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Bharthari's view of the pramas inthe VkyapadyaAlberto TodeschiniPublished online: 24 Mar 2010.

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Asian PhilosophyVol. 20, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 97109

Bhartr_haris view of the praman

_as

in the Vakyapadya

Alberto Todeschini

This paper is a study of Bhartr_haris understanding of the praman

_as, i.e. the means

whereby knowledge is acquired, as can be evinced from his Vakyapadya and the

corresponding commentary (Vakyapadya Vr_tti). Both Bhartr

_haris general attitude

towards praman_as as well as his specific understanding of the individual means of

knowledge are analyzed. In particular, it is established that Bhartr_hari accepts exactly

three praman_as: perception (pratyaks

_a), inferential reasoning (anumana) and tradition

(agama). However, the status of the three is unequal: perception and inferential

reasoning are fallible and hence cannot provide reliable guidance with regard toDharma. These two praman

_as do have their place and according to Bhartr

_hari should

not be discarded entirely. As for agama, it is clear that Bhartr_hari accords it primacy

in matters related to Dharma. But again, Bhartr_hari does not discard anumana and

pratyaks_a entirely. Rather, he seems to suggest that they have to be supplemented by

agama, which is the unimpeacheable judge of tradition.

Introduction

This paper is a study of Bhartr_haris understanding of the praman

_as as can be evinced

from his Vakyapadya (VP) and the corresponding Vr_tti (VPV).1 Not much is known

about Bhartr_hari as a historical figure.2 He was probably active in the second half

of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth and, as is often the case with

leading figures of Indias religious and philosophical past, a large number of works

were attributed to him. However the case may be, we know for certain that

Bhartr_hari exerted a considerable influence on the subsequent course of Indian

philosophy.3 As regards which individual thinkers influenced Bhartr_hari, apart from

the obvious stimulus of preceding Grammarians, not much can be said with

precision.4 Hence, Houben claims that: At the present state of our knowledge,

it seems premature to try to pursue the connections with other systems of thought

too far, and draw definite conclusions about Bhartr_haris relation with other

thinkers.5 At any rate, a considerable share of attention has been devoted to the

Correspondence to: Alberto Todeschini, Department of Religious Studies, Halsey Hall, University of Virginia,

PO Box 400126, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4126, USA. Email: at8u@virginia.edu

ISSN 0955-2367 print/ISSN 1469-2961 online/10/010097-13 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09552360903577675

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thought of Bhartr_hari from a linguistic point of view, rather than the more

immediately religious aspects of his thought. However, it should be noted that

grammatical and linguistic considerations are for Bhartr_hari fundamentally inter-

twined with religious and metaphysical concerns.6 This is clear from the VPs first30 verses, in which Bhartr

_hari introduces brahman and the means to attain brahman,

i.e. the Vedas. As VP I.11 makes clear, Grammar (vyakaran_a) is the closest to brahman

(asannam_

brahman_as) of the auxiliary sciences of the Vedas, and the best of the

austerities (tapasam uttamam_

tapah_).7 The relationship between the study of grammar

and the ultimate religious goal is brought out well in I.14,8 where vyakaran_a is said

to be the door to liberation (dvaram apavargasya)9 and again at I.16:

This [i.e. vyakaran_a] is the first step of the ladder to religious perfection;

this is, for those whose purpose is liberation, the straight, royal road.10

As Bhartr_haris argument progresses (I.3043), he emphasizes that for determining

Dharma11 the primacy belongs to agama, which we can provisionally translate astradition, over tarka and anumana, that is, reasoning.12 Verse I.36 introduces

another important term, that is, pratyaks_a or direct perception. These three

agama, anumana and pratyaks_a are three types of praman

_as, i.e. means to acquire

knowledge.13

In the remainder of this paper, I will first evaluate some of the evidence and

arguments in favor of taking Bhartr_hari to accept exactly three praman

_as, that is,

agama, anumana and pratyaks_a. As we shall see, this is neither an immediately

obvious nor universally accepted conclusion. Furthermore, the amount of secondary

literature on the topic is not substantial, and even sustained treatments such as theones undertaken by Iyer (1969, pp. 8397, 1982, pp. 5169), do not explicitly say

which and how many praman_as Bhartr

_hari accepts. After establishing that Bhartr

_hari

accepts agama, anumana and pratyaks_a, I will analyze the praman

_as individually.

Before we progress any further, it should be noted that the VP does not

methodically put forward a philosophical system or a fully worked out darsana even

though, to be sure, it greatly contributed towards vyakaran_a being considered so by

later authors.14 Furthermore, nowhere does Bhartr_hari explicitