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Obama’s Pacific Pivot in US Grand Strategy: A Canadian Perspective

This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version

of Record, has been published in Asian Security 9, 3 (2013) [Copyright © Taylor and Francis],

available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2013.832213#.Up1K7dJDuuI.

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Canada sits at a crucial strategic juncture, with the military undergoing an expensive (and

increasingly controversial) process of recapitalization, the government focused on deficit

reduction and departmental budget tightening, including National Defence’s, and a longstanding

military commitment to Afghanistan finally coming to an end in 2014. As a result, a growing

debate has emerged on Canada’s post-Afghan role. Much of this debate is limited to the question

of whether Canada should participate in stability operations, particularly in Africa.1 Discussion

also turns to the future of the Canadian Army, given its operational wartime experience and

counterinsurgency expertise, even though appetite for boots on the ground has dramatically

lessened.2

Yet Canada needs to look further afield when crafting a post-Afghan role. Officials

should not make the mistake of assuming that the next major military commitment will

necessarily resemble the last one, whether involving either sizable ground force deployments or

counterinsurgency operations. Importantly, Ottawa does not have complete autonomy in its

foreign policy and strategic actions. Instead, Canada often uses its superpower patron as a focal

point and adapts its policies in accordance to the strategic preferences that take hold in

Washington. Canada does not merely follow the American lead on strategic issues. But Canadian

security policy is heavily shaped by what goes on south of the border, whether this entails close

accommodation with US policies or greater distancing. As a result, Canada has a definite

incentive to better understand American strategic preferences and the future direction of its grand

strategy.

The purpose of this article is to assess the likely trajectory of Canada’s post-Afghan

security policy in light of the strategic recalibration now underway in Washington. I am

referring here specifically to President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, a move

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meant to shore up America’s force presence and reassure regional allies, with important

implications to the country’s force structure and broader grand strategy. Officials now prefer to

use “rebalance” in reference to this effort. But, as this article shows, the administration is also

strongly inclined towards achieving greater selectivity of commitments in order to preserve

continued preponderance in the Asia-Pacific – a fact that helps to distinguish the current effort

and explains why I prefer making reference to a Pacific “pivot,” in so far as that term implies

pivoting away from other less salient locales. By heralding a more sustained strategic

adjustment, Canada will need to reevaluate its position and perhaps take on a more substantial

role – at least if it hopes to retain some influence in Washington. This would be true even if the

government has other priorities or plans to focus elsewhere, given the extent to which Ottawa

looks south of the border for cues to guide its own strategic behavior.

This article begins by providing an overview on the various elements that make up

Obama’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific, from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. It situates the pivot

in American grand strategy, with a particular emphasis on how fiscal austerity and a more

specialized force structure provides the basis for a more fundamental strategic adjustment to

“selective primacy.” It then turns to the subject of Canada’s security policy and assesses the

extent to which Canadian policymakers will be forced to adapt to this latest strategic initiative to

emerge in Washington. The article concludes with some thoughts on an expanded Canadian

effort at maritime diplomacy and how the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) could be better prepared

for such a role.

Pivoting to the Pacific

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The United States initially hoped to offer some “strategic reassurance” to Beijing.3 Yet

such effort proved remarkably short-lived. Rather than reciprocating Obama’s initial overtures,

Chinese leaders opted for a more uncooperative and assertive position on a range of issues, from

Iran and North Korea to currency manipulation to maritime disputes. As a result, the Obama

administration began to hue towards a firmer line, perhaps most evident in how the United States

has taken a more direct role in the South China Sea maritime dispute.4 In his 2011 trip to the

Asia-Pacific, the president spoke about the need for the United States to “play a larger and long

term role in shaping this region and its future,” and used this occasion to announce a first step –

the deployment of 2,500 Marines on a rotational basis in Darwin, Australia, with negotiations to

ensure greater access for US air and naval assets in the country.5

Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton coined the term “pivot” to describe this renewed

focus, though it should not be construed as solely military in nature. For instance, Obama moved

quickly to reengage the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by signing the Treaty

of Amity and Cooperation and joining the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-

Plus). The United States became a member of the East Asia Summit in 2011, even as its effort to

free up regional trade continued with its role in negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership

(TTP). Yet much of this effort is arguably about restricting China’s burgeoning diplomatic and

economic influence in the region, with a strategic logic that goes beyond simply diplomatic

niceties or parochial economic interests. In that sense, it is the military component of the pivot

that represents the hard-edge of this Pacific reengagement – one that has garnered perhaps the

most public attention and is the central subject of this analysis.

Importantly, the president’s pivot is not limited to the redeployment of US Marines –

even if this action reflects the Marine Corps’ growing preference for rotational (albeit persistent)

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presence in the region.6 Perhaps more significant is Washington’s interest in air and naval access

arrangements with Australia, which coincides with Canberra’s potential interest in upgrading its

existing military bases. For example, the Australian Defence Force Posture Review recommends

upgrading naval facilities and services of Fleet Base West near Perth to better handle large

capital ships, not only to support the forward deployment of its future destroyers but potentially

American vessels as well.7 Indeed, Australia recently assented to greater American naval and air

access to its bases, though naval access on the West Coast would still have to wait for port

facilities there to be upgraded.8

The Obama administration is also overseeing a redeployment of US Marines from Japan

to Guam begun under its predecessor, though the total number has been reduced to 5,000 and its

completion pushed back to 2020.9 Plans are also underway to expand the naval facilities and air

fields on the island, though much depends on whether adequate funding is available for these

upgrades or if infrastructure projects are delayed. It has also been boosting its presence in

Southeast Asia, with a small fleet of littoral combat ships to be forward deployed on a rotational

basis in Singapore. Military ties have been strengthened with Vietnam, so far involving naval

exercises and training between both countries, though Washington has indicated interest in

accessing the deepwater naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.10 Relations with Indonesia have been

rehabilitated, with the resumption of ties to the Indonesian Kopassus (Army Special Forces) and

200 joint security engagements in 2012 alone.11 Lastly, the US military is now able to use its

former naval and air force facilities at Subic Bay and Clark airfield in the Philippines, even as

discussions continue on greater American use of base facilities in Thailand.12

President Obama has also followed his predecessor’s footsteps by strengthening

diplomatic and military ties with India. High-level discussions have continued under the Indo-US

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Strategic Dialogue, with a burgeoning number of military exchanges, staff talks, and military

exercises between the two nations, the centerpiece being the large-scale Malabar maritime

exercise.13 Washington sees India as a “provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region”

and a “linchpin” to the Pacific pivot, if not yet a close ally.14 An even more unexpected

development has been the gradual normalization towards Burma (Myanmar), involving the

easing of economic sanctions, start of military-to-military ties, and visits by senior US officials,

which helped pave the way for a presidential visit in November 2012.15 At this early stage, while

much depends on whether the reforms continue, it is clear that Washington hopes to wean the

former pariah regime away from China’s decades-long embrace.

The United States has made some progress in forging an implicit link between the Indian

and Pacific Oceans, in what then Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt

Campbell described as “the next challenge” in American strategic thinking.16 Indeed, with

greater access to air and naval bases in Darwin and Perth, the United States would have a

stronger capacity to project power into the Indian Ocean, and therefore strengthen an Indo-

Pacific strategic linkage. Of course, such access would also provide an important anchor for an

“Oceania” strategy, in which a smaller naval fleet-in-being could coalesce “just over the

horizon” from both the Chinese mainland and the “main shipping lanes of Eurasia.”17 More

broadly, however, there are ample reasons to doubt that Washington is actually pursuing such a

radical offshore force posture. One need only look at America’s growing interest in the South

China Sea dispute and recent push to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia, to say nothing of

its continued presence in Northeast Asia. With the exception of moving some US Marines from

Okinawa to Guam and elsewhere, the United States shows little sign of fundamentally altering its

commitment to and force presence in South Korea and Japan. In fact, Obama has been keen to

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strengthen ties with both allies, including expanded military exercises with Seoul, re-emphasis

that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands fall under the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

and Security, and engagement with Seoul and Tokyo on nuclear deterrence issues.18

Lest dispersal be mistaken for force reduction, the administration also codified the need

to maintain a robust regional military presence in its 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance.19 Then

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has spoken about the need to enhance America’s “presence,

power projection, and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific,” and promised to achieve a 60/40 split in

naval assets between the Pacific and Atlantic by 2020.20 In a recent speech by his successor,

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel expanded on this goal to include a 60/40 split in US Air Force

assets as well, including tactical aircraft, bombers, and space and cyber capabilities.21 Even

ground forces contingents, including the US Army I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division and III

Marine Expeditionary Force, have been removed from worldwide service rotation for assignment

to the Asia-Pacific.22 Officials have also made clear that the onset of sequestration will not

impact this effort, despite resulting in an additional $600 billion in defense cuts over ten years.23

The United States has not eschewed high levels of diplomatic and economic engagement

with China, most notably in the expansive Strategic and Economic Dialogue. But, as noted by

David Shambaugh, “In virtually every subject area of the two governments’ 60-plus dialogues,

substantive differences and frictions are now evident.”24 This is not to deny that an improvement

in tone is now evident under Beijing’s newly appointed leadership. Obama has worked hard to

establish a personal rapport with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping. And, despite

rising tension and mutual accusations over cyber espionage, both countries were able to come

together at the recent summit to set up a working group on cyber-security. Still, the

administration has put relatively greater weight on balancing China rather than simply trying to

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engage with it – though much depends not only on China’s reaction to this effort but also the

long term sustainability of the pivot itself at a time of fiscal tightening.

Grand Strategy and Fiscal Realities in Obama’s Pivot

Much like his predecessors, President Obama has eagerly maintained American primacy

in the Asia-Pacific. But there is an important qualifier to this point. Yes, strategic preponderance

remains as important as it ever was in a region where the threat of a near-peer competitor is

considered acute. At the same time, the administration appears more willing to reduce its level of

engagement elsewhere. Selective engagement will be pursued in less strategically vital regions,

even as the pivot ensures primacy is maintained in the one region where it matters the most.25 As

two observers conclude, the United States “has prioritized seeking continued dominance in the

Pacific basin at a cost to power projection elsewhere.”26 The administration now prefers to use

the more innocuous term “rebalancing,” in an apparent effort to avoid the appearance of pivoting

away from other commitments.27 Yet this seems to obscure more than it reveals, in so far as

America’s actions and stated intentions seem to indicate a much greater willingness to retrench

from some of its less strategically salient commitments. It is this fact that provides Obama’s

Pacific pivot a potentially transformational character fundamentally different from previous

efforts.

Hints at greater selectivity can be found first in Europe, where the withdrawal of two

Army brigades and two air squadrons will reduce the US military commitment there by 15

percent to a low of 68,000.28 Sequestration promises to only undercut the rationale of this still

sizable force presence, especially on ground forces designed to deal with the threat of a land

invasion that no longer exists – a fact noted by the head of US European Command Admiral

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James Stavridis, who suspects that the “downward trajectory over time will probably continue.”29

The same is even true in the Middle East, where the US has already suffered a setback by failing

to reach a postwar agreement with Iraq for a residual force presence and base access. The

Pentagon hoped to use Kuwait as a possible replacement, but it recently closed down a logistical

hub there in late 2012 and scaled its force presence back to 13,500 troops.30 Of course,

Washington still places “a premium on U.S. and allied military presence” in the Mideast.31 But,

if sequestration cuts continue, the US may be tempted to scale back its ground forces in Kuwait

to save costs. US air assets and naval patrols in the Persian Gulf might be in a safer position. But

even these are not necessarily sacrosanct, as shown by the Navy’s recent decision to retain only a

single carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf.32

Some officials speak as if the administration has embraced a grand strategy of “restraint”

or “offshore balancing.”33 There is a kernel of truth to this position. President Obama has pivoted

away from land wars in Southwest Asia and often preferred to employ limited naval and air

power (and covert operations) elsewhere, as shown in Libya and Mali – or pursued an even more

hands off approach in the Syrian civil war, for example. Yet offshore balancing involves a more

abject rejection of America’s global role, including the withdrawal of all forward deployed

military forces, abrogation of alliance commitments, and wholesale “buck-passing” to the likes

of Germany and Japan.34 In contrast, the United States seems little inclined to relinquish its

preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, though a much lighter military footprint is increasingly

possible in Europe and the Mideast. Even the US Navy (USN) does not envision either pulling

back from its substantial naval presence abroad or dismantling its basing infrastructure, despite

occasional comments in support of an offshore position.35

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Still, questions have been raised as to whether the pivot will be adequately funded,36

particularly since the defense budget will be increasingly squeezed by the growth of entitlement

spending. Many of the pivot’s initial proponents are no longer in office, including Hillary

Clinton, Kurt Campbell, and Leon Panetta, which has generated concern that the new Secretaries

of State and Defense John Kerry and Chuck Hagel may not be wedded to the pivot as their

predecessors.37 Yet selective primacy has an underlying strategic and fiscal logic that is difficult

to discount. True, defense spending cuts can perhaps endanger the military basis of this pivot.

But, at a time of budgetary austerity, Washington must pay greater attention on prioritizing

different interests, of which the need to manage China’s rise arguably looms largest. As a result,

the United States has greater urgency to become selective in its commitments, so that “more

military assets and spending can be assigned to the region.”38 In that way, US fiscal constraint

actually underwrites rather than negates the Pacific pivot. Another factor is the deciding role of

the president himself. It would be premature to think that officials could do away with this

initiative without considering the president’s own views – and there is little indication that

Obama has lost interest in the Pacific pivot.

A better description of America’s current grand strategy might be “selective primacy,”

where Obama’s pivot reflects a narrower application of primacy and retrenchment elsewhere is

used to safeguard continued preponderance in the Asia-Pacific. As a component of this grand

strategy, the Pacific pivot implies a broader blueprint in how to deal with future defense

spending cuts, starting with the principal long term goal of maintaining preponderance in the

Asia-Pacific. Washington could in turn pivot away from its commitments elsewhere to safeguard

this higher order priority, first with its sizable force presence in Europe, and then by a drawdown

from the Middle East if necessary. If correct, additional cuts to America’s force presence in both

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regions may soon be in the offing, likely to disproportionately impact ground forces than more

flexible naval and air force deployments.

Selective primacy also envisions a military force structure attuned to both greater

selectivity and a continued force presence in the western Pacific to counter China’s burgeoning

anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.39 With an A2/AD threat envelope, Beijing

would finally have a capacity to contest the maritime and aerospace domains in its immediate

littoral zone and beyond, whether by anti-access missile attacks on US naval and air bases in

region or by naval operations to contest American command in this theatre – in a manner similar

to how the Soviet Union pursued a “line in the ocean” strategy to “push back U.S. carriers by

establishing defensive maritime perimeters.”40 China’s line would include much of the near seas

(Yellow Sea and the East and South China Seas) and potentially extending past the first island

chain (composed of the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines).

Washington needs to prioritize naval and air power in order to buttress its preponderant

position in this region. With the important exception of Korea, American ground forces would be

relegated to a secondary role. This implies a reversal of the military service priorities that existed

under the previous administration, when both the US Army and Marine Corps expanded to

prosecute land wars in Southwest Asia. Already, the US Army is expected to lose much of its

recent troop increases, with an active duty force shrinking to 490,000 over the next five years.

Discussion is also underway on further reductions arising from sequestration, which could limit

the active force to 400,000-425,000 and cut the reserves by tens of thousands.41 Unlike his Army

colleagues, Commandant General James Amos has so far been unwilling for the Marine Corps to

go below a planned 182,000-strong force, preferring that procurement take the brunt of any

further reductions.42 Yet even this outcome could prove optimistic, especially if the United States

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opts for a smaller ground presence in Europe and elsewhere. Potential cost-savings should not be

discounted. According to a RAND paper, for example, the United States would save $107-126

billion over ten years by eliminating six Army brigade combat teams and 13,500 Marines from

the Europe-Mediterranean region.43

In contrast, the US Air Force (USAF) and USN will likely emerge from sequestration in

comparatively better shape, if not completely intact. The USAF is still expected to rely on the F-

35 Lightning II program to fulfill its principal next-generation fighter requirements, despite cost-

overruns and production delays – though fewer numbers of F-35 aircraft will likely be procured

in the current fiscal climate. Still, the United States has the option of either accelerating the

development of next-generation unmanned vehicles or procuring greater quantities of less

advanced (but still formidable) aircraft, such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, which could help

safeguard its plans for a new long-range strike bomber. The USN, in turn, only expects a modest

increase in fleet size to 300 ships, though this goal could also prove overly optimistic after

sequestration. Notably, the Navy has at least emphasized maintaining its inventory of Aegis

destroyers, nuclear attack submarines, and carrier strike groups; precisely those platforms that

would help ensure its command of the maritime commons.44 Even with a modest decrease in

size, the United States would still have a comparatively large fleet composed of extremely

formidable ships, with the option of surging these forces to a particular region, if required.

Undoubtedly, both services are under growing budgetary pressure that could impact their

readiness, deployments, and even procurement plans – even if not to the extent proposed by

more alarmist accounts that underplay expected delays in procurement and overlook the likely

formidable size of America’s air and naval fleets.45 Still, the Air Force might discover that its

next-generation fighter aircraft and strike bombers are unaffordable, leading to an even more

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radical restructuring of its future fleet, while the Navy could find maintaining eleven carrier

strike groups far too ambitious and cut back on some of its capital ships. Yet, unlike their ground

counterparts, the USN and USAF play a crucial role in buttressing America’s military presence

in the Asia-Pacific. For Washington, this creates an additional incentive to let any defense cuts

fall disproportionately on the ground forces, since manpower can be regenerated relatively

quickly in contrast to large capital projects.46

The USN and USAF can also compensate for capital shortfalls in other ways. On one

hand, both services have been intent on renewing their operational partnership through the

AirSea Battle concept, designed to construct a capacity for “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-

Depth” to disrupt, destroy, and defeat A2/AD threats. Yet this concept is also about improving

America’s “power projection capabilities in smarter, more cost-effective ways.” By emphasizing

networking and integration, it envisions increasing cross-service synergy that would “improve

the ability of existing platforms to operate or deliver effects,” which could better preparing the

USN and USAF to deal with smaller budgetary outlays.47 On the other hand, given its intention

to pivot away from other locales, the United States could reposition naval and air assets from less

vital positions to ensure a robust military presence in Asia. For example, even if the USN’s fleet

modestly shrinks, it could still reposition naval assets in such a way as to retain much of the core

strength of the US Pacific Fleet. Indeed, the USN has the means to relatively quickly surge assets

from one theatre to another, thereby reducing (if not eliminating) some of the risks associated

with a more selective American overseas naval presence.

A Canadian Contribution to the Pacific Pivot

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Canada has made some recent moves to reinvigorate its engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

In 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government finally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation. Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird was also particularly active in the

region, whether by taking the lead in engaging Myanmar, pushing for bilateral free trade

agreements, including with South Korea and Japan, or committing C$10-million in funding to

ASEAN-related projects.48 The Canadian government also formally joined the TTP negotiations

as a full partner and indicated interest in the East Asia Summit, though it has more limited

negotiating rights in the former (like other late entrants) and has yet to be invited to the latter.49

Ottawa has also shown a greater willingness to expand its security role as leverage to join

the region’s institutional architecture. Of particular importance is the ADMM-Plus, widely seen

as a stepping stone to join the East Asia Summit.50 Indeed, senior officials led by then Defence

Minister Peter MacKay have begun to make more regular appearances at the Shangri-La

Dialogue, with an eye towards gaining an invitation to ADMM-Plus. Canada is negotiating a

mutual logistics support agreement with Japan and shown interest in a logistical support hub in

Singapore, likely to include a cross-services agreement and access to facilities.51 One can also

point to Canada’s role in the 2012 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercise, where it

deployed a relatively strong 1,400-strong contingent and occupied key command positions.52

Yet it remains to be seen whether the government’s current reengagement will be

sustained in the long term. With only a few exceptions, much of Canada’s post-Cold War interest

has been focused on trade, exemplified by Team Canada trade missions to China. Even this

economic engagement lacked much of a “strategic dimension.”53 Attention also fluctuates based

on the particular proclivities of the government in power. A good example is Prime Minister

Harper’s decision to spurn talk of a “strategic partnership” with China for reasons of human

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rights, then to reverse course soon afterwards.54 With that in mind, Canada may find it

unexpectedly difficult to be treated as a long term regional player or be invited for a seat at

ADMM-Plus, let alone the East Asia Summit. This was recently brought home at the 2013

Shangri-La Dialogue, where Peter MacKay publicly broached the issue of participating in

ADMM-Plus only to be politely rejected by his Singaporean counterpart.55

Clearly, a core deficit has been Canada’s lack of a strategic rationale in the Asia-Pacific.

It partly arises from the privileged position of North America and Europe in Canadian security

policy. At a more fundamental level, it is a consequence of how Canada traditionally follows

America’s lead on politico-military issues, owing to its strong “adaptive” or “responsive”

tendencies.56 This fact helps to explain why Canada places greater priority on continental and

trans-Atlantic ties, the former in recognition that Washington saw bilateral cooperation as

necessary to secure North America from Soviet attack, the latter coming from the need to cement

America’s security guarantees to Europe within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

One can also look to when Canada last played a strategic role in East Asia, from its

involvement in Korea (militarily) to Indochina (diplomatically) until the early 1970s. Then,

officials were largely focused on adapting to the ebb and flow of America’s interventions, which

distracted attention from the Central Front and even raised the possibility of nuclear war – a

concern only put to rest with Washington’s post-Vietnam disengagement and the onset of Sino-

American rapprochement.57 Canada then expanded economic and trade links to the region, but its

involvement on regional security matters remained modest or sporadic at best – essentially

limited to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s short-lived North Pacific Cooperative Security

Dialogue and funding of the South China Sea Dialogue in the 1990s. Yet Obama’s pivot may

soon make this situation untenable. After all, the United States now has a strong incentive to

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strengthen regional alliances, share more of the burden of this effort, and to look further afield

for new partners, already apparent in the emerging alignment between Washington and New

Delhi. If it continues, Canada will find its modest role in the region under greater scrutiny.

Of course, Canada could opt to instead backstop the receding American military presence

in Europe and the Mediterranean, as a means of indirect support. Much depends on how

amenable the pivot is to Canada and the extent to which both countries preferences converge – a

subject to be discussed shortly. Yet it is important not to overstate such concerns. Canada has a

strong preference for more direct forms of cooperation with the Americans, especially if their

interests coincide. As such, Canada is unlikely to play too distant a role on issues that our ally

sees as important, any more than it was willing to settle for a role in North America when

Washington was fixated on the Central Front in the Cold War. It might not be in Canada’s more

parochial economic interest to do so either, given the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific

compared to that of Europe and elsewhere. As noted in a recent report, if it hopes to make

economic inroads, Canada needs to pursue full-scale engagement across “multiple domains,”

including on security, rather than rely on a “one-legged (read economic) strategy.”58 As such,

Canada’s participation in the Pacific pivot may soon become the only strategic game in town, so

to speak.

Of course, Canada has traditionally been inclined to skirt between close cooperation and

maximizing distance in its relationship to its superpower ally – a tendency likely to shape how

the country actually responds to America’s Pacific pivot. Some important conditions seem to

impact the relative balance between these contradictory impulses towards accommodation and

distancing in Canadian grand strategy.59 Among the most basic is whether the United States

actually prioritizes a particular initiative. After all, American proposals periodically emerge

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without substantive support or funding, a good example being initial plans for an ambitious

continental air defense perimeter with little official support from Washington in the mid-to-late

1940s.60 Equally important is for Canada’s participation or endorsement of an initiative to be

valued, thereby creating an incentive for the United States to turn its attention on its northern

neighbor.

On the first condition, the United States seems ready to prioritize military commitments

in the Asia-Pacific. As outlined earlier, rather than a modest and short-lived recalibration,

Obama’s pivot actually presages a more fundamental strategic adjustment likely to deepen in

coming years, due to America’s fiscal problems and the constraints of a more specialized force

structure. The question then becomes whether Washington will soon put some pressure on

Canada to support its effort in the region. The answer here is more ambiguous. The United States

has so far been intent on emphasizing burden-sharing with its immediate allies in the region.

However, as Washington’s fiscal tightening continues, there is also reason to suspect that

American officials would turn their attention to other allies, including Canada. Admittedly, the

United States could encourage its allies to commit towards greater burden-sharing elsewhere, as

a way to facilitate its retrenchment from other locales and enable a semblance of continued

global engagement. Yet such concerns are also likely to fall to the wayside, pulled under by the

combined weight of a growing Chinese military challenge and the consequent difficulty of

maintaining preponderance at a time of budget cuts. Selective primacy places a premium on

prioritizing the Asia-Pacific at the expense of other commitments – a logic that creates an

incentive to emphasize burden-sharing for this region among countries best able to contribute.

European countries that lack sufficient power projection capabilities may be asked to buttress the

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American presence in their own region; the same cannot be said of a blue-water, extra-regional

power like Canada.

Other conditions will then help shape Canada’s policy response. For instance, Canada

prefers to avoid cooperation when it involves significant controversy that could generate political

headaches at home, whether from the initiative in question or through guilt by association to an

unpopular administration. One example is Ottawa’s aversion to join the controversial Strategic

Defense Initiative of the 1980s, which the Liberal opposition was quick to disparage as space

weaponization.61 It can also be seen in the controversy attached to President George W. Bush’s

missile defense deployment, though rejection in this case was more closely associated with

anxieties about the administration itself.62 Equally important is for both countries to share the

sense of threat that underpins the initiative, which would help to smooth possible wrinkles to

emerge from bilateral cooperation and make Ottawa more willing to accept any perceived sense

of subservience to emerge from it. For instance, Canada had little objection to the militarization

of the NATO alliance in the 1950s, due not least to concerns over direct Soviet conventional

aggression after the Korean War.63 Without such convergence, Canada could very well see

greater benefit in adopting more implicit, arms-length forms of support.

Yet Canada is unlikely to find much controversy in the pivot’s close association with the

current US administration. Indeed, compared to his almost vilified predecessor, President Obama

has proven exceptionally popular in this country, with polls just prior to the last election showing

that two-thirds of Canadians would vote for him if possible, including “79 per cent of Quebecers

and 71 per cent of Canadian women.”64 Indeed, with Obama’s popularity higher than the prime

minister’s, the government could even discover that it has little choice other than to support

American preferences on this matter, if only to forestall any domestic political repercussions.

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More uncertain is how Canada might perceive the Pacific pivot itself. Canadian political

leaders will likely be wary of action that could potentially jeopardize economic ties with this

rising Asian power. Another possible problem is that Obama’s pivot is closely tied to America’s

alliance system in East Asia. There, compared to the multilateral norms that hold sway across the

Atlantic, the United States has historically preferred bilateral alliances under the San Francisco

“hub-and-spokes” system. It can even be extended to regional alliances often mistaken for being

multilateral, like the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).65 Yet Ottawa strongly

prefers placing ties with the United States within a multilateral framework, at least when

cooperating beyond the confines of North America. So the prospect of operating in a strictly

bilateral setting might not be so appealing.

The first point depends on whether Canada necessarily sees eye-to-eye with the

Americans on China. As such, it is closely associated with the relative convergence or

divergence between the two countries on the China threat, in so far as a higher sense of threat –

more similar to that which is prevalent in the United States – would make it less controversial to

both participate in the pivot and risk economic ties with China. Canada might have grown

concerned about Chinese industrial espionage, cyber attacks, and foreign influence, but there is

relatively little discussion on “the strategic implications of China’s military rise.”66 Still, Canada

also has little chance of siding decisively against Washington on this issue. As Bruce Gilley

notes, Canada lacks structural or normative incentives to bandwagon alongside China. Simply

put, there is no possibility of Canada pushing for an “Asian third option” any time soon. If

tensions increase between Beijing and Washington, Canada will be strongly inclined to become

more closely aligned with the latter, even if continuing bilateral differences with Washington

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could provide a possible way to justify a “bridging role among allies” and indeed with China

itself.67

On the second point, it is important to recognize that the San Francisco system has begun

to evolve. Japan signed a bilateral intelligence sharing agreement with South Korea, and both

countries now undertake joint exercises with the United States in the Yellow Sea, with current

discussion focusing on a trilateral dialogue between them. It might be premature to envision a

Korea-Japan alliance, given the distinct lack of mutual trust and domestic/structural impediments

to greater cooperation.68 But, clearly, one can also no longer say that there is “no apparent

connections between the ‘spokes.’”69 Even closer bilateral ties are evident between Australia and

Japan, with an important turning point taking place in 2005, when Australia dispatched hundreds

of additional troops to protect Japanese soldiers deployed in Iraq.70 Afterwards, both countries

signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, followed quickly by an Acquisition

and Cross-Servicing Agreement to increase military interoperability. Intelligence sharing, joint

military exercises, and Japanese involvement in Australia’s Collins submarine replacement

project are possible next steps, with some discussion raising the possibility of an Australia-Japan

alliance.71

Ministerial-level discussions have also expanded between Australia, Japan, and the

United States under the Trilateral Security Dialogue. These high-level discussions were briefly

superseded with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that had India as a member, in an apparent

reaffirmation of when India joined a “core group” to coordinate disaster relief in the immediate

aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami – though this arrangement also shared a similar fate to the short-

lived core group.72 All four “Quad” countries held occasional quadrilateral meetings and, with

the inclusion of Singapore, participated in the Malabar maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal in

21

2007. But Australian and Indian interest in this new framework suddenly cooled, due not least to

concern about unduly alarming China.73 It might have been dealt a final blow with the 2007

resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the strongest proponent of this arrangement

– though his return as prime minister in 2012 does potentially auger well for deepening

quadrilateral ties.

Indeed, regional ties have only deepened in recent years. Trilateral discussions continue

between Japan, Australia, and the United States. Meanwhile, Australia has pursued bilateral 2+2

meetings with Japan and South Korea, involving their respective countries’ defence and foreign

ministers. New Delhi has also steadily strengthened ties not only with Washington, but also both

Japan and Australia, “the northern and southern anchors of the Western alliance system.”74 With

Japan, for instance, India signed a Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global

Partnership in 2007, followed by a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation one year later,

which initiated naval talks, a defense policy dialogue, and military exercises.75 India and

Australia also signed agreements in 2006 and 2007 on “joint naval exercises, enhanced maritime

security cooperation, increased military exchanges, and joint training.”76 True, relations between

both countries took a quick downturn following Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s refusal

to sale uranium to India. Yet Canberra now shows greater willingness to lift its ban on uranium

sales and expand military-to-military cooperation.77

Rather than solely a bilateral hub-and-spokes system, one can see at least the beginnings

of a more diffused network emerging in the region, what Dan Blumethal calls a “point to point”

or networked “model of alliances.”78 True, America’s bilateral alliances remain at the core of this

system. But bilateral ties between the spokes are now an important supplement, in addition to a

growing number of trilateral and quadrilateral discussions between different sets of countries, in

22

what can be called “mini-lateral” arrangements.79 This does not mean that a formal multilateral

alliance is on the horizon, to say nothing of the multilateral norms and institutions that Canada

finds so familiar across the North Atlantic. The fate of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

provides a sobering lesson on this point. Still, Ottawa will likely find it easier to accept closer

bilateral Canada-US cooperation when it is situated in an emerging network marked by mini-

lateral ties. As a result, Canada has the opportunity to not only enhance cooperation with

Americans but also do the same with many of allies and partners (for example, Japan, India, and

Australia), thereby strengthening the network and diffusing some of the controversy close ties

with the superpower seems to engender in the country.

One can therefore surmise that Canada will prove supportive of the United States in its

Pacific pivot. Washington will still likely need to show at least greater interest for it to do so, at

least for Canada to go beyond its current levels of engagement – unless Canadian officials prove

unexpectedly proactive. Cooperation rather than distancing will be the dominant tendency in

Ottawa. Yet, without greater convergence on the China threat, Canada will likely prefer more

modest ways to support the United States. Indirect support will likely prove a step too far, for the

reasons already addressed. Instead, Canada will likely prefer more direct forms of support –

sufficient to placate the Americans and give the government a façade of independence, but

limited enough to minimize the risk of damaging economic ties with a rising China.

Canadian Maritime Diplomacy: A Way Forward?

One fruitful avenue of Canada-US cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is maritime diplomacy.

Such activity seems ideally suited in a theatre where key players are expanding their naval

capabilities and could be involved in regional maritime flashpoints, whether the Taiwan Straits,

23

South China Sea, or the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.80 It would also complement the military’s post-

Afghan emphasis on defense diplomacy, as outlined in the Department of National Defence’s

Global Engagement Strategy.81 Indeed, by expanding its naval role in such a way, Canada would

be able to more convincingly argue for its inclusion in ADMM-Plus, and eventually the East

Asia Summit. For example, ADMM-Plus has an Expert Working Group to facilitate cooperation

in maritime security, which would be the natural loci for an expanded Canadian naval effort.82

Other working groups also explore non-traditional security issues heavily tied to the maritime

domain, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and counter-terrorism. If necessary,

naval forces would also be equally useful way to demonstrate commitment on traditional security

concerns like sea control, for example – a possibility that should not be discounted given that a

competitive naval element is increasingly part of the East Asian strategic landscape.83

The RCN already has a history of making naval port calls to the Pacific since 1995, under

a rolling five-year deployment pattern called WESTPLOY “designed to ensure a consistent and

predictable Canadian naval presence in Asian water.”84 Even then, WESTPLOY is limited to

alternating visits to Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Moreover, with the exception of

RIMPAC, Canada often settles for ad hoc participation in the regional military exercises, such as

the trilateral naval exercise between Japan, the US, and Canada during the WESTPLOY

deployment in 2008.85 Yet more needs to be done. For example, Canadian frigates or destroyers

could be permanently integrated into US carrier battle groups operating in the western Pacific,86

similar to how it commits warships to the Standing NATO Maritime Group (and the Standing

Naval Force Atlantic before that). With the high levels of interoperability between RCN and

USN, this could be done relatively easily – so long as sufficient RCN vessels are available.

Canada should also balance such bilateral ties by establishing closer naval ties with America’s

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key allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, and even India. This would include not only

“show the flag” port calls but also more frequent maritime exercises with allied navies. RIMPAC

remains one of the most important venues for maritime diplomacy, which necessitates a strong

Canadian presence. But RCN could also be involved in additional bilateral or mini-lateral

exercises, not all of which need to involve the USN.

Canada should also not be averse to joining any multinational deterrence patrols and

future naval task forces, which could provide a means to “work with non-traditional coalition

partners” on a range of different issues, from terrorism and piracy to weapons of mass

destruction.87 When placed alongside more varied maritime ties, it would even help reduce the

perception that Ottawa is simply falling in line behind Washington in its Pacific pivot. As such,

Canada’s actions would increase the level of cooperation with the Americans but would do so in

a relatively low-key manner. Canada could ensure that maritime diplomacy also includes

overtures to the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN), including participating in bilateral or

trilateral maritime exercises with this rapidly modernizing naval force. This could further

minimize the perception of Canada’s subservience to Washington while also helping to reassure

China that the RCN’s maritime reengagement is not part of any purported containment or

encirclement effort.

Yet this discussion on the Canada’s maritime diplomacy only raises another question.

Does Canada have the military means to fulfill such a role? The answer here is more mixed.

Canada could benefit from placing more of its naval forces on the West Coast than the East,

rather than the current 55/45 division favoring the latter.88 Equally useful would be to forward

base some vessels or air assets in the western Pacific, whether in Guam or even Singapore, which

could ensure a more regular force presence and reduce some of the logistical difficulties of

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operating in this theatre. With a mid-sized blue-water fleet, the RCN would only have the means

to modestly increase its presence in the Pacific, even with a more favorable deployment scheme.

But such a redeployment would be an important first step in signaling Canada’s resolve to

support America’s Pacific pivot, while also providing a increased (albeit still limited) capacity

for maritime diplomacy. Of course, much also depends on how the RCN proceeds with its fleet-

replacement plans. Further delays in procuring replacements for its auxiliary oil replenishment

(AOR) ships and guided missile destroyers could result in a temporary loss of key capabilities,

thereby degrading Canada’s ability to play a supporting role in the short-term, or at best induce

an expensive effort to maintain and modernize increasingly aging ships.

More problematic is the question of capital funding for fleet-replacement. On one hand,

Canada needs to ensure that the actual size of its blue-water fleet is maintained, including a

suitable number of replacements for its destroyers, frigates, and AOR ships – the first two

coming under the Canadian Surface Combatant project and the last coming under the Joint

Supply Ship project (essentially an AOR+). If the size of the fleet declines further, Canada will

find it very difficult to reprioritize its fleet to the Pacific. Indeed, it might be hard enough just to

maintain the current number of naval assets stationed in Esquimalt, British Columbia, to say

nothing of increasing it. Moreover, in the absence of enough ships, Canada will likely find it

difficult to either expand its Pacific deployment scheme beyond WESTPLOY or be invited to

participate in military exercises there, let alone increase naval ties with regional partners.

On the other hand, the RCN needs to have the necessary capabilities to operate in the

western Pacific. Fortunately, as specified in its recent draft Horizon 2050 naval strategy, the

RCN seems to recognize the challenge posed by “inter-state maritime armed conflict” and

“sophisticated area denial capabilities,” in what Elinor Sloan views as an implicit reference to

26

China’s A2/AD capabilities.89 Yet it remains to be seen whether the RCN will have the requisite

capabilities to join with its American (and allied) counterparts in confronting such challenges.

For example, even with its historic area-air defense role, the RCN has given little indication

about adding the Aegis combat system to its future vessels, which offers an important capability

against China’s anti-access missile threat while permitting the RCN to support key defensive

missions envisioned in the US AirSea Battle concept. Aegis could be required for Canada’s navy

to maintain interoperability with the USN and its many regional partners (Australia, South

Korea, Japan), all of which are rapidly expanding their fleet of Aegis warships.90 It could also

provide a means for Canada to realize the full potential of its planned acquisition of the F-35

Lightning II. After all, many regional allies are acquiring both F-35s and Aegis ships, and the

interconnected networked sensors of these fifth-generation aircraft could be mated with the

Aegis system under its launch-on-remote concept, thereby creating “an integrated air-sea sensor

net for deployed fleets.”91

Little discussion is also underway on the possible contributions of anti-submarine warfare

(ASW), highly valued by Americans and others to ensure sea control in the face of China’s

growing undersea fleet. The RCN could also potentially leverage an ASW capability to cement a

naval partnership with other regional partners. One possibility is the Japanese Maritime Self-

Defense Force, which operates a large and sophisticated undersea and surface ASW fleet and has

shown growing willingness to contemplate strategic relations beyond its traditional America ally,

including Australia. The RCN has historically undertaken area-air defense and surface

ASW/escort missions, so this defensive role would be quite familiar. Indeed, its Victoria diesel

submarines could prove a very useful platform for ASW missions, in a return to when the RCN

briefly acquired an undersea ASW capability after refurbishing its older Oberon submarines in

27

the 1980s.92 It would also allow Canada to avoid some of the more troubling “offensive” aspects

of AirSea Battle, even if it raises uncomfortable questions on replacing Canada’s aging Aurora

maritime patrol aircraft, and eventually its submarines.

Yet, in the absence of sufficient funding, the RCN will likely discover the natural trade-

off between fleet size and ensuring that these ships maintain their qualitative edge. Canada has

already scaled back the Joint Supply Ships’ capabilities and settled for only two vessels, which

could very well curtail its operational sustainment capability – and at the very least displays a

marked under-appreciation on the need for at-sea replenishment, especially in an expansive

maritime environment like the Pacific.93 The same could eventually be said of the Canadian

Surface Combatants. Critics already question whether Canada’s National Shipbuilding

Procurement Strategy’s C$33 billion budget envelope is sufficient to recapitalize naval and coast

guard fleets, especially with rising platform costs and possible capital budget shortfalls.94 With a

decades-long procurement process, one can imagine a future government someday deciding to

scale back capital spending. In such a situation, Canadian defense planners may have to envision

a more specialized military force structure.

The full implications of such a force structure are beyond the scope of this article. But

one should at least recall that some degree of military specialization is not totally unfamiliar to

the Canadian Armed Forces. One can see it in how the RCN evolved into a specialized (albeit

flexible) surface-oriented ASW force for much of the Cold War, or in how Canada’s military

finally shed its nuclear role by the 1980s. Even Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has only

facilitated de facto specialization in “land-centric missions.”95 As such, Canada may need to face

some hard choices about its military force structure and the relative priority assigned to its three

services. To ensure a robust naval fleet, Canada may simply have to follow the Americans by

28

cutting personnel numbers and accepting that such an outcome would adversely impact the Army

over more capital-intensive services. With a more balance capital-to-personnel ratio, one can

better ensure greater funding is allocated for equipment renewal and fleet replacement.96 Such

specialization might be necessary for Canada to maintain high-end combat-capable naval and air

forces into the future. If not ideal, it may also be the only way for the RCN to ensure that it has

the numbers to reposition to the Pacific and capabilities to operate in an anti-access environment.

Importantly, this outcome would not reduce the RCN to a niche naval role for the Pacific, in so

far as naval vessels are inherently flexible and can be redeployed or surged into other theatres,

some of which face an A2/AD challenge as well, not least the Persian Gulf.

Conclusion

Canada has already made some limited effort at reengaging in the Asia-Pacific. Yet even

this progress will likely prove insufficient in coming years, especially as the United States

reduces its global commitments to sustain a preponderant position in the Pacific. Such an

outcome remains only in the realm of a conjecture. However, there are strategic and fiscal

reasons to believe that Obama’s pivot heralds a more significant strategic adjustment towards

selective primacy. It seems to be only a matter of time before renewed attention on burden-

sharing is finally brought to bear on Canada.

Ottawa is also unlikely to be intransigent when it comes to adapting to American

preferences here, so long as key factors points to cooperation rather than distance. Simply put,

irrespective of the government’s own plans and proclivities, Canada’s strategic behavior has

often been heavily shaped (if not determined) by what takes place in Washington – a reactive

tendency that has proven especially difficult to overcome. Importantly, as this article shows,

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Canadian support for the Pacific pivot will not prove terribly controversial, even if some qualms

can be expected due to the limited convergence on the need to counter China’s growing military

power. This means that Canada should prepare to increase its cooperation with the United States,

even if care must be taken to minimize its consequence on the country’s economic and trade

links with China. Such modest distancing would also have the ancillary benefit of demonstrating

Canada’s resolve in maintaining a semblance of independence, while making closer cooperation

with the Americans more domestically palatable.

Maritime diplomacy seems to provide the best way to achieve such a balanced approach.

Naval assets have a natural suitability to this heavily maritime theatre. Indeed, by using the RCN

as the centerpiece of its reengagement effort, Canada would be offering capabilities ideally

suited to buttress America’s own position and contribute to possible military contingencies,

whether in the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere. Such assets also have a

number of different uses, ranging from power projection and sea control to logistical support,

which gives them a flexible and potentially non-intrusive character. Importantly, maritime

diplomacy is also inherently amenable to modest forms of distancing from the United States,

whether by engaging in the loose maritime network emerging in the region, including ties with

regional navies and even the PLAN, or by providing a means to support Canada’s participation

in the region’s broader security architecture. If required, Canada has the option of reducing its

naval involvement. But, if Canada’s sense of threat from China increases, the government can

also turn to more robust demonstrations of support, by increasing ties with America and her

allies and/or minimizing its attempts to assuage Chinese concerns.

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1 Brian Stewart, “Time for Canada to get back to peacekeeping,” CBC News, December 3, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/11/30/f-vp-stewart-peacekeeping.html. Also see Louis Delvoie, “What Next for the Canadian Forces? Not the Congo,” On Track Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 2010/11): pp 28-29. 2 Eugene Lang and Eric Morse, “World-class Canadian military now at Ottawa’s disposal,” Toronto Star, June 11, 2011. 3 Aaron Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative to U.S. China Policy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, No. 5 (September/October 2012), p 52. 4 For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke about the need for any resolution to take into account exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, in an implicit rebuff of China’s historical claims. See Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US-China Strategic Rivalry,” The Washington

Quarterly Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring 2012), p 148. 5 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, and Craig Whitlock, “U.S., Australia to Broaden Military Ties Amid Pentagon Pivot to SE Asia,” Washington Post, March 26, 2012. 6 Robbin Laird, “The US Marine Corps in the Pivot to the Pacific,” The Diplomat, May 24, 2013. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/24/the-us-marine-corps-in-the-pivot-to-the-pacific/. 7 Australian Government (Allan Hawke and Ric Smith), Australian Defence Force Posture Review (March 30, 2012), pp 32-33. 8 Jonathan Pearlman, “Australia to allow greater US naval access to west coast,” Strait Times, November 13, 2012. 9 Alex Frangos, “Plan to Shift U.S. Forces in Pacific Hits Speed Bumps on Guam,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2013. 10 William Wan, “Defense Secretary Leon Panetta highlights U.S. ties to Vietnam during visit,” The Washington

Post, June 3, 2012, and Gopal Ratman, “Cam Ranh Bay Lures Panetta Seeking Return to Vietnam Port,” Bloomberg News, June 4, 2012. 11 Murray Hiebert and Jeremiah Magpile, “Comprehensive Partnership Nudges U.S.-Indonesia Relations to New Levels of Cooperation,” Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets, September 27, 2012, p 3. 12 Manuel Mogato, “The US military pivot to Asia: when bases are not bases,” Reuters, November 14, 2012. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-usa-asia-military-idUSBRE8AD05Y20121114. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. eyes return to some Southeast Asia military bases,” The Washington Post, June 22, 2012. 13 See K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto, “India-US Security Relations: Current Engagement,” CSR Report for Congress (November 13, 2012), pp 1-33. 14 United States, Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012 (hereafter the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance), p 2, and Pentagon transcript. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054. 15 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Obama Visit Reflects Myanmar’s Key Role in US Pivot to Asia,” World Politics

Review, November 27, 2012. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12523/obama-visit-reflects-myanmars-key-role-in-u-s-pivot-to-asia. Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia,” New Republic, November 20, 2012. 16 Quoted in Mark Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Towards Asia,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (March 28, 2012), p 5. 17 Robert Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010), p 40. For this strategy to be effective, the United States would need to establish a more permanent military presence near Perth for a carrier strike group, an expensive proposition given that the estimated cost of a nuclear carrier-capable port ranges from $1-5 billion. David Berteau and Michael Green (directors), US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012), p 74. 18 This involves the US-Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue. 19 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, p 2. 20 Pentagon transcripts. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4953, and http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681. 21 Karen Parrish, “U.S. Following Through on Pacific Rebalance, Hagel Says,” Armed Forces Press Service, June 1, 2013. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120186. 22 “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, US Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed Service Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” Hearing: The Posture of the U.S. Pacific Command

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and U.S. Strategic Command, House Armed Service Committee, March 5, 2013, pp 30-31. Available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130305/100393/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-LocklearUSNA-20130305.pdf. 23 David Beitelman, “America’s Pacific Pivot,” International Journal Vol. 67, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), p 1088, and “Asia rebalance remains U.S. priority amid fiscal woes: Pentagon,” Reuters, February 27, 2013. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-usa-fiscal-pentagon-asia-idUSBRE91R02O20130228. 24 David Shambaugh, “Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), p 21 (emphasis in original). 25 For more on selective engagement and primacy, see Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp 5-53. 26 David Carment and Simon Palamar, “Canada Grapples with Asia Dilemma,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/10/canada-grapples-with-asia-dilemma. 27 Richard Weitz, “Pivot Out, Rebalance In,” The Diplomat, May 3, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in. 28 Donna Miles, “Force Changes in Europe to Preserve Strategic Edge,” American Forces Press Service, May 7, 2012. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116221. 29 Jeff Schogol, “European troop cuts may be deeper than expected,” Army Times, March 19, 2013. Available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2013/03/air-force-armed-services-031913. 30 Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Security, Reform, and US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, December 6, 2012), 16. 31 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, 2 32 Lolita Baldor, “US to cut carrier fleet in Persian Gulf to 1,” Associated Press, February 6, 2013. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/us-cut-carrier-fleet-persian-gulf-1-212704370--finance.html. 33 See John Barry, “Historic Shift in US Strategy Will Have Major Impact on Europe,” European Affairs, April 2012. Available at http://www.europeaninstitute.org/EA-April-2012/historic-shift-in-us-defense-strategy-will-have-major-impact-on-europe.html. 34 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security (Summer 1997), pp 86-124. 35 See James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian Ocean,” Asian Security Vol. 8, No. 1 (2012), pp 1-26. 36 On the first concern, see Dan Blumethal, “The U.S. Response to China’s Military Modernization,” in Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-13:China’s Military Challenge (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), p 324. 37 Michael Auslin, “The Asian Pivot Under New Management,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2013. 38 Benjamin Schreer, “Planning the unthinkable war: ‘AirSea Battle’ and its implications for Australia,” Strategy Report (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2013), p 15. 39 Of particular concern in the latter is China’s regional missile force, including 1,000-1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, 75-100 road-mobile medium-range ballistic missiles, 200-500 second-generation land-attack cruise missiles, and a new medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile. In recent years, China’s navy displays a much greater capacity for anti-ship and area-air defense missions, with the acquisition of 23 advanced diesel-electric submarines, 4 Russian Sovremenny destroyers, and upwards of 50 indigenous major surface combatants, with more undergoing serial production, including advanced warships like the Luyang II and Luyang III destroyer and Jiangkai II frigate. It has also recently commissioned a revamped Russian aircraft carrier as the Liaoning, with indigenous carriers expected to be launched in coming years. See United States, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013), and Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (December 10, 2012). 40 Blumethal, “The U.S. Response,” 317. 41 C. Todd Lopez, “Odierno: Sequestration could lead to hollow Army,” Army News Service, May 17, 2012. Available at http://www.army.mil/article/80058/Odierno__Sequestration_could_lead_to_hollow_Army/. 42 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Budget cuts seen squeezing Marines’ capacity, programs,” Reuters, September 10, 2012. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-marines-aircraft-idUSBRE88912Y20120910. 43 Stuart Johnson et al., A Strategy-Based Framework for Accommodating Reductions in the Defense Budget, Occasional Paper (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012), pp 37-38.

