then forgotten under the pressure of Newton’s physics, i.e. the

existence of a specific time relative to each specific process. In accordance with the

already mentioned Aristotle’s definition, although standard systems of measuring time

can be adopted, strictly speaking each type of movement has its own time. Against the

absolute, homogeneous and undifferentiated kind of time postulated as something real

by Newton’s physics, and as a condition of our way of knowing by Kant’s philosophy,

there is presently once again an awareness that the real time dimensions are related to

the specific way of being of the entities and processes. There is no doubt that it is

possible to adopt standard systems to measure time; however, the natural is marked by

temporal structures and patterns which determine their specific characteristics to such an

extent that the measurements of time are seen as affected by the physical state of the

subject who measures and of the object which is being measured.

There have been moreover other scientific developments which have had

repercussions on time-related problems. We shall mention three of them especially

relevant.

First, the development of classical thermodynamics in the 19th

century led to the

general acceptance of the so-called «second principle of thermodynamics» which seems

to suggest the existence of a «time-arrow». Physical processes can proceed in one

direction but not in the opposite one. As a whole, the entropy of an isolated system

which measures the degree of disorder of a system, increases: if greater order is

produced in some places this must happen at the cost of some disorder in its

surrounding. In thermodynamics this principle is expressed in more accurate ways;

when it is applied to the universe as a whole it seems to suggest a future thermal death

since, as a whole, physical disorder tends to increase.

Second, great strides have been made in the physics of «irreversible processes»,

i.e. those processes which occur in one direction. A reversible process is that which can

occur in any of the possible directions. Classical physics was mainly a physics of

reversible processes where the direction of time did not play any relevant role. In our

own days irreversible processes have been dealt with scientifically; they are the real

processes (in classical physics it had become necessary to convert real irreversible

processes into a sum of reversible ones, brushing over important aspects of the

problem). These progresses are also related to the «time-arrow» and explain how order

can be produced in nature from states of disorder, and for this reason they are very

important in the evolutionary worldview.

Third, evolution theories - cosmic as well as biological - refer to a gigantic

process in which successive degrees of organization have appeared. Time is here the

centre of the explanations, and the problem is even posed about the origin of time in a

scientific way.

We could add more references to the ones already mentioned which refer to

other areas of scientific progress; they all show how time is presently at the centre of

attention of the scientists. Let us now develop more in depth one of the aspects that the

scientific progress highlights: the unity between space and time.

23. UNITY BETWEEN SPACE AND TIME

We have already made reference to the unity between space and time as it appears in the

relativity theory; this fact has also other consequences which affect space and time. We

re going to highlight some of the implications of this unity.

23.1. Space and time in the relativity theory

Space and time are not only related to each other in the relativity theory but they are also

somehow united to form a space-time continuum. This idea corresponds to the

intertwining which we have already emphasised, of the spatial and temporal with the

real physical conditions and therefore, their own intertwining.

Although space and time relations correspond to reality, no trivial difficulties

arise when one tries to measure them. The special relativity theory pointed out such

difficulties. Einstein indicated concretely that the measures of the intervals of space as

well as of time depend on the situation of the observer, and formulated those equations

which allow the determination of durations in different cases.

This difficulty seems to be logical and corresponds also to ordinary experience.

For example, we shall obtain different values if we measure the duration of a

phenomenon from a relative situation of rest or from a train which passes at a great

speed through that place where this phenomenon occurs. Something similar occurs in

relation to distances. When phenomena unfold at great speed changes in the

measurements are also great; in these cases it is necessary to use the formulas of the

special relativity.

New problems have been posed on this basis in connection with the temporal

situation: they refer to the simultaneity and to the relationship between past and future.

A disquieting question is asked in relation to simultaneity: “Is it possible to claim

the existence of really simultaneous events? Actually, it may look impossible to claim

the existence of a real simultaneity since any time measuring will refer to particular

conditions of the observation and the different measurement will not coincide. However,

the difficulty only affects the concrete measurements and not the real existence of

simultaneity. Although it may be impossible to determine the simultaneity of very

distant phenomena through measurements, it is yet possible to claim the existence of this

simultaneity in each moment. At present many simultaneous phenomena are occurring

in different parts of the earth and of the universe independently from the difficulties

which we can meet when we try to determine this simultaneity in a quantitative way. If

you prefer, instead of speaking of «simultaneity» we could speak of «co-existence» or of

«contemporariness», to emphasise the fact that time measurements are affected by the

physical conditions. It would be really impossible for us to determine simultaneity

through physical methods. However, this relativity in the measurements of time does not

mean that such measurements are arbitrary; on the contrary, once the conditions in

which the observer operates are established the theory permits us to calculate the value

to be obtained when measuring time intervals.

The problem of simultaneity has generated the so-called twins’ paradox. Of two

identical twins, one remains on earth while the other travels at a great speed in a space

ship. When the space ship returns to earth, as the durations measured in the ship and the

ones measured on earth are different, the twins will be of different age, and therefore of

different looks. There is no doubt that this paradox highlights the fact that, as we have

already indicated, the real duration is intertwined with concrete physical conditions:

different conditions will produce different effects. However, the interpretation of this

paradox is not simple; different authors, including the same Einstein, warn that in order

to correctly interpret this possible situation, factors have to be taken into account which

eliminate the possible paradoxes: for instance, the fact that the space ship travels in

different directions when it moves away from the earth and when it comes back so that

the relative durations, including the physical effects of both routes, could be

compensated.

Other problems refer to the relationship between past and future. We have

emphasised the irreversibility of the real time successions. Actually, it has been claimed

that the relativity effects could permit, for instance, «trips to the past» which would

include the unusual possibility of causing changes in events of the past and, therefore, in

the real situations of the present. This strange possibility has been connected to the

«time tunnels» which would be related with the exotic physical conditions present for

instance in the black hole. It seems that in this case theoretical constructions of the

physico-mathematics are confused with real time successions. Actually, possibilities

contained in mathematical models cannot be identified with real possibilities and, in this

case, it is of no use to make appeal to the success of the scientific theories. We have

already pointed out, for instance, that classical physics treats time as if it were

reversible; in reality, this is not certain, but this does not prevent classical physics from

being applied successfully in a number of cases: applicability of a theory does not mean

that all the aspects of the models it utilizes reflect reality as it is. These observations are

valid also in the case of the present-day theories: natural processes are irreversible and

no mathematical theory can change their real time succession. This cannot be denied by

leaning on the relativity theory: in this theory, the temporal order of events is preserved

whenever causally related events are considered.

23.2. Space and time as material conditions of the reality

From the very beginning we have considered space-time structuring as one of the great

characteristics which we use to characterize the natural. After examining space and time

with great attention, one is able to discover the meaning of this characterization with

greater depth.

It is obvious that the claim that the natural is characterized by its own dynamism which

exists and unfolds in space-time conditions, implies the claim that these conditions are

real. Our conceptualization of space and time includes our own constructions in ordinary

life as well as, and even more, in the experimental science. Concepts constructed in this

way correspond to reality in different degrees and with specific modalities. However,

extension, duration and their reciprocal relationships are something real.

It is important to emphasise that in our characterization of the natural we do not only

refer to space and time: we are actually speaking of space-time structuring. This permits

us to distinguish the natural from the spiritual which can be intimately related to space-

time (as in the case of a human person) but which does not include, in its own way of

being, space- time structuring: intelligence, will, freedom, responsibility, morals, are all

closely associated, in our case, with material conditions; however, such material

conditions are not primary in the order of importance in these human dimensions.

Moreover, space-time structuring is a characteristic of the natural which acquires a

progressively greater relevance in the understanding of nature. Scientific progress

opens new panoramas always centred in the space-time patterns, i.e. in configurations

and rhythms which can be repeated and, actually, are repeated countless times in each

case with its own variations.

It is easy to find illustrative examples of this in contemporary science. In a paradoxical

way, the theories of the determinist chaos emphasise the existence of a certain

indeterminism in nature; however, and at the same time, they show the existence of

patterns associated with new phenomena. Fractals are actually patterns which are

repeated in different scales. The great importance presently attributed to this scientific

field shows that the deepest knowledge of nature leads to a noticeable combination of

repetition and subtlety. In this particular field which encompasses many different

phenomena, we find that enormously varied and complex results with a great organizing

capacity are the result of repetitive applications of relative simple resorts. Once again,

we can admire how so much can be done with so little.

The image of nature which results from these considerations is very different from that

presented by mechanism which used to consider nature as the result of mechanical

clashes between portions of a matter which lacked internal dynamism and reduced it to

the model of a mechanical machine. It is also very different from that present by the

evolutionist ideology which, going much beyond the data provided by science, tries to

reduce the whole reality to a result of blind forces. If nature is built in a very subtle way

around space-time patterns it is easy to note the fact that we are in the presence of a

materialized rationality which is the result of a very powerful dynamism; this unfolds in

accordance with time patterns, is stored in space patterns and is combined in a thousand

ways producing new enormously sophisticated space and time patterns.

23.3. Interpenetration between the spatial and temporal

Frequently we think of space and time as if they were completely separated dimensions;

however, this idea does not correspond to reality. We have already pointed out that both

dimensions are united in the relativity theory. We shall now add some concluding

considerations.

We can grasp the close relationship that exists between space and time through a fairly

simple example which mesmerizes those who have never finished considering it: it

refers to our viewing of the stars. It is a well-known fact that stars are enormously

distant from the earth. The closest one is four light-years distant (a light-year is the

distance covered by the light in one year, while travelling at 300,000 kilometres per

second); other stars are ten, hundred or thousand light-years distant. This means that,

when we look at a star which is 700 light-years distant, the light that reaches our eyes

left that star seven hundred years earlier. Therefore we see that star now as it was seven

hundred years ago, i.e. in the Middle Ages. When we look at the stars we see them as

they were ten, hundred or thousand years ago. Moreover, the impression we have of the

stars as if they were fixed on a sphere and as they are represented in the drawings of the

constellations of ancient times, does not correspond to reality: we see the stars as if they

did not change their relative position because they are enormously far away from us, but

they move very rapidly and are found at different distances from the earth.

Although we can distinguish between space and time dimensions, these are tightly

intertwined in nature. Space configurations are not just static realities; when stable, their

stability is the result of a dynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, rhythms depend on

configurations; potentialities are stored in space structures and their actualization,

realized in accordance with temporal rhythms, depends on these configurations.

A very adequate example of all this is the genetic information contained in the DNA of

the living organisms. The space and time intertwining is manifest in the processes of

transcription and translation in which proteins are produced, together with the

duplication of the very DNA during cell division.

Nature is built and functions around configurations and rhythms which are closely

related. In this perspective, space and time are not mere abstract concepts, objects of

complex scientific theories and of abstract philosophical reflections, but basic conditions

of nature; these exist in interrelated and highly sophisticated structures which open the

door to a deep understanding of nature.

VIII. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

The natural world appears with specific ways of being which, although realised

in quantitative dimensions, are not reduced to the latter. We have already mentioned the

relationship between the quantitative and the qualitative aspects. Now, after having

examined in detail the different aspects of the quantitative dimensions, we are in a better

position of analysing the meaning of the qualitative properties of the natural world in

more depth.

Quantity is a dimension proper to the material beings. On the other hand,

qualities are found not only in the material but also in the spiritual beings. For this

reason the study of qualities is part of metaphysics.

Philosophy of Nature studies only the qualities of the physical world; however,

this study is important to metaphysics because it provides the basis on which

metaphysics can build in a reliable way a general explanation of those qualities which

can also be considered in the spiritual realities.

We shall consider first the qualities of the material substances, analyse their

types and examine the way we know them. We shall then consider once again, and in

the light of the newly acquired perspective, the relationship between quantity and

quality particularly in all that makes reference to the quantitative study of the qualities.

24. QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES

Qualities are accidental ways of being or determinations of the substance. Natural

entities do not have only quantitative dimensions; for example, magnitude does not have

its own isolated existence but it exists as magnitude of a substance and of its qualities.

Quantity exists as a condition of the way of being of the natural entities.

The essential way of being of substances is expressed by their substantial form.

However, there are also accidental ways of being which can change without any change

in the essence of the substance and which are usually called qualities.

24.1. Qualitative virtualities of the natural entities

Firstly, we want to point out that qualities determine the substance in relation to its

substantial form, and that some of them are properties which, without forming part of

the essence, accompany it necessarily.

a) Substance, form and qualities

Dynamism refers to a fundamental characteristic of the natural world, i.e. the existence

of virtualities, which unfold through interactions. This unfolding corresponds to the way

of being of the substances, to the specific characteristic of each substance and, therefore,

to their substantial form. However, it is not identified with the latter. Actually, the same

substance, without changing its essence, can unfold some virtualities and not others, and

can unfold in distinct degrees; if it were not so, all substances would be unfolding all

their possibilities of interaction at all times, and this is not what really happens. It is not

even possible that this may happen since the unfolding of virtualities is realized in

function of the present circumstances in each case and these may be very varied. It is not

possible for all the possible circumstances to be all present at the same time.

These virtualities, or accidental ways of being, are usually called «qualities». In the case

of quantity, the use of the singular expresses the unity of the extended substance; on the

other hand, in the case of qualities we use the plural to express that in any substance

there are different qualities.

We also speak of «virtualities» because these are properties which are present in the

substance as possibilities or potentialities whose actualization depends on the

circumstances. This terminology expresses capacity of acting as well as capacity of

receiving the action of other substances. Although in the first case they are usually

called «active» qualities and in the second case «passive» qualities, from a general point

of view all of them unfold through interactions which include two or more subjects,

independently from whether one or the other could be considered «agent» or «patient».

All in all, qualities are accidental ways of being because they do not have their own

independent existence, nor are they identified with the essence of the substances. They

are ways of being which are related to the substantial form, because they are particular

determinations which correspond to the specific way of being of each substance. They

also determine the substance «through» quantity because they are ways of being which

are realised in quantitative conditions. The magnitude of a substance, its space

configuration, the time structuring of the processes which exist in it and, in general, the

material conditions, are like the backdrop against which qualities exist; however, it is a

backdrop which is intertwined with the actors and with which it forms one reality only.

The quantitative conditions impose limitations to the qualitative aspects which exist

within the boundaries of these conditions.

b) Qualities as intrinsic properties of the substance

We may also add that qualities are intrinsic accidents because they refer to ways

of being which are proper to the substance. Although accidental ways of being, qualities

express determinations of the substance as such and not of the substance in relation to

others. However, as we shall show shortly, some qualities are more closely related to the

essence of the substance than others are. Moreover, although they are intrinsic

determinations, qualities are manifested through interactions with other substances and

with the subject who knows them so that it is necessary to determine in each case what

is really objective in each quality and what corresponds to the interactions with other

substances and with the subject who knows them.

As ways of being, two basic types of qualities are usually distinguished:

properties, which do not belong to the essence but necessarily accompany it, and the

purely «contingent» qualities which can be present or not in a specific substance. For

instance, purely chemical substances have well-determined properties which distinguish

them (atomic mass, fusion or vaporization points, etc.) but also other qualities which

are not characteristics of them (for example, the fact of appearing with a certain colour,

or of being in a solid, liquid or gaseous state).

Properties are used to define the substances. Actually, we do not know the

essences either in a direct or in a complete way and, therefore, we determine their ways

of being and their definitions through their properties.

We also distinguish active and passive qualities. The former refers to the ways of

operating, while the latter refers to the way of receiving actions of other subjects.

However, we have already seen how this distinction corresponds to partly conventional

criteria because actions as well passions are interactions and a substance is called agent

or patient according to specific points of view; for instance, according to whether it is a

living being or an inorganic substance, whether it is a substance of a greater or smaller

size, etc.

24.2. Types of qualities

There are many types of qualities, and not all of them are found in all substances.

We have already spoken of those qualities which necessarily follow an essence and

which are called properties, and of others which can be or not in a specific type of

substance and which are called, therefore, contingent qualities.

We shall now consider other ways of classifying the different type of qualities.

We shall refer in the first place to the four types of qualities identified by Aristotle; we

shall then examine virtualities and dispositions; finally we shall refer to those qualities

which can be perceived by the senses and which play, for this reason, a basic role in our

way of knowing nature.

a) Four types of quality

In analysing the meaning of quality106

Aristotle called it with a name derived

from the pronoun poiós which means «of this or of that class». Quality is that by which

entities are called this or that. He seems to claim that the qualitative is what is present in

the substance besides the quantitative.

106

Cf. ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 8, 8 b 25 – 11 a 38; Metaphysica, V, 14, 1020 a 33 – 1020 b 25.

For Aristotle, nature has quantitative and qualitative characteristics and both are

real. The quantitative is the first determination of what is material while the qualitative

determines entities through quantity; for instance, whiteness affects the surface of a

body. The quantitative has a kind of supremacy since all the other accidents affect the

substance through quantity. However, the qualitative is real, because it expresses the

way of being of entities.

This perspective is in line with the realism of ordinary knowledge. Moreover, it

determines the way of studying nature: in an Aristotelian context, primacy is granted to

the qualitative against any stand which claims primacy of mathematical (quantitative)

approach in the study of nature. Actually, any knowledge is based on ordinary

knowledge which in turn is based on the quality of the bodies.

According to Aristotle, the first and most appropriate way of speaking of a

quality is to say that it is the difference of the substance which is usually called specific

difference. For example, «rational» being is the specific difference, which defines man

respect to the other animals which are not rational.

Aristotle distinguishes four types of qualities. He warns that maybe some other

type could be there; however, the following are those which are more appropriately

called qualities: state and disposition, capacity and incapacity, affective qualities and

conditions, figure and form.

The qualities of the first type are state (or habit) and disposition which are

different because of being more or less stable: habits, or states, are more stable than

dispositions. States are also dispositions while dispositions are not necessarily states.

Aristotle speaks of «having a certain state» and «being in a disposition». These ideas are

applied not only in the philosophy of nature but also in other fields such as ethics and

moral theology when one speaks, for instance, of virtues as stable habits, of the state of

sanctifying or habitual grace, or of moral dispositions.

Qualities of the second type are natural capacity and incapacity (or potency and

impotency). They consist in having a natural capacity to do something. For example, in

anthropology one speaks of intellect, will and senses as potencies of the soul since they

are intellectual or volitional capacities to act which a human being has.

Qualities of the third type are the emotional qualities (patibilis qualitas), and

conditions (passions). Here, the terms «affective» and «conditions» take their meaning

from the verb «to affect» and refer to those qualities which affect the senses and change

during natural alterations. Qualities, which are studied in the philosophy of nature,

belong, in general, to this type: they are material, or corporeal, qualities related to

physical changes, such as colour, weight and density.

Qualities of the fourth type are figure and form: triangular, straight, curved, etc.

Obviously, these qualities also come under the consideration of the philosophy of nature

and it is easy to see how they occupy a very important place since they refer to the

space-time structuring of the natural world.

b) Virtualities, dispositions and tendencies

All qualities can be considered as «virtualities» because they are possibilities which can

be actualized in function of the circumstances. Moreover, any virtuality is equivalent to

a real possibility, to a specific potentiality which may be more or less near its

actualization. According to the degree of this proximity, one can speak of less and more,

of simple «virtualities» or «capacities», of «dispositions» or of authentic «tendencies».

Taking into account the fact that the actualization of virtualities depends on the

circumstances, which permit or drive it, the attribute of a quality as virtuality, capacity,

disposition or tendency will also depend on these circumstances. For instance, the

affinity of chemical substances refers to their tendency to combine and this is different

in different circumstances. A quality is usually considered as virtuality, capacity,

disposition or tendency in relation to the habitual circumstances, or to the most relevant

ones in a specific context.

The existence of tendencies is particularly evident when the agents form part of a

stable unitary whole. Actually, in these cases those conditions are present which favour

or provoke the actualization of some specific virtualities. It is important to note that such

a case occurs very frequently in nature, and it is a manifestation of their highly specific

and tendencial character.

The tendencial character of the qualities has been denied, frequently, because of

its connection with finality; yet, it is a central aspect of nature.

c) Sensible properties and non-observable properties

The distinction of qualities into those which are sensible and those which are not so is

very important to us. Actually, our knowledge of nature depends completely on sensible

qualities which are the condition of what can be known through our senses.

On the other hand, the distinction is irrelevant in view of determining the way of

being of the natural, since this would remain the same even if men disappeared (here,

we disregard the effects of our action on nature).

Our senses have a very limited reach and their functioning refers, before

everything else, to the necessities of practical life. It is not surprising therefore that the

progress of science, through which we know many aspects of nature which are

inaccessible to ordinary experience and which are very far from it, appears as an

astonishing fact. Such a progress is made possible thanks to a peculiar combination of

conceptualization and experiments. The scientific method, based on this combination, is

one the principal manifestations of the human intellect since it presupposes a high

degree of idealization necessary to build theoretical models, and the capacity of relating

the theoretical constructions to the experimental results by conceiving and carrying out

very sophisticated types of experiments. All this presupposes a capacity of interpretation

and reasoning.

However, the whole body of experimental science depends on data provided by

the senses. Even the most abstract theories need to be verified through experiments

whose interpretation depends, inevitably, on the data provided by ordinary experience.

Other living organisms can perceive qualities which are not accessible to us, or

to a degree which goes beyond our possibilities. In any case, the fact of being related to

our knowledge leads directly to the problem of the objectivity of qualities.

24.3. The objectivity of qualities

In Aristotle’s view, quality refers to a way of being, i.e. to an accidental form

which represents an aspect of reality, an accidental determination which cannot be

reduced to the quantitative dimensions. Quantity without form would be, so to say,

blind. To deny the qualitative is equivalent to denying the existence of real ways of

being.

However, although one may admit that there are real qualities in nature, there are

some issues which seem to affect the objectivity one may attribute to these qualities:

how do we know them? Can we say that things have qualities just as we perceive them?

In which measure is our knowledge conditioned by our particular way of gaining access

to reality?

a) Primary and secondary qualities

In the Cartesian mechanism and in the post-Cartesian empiricism a terminology

was coined which has survived up to our own times. Quantitative characteristics, such as

magnitude, figure and local movement would be primary qualities, which are real

properties of nature. On the other hand, sensible qualities, such as colour, taste, sound,

etc. (the direct objects of our senses) would be secondary qualities which are not real

properties but effects that things produce in our senses. A dichotomy was therefore

established between what is quantitative, which would be objective and could be studied

with mathematics, and qualities which would exist only in the subject who knows them.

This dichotomy is usually presented as endorsed by the quantitative method of

the experimental sciences which manage to study the primary qualities in a inter-

subjective way while this is not possible in the case of secondary qualities.

In order to clarify this problem it is important to understand the function of

mathematics in the study of nature. Mathematical concepts, and especially the most

abstract ones, are our own constructions. It is possible to apply mathematics in natural

sciences because we define magnitudes in relation to mathematical formulations and to

experiments. The fact that these constructions are successful says nothing about the

existence of qualities.

The scientific progress permits us to know physical processes which take place

in a sensation, such as electromagnetic phenomena related to light and vision, and the

cerebral mechanisms related to perception. Taking into account the present-day

knowledge, it is not difficult to see the differences between extreme realism and

subjectivism which are two extreme conceptions about the objectivity of sensations and

qualities.

The extreme form of realism about qualities, i.e. the doctrine according to which

sensible qualities exist in reality just as we perceive them, does not seem to be

sustainable. Our sense organs receive signals which are codified and translated, and the

result is the production of sensations generated in accordance with out cognitive

apparatus. Therefore, what we perceive and as we perceive it exists only in ourselves.

The pure subjectivism about qualities according to which there is a radical

heterogeneity between the sensation and the physical reality does not seem to be

sustainable either. It underestimates the fact that qualities correspond, somehow, to

properties of the object.

The solution to the problem is found along an intermediate way. On the one

hand, the sensation and its content are found only in a subject provided with a specific

organism. However, and on the other hand, there is continuity between sensation and

external reality. It is usual to say that through sensation, we perceive real properties in

accordance with our way of knowing. In order to determine in detail the characteristics

of these properties scientific investigation is required, and in this field science plays an

irreplaceable role. However, this very science would not be possible if the basic

objectivity of sense knowledge were not admitted since science constantly uses it and

there is no substitution for it.

For example, sight corresponds to a set of interactions of physical and

physiological character. A sensation is subjective insofar as it is a personal experience;

however, it has correspondence to reality and can be an object of inter-subjective

verification. In stating that something has colour, something real is predicated although

such a predication is mediated by our sense mechanisms and by the physical

circumstances. That colour corresponds to something real is verifiable because, when

we observe something, in each circumstance one perceives well-determined effects107

.

On the other hand, the so-called primary qualities (size, figure, position,

movement, velocity) also depend on our conceptualization and on the physical

circumstances. Insofar as they are perceivable, primary qualities are as real and

subjective as the secondary ones: both are the result of data which are processed and

interpreted.

107

Cf. K. NASSAU, “Las causas del color”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 51, December 1980, pp. 56-72; A. TREISMAN,

“Características y objetos del procesamiento visual”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 124, January 1987, pp. 68-78.

b) The knowledge of qualities

We have said that quantity is the first accident of a corporeal substance. This means that

the other accidents affect the substance through quantity, and this better explains the

primary character of the quantitative; however, one may be bale to appreciate the fact

that reducing everything to the quantitative is an unjustified extrapolation.

Nature is composed of entities with ways of being (forms, qualities) whose

existence leans on a quantitative basis. In the ordinary experience we perceive both

aspects in our own way whereas scientific and philosophical studies aims at knowing

them better.

We are provided with a sensory equipment which permits us to have a

representation of nature which is contextual (it depends on our cognitive equipment) and

partial (we perceive some aspects and not others), nevertheless authentic (we perceive

real characteristics in our own way). This knowledge takes place through experience and

is related to practical purposes: the recognizing of objects, orientation, action, nutrition,

etc. Moreover, this knowledge provides also a basis, partial though reliable and

indispensable, for a further reflection which can be scientific as well as philosophical,

and directed towards the knowledge of aspects of nature which are not clearly visible.

It does not make any sense to criticise the validity of ordinary knowledge in the

name of science since ordinary knowledge is the basic assumption of science. Without

ordinary knowledge no scientific problems could be posed, and no observation and

experimental verification would be possible.

Moreover, scientific progress justifies retroactively the validity of ordinary

knowledge, it widens it, and eventually contributes to specify it (for example, by

eliminating some inadequate assessments of experience); what scientific knowledge

cannot do is to render ordinary knowledge obsolete or to substitute it.

Experimental sciences do not always provide photographic representations of the

reality as if they were a mere translation of the external world. They make use of

symbolic languages which are our own constructions. However, through these

constructions we know in a contextual and partial way, yet authentic, real

characteristics. These characteristics refer, in one way or another, to ways of being and

can be catalogued consequently as qualities.

According to their nature and to the context of the problems which are studied,

these characteristics can be catalogued as virtualities, capacities, dispositions and

tendencies108

. It is not difficult to frame them within the classical species of qualities. It

is not just a question of forcing them within a mould which would be of no interest

whatsoever, but to be aware of the fact that they correspond to the classical idea of

quality and that, consequently, this idea preserves its validity.

108

Cf. R. HARRÉ, “Powers”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21 (1970), pp. 81-101; I.J. THOMPSON,

“Real Dispositions in the Physical World”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39 (1988), pp. 67-79.

c) Reductionism and emerging properties

There are two great types of reductionism, i.e. ontological and epistemological:

the former refers to nature and to its different levels while the latter refers to science, i.e.

to our knowledge of nature.

Ontological reductionism is the doctrine according to which the superior levels

of nature are no more than a simple sum of the elements of the inferior levels and,

therefore, the former can be reduced to the latter. The most radical type of ontological

reductionism claims that, ultimately, everything can be reduced to physical entities and

processes. Since the physical can be identified with what is material, this type of

reductionism can be identified with some kind of materialism: it says that ultimately the

whole reality is reduced to what is material.

Epistemological reductionism claims that sciences are ultimately reduced to the

most basic ones. And so, biology is reduced to physics and chemistry in such a way that

in reality biology is no more than physics and chemistry applied to the living organisms.

The most radical form of epistemological reductionism claims moreover that sciences

are reduced ultimately to a combination of sense experiences.

There are serious difficulties in both doctrines. It is certain that in the

epistemological area the scientific progress permits the stretching of bridges able to

connect more and more some scientific disciplines with others, and all of them with

physics. However, it is also certain that it is not possible to reduce the knowledge of one

level from the knowledge of an inferior level. Nor is it possible to reduce chemistry to

physics, and within physics there are theories whose harmonization is difficult. In the

ontological area there are different levels of organization that are not reducible to one

another just like that. For example, it is certain that living organisms are made of the

same types of materials which are studied in physics and chemistry; however, it is also

certain that there are in living organisms many types of organization and function which

do not exist in the other levels and which therefore claim a specific perspective different

from those adopted in physics and chemistry.

The term emergence is used frequently these days to express the irreducible

aspect of some levels to others. This term had already enjoyed some popularity in the

first half of the 20th

century. At a first glance the term means exactly the opposite of

reduction, i.e. it means that there are emerging characteristics in the superior levels of

nature and science which spring up from or stand above the inferior levels. There are

some doctrines which present themselves as a kind of non-reductionist materialism or

non-reductionist physicalism in the attempt of avoiding the difficulties of reductionism;

however, at the same time they claim that ultimately everything is explainable in terms

of evolution of the material or physical. Actually, it is possible to hold an emergentist

stand which acknowledges the existence of new properties at different levels of nature

and at the same time to claim that these new properties arise simply from the inferior

levels through successive processes of organization.

In any case, it is important to emphasise that really new properties appear in the

successive level of organization of nature. Calling them emergences is nothing but

sticking a label to them, which, by itself, explains nothing. They need to be explained by

science or philosophy. Although science manages to explain how a new property arises,

this does not eliminate further philosophical questions. We can ask ourselves, for

instance: Why are there physico-chemical laws so specific that are able to produce such

a sophisticated organisation in nature? How is it that superior levels of organization are

produced which contain virtualities for the successive production of more and more

astonishing types of organisation?

25. QUANTITY AND QUALITIES

There is a very close relationship between the quantitative and the qualitative. In the

material beings all qualities are affected by quantity: they exist within specific

dimensions and are bound to specific space and time structures.

After analyzing different aspects of quantity and qualities we are now in better

position to understand the types of relationship that exist between these two dimensions

of the natural entities.

25.1. Quantitative dimension of the qualities

In considering specific natural entities we note that the relationship between the

quantitative and the qualitative is not something general and abstract but very concrete.

Actually, the ways of being of the natural entities are strongly conditioned by the

quantitative dimensions. For example, insects, birds and primates have characteristics

which are related to the magnitudes of their organism and to the proportion between the

sizes of their organs.

The basic designs of the natural entities are neither many nor arbitrary. There is a great

variety of specific designs; however, they are the combination of a much more reduced

number of basic designs. And so, in a study on these issues one can read: “Our study

will focus on designs and forms which appear in the natural world. These designs appear

to be particularly limited so that the immense variety of forms that Nature creates arises

from the elaboration and re-elaboration of a reduced number of basic themes. Such

limitations are the ones which confer harmony and beauty to the natural world… In

matter of design we observe that Nature has preferences among which we find spirals,

the winding and sinuous forms, the branchings and the 120o joints, designs which are

repeated time and again. In this sense, Nature works as a theatre producer who would

present every evening the same actors but in different forms according to their distinct

role… A glance behind the footlights reveals that Nature does not have preferences

when the time comes of assigning roles to the actors. Its productions are limited by the

scarcity of means and by the restrictions imposed by the tri-dimensional space, as well

as by the relationships existing between the distinct sizes of the objects and by a peculiar

sense of austerity. Within the domain of Nature only five types of regular polyhedrons

can be formed, and no more. In the same way, only seven crystalline systems exist and

an eighth one never appears. The absolute size determines the fact that a lion cannot fly

and that a robin cannot roar. All the elements which form part of the distinct actions

which occur in the Universe and each one of them must abide by the established

rules”109

.

Along the same lines we read: “Each form has its own field of dimensions and it is

superiorly as well as inferiorly limited. Now, the distinct forms establish associations

and act together with other forms of their same characteristics in order to originate

greater structures and superior levels of organization”110

. The author of this quotation

refers to D’Arcy Thompson who published in 1917 a study which is considered as

pioneer. The study may contain controversial and even obsolete ideas because of the

progress in this field; they nevertheless point at a central idea which is now gathering

more and more strength. D’Arcy Thompson expressed it in the following terms: “We

then come close to the conclusion which will affect the whole rest of our argument

along this book, i.e. there is an essential qualitative difference among the phenomena of

the form, according to whether the organisms are big or small”111

. And also: “To begin

with, we have discovered that the scale has a pronounced effect on the physical

phenomena, and that the increase or diminution of the dimensions may mean a complete

change in the static or dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we begin to become aware of the

fact that there are discontinuities in the scales which define the phases in which different

forms and different conditions predominate”112

.

The scientific progress discovers new kinds of relationship between the quantitative and

the qualitative. Natural entities and processes are the result of multiple combinations of

elements which are not many in number and which can combine in very specific ways

producing a great variety of results. Think for instance of the 92 types of atoms which

are the basis of almost the whole of our world; think of the three sub-atomic particles

which are the basic constituents of these atoms and of the whole matter; think of the

combinations which are formed by taking the carbon atom – the backbone of life as we

know it - as building unit; think of the DNA – the store of the genetic programme of any

living being – which is assembled by using a combination of 4 nucleotides as bricks, etc.

Fractals are an especially interesting discovery along this line. They are forms with the

same structure at any scale of enlargement so that they are similar to themselves: small

parts of it have the same structure as the whole. This permits to understand how, on the

basis of few structures which are repeated in a thousand of ways, an enormous variety of

natural forms is produced.

All in all, we can claim that specific magnitudes and mathematical forms correspond to

distinct natural forms. The qualitative ways of being are not only related to the

quantitative but also closely depend on the quantitative forms and combinations. At the

109

Peter S. STEVENS, Patrones y pautas en la naturaleza, Salvat, Barcelona 1986, pp. 1-2. 110

Ibid., p. 26. 111

D’Arcy Wenworth THOMPSON, Sobre el crecimiento y la forma, Hermann Blume, Madrid 1980 (original edition of

1917), p. 35. 112

Ibid., pp. 45-46.

same time, the quantitative is not an amorphous and undifferentiated reality: the nature

we know is the result of the combination of very specific mathematical forms113

.

25.2. The measurement of the qualitative intensity

Because quantity and quality are so closely related and intertwined in the natural

world, it is possible to study the qualitative with mathematical methods. Although

qualities as such cannot be measured nevertheless, because of their specific realisation

within quantitative dimensions, they can be studied mathematically. In this sense one

may usually speak of indirect measurement of the qualities.

Actually, the advances in the indirect measurements of the qualities developed

with great difficulties (because being a novelty) in the past centuries was one of the

factors which made it possible for the experimental science to be born in the 17th

century. Along this line, special importance is to be attributed to the works carried out in

Paris and Oxford in the 14th

century. There were precedents: for example, Roberto

Grosseteste had insisted on the fundamental importance of mathematics for the studies

of the physical phenomena, and he had applied geometry to optics, boosting the

scientific orientation in Oxford. The studies of Nicholas Oresme in Paris in this field

were also important. The contribution of Oresme to physics includes the graphic

representation of the qualities and the application of this representation to the study of

the uniformly accelerated movement. Oresme’s supremacy is unquestionable in two

central aspects: the extent of the problems to which he applied the mathematical method

and the use of coordinates for the graphic representation of the changes in qualities and

in movement114

.

The measurement of qualities is the basis for the application of mathematics to

the study of the qualitative properties of the bodies. Physico-mathematical sciences are

based, to a large extent, on the indirect measurement of qualities; since these sciences

seek a kind of knowledge of the reality which may permit the use of quantitative

concepts, and taking into account the fact that our knowledge of the bodies is made

possible because of their qualities, one can easily see how the ground of the physico-

mathematical knowledge is made of enunciations in which the qualitative aspect is

related to the quantitative one.

25.3. Qualities and magnitudes

We have already examined how scientific magnitudes are constructed and what the

reach of the physico-mathematical method is. We shall now analyse a particular issue

related to qualities. Actually, if qualities are real properties, and if one admits that

113

This idea is greatly emphasized, for instance, in: Ian STEWART and Martin GOLUBITSKY, ¿Es Dios un geometra?,

Crítica, Barcelona 1995. 114

Cf. Mariano ARTIGAS, “Nicolás Oresme, gran maestre del Colegio de Navarra, y el origen de la ciencia moderna”, op.

cit.

experimental science provides an authentic knowledge of the reality, one should come

across concepts in science which are related to qualities.

It is not really a problem to ascribe qualities to entities studied by science when

the aspects under consideration are easily observable, as is the case for example with

many biological phenomena. On the other hand, when non-observable aspects are

studied, as it happens in micro-physics, the problems become bigger since in these cases

we need to make recourse to mathematical models which are not a snapshot of reality.

However, even in those cases one comes to know virtualities, capacities, dispositions

and tendencies which entities have in accordance with their own natures. There is no

doubt that in some cases it is difficult to reach certain conclusions about the ontological

status of the entities and their properties; however, this is due to the limitations of our

knowledge. Not admitting that nature is constituted by entities which have a nature and

some properties of their own would mean that the scientific investigation does not make

any sense, and the same would be true in the case of scientific enunciations. This is

incompatible with the abstract character of many scientific formulations and with the

existence of difficulties met with to determine their concrete ontological reach.

One of the ways in which qualities are manifested to the scientific investigation

is the so-called dispositional ends which point at the existence of tendencies to act in

specific ways in certain circumstances. There has been a lot of discussion about the

reality of these ends. Sometimes it is said that they are not necessary and that do not

play any essential role in science: they could be replaced by purely operational terms.

However, in real life the scientific activity does not work in this way, and a dispositional

vocabulary is frequently used: this is equivalent to attributing qualities to the scientific

entities. Experimental science makes frequent recourse to dispositional properties; think

for instance of properties such as electrical resistance, electrical sensitivity, density,

solubility, chemical affinity, and many others. They are authentic scientific magnitudes,

which refer to qualities, because they express virtualities, capacities, dispositions and

tendencies.

Those who state that experimental science cannot speak of virtualities or

tendencies frequently use arguments such as the following: they say that enunciations,

which express tendencies, cannot be submitted to experimental control. They add that it

is possible to speak of tendencies only in the field of human intentionality, and that

attributing tendencies to the natural entities would be equivalent to admitting a kind of

pan-psychism, i.e. that everything has life and intentions. It is also claimed that a

reference to tendencies lends itself to metaphysical abuses because it would end up in

seeing finality where there is none, and to pose problems which arise from an undue

anthropomorphism115

. An example that is usually presented is the one which refers to

situations without detectable effects and which, in accordance with the defenders of

tendencies, would be explained through an equilibrium of real tendencies. This is the

case, for instance, of two teams which pull a rope in opposite directions so that the rope

does not move: if an explanation of this is given using the concept of tendencies, one

will say that there are tendencies in action but they balance each other.

115

A similar kind of reasoning can be found, for instance, in: Q. GIBSON, “Tendencies”, Philosophy of Science, 50 (1983),

pp. 296-308.

However, the existence of real tendencies seems to be undeniable. At a scientific

level the problem refers to the possibility of constructing concepts which permit to

represent tendencies and that they may be able to explain things.

Those who defend the existence of tendencies summarise the problem in the

following terms: in nature, there are different tendencies or active potencies, which

correspond to the nature of things. They act in a combined way and in order to detect

them one has to make recourse to experiments in which the effects of the particular

tendencies are isolated. Nature is an open system in which different tendencies interfere

with one another; in order to know them, it is necessary to produce closed systems in

which only the factors we can control are present. In the closed systems, i.e. in the

experiments in which the undesired interferences are eliminated, natural laws can be

obtained which express constant sequences. Once these laws are made available to us

we can proceed to explain what happens in the open systems of the world in terms of

laws which are the expression of tendencies116

.

According to Rom Harré, a tendency is a power which is, as it were, suspended,

on its way of being exercised or manifested117

. Harré claims that this concept plays a

central role in the philosophical reflection on science: “I try to show how the concept of

power can play a central role in a metaphysical theory according to a realist philosophy

of science…; I will show how powers are not only indispensable in the epistemology of

science, but also how they are the authentic heart and key of the best metaphysics for

science. In doing so, I will show that the concept of power is neither magical nor occult

but as empirical as one can wish it and also richer in capacity than the concepts which it

follows…; we need to have the concept of power if science must make sense”118

.

In Harré’s analyses the concept of power expresses active potency, capacity,

force, energy, and is related to the concepts of disposition, propensity, trend, tendency,

and to passive potency or capacity of intervening in actions which are provoked by the

active potencies (liability). All these express aspects which are related to capacity and

directionality.

According to Harré, to claim the reality of a power does not mean to

categorically claim the presence of a quality: it is just a generic conditional or

hypothetical enunciation, because it does not specify which type of specific issue it is

applied to. It is an enunciation accompanied by subjunctive conditionals that refer to

cases in which it has not been manifested and which has the form: «if it were subjected

to such conditions, then this effect would arise». Harré claims that entities have powers

even if they do not exercise them. The difference between that which has power to

behave in a specific way and that which does not have it does not refer to their actual

acting or not since it can happen that this power is never exercised. The difference refers

to what entities are: it is a difference in their intrinsic nature.

116

A similar kind of realism can be found, for instance, in: Roy BHASKAR, A Realist Theory of Science, Leeds Books,

Leeds 1975, pp. 33-36; Rom HARRÉ, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, MacMillan, London 1970. 117

Cf. Rom HARRÉ, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, op. cit., p. 278. Harré uses here, and in many other places, the

term power which can be used in the sense of potency; it is clearly a a kind of active potency or capacity of acting. 118

Rom HARRÉ, “Powers”, op. cit., pp. 81, 83 and 85.

In this context, power corresponds to the classic concept of active potency while

the opposite concept (liability) to passive potency. Harré points out that these two

concepts are the extremes of a whole spectrum in which there are different degrees.

Harré observes that, according to a realist perspective, there is necessity in

nature, and that whatever happens corresponds to the way of being of the entities. On

the other hand, empiricism considers legitimate only to affirm the existence of a

concomitance among events and denies the possibility of knowing real causal

connections which correspond to the nature of things. However, the two perspectives

lead to two different types of scientific investigation: the empiricist one will look for

new cases of concomitance, while the realist one will try to know causes and their

effects in a better way; and the scientific investigation is carried out in accordance with

the realist perspective.

Harré’s conclusions basically coincide with the Bhaskar’s stand. Both defend a

realism according to which, in order to justify intelligibility in science, it is necessary to

admit that the order discovered in nature exists independently from man’s activity. Such

order consists in the structure and constitution of the entities and in the causal laws. In

order to justify the scientific activity an ontology is required able to provide a schematic

answer to the question: how should the world be so that science may be possible?119

Bhaskar and Harré clearly emphasize the fact that an ontology coherent with the

present-day scientific knowledge must include, as fundamental ingredients, the

existence of causal relations which are based on dispositions, tendencies and capacities,

the fact that these characteristics correspond to the way of being proper to the entities,

and that it is necessary to admit this natural order in order to justify the scientific

activity120

.

The constructions made by science cannot just be considered as real

characteristics of nature. However, the basic assumptions of the experimental science

include the existence of natural entities which have their own way of being manifested

through dispositions with a tendencial character. The scientific progress justifies these

assumptions and widens their reach. Actually, the present-day scientific worldview

provides a wide basis for the concepts of virtualities, capacities, dispositions and

tendencies all of which reflect the qualitative dimensions of nature.

25.4. Real aspects of the physical magnitudes

We shall now complete our analysis of the scientific magnitudes and of their

relationship with reality.

119

Cf. R. BHASKAR, op. cit., pp.27-29. 120

Bhaskar’s and Harré’s analyses are in the line of experimentalism which is also represented by Ian Hacking (cf. I.

HACKING, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983). These analyses are not without

difficulties. We limited ourselves to point out some important coinciding points.

A magnitude, in a scientific-experimental sense, is a concept defined in such a way that

it can be submitted to mathematical treatment and to which quantitative values can be

assigned in relation to the results of the experiments. These are, among many, the

scientific concept of «mass», «velocity», «temperature», «entropy» and «electrical

potential».

There are magnitudes of many different types. Some are directly related to the

experimental results and can be measured through instruments (for instance, mass and

temperature); others, on the other hand, have a pretty instrumental character, i.e. they are

magnitudes which are introduced in order to facilitate conceptualization and calculation

without presuming of having a direct correspondence to reality (for instance the

Hamiltonian or the Lagrangian).

Some magnitudes are related to properties and concepts of ordinary experience at least

initially (mass, force, energy, etc.), while others originate from theories very far from

ordinary experience. However, in all cases magnitudes are defined and used within the

context of specific scientific theories. Therefore, in order to be able to interpret the real

meaning of a magnitude, it is indispensable to take into account the context within

which that magnitude is defined and used.

Let us consider, as an example, a case which usually originates a number of

misunderstandings: the transformation between mass and energy, admitted in physics as

a consequence of Einstein’s relativity theory. This is usually brought up in order to

claim that the concept of substance is not valid any more because, after all, everything is

concentrated energy; or also to claim that it is possible to produce matter from a state in

which there is no matter but pure energy. This reasoning is usually stretched to the point

of claiming that the creation of the universe is possible starting from nothing through

purely physical processes without the necessity of a Creator. In reality, the relativity

theory only establishes a quantitative relationship between two magnitudes, i.e. between

mass and energy, claiming that in some specific processes a specific quantity of mass is

lost and a specific quantity of energy is produced, or the other way around. They are

natural processes in which there is nothing mysterious and they do not justify

conclusions such as those mentioned. In the case of some of these processes physicists

speak of creation or annihilation of particles; however, they do not use these terms in

their philosophical or theological meaning. Mass and energy are defined in physics in

relation to mathematical and experimental procedures, and physics only claims the

existence of specific quantitative relations between such magnitudes in specific physical

processes.

In order to determine the real meaning of the magnitudes one has to take into account as

a basis its definition and use in the corresponding scientific theories, avoiding pseudo-

scientific extrapolations. For example, the concept of matter is not identified with the

concept of mass. Mass in physics is a magnitude defined in a very specific way. This is

a scalar magnitude to which numbers are assigned unlike vectorial magnitudes, such as

velocity, which have also a direction and sense. Mass is an additive magnitude: this

means that the masses of various bodies can be summed up through a simple

arithmetical operation, while this is not possible with vectorial magnitudes whose sum

includes geometric operations; nor is this possible with other scalar magnitudes such as

temperature since temperatures of contiguous bodies cannot be summed up. Every time

one wishes to determine the real reference of a scientific magnitude, or of an

enunciation which relates scientific magnitudes, one needs to take into account this type

of characteristics. To proceed in any other way would only lead to speculations devoid

of rigor.

25.5. Quantity and quality in the knowledge of the natural

In conclusion, we claim that our access to nature is entirely conditioned by our

knowledge of qualities. This knowledge has a subjective aspect (sensation), but at the

same time permits to perceive objective aspects of the reality. There are real qualities in

the natural entities, and we know them in a contextual and partial, nevertheless

authentic, way; the scientific progress permits us to know many qualitative aspects of

nature more in depth.

A purely quantitative world would be unobservable. The experimental science

transcends the field of ordinary knowledge, but has to take it into account as a basic

point of reference. In any case, experimentation is inconceivable without a minimum

dose of realism about qualities as they appear to ordinary knowledge.

Scientific magnitudes make us know properties and natures of the bodies. The

knowledge provided by the experimental science is not reduced to the phenomenal or to

the purely quantitative aspects. Through science we come to know about the existence

and characteristics of many entities, as well as properties and processes of the natural

world which otherwise would remain inaccessible. However, scientific enunciations are

not always a snapshot of the reality; therefore, in order to assess their reach, it is

necessary to analyse the concrete context of the theories which are being used in each

case.

On the other hand, knowledge provided by the experimental science does not

exhaust our knowledge of nature and therefore is not the only way to know it. There is

no doubt that scientific knowledge is peculiarly reliable owing to the rigor of the

theoretical proofs and of the experiments which are used; however, this is not a

sufficient reason for denying the validity of ordinary knowledge which is the backdrop

of science, or of the philosophical or theological knowledge, although these must take

into account the data provided by science when reflecting on the natural world.

Scientism, which considers experimental science as the only valid knowledge of reality,

or at least as the model which any other type of knowledge should imitate, lacks any

scientific ground, and insofar as it is presented as scientific, or as a scientific conclusion,

is an illegitimate pseudoscientific extrapolation. Actually, no science in particular, or all

of them together, can judge the validity of what falls outside science.

IX. ACTIVITY AND CAUSALITY OF THE NATURAL ENTITIES

Causality is a topic not only of the philosophy of nature which studies its

relationship with the physical world, but also of metaphysics which studies it globally,

including its realisation in the spiritual world.

From the very beginning we have considered dynamism as one of the basic

characteristics of the natural world. We have then considered the ways of being,

substantial as well accidental which are at the same time source of this dynamism and

result of its unfolding. Now we are going to consider how the natural dynamism unfolds

through physical action. This will take us to examine the topic of causality as it appears

in nature.

26. CAUSALITY AND PHYSICAL ACTION

Dynamism unfolds through actions of the physical systems. We shall show how every

action is an interaction; we shall distinguish the different types of interactions and

consider efficient causality which is the type of cause directly related to activity.

26.1 Natural dynamism and physical interactions

If we admit that natural entities have their own dynamism we should conclude that

physical activity is not just one more aspect of the world: it is something which deeply

permeates the whole nature. We meet actions everywhere. Even that which appears

more static is, properly speaking in a state of equilibrium: in this case different

dynamisms are in action but their effects are balanced.

Properly speaking, natural activity consists of interactions: it is never the work

of a completely isolated agent; it always implies the action of some beings or

components on other beings or components.

If we take into account the central role played in nature by the unitary systems or

substances we can see how it is especially interesting to relate interactions to substances.

Actually, interactions correspond to the actions of substances, of their components or of

their aggregate parts. Therefore, it seems logical to focus the study of the natural activity

on the actions of its subjects, i.e. on the agent or efficient causes

We can state that the dynamism proper to the natural is the cause of the

interactions of the physical beings. Actually, each physical being has a capacity of

acting in different ways according to different circumstance. Its dynamism is a capacity

of acting which is not exhausted in some specific results but unfolds in very different

ways in function of other dynamisms which intervene in each specific case. Therefore,

in each singular case a confluence of dynamisms unfold to produce specific interactions.

The enormous variety of possible results is what makes it necessary, in order to study

the natural dynamism, to artificially provoke situations in which we can observe and

experiment with particular aspects after separating them from other aspects.

At the same time, natural dynamisms are the result of physical interactions.

Actually, different interactions produce new systems which have new types of

dynamism, either because this type of systems and dynamisms did not exist before or

because new cases are produced of something which existed before.

26.2 Modalities of the natural transformations

Physical interactions produce natural changes. What is natural is mutable.

Mutability is a basic condition of the natural entities which have their own dynamism

that is realised and unfolds in space-time conditions, i.e. space configurations which are

produced and change, and temporal rhythms which mark the succession of the physical

states.

In relation to the effects produced we can distinguish two great modalities in the

natural transformations: substantial and accidental transformations. In substantial

transformations changes in the essential ways of being occur: one substance ceases to

exist and a different one is produced, or a new substance is formed from others which

combine to form a new unity, or a substance breaks up originating in this way various

different substances. In accidental transformations the same substance is preserved as

such while some of its accidents change. There is no doubt that substances change

during accidental changes; however, they only change accidentally. This clarification is

important if one takes into account the fact that many objection against the concept of

substance proceed from the idea according to which substances would be what remains

through changes, as if they were a kind of immutable substratum.

We have already considered these modalities of natural changes or

transformations while examining the natural processes. We have also emphasised that

there are only three possible accidental changes: the change of place or local movement,

the change in quantity usually called increase or diminution, and the change in quality

usually called alteration. We have also said that there is a hierarchy among these

changes: the most basic one is local movement, then we have the quantitative change,

and finally the qualitative one. Now we can better understand why this is so and what it

means. Actually, we have seen that quantity and quality are intertwined, and that

quantity is the basic space-time frame within which qualities exist. Therefore, any

physical change implies some change of place, and any qualitative change implies some

quantitative change. On the other hand, there is no change in the accident quando, or

temporal situation, since time is precisely the measure of any change. There is no

change in the accident relation either which is nevertheless the consequence of some of

the already mentioned changes. There is no change in action and passion either because

these accidents, as we shall see, accompany all changes.

In relation to duration, one usually distinguishes between instantaneous and

successive changes. The successive change appears when there is a succession along the

change as usually happens with changes related to material beings which are affected by

quantitative dimensions (space and time). Typical instantaneous changes are the

substantial ones. Although ordinarily preceded by successive accidental changes which

end up by causing a substantial one, this type of change in itself occurs in an abrupt

way: some types of substances cease to be and at the same time other types of

substances begin to exist as it happens in a special way in the generation and death of

the living organisms.

26.3 The physical order and the four causes

To look for the cause of something means to try and explain why that thing exists

and has its characteristic way of being. Looking for explanations is, to a large extent,

looking for causes.

What is a cause? A classical definition of cause is the following: a cause is the

principle on which something depends in its being and in its becoming. A cause is a

principle though not any principle as a simple beginning could be. It is a principle which

really affects the being of what exists or the production of transformations.

The systematic study of causality properly belongs to metaphysics; however, as

it happens with other topics, the basic modalities of causality are those which are found

in nature. We are going to focus our attention on them.

In the first book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle analyses what the previous

philosophers had said about causes and presents his doctrine on the four causes, i.e.

material, formal, efficient and final. It is indeed an enormously influential doctrine

which is still in use because it takes in the basic modalities of causality. Aristotle found

a treatment of the first three causes in the works of his predecessors and considered a

glorious achievement the fact of having gone in depth in an original way into the fourth

type, i.e. the final cause.

We have already mentioned causality when speaking of material and formal

causes. We shall presently expound on those ideas which are necessary in order to offer

a systematic perspective of the four causes and develop more in detail that which

corresponds to the topic of this chapter, i.e. the efficient cause.

Material and formal causes are intrinsic causes since matter and form are the

constitutive co-principles of the natural beings. On the other hand, efficient and final

causes are extrinsic because they do not refer to the being of the natural entities but to

the agent which produces a process and to the end which leads its action. Let us examine

how each of the four causes is usually characterised in accordance with the classical

scheme.

Material cause is that from which something is made, and remains within the

thing made. It is wood in the case of a door, glass in the case of a window, etc. One

speaks of second matter when the material cause is the substance which changes only

accidentally. On the other hand, one speaks of proto-matter in order to indicate the

materiality common to all natural entities and which can be considered as a substratum

present in every change including the substantial change.

Formal cause is that by which something has a specific way of being. It is either

the accidental form, i.e. that accidental way of being which changes in the accidental

changes, or the substantial form which expresses the way of being of the substances and

which does not change during accidental changes. The different accidents are accidental

ways of being and therefore can be expressed as accidental forms. On the other hand,

what is usually called form in ordinary language corresponds to form and figure which

we have already referred to while speaking of the fourth species of quality in Aristotle’s

philosophy.

At the substantial level, proto-matter and substantial form are the material and

the formal cause respectively. However, they are causes as constitutive principles of the

essence of the substance: they are not complete things or beings, or pieces or parts of

things but constitutive principles of beings as potency (matter) and act (form). At the

accidental level, the substance behaves as matter or subject (second matter) while the

accidents as forms (accidental forms), and they are also related as potency and act.

Efficient cause is that from which an action arises which affects the being or the

becoming of another thing. This is what one commonly understands as «cause» in

ordinary language. It is for instance the hitting of something and causing its

displacement. Efficient causes are agents or subjects of the actions. Final cause is that in

view of which something is done. It is the objective or the end sought by the agent in a

conscious or unconscious way when it acts.

We have considered the material and formal causes in the previous chapters at

substantial as well as at accidental level. We shall consider the final cause later on. Let

us now examine the efficient cause.

26.4 Efficient causality: classical notion

The activity of the natural entities corresponds to their ways of being. The

classical aphorism operatio sequitur esse means that an entity can carry out those

actions which correspond to its way of being and, therefore, to its substantial and

accidental forms. An agent is a natural subject which acts always in accordance with its

way of being. We shall focus our attention on the action as actualisation of the

virtualities possessed by the agents or efficient causes.

The efficient cause is one of the four Aristotelian causes. Material and formal

causes constitute beings intrinsically while the efficient cause produces movement and

the final cause indicates its direction. Aristotle summarises his doctrine with the

following words: “In a primary sense the immanent matter from which something is

made is called cause, for example, bronze is the cause of the statue and silver is the

cause of the chalice and also the genera of these things. In a different sense, the species

and the model are causes; and this is the enunciation of the essence and its genera (for

instance, of the musical octave, the relation to two and one and, in short, the number),

and the parts which are in the enunciation. Then comes that from which the first

principle of change or rest proceeds; for example, he who gave an advice is cause of the

action, and the father is cause of his son; in short, it is the agent of what is done, and that

which produces the change of that which suffers it. Then comes that which is as the end;

this is that for which something is done; for example, health is the cause of going for a

walk. Why do we actually go for a walk? We say: in order to be healthy. And in saying

so, we think we have given the cause. And how many other things with different movers

are done with a beginning and an end! For instance, health is the cause of slimming, but

also a laxative, or medicines, or the instruments of a physician. Then all these things are

for the cause of the end and are different among them because some are instruments and

others are works”121

.

Aristotle doe not use the expression «efficient cause» whose history is

complex122

. He speaks of «that from which the first principle of change or rest

proceeds», «the first source of change or rest», «the principle of movement». It is

therefore the «moving cause» or the «agent cause».

The fundamental core of the Aristotelian doctrine preserves its validity. Actually,

the natural activity corresponds to a dynamism whose «source» is found in the

«interior» of the natural entities: it corresponds to their essential way of being, to their

virtualities or qualities. This dynamism unfolds in function of the internal tendencies

and external circumstances which make their actualisation possible.

Movement, as actualisation of potentialities, presupposes always the existence of

subjects provided with their own dynamism, and of circumstances which condition their

unfolding. All in all, movement requires some causes which can produce it, i.e. some

subjects of the natural dynamism. These subjects are the unitary systems or substances,

and the aggregations of substances.

26.5 Efficient causality vis-à-vis science

That there are agent causes is a fact that can be easily verified if one relies on the data of

ordinary experience. However, it seems that the scientific progress has introduced a new

dimension which compels the posing of the problem about the real existence of agent

causes once again. We shall now consider some objections which can be posed against

the classical conception of efficient cause in the name of science.

a) Agents and interactions

121

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, V, 2, 1013 a 24 – 1013 b 4. An almost identical text can be found in: Physica, II, 3, 194 b 23

– 195 a 1. 122

On the history of this concept, one may read for instance: E. GILSON, “Notes pour l’histoire d ela cause efficiente”,

Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 37, (1962), pp. 7-31.

Experimental science has created in this field a slightly paradoxical situation: it

is claimed, on the one hand, that science deals only with the material and efficient cause

and rejects other causes; but also the notion of efficient cause, on the other hand, is

called into question. Actually, science seeks laws which permit to determine the

behaviour of the bodies under the action of forces; however, these forces do not

correspond to agents but to interactions. For example, at the level of fundamental

physics explanations are focused on the standard model of the four fundamental

interactions which are studied through the field theories (gravity, electromagnetism, and

the two nuclear forces). Therefore, the classical distinctions between agent and patient,

motors and mobiles, seem to shade off, and science replaces them with a focus on the

determination of phenomena under general laws.

However, the usual representation of actions in terms of agent subjects preserves

its validity because interactions presuppose, in one way or another, unitary systems

which are their subjects. This is clear in the case of subjects with a high level of

organisation. This is especially true in the case of living beings, but subjects of actions

exist also in the field of non-living beings: it is the case of particles, atoms, molecules,

macro-molecules and also aggregations which, although not unitary systems, behave as

unitary subjects of interactions. In order to explain movement science uses models

which at times do not seem to make reference to agent causes: for instance, «waves»,

«forces», «fields of forces», «energy», «field intensity». Nevertheless, it is always

assumed that there are subjects of interactions, and frequently reference is expressly

made to them.

b) Action and contact

Aristotle claimed that in nature an agent cause always acts through contact: “it

moves the mobile by precisely acting on the mobile insofar as it is a mobile. But it does

so by contact so that at the same time it receives and action. Because of this we can

define movement as the actualisation of the mobile insofar as it is mobile, the contact

with that which can move it being the cause of this attribute so that the motor also

receives an action. The motor, or agent, will always be the vehicle of a form, either this

or that form which, when moving, will be the source and cause of the change; for

instance, a fully formed man engenders a man from what is potentially a man”123

.

However, he also claims that contact can be understood in a wide sense: for

example, the change produced by a stone which is thrown and crashes, is due to the

agent which threw it. Moreover, there are special cases: the celestial bodies act on the

sub-lunar ones, and the magnet on that which is attracted.

Disregarding ancient examples, we can claim that, according to the present-day

knowledge, the existence of a contact is required for a natural action. Centuries-long

discussions have dragged along on the possibility of «distance action» without physical

contact, and the «field» theories appear to support this possibility since they refer to

123

ARISTOTLE, Physica, III, 2,202 a 5-12. Cf. also ibid., VII, 2: the entire chapter is dedicated to the study of this

problem. It is interesting to note that, in the text quoted, it is stated that in each action there is an interaction.

interactions which sometime (the electromagnetic and the gravitational one) are

influential at great distances. However, even in these cases the existence of a certain

contact is being claimed: interactions propagate at a finite speed, they do not exercise

any influence until they have covered a specific length of time necessary to «reach» the

place where they act; moreover, they lean on physical «particles» which work as

«mediators» of the interaction124

.

Another objection against the necessity of contact for the physical action could

come, as we also saw when speaking of space and localisation, from those

interpretations which claim a non-locality in quantum physics. The difficulty of these

problems leads us to emphasise the fact that, although we claim the necessity of contact,

there are not a few questions on what this means and how it is realised. The necessity of

contact does not mean that the physical actions are reduced to «pushing» and

«dragging», as is suggested by our ordinary experience; nor does it mean that reality

needs to be represented necessarily by making recourse to corpuscular images. If we ask

for the «ultimate» way of representing the activity of the physical world, perhaps we

should answer that, in spite of the progress of our knowledge an ultimate answer to this

question is still very difficult to give.

c) The principle of causality

Generally speaking the principle of causality states that everything that exists must have

a proportionate cause which can explain its existence. If one wants to apply this

principle in a complete way he should take into account all those causes which intervene

in each case. Here we shall limit ourselves to examine how this principle can be applied

to the problem of the agent cause, and to the explanation of movement.

From this particular perspective this principle could be expressed by claiming

the necessity of an agent in order to explain movement. It is convenient to note from the

very beginning that a complete explanation of actions and transformations will have to

take into account also the founding divine action which gives being and the capacity of

acting to everything that exists. Moreover, our knowledge is very limited even in

science because our cognitive apparatus, although it empowers us to reach conclusions

which may seem extraordinary, hardly permits us to give an exhaustive explanation of

nature. Therefore we should not be surprised if once again we stumble in the limits of

our capacity of representation and explanation.

One of the problems which arise from this issue refers to Aristotle’s claim

according to which everything that moves is moved by something else125

. Aristotle gives

a lot of attention to it since it has an important place in the proof of the existence of the

First Mover and therefore in the connection between physics and metaphysics. In order

to demonstrate it he proposes three arguments which are partly related to difficult

124

Each of the four fundamental interactions has some intermediate particles associated with it: electromagnetism with the

photon, gravity with the hypothetical gravitons, the strong nuclear force with the gluons, and the weak nuclear force with

the W and Z particles. 125

Aquinas formulates it in a lapidary language: quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, and uses it in the reasoning of his first

way to prove the existence of God: cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.

aspects of his worldview126

. The affirmation seems to oppose the principle of inertia of

the classical physics according to which an external action does not necessarily provoke

movement but only acceleration or change of movement. However, one may say that

movement is caused, at one stage or another, by some agent and that its permanence is

due to physical circumstances. Moreover, according to Mach’s principle inertia is due to

the interactions of a body with the rest of the universe, and the relativity theory explains

this in function of the distributions of masses. If this is so, inertia is an effect arising

from physical interactions and it does not mean that bodies keep their movement

independently from external causes. This interpretation appears to be pretty coherent.

We can also ask ourselves how a dynamism proper to natural entities and the

necessity of external agents in order to provoke movement can go together. To answer

this we shall recall that in every action there is an interaction: the unfolding of the

dynamism depends on the circumstances and therefore on the interactions. Consequently

and in any case there are actions which accompany the activity of the natural subjects. In

the case of the living beings any action presupposes physical interactions within the

organism, and between the organism and the surrounding environment (sensations,

neuronal processes, etc.). Moreover, if we stretch our question to the limit we shall

stumble with the necessity of making a «metaphysical leap» by claiming the necessity of

the founding divine action which ultimately explains the existence and the activity of

some beings that do not have in themselves their ultimate reason of being and of acting.

This seems to be the deep meaning of the first way of Aquinas in order to prove the

existence of God. This way acknowledges the fact that the activity of the creatures

presupposes always a passing from potency to act, and that causal chains formed by the

creatures can only be ultimately understood if the existence of a Being is admitted which

is Pure Act, source of all being, radical foundation of the dynamism of all created

entities. Similarly, the second way of Aquinas considers how the agent causes remit,

ultimately, to a First Cause which is the foundation of their activity.

26.6 Action and passion

The study of the agent cause takes us by hand to the consideration of two of the

nine accidents of Aristotle: action and passion.

a) Action and passion as accidents

Insofar as we can distinguish unitary subjects of interactions it makes sense to

speak, as Aristotle did, of the accidents action and passion. For example, in the case of

us human beings it is clear that we are active subjects of the actions we carry out and

passive subjects of the actions of other beings. One can say something similar in the

case of the other living beings which have a well-defined unity and individuality. This

126

Cf. ARISTOTLE, Physica, VII, 1, 241 b 24 – 242 a 16; VIII, 4, 254 b 24 – 256 a 3; VIII, 5, 257 b 6 – 13. Aquinas

presents and uses these arguments in the Summa contra Gentiles, book I, Ch. 13, where he sets out at length the proof which

is synthetically presented in the first way of the Summa Theologiae.

consideration can be extended to the field of non-living beings insofar as we deal with

substances which are individual unitary systems, and also to the interactions between

living and non-living beings, and between parts of these beings.

This conceptualisation is applied also to the study of those phenomena which are

very far from ordinary experience such as atomic particles. Actually, one speaks of

particles subjected to the action of fields produced by the activity of other systems.

Particles interact and interactions are precisely mutual actions.

From the point of view of the philosophy of nature action is an accident which

consists in the actualisation of the active potency of a substance. The natural is

characterised by having its own dynamism. However, this dynamism is not completely

actualised in all its possibilities: some possibilities are actualised in accordance with the

present circumstances in each particular case (i.e. in accordance with the presence of

other dynamisms). For this reason action is an accident: it is something real present in a

subject, it is the actualisation of some of its potentialities without any change in the

essential way of being of the subject.

We refer here to the predicamental action, i.e. action considered as a predicate or

category, as one of the accidents. One can easily become aware of the reality of this

accident by considering what would happen if it were denied. In this case we should

admit that all subjects are continuously actualising all their potentialities which is

evidently false. Admitting the reality of action is equivalent to acknowledging that, in

nature, subjects act by unfolding every time only part of their potentialities.

We can say that through action, i.e. by acting - by actualising potentialities - a

subject (substance or second matter) which has the capacity of acting (active potency,

first act, way of being), actualises this capacity (passes to a second act).

The aphorism operatio sequitur esse expresses the fact that every agent-subject

acts according to the potentialities that are proper to it and which correspond to its way

of being. For this reason the way of being of the subjects is known through their actions.

The more perfect a being is the more perfect are the actions that it is able to carry out.

It is also certain that actions perfect the subject which carries them out at least

from the ontological point of view since this is equivalent to the unfolding of the

potentialities of the way of being of the subject. Evidently it may happen that an action

be prejudicial to the subject because it is not adequate to its nature. Moreover, from the

ethical point of view, although an action may have a certain ontological goodness, it

may be globally evil because it is ill-oriented in relation to the ultimate end.

On the other hand, when these considerations are transferred to the human field,

it is especially important to realise that actions are accidents. Actually, much as these

accidents can either perfect or be prejudicial to the person who carries them out, this

person always has, as such and independently from his actions, the dignity that

corresponds to each person. His human rights need to be always acknowledged and he

always has the duty of acting in accordance with his dignity as a person.

Passion in a subject which receives it corresponds to the action of an agent. We

may say that passion is an accident which consists in the actualisation of the passive

potency of a substance under the action of an efficient cause.

Actions and passions in the physical world imply changes since somehow they

always presuppose a material contact. Agents change when acting and subjects also

change when receiving actions.

There are different levels of causality in natural entities which have active

potencies of different types, and therefore are able to carry out different types of actions.

Non-living beings have potentialities which are studied in physics and chemistry. At the

fundamental level the present-day knowledge remits to the four basic interactions

already mentioned which give origin, in the successive levels of organisation, to

different modalities of interaction, e.g. affinity which causes the chemical bonds among

atoms, the inter-molecular forces, the activity of the bio-chemical macro-molecules such

as proteins and nucleic acids, etc. Living beings have, besides the physico-chemical

ones, potentialities which refer to life actions such as nutrition, reproduction, sense

knowledge and sense tendencies.

b) Transient and immanent actions

The consideration of the actions of living beings allows us to distinguish two

broad types of action which are called transient and immanent.

Transient actions are those which have an effect external to the same agent.

These are typically the physical actions which constitute the predicate or accident

action, to which we have almost exclusively referred up to now. In a classical

terminology the term action, without specifications, is used to designate transient

actions.

Immanent actions are those whose terminus is the same agent which therefore

perfects itself while acting. Knowledge and love are usually considered to be typically

immanent actions. Obviously, there are actions which include at the same time transient

and immanent aspects. It can also be said that among natural entities any immanent

operation has material dimensions and therefore includes transient actions. However,

actions such as seeing, hearing, thinking, reasoning, intellectually perceiving a truth,

loving the good, are usually considered as immanent operations which remain within the

subject and perfect it, although they entail a physical action as a basis. Life, and

especially spiritual life, is characteristically immanent activity; it presupposes a way of

being and acting in which there is a specific autonomy and a kind of perfection which is

greater than in any of the other levels.

With the immanent operations proper to the human beings we reach a level that,

although closely related to nature, transcends it in a special way. In a special way,

intellectual knowledge and love of friendship rise above the limitations of what is

material; unlike the latter which is always found particularised and can only be

participated by division, intellectual knowledge and the love of friendship can be

multiplied indefinitely without diminution. Actually, they increase in depth and dignity

when they are participated in a greater measure.

26.7 Causality and the emergence of novelties

We have already mentioned the problem of emergence in the previous chapters.

In nature we come across different levels of organisation each of which has new

characteristics which did not exist in the other levels and which are usually considered

as emerging respect to the less organised levels.

The emergence of novelties demands the existence of causes which may make

them possible. The natural processes which lead to the production of these novelties are

becoming better known; as a matter of fact, an important part of the present-day

scientific progress is related to this type of processes which are usually grouped under

the name of complexities.

Two types of natural causes need to be present for new characteristics to emerge.

On the one hand, there must be potentialities that can be able to emerge; for example,

for the development of a tree there must be some seeds which contain the elements

which make the development of the tree possible. On the other hand, the confluence is

needed of those agent causes which are necessary for the actualisation of these

potentialities. In the case of the seeds, it is necessary that all those factors (humidity for

water, adequate soil for the necessary nutrients, etc.) which are necessary condition for

the actualisation of the potentialities contained in the seed be present simultaneously.

The scientific progress shows that these potentialities exist, to a large extent, as

information, i.e. as programmes of possible activity which are engraved and stored, as it

were, in physical structures. We know how the biological information works, and we

can also speak of information in a wider sense in the case of non-living beings.

Therefore we can understand how the potentialities of nature can unfold when the

appropriate circumstances are present producing new types of organisations. Almost

always these are new individuals of already existing species; however, nothing prevents

that new species be also produced, i.e. new types of ways of being.

Natural causes do not eliminate the problem of the radical foundation of nature.

As a matter of fact the opposite occurs. The better we know the natural causes the more

clearly we see that nature has a very efficient, complex and subtle rationality whose

explanation remits to a causality which transcends nature and, at the same time, is

immanent to it because it places into it those potentialities and conditions necessary for

their actualisation. Only God, as First Cause which gives being to all that exists, can

provide the radical foundation to natural causality without lessening its value. On the

other hand, natural causes appear to be the ordinary way of the divine action which

wants to count on them and, for that, it gives them potentialities necessary for their

actualisation and arranges the confluence of those conditions necessary for this

actualisation.

27 CONTINGENCY OF NATURE

The study of the activity of the natural entities leads us to pose some questions in

relation to the necessity and contingency of this activity: do natural laws have an

absolute necessity, or do they only express generic regularities? Is there really chance in

the natural processes?

Moreover, these questions take us by hand to pose in a general way the problem

of necessity and contingency of nature which is one of the basic problems we need to

tackle if we really want to understand the being of the natural.

Since our knowledge of nature is not a simple copy or snapshot of the same

nature, we shall begin our analysis by presenting the kind of relationship that exists

between scientific laws and natural laws. We shall then examine the types of necessity

and contingency present in nature, as well as the problems of determinism and chance.

27.1 Scientific laws and natural laws

Natural activity unfolds around dynamic patterns. Science formulates laws which

refer to these patterns, and when these laws are well proved we can claim that they

reflect somehow the natural laws.

a) Scientific laws

Experimental science seeks a knowledge of nature which can be submitted to

experimental control. It achieves this aim to a large extent through those enunciations

which are called laws.

Scientific laws are enunciations which refer to different aspects of the natural

phenomena. When these laws are formulated mathematically they establish relations

between magnitudes which can be measured directly or indirectly. For example,

experimental laws establish relations between magnitudes whose values can be

measured directly, and the general principles, such as the distinct principles of

conservation (energy, electrical charge, etc.), express general conditions which are

present in all processes or in some concrete type of processes. Other laws are not

expressed mathematically; however, they constitute the basis for mathematical

formulations. The case, for instance, of the relativity theory can be taken as an example:

this theory postulates that scientific laws are expressed in the same way although

different systems of reference may be used.

When well proved, the scientific laws express aspects of the reality. However,

they make reference to reality through theoretical constructions (concepts and relations),

and are not just a simple snapshot of nature. For example, by saying that force is equal

to mass multiplied by acceleration, results of possible measurements are actually

anticipated in particular conditions. This law expresses therefore a relationship between

magnitudes whose definition and measurement are not given by nature but depend on

conceptual and experimental contexts constructed by the scientists.

Scientific laws express regularities which really exist in nature in accordance

with the modalities proper to each type of law (experimental laws or general principles,

determinist laws or probabilities, etc.). Since our knowledge is very limited we cannot

claim that scientific laws, no matter how well proved they are, coincide completely with

the natural laws. However, if well proved, we may claim that they are not purely our

mental constructions but a reflection of a real natural order.

Scientific laws have an approximate and perfectible character: it is always

possible to better describe those phenomena which the laws refer to, for instance, by

constructing new concepts and by improving the precision of our formulations. This

does not mean, though, that they will be mere hypotheses or conjectures. Many

scientific laws describe natural phenomena in a correct way, although it is always

possible to achieve better conceptualisations or greater precision. Each scientific law has

a validity which is determined by the context of concepts and availability of adequate

instruments. When a law is well proved within the area of specific phenomena, we can

claim that it will continue to be valid within this area although we may be able to

formulate more exact or deeper laws and theories in the same area or in others.

b) Natural laws

The term law refers, in its most proper meaning, to rules of human behaviour. In

this context one can speak of obeying or abiding by a law, or of the fact that we are

subjected to specific laws. By analogy, this concept is applied also to the activity of the

natural agents because of the much regularity that characterises this activity. One can

then speak of natural agents obeying or abiding by a law.

There is no doubt that there are regularities in the activities of nature. Since

purely natural beings do not enjoy freedom we tend to think that all the actions of the

natural agents are realised by following pre-established regular patterns with total

necessity. Leaving for later the analysis of this issue, we can say that the laws of physics

are an expression of the regularities that characterise the activity of the natural agents.

Although there is much regularity, there are also many factors that intervene in

the unfolding of the natural processes and therefore it is very difficult, not to say

impossible, that the same circumstances be repeated exactly in different processes. It can

be said that properly speaking, there are no laws in nature. The concept of law, when

applied to the behaviour of nature, corresponds to an abstraction. It is not just the

question of being aware of the fact that scientific laws are not just a simple snapshot of

nature. The problem is much deeper: in reality, nature is made of entities (and their

properties) and processes, and laws are abstract enunciations by which we express

structural and repeatable aspects of the natural.

In a strict sense, in nature nothing repeats itself in an exact way. There is no

doubt that there is much regularity which can be considered as repetitions when

considering certain specific effects. However, the repetitions are only approximate

though at times the approximation is very precise.

We are easily led to think that what is exactly repeated is what, in ordinary life

or in the scientific practice, is pretty stable. We do not realise that the configuration of

the constellations of stars changes, or that the sun is exhausting its fuel, or many other

changes which are imperceptible to ordinary experience and also to science. We cannot

even be sure that the best-proven scientific laws remain exactly the same with the

passing of time. These problems lead us to pose the question about the degree of

necessity of the natural activity.

27.2 Necessity and contingency in nature

The concept of contingency is opposed to that of necessity. What is contingent

can be in one way or another, can be or not to be. On the contrary, what is necessary

cannot cease to be what it is, or cannot cease to be at all.

There are different modalities of necessity and contingency. Let us now examine the

concepts of necessity and contingency which refer to the level of being and to that of

acting.

a) Necessity and contingency in being

All the substances of the physical world can be subjects not only of accidental

changes, in which they change accidentally while preserving their essential way of

being, but also of substantial changes when they are transformed into another or more

substances. The substance - or the substances - which existed before ceases to exist and

is changed into another or more substances. In this sense all material beings are

contingent since they are subjected to generation and corruption: they begin to exist

through substantial changes and they can cease to be what they are.

Actually, we can currently provoke transformations also of those natural systems

which are more stable in a natural way; this is the case of the atomic nuclei and of the

sub-atomic particles which are more stable and which can be transformed into other

micro-physical systems in an artificial way. The most organised physico-chemical

systems can be easily broken down, and living organisms show their contingency when

they begin to exist by generation and cease to exist with death.

Consequently, contingency in being extends to all levels of nature and to all

individual systems. It is logical that this be so since they are material beings which, in

principle, can change into others. It is because of this that one can say that the root of

this contingency is materiality which implies space-time structuring and, therefore, the

possibility of accidental as well as of substantial changes.

We may ask ourselves if this contingency in being also affects the universe as a

whole; actually, it seems that transformations of systems into others do not affect the

existence of the universe as a whole but only its parts. However, we can also claim that

the universe as a whole is contingent since, in this case, if the universe were necessary it

should have characteristics proper to the divinity. If something existed in a completely

necessary manner it would exist by itself, independently from what could happen to

other beings; it would depend on no other being and therefore it should have being by

itself; however, this can only be attributed to God. If one claimed that the universe has

being in a necessary way one would be admitting some form of pantheism since he

would identify the universe with God which is impossible and does not correspond to

what experience shows.

In any case, there are many types of necessity in the world. Although there is no

absolute necessity yet there are many types of relative necessity. Specifically, the

universe as a whole will not cease to exist, unless it is annihilated (the Christian doctrine

in this regard teaches that the world will be transformed and not annihilated). There are

also many beings which have a relative, though quite strong, physical necessity and this

occurs in individuals as well as in species and in certain types of organisation. For

example, the protons which constitute ordinary matter are not transformed

spontaneously into other particles or at least they do it so only in rare occasions. In the

present-day conditions of our world the most stable sub-atomic particles and many

nuclei of atoms are not disintegrated; bacteria have been existing and multiplying for

many millions of years defying all sorts of changes in the environment, and the present-

day organisation of our world is pretty stable.

There is no doubt that existence of many things in our world, including us

human beings, depends on circumstances which could change because of pretty simple

causes such as the collision of a big meteorite with the earth. However, if no big

catastrophes occur, the organisation of the world, as we know it in its basic aspects, is

pretty stable.

Spiritual beings have a much stronger type of necessity since they are not

composed of material parts and therefore are not subjected to decomposition or

substantial changes. A personal being cannot be transformed into another

(transmigration of souls, or reincarnation, is impossible). In the case of purely spiritual

beings, such as the angels (whose existence can only be known through divine

revelation), once in existence they cannot die; annihilation is required for them to cease

to be, and this can only occur as the result of a God’s action. Human beings, made of

matter and spirit, have the necessity of the spiritual beings so that, once in existence,

could cease to exist only through annihilation by God. However, we are subjected to

death which implies the separation of the spirit from the matter; the spirit in such a new

situation begins a somehow mysterious life which corresponds to the type of necessity

proper to the spiritual realities. Obviously, only God exists with a complete and proper

type of necessity since he and his own being are identical, without depending in any way

on anything outside him. What exist outside God are creatures which depend completely

on God for their being although they may have different degrees of necessity in being.

We have so far referred to necessity as a perfection: the more consistent

something is in its being the more perfect it is, and less it depends on the changing

circumstances. However, it is possible to refer to necessity in another sense, as

something proper to the more imperfect beings, i.e. as a sign of imperfection. We have

said, for instance, that those particularly simple beings (such as some sub-atomic

particles, nuclei of atoms or bacteria) have an especially strong consistency precisely

because of their material simplicity. On the other hand, we can now add that especially

perfect beings, such as is the case of superior living organisms in general and of man in

particular, are greatly fragile in their material being. Actually, they require a very

sophisticated type of organisation which can easily cease to exist owing to a number of

circumstances which can cause death.

b) Necessity and contingency in acting

More dependence on matter means more necessity in acting: this is a sign of

imperfection. The more perfect beings have a greater independence respect to material

conditions owing to the fact that they have knowledge and sensitivity. In the case of man

there is authentic freedom because of his spirituality. In this context necessity is usually

opposed to freedom. Man performs many actions in a necessary way and precisely those

which correspond to the automatic unfolding of his material dynamism. On the other

hand, he acts necessarily in his spiritual dimension in relation to those things which

necessarily derive from his way of being (for instance, he necessarily looks for

happiness, although he may make mistakes in the way of looking for it), and he acts

freely in those things over which he has dominion. These references to an issue that

transcends the proper object of the philosophy of nature seem to be sufficient. A more

complete study would include for instance the consideration of the possibility of going

wrong while acting freely, a fact which is not properly speaking a perfection since

freedom achieves its authentic perfection when it used to act well.

Material beings do not have freedom and in this sense one may say that they act

in a necessary way. However, a number of varied circumstances happen to converge

into material actions so that the necessity of the material acting does not imply as such a

determinist type of acting. In other words, lack of freedom is not equivalent to a

completely uniform kind of acting in any circumstance. We shall now examine therefore

this problem related to determinism.

27.3 Determinism and uncertainty

Before anything else we shall show how frequently, when speaking of

determinism or necessity of the natural activity, one only intends to highlight the fact

that, unlike the rational and free human actions, natural agents act in a way determined

by laws, instincts or tendencies. There is no doubt that this way of speaking is correct, it

corresponds to reality and does not pose special problems. In this sense one can say that

the natural activity is univocally determined (determinatio ad unum).

Difficulties arise, on the other hand, when we wish to be more precise in trying

to determine what constitutes the necessity of the natural activity. Does it mean that

everything happens in accordance with a rigid determinism? Is there some type of lack

of determination in nature?

Determinism in its classical form was expressed in a famous passage of a work

published by the French physicist Pierre Simon de Laplace in 1814: “So then, we need

to consider the present-day state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as

the cause of the state which will follow. An intelligence which in a specific moment

could know all the forces which animate nature, as well as the respective situation of the

beings that constitute it, and could be enough wide to be able to analyse such data, could

summarise in one formula only the movement of the biggest bodies of the universe as

well as the lightest atoms. Nothing would appear uncertain to it and past and the future

would be present to its eyes”127

. Of course, Laplace acknowledges later on that the

human spirit “will always remain infinitely remote” from an intelligence like that.

However, this limitation of our knowledge will coexist with a completely rigid

determinism in nature: in principle, any future state of nature could be foreseen with all

precision by a sufficiently powerful intelligence by simply applying physical laws.

In the first half of the 20th

century, quantum physics seemed to discredit this

opinion. The uncertainty principle, formulated in 1927 by the German physicist Werner

Heisenberg, states that there are limits in the micro-physical world which prevent the

measuring of the values of couples of conjugated magnitudes (such as position and

moment of a sub-atomic particle, or energy and time) simultaneously and with all

precision. However, there are still discussions going on whether these limits only refer

to the possibilities of measurement, or they also affect the way of being of the micro-

physical entities128

. It is interesting to point out that, according to the uncertainty

principle, what cannot be done is to measure at the same time two conjugated

magnitudes like the ones already mentioned; however, nothing prevents any one of

those magnitudes from being measured with enormous precision.

In the last decades of the 20th

century the theories of the determinist chaos have

shed new light on the problem and posed, at the same time, new questions. These

theories show that, even if one admits that the physical laws are determinist, small

changes are enough in the initial conditions of the systems to be able to produce very

different results. Therefore, determinism and uncertainty could coexist. We have

actually pointed out that conditions are never completely identical. Therefore, a

basically determinist behaviour can produce unpredictable results. However, this

unpredictability is also relative: given some specific set of conditions, the fact is that

there is also a set of some specific possibilities. Actually, the theories of chaos do not

claim the existence of a pure chaos. It may also sound shocking to hear someone

speaking of determinist chaos; however, this name expresses a reality: new laws

127

Pierre Simon DE LAPLACE, Ensayo filosófico sobre las probabilidades, Alianza, Madrid 1985, p. 25. 128

The bibliography on this issue is immense. One may read for instance: N. CARTWRIGHT, “Philosophical Problems on

Quantum Theory”, in: L. KRÜGER – L.J. DASTON – M. HEIDELBERGER (publishers), The Probabilistic Revolution,

The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.): vol. II, Ideas in Sciences, 1989, pp. 417-435; S. DELIGEORGES (publisher), El

mundo cuántico, Alianza, Madrid 1990; S.L. JAKI, Chance and Realityand other Essays, University Press of America,

Lanham 1986, pp. 1-21; F. SELVAGGI, Causalità e indeterminismo, Università Gregoriana, Rome 1964.

previously unknown have been determined which are verified in those phenomena that

these theories study.

It is difficult to propose a definitive solution to the problem of uncertainty in

nature. In any case, it seems possible to state something very important in order to avoid

equivocations: concretely, causality is not equivalent to determinism. On some

occasions the existence of hints in favour of uncertainty is interpreted as if the very

concept of causality had failed, and some speak of the possibility of events without

causes. Nothing is more remote from reality if we take into account the fact that

causality includes the different types of causes which we have already considered, and

that nothing can begin to exist in nature unless produced by proportionate causes. On the

other hand, it is certain that there is uncertainty in the natural activity, so that completely

determinist laws cannot be formulated which may permit an exact prediction of the

future in the sense presented by Laplace. Some of the implications which this situation

can have in other fields, especially when one thinks of the existence of a divine plan

which governs nature, will be examined later after analysing the concept of chance.

27.4 Chance, order and complexity

We have already examined the existence of chance in nature in the chapter dedicated to

the natural order. We shall recall now those ideas which were presented there, and we

shall apply them to the problems we are now dealing with, i.e. the activity of the natural

agents, determinism and the metaphysical problems which pop up within this area of

investigation.

It is usually admitted that chance is the result of the confluence of independent

causal chains. We now claim that something happens casually, or by chance, when this

is not the effect expected from a cause: its existence is due to the concomitance of

causes which have no reason to coincide. For this reason we usually distinguish proper

causality (causality per se in the classical terminology) and accidental causality (cause

per accidens). All agents produce effects in accordance with their way of being and

which are the consequence of their natural activity: they are the effects proper to such

agents. Moreover, different agents co-operate in a unitary way and produce also co-

operative effects which are classified as proper effects. However, it frequently happens

that different causes coincide without any reason for this to happen, and produce effects

which, so to say, fall out of the proper tendencies of those causes which intervene. It is

in these circumstances then that accidental effects are produced as a consequence of this

fortuitous concomitance: in these cases we speak of chance.

The characteristic of chance is that those causes which act together are

independent from one another, i.e. there is no reason why they should coincide and

ordinarily they do not coincide. Chance is found in the field of accidental causes; this

means that, properly speaking, chance is not a cause; it presupposes the existence of

proper causes which coincide to produce the effect. However, such a coincidence is

fortuitous or accidental because nothing says that it should necessarily happen.

Understood in this sense chance does really exist in nature. Moreover, it plays

an important role in the unfolding of many natural processes. Actually, the coincidence

of independent causes is very frequent owing to the great variety of causes which exist

in nature. Chance is not due solely to our ignorance by which we are unable to

determine the causes which have produced a specific effect. Sometime, though, it is like

that since the ignorance of the intervening factors can induce us to think of a casual

coincidence which in reality is not so.

Chance is related to the uncertainty of the natural activity. Many are the causal

factors which can intervene in the natural processes, and it is not possible to foresee

which of them will intervene in each specific case. For this reason the uncertainty of

nature can be considered as a real characteristic in the same way in which chance is and

for the same reason. It is not just the question of the difficulty or impossibility of

foreseeing the future because of the limitations of our knowledge, it is the question of

the complexity of nature which makes this prediction very difficult or impossible since

factors intervene in each particular case which may be absent in other cases.

In order to know the natural patterns experimental science provokes situations in

which few factors are isolated so that their behaviour can be studied, and assumes that

the other factors existing in nature do not play any role. In this way we can know

isolated natural patterns which, in reality, are combined with many other factors. For

this reason it is difficult at times to explain very familiar phenomena in a scientific way;

in this way, on the other hand, an exact knowledge is obtained of the most hidden

aspects of the reality. The determinism of nature depends on the production of stable

situations in which some types of behaviour are uniform or regular.

Chance plays a role in the production of successive levels of complexity in

nature. There are fortuitous coincidences and they can be important for the production

of some effects and not of others. This is particularly important in the study of the

evolution and of the role that chance plays in the evolutionary process. We shall deal

with this issue later on while studying evolution.

However, there is no chance for God. As the first cause of the being of all that

exists, every thing is manifested to God, past as well as present and future. God is

outside time and these temporal distinctions do not affect him. Moreover, everything

completely depends on God in their being. Consequently, although chance does really

exist from the point of view of nature and of man, this does not affect the knowledge

that God has of everything, or the providence with which he governs everything.

In the present-day perspective it is usually admitted that there is a degree of

uncertainty in nature so that evolution is, in a certain way, a creative process. It is also

admitted that future is not completely determined by the past. This perspective is

compatible with divine providence which does not direct the course of nature in the

same way in which natural causes do, but being the foundation of their being and acting,

it makes them possible. Moreover, the disregard of providence and divine governance

makes it difficult to understand how some natural virtualities can exist whose unfolding

produces, at successive levels of organisation, always new virtualities whose

actualisation, in very varied circumstances, leads ultimately to a nature which displays

an amazing organisation at the top of which man is found.

The disjunctive «either an unforeseeable chance or a rigid determinism» does not

exhaust the possibilities. Another possibility can be added to the disjunctive «our

number has come up in the Montecarlo roulette» by Jacques Monod and «God does not

play with dice» by Albert Einstein». This new possibility is that «God plays with rigged

dice». If one thinks of God as a being which is much more intelligent than ourselves -

Laplace’s superior intelligence - who acts like us but with an enormously greater

capacity, then one would not be able to understand how the existence of a divine

providence can go together with the reality of uncertainty and chance. However, this

representation of God is inadequate: it would correspond to a kind of demiurge, or

superior being, who would not really be God. A personal God creator, conceived as the

First Cause of the being and of acting of everything that exists and acts, does not find

any problem in governing a nature in which there is uncertainty and chance. Actually,

God knows everything in a perfect way, in a way which is different from ours, and

encompasses in his knowledge and in his power absolutely everything down to the

minutest detail.

X. THE LIVING BEINGS

We shall study in this chapter the characteristics and origin of the living beings

which occupy a central place in nature and manifest, in an especially adequate way, the

characterisation of the natural through the intertwining of a proper dynamism and space-

time structuring.

28. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LIVING BEING

We have characterised the natural as the union of the dynamism proper to a

natural entity with space-time structuring. We have seen how nature can be considered

as a big system of systems in which a prominent place is occupied by those unitary

systems traditionally called «substances». The living beings are the most important

examples of natural substances with a very special type of dynamism and organisation.

We shall now examine the characteristics proper to the living beings and the problem of

their origin. We shall first comment on the impact that the progress of biology has on

philosophy.

28.1. Biology and philosophy

The huge strides made by biology since the second half of the 20th

century have

had important consequences for the present-day worldview and for the philosophy of

nature. We shall now refer to some of these consequences.

a) Physics, biology and philosophy of nature

Living beings occupy a central place in nature. The ancient worldview, together

with its philosophical reflections, acknowledged this. Living beings feature prominently

in Aristotle’s philosophy; one can say that “the substances properly called in Aristotle

are the living beings, to such an extent that the understanding of being in general has its

roots in the understanding of the living being”129

. Actually, at times it has been said that

Aristotle’s philosophy is very biological, as if it could be applied easily to the living

beings but difficult to do so to the rest of nature.

129

Alfredo MARCOS, Aristóteles y otros animales. Una lectura filosófica de la Biología aristotélica, PPU, Barcelona 1996,

p.192.

The systematic birth of the modern experimental science in the 17th

century

began, logically, with physics which is the science that studies the most general and

basic characteristics of nature. At the time when physics had already made huge strides

ahead, biology was still in its infancy; this is also logical since the progress of biology

requires the previous progress of physics and chemistry which provide the foundations

which biology needs. Consequently, supremacy was granted to physics and at times

living beings were explained in function of the physical in a kind of reductionist way.

Even when the specific character of the living beings was emphasised, philosophy of

nature was still quite conditioned by the concepts and problems of physics.

When physics and chemistry were sufficiently ahead in the 20th

century, there

was an authentic explosion of biology, a fact which had a great impact on the present-

day worldview and on philosophy of nature. Living beings have recovered the

prominent place which had always corresponded to them, and the categories proper to

biology have been strongly emphasised. In this context, the central ideas of Aristotle’s

philosophy have acquired new strength.

This has happened, for instance, with the concepts of substance, form and

finality. Although the existence of substances is admitted in the non-living world, it is

clear that the notion of substance is realised in a primary way in the living beings which

have an especially strong unity and individuality. In a similar way, the concept of form

acquires special relevance when the organisation proper to the living beings is

considered. The concept of finality is the one that features more prominently.

Mechanism had taken, as a mould, a part of physics and declared that finality did not

exist; moreover, it tried to explain the finalist dimensions of nature in terms of

mechanical categories. However, contemporary biology has highlighted these finalist

dimensions since finality appears everywhere among living organisms.