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44 United States, Department of the Navy, Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013, April 2012, p 12. 45 Schreer, “Planning the unthinkable war,” p 14. 46 David Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp, Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, October 2011), p 11. 47 Norton Schwartz and Jonathan Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle, Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012 (emphasis added). Available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212. For more on the crucial role of networks and integration in Air-Sea Battle, see Richard Bitzinger and Michael Raska, “The AirSea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia,” RSIS Policy Brief (February 2013), pp 1-8. 48 See Brian Job, “Revitalizing Canada–Southeast Asia relations: The TAC gives US a ticket. . . but do we have a destination?” Canada-Asia Agenda, August 25, 2010, p 3, and Peter MacKay, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” speech at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue Fourth Plenary Session, 2 June 2013. Available at http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/mackay-1f8b. 49 Brian Job, “Realizing the ‘Other Half of Diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia: Will Canada’s Efforts Last?” Canada-Asia Agenda, August 7, 2012, p 3, and Hugh Stephens, “Canada’s Asia ‘Pivot,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2012. Available at http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/07/27/canadas-asia-pivot/. 50 Campbell Clark, “Mackay presses China to take regional disputes to UN,” Globe and Mail, June 4, 2013. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mackay-presses-china-to-take-regional-disputes-to-un/article12329483/. 51 Job, “Realizing the ‘Other Half of Diplomacy,’” p 5. 52 “Canadians get key posts in huge joint military exercise,” The Canadian Press, July 15, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/07/15/rimpac-exercise-canadians.html. 53 Paul Evans, “Engagement with conservative characteristics: Policy and public attitudes, 2006–2011,” in Pitman Potter and Thomas Adams, eds., Issues in Canada–China Relations (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2011), p 27. 54 See Wenran Jiang, “Seeking a strategic vision for Canada-China relations,” International Journal Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2009): pp 891-909. 55 Peter Jennings, “Australia and Canada: the kangamoose wakes,” The Strategist blog, June 12, 2013. Available at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-canada-the-kangamoose-wakes. 56 Don Munton, “Planning in the East Block: the Post-Hostilities Problem Committees in Canada 1943-5,” International Journal Vol. 32, No. 4 (1976-77), p 706, and Norman Hillmer, “Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Boundaries of Alignment,” in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Norman Hillmer, eds. Activism and (Non)Alignment: The Relationship between Foreign Policy and Security Doctrine (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p 57. 57 David McDonough, “Canada, Grand Strategy, and the Asia-Pacific: Past Lessons, Future Directions,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp 273-286. 58 Don Campbell, Paul Evans, and Pierre Lortie, Securing Canada’s Place in Asia: Means, Institutions and

Mechanisms (Vancouver, BC: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, August 2012), p 13. 59 See David McDonough, “Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture, Cybernetics, and Canada's Goldilocks Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 32, No. 3 (2013), pp 237-238. 60 This included the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee’s Appendix A, “Air Interceptor and Air Warning Plan and the US Air Defense Command’s Plan Supremacy. See Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), Chp. 2-3. 61 James Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence 1954-2009: Déjà vu All Over Again (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), pp 82-84. 62 Donald Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence: Saying No to Mr. Bush,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies

Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), p 35. 63 See David Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not For Very Long),” in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds., Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a

Changing World Order (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), pp 103-123. 64 Nahlah Ayed, “Why the world wants Obama to win,” CBC News, November 1, 2012. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/10/31/f-vp-ayed-obama-world.html.

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65 Unlike its trans-Atlantic namesake, SEATO had very weak collective defense commitments, did not negate bilateral commitments or America’s unilateral prerogative, and had little to no institutional structure. Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism” International Organization Vol. 56, No. 3 (June 2002), pp 578-579. 66 James Manicom, “Canadian debates about China's rise: Whither the ‘China threat’?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), p 289. 67 Bruce Gilley, “Middle powers during great power transitions: China’s rise and the future of Canada–US Relations,” International Journal Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp 259, 261. 68 Brendan Taylor, “Japan and Korea: The Limits of Alliance,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 54, No. 5 (October-November 2012), pp 93-100. For an opposite perspective, see Peter Beck, “A Korea-Japan Alliance,” East Asia Forum, June 9, 2011. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/09/a-korea-japan-alliance. 69 Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2010), p 161. 70 Purendra Jain “Japan–Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 60, No. 4 (2006), p 524. 71 Hugh White, “An Australian-Japan Alliance,” Centre of Gravity No. 4 (December 2012), and Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan: Allies in the making,” East Asia Forum, July 30, 2011. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/30/australia-and-japan-allies-in-the-making. 72 John Garver, “China’s Anti-encirclement struggle,” Asian Security Vol. 6, No. 3 (2010), p 254. The core group was quickly dissolved following complaints from China and Europe. 73 Ashok Sherma, “A Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation,” South Asian Survey Vol. 17, No. 2 (September 2010), p 237. 74 Ramesh Thakur, “Japan and Australia: natural allies in the changing Pacific,” Japan Times, March 6, 2013. 75 Garver, “China’s Anti-encirclement struggle,” p 256. 76 Walter Ladwig III, “Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, ‘Look East,’ and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Security Vol. 5, No. 2 (2009), p 101. 77 Purnendra Jain, “Australia plays catch up in India,” East Asia Forum, October 23, 2012. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/23/australia-plays-catch-up-in-india/. 78 Dan Blumethal, “Networked Asia,” The American Interest, May/June 2011. Available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=960. 79 Blumethal, “The U.S. Response,” p 322. 80 See James Manicom, “Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy” CIGI Policy Brief, February 2013, pp 1-8. 81 Lee Berthiaume, “Military carrying diplomatic torch as Foreign Affairs struggles to stay above water,” Ottawa Citizen, 7 Jun 2013, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=8495856&sponsor=SOMNIA 82 See Manicom, “Canadian debates,” pp 296-297, and “Canada’s Return to East Asia,” p 4. 83 See Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An arms race in the making? (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). 84 James Boutilier, “The Canadian Navy and the new naval environment in Asia,” International Journal Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), p 195. 85 Canada, Royal Canadian Navy, “International Exercises: Navy makes history in the Far East.” Available at http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=662. 86 Eric Lerhe, “Time for a Canadian Pacific Pivot,” Canadian Naval Review Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2013), forthcoming. 87 Thomas Adams, “Shift to the Pacific: Canada’s Security Interests and Maritime Strategy in East Asia,” in David McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategic, Interests, and Threats (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), p 170. 88 Adams, “Shift to the Pacific,” p 168, and James Boutilier, “Grey on Grey: The Critical Partnership between the Canadian and U.S. Navies,” in Paul Taylor, ed., Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, Newport Paper (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008), p 114. 89 Elinor Sloan, “US-China military and security developments,” International Journal Vol. 66, No. 2 (Spring 2011), p 277. 90 Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott Truver “The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise: A ‘High End’ Maritime Partnership,” Naval War College Review Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer 2012), pp 73-74. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force operates six Aegis warships, consisting of four Kongo destroyers and two recently commissioned

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Atago warships. South Korea has three Aegis destroyers in service and plans to procure six more in the next decade, while Australia plans to procure three Hobarts destroyers fitted with the Aegis combat system. 91 Robbin Laird, “The Long Reach of Aegis,” Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 138/1/1307 (January 2012). Available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-01/long-reach-aegis. 92 Nicholas Tracy, A Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), p 171. 93 Ken Hansen, “Logistics: Is it central or peripheral to operations?” Broadsides Forum, December 30, 2012, Available at http://www.navalreview.ca/2012/12/logistics-is-it-central-or-peripheral-to-operations/. 94 Eric Lerhe, “The National Shipbuildiung Procurement Strategy: An Update,” Strategic Studies Working Group

Paper (February 2013). Available at http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20National%20Shipbuilding%20Procurement%20Strategy%20-%20An%20Update.pdf. 95 Allan English, “Outside CF Transformation Looking In,” Canadian Military Journal Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 14. For example, Canada’s Army benefited significantly from personnel increases and capital acquisitions that arose from operational requirements of fighting the Afghan campaign and/or were geared towards troop mobility, including Leopard tanks, Chinook helicopters, Globemaster strategic-lift aircraft, and tactical airlifters. 96 Eric Lerhe, “Getting the Capital and Personnel Mix Right: Implications for the Future of the Canadian Navy,” in Ann Griffiths and Eric Lerhe, eds., Naval Gazing: The Canadian Navy Contemplates Its Future (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2010), pp 75-77. The author suggests a capital-to-personnel ratio of 24:39 rather than the envisioned 12:51, which could be done by a combination of infrastructure and personnel reductions.