On the other hand, the biological theories about the evolution of the species, i.e.

the origin of some species from others through natural processes, have had an important

impact in the philosophy of nature and in other branches of philosophy. We shall refer to

them later on.

b) Life from the perspective of molecular biology

The question « what is life? » is a very complex one for biology since there is an

enormous variety of living organisms and there are many different levels of life. On

the other hand, scientists do not need a simple and unequivocal answer to this

question: they only need to study the characteristics of the different living beings.

Moreover, biologists, take, as starting point, common ideas that all of us have about

the living organisms, and these ideas are a sufficient basis for the construction of

biology as science.

However, molecular biology has provided a kind of knowledge which has placed

our ideas about life at a new level unknown before. In their quest for physico-chemical

material which may be responsible for heredity, scientists direct their attention to the

nucleus of cells and, concretely, to the chromosomes. Before 1900 it had already been

established that the chromosomes of the majority of the organisms contain proteins and

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It was thought for sometime that the proteins were the

ones containing the genetic material since only proteins were sufficiently complex to

carry out this job. However, evidence in favour of DNA as genetic material had started

accumulating around 1940. By 1950 a lot of knowledge about the chemical structure of

DNA was already available. Finally, James Watson and Francis Crick proposed in

1953 the model of the double-helix structure of the DNA; this structure has been

confirmed by further works and constitutes one the most important advances in

modern science.

Since then, discoveries have multiplied: the genetic code, the manufacturing of

proteins, the information which directs the development of the living beings, the

structure and function of genes, and other related topics. The progress of molecular

biology which studies the structure and functions of the molecules which make up the

living beings, have led to the knowledge of other important aspects of the living beings

such as cell communication. This progress has fostered the development of new ideas

about the characteristics of the living beings.

Unicellular organisms are made of one cell only while the multicellular ones are

made of many of them. All cells have DNA as genetic material which contains the

information for the replication of the living beings and for the manufacturing of many

of their principal components. There is an exception in the case of some viruses whose

genetic material is RNA (ribonucleic acid, similar to the DNA but different in some

aspects of its composition). Unlike the «prokaryotic» cells which do not have a nucleus

(it is the case of bacteria), the DNA of the «eukaryotic» cells is contained in a nucleus

surrounded by a nucleus membrane.

Life, as we know it on our planet, is characterised by the DNA as genetic

material; the RNA which plays a role in the translation and transcription of the DNA

of the nucleus into proteins which are manufactured in the ribosomes of the cells; and

proteins (macromolecules made of amino-acids) which exist in a great variety, adopt

very specific space structures and carry out functions which are also very varied.

The present-day knowledge places the problem of life in a new perspective: on

the one hand, because for the first time in history an important part of the physico-

chemical mechanisms of life is known in detail, and this leads to look at the living

organisms from a new perspective; on the other hand, because now we know that an

important portion of the living beings is made of very primitive beings. Actually,

bacteria have perhaps played a central role in the origin of other organisms, and

certainly play an essential role in the biosphere. However, they can hardly be described

with the same terms which we use when speaking of those living beings which are

accessible to ordinary experience. A number of clarifications need to be made when

speaking of an organism, or of growth and development, and also of death, in the case

of bacteria. Therefore, although the present-day scientific knowledge can give new life

to classical philosophical concepts, it is also clear that we shall be able to obtain a

rigorous description of the types of living beings and of their functions only if we take

into account the knowledge provided by biology, a knowledge that takes us much

further than what ordinary experience does.

Besides what has been said, we can also mention that, according to the

opinion of some scientists, the frontiers of life will have to be placed at the level of

molecules rather than at that of the cells. This is certainly appropriate if we take into

account the fact that some of the main characteristics we consider as belonging to life

are also found in viruses. Not only, but also in some proteins called «prions»

(«infectious protein particles») capable of replication. Prions can cause a change in the

configuration of proteins and turn them almost identical to themselves; moreover, this

change propagates successively to new proteins130

.

c) Genetics and its implications

Genes are the hereditary units and are made of pieces of DNA. The number of

genes found in the chromosomes varies a lot in different organisms; and so, the

«genome» of a bacterium can contain 3,000 genes, while that of human organism

contains 100,000 genes. The entire genome is found in each cell of an organism;

however, only some of the genes are «expressed» (are active). Therefore, «the

regulation of gene expression» is very important; internal factors join external ones to

determine which genes are expressed in which circumstances from the beginning of the

development of an organism to each one of its stages.

Processes and methods involved in the control and expression of the genes which

are fairly sophisticated structures, are being known progressively better. These processes

involve not only those genes which are expressed but also regulatory genes which

control the expression of other genes. This takes us to the problem of «differentiation»:

how to explain the fact that along the development of an organism so many different

cells are produced?

As a fertilised egg-cell develops different cells are produced which go to occupy

their own place and carry out their specific functions. This fact is summarised by Tim

Beardsley in few words: “During the development of an organism, cells move, migrate

following their complex strategies, change their form and end up by associating

themselves with one another to constitute specialised tissues. A human being, for

instance, has more than 250 types of different cells and each one of them has to be and

function in the appropriate place (hepatic cells would be of no use in the brain).

However, each one of them has the same genes in its DNA”131

.

We have known for a long time that in these processes genes are activated and

inactivated. Only now we are beginning to know the mechanisms of the process, i.e.

how the activity of the genes is harmonised so that at a precise moment different cells

are formed and perform their function in the appropriate place. With Beardsley’s words:

“Hundreds of experiments show that the control of the expression of most genes of an

organism is carried out almost always through regulation of transcription, a process

130

They are the agents involved in the sickness of the «mad cows»; cf. Stanley B. PRUSINER, “Príones”, Investigación y

cíencia, No. 99, December 1984, pp. 22-32; “El príon en la patología”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 222, March 1995, pp.

14-21. 131

The quotations by Beardsley included in this section are taken from: Tim BEARDSLEY, “Genese inteligentes”,

Investigación y ciencía, No. 181, October 1991, pp. 76-85.

whose end is to copy the genetic information contained in the DNA into RNA; these are

the molecules by which millions of proteins are manufactured and which make cells

noticeably different from another one”. Beardsley points out the fact that “the main

teaching of molecular biology in the last 20 years is the control of gene expression

through regulation of transcription”.

Eric H. Davidson has been one of the protagonists of these advances in

molecular genetics; he speaks in this regard of «intelligent genes» and of the «brain» on

the intelligent gene. This «brain» is a complex aggregation of proteins, a kind of

computer, “where signals are combined and where decisions are taken on whether to

activate a gene or not”. It is clearly an anthropomorphic type of language since

biochemical entities are presented as intelligent with capacity of integrating information

and capacity of decision. Beardsley captures the following statement made by François

Jacob and Jacques Monod who shared the Nobel prize for medicine in 1965 for their

contribution to molecular biology: “The genome contains not only a series of drafts but

a fully co-ordinate program for the synthesis of proteins and means of controlling their

execution”. The same Beardsley writes that “the cells of a complex organism need to

know where they are installed in order to decide which genes are going to be expressed.

These cells should also be able to respond to situations of emergency such as an

aggression or the sudden presence of an hormone”.

The progress of genetics is interpreted at times with the bias of a genetic

determinism which, if considered in a rigid way, would hardly leave room for any

freedom. However, this alleged determinism has two limitations. On the one hand,

although the basic programme of instructions is contained in the genome of an

organism, the expression of the genes depends on multiple factors among which one

finds factors which are external to the history of the very organism. There is no doubt

that there is some kind of determination in the genes, but there is also a variety of

functions of the distinct factors which intervene in the complex biological processes.

Therefore, not even from a biological point of view is it possible to speak of rigid

determinism. On the other hand, in the case of a human person freedom allows that

person to act for rational motives and determinations of the will, although obviously our

activity unfolds on the basis provided by our genetic peculiarities. A genetic

reductionism which forgot or doubted the decisive importance of human intelligence

and will, would be unduly extrapolating some biological factors - no doubt important -,

and forgetting the decisive function of the superior capacities of the human being132

.

d) Directional information

We have already pointed out the fact that the progress of contemporary biology

has taken to the forefront the concept of information. Concepts taken from cybernetics

and from the theory of information are constantly used in biology. The genes contain the

genetic information where the «instructions» are found for the development of an

132

An interesting critique of the present-day biological reductionism is found in the article: “Biology isn’t destiny”, The

Economist, 14th

February 1998, pp. 97-99.

organism, so that the manufacturing of proteins, the formation of new organs and many

other life processes are directed by this information.

The existence of a genetic information takes us by hand to the admission that

there are realities in the living beings which correspond to the concepts of programme,

design and plan. There is an immanent directionality which the scientific progress

clarifies more and more every day. We are not talking here of those tendencies called

psychic and which are very important. We are speaking here of physico-chemical

tendencies which are inscribed in the space-time structures of the living beings.

We have just pointed out that the biological directionality should not be

identified with determinism. It is a real directionality however complex and at the same

time compatible with increasing degrees of spontaneity which, at human level, is

completed with new dimensions of spiritual nature which transcend the space-time

scope of the natural.

The directionality we find in the living beings provides new elements for the

teleological argument which takes us from the «unconscious intelligence» of the natural

up to the conscious intelligence of the personal God creator. However, this requires

further reasoning which will be done later.

28.2. Characteristics of the living beings

Life is usually spoken of as a reality with a special type of spontaneity: self-

movement, indeed beneficial to the very subject that moves. It is also usual to distinguish

in the living beings a series of functions some of which are found at all levels of life

while others are proper only to some organisms. All these are based upon two

fundamental characteristics of the living beings, i.e. life organisation and functionality.

We have already pointed out that a very important portion of the living beings is

represented by bacteria; perhaps virus should be added together with some self-

replicating proteins. Consequently, it is obvious that the ideas that follow cannot be

applied to the most primitive living beings exactly in the same way in which they are

applied to those that are more complex. It is interesting to note, however, that the

characterisation of the natural by the intertwining of one’s own dynamism and space-

time structuring, as we have proposed from the very beginning, appears to be especially

adequate when it is applied to the living beings.

a) Life organisation and functionality

If we admit that the natural is characterised by its own dynamism closely related to

a space-time organisation, one will also admit that this characterisation achieves its

ultimate and paradigmatic expression in the case of the living beings. This is logical if

one takes into account the fact that living beings occupy the central place among the

natural beings.

It is undeniable that living beings have their own dynamism. More precisely,

living beings are usually characterised by their capacity of self-movement. We have

already expressly emphasised the fact that, in claiming that the natural has its own

dynamism, we were not claiming a kind of pan-psychism. This clarification is necessary

owing to the fact that self-movement is so deeply entrenched in living beings that it is

very easy to establish a kind of identity between them. At this stage it is convenient to

point out also that frequently, in characterising living beings, one usually tends to

oppose living beings to any thing which is different from them. This opposition is

usually expressed with negative terms such as the «non-living», the «inert», that which

behaves in a passive way and does not have in itself a principle of movement, the

«inorganic» or that which lacks the organisation proper to the living beings. The use of

such negative terms can lead to confusion because there is nothing really in nature that

is purely passive or inert, or that does not have some type of space-time structuring.

However, there is no doubt that the living beings have their own peculiar

dynamism which corresponds to a particularly strong unity and individuality. They are

clearly subjects different from other subjects; they have parts organised in a co-operative

way in an organism which has its own needs, goals and tendencies. The dynamism

proper to the living beings includes the activity of different parts which co-operate in the

realisation of the goals of the living being: these parts perform functions which are

integrated in a unitary way, and co-operate in the maintenance, development and

reproduction of the organism.

All in all, own dynamism and space-time structuring correspond, in the living

beings, to self-movement which includes functional co-operation of the parts of a

unitary and individual organism. It is unusual to speak of «organism» in the case of

primitive living beings; however, and in any case, these beings are unitary and

individual, they have a very specific organisation and, in adequate conditions, perform

an enormously specific function: reproduction. This function requires the orderly and

unitary co-operation of different parts in carrying out the perpetuation of this subject and

of its activities. This is true not only in the case of bacteria but also of viruses and of

some proteins such as the prions.

b) Immanence and spontaneity

Self-movement is a characteristic of the living beings. Although everything natural

has its own dynamism, there are dynamic equilibriums which in many cases hide this

dynamism from ordinary experience. However, the dynamism of the living beings

appears clearly and it is usually considered as a fundamental characteristic of these types

of beings.

The dynamism of the living beings appears as a kind of spontaneity which.

Spontaneity can be attributed to all that is natural; however, it has peculiar

characteristics at biological level because its subjects are clearly unitary and individual

beings which actively seek what is appropriate to their keeping in being and to their

development. There is no doubt that an atom, or a molecule, has its own dynamism and

a unitary space-time structuring. They are also stable and have certain tendencies;

however, it does not make any sense to say that they actively seek to keep in their being,

and even less to develop and reproduce. The activity proper to the living being is at a

different level from that of the physico-chemical entities.

The peculiarities of this activity can be expressed by the term immanence. Living

beings, insofar as they are unitary and individual beings which act seeking their own

perfection, have a kind of activity whose effects remain within themselves and which,

for this reason, are called «immanent».

The immanence of the living beings means that, somehow, they act having

themselves as ends. They are the «beneficiaries» of their own actions. This does not

exclude the fact that other beings may benefit by their actions, and that their activity

may have ends outside themselves.

We have already distinguished between transient and immanent actions when

considering the natural activity. We have seen that transient actions are physical actions

which have an effect external to the agent, and that immanent operations have an end in

the very agent which therefore perfects itself in acting. Living beings perform actions

whose effects remain within them and contributes to their perfection; although in many

cases these actions are also transient, since they produce detectable physical effects, they

nevertheless revert to the agent which performs them. Moreover, when we reach the

level of knowledge, a peculiar type of immanence is involved. In the case of the human

beings, intelligence and will are at a level essentially superior to that of other natural

beings, and at this level we find a unique degree of immanence by which a human being

achieves his specific perfection.

c) Phenomenological aspects of the living being

We have already said that a great number of living beings are micro-organism.

Consequently, when we speak of phenomenological aspects of the living beings we

refer, in a strict sense, only to those which can be observed in the ordinary experience.

However, we expand this idea so that it may include the main characteristics of all living

beings: these are self-movement, organisation, generation, development, reproduction

and death.

We have already mentioned self-movement and we have emphasised that it is the

dynamism characteristic of living beings. Although every natural entity has it own

dynamism, living beings in particular are beings with a strong unity and individuality

and their dynamism is such that their activity contributes, as a result and to a large

extent, to the keeping and development of the very being of the subject which performs

it. Moreover, the self-movement of living beings is manifested in two aspects which are

typical of them, namely development and reproduction.

The organic makeup is another characteristic typical of many living beings. We

do not say that it is a characteristic of all because, as we have already pointed out, it is

unusual to speak of «organisms» when we refer to primitive living beings; however,

even then we find complex co-operative structures which correspond to the idea of

organisation proper to the living beings. In relation to the organic makeup we can

mention some characteristics which make it possible to keep the living beings in their

being; such is the case of metabolism, or the set of chemical reactions in which energy is

produced that the organism needs in order to keep living and to perform its functions;

and of homeostasis, or the keeping of some characteristics at a constant level against the

changes of the external environment. They are very general characteristics to which

many particular functions could be added which are present in different types of living

beings.

Generation refers to the beginning of the existence of the living being which is

formed as an individual and unitary being from other living beings. In many living

beings generation is followed by a gradual development which leads to the realisation of

the specific type in accordance with established patterns and, finally, by death or

disappearance of the living being which ceases to exist as such and is changed into a

lump of inorganic material.

Reproduction is one of the basic characteristics of the living beings which

transmit, from generation to generation, the characteristics typical of the species.

Moreover, heredity constitutes the basis of mutations which make the evolution of

species possible.

28.3 Explanation of life

Experimental science seeks explanations which can be submitted to experimental

control and which, therefore, refer to components and structures that follow repeatable

space-time patterns.

Since ancient times discussions have taken place on whether living beings can be

explained by taking into account only explanations of this type, or whether it is

necessary to introduce other principles as a point of reference. These discussions are still

going on thanks also to the stimulus of the progress of contemporary biology.

The discussion focuses around two antagonistic stands which are traditionally

called mechanism and vitalism. Mechanism in the proper sense was defended by

Descartes who held the view according to which all natural entities, including the living

beings (with the exception of the human soul) are mere mechanical machines. This

version of mechanism is clearly insufficient and has been replaced by more

sophisticated explanations which portray the living beings as cybernetic machines. It is

claimed that it is useless to look in living beings for something which falls outside the

scope of the experimental science. On the other hand, vitalism emphasises the peculiar

characteristics of the living beings, and postulates some meta-empirical factor, some

type of vital principle which should be necessary to justify the being and acting of living

beings.

Although there are different interpretations, yet it is presently and generally

admitted that living beings have specific characteristics which are not found at other

levels of the natural world. There is no doubt that they follow the laws of physics but

they transcend them.

Aristotle’s philosophy provides concepts which shed light on this problem.

Actually, when Aristotle speaks of a «soul» of the living beings he refers to their way of

being which truly has peculiar characteristics. In his second treatise On the Soul

Aristotle proposes a general definition of soul through three steps. First, he says that “we

usually refer to life as feeding, growing and getting older” and he asks what is that

makes a living natural body different from one which is not living. He claims that the

difference is not in the body since there are bodies that are alive and bodies that are not.

He concludes that the soul is “the specific form of a natural body which has life in

potency” (here, “specific form” is the translation of the Greek word eidos). Second,

Aristotle adds that to have life is anterior to exercising it, and therefore he claims that

“the soul is the first act of the natural body which has life in potency”. Immediately

afterwards, he comments that a body of this type which has life in potency, is an

organism. Then he concludes that the soul is “the first act of the organized natural

body”133

. Aquinas accepts these same ideas in his commentary on Aristotle134

.

WE have already seen what the concepts of «substantial or specific form», «first

act» and «potency» mean. We have seen how the essences of the natural beings are not

simple but composed: they exist in material conditions (proto-matter) and how they

include perfections which determine the specific way of being (substantial form). Matter

and form are not complete entities, or physical parts: they are principles which behave

as potency and act respectively. Proto-matter is a potential and undetermined principle,

while the substantial form is the actualizing determining principle. If we apply these

ideas to the living beings we can say that the soul is their substantial form, the

actualising principle of their essence, their first act which expresses the essential

perfections proper to each type of living beings.

We have said that the substantial form refers to the unitary way of being of the

substance and to the totality of the possibilities of acting which correspond to the way of

being: it is act, energy or active nature. In the living beings the substantial form, or soul,

is their first act: it expresses their essential way of being which is always in act as long

as the living being exists. In order to act the living being has to pass from potency to act:

it has some active potencies or vital faculties which empower the living being to act;

however, they need to be actualised in each specific case. When a living being actualises

one of its faculties, or active potencies, it passes to second act which is the action or

operation expressed by the verb “to act”. Operatio sequitur esse: the being in second act

which is action, is realised in accordance with the way of being of each living being, i.e.

that which is first act and which is expressed by its substantial form or soul.

We should be aware of the fact that the term «soul» has a long history not only

in philosophy but also in religion and theology. Later on we shall expressly consider the

human soul and its spirituality. For the time being we shall refer only to the soul of the

133

ARISTOTLE, De anima, II, 1, 412 a 9 – b 6. 134

AQUINAS, In Aristotelis librum De Anima Commentarium, 5th

ed., Marietti, Turin 1959; book II, Ch. 1, pp. 60-62 (nn.

219, 221, 229, 230, 233).

living beings in general, and at the same time claim that Aristotle’s ideas can be

presently applied, with the clarifications made, when speaking of the substantial form.

We have emphasised the fact that the living beings have a specific type of unity

and individuality. Although some of them live in colonies, living beings are typically

individual, have a very specific material organization and their own dynamism which is

manifested in their life functions. All this corresponds to the Aristotelian idea of soul as

essential first act of an organism which refers to the substantial form, to the original

energy which corresponds to the way of being of each living being. Of course, there are

very many types of living beings; however, they all have in common what is expressed

by the general idea of soul. Moreover, the idea of substantial form expresses in a very

adequate way the fact that this soul forms one thing only with the material conditions in

which it exists: what properly exists is the living being, while the soul does not express a

physical part or its simple structure. We repeat that for the time being we do not refer to

the spirituality of the human soul which is a case apart.

The philosophical conceptualisation of the soul of living beings is not only

compatible with the progress of biology but it also expresses in an adequate way the

peculiar way of being of the biological entities. Philosophy of nature should not be a

substitute for biology; its explanations are not like the ones of the experimental science.

In the philosophy of nature we try to represent the way of being of the natural entities as

faithfully as possible and, in our case, that of the living beings. Living beings occupy a

central place in nature; they correspond, in a particularly faithful way, to the

characterization of the natural world through the intertwining of its own dynamism and

space-time structuring. This characterization of the living beings corresponds to the

basic ideas expressed by Aristotle whose philosophy especially focuses on the living

beings.

We have also emphasised that the progress of contemporary biology highlights

the importance of directionality in the living world. In the case of individual living

beings, the existence of an immanent finality is a fact which can be illustrated by

abundant examples and which increase as the scientific progress advances. However,

natural finality has to face a challenge of different type when we examine, as we are

going to do, the issue of the evolution of the living beings.

29. THE ORIGIN OF LIFE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIES

One of the more prominent aspects of the present-day worldview is the

importance attributed to the theories on the origin of the world, of the living beings and

of man. For the first time in history we have theories generally accepted by the scientists

which claim the existence of a great process in which successive levels of the

organization of nature would have been produced in a gradual way.

We shall now examine the biological evolutionism according to which the

present living organisms proceed from more primitive ones through successive

transformations. This idea began to acquire popularity during the 19th

century as

evidence started accumulating which were based on fossils and on studies of

comparative anatomy.

Lamarck proposed the first transformist idea in his book Zoological Philosophy

published in 1809. Transformism became quite widespread in the scientific and cultural

circles in 1859 when Charles Darwin published The Origin of the Species. The progress

of genetics in the 30’s contributed to the formulation of the neo-Darwinism also known

as synthetic theory of evolution. Presently biologists agree on admitting the fact of

evolution although there is no unanimity about the specific explanations of its

mechanisms.

If nature is considered from the point of view of the intertwining between

dynamism and structuring, evolution appears as a collection of morphogenetic processes

at the different natural levels. At each stage of evolution there are some virtualities

which are actualized in function of the intervening factors. New types of organization

are produced with new types of dynamism and virtualities whose unfolding and

actualization produce, in their turn, other levels of organization, and so on and so fort.

All this can be looked at as the unfolding of an original information which, at successive

levels of organization, originates new information patterns of increasing complexity.

Two are the main problems posed by biological evolution, namely the origin of

the first living organisms, and the subsequent origin of some species from pre-existing

ones. Although the latter clashes with no trivial difficulties, the former is perhaps even

more difficult.

We shall now examine the scientific explanations about the origin of life and of

its subsequent evolution; we shall add some reflections on the philosophical

implications which these problems raise.

29.1 The origin of life

A-biotic biogenesis means that the first living beings were formed at the physico-

chemical level through natural processes. It is a process which is not observed presently

in nature, and which cannot be reproduced in the laboratory for the time being. What we

know presently is that living beings originate from other living beings.

The ancients claimed that in some cases (such as putrefaction) there was

spontaneous generation, i.e. the generation of some imperfect living beings from

inorganic material. This opinion was held, for instance, by Aquinas135

. However,

Pasteur’s experiments in 1860 showed that there is no spontaneous generation in our

world, and that the experiments which seemed to support it, were due to an insufficient

isolation of the material being used. When the products were adequately isolated,

135

One may read: AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 71, a.1, ad 1m; I, q. 91, a. 2., ad 2m. These texts support the

generation of the imperfect living beings from putrefaction under the action of the celestial bodies, and deny that perfect

animals, in whose generation semen intervenes, can be generated in this way.

avoiding the communication between them and the micro-organisms of the external

environment, there was no generation of any living being.

However, the problem of the a-biotic biogenesis was posed once again later on

and in a new way when evolutionism got a firm foothold. The question was now the

origin of the first living beings, a process which would have taken place historically in

accordance with natural processes in very remote times, i.e. some 700 million years after

the formation of the earth.

It is usually admitted that the earth was formed some 4,500 million years ago,

and that the most ancient fossils belonging to living being are 3,800 million years old.

There is no doubt that 700 million years is a very long time; however, if one takes into

account the enormous complexity of the living beings respect to the inorganic matter

this time appears to be quite short for the first organisms to be formed in a casual

way. Different types of explanations have been proposed for the possible chemical

origin of life. However, the complexity of the living beings, no matter how elementary

they are, is still a challenge to the understanding of how casual processes could have led

to such sophisticated structures in which there is interdependence of parts. There is no

unanimous agreement among scientists in this field, and discrepancies affect all the

dimensions of the problem.

As for the environment where life arose, the most widespread interpretation

(which is frequently presented as the most certain) claims that there may have been a

«primitive soup» in the ocean whose water surrounded volcanic islands which contained

those chemical elements most indispensable to life. The first living beings would have

originated in this kind of situation, such as unicellular bacteria capable of

reproduction136

. However, some scientists warn that this explanation presents

difficulties, and they offer other types of possible explanations; for instance, the

presence of clay crystals which would have acted as row kind of material in which the

first organisms could have been formed137

.

As for those processes which would have led to the production of the first

organisms, the main difficulty consists in explaining the formation of the first systems

capable of self-replication in the absence of those mechanisms which presently permit

that replication. Actually, replication occurs in the present-day living organisms through

the cooperation of the nucleic acids (DNA and RNA) and proteins. However, proteins

are produced in processes which are directed by the nucleic acids, while the activity of

the nucleic acids requires the intervention of proteins. Therefore, it seems that we are in

vicious circle.

The way out of this circle could be found in the hyper-cycles. These are

processes in which one entity produces the factors necessary for its own replication

through a cyclic process. There are already feed-back circuits which make this «self-

136

Cf. R. GORE, “Our Restless Planet Earth”, National Geographic Magazine, vol. 168, No. 2, August 1985, p. 151: this

article is an example on how this hypothesis can be presented as a certainty. 137

Cf. A.G. CAIRNS-SMITH, “Los primeros organismos”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 107, August 1985, pp. 54-63.

catalysis» possible138

. It has been proposed, along this line, that the RNA is the original

precursor of life as we know it. This possibility is based on the existence of different

types of RNA, and in its capacity of self-replication by combining its catalytic function

with that of «mould»: the RNA can direct the replication as well as the reproduction of

the factors necessary to it139

.

However, there are other possible explanations for the origin of life. We have

already mentioned some of them, but there are more. Although it is frequently claimed,

particularly in some books of general information, that the origin of life has already

been unravelled - and as a matter of fact there are theories which enjoy a certain success

-, the enigmas which still wait for an answer are neither few nor small140

. Some

scientists consider as enormously improbable the fact that life could have been formed

on earth in a spontaneous way, and postulate the possibility that life, or at least some of

its basic organic components, could have reached the earth from the outer space or from

some inhabited planet141

. However, this does not solve the problem and the questions

are only taken a step further.

29.2 The evolution of the species

Evolutionist theories claim that all living beings were formed through natural

processes from some few first ones. Nowadays there is a widespread consensus among

biologists on the fact of evolution although there are also disagreements, and sometime

serious ones, about its explanation.

Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1774-1829) in 1809 defended the hypothesis of

biological transformism, i.e. the origin of the species through transformation of other

more primitive ones. He tried to explain it through the heredity of acquired characters.

The neck of the giraffe is a typical example: because of the giraffe’s effort to reach food

placed at progressively higher altitudes, its neck became longer and these variations in

the neck’s length were transmitted to the descendants. This explanation was rejected

later on, although some scientists claim that in some cases there are quasi-Lamarckian

processes involved.

138

This kind of processes is explained by applying them to the origin of life, in: M. EIGEN – W. GARDINER – P.

SCHUSTER – R. WINKLER-OSWATITSCH, “Origen de la información genética”, Investigacíon y ciencía, No. 57, June

1981, pp. 62-81. Eigen and Schuster proposed this explanation in 1977. 139

Cf. R.F. GESTELAND – J.F. ATKINS (publishers), The RNA World, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, Plainview

(New York) 1993, where the different aspects of this model are studied together with the arguments which support it. 140

The difficulties are reflected in: John ORGAN, “Tendencias en evolución. En el principio…”, Investigación y ciencía,

No. 175, April 1991, pp. 80-90, where the panorama of the different proposed explanations is studied. The subtitle of this

article says that “there are very divergent points of view on when, where and, above all, how life begun on earth”. One may

perceive that the explanations which usually appear in the textbooks, have been seriously questioned. The different

proposals are analyzed and, in a schematic summary, it is said that “it is a Penelopes’ loom where new data wreck the

already established ideas”. 141

The hypothesis of the «panspermia», according to which there are germs of life in the space from which they would have

reached the earth, is ancient. In our days, Francis Crick (Nobel prize together with James Watson for their discovery of the

double-helix structure of the DNA) speaks of a «directed panspermia»: germs of life, or perhaps bacteria, could have been

sent to our planet in an intentional way: cf. F. CRICK, «Forward», in: R.F. GESTELAND – J.F. ATKINS (publishers), The

RNA World, op.cit., p.xiv.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published The Origin of the Species in 1859, a

work which contributed in a decisive way to a progressively greater acceptance of the

theory of evolution. Darwin’s explanation focused on natural selection. It is assumed

that in the living beings there are small hereditary variations some of which confer

advantages to their owners for the struggle for survival; according to this view, the best

adapted individuals would have more descendants and, in the long run, the small

advantages would accumulate through a gradual process until they would produce new

types of living beings, i.e. new species.

When Darwin formulated his theory almost nothing was known about the

variations he postulated, or about their inheritance. Genetics, the science that studies

these problems, was not yet born. Gregory Mendel (1822-1884) formulated his laws

which constitute the basis of genetics, at the same time in which Darwinism was getting

a foothold. However, these laws were known and valued only since the beginning of the

20th

century. Without any support in genetics Darwinism was in difficulties. However,

the progress of genetics contributed to the support of the evolutionist idea. Around 1930

the so-called synthetic theory of evolution –also referred to as neo-Darwinism - was

formulated. Thanks to this theory, it was possible to connect Darwin’s ideas with the

progress of genetics and the study of populations. Later on molecular biology provided

other basic ingredients to the evolutionary theories.

Neo-Darwinism claims that the variations which constitute the basis of evolution

are the genetic mutations, i.e. changes in the DNA which are produced for various

reasons but always «by chance» (because they do not correspond to an intention of

nature). There are many types of mutation and most of them produce anomalies which

render the new being non-viable. However, some mutations can be viable and

beneficial: these are the ones which are preserved. Since genetic mutations affect the

hereditary material (the genes) they are transmitted to the offspring. In this way, the

effects of the beneficial mutations would be amplified because their carriers would be in

an advantageous situation in the struggle for survival. A «natural selection» is produced

which is called because of the analogy with the artificial selection by which man tries to

improve the characteristics of animals and plants through appropriate crossings.

Possibly, this amplification could provoke, by the accumulation of many small changes,

the appearance of new types, or species, of living beings. All in all, according to the

Neo-Darwinism evolution can be explained by the combination of chance mutations and

natural selection142

.

Many are the problems posed by the evolutionism. Therefore, it is surprising

that, although there is a wide consensus among the biologists about evolution as a fact,

there are also disagreements about the many specific explanations. We shall mention

some of them.

One of the disagreements is about the scope of natural selection. Darwinism

interprets the different biological characteristics in terms of adaptive advantages or

142

One may find a collection of studies on evolution, interpreted in the light of the neo-Darwinism in: AA.VV., Evolución,

Labor, Barcelona 1982. On the basic principle of the neo-Darwinism cf. F.J AYALA, «Mecanismos de la evolución», ibid.

pp.13-28.

disadvantages through natural selection. However, the theory of neutralism (proposed

by Motoo Kimura) claims that many changes in the DNA, and even the majority of

them, do not have any adaptive meaning: they are «neutral» in this regard143

.

Another disagreement is about the gradual character of evolution. Darwinism

interprets evolutionary changes as the result of a slow accumulation of small changes: it

is a «gradualist» theory. However, the «leap», or of punctuated equilibriums, theory

(proposed by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge) claims the existence of abrupt

changes which do not correspond to a slow accumulation of variations, but to other

types of mechanisms144

. In this way one can understand how the fossil record shows

important lacunae in the gradual changes postulated by Darwinism.

Moreover, it seems logical to suppose that there should be some laws or

principles of organization for an evolution which proceeds from the most primitive

organisms up to man. These laws and principles which are for the time being unknown,

should be able to «guide» such a complex process up to its present form. There have

been attempts made in this direction in which no much importance is given to selection

and chance. However, the present-day knowledge is insufficient to tackle these

problems which are objects of controversy and speculation, with certainty.

For instance, two field of research are being known better and better, and they

can provide important clues for a better understanding of evolution. On the one hand,

gene regulation, i.e. the existence of programmes which regulate the genes expression,

could explain how one change only in a regulatory factor can cause the appearance of

new plans of organization. On the other hand, as a result of new knowledge about self-

organization, the appearance of new characteristics could also be explained in function

of the virtualities and tendencies inscribed in the natural world. These two fields are

related to each other and one can hope that they will contribute to the progress of our

knowledge of the biological evolution145

.

The evolution of the evolutionist theories goes on relentlessly; every day new

syntheses are made which usually include new perspectives146

. This does not mean that

these theories are not very rigorous, and that a philosopher can disregard them. The

situation is similar to that we find in other branches of science, and the discussions

usually refer to the mechanisms of evolution, not to evolution as a fact. On the other

143

Cf. M. KIMURA, “Teoría naturalista de la evolución molecular”, Investigación y ciencía, No. 40, January 1980, pp. 46-

55. 144

Cf. for instance: S.J. GOULD, “The meaning of punctuated equilibrium, and its role in validating a hierarchical approach

to macroevolution” in: R. MILKMAN (publisher), Perspectives on Evolution, Sinauer, Sunderland (Mass.) 1982, pp. 83-

104. 145

One may read for instance: Stuart A. KAUFFMAN, The Origins of Order. Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution,

Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993. The author penetrates into the difficult areas which may require scientific and

philosophical clarifications; however, in any case, his work constitutes a manifestation of those problems which the present-

day evolutionist theories have to face, and of some possible directions for their solution in the line of self-organization. 146

One may read for instance: G. Ledyard STEBBINS – F.J. AYALA, “La evolución del darwinismo”, Investigación y

ciencía, No. 108, September 1985, pp. 42-53. The authors conclude the article with the following words: “Whatever may be

the new agreement may arise from the investigation and present-day controversy, it is not probable that it may demand the

rejection of the basic program of the neo-Darwinism and of the theory elaborated half way through this century. The

synthetic theory of the 21st century will distance itself considerably from that which was elaborated some few decades ago;

however, his appearing will entail more a kind of evolution than of a cataclysm.

hand, the fact of being aware of the limitations of the present-day explanations is the

only way of progressing. Claiming that the present-day explanations with all their many

lacunae are definitive and complete is in reality equivalent to placing obstacles to the

scientific progress.

29.3 Evolution: science and philosophy

Biological evolution and the philosophical perspective are complementary.

Actually, the scientific theories refer to evolution as a fact and to its mechanisms, while

the philosophical reflection focuses on the meaning of evolution: it analyzes its

conditions of possibility and its implications

a) Evolution and creation

The conditions of possibility for evolution remit to the problem of creation. In

order to show it we shall mention three conditions of possibility for evolution which

refer to its very assumptions, i.e. to the requirements which must have been there for

evolution to be possible.

First, for evolution to be possible it is essential that there be some entities and

some basic laws as its basis.

Second, these entities and laws must be very specific because they need to have

some virtualities (or possibilities, or potentialities) from which new entities can be

formed with new types of organization. These new entities should have new virtualities

to allow the process to go on and on along the big evolutionary ladder.

Third, the conditions which have made the actualization of the virtualities

possible, must have been there at each phase of evolution,.

Here is an analogy represented by a written work (a novel, a drama, or a work of

any other genre) which can help understand the problem. The existence of a written

language is essential for the work to exists, i.e. an alphabet, or collection of signs with a

specific meaning, plus a rule which can determine the union of these signs in

meaningful words and phrases. Moreover, it is also necessary that letters, words and

phrases, be united so as to form an intelligible whole. If it is a quality work, it will also

be necessary that the whole and each one of its parts have unity, interest and elegance.

Similarly, basic physico-chemical components are required (particles and

fundamental forces) so that organisms, as we know them, may be produced through

evolutionary mechanisms. These components must have specific properties able to

permit the formation of the subsequent levels of organization (nuclei, atoms, molecules,

macro-molecules) till reaching the first living beings. It is also necessary that new

combinations may be produced at biological level which may lead to new forms of

organization. The result is already known: the ladder of the living beings at the top of

which man is found, and this result has an enormously sophisticated organization.

Therefore, those virtualities which were present in the basic components from the very

beginning must be very specific. Finally, there must have been at each evolutionary

stage precise circumstances and a co-operation which made it possible for the different

factors to be integrated in order to produce new structures.

In conclusion, evolutionary theories do not explain everything. They lean on

some assumptions or conditions of possibility, i.e. the existence of a matter and of some

very specific laws whose virtualities have permitted the subsequent production of a

whole series of organisms which form an enormously varied ladder whose final result is

the human organism.

If we move further on with these considerations we finally reach the problem of

the divine creation of the world. Science can study how some entities are formed from

pre-existing ones, but it cannot give a reason for the very existence of the world and

of its basic properties. One may say, therefore, that the problem of creation is a

metaphysical one which transcends the possibilities of the scientific method, and which

refers to the conditions which may make evolution possible.

We claim that there is no contradiction between evolution and creation.

Moreover, we claim that the reflection on the conditions of possibility of evolution leads

to the problem of creation. There are some misunderstandings in this area owing to two

extreme stands. On the one hand, some defend a type of evolutionism which goes much

further than what science actually permits, and which denies creation, or divine action in

the world. On the other hand, some religious fundamentalists deny the possibility of a

biological evolution in the name of the Bible. However, both stands are illegitimate:

neither science can deny divine action, nor religion is competent to oppose truly

scientific arguments.

b) Evolution and finality

Evolution is also related to the problem of finality. Actually, the existence of

series of levels of organization every time more complex which culminates with a

human organism, suggests the existence of an «orientation», or «direction», in the

evolutionary process. Therefore, looking for causes which may permit us to understand

evolution in a complete way, leads us to the question on whether there is a superior level

which directs the evolutionary process.

It has been claimed sometime that there is a «global orthogenesis», i.e. an

«evolutionary trend» which has produced the results we know, and that it is possible

therefore to prove scientifically that evolution is a «directed»147

process. It is quite

147

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin tried to prove that there is a kind of ascending directionality in evolution. His arguments are

based on the existence of ascending levels of organization which culminate in the nervous system and in the formation of

the brain, and these are united to a progressive increase of consciousness. On this basis, he thought he had enough authority

to claim, as if it were a scientific conclusion, that evolution is «directed». Cf. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenómeno

humano, Taurus, Madrid 1967, pp. 173-178. It is a kind of theist version of the «elan vital» of Bergson: cf. H. BERGSON,

La evolución creadora, Espasa Calpe, Madrid 1985 (original of 1907).

evident that there is actually a series of levels of organization in which, not always but

yes under some important aspects, one can distinguish a progress in the organisation. It

is also evident that this fact requires an explanation. However, it does not seem possible

to conclude that there is a trend which has necessarily led to the results we know on the

one hand, because our world is contingent, and on the other hand, because, even in

claiming the existence of a divine plan, this plan can include forward and backward

movements, explosions of life and mass extinction. Nothing obliges to identify all this

with a linear and always progressive process.

Frequently some deny the existence of a divine plan by arguing precisely that the

evolutionary process is not always progressive, i.e. it includes successes and failures (for

instance, the majority of the species is extinct). They also add that many evolutionary

results do not seem to correspond to a plan but to opportunistic adaptations. Moreover,

they emphasise the fact that chance plays an important role in the process, and this does

not seem to be compatible with the existence of a plan. However, these difficulties

would be incompatible only with a completely «linear» plan, always progressive which

unfolds in a completely necessary way. However, it has already been pointed out that

there is no reason to think that the divine plan has to fit this model; it is more congruent

to think that, if God has wanted to produce the living beings through an evolutionary

process, this process will include all those contingencies proper to a gigantic process

which unfolds during a very long time and contains many fortuitous factors.

Elsewhere some say that the existence of a divine plan would be incompatible

with the scientific spirit which tries to explain phenomena through natural causes. In

reality a divine action is not only compatible with the natural laws but it also founds and

makes its actualization possible; moreover, it permits to understand the rationality of an

evolutionary process which, if it were only due to blind forces, would remain wrapped

in a great mystery.

The question of the existence of a divine plan is found outside the scope of the

evolutionist theories: science can study the fact and the modalities of the evolution, but

the possibility of existence of a divine plan is beyond the possibilities of its method.

Consequently, the same reasons which prevent us to scientifically claim the existence of

a superior plan prevent us also from denying its existence in the name of science.

However, the knowledge provided by science invites us to pose the question about a

divine plan.

One may understand, therefore, how Christian de Duve, Nobel prize, has replied

to Jacques Monod, also Nobel prize, who claimed that “man knows now that he is alone

in the indifferent immensity of the universe from where he arose by chance”, with the

following words: “This is clearly absurd. What man knows – or at least he should know

– is that, with the time and quantity of matter available, not even something similar to

the most elementary cell, not to talk of man, could have originated by blind chance if the

universe had not carried it already in its bosom”148

.

148

Christian DE DUVE, La célula viva, Labor, Barcelona 1988, p. 358. Some interesting reflections about these issue are

found in: Ernan McMULLIN, “Contingencia evolutiva y finalidad del cosmos”, Scripta Theologica, 30 (1988), pp. 227-251.

c) Evolution and emergence

For evolution to occur, proportionate causes must exist. In this sense, a classical

objection against evolution consists in claiming that the more cannot arise from the less,

i.e. that the effect cannot be superior in perfection to its cause. How is it possible that

along the evolutionary process new perfections are produced which did not exist before?

The emergence of new perfections is explained, in the first place, by the

integration of new factors in a new unitary system. As a matter of fact, there are many

processes at physico-chemical level in which new systems are formed and endowed with

holistic characteristics and emerging properties. At the biological level, genetic

mutations cause changes in the genetic information and, if viable, they will produce new

characteristics. Mutations have specific causes, and the unfolding of the genetic

programme is the cause of the new characteristics. In this way it is possible to explain

how novelties can appear in the organisms.

However, in living beings structural novelties are associated with their peculiar

way of being, i.e. with an «interiorness» whose relationship with a structural

«exteriorness» is a bit mysterious; in other words, there is a close relationship between

the tendencies proper to living beings and the psyche of the animals. There is no doubt,

it seems, that there is a parallelism between the degree of organization and the

interiorness of the living beings. It is also clear that, as the knowledge of the biological

structures progresses, the specific aspects of this parallelism are better determined.

However, the interiorness of the living beings is still more an object of wonder than of

understanding.

It is therefore understandable how evolutionary theories find limitations in this

area. The more directly can a scientific explanation be verified through experimental

control, the more rigorous that explanation is. However, it is difficult to submit the

interiorness of the living beings to experimental control; science must be content with

studying the connections between this interiorness and the space-time structures to

which it relates.

d) Evolution and divine action

We may conclude that biological evolution is not only compatible with divine

action, but also that divine action places us in a very adequate vantage point in order to

understand the conditions which make evolution possible.

Some authors claim that the combination of chance mutations with natural

selection is enough to explain everything: mutations are a source of variety, while

natural selection is the source of order because it is a filter which permits steps ahead

only for those organisms which are better equipped. There is no reason, therefore, to

make recourse to other types of explanation. In some cases these authors only try to

emphasize the fact that philosophy and theology should not invade the scientific field.

However, in other cases the legitimacy of philosophy and theology is denied together

with the implicit or explicit claim that science does not leave room for philosophical or

theological questions; these questions would really be badly posed questions since the

only legitimate method for the study nature is the scientific one. Those who uphold a

stand of this type are really upholding a case for scientism149

.

The thesis according to which genetic mutations and natural selection are enough to

provide a complete explanation of evolution faces serious difficulties. Actually, if

natural selection can carry out the function of putting order in nature, it cannot be the

proper cause of this order. Selection consists in letting in part of the candidates while

letting out others and, in this sense, it produces a more orderly situation. However, in

order to do that it is necessary that the candidates already exist: it impossible to select

some positive properties if these have not been previously produced. In any case,

properties must be produced by proper causes: the eyes, the brain, the radar of a bat and

the genetic information are the result of positive causes and not of a filter of selection.

One may well say that these causes are the genetic mutations which are not

produced in view of a end (they are not directed towards an end) but by chance.

However, although containing part of the truth this statement can also be a source of

misunderstandings if it is interpreted as a complete explanation. Actually, although

many fortuitous mutations are produced, only few of them will be viable, and

specifically those which can be functionally integrated within a very complex

programme which is already in operation. The fact that there is the possibility of these

subsequent enormously subtle integrations which lead to increasingly complex levels,

leaves the door open to questions about virtualities, tendencies and their ultimate

explanation.

Ultimately, the combination of mutations and selection can explain some aspects of

the generation of living beings, but it is insufficient as a total explanation of the holistic,

directional and cooperative aspects which exist in evolution.

When the legitimacy of the philosophical questions is denied in the name of

science, a scientist stand is adopted according to which there is only one way to know

nature: the one used by the experimental science. In reality, scientism corresponds to

motivations which are not scientific but philosophical and also theological. In the case

of evolution, it usually corresponds to the desire of claiming that the explanations

provided by the theories of evolution do not leave any room for a God who is creator

and provident, as if this were a scientific conclusion or a conclusion based on scientific

evidence150

.

149

Jacques Monod, Nobel prize for biology, is a paradigmatic example of this kind of attitude (cf. his work El azar y la

necesidad, Barral, Barcelona 1971) which has been subsequently defended very vigorously by Richard Dawkins, biology

profesor at the Oxford University in his work El relojero ciego, Labor, Barcelona 1988. 150

The case presented by Dawkins is clear: his book wants to show how it is not necessary to make recourse to God in order

to explain evolution. It has already been said that the existence of a clock remits to a clockmaker; however, Dawkins tries to

show that a recourse to natural selection is enough, but this is a «blind clockmaker»: “Natural selection, that automatic

process, blind and unconscious discovered by Darwin, and which we now know to be the explanation of the existence and

of the form of every type of life with an apparent purpose, does not have any finality in mind. It does not have either a mind

or an imagination. It does not plan future. It does not have any vision, or prediction or eyesight. If one may say that it

performs the function of clockmaker in nature, it is a function of a blind clockmaker…; the «designer» is the unconscious

natural selection…; our present hypothesis is that the work was done by the natural selection, in gradual evolutionary

stages”: El relojero ciego, op. cit. p. 4, 27 and 28.

However, such a claim is illegitimate because it is presented as scientific when in

reality it is not. Scientism is a kind of reductionism which arbitrarily denies those

problems which do not fit into its narrow mould.151

.

We have already seen how in other occasions some claim that evolutionary theories

are sufficient not because the legitimacy of the philosophical problems is denied, but

because of a desire of avoiding philosophical discussions in the scientific field152

. In this

case one’s claim is not prompted by a scientist stand, but by the desire of distinguishing

what belongs to science and what corresponds to other types of perspective. This

distinction is reasonable and also necessary, and is not in any way opposed or against

our conclusions. However, it is arguable, from a scientific and epistemological point of

view, whether the present-day theories are sufficient to completely explain evolution,

even if only at the level of scientific explanations.

However, it is important to emphasise that, independently from the achievements of

science, in order to obtain a complete perspective on evolution the scientific

explanations must take into account the metaphysical dimensions of the problem,

namely those which refer to the creation of the universe and to the existence of a divine

plan which governs it. This is not at all opposed to science because the claim of the

presence of a divine action - which gives being to all that exists in nature and governs it,

making the unfolding of the natural dynamism and the production of emerging novelties

possible - does not refer to the mechanisms specifically studied by science but to its

radical foundation; it is an issue which is posed at a level different from the one of

science, and which complements the latter.

29.4 The origin of man

The problem of the origins reaches its apex when the origin of man is considered.

This is obvious not only because it is the problem which more directly affects us, but

also because we have spiritual dimensions which transcend the natural level to which we

also belong.

We shall now consider in the first place the hominisation process, a term used to

refer to the evolutionary origin of the human organism. We shall then analyse the

151

Even in this aspect, the case presented by Dawkins is paradigmatic. He claims that, if there is something complex which

we still do not understand, we hall be able to understand it in terms of more simple parts which we already understand. He

adds that, if an engineer, in providing explanations of this type, “started to bore me telling me that the whole is greater than

the sum of its parts, I would stop him: This does not concern me, only tell me if it works”, cf. R. DAWKINS, El relojero

ciego, op. cit. p. 9. Obviously, this stand is a kind of reductionism, as the same Dawkins acknowledges (although he tries to

justify his perspective by saying that he admits a hierarchy of natural levels). He only takes into account the explanations in

terms of components and working, and leaves aside any philosophical question. It is legitimate to limit oneself to a specific

method; what is not legitimate is to deny anything which cannot be studied through this method, and this leads to an

incomplete and arbitrary perspective. 152

One may find an example of this type in: M. DELSOL – P. SENTIS – R. PAYOT – R. LADOUS – J. FLATIN, “Le

hazard et la selection expliquent-ils l’évolution? Biologie ou métaphysique”, Laval théologique et philosophique, 50 (1994),

pp. 7-41. The authors claim that the neo-Darwinism completely explains evolution at a scientific level which is arguable.

However, they claim, at the same time, the legitimacy of the philosophical questions on evolution and provide a basis for

them, particularly when they emphasize the existence of very specific potentialities in nature as a condition for evolution.

specifically human characteristics and their relationship with the evolutionary

process153

.

a) The process of hominisation

It is frequently claimed that the human organism originated from that of other

living beings by using the expression “man originates from a monkey”. Obviously, this

claim, in its literal meaning, is false: man does not originate from any of the primates

which presently exist, and no scientist claims this. The evolutionary theories claim the

existence of a remote common ancestor from which man, as well as the pongids, or

anthropoid monkeys (chimpanzee, orang-utan, and gorilla) may have originated.

The identity and characteristics of this common ancestor, as well as its antiquity,

are matters of discussion. It may have existed some 20 million years ago. Another object

of discussion is the time at which the two evolutionary lines may have separated. The

progress of molecular biology leads to dates which are more recent than the ones

previously thought. There is no unanimity either on the separation of the two lines: there

are various hypotheses which are object of scientific debate, although it is usually

admitted in general that the chimpanzee is the anthropoid which is closer to man.

As for the phylogeny of the hominids which reaches up to the present man, the

following sequence is taken as plausible: «Australopithecus» (four million years ago),

«Homo habilis» (from 2.5 million to one million years ago), «Homo erectus» (from 1.6

million to 200,000 years ago), «Homo sapiens» (130,000 years ago). The present-day

man would have been in existence for some 30,000 years.

As for the specific details of the process, difficulties and differences of opinion

among scientists are also found in this area154

. All in all, the difficulties in the

reconstruction of the origin of man are still very big. However, this is not an obstacle to

a generalised scientific consensus on the existence of the process as a whole. There is an

almost total unanimity among the scientists on the fact, i.e. on the origin of the present-

day man from those mentioned ancestors. But there are also important disagreements

about the specific explanations, i.e. when and how the different branches originated, and

when can one say that a specific fossil corresponds to a human being in a full sense. It is

clear that the «Australopithecus» was not a human in a proper sense; however, opinions

differ at the moment of establishing which one would be truly the first human being.

153

One may find a good summary of the scientific data on the hominization together with interesting reflections on the

philosophical and theological aspects which include an original proposal of the author, in: R. JORDANA, “El origen del

hombre. Estado actual de la investigación paleoantropológica”, Scripta Theologica, 20 (1988), pp. 65-99. 154

One can read a propos, for example: S.L. WASHBURN, “La evolución de la especie humana”, in the collective work

Evolución, Labor, Barcelona 1982, pp. 128-137; D. PILBEAM, “Origen de los hominoideos y homínidos”, Investigación y

ciencia, No. 92, May 1984, pp. 48-58. Although there are more and more data available, Pilbeam concludes: “at the same

time, doubts have increased about the degree of reliability which any report on human evolution can inspire. What kind of

precision and reliability can these reconstructions achieve? The cake, i.e. the different primitive stages of human evolution,

is for now very hard to digest”. These difficulties persist presently: it is very difficult to obtain reliable conclusions,

generally admitted, on the details of the process of hominization.

Some suggest the «Homo habilis», although it had a skull capacity inferior to the one of

the present-day man155

, while others are in favour of much later beings.

The study of the mitochondrial DNA which is inherited from the mother, has

been used to support the idea according to which an African woman of 200,000 years

ago is our common ancestor. Her descendants would have substituted other primitive

humans who existed in other places. However, these data seem to lead only to a specific

population and not to an individual woman, and some palaeontologists do not share this

conclusion156

.

It seems that it is not an easy job to clear the above mentioned question marks

completely, although the future advances of science may be able to provide data which,

for the time being, are unforeseeable.

b) Man and animal

The controversies on evolutionism have always been particularly centred on the

difference between man and the other animals. The main point of discussion is whether

man has a nature essentially superior to that of the other animals, or it is just a difference

of degree.

These controversies have a long history behind; actually, they go back to Charles

Darwin. In his Origin of the Species, Darwin did not expand sufficiently on the theme of

man. He tackled it in 1871 in his work The Descendants of Man and Sex Selection. The

chapters 3 and 4 of this work are entitled Comparison of the Mental Faculties of Man

with those of the Inferior Animals. From the beginning Darwin states his basic thesis

according to which, from the point of view of the intellectual capacities, there is no

fundamental difference whatsoever between man and the superior mammals. After

examining the main human characteristics, including language, abstract thought and the

moral and religious sense, Darwin concludes that, no matter how considerable is the

difference between man and the superior animals, it is only a difference of degree and

not of species.

Discussions continue nowadays. For example, Stephen Jay Gould claims that the

difference between man and animals is only a difference of degree and continues: “We

are so much bound to our philosophical and religious inheritance that we keep on

looking for some criteria of sharp differences between our capacities and those of a

chimpanzee…Many criteria have been tested, and they have failed one after another.

155

This opinion may be found in: R. JORDANA, “El origen del hombre. Estado actual de la investigación

paleoantropológica”, op. cit. The skull capacity of the «homo habilis» could reach the 775 cc., against the 1,345 of that of

the «homo sapiens»; however, it has been suggested that the former had the necessary physiological conditions to be able to

speak and that, therefore, it could have had the main human characteristics: cf. P.V. TOBIAS, “Recent Advances in the

Evolution of the Hominids with Especial Reference to Brain and Speech”, in: C. CHAGAS (publisher), Recent Advances in

the Evolution of Primates, Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Città del Vaticano 1983, pp. 85-140. 156

Both stands are presented in Investigación y ciencia, No. 189, June 1992: A.C. WILSON and R.L.CANN (“Origen

africano reciente de los humanos”, pp. 8-13) argument in favor; A.G. THORNE and M.H. WOLPOFF (“Evolucion

multiregional de los humanos”, pp. 14-20) argument against.

Their only honourable alternative is to admit the existence of a strict qualitative

continuity between the chimpanzees and us. And what do we lose with our way out? We

lose only an old-fashioned concept of soul in order to gain a more humble view, and

even exciting, of ourselves and of our unity with nature”157

.

There is no doubt that there is continuity between man and the other animals.

However, even admitting that man’s organism comes from other organisms through

evolution, the specifically human characteristics continue being real: it is enough to

think of the intellectual knowledge, of the capacity of self-reflection, of the capacity of

arguing, of the sense of evidence and truth, freedom and ethical values.

Actually, the problem is not to find some criteria able to show that there is a

basic difference between man and the other animals. That this difference exists is very

clear, as it can be demonstrated, for instance, by reflecting on the assumptions and

implications of science.

It is interesting to note that science, in whose name the essential difference

between man and the other animals is at times intended to be wiped out, is one of the

clearest evidences that this difference exists since science is possible only because man

has a theoretical and argumentative capacity which is not found in other living beings.

c) Human spirituality

The uniqueness of man corresponds to some dimensions which are usually

referred to as spiritual to distinguish them from the material conditions. Human

spirituality means that the human person has some characteristics which transcend his

material conditions.

Some seem to think that it is necessary to criticise the evolutionist theories in

order assert the spirituality of man. However, problems about the spirit can be posed

even by disregarding evolutionism. Actually, we know for certain that the organism of

each one of us began its existence as one cell, of course, a living human cell,

programmed to produce our whole organism, but after all one cell. To claim the fact that

man has spiritual dimensions is to transcend the biological level. Whether we think of

each man as existing nowadays, or refer to the origin of the first human beings, the

claim of a human spirituality is based on the existence of specific characteristics in the

human person, whatever may be the origin of our organism.

The spiritual dimensions require a real substratum which is usually called soul.

Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that these dimensions transcend the field of

what is natural, they also require a special intervention of God by which he creates a

spiritual human soul. This claim is not at all opposed to the natural laws or to the

scientific spirit; it simply says that, together with those dimensions which can be studied

by the experimental science, there are others (the spiritual ones) which, being

transcendent respect to what is natural, are also transcendent respect to science.

157

S.J. GOULD, Desde Darwin, Hermann Blume, Madrid 1983, p.53.

However, they are real dimensions which must be admitted in order to explain the data

from experience and the existence of science.

Finally, it may be appropriate to mention the issue of monogenism, i.e. the

doctrine according to which all men descend from one original couple. Sometime it is

said that, by admitting evolution, monogenism would become unsustainable, while

polygenism would really be the answer, i.e. the origin of man from a number of

primitive human beings. However, the issue is more complex. Polygenism is not as

simple as it looks at a first glance. Would different beings have managed to become

truly human over a full period of time? Of course, we do not have any scientific

evidence in favour of this. It is difficult to reach definitive conclusions in this respect in

the strictly scientific area. However, it is interesting to note that, from the point of view

of science, there is no reason whatsoever which may force one to admit that the origin of

the human organism by evolution implies polygenism, and there is no difficulty in

principle in explaining the origin of the present-day mankind from one first couple.

29.5 The frontiers of evolutionism

The boundaries of the experimental science are determined by the limitations of the

experimental control. Spiritual realities and dimensions, in principle, cannot be

submitted to experimental control. This does not mean that their reality cannot be

proved; it only means that the evidence required in this case is of metaphysical nature.

This evidence leans on the data provided by experience, but uses reasoning to establish

the conditions of possibility of what we know through experience.

If we apply this idea to the evolutionist theories, three basic problems can be

pointed out which we come across far beyond their boundaries.

The first is the creation of the universe. In a strict sense, creation refers to the

production of a universe which did not exist before in absolute. This issue is totally

outside the scope of science. How could this be verified through experiments and

observations? It would be necessary to observe the nothingness, or the very creation:

however, both are impossible. Hence, the problem of creation falls within the scope of

metaphysics. The fact that creation must have happened can be proved; however, the

reasoning which supports it falls far beyond the possibilities of the experimental science.

The second problem is that of the human soul. Only that which is material can be

submitted to experimental control following the laws of matter. Experiments imply

always observations through our senses and instruments. However, the spirit is invisible

and cannot be submitted to scientific experiments. Spirit is interiorness, personality,

self-awareness, love, freedom. We well know what all this means. The spirit is what we

know best; it has been an object of in-depth study since ancient times, whereas it has

taken thousands of years to begin to know matter somehow in a detailed way. Spirit is

completely real. However, it cannot be known by submitting it to experimental control

which is the way proper to science. Therefore, the boundaries of the theories of

evolution are illegitimately trespassed if they are extended into the field of the spirit,

whether in order to assert its existence or to deny it.

The third one refers to the problem of the action of God in the world. Science

formulates laws about the world; however, the existence of the world and of its laws

does not depend on our science. Nature has its own dynamism. We may intervene in

order to provoke transformations always, though, in accordance with the natural laws.

Science leans on this dynamism and on these laws; if they did not exist, science would

not exist either. Moreover, the method of the experimental science is not apt to decipher

the key to the existence of nature, to its dynamism and to its laws. The metaphysical

reflection can claim that this key is found in the action of God who gives being to all

that exists, gives it its own laws and makes the functioning of nature possible. It does

not make any sense to deny this divine action in the name of science. It is an issue that

goes beyond its boundaries.

Other border problems refer to finality and chance. In this case science can say

something, but they are problems which can be tackled with a certain rigor only from a

philosophical perspective. For example, the partisans of the so-called antropic principle

emphasise the fact that the existence of man is possible because the basic laws of

physics, and the subsequent structures in the physical, chemical and biological levels,

are very specific. There is no doubt that these considerations are useful for examining

the natural finality; however, they need to be completed with reflections which permit to

tackle the problem of finality at its proper level which is philosophical.

To claim that science has boundaries is not a way of undervaluing it. The

progress of science depends, to a large extent, on the deliberate choice of a particular

method which limits itself to the study of those dimensions of the natural which can be

put submitted to experimental control.

On the other hand, a metaphysical perspective makes it possible to understand in

all its depth the meaning of nature in the human life; this would not be possible if one

adopted a naturalist and reductionist stand. The obvious exaltation of science and of

nature by scientism and naturalism leads, if developed in a consequential way, to an

impoverished view in which the authentic meaning of the human life is lost, being

reduced to an accident within an evolutionary process devoid of finality. On the other

hand, the metaphysical perspective founds a view of nature which is framed within the

anthropological and ethical dimensions of the human existence.

XI. ORIGIN AND MEANING OF NATURE

We shall now examine those problems related the origin and meaning of nature,

taking into account the knowledge presently provided by science. As a conclusion, we

shall consider the relationship that exists, on one hand, between nature and the human

person, and, on the other hand, between nature and God.

30. ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

Cosmogonies have been conceived since ancient times whose intent was to

represent the history of the universe but without an adequate scientific basis. They also

posed philosophical problems about the ultimate explanation of the universe158

.

In modern times some scientific hypotheses were formulated which are

considered as the forerunners of the present-day ideas. Kant proposed the idea according

to which the universe was formed from a primitive nebula159

. Laplace used this idea

later on and suggested that the sun was formed by the contraction and cooling of an

incandescent nebula, while the planets originated from fragments detached from the sun

and the satellites came from the planets160

. Such explanation left intact the problem of

the creation of the universe and referred solely to physical processes which were not a

substitute for creation161

. On the other hand, a still limited knowledge of the

composition of the universe was available at that time, and it was very difficult to

submit these theories to empirical verification.

For the first time in history in our own times rigorous scientific theories were

formulated about the origin and evolution of the universe. These theories have renewed

the interest for philosophical problems about creation.

30.1. Scientific cosmology

Scientific cosmology is a branch of physics which studies the origin of the universe. It is

a relatively recent discipline. Evidence about the existence of galaxies different from

ours became substantial only around 1920, while the model of the Big Bang was not

accepted until 1964.

158

An extensive study on this issue is found in Juan Jose Sanguineti, El origen del universo. La cosmologia en busca de la filosofia,

Buenos Aires 1994. The study includes the history of the issue, the scientific data and the appropriate philosophical reflections. 159

In his Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven, or study of the constitution and of the mechanical origin of the

universe according to Newton’ principles, a work published in an anonymous way in 1755. 160

In his work The System of the World, published 1796. 161

Kant admitted, for instance, in the work mentioned, that there is in the universe a finality which implies the existence of

a creator.

The Big Bang model is based on the general relativity theory which was

formulated by Einstein in 1915. The equations of this theory permit to perform

calculations of the local movement of matter under the action of gravity. For this reason

they are appropriate to describe the universe on a large scale since, in this perspective,

the universe can be considered as a physical system made of objects with a big mass,

such as stars and galaxies which are separated by huge distances. At the same time the

evolution of the systems is determined by the force of gravity.

Einstein applied his theory to the universe as a whole in 1917. The resulting

model was a dynamic universe (which evolves with time). However, Einstein, disgusted

by this idea, modified it by introducing, in an arbitrary way, a constant whose purpose

was to provide a static model of the universe (later on he declared that this had been the

worst mistake of his life). On the other hand, the works of Willem de Sitter in 1916-

1917 and of Alfred Friedmann in 1922-1924 presupposed a dynamic universe. This idea

got a foothold when Edwin Hubble formulated in 1929 the law which bears his name,

according to which galaxies would move away from one another at a speed proportional

to their relative distance (the greater their distance, the greater the speed at which they

move away from each other)162

.

The first version of the model of the Big Bang was formulated by Georges

Lemaître, a Belgian astronomer and a Catholic priest, in 1927. He assumed that the

universe was formed from the explosion of a kind of primitive atom, and coincided with

Hubble’s law in postulating the expansion of the universe. George Gamow reformulated

this theory in 1948. However, the model of the Big Bang was not accepted by the

majority of the scientists immediately. Even in 1948, Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold

formulated a different model of the universe, the theory of the so-called stationary state;

they postulated that the universe shows the same aspect in any epoch and, in order to

explain its expansion, they suggested a continuous creation of matter so that, when the

galaxies separate from one another, new matter is formed in-between them. In order to

keep the density constant, the creation of one milligram of matter per cubic meter every

one billion years would be enough. For years the model of the Big Bang and of the

stationary state were presented as alternative hypotheses. In 1960 the origin of the

universe was still an issue and the concern of few scientists, while the existing models

were studied as a curiosity.

The situation changed radically when, in 1964, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson

discovered the background radiation of the microwaves whose characteristics were

congruent with the predictions of the model of the Big Bang. From then on, this model

has been generally accepted by the scientists, and the model of stationary state was

abandoned. The progressive consolidation of the model of the Big Bang is due also to

the confirmation of other predictions made on the basis of this model. Specifically, it

provides an explanation coherent with the expansion of the universe, it proposes an age

of the universe which is in accordance with the data about the age of its components,

and its predictions on the relative abundance of light atoms in the universe is in

agreement with the data of observation.

162

The Hubbles’s law leans on the interpretation of the sliding of the spectrum of the galaxies towards the red color, as a

result of the Doppler effect.

Since 1981, the model of the Big Bang has been completed with the theory of the

inflationary universe proposed by Alan Guth. This theory refers to the enormous

expansion that would have occurred during very short instants immediately after the Big

Bang, producing very important effects for the subsequent evolution of the universe.

According to the model of the Big Bang, the evolution of the universe would

have followed a scheme which, in an approximate and simplified way, would be the

following. The universe is 15,000 million years old. At the beginning, it was in a

concentrated state at high density and temperature. As a consequence of the explosion,

an expansion was produced which was accompanied by a progressive cooling. In the

first second, the temperature was 10,000 million degrees. At this stage there were only

radiations and some particles among which there were very violent interactions. At the

end of three minutes, the lowering of the temperature permitted the nucleo-synthesis, or

formation of nuclei of the lightest atoms. After 300,000 years, when temperature had

gone down to few thousand degrees, the recombination, or formation of atoms, took

place; then, the radiation of photons was separated from matter and expanded freely,

equally in all directions and at a temperature which went down with the passing of time,

originating the «fossil» isotropic radiation which Penzia and Wilson detected for the

first time. Later on, the gravitational force caused the condensation of big masses where

thermonuclear reactions were produced. In this way, stars and galaxies were formed. In

the nuclear reactions within the stars, the heaviest atoms are produced which are spread

throughout the space when stars explode, and they are the material from which planets,

such as the earth, are formed.

30.2. Creation: physics and metaphysics

The newly acquired scientific knowledge has not only contributed to the formulation of

a new image of the world, but has also caused a re-posing of the problem of creation.

a) Creation as a metaphysical problem

With the model of the Big Bang, for the first time in history we have realistic

calculations of the age of the universe. There is no doubt that this will give room to

discussions about the problem of creation; actually, if it is possible to attribute a specific

age to the universe, it looks like a demonstration of creation has been produced.

Actually, the model of the stationary state was at times used in order to avoid attributing

to the universe an unlimited age, with the connotations that this seems to have in favour

of creation.

However, physics cannot determine the age of the universe in an absolute way.

Physics can claim, for instance, that the universe comes from a kind of primitive atom;

however, it can continue inquiring for the origin of this atom and assume that it was

formed from previous physical states. At its own proper level, a physicist can always

postulate, although as a hypothesis, the existence of physical states previous to any state

of the universe. Therefore, scientific cosmology cannot demonstrate the creation of the

universe.

The problem of creation does not refer to the origin of a physical state from a

previous one, but to the radical foundation of the universe, i.e. to the production of its

being. Experimental science studies the transitions between physical states, and its

methods do not allow for the study of the radical foundation of the universe. Therefore,

physics cannot say anything about God or creation, and the use of scientific arguments

to tackle these problems is non-viable. All in all, creation is not a physical but a

metaphysical problem. The philosophical problem of creation consists in determining

whether the universe can be self-sufficient or if, on the contrary, it is necessary to claim

a cause that has produced it by giving it its being.

Christianity claims that God created the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo,

according to the classical Latin expression)163

. This means that the divine creative act

produces being totally, without leaning on something pre-existing. It is not a simple

transformation of something which already existed164

.

It is appropriate to ask whether the creation of the universe is only a content of

religious faith or can also be rationally demonstrated. The Catholic doctrine claims that

the existence of God creator, principle and end of all things, can be known with

certainty through the light of natural reason from the created things, so that the human

intellect can find an answer to the question of the origins165

by its own powers.

The rational evidence of creation remits, ultimately, to a dilemma: either the

universe is self-sufficient, i.e. it exists by itself and there is nothing outside it to explain

its existence, or it asks for a cause which is different from the very universe, and which

has produced it and given being to it. The first possibility is, in reality, an impossibility:

if the universe were self-sufficient, it should have divine characteristics which in fact

does not have. Material beings are limited, change, are generated and corrupted, they

have a being which cannot give a complete account of itself. These difficulties are not

solved by making recourse to an infinite chain, i.e. by assuming that the universe has

always existed; actually, the insufficiency of what is material to give an account of itself

subsists even though the causal chains are multiplied indefinitely: it is not a question of

numbers, but of causality. The way of being of the material entities includes lack of self-

sufficiency and to these effects it is the same whether we consider one being only, or

many, or an infinite series of them.

Therefore, the physical universe remits to a superior cause which has given it its

being. Only a personal God can have the characteristics proper to the divinity. The

particular beings, limited and changeable, remit to a Being which has being by itself and

which, for this reason, can give being to other beings in a limited and specific way: it is

what we call «participation in being». This does not mean that creatures have a part of

163

Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, nn. 279-301 164

Cf. G. COTTIER, “La doctrine de la création et le concept de néant”, Acta Filosofica 1 (1992), pp. 6-16. 165

Cf. H. DENZINGER – A. SCHÖNMETZER, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et

morum, 36th

ed., Herder, Barcelona, Freiburg, Roma, 1976, nn. 3004 and 3026; Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 286.

the divine being, but that they have, in a partial and limited way, the being they have

received from God.

The claiming of a divine creation of the universe is not concerned with when and

how the universe began to exist. As for when, the creation of the universe, reason tells

us, has nothing to do with its duration. As for how, this is also irrelevant: the issue of

creation is relevant not only in case the universe was at the beginning an imperceptible

quantum bubble, but also in case there were already much more organized entities and

processes. In any case, both issues have originated ample discussions, and for this

reason we will now analyse them more in depth.

b) Beginning in time and creation

It seems that it is not possible to demonstrate that the universe is of a limited age

because it is always possible to assume, even if in a hypothetical way, the existence of

states antecedent to any specific state of the universe. This had already been emphasized

by Kant in the first cosmological antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason which deals

with the scientific impossibility of demonstrating whether the universe is temporally

finite or infinite. Many centuries before, Aquinas had already tackled the problem in a

radical way when in his brief treatise On the Eternity of the World he claimed that, if

one leans only on rational arguments, he cannot not exclude the fact that the universe

has had an indefinite duration, and that he can know that this was not so only because of

a supernatural revelation166

.

Aquinas asks whether it is possible for a created being to have always existed.

He examined the opposing arguments and after refuting them he concluded that we

know the origin of the universe in time only because of divine revelation. All in all, he

emphasised that the problem of the creation of the universe is not identical with that of

its origin in time, so that it is possible to know through reason that the universe must

have been created by God, but reason cannot prove that the same universe had a

beginning in time: a Christian knows that the universe had an origin in time only by

divine revelation167

. In any case, indefinite duration is not the same as eternity in a strict

sense; eternity means the perfect possession of being, above time and duration, and it is

only given in God, while the duration of the natural beings refers to the successive

existence proper to a temporal and mutable way of being168

.

Of course, if it were possible to prove that the universe had an absolute

beginning, before which it did not exist, then one should really say that the universe had

been created; unfortunately, a proof of this kind does not seem possible. However,

independently from the problem of the beginning in time, the universe is not self-

sufficient, and this is enough to establish that it must have been created by God.

166

Cf. J.I. SARANYANA, “Santo Tomàs: «De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes»”, Anuario Filosofico, 9 (1976), pp.

399-424. 167

In this context, Aquinas added that if the Christian claims the origin of the universe in time through rational arguments,

could give an opportunity for teasing to a non believer, who knows about the illegitimacy of such arguments: cf.

AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 46, a. 2, c. 168

AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 44, a. 1; I, q. 45, aa. 1 and 2; I, q. 46, aa. 1 and 2; Summa contra gentiles, II, c.38.

None of the proofs that Aquinas presented in order to demonstrate the existence

of a God creator presupposes the fact that the world had a beginning. However, in the

discussion about creation frequently both ideas go together. This way of reasoning

easily leads to misunderstandings. For this reason it is important to emphasise that the

problem of the origin of the world in time cannot be identified with that of its creation.

The problem of the creation of the universe refers to the radical foundation of its being,

and this can be solved by leaving aside the problem of its duration.

c) The beginning of the universe

According to the model of the Big Bang, the universe existed 15,000 million

years ago in a primitive state whose study seems to remit to a peculiarity to which the

laws of physics would not apply. Different hypotheses have been proposed to tackle the

study of this initial state. It is a difficult problem and, for the time being, it is not even

sure that the ways of tackling it nowadays are correct.

According to a hypothesis which enjoys a certain popularity, the universe would

have began to exist as a kind of «quantum bubble», said in a more technical way, as a

«fluctuation of the quantum vacuum». Schematically, what is claimed here is that the

quantum fluctuations of the gravitational field would have produced space-time

structures from which material particles would have been produced through the

fluctuations of the quantum vacuum. The rest of the universe would have been produced

from these particles in accordance with the physical laws169

.

This hypothesis is at a very speculative stage. It remits to the «quantum gravity»,

a theory which hopes to unify quantum physics and gravity, and about which there are

serious problems and not few disagreements170

. However, it is possible that the universe

began to exist in a tenuous way, almost imperceptible, just as this hypothesis proposes.

On the other hand, it does not make any sense to claim an alleged self-creation

of the universe, i.e. an authentic creation but without Creator171

. Does this strange

possibility make any sense? It looks like a contradictory one, and it is really so. Some

considerations on the nature of the physical concepts will allow us to pinpoint the

misunderstandings implicit in this claim.

In the first place, it is important to note that physics usually speaks of the

creation of matter in an improper way, and this can lead to confusion. Actually, one of

169

Cf. D. ANDRESCIANI, “Lo studio dell’origine dell’universo nel contesto dellacosmologia quantistica”, in Excerpta e

dissertationibus in Philosophia, vol. III, Facultad Eclesiastica de Filosofia, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 1993, pp. 9-

88. 170

Cf. C.J. ISHAM, “Quantum Theories of the Creation of the Universe”, in: R.J. RUSSELL – N. MURPHY – C.J. ISHAM

(publishers), Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature, Vatican Observatory Publications, Vatican City State 1993, pp.

49-89. 171

Proposals of this kind can be seen, for instance in: Paul DAVIES, God and the new Physics, Dent, London 1983;

Quentin SMITH, “The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe”, Philosophy of Science, 55 (1988), pp. 39-57; Peter W.

ATKINS, Como crear el mundo, Grijalbo, Mondadori, Barcelona, 1995.

the consequences of the special relativity theory, formulated by Einstein in 1905, is the

equation which establishes the equivalence between mass and energy. When certain

phenomena occur to which this equation is applied, it is usual to speak of creation of

particles from energy or, in the opposite process, of annihilation of a couple of particles

and production of energy. These are though physical processes in which transformations

take place which are analogous to those of any other physical process; it does not make

any sense here to take the term creation in its philosophical and theological meaning,

i.e. as a creation from nothingness.

On the other hand, the physical concept of vacuum (which appears to be close to

the concept of nothingness), refers to specific physical states. Actually, physicists

distinguish two types of vacuum, according to the theories and methods in use; one

speaks, for instance, of classic vacuum and of quantum vacuum. Therefore vacuum

cannot be identified with nothingness172

.

The quantum vacuum is a physical state with a complex structure. Its study

pertains to quantum physics, a field in which there are discordant interpretations

particularly about causality. At times it is claimed that in a quantum world events

without causes occur. Once the misunderstanding is cleared, it is easy to acknowledge

that any process, even at a quantum level, demands the existence of causes to explain

their production, although the causality involved here is of non-determinist type.

The general relativity which is the basis of the cosmological models, interprets

gravity as a curvature of the space-time and for this reason presupposes somehow a

geometrization of physics. In the field of quantum gravity which tries to unify the

general relativity and quantum physics, one speaks of topological fluctuations which

would explain the appearance of space-time structures. Somehow and in a confused

way, it is usually claimed that quantum fluctuations may exist through which space-time

structures may appear in a non-causal way from which, later on, material particles may

be produced. However, without denying the scientific interest in topological transitions,

it is not difficult to note that the existence of a space-time without matter, and the

appearance of matter from a pure space-time do not make any sense if these concepts

are used in their habitual meaning.

If we put together the above mentioned misunderstandings, we reach the

conclusion that it is possible to claim the self-creation of the universe. However, this

claim is based on illegitimate extrapolations173

which intend to extract from physics

something that this science, because of its own method, is incapable of providing, since

its ideas are meaningful only within an empirical context when there are procedures able

to relate them to real or possible experiments. All this is not possible in the case of the

problem of the absolute origin of the universe from nothing. The method used to obtain

these unlikely conclusions consists in attributing a metaphysical meaning to the

physical theories on space, time, matter, energy and vacuum, a meaning that cannot be

172

Philip YAN, “Aprovechamiento energético del punto cero”, Investigacion y ciencia, No. 257, February 1998, pp. 42-45.

On can read the following in page 42: “the energy of the vacuum is just real. According to modern physics, vacuum is not

the same as nothingness”. 173

One may find a critical analysis of this proposal in: William L. CRAIG, “God, Creation and Mr Davies”, The British

Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37 (1986), pp. 163-175; Mariano ARTIGAS, “Fisica y creacion: el origen del

universo”, Scripta Theologica, 19 (1987), pp. 347-373.

attributed to them since these ideas are defined in physics in accordance with

mathematical theories and experimental data. Because of all this, these ideas necessarily

refer to entities, or properties, or physical processes and in no way can they be applied to

events such as creation from nothing which, by its own nature, is not a process which

relates a physical state to another state also physical174

.

Those proposals which present a self-creation of the universe as a scientific

possibility are just some of the present-day manifestations of the pseudo-scientific faith

in naturalism. The properly scientific problem is totally different. It pertains to science,

in this context, to decide whether the far history of the universe remits to an almost

imperceptible quantum phenomenon, or to other different states. For the time being, it is

not easy to provide solid arguments on this issue.

30.3 The implications of creation

We shall now deal with some implications contained in the notion of creation. They will

help us understand its true meaning, its relationship with the scientific theories and its

consequences so as to obtain a complete understanding of nature.

Creation is necessary to found the being of creatures; it does not refer to some

particular aspects of the created entities, but to the totality of what they are. The being of

creatures depends radically on God not only in order to begin to exist, but totally:

consequently, divine action is necessary as the foundation of the created being even after

this being has began to exist. The founding divine action extends to all that exists in any

of its aspects and, therefore, even to the activity of what already exists, and to the new

beings which are produced through the natural processes. Consequently, the creation of

the universe cannot consist in a simple «setting off» something which later on will be

self-sufficient.

Creation is not only necessary to explain that something has begun to be. The

divine action extends to all that is, is produced, is preserved and originated. The limited

being of creatures remits to the Being which has being by itself and which, therefore,

can give being to creatures without losing nothing of what it is. Moreover, creation takes

into account the fact that the God who creates has to be infinitely wise, almighty and

good (because he has the fullness of being). It is clear, then, that the created universe

must correspond to a divine project: it must be rational and be governed by God.

The divine action is not only necessary to explain some aspects of nature which

could not be explained otherwise; the very existence of the natural activity in all its

aspects demands it. Divine creation does not correspond to that false image of God

which has been called the «god of the gaps», i.e. it is not a recourse for «filling the

174

However, it is not infrequent to find good scientific expositions on these themes intermingled with philosophical

reflections which give the impression of taking physics much beyond its possibilities, as is the case, for instance, of

Jonathan J. HALLWELL, “Cosmologia cuántica y creación del universo”, Investigación y ciencia, No. 185, February 1992,

pp. 12-20.

gaps» of our ignorance; it is a rigorous conclusion to which we arrive when we try to

explain, in a rational way, the existence of the natural world.

Moreover, the divine action does not interfere with the natural at its own level: it

rather founds it. It is not a cause placed along the line of the natural causes, no matter

how excellent it may be. It is the cause that makes it possible for all the natural causes

and their effects to be. To claim the necessity of a founding divine action is not to

belittle the importance of the natural, or to claim that it is a substitute for it. It is

precisely this divine action that gives being to everything natural, together with its own

dynamism and virtualities.

It is easy to see how the claim for a divine creation implies a very specific

perspective of the natural world, and how it is possible to reach completely different

ideas about the being and the meaning of the natural world when creation is either

admitted or denied.

For example, the claim for a divine creation gives us the possibility of

understanding not only the existence of the universe, but also its rational character.

More specifically, it gives us the possibility of understanding the existence of an

information in which dynamism and structuring are intertwined in such a way that the

subsequent unfoldings of the dynamism produce systems every time more organized

and, ultimately, the global system of nature with all its levels which culminate in the

human organism. If divine creation is denied, we must say that the organization of the

system of nature is the accidental result of blind forces, and this is completely

unrealistic. Although there are forces which may somehow be qualified as blind, and

although we may admit that accidental coincidences play a very important role in the

unfolding of the natural processes, to claim that these factors are the ultimate

explanation is equivalent to denying a rational and coherent explanation of a nature

which is, on the contrary, permeated by rationality in all its dimensions175

.

31. FINALITY IN NATURE

Finality in nature occupies a central place in the reflections on nature. From ancient

times up to our own days, the main differences of opinion in the philosophy of nature

refer, to a large extent, to this problem. The «finalists» claim there is directionality in

nature which should be interpreted as finality. This stand corresponds to the natural

approach of man to nature, and it connects easily with the claim of a divine providence

which governs the course of the natural phenomena. On the other hand, the «anti-

finalists» deny the existence of finality in nature or, at least, the fact that we cannot

175

Edgar Morin, for instance, claims that the organization of the universe would arisen from chaos, conceived after

Heraclitus’ fashion: an “original chaos from which the logos arises”: E. MORIN, El método. I. La naturaleza de la

naturaleza, Ediciones Cátedra, Madrid 1981, pp. 76-78. It seems that Morin identifies the primitive state of the universe

and, in general, of the micro-physical world, with chaos in a strict sense. However, this identification is very problematic

because the micro-physical world, even in its primitive state, should have those virtualities whose actualization has

provoked the formation of more organized structures. Physics assumes always the existence of laws, and actually manages

to formulate them; therefore, it seems unlikely that, before a philosophical reflection, the present organization of nature

comes from a chaos in the proper sense of the word which lacks any type of structure or of laws.

know it; they also usually rejected the notion of a divine providence. Their arguments

frequently seek support in the progress of science.

Let us try to delimit first what we mean by «natural finality». Afterwards we shall

analyse the dimensions of finality which exist in nature. We shall then try to show that

there is finality in nature, determine its scope, and examine the implications of the

present-day worldview with respect to the problem of the natural finality.

31.1. The concept of finality

The notion of «end» has three main meanings: «the end of a process», «the goal of a

tendency» and «the objective of a plan».

In the first place, end designates the «conclusion» of something. In the case of

entities, it refers to their physical limits (the end of a book, the end of a road, for

instance). In the case of processes which unfold over time, end designates the last stage

at which they stop or are finalised (for instance, the end of reading a book, or the end of

a trip). These two types of ends are aspects of the same reality, considered in its static

and dynamic aspects respectively: the end of a process is a thing, or a state of things

which is arrived at through the process. It is interesting to emphasise here the dynamism

and activity; in this sense, finality means, «end of a process».

In the second place, end is the «goal» towards which and action or a process

«tends». This meaning is added to the second: not every end is a goal; however, every

goal is the end of a tendency. The concept of finality is closely related to that of

«tendency» which is used as a criterion for recognising the existence of finality. In this

sense, finality means «goal of a tendency».

In the third place, when the end is achieved through a voluntary action, the end

becomes the goal of a deliberate project, the objective sought through one’s action. This

third meaning presupposes the first two and adds to them the intention of the subject.

Irrational living beings are able to act in this way by following their natural inclinations.

In the case of intelligent and free subjects, capable of establishing objectives, this

meaning of finality is the same as the «objective of a plan».

Our considerations are focused on the finality of the second type as it exists in

the activity of the natural entities, not caused by knowledge either because they are

beings without any kind of knowledge, or because they are processes which, although

existing in beings capable of knowledge, are carried out in an automatic way, without

the intervention of any knowledge. Therefore, we shall distinguish between «subjective»

finality provoked by the knowledge of an end, and «objective» finality which is

independent from this knowledge. Our considerations will be limited to those actions

and processes which are not the result of a deliberate plan on the part of the agent and,

therefore, to the objective finality of tendencial type. Left out of our consideration are

those actions which depend on a previous knowledge, and also the instinctive actions of

the animals. We adopt this stand for two reasons: first, because the analysis of these

actions would require us to go into the field of animal psychology, and this would take

us too far away from our purpose; second, because we want to place the problem of the

natural finality in that field which is closest to empirical verification.

Finality is opposed to chance. We said that something happens by chance when

it is the result of accidental, i.e. unforeseen coincidences which do not seem to have a

specific cause. On the other hand, finality implies the fact that there are tendencies

which explain the effects; the effect is the direct result of proper causes and not of the

accidental coincidence of these causes.

31.2. How finality is manifested in nature

Natural finality is manifested mainly in three ways: directionality, co-operation,

and functionality. Directionality refers to the existence of tendencies in the natural

processes. Co-operation refers to the capacity that entities and processes have to be

integrated within unitary types of results. Functionality expresses the fact that many

parts of nature create with their activity the conditions for the existence and activities of

those systems of which they form part.

a) Directionality

Let us consider first the notion of directionality. Natural processes do not unfold

in an arbitrary way. On the contrary, they originate from specific entities and unfold

according to dynamic patterns. The natural dynamism unfolds following «privileged

channels». Of course, there is a great variety of possible processes in function of the

concurrence of the different dynamisms; however, processes move around specific

patterns. As we have already pointed out, in nature everything articulates around

patterns, although not everything in nature is pattern.

This occurs from the lowest levels of organization to the most complex ones. At

the fundamental level, the four basic interactions have a well-defined intensity and

effects, and condition the unfoldings of all the natural processes. Something similar

occurs with the activity of the atoms and molecules, and with the biochemical activity in

the life processes. When we go deeper into the field of the living organisms,

directionality reaches its peak and it is really amazing: the unfolding of the genetic

information, the intracellular activities, the intercellular communication, the life

functions, are all manifestations of a clear and specific directionality. There are specific

and directional dynamisms which also unfold in the earth and in the stars. The existence

of dynamic patterns, even in those processes which are usually qualified as chaotic, is

every time more evident.

Science presupposes the existence of a directionality in nature and actually tries

to determine its modalities. Its success implies a progressively more specific knowledge

of the directionality of the natural processes.

We can say without hesitation, therefore, that the natural dynamism unfolds in a

directional way, and it is enough to claim the case for a weak type of directionality

which, though being real, yet does not guarantee the achievement of specific goals. Can

we make a step further, and claim the case for a strong type of directionality, i.e. for the

existence of tendencies towards specific goals?

We meet here with a formidable difficulty since the specific unfoldings of the

natural dynamism depend on very varied circumstances which, to a large extent,

correspond to accidental coincidences. In other words, although the natural dynamism

moves around patterns, the results of its unfolding are not determined because different

dynamisms concur in the processes and nothing guarantees that specific results are

going to be achieved. This is equivalent to acknowledging that the results are not

necessary but contingent. In these conditions, how can we claim that there are

tendencies towards specific goals?

This difficulty is insurmountable if we think of goals which are achieved in an

absolutely necessary way. If we make directionality to be the same as tendencies which

necessarily lead towards specific goals, we should then conclude that this directionality

does not exist.

At a first glance this conclusion seems to shatter any hope of finding a

foundation for the natural finality. However, it is not so. We are simply obliged to

introduce a clarification which is decisively important at the time of establishing

conclusion about the existence and scope of the natural finality. This clarification

concerns those conditions which guarantee the goals of the directionality. There are

specific goals only insofar as some factors intervene which, so to say, «impose their

laws». In many cases, either because of the existing organisation or because of the

intervening factors, the achievement of specific goals is guaranteed within a wide

margin of circumstances. There are many situations in which there is a stable

organization and, therefore, there are tendencies towards specific goals176

.

One can speak, in this sense, of degrees of directionality in function of the

factors which intervene in a situation. It may just be the case, for example, of simple

potentialities, of capacities closer to their actualisation, or of authentic tendencies which

will lead to specific results. All in all, they are always potentialities whose actualisation

is either only possible, or probable, or certain.

b) Co-operation

Co-operation is a particular case of directionality. Specifically, it is a potentiality

which refers to the integration of different factors into a unitary result. In speaking of

«unitary result», we refer to a holistic system, to emerging properties, to new types of

176

This statements is not prejudicial to the problem of indeterminism. We are speaking of tendencies which are compatible

with the existence of a kind of indeterminism: it is in the field of quantum physics where this problem arises, and where

probabilistic laws are formulated. However, also the theories on chaos point out the existence of specific tendencies.

dynamism, i.e. to the appearing of new types of structuring and dynamism which are not

just reducible to the juxtaposition of the initial factors.

The knowledge of many modalities of co-operation in nature is one of the main

achievements of modern science in which synergy, or co-operative action, occupies an

important place.

Holistic systems occupy a central place at all levels in nature; they are systems

formed thanks to the co-operative action of their components. In the micro-physical

world, protons, neutrons and electrons are integrated according to specific interactions,

so that atoms are formed whose electrons are placed at energetic levels also very

specific, determining in this way the chemical properties of the atoms and, therefore,

their capacity of being integrated into greater systems. Starting from this level, there are

many other types of co-operation which reach their apex in the organisms of the living

beings.

Thanks to this co-operation, morphogenesis - or the production of specific holistic

pattern -, which is the basis of the specificity of nature, is made possible.

If co-operation is considered from the diachronic perspective of the evolutionist

theories, it is easy to see how successive integrations lead to new types of organisation

which, in turn, open new possibilities and shut others.

As organisation progresses, new routes are opened which did not exist before. In

this regard, we may emphasises the inconsistency of some critiques which are opposed

to evolution arguing that it is highly improbable that all the components of a new

organism, or all the variations which are needed to make new organism appear, may

coincide by chance. Actually, the improbability is huge if we think of a random mixing

of completely independent factors, as it would be the case of random mixing the letters

or words which make up a literary work. On the other hand, probability increases in a

noticeable way when the components are not independent, when there are co-operative

tendencies, and when each achievement results in new co-operative potentialities which

did not exist before and which are more and more specific. Probabilities are even

greater, when one takes into account the fact that, besides the simple co-operation, there

is a greater degree of directionality in which there can be regulatory factors whose

variations permit perhaps to explain the simultaneous production of a whole collection

of co-ordinated changes. This greater degree of directionality is what we call

functionality.

c) Functionality

We usually speak of «functionality» to express the fact that a part plays a certain

role within a greater whole. Nature is organized in such a way that there are systems

with a notable level of functionality. Moreover, one can speak also of the functionality

of nature as a whole insofar as it provides those conditions which make human life

possible.

There is a close relationship between structure and function, because the function

of a part obviously depends on its structural characteristics. In our case this is

particularly relevant because our analysis focuses on the natural structuring which

provides the basis for a high degree of functionality.

The existence of functionality in the living beings is evident. Any treatise on

biology is actually a systematic exposition of the functionality in the living beings.

Can one speak of functionality at the physico-chemical level? Obviously, the

systems of this level do not have the typical characteristics of the living beings;

therefore, it does not seem logical to claim that they have the same type of functionality

of the living beings. For instance, it makes sense to speak of the functions of the red

blood cells, or of the liver or of the nervous system; however, it sounds paradoxical to

speak of the functions that an electron performs in the atom, or that an atom performs in

the molecule. The reasons for this difference are evident: a living being has typical

tendencies whose realization is made possible thanks to the functions that its

components perform. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to attribute similar

tendencies to physico-chemical entities.

However, it is possible to speak of functionality even in the case of physico-

chemical entities if one takes into account their twofold type of integration with the

biological level, as components and as environment. The functionality of the living

beings depends on their physico-chemical components, and the exercise of this

functionality is only possible when there is an environment which offers the

indispensable, or convenient, conditions. In the first case (components), one may speak

of «internal functionality», while in the second case (environment), one may speak of an

«external functionality».

We can take our reflections much further if we consider that different natural

systems are integrated into greater systems. Insofar as a whole collection of natural

entities can be considered as an authentic system, its components can be said to have an

«internal functionality». It is the case, for instance, of the ecosystems in which there are

living beings (the various species which live in it) and non-living beings (the

environmental factors); or of the biosphere whose components extend to the lithosphere,

atmosphere and oceans, besides the living beings. One can also speak of the total system

of nature since there are close relationships of dependence among many of its parts

(these relationships are especially close from the evolutionary point of view).

These reflections are useful to solve a problem which is usually mentioned when

speaking of finality. Actually, it is usually said that many cases of apparent finality, in

reality, are no more than examples of an «external usefulness», and cannot be used for

arguing in favour of finality. This objection is partly right; it would not be correct, for

instance, to speak of «natural» finality in relation to a climate or a vegetation favourable

to certain species. However, many cases of «external usefulness» become cases of

«internal functionality» if they are conditions which become integrated, as components,

into greater systems. If we continue with the previous example, specific climatic

conditions and the existence of plants are indispensable for the human existence;

therefore, in considering systems which include human life, climatic conditions and

plants become components with an authentic internal functionality.

Of course, there are degrees of functionality. For example, some functions are

completely necessary for the survival of the organisms in which they take place, while

others, on the other hand, are only convenient. Something similar occurs when we

consider greater systems.

Functionality is the dynamic aspect of structuring. The structuring of the

organisms and of their parts is the basis of their functionality, and this is a manifestation

of an intertwining between dynamism and structuring. It is not necessary to consider

more examples which are everywhere in the living beings. On the other hand, it is

convenient to consider the functionality of the different natural levels since some are

conditions of possibility for others.

Actually, to say that there is continuity among the different levels of nature

means that some are conditions of possibility for others (not in all their aspects, but only

in some or as a whole). The physico-chemical level provides the components of all the

others. The astrophysical level provides the components of the geological one which

performs, in part, a similar function with respect to the biological one. The astrophysical

and the geological levels provide the necessary environment for the existence of the

biological one. At biological level, some organisms are conditions of possibility for

others: for example, plants are indispensable for the life of the heterotrophs, i.e. for all

the other living beings.

If we now look at the conditions of possibility of the human life, we easily see

how the organisation of the natural levels acquires an obvious meaning. We are not

trying to say that the existence of each component of nature should be explained in

function of particular human conveniences: this would be a naïve and unsustainable

anthropocentrism. However, there is something like a legitimate anthropocentrism

which considers the human person as the apex of nature, and which acknowledges the

fact that the existence of man is possible only because there is a grand functionality in

which all the other levels of nature are involved. Therefore, if one acknowledges the

great value of human life, it is then possible to attribute a meaning to the organisation of

nature in function of the human life.

There is not only functionality in nature, but also a noticeable one. We shall not

delve with particular examples which are, in all other respects, very many. The progress

of molecular biology has contributed to the appreciation of the huge level of

sophistication of the biological structures and of their respective functionality177

. These

are co-ordinated in such a way as to involve whole series of processes, and this co-

ordination is carried out with an admirable precision. One can claim that, in many

aspects, the functional organisation of nature far exceeds human realisations in variety,

richness, harmony, efficiency, simplicity, beauty and imagination.

177

Jacques MONOD provides, in his already mentioned Chance and Necessity, abundant examples which were multiplied

in the subsequent decades. What he denies is the fact that this functionality corresponds to a plan; however, his work points

out the fact that even those who oppose the existence of a superior plan admit that there is in nature a very notable degree of

directionality, cooperation and functionality, and that the scientific progress highlights, ever more widely, the existence of

these characteristics in nature.

31.3. Existence and scope of natural finality

Can we claim that there is finality in nature? And if the answer is yes, what does it

consist in, and what is its scope?

If we take into account the previous considerations it is not difficult to answer

these questions. Actually, we have analysed the issues of directionality, co-operation

and functionality which exist in nature; now we are just left with the task of carrying out

a synthesis of the results of this analysis and of examining its implications.

There is directionality in nature, in the weak sense as well as in the strong one.

The existence of a weak directionality means that natural processes articulate around

patterns, and that there are, therefore, general tendencies whose actualisation depends on

the factors which intervene in each case. When processes unfold in organised systems

which are sufficiently stable, there is, besides, a strong directionality, i.e. tendencies

towards well-defined specific goals.

There is also a special type of directionality called co-operation. Natural entities,

as well as processes, manifest a co-operation which is able to integrate them into new

unitary results. Moreover, this co-operation extends to all levels of the natural

organisation.

Finally, there is functionality in all unitary systems and processes. The

components mutually co-operate rendering the activity of each one of them and of the

whole possible. This functionality is evident in the case of individual organisms, but it

also extends to greater systems and to the total system of nature as well owing to the

continuity and mutual dependence that exists among the natural levels. When one

considers nature as condition of possibility for the human life, one can claim that the rest

of nature has functionality with respect to man.

This synthesis expresses the meaning and scope of natural finality, as we

understand it here. We shall now add some considerations in order to specify the scope

of our conclusion.

One may think that natural finality, as we have just characterised it, is just a

collection of characteristics of nature whose existence is evident. Actually, this is so.

However, there is another problem related to natural finality, i.e. the problem of its

explanation. This problem requires further considerations which enter the fields of

metaphysics and natural theology; we shall mention these considerations when tackling

the proof of the existence of God which starts from nature. For the time being, we have

limited ourselves to examining, in a rigorous and objective way, the dimensions of

finality in nature in order to establish the basis on which a further reflection can be

carried out. Therefore, if we have managed to include in our conclusion only those

aspects with which everyone agrees, this is certainly an indication of the fact that we

have succeeded in our intent.

It is important to note now that directionality, co-operation and functionality are

dimensions which refer to the way of being of the natural entities and processes: they

correspond to their dynamism and structuring, they are not something added on the top

of them, nor are they accidental results; they are constitutive dimensions of the natural

world. Properly speaking, they are ways of acting which manifest ways of being. One

can speak of directionality and co-operation because there are specific potentialities of

tendencial type whose actualisation is not realised in a necessary way but in function of

the circumstances. Functionality corresponds to the unfolding of these tendencies when

those circumstances which permit the existence of a stable organisation, are present.

We can say, all in all, that the concept of natural finality, as we have described it,

represents real dimensions of nature, and that these dimensions refer to the way of

acting of the natural world and, therefore, to its way of being. We add now that these

dimensions have to be taken into account if one wants to have a reliable representation

of nature, since these dimensions express important characteristics of the natural world.

If they are disregarded, it will not be possible to have an adequately realistic picture of

the dynamic and tendencial character of nature which leads to the appearance of systems

whose organization has a high degree of functionality.

31.4 Natural finality vis-à-vis the present-day worldview

Three are the main fields in which the natural finality meets with challenges and

confirmations in the present-day worldview: cosmology, evolution and self-

organization.

a) Finality and cosmology

The model of the Big Bang and the present-day physics clearly show how the existence

of nature, as we know it, depends on a whole series of coincidences and equilibriums. If

the proportions of matter and anti-matter at the beginning of the universe had been

slightly different, or if the mass of the neutron were not slightly greater than that of the

proton, or if there were no specific physico-chemical properties at present as well as in

the past, life on earth and our own existence would not have been produced.

On this basis, the so-called antropic principle has been proposed. In 1955, G.J.

Whitrow emphasised the fact that scientific explanations which are incompatible with

those results that have produced our world, are inadmissible. Robert H. Dicke used this

idea in 1957, arguing that the biological factors pose conditions to the values of the

basic physical constants. In 1974, Brandon Carter proposed the expression antropic

principle, stating that man does not occupy

a central place in the universe but, yes, a privileged one. John D. Barrow and Frank J.

Tipler published a book in 1986 where they expound on a long defence of the antropic

principle178

.

One usually distinguishes between a weak formulation of the antropic principle

and a strong one. In its weak, or moderate, formulation this principle claims that the

178

John D. BARROW and Frank J. TIPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986.

initial conditions of the universe, as well as its laws, must be compatible with the

existence of the nature which we observe, including ourselves. The conditions necessary

for the existence of the human life encompass a wide collection of physical, chemical,

geological, astronomical and biological factors which are very specific. This moderate

version simply claims that there must have been - and are still there -, the conditions

necessary for our existence which is a certain fact. This formulation of the antropic

principle can be useful as a heuristic guide in order to exclude, in the scientific study,

any thing which is incompatible with the characteristics which, in fact, nature has.

In its strong version, this principle postulates, somehow, the existence of a

finality which encompasses the whole process of formation of nature. There is nothing

objectionable to this claim if it is formulated as a philosophical reflection based on the

data provided by science. However, at times, those who defend some of the strong

versions of this principle seem to try to present it as if it were part of science, against

which not few scientists protest and rightly so. In some occasions, a strong version of

this principle is defended without admitting, on the other hand, the existence of a

personal God; this has originated a confused stand with a more or less pantheistic

character.

In any case, the popularity of the antropic principle nowadays shows clearly that

it is quite difficult to leave aside the dimensions of finality in nature.

b) Finality at biological level

Although the progress of biology makes it possible for us to know more and more about

the dimensions of finality in nature, one of the main objections against the natural

finality comes from the theory of evolution. We have already mentioned this problem

when studying evolution. We shall now add some complementary considerations.

The argument against finality posed by evolutionism stems from the fact that,

according to evolutionism, the origin of living organisms can be explained in terms of

efficient natural causes through evolution from less organized forms, and more

specifically, as the result of the combination of fortuitous variations and natural

selection. Novelties would be produced by chance, and the adaptive competition would

cause the survival only of the fittest organisms, giving the impression of a programmed

progress.

According to widespread interpretations, evolutionism can remove finality from

the biological world which was its last redoubt. Evolution would render useless any

finalist explanation because the apparent finality of the living beings can be explained

through their evolutionary origin. Moreover, one cannot claim that man is the end of

evolution since evolution depends on fortuitous and unforeseeable factors. Finally,

evolution would also invalidate the teleological argument (divine plan) which can be

substituted by naturalist explanations (the combination of chance and necessity)179

. We

179

We shall not detain ourselves more in details on the evolutionist theories because we have already analyzed them

previously. We have also referred here to the scientist stands of Jacques MONOD (in his work Chance and Necessity) and

shall now examine these three objections with the intent of showing that evolution does

not eliminate finality.

First, evolution does not provide a complete explanation of natural finality.

Actually, evolution does not explain how there may be in nature some very specific

virtualities whose actualisation leads to new virtualities which are also very specific, and

so on and so fort. Evolution becomes unintelligible if one does not admit the existence

of tendencies and co-operation. Evolution does not explain what constitutes the natural

dynamism which is highly specific and which forms its basis, nor does it explain where

this dynamism comes from. The explanation of the origins is only one part of the

explanation of finality. On the other hand, be it as it may, organisms show a high degree

of finality, and the recourse to the binomial chance-selection is not sufficient to

completely explain the production of such a sophisticated, coordinated and functional

organization.

Second, evolution is not incompatible with the notion that man occupies a

central place in nature. There is no doubt that man, as the goal of evolution, is a

contingent result. If we consider the natural conditions which make the human existence

possible, there was a time in which they did not exist, there will be a time in which they

will not exists, and they could have never existed. However, man is at the apex of the

evolutionary process, not under any aspect but in relation to the subtlety of the material

organization and, without doubt, in relation to the spiritual dimensions which transcend

the field of the natural world. Moreover, nothing is opposed to the fact that man may

have been the goal foreseen by a superior plan which, although acting through natural

causes, nevertheless is above them.

Third, evolution is compatible with the existence of a God creator and with a

consequent divine plan for creation since evolutionism is placed at a different level.

This is acknowledged by almost all evolutionists, though they may be agnostic.

Evolution may be incompatible only with a «static creation» (according to which nature

may have been created in its present state) or with a «linear plan» (evolution may be

always linear, progressive and perfect under any aspect). One understands how only

some fundamentalists may deny the compatibility between evolution and divine plan

who hold quite a literal interpretation of the biblical story, and some scientists and

philosophers who hold scientist stands. We may say also that the evolutionary process

cannot be easily understood unless there is some kind of direction or plan involved. This

process presupposes the existence of very specific initial potentialities whose subsequent

actualizations over an enormously long period of time lead to new potentialities which

are again very specific, and so on and so fort many times. Moreover, the coincidence of

many adequate factors was necessary to permit this enormous chain of actualisations of

potentialities.

c) Finality and self-organisation

of Richard DAWKINS (in his work The Blind Clock); they are two representatives of anti-finalism which is presented as

being supported by biology. According to the radical anti-finalism defended by Monod, science is based on the postulate of

objectivity which excludes any type of «project» or superior plan: if to this scientism is added, one can conclude (as Monod

does) that there is no plan. Dawkins reaches the same conclusion, and emphasizes the directing role of the natural selection

in the evolutionary process; he claims that this factor is enough to explain the present organization of the living beings.

The new paradigm of the self-organisation which has become widespread nowadays

encompasses a collection of different theories relative to the different levels of nature.

The basic idea - from which the name ‘self-organisation’ is taken -, is the spontaneous

formation of order from states of lesser order.

This paradigm can be summarized in few words in the following way: matter has

its own dynamism which, in adequate conditions, originates synergic and cooperative

phenomena through which an order of superior type (more complex and more

organized) is produced. The universe would have been formed in this way with all its

parts.

What is emphasised here is, therefore, the fact nature has its own dynamism

which unfolds in a directional way. Actually, self-organization is based on the existence

of tendencies and co-operation.

However, contingency is also emphasised. The actualisation of tendencies

depends on fortuitous circumstances. The results do not appear in a necessary way: other

results could appear if the circumstances were different. The complexity of the real

processes clearly shows the contingency of the subsequent stages of the evolutionary

process.

A key element in the new paradigm is the central role played by information: the

natural dynamism unfolds structurally according to patterns. This unfolding produces

new space structures which, in turn, are sources of new dynamisms. All this works

through an information stored structurally, and unfolds through processes in which the

information is coded and decoded, transcribed, translated and integrated. Information

becomes in this way a materialised rationality, because it contains and transmits

instructions, directs and controls, and all this is done through space-time structures.

In this way philosophy of nature finds newly opened horizons: it is not only

possible to pose the main philosophical problems and give the old answers once again,

but also to formulate them in a different way and to expand them into a much richer

context. Finality occupies a central place in this perspective because it emphasises the

importance of the dynamic, holistic and directional factors, as well as the role played by

information.

Self-organisation is understood at times as a kind of «naturalist pan-Darwinism»

which would definitively eliminate the problem of the radical foundation of nature:

nature would be a self-sufficient reality. However, the rigorous reflections on the

present-day worldview do not have anything to do with such naturalism. Experimental

science owes its progress to the adoption of a method which has some precise limits: it

does not study the philosophical dimensions of nature thematically, but it presupposes

them and at the same time it provides elements for a more in-depth study of them.

Moreover, the consideration of the philosophical dimensions remits to the questions

about the radical foundation of nature.

32. NATURE AND THE HUMAN PERSON

We have characterized the natural as the intertwining between a dynamism specific for

each entity and space-time structuring which articulates around patterns. We have

pointed out that this characterization permits to distinguish the properly natural from the

specifically human whose dynamism transcends the space-time structures. We shall now

consider the relationship between the human person and nature.

32.1. The human singularity

Man belongs to nature but, at the same time, transcends it. He is immersed in the

physical world, but he is a personal being with immaterial dimensions as well.

a) Characteristics of the human person

The human person, has he appears before our experience, shows specific characteristics

which distinguish him from the rest of the natural beings.

First and foremost, man is a person, i.e. a subject which can act voluntarily and

is responsible for its own acts. The dynamism proper to a person refers to an interior

principle for which no one, except the very individual person, can be responsible.

Persons can be replaced by other persons; however, no one can substitute anyone else

when the strictly personal dimensions of human life are considered, such as the ethical

behaviour, friendship, love.

The personal character of man is closely related to self-consciousness. His

intelligence is not limited to some capacities to act, but it incapacitates the person to

interiorise his own life, and the world which surrounds him, through a reflection on his

own acts. Man’s immanence has an intentional character; this means that it has an

opening which makes the person capable of relating with other beings.

The human person has a way of being and of acting which place him above the

other natural beings. Intellectual knowledge is characteristic of the human being; this

type of knowledge allows man to pose questions about being and meaning, and it is

closely linked to the capacity of choosing and loving. Man determines himself to want

and love in a voluntary way, and this is possible only in a being which has intellectual

knowledge. The free activity of man is founded on judgements of value which

presuppose the knowledge of good.

The distance which separates man from the purely physical nature is evident.

However, the natural-physical is a constitutive part of man. The physical dimensions are

not something external or accidental to the person, but a basic aspect of the human

being. However, the person is not exhausted in the natural-physical dimensions. The

peculiarity of the human person consists in the fact that his nature belongs to the

physical and to the spiritual world at the same time.

The reality of a personal I, endowed with spiritual dimensions, is undeniable.

The problem is not solved by finding some singular man’s activity which may confirm

this spirituality: our experience is full of it. The problem is that by denying it, we

necessarily make violence to a whole collection of deep convictions, followed by the

adoption of impossible practical attitudes. We have an ample and clear experience of

what spirituality means: personality, creativity, friendship, capacity of arguing and

criticizing, ethical action, freedom, the appreciation of values, responsibility.

The simultaneous material and spiritual character of the human person entails

aspects which are difficult to conceptualise; however, it corresponds faithfully to the

experience we have. The physical aspects of man are human and not animal aspects;

they are interpenetrated with the spiritual dimensions which are characteristic of the

person. At the same time, the spiritual life is realised together with the psychic,

biological and physical capacities. Everything human is incarnated and spiritualised at

the same time. Man is at the same time material and spiritual.

b) Scientific creativity and human singularity

The progress of the experimental science shows in an especially clear manner the

existence of the specific dimensions in the human person. We shall now analyse the

meaning of this statement by considering the scientific activity, its methods, its results

and its assumptions and conditions of possibility.

The scientific activity is directed towards a twofold objective: the knowledge of nature

and a controlled power over it. Neither of the two is sought after separately, but both

together in a peculiar combination: what is sought after is a kind of knowledge which

can be submitted to experimental control.

The scientist adopts a very special attitude towards nature. He has the desire to know it,

but he faces a fundamental difficulty: nature does not speak. Therefore, in order to know

those aspects of nature which do not appear to the ordinary experience, he must find a

way to get its «secrets». The scientific method is essentially the way that man has found

to ask questions to the nature so that nature may answer back.

The scientific method is extraordinarily subtle, and one should not be surprised that it

has taken centuries for it to develop systematically. Actually, it did not establish itself

until the 17th

century. Sometimes it is said that the scientific method consists in

observing nature, gathering the data carefully and systematising them into laws.

However, this is a caricature of the method really used by science. The method consists

in formulating hypotheses and submitting them to experimental control; however, this is

only possible if concepts are used which can be defined mathematically and which can

be related to procedures of measurement. This complicates the problem extraordinarily.

In order to realise this it is enough to think of the most simple scientific concepts, such

as mass, velocity, time and temperature. We all have an intuitive idea about these

concepts. However, to be useful in science they have to be defined in such a way as to

form part of mathematical relations and, at the same time, concrete values have to be

assigned to them in accordance with the results of the measurements. How can we

manage this? There are no automatic procedures. A creative, as well as an

argumentative, capacity is needed.

Let us consider the theoretical aspect. How are magnitudes summed up? In the case of

the mass it is an arithmetical kind of sum: mass is a scalar magnitude. On the other

hand, velocities are vectorial magnitudes and, as such, added up with the rule of the

parallelogram. Temperatures are not added up in any of the two previous ways.

However, these rules are not obtained by simple observation of facts or through a pure

mental exercise; a creative work is required whose results have to be submitted to

experimental control.

As for the experimental control, the problems are no less difficult. In order to measure

one needs units of measurement, and the definition of unit faces to no trivial difficulties.

For example, to determine the values of time we need to have a movement which is

repeated periodically at equal intervals, and to take a fraction of this duration as unit.

However, how do we know that a specific movement is periodical, if we still do not

know how to measure time? The difficulty involved is real. In the case of temperature,

we need a law to measure it able to relate the values of temperature to the values of

some magnitude which we can observe directly, such as the expansion of the volume of

a liquid or of a gas. However, again, how do we know that this law is correct if we still

do not know how to measure temperature?

These are authentic difficulties, and they increase considerably when we consider more

abstract magnitudes as it is done continuously in the experimental science.

On the other hand, even though one may assume that we have a good hypothesis and

know how to measure the values of the magnitudes, how can we be sure, through

experimental control, that this hypothesis is true? Although we may be able to verify

that in many cases it corresponds to the data of experience, it will always be possible to

come across new cases in which the hypothesis does not work: the history of science can

provide countless examples of this type.

Therefore, experimental science requires a strong dose of creativity, interpretation and

argumentation. With all this, science is a fact and its progress notable. This is possible

only because the human person has characteristics which have permitted him to develop

highly sophisticated methods, thanks to which he can study aspects of nature which are

very far from any possibility of direct observation. This is possible because man can

formulate very elaborate hypotheses and submit them to experimental control through

no less sophisticated techniques.

Consequently, the analysis carried out on the nature of experimental science manifests

the completely singular character of the human person, since science presupposes some

capacities which are not present in other natural beings. Science is a way of confronting

nature, of studying and dominating it which is made possible only because we have that

creative capacity which permits us to create methods and concepts, that argumentative

capacity which permits us to evaluate solutions, that sense of evidence which is implicit

in the argumentative capacity, and that capacity of self-reflection, without which all the

other already mentioned capacities would not be possible. Moreover, these capacities

are combination of the rational with the empirical which shows the intertwining of both

aspects in the human person.

All in all, the progress of the experimental science manifests the presence of material as

well as rational dimensions which are interpenetrated in the human person. Materialism

and empiricism on one extreme side, and the idealism and a-priorism on the other side,

cannot justify the fact of the experimental science and, as a matter of fact, run into

insoluble difficulties when they try to propose an image of science which should

corresponds to the real scientific activity and its achievements180

. The reflection on the

characteristics of the experimental science shows how only an anthropology which

acknowledges the interpenetration of material and rational dimensions in the human

person will be able justify the scientific activity and its real achievements.

32.2. Matter and spirit in the human person

Man’s level has continuity with the inferior levels of nature. However, the

human person has peculiar characteristics which are found at a level qualitatively

superior to the one of the other natural entities. This is a clear fact and it seems logical

to use a specific term in order to designate this type of characteristics.

The use of the term spiritual in this context does not pose any problem since it is

just the way of referring to those specifically human qualities whose existence is

evident. Problems arise when we try to establish the nature of the relationship between

man’s spirituality and his material conditions. We shall now examine this problem.

a) The material and the spiritual: four problems

Let us now consider four problems which arise from the relationship between

man’s spirituality and his material conditions. The first problem is epistemological and

refers to the possibility of observing specific manifestations of man’s spiritual

dimensions. The second is ontological and refers to the characterisation of the way of

being proper to the spiritual, and to the co-existence of the spiritual and of the material.

The third is metaphysical and refers to the necessity of admitting a divine action in order

to justify man’s spirituality. The fourth is existential and refers to the persistence in

being of the human spirit after death.

As for the epistemological problem, if we admit the unity of the human person, it

is futile to look for manifestations of man’s spirituality which are not related in any

possible way to the material conditions. The existence of spiritual dimensions is evident,

but it is also evident that the man’s activity is mediated by his material conditions.

180

This idea is extensively illustrated in: Stanley L. JAKI, Angels, Apes and Men, Sherwood Sugden, La Salle (Illinois)

1982.

Searching for dimensions which are not mixed with the material is equivalent to

searching a ghost located in some holes of the man’s organism, and this ghost does not

exist. However, the spiritual dimensions proper to man are manifested throughout his

whole conscious activity, and the progress of experimental science is one of its best

examples: our creative and argumentative capacity, which reach a very noticeable level

in the experimental science, clearly show the fact that we form part of nature but, at the

same time, we transcend it.

As the ontological problem, the way of being proper to the person includes, as a

constitutive part, the natural way of being but, at the same time, it transcends it. The

person has his own dynamism which goes beyond the possibilities of the space-time

patterns as it is shown, for instance, in his capacity of posing questions and in desires

which fall outside the field of space-time, and its capacity of free self-determination on

the basis of his knowledge of ethical values. However, the dynamism of a person is a

unitary one and, therefore, the problem of the interaction between the spiritual and the

material corresponds to a false approach. The posing of this problem presupposes

somehow the fact that in a human person there are two different realities which interact

in an external way; however, this does not correspond to reality. The person has one

being only and, although his way of being includes material and spiritual dimensions

with specific manifestations, both are interpenetrated within a unitary way of being.

The metaphysical problem does not pose any difficulty different from the ones

we have met in the case of the purely natural entities. It is necessary to admit the

existence of a divine founding action in the case of the person as well as in the case of

the natural entities. When one speaks of a special creation of the human soul, what is

special is the result of the divine action, i.e. the spiritual dimensions of the person.

However, it is necessary to admit a divine founding action in all cases and not only in

the case of man. Therefore, special creation does not mean, so to say, an alteration of the

ordinary course of nature, as if this nature were independent from the divine action

which would take place only in the case of man. God gives being to all that exists in

nature; what is peculiar in the case of man is the fact that the result of the divine action

has an «ontological density» which goes beyond the way of being proper to the natural

entities. Moreover, the way of being of the human person is possible because there are

very specific natural conditions; therefore, also under this point of view one may note

that the special creation of the human soul is in continuity with, and not in opposition to,

the ordinary course of nature. All in all, the spirituality of the human soul requires that

each soul be created directly by God, since the spirit cannot proceed from a

transformation of matter; however, this does not mean that the natural world does not

need a divine founding action181

.

There is no doubt that the existential problem which refers to the persistence in

being of the human soul after death is more difficult. However, if it is true that the

human person has ontological dimensions which presuppose a participation in the being

181

Cf. what was said in the chapter 10, section 29.4.c. In relation to this, one may read: Roger VERNEAUX, Filosofia del

hombre, Hereder, Barcelona 1971, pp. 219-220; Ricardo YEPES, Fundamentos de antropogia. Un ideal de la excelencia

human, 2nd

ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 1997, pp. 474-479; Mariano ARTIGAS, Las fronteras del evolucionismo, 5th

ed.,

Palabra, Madrid 1991, pp. 163-69, 171-177 and 198-200. One may find an analysis of the scientific context of this theme, in

which one can conclude the divine creation of the human soul, in: C. ECCLES, Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self,

Routledge, London and New York 1991, p. 237.

proper to God, and if it is true that his being depends on the divine action, it seems

logical to claim that, when the natural conditions make it impossible for the human life

to continue completely in its way of being, the person continues living in his spiritual

being. Otherwise, for the spirit to cease to exist, an annihilation would be required, i.e. a

divine action which seems to contradict the creative action. The main difficulties come

from the difficulty of representing human life not in its natural conditions; however,

these are minor difficulties because they are due only to our limited capacity of

representing a situation of which we do not have experience.

b) The spiritualist hileo-morphism

Man’s peculiarity is a clearly evident; problems constantly arise when one tries

to explain it. They are problems which have been tackled and discussed since ancient

times.

According to the materialist monism, man is not made of matter and spirit;

everything is actually matter and different manifestations of material phenomena. The

so-called emergentist materialism, which is a more sophisticated version of materialism,

admits a mental reality in man which is reduced to the physico-chemical. It claims that

that the mental reality is something qualitatively different from the physical but, at the

same time, claims that it is a reality which emerges from neuronal processes. By making

recourse to the theory of the systems, it claims that the interaction of the components

can explain, in a sufficient way, the existence of emerging properties without any need

of admitting immaterial realities which, on the other hand, could not produce observable

effects or interact with the material components.

Emergence means that a system has properties which its components did not

have. They are system properties which are the result of the interaction of the

components. There is no need to make recourse to new causes in order to explain an

emergence; it is enough to take into account the fact that the interactions of the

components - in this case the neurones -, result in the appearance of truly new properties

which are only present in the systems. However, claiming that the mind is an emergence

is not equivalent to providing an explanation of its specifically human characteristics.

Emergentism does nothing but claiming that these characteristics really exist, and adds

at the same time and against all evidence that material properties are sufficient to explain

them: it denies human spirituality and, because of it, has to make violence to a whole

collection of fundamental data of experience.

Materialism cannot be defended by seeking the support in the progress of

experimental psychology; this progress only shows that there is a relationship between

the human psyche and the material conditions in which this psyche exists and operates.

The so-called interactionist dualism claims that together with materiality there is

also in the human person a kind of immaterial reality which is called, according to

different authors, mind, or spirit, or soul, and that this immaterial reality interacts with

the material conditions. However, this interactionism has to face the difficulties related

to the classical problem of the communication of substances posed, in modern times, by

Descartes, and which has been a central issue in the post-Cartesian philosophy, being

left with no satisfactory answer. How can two so heterogeneous realities relate to each

other, when they are considered mutually external? Moreover, the problem of the origin

of the mind persists. The recourse to evolutionist explanations does not solve the

problem. And so, a partisan of the interactionist dualism, such as Karl Popper, claims,

on the one hand, that evolution by natural selection can explain the emergence of the

immaterial dimensions of the person182

. However, and on the other hand, he admits that

it is a problem whose ultimate explanation is shrouded in mystery: “I want now to stress

how little is said when it is claimed that the mind is an emergence of the brain. It

practically lacks explanatory value and is equivalent to something hardly more than

placing a question mark in a specific place of the human evolution. Nevertheless, I

believe that it is the only thing we can say from a Darwinist point of view” 183

.

This uncertainty is inevitable when one does not admit metaphysical

explanations and only makes recourse to evolutionist explanations which, in principle,

cannot justify the spiritual dimensions of the human person. Popper is aware of the

limitations of the evolutionist explanation, yet he does not open other doors, and

therefore he has to be content with a semi-darkness shrouded in the most obscure

mystery: “Clearly, evolution cannot be taken in any sense as the ultimate explanation.

We have to resign ourselves to the idea that we live in a world in which almost

everything important must remain essentially unexplained…ultimately, everything is

left without explanation: especially everything related to existence”184

.

The concept of hileo-morphism was used by Aristotle in order to explain the

basic way of being of the natural substances, and was classically formulated by Aquinas.

This concept characterises man as composed of body and soul, emphasizing the unity of

the compound and the spirituality of the soul. Man is conceived as one substance only

against the dualism of Cartesian type since, although spirit and matter are different

realities, the soul is the substantial form of the body. Man is not a body to which a soul

is added as a juxtaposed reality, but soul and body form one reality only; this does not

prevent the soul from persisting in being after death, owing to its spiritual character.

This doctrine is not simple, but is not a surprising one either if one takes into

account the fact that man is not a simple being. It tries to reflect some facts and some

rational demands without suppressing what is mysterious in man which is not little. It

puts together the data of experience and what is required by an intellectual rigor,

avoiding the simplification of the complexity of human existence.

Experience and reasoning show how material as well as spiritual dimensions are

present in man, and how both constitute one person only. Man is not made of two

juxtaposed substances which interact with each other: man is one substance only, and

this is reflected in the concept of hileo-morphism, when it claims that the union between

soul and body is like the union between form and matter. Form and matter are not

complete entities. Spirituality requires a subject, the soul; however, the soul is not a

182

Cf. Karl R. POPPER, “Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind”, in: G. RADNITZKY – W.W. BARTLEY III

(publishers), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality and the Sociology of Knowledge, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois) 1987,

pp. 139-155. 183

Karl R. POPPER – John C. ECCLES, El yo y su cerebro, Labor, Barcelona 1980, p.622. 184

Ibid.

complete subject added to the body. As form of the matter, the soul expresses the

characteristic way of being of the person. On the other hand, the spiritual dimensions

cannot be derived from matter; therefore, it is necessary to claim the divine creation of

the soul which, although being the form of the matter, does not depend on the latter

since it is spiritual, and it persists in being once the disintegration of matter provokes

death. According to this perspective, one cannot properly speak of interaction between

soul and body since both soul and body constitute one substance only.

32.3. Nature and the human life

Man is a synthesis of the material and of the spiritual world. He is above the rest

of the physical world. He participates in the physical which is inscribed in his nature as

a constitutive part, but his reality is not exhausted in the physical dimensions. He has the

capacity of knowing and dominating the world.

A theo-centric kind of worldview sees man as God’s creature, made by God in

his image and likeness, placed above the reset of nature which he uses to achieve his

end. This anthropocentrism is coherent with the present-day scientific worldview, and it

may also be said that the present-day knowledge corresponds to the anthropocentric

perspective in a much better way than it did in the ancient worldview.

According to the present-day worldview, nature appears to us as the unfolding of

a dynamism which gets organised according to patterns. Natural processes unfold in a

directional and selective way, although the actualisation of the natural potentialities

depends on fortuitous factors. The natural systems have holistic characteristics. Thanks

to the co-operation of specific dynamisms, the formation of single systems, as well as of

the total system of nature, is made possible. Nature has a strong unity which is

manifested in the continuity among its levels and in the integration of the most basic

levels into those levels of greater organization.

This worldview does not have, as such, metaphysical implications. However, it

provides a very adequate basis for an ontological and metaphysical reflection which

leads to the re-posing of the classical issues about transcendence and human person.

Man appears in this perspective as the crowning achievement of nature. His

existence is made possible because nature has some highly specific characteristics. The

scientific and technological activities show in a clearly evident way the central place

occupied by man in nature. The analysis of the conditions of possibility of science

shows that the human person has peculiar characteristics which reflect a synthesis of the

material and of the spiritual.

The fact that the earth has lost its central place in the universe does not weaken

the claim that the person occupies a central place in nature. This is, in fact, an issue of

secondary importance. We can also think that the immensity of the universe that we

know is necessary for the formation of the earth, with its highly specific conditions

which make the human life possible.

The possible origin of the human organism from inferior living beings is not a

difficulty either in order to claim the fact of the human singularity whose spiritual

characteristics shine forth clearly. The theories of evolution can only be used to support

naturalism, if their scope is distorted by using them to solve problems which, in reality,

are outside of the scope of the experimental science.

The hypothetical existence of other intelligent beings in the universe does not

contradict the previous claims since we refer to the central place occupied by man

respect to the material nature, and this is compatible with the existence of other beings

which could also be found in a similar situation with respect to nature. For the time

being, there is very little that one can say about the existence of life and intelligence in

other parts of the universe. Some claim that this is very probable, while others claim that

it is highly improbable that life may exist in conditions different from the ones that we

know. For example, Roman Smoluchowsky, of the Council of Science and Space of the

United States, has written: “The question on whether there might be other forms of life

in other conditions has not yet been answered in a decisive way; however, the answer

will probably be negative”185

. On the other hand, the possible existence of life in other

places would highlight even more the specific and singular character of nature with its

clearly defined tendencies able to produce, in different places, such an enormously

sophisticated and specific phenomenon as life is.

The human activity, whose highest manifestation is the ethical behaviour,

includes material dimensions as fundamental elements, and has to take them into

account for its full realization. Nature makes human existence and the unfolding of its

potentialities possible. The human person, as synthesis of the material and of the

spiritual, occupies a special place in nature; he participates in the personal character

proper to God, author of nature, with whom he is in a unique kind of relationship of

personal character. If the whole nature corresponds to an unfolding of the effects of the

divine action, this unfolding results in unique characteristics in the case of man whose

relationship with the rest of nature can be contemplated in continuity with the divine

action. The theological perspective sees the human person as a being carrying out a task

which God has entrusted to him in the world, and nature in this task plays a central role.

33. NATURE AND GOD

A philosophical study of nature would remain incomplete without tackling the

problem of its radical foundation. The radical explanation of nature has been one of the

central problems of philosophy in all the various epochs of history, and is still an object

of major attention at present. The basic question is: “Is nature self sufficient? Can it

explain itself completely? Or the alternative one: “Should a foundation which transcends

nature and ultimately explains its being and activity, be admitted?

The detailed examination of these questions corresponds to Natural Theology

and requires a systematic study. Here we shall only highlight the fact that present-day

scientific worldview, together with the philosophical reflections about it, provide

elements which can be useful for the arguments of Natural Theology.

185

Roman SMOLUCHOWSKI, El systema solar, Prensa scientifica-Labor, Barcelona 1986, p. 50.

33.1. Science and transcendence

Science and Natural Theology adopt different perspectives. However, it is possible

to integrate them into each other, provided that one respects their differences and adopts

the perspective proper to each of them in each type of problems.

Each scientific discipline adopts a particular perspective which can be called

objectification, because it refers to the way in which the discipline constructs and studies

its own object. By doing this, a cut is performed on reality, and the study of that

discipline is focused on some particular aspects. Obviously, any objectification of this

type has an historical character since it depends on concepts and instruments available at

a particular time in history186

. In this way, scientific inter-subjectivity is achieved which

presupposes the adoption of definitions and operational criteria that have in part a

conventional character. This way of operating permits the achievement of a truth which

is contextual and partial, nevertheless authentic.

Since each scientific discipline operates within a particular objectification, the

scientific method leaves the possibility open to a study directed towards the radical

conditions of being. No matter what metaphysical stand is adopted, it is compulsory to

acknowledge that there is always a methodological leap between the scientific

perspective and the metaphysical one.

However, it is also frequently claimed that both perspectives need to be related to

each other through a dialogue, and that science leads to questions which are at

borderline with theology. It is claimed that they are “issues that arise from science and

which insistently demand for an answer but which, by their own nature, transcend the

competence of science”187

.

These problems can arise in two ways. First, they arise from scientific problems

which provoke metaphysical questions in those subjects who study them; it is

understandable that this may happen, and how this may affect the scientist only as an

individual person. Second, they arise from the general assumptions of science and from

the implications of its achievements: these last ones are the best candidates for the title

of borderline issues. Among these borderline issues we may mention the intelligibility of

nature and its rationality: they form an important part of the assumptions of the

scientific activity which could not exist or make sense if these assumptions were not

certain. There is no doubt that there is a long journey from the implicit admission of

these assumptions by the scientists up to their philosophical articulation. However, they

are issues that can be studied in an objective way, and which are indicators of important

points of confluence between the scientific activity and metaphysical ideas188

.

186

The epistemological aspects of this problem are more extensively treated in: Mariano ARTIGAS, Filosofia de la sciencia

experimental. La objetividad y la verdad en la sciencias, op. cit. 187

John C. POLKINGHORNE, “A Revived Natural Theology”, in: J. FENNEMA- I. PAUL (publishers), Science and

Religion. One world: Changing Perspectives on Reality, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1990, p. 88. 188

An extensive study on this theme is found in: Mariano ARTIGAS, The Mind of the Universe (Templeton Foundation

Press: in printing)

In any case, the claim of the existence of God and of a divine plan which governs

nature, goes beyond the level proper to science, and remits to metaphysical reasoning.

However, for the same reason, it is not legitimate to deny the existence of a divine plan

in the name of science. Science does not permit us either to claim or to deny a divine

plan for nature, because it is something that falls outside of its method. Science provides

knowledge about the manifestations of the ontological and metaphysical dimensions of

nature; however, the explicit study of these dimensions requires the adoption of a

perspective which is properly metaphysical. Actually, one may find all sorts of

philosophical and theological stands among scientists, and this shows that these stands

are not determined only by science189

.

The possible attitudes before the issue of God as the ultimate explanation of the

universe are basically five: atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, deism and theism. The first

four pose notable difficulties. This is easily perceived in the case of atheism, since there

are no proofs, nor can they exist, of the non existence of God. With its stand of

renouncing to tackle the issue of God, agnosticism is, at least, poorly coherent with the

scientific and rational spirit which tires to seek explanations of all that exists, though our

answers may always be limited and partial. Deism justifies the existence of the universe,

but it is not coherent when it claims that an infinitely good, almighty and intelligent God

gives existence to the universe only to abandon it to its own destiny. Pantheism tries to

give answers to the ultimate questions which we pose about the universe; however, even

admitting the active presence of God in the whole universe, it is not possible to identify

God with any creature or with all of them as a whole, since all the dimensions of the

creatures are limited and, therefore, cannot be identified with something divine in a

strict sense.

Hence, theism appears to be the only rigorous option for him who does not

renounce to seek an explanation of the universe. Neither the universe as a whole nor

some of its partial aspects can be identified with something properly divine. However,

the rationality of the universe strongly suggests its connection with a divine intellect.

We do not try to claim that the experimental science can demonstrate the existence of

God: experimental science as such does not permit either to claim or to deny the

existence of God. However, a rigorous reflection on the achievements of science

provides a very adequate basis for reaching God as the radical foundation of nature.

The present-day scientific worldview can be easily related, above all, to the

teleological argument which proves the existence of God and of his providence over the

world from the consideration of natural finality. For this reason we shall now examine

some aspects of the teleological argument.

33.2. Theology and transcendence

The present-day worldview emphasises the existence of dimensions of finality in

nature, and in this way it widens the base of the teleological argument.

189

This diversity is reflected, for instance, in: Henry MARGENAU – Roy Abraham VARGHESE (publishers), Cosmos,

Bios, Theos: Scientists reflect on Science, God, and the Origins of the Universe, Life and Homo, Open Court, Peru (Illinois)

1992.

a) The teleological argument

The teleological argument has always occupied a prominent place in history, and

also nowadays, among the proofs of the existence of God.

It was developed with a special intensity by Aquinas who used the ideas of

Aristotle but placing them within a new context. Aquinas proposed several formulations

of the argument among which the prominent fifth way for the demonstration of the

existence of God.

The following is the text of the fifth way: “The fifth way is taken from the

government of the world. We actually see that some things which lack knowledge, and

specifically the natural bodies, work in view of an end. This is manifested by the fact

that they always, or very frequently, operate in the same way in order to obtain the best,

from which it is clear that they achieve their end not by chance but intentionally.

However, beings without knowledge tend towards their end directed by some being that

is intelligent and knows, in the same way in which the archer directs the arrow. Hence,

there is an intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordained to their ends, and

we call this being God”190

.

The fifth way, and other parallel texts in the works of Aquinas, has been the

object of countless number of studies191

. We shall now focus our attention on some

aspects which are especially relevant in order to specify its meaning and value.

The fifth way makes reference to the natural bodies (corpora naturalia) which

lack knowledge. It includes, therefore, the whole natural activity which unfolds

independently from the knowledge, and in a particular way that of the non living beings

but also that of the living ones which does not depend on knowledge (the organic

activity with all is functions).

It is claimed that the natural bodies operate in the same way «always or almost

always» (semper aut frequentius). It is a claim supported by the ordinary experience and

as such does not present any difficulty; it is a true claim in the case of the living beings

as well as in the case of the other natural beings. Aquinas takes his stand within the

ordinary knowledge; however, his claim can be extended to the whole nature, as it is

portrayed by the present-day scientific worldview, without difficulties.

190

AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c. 191

One may read, for instance, M. ARTIGAS, “Ciencia, finalidad y existencia de Dios”, Scripta Theologica, 17 (1985), pp.

151-189; M. DUQUESNE, “De quinta via: La preuve de Dieu par le gouvernement des choses”, Doctor Communis, 18

(1965), pp. 71-92; S. KOWALCZYK, “L’argument de la finalité chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Divus Thomas (PIazenza),

78 (1975), pp. 41-68; P. PARENTE, “La quinta via di S. Tommaso”, Doctor Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 110-130; F. van

STEENBERGHEN, “La cuinquième voie, «ex gubernatione rerum», in: L. ELDERS (publisher), Quinque sunt viae,

Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Cittá del Vaticano 1980, pp. 84-108; L. Vicente BURGOA, El problema de la finalidad,

Universidad Complutense, Madrid 1981.

The constancy in its way of operating shows how the natural activity

corresponds to tendencies which arise from the nature of the bodies. The regularity of

the natural activity permits us to claim its character of finality. The possibility for the

natural bodies to achieve their end by chance is excluded because they achieve it by

operating always, or almost always, in the same way, while the effects of chance are not

regular. The natural dynamism is tendencial, and tendencies are directed towards the

achievement of an end which is identified with something good.

The reference to good is the central point of the argument. It is claimed that the

natural bodies operate in view of an end (operantur propter finem), achieve their end

(perveniunt ad finem) and tend towards the end (tendunt in finem), and this end is

somehow the best. This reference not only to the good but to the best is fundamental:

without it the argument would not permit us to claim the existence of God. The present-

day worldview provides a new basis for verifying the value of the natural activity and of

its results. Actually, it makes it possible to know in details the perfection of the natural

mechanisms in the individuals, and the organization of nature at the different co-

operative levels which make the human existence possible.

We are in the presence, therefore, of a highly directional and rational activity

which is carried out by beings which lack knowledge. The natural bodies cannot have

such directionality by themselves since they lack an intellect. Hence, it is necessary to

make recourse to an intellect able to justify the natural tendencies and their ordination to

good. Consequently, it must be an intellect which is completely far above nature, and

even more, an intellect which has foreseen the way of being of the natural and of the

tendencies which derive from it. Only a personal God creator can give their being and

their ways of operating to natural entities.

Actually, an intellect which puts order corresponds to the Being who orders all

natural things towards their ends (a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur in finem). It

must be therefore not only a being different from nature but precisely that Being who is

the author of nature, since only this Being can produce some tendencies which are

inscribed in the very interior of the natural bodies. It is not enough, therefore, to make

recourse to a being which puts order to the bodies «from outside» by giving them some

kind of movement: we actually reach a God who is personal and creator.

It seems possible to claim that the fifth way is still valid nowadays, since all the

aspects which have been mentioned are coherent with the present-day scientific

worldview. It can also be said that the scientific progress notably widens the scope of

those facts which are the basis for the considerations contained in the fifth way. In this

sense, the fifth way is strengthened by this progress.

The fifth way focuses on individual finality proper to each body. Other Thomist

formulations of the teleological argument emphasise the co-operation of different agents

towards the same end: the order of nature as a whole192

. The core of the argument,

though, is the same in both cases, whether this issue is considered at individual or at

cooperative level. However, in relation to the scientific knowledge, the consideration of

192

Cf. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, I, c. 13; III, c. 64; De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, c; Coimmentary to the Metaphysics of

Aristotle, book XII, Ch. 10, lectio 12; Commentary to the Gospel of St John, prologue; Commentary to the Symbol of the

Apostles, article 1.

the co-operative order is especially strong in view of the fact that it occupies a central

place in the present-day worldview.

Some Thomist formulations of the teleological argument are more encompassing

than the fifth way, and include a detailed philosophical analysis of the natural finality

which is also fully timely. For instance, Aquinas refers to those who try to explain

nature making recourse only to material and agent causes; he points out that these

causes intervene in the production of the effects, but are insufficient to explain their

goodness193

.

It is interesting to emphasise why, in the Thomist arguments, the explanations

which make recourse only to necessity and chance are considered insufficient. The

reason is different in the two cases. Insofar as the material and agent causes are

concerned, one can say that a certain necessity corresponds to them, hence they permit

us to understand how the activity of the bodies is realised in a constant way, but they are

unable to explain how the best result is achieved. As far as chance is concerned, it is

claimed that chance does not explain how the activity of the bodies is realised in a

constant way: chance is blind respect to the constancy of the activities. Finally, one does

not get a sufficient explanation either by combining necessity and chance; actually,

although this combination may partially explain the formation of nature, yet it is

insufficient to explain the perfection of nature and, moreover, does not explain its

radical foundation, since it always remits to previous physical situations194

.

All in all, the natural finality which is a habitual tendency towards something

which is best, asks for an intelligence because, to relate, to direct and to order towards

an optimal end which is achieved in a habitual way, are all operations proper to an

intelligence. If one takes into account the fact that this direction affects the natural

tendencies and, therefore, the way of being of the natural, it is logical to claim the

existence of a personal God who is creator. The present-day worldview provides the

teleological argument with a basis which is more complex than the one provided by

ordinary experience, but it goes much further than the latter does in depth and precision.

b) Nature and providence

The final cause acts in two ways: as the objective foreseen by the agent and as a

tendency towards a specific objective. All beings have tendencies which correspond to

their ways of being; however, only intellectual agents can establish objectives in a

conscious and free way.

The first part of the teleological argument states that the natural beings which

lack knowledge have constant tendencies whose actualization produces optimal results,

and that the constancy in the tendencies shows how these beings do not act by chance

193

Cf. AQUINAS, De veritate, q. 5, a. 2. 194

This possibility which is insistently proposed in our days in relation to evolutionism, may seem curious to a modern

reader; yet it was considered expressly by Aquinas, who just gathered what Aristotle had already about this many centuries

before; cf. AQUINAS, Commentary to the Physics of Aristotle, book II, Ch. 8, lectio 12.

but in accordance with the necessity characteristic of the agent causes. Then it adds that

the production of optimal results shows how these results are an objective foreseen by

an intellectual agent. Therefore, there is a double reference to chance: it is denied that

the natural tendencies correspond to chance, and it is also denied that the goodness of

the results can be due exclusively to the fortuitous confluence of necessary causes. This

double reference corresponds to the two levels of finality. Consequently, when natural

finality is denied, one has to specify which aspect this denial refers to, i.e. if one denies

that there are no natural tendencies, or if one denies that there is a superior finality

which is related to the divine government of nature.

If one denies that there are tendencies, he has to clash not only with the very

ordinary experience, but also with the achievements of the scientific progress which

emphasise abundantly the existence of a directionality in nature.

What is frequently denied is not so much the existence of particular tendencies in

nature, but the existence of a global tendency in evolution. It is claimed that evolution

proceeds by an opportunistic «zigzagging», in a way which looks more like a bricolage

than a premeditated plan. In such conditions, how could one still speak of a divine plan?

However, this difficulty disappears if we pay attention to the fact that the divine

plan does not imply a rectilinear evolution, always progressive and without accidents: it

is more logical to assume that God counts on the complexity of the natural causes to

carry out his plan. The existence of a divine plan is fully congruous with the complex

character of evolution. Moreover, the complexity of the universe acquires in this way

new importance. One can understand, for instance, how God may have wanted the

existence of millions of galaxies for the possibility of existence of the earth and of man.

Actually, the present-day cosmological theories claim that the heaviest atoms were

produced in the interior of the stars, and this may have happened millions of times so

that finally one planet could be produced with the specific characteristics of the earth.

The existence of millions of galaxies and stars which otherwise would appear

unnecessary, may have resulted necessary for the appearance of human life through

natural processes.

There is not just a simple harmony between the divine action and the activity of

nature. If the natural activity corresponds to a divine plan, one must say that God does

not only respect it, but that he positively wants it, although God can also produce effects

which go beyond the ordinary course of nature. Therefore, it is congruous for the divine

plan to count on the unfolding of the natural dynamism. In this perspective, one can

understand, for instance, how the divine plan is compatible with a zigzag unfolding of

the natural dynamism which can produce results destined to disappear, and with the

existence of mechanisms in which, necessity and chance, and variation and adaptation,

are combined. Claiming the existence of a divine plan is not the same as claiming that

everything that happens in nature is good from all points of view.

The existence of a superior plan permits us to understand in depth the existence

of nature. There is no doubt that this is a bit mysterious, but it is the kind of mystery we

meet before the divine. On the other hand, if one denies the existence of a divine plan,

nature remains shrouded in an irrational mystery, and there comes the serious danger of

reducing to an absolute the partial explanations provided by science.

c) Evil in nature

The existence of evil is the main difficulty which faces the teleological argument.

Aquinas paid a lot of attention to this problem in his writings. He concisely gives his

answer to the problem of evil in few words in the Summa Teologiae while developing

the five ways for the demonstration of the existence of God: “God permits evil in view

of the preservation of greater goods”. This idea is applicable to two different cases: the

moral evil, due to the bad use of freedom that the human person makes, and the physical

evil which is the one more properly related the natural finality.

As for the moral evil which is sin - or evil understood in its radical sense -, it is

not easy to explain how its elimination could be compatible with human freedom.

Therefore, one may understand how God permits it because the possibility of the moral

evil corresponds to the existence of the human freedom which is an even superior good.

Physical evil which is the one properly related to the teleological argument, can

be justified in two ways; first, by taking into account that physical evil is only a relative

one which can be ordained to a superior good which is the spiritual good; second, by

realising that the particular physical evils can be integrated into superior goods even in

the physical order. The existence of physical evil is not opposed to divine goodness: it

seems inevitable that conflicts may exist among different particular goods; however,

these can be integrated into a superior good.

Aquinas claims that the world is not only good, but also very good. This claim is

partly related to an obsolete worldview according to which the movements of the

physical bodies could be considered good because they are related to their natural places

which determine an order in the structure of the universe. However, the fundamental

idea is still timely. Aquinas claims that the intention (intentio) of everything that moves

is a tendency towards an act, or perfection, and adds: “There are degrees in the acts of

the forms. Actually, proto-matter is primarily in potency respect to the form of the

element. However, by existing under the form of the element, it is in potency respect to

the form of the compound and, because of this, the elements are the matter of the

compound. Considered from the point of view of the compound, proto-matter is in

potency respect to the vegetative soul, since the soul is the form of the body of this kind.

Moreover, the vegetative soul is in potency towards the sensitive soul, and the sensitive

towards the intellectual….However, after this form, no more dignified and subsequent

form is found among what is generated and corrupted. Therefore, the ultimate end of all

generation is the human soul, and matter tends towards it as its ultimate form.

Consequently, elements exist because of the compounds, compounds exist because of

the living beings and, among the latter, plants exist because of the animals, and the

animals exist because of man. Therefore, man is the end of all generation”195

.

This text shows what Aquinas intends when he claims that the natural bodies

“act always, or very frequently, in the same way to achieve the best”. It is a very timely

point of view. Natural entities are found at hierarchical levels. Their activities consist in

195

AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, III, c. 22.

the unfolding of directional capacities which correspond to their proper way of being.

The unfolding of these capacities makes it possible for levels of higher organization to

exist and, finally, they make the existence of man possible. All in all, the tendencial

activity of the natural entities creates the conditions for the existence of man.

Aquinas expressly claims that God created the universe in view of man. He

reminds us that finality can be spoken of in two ways: as a natural tendency or as a plan

of an intelligent agent, and says that man is the end of creatures in all senses196

.

In order to claim that God created the universe in view of man it is necessary to

make recourse to a type of reasoning which transcends the scope of the teleological

argument. However, this statement is fully congruous with the existence, at all levels of

nature, of natural cooperative tendencies which make human life possible. In this

perspective, the application of the notion of good to nature implies a legitimate

anthropocentrism which reflects the central place that man occupies in the universe.

33.3. The intelligibility of nature

The knowledge, that ordinary experience and science provide, presents us with a

nature endowed with an intelligibility which becomes fully manifested when we look at

the system of nature in the light of its radical foundation and of the human life.

a) Unconscious intelligence

In the light of finality, the activity of nature appears as a work of an

«unconscious intelligence»: nature does not deliberate; however, it seems to act as if it

really had a rational capacity.

The expression «unconscious intelligence» is contradictory if interpreted in a

literary sense, since it contains two incompatible terms. Therefore, it can only be used as

a metaphor. However, the metaphor has a real basis197

: the operations of nature are

directional and, moreover, co-operate in the production of results which, in many

aspects, go far beyond what can be achieved through the most sophisticated type of

technology. In this sense, nature goes beyond the capacities of human reason which, on

the other hand, can only produce artefacts insofar as it knows and uses the laws of

nature.

196

Cf. AQUINAS, Commentary to the sentences, book II, distinction I, question II, article III, body. 197

“Taken in a literal way, the formula intelligence without conscience is a contradiction, a pure absurd and, yet, still has a

certain meaning if taken as a metaphor. Understood in this way, it means the capacity of adjusting one’s behavior to a

specific end, in spite of not having any idea of it, i.e. as if the corresponding idea was being known by the being who acts.

In this sense, it would be a capacity which can be stated without incurring into any anthropomorphism, since it does not

imply the absolute identification of the human behavior with the non human one, but only an analogy between the two. The

whole being of liking is the tension towards an end, being conscious of it or not. This is what in Greek is called orexis, from

which the adjective orectic, a term used in the present-day terminology as a synonym of what can also be called tendential,

i.e. related, or relative, to a tendency”: A. MILLÁN-PUELLES, Lexico filosofico, Rialp, Madrid 1984, p. 452.

Sometimes there have been attempts to explain nature by taking into account its

composition and laws exclusively: order would then be the result of fortuitous

combinations of processes, and finality would then only be apparent. In this perspective,

and starting from the opposition between chance and finality, the more the function of

chance is emphasised the less space is left for finality. However, the opposition between

chance and finality is not absolute because chance demands finality. Actually, one could

not even speak of chance if directionality did not exist, nor would it make any sense to

speak of disorder if there were not any type of order.

Critiques against teleology usually assume that there is an absolute contradiction

between chance and finality; consequently, the explanations which make use of chance

are considered to be arguments against finality. However, there is no absolute

contradiction between chance and finality. By claiming the existence of finality we do

not try to say that there is no chance whatsoever. We simply emphasise the fact that

chance and, in general, any combination of «blind» forces, cannot be considered as a

comprehensive kind of explanation.

For instance, in order to explain the origin of a phrase which has a meaning in a

specific language, it is not enough to verify that there is some probability that this phrase

may have been produced through a chance combination of letters. If a language does not

exist before, together with its alphabet, its dictionary and its grammatical rules, no

combination of letters could result in meaningful terms. There must be an intellect at the

beginning. This is equally valid with respect to nature. The claim that supporting the

existence of finality is equivalent to claiming the intelligibility of nature is founded,

ultimately, on an intelligent activity. An unconscious intelligence must be based on a

conscious one.

b) Nature from a metaphysical perspective

In commenting on Aristotle’s ideas about natural finality, Aquinas proposed a

kind of definition of nature from the point of view of its radical metaphysical

foundation. It is very original and goes deeply ahead of Aristotle’s ideas. Moreover, it is

surprisingly coherent with the present-day worldview. He says: “Nature is precisely the

plan of a certain art (concretely the divine art) imprinted in things, by which the very

things move towards a specific end: as if the artisan, who makes a ship, could endow the

wood with the capacity of moving itself in order to form the structure of the ship”198

.

Three aspects of this «definition» deserve special attention, i.e. the rationality of

nature, its connection with the divine plan and the emphasis placed on the self-

organization.

First, the rationality of nature is being emphasised as the plan of an art (in the

original Latin ratio cuiusdam artis). Actually, the scientific progress shows, up to

unsuspected extremes, the efficiency and subtlety of nature. The success of the scientific

198

AQUINAS, Commentary to the Physics of Aristotle, book II, Ch. 8, lectio 14.

activity contributes to widen more and more our knowledge of the rationality of nature.

Although the products of technology may be superior to some aspect of nature, yet they

are always based on the materials and laws which nature provides us with, and therefore

nature always goes ahead of us, in a long run, in many aspects of great importance.

Second, the connection of nature with a divine plan expresses the radical

foundation of nature: nature is a manifestation of a divine plan and, therefore, of a

supremely wise plan. Moreover, the divine action does not direct the natural activity

from outside: the divine plan is inscribed in things (the original Latin says ratio

cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus). The natural has ways of being,

accompanied by the corresponding tendencies which lead towards optimal results. One

can understand, therefore, that there is no opposition between natural activity and divine

plan; on the contrary, the divine plan includes the tendencial dynamism of the natural

and is realised through its actualisation.

Third, there is a reference to self-organisation as a basic characteristic of nature.

The example given is very graphic: “as if it were possible to endow pieces of wood with

the capacity of moving by themselves to build a ship”. This idea corresponds, in a way

which could not be suspected when it was written more than seven centuries ago, to the

present-day knowledge about the self-organization of nature. It is a fact which implies,

moreover, a great level of co-operation among nature’s components, laws and the

different systems which are produced in the subsequent levels of organisation. The

directionality of nature is, in this way, emphasised even in its energetic aspect, and the

idea of emergence of new systems and properties is hinted at as a result of the synergic

or co-operative action.

On the other hand, the implications of the Thomist characterisation of nature also

deserve special attention, for instance: the positive value of nature as a result of the

divine plan; the articulation between necessity and contingency since, on the one hand,

nature is contingent insofar as it is the result of the free action of God and, on the other

hand, it has a strong consistency in accordance with the way of being God has inscribed

in the natural entities; the articulation between unity and multiplicity because the

perfection of the universe is achieved through the cooperation of its components and,

ultimately, is ordained towards human life, since nature offers those conditions which

make the existence of the human person and the unfolding of his capacities possible.

Finally, one can appreciate the articulation between being and becoming, since God has

placed some virtualities in nature which make its progressive evolution possible, and

counts on the co-operation of man, through his work, in order to lead nature towards an

always more perfect state.

All in all, the Thomist «definition» expresses the core of the metaphysical

perspective on nature and is of great importance in order to appreciate its value within

the context of the present-day worldview.

c) The autonomy of nature

The claim that nature remits to a divine plan does not underestimate the autonomy of

nature, on the contrary, the opposite is true. It is precisely the perfection of nature which

demands, as an adequate explanation, the existence of a creative divine plan.

The claim of God as the radical foundation of nature coincides with the pre-

Socratic view of nature as a reality impregnated with something divine, with the

Aristotelian upward movement which reaches a Pure Act starting from the analysis of

movement, with the teleological argument based on the directionality of nature, with

Leibniz’s arguments which emphasise the basic dynamism of the natural and the

harmony of nature, and with other arguments which have been proposed in every epoch.

We can claim that our present-day scientific worldview is coherent with the existence of

a foundation which transcends nature. Of course, for that coherence to be upgraded to

proof, one must make recourse to philosophical reasoning: nature claims a metaphysical

foundation because the natural dynamism is not self-sufficient and its unfolding

produces eminently rational results which ask for a superior intelligent cause.

The boundaries between the physical and the metaphysical are at time placed

between matter and life, at other times between life and the spirit, and at other times

between nature and the spirit. On some occasions the existence of these boundaries is

denied because the metaphysical is denied. These boundaries do not exist in a strict

sense; this, though, is not due to the fact that the metaphysical does not exist, but to the

fact that the whole natural world includes metaphysical dimensions. The metaphysical

foundation is necessary to explain the origin of nature, and also to explain its dynamism,

its structuring and the intertwining between the two at all levels.

The world appears before ordinary experience as a cosmos with metaphysical

dimensions. The pre-Socratic reflections and the ancient culture reflect a universe which

is enchanted and mythical, in which the natural is intertwined with the divine. The

perspective of the experimental science objectifies nature and neutralises its

metaphysical dimensions. It is a legitimate perspective, as long as one does not make it

an absolute. When it is claimed that this perspective exhausts everything which can be

known about nature, natural philosophy is destroyed and, therefore, the bridge between

nature and metaphysical reflection with it. However, this process of absolute-making is

an illegitimate extrapolation which has no grounds and is further removed from the rigor

proper to the scientific method.

Presently, the new scientific worldview provides the basis for a true re-

assessment of nature which goes beyond the contradictions of scientism and naturalism.

Actually, it provides a very enticing basis to look at nature under a new light.

In the perspective of its radical foundation nature appears as the unfolding of a

dynamism which comes from a superior cause that creates, sustains and directs it. In

speaking about unfolding we refer to the effects of the divine action; it is, therefore, an

unfolding which is fully coherent with the divine transcendence and immutability. This

idea corresponds to an intuition which has been articulated in many different ways: one

can think, for instance, of the unfolding of Hegel’s absolute, of Bergson’s elan vital, of

Teilhard de Chardin’s ascending evolution. However, this correspondence refers only to

specific aspects of this intuition, and does not have anything to do with the formulations

which, on the other hand, link it to pantheism.

We could say that the divine action unfolds through the channels of the natural

dynamism and structuring: it makes the existence and the activity of these channels

possible and, through these channels, divine action flows in an ordinary way. Therefore,

somehow the unfolding of the effects of the divine action is proportional to the natural

channels although it is not limited by them in a necessary way. God can act bypassing

the natural laws of which He is the author. However, precisely because he is the author

of the natural channels, one may say that the divine action not only respects them, but

also accommodates itself to them, without being really conditioned by them.

This perspective permits us to understand how it is possible to combine the

autonomy of nature with the existence of its radical foundation. It is not just a mere

compatibility; the divine action provides the conditions of possibility of the natural

dynamism and of all its particular unfoldings. The channels of the natural dynamism

have their own consistency and an intelligibility which is the result of a superior rational

plan.

The unfolding of the natural dynamism is directional. The directionality of

nature is real and corresponds to a simple linear process: the unfolding of the natural

dynamism originates multiple accidental coincidences. In this sense, chance plays a real

role; however, this role is integrated within a comprehensive plan.

The emergence of real novelties corresponds to the unfolding of the natural

dynamism; however, this dynamism includes the effects of the divine action which

make its existence, its unfolding and the production of its results possible. The

proportionality between the effects of the divine action and the natural channels is

manifested in the gradation of nature: a greater level of organization causes a greater

level in the unfolding of the effects of the divine action.

The highest level of natural organization creates the conditions for a new

participation in being which is essentially far superior to that of any other natural entity

because it implies a personal way of being. The human person has unique metaphysical

dimensions which, although transcending nature, yet are interpenetrated with the natural

conditions. This peculiar unity between the natural and the metaphysical levels present

in the human person provides the key for the understanding of the meaning of a nature

which provides the conditions for the existence of the human person, the unfolding of

his potentialities and the achievement of his end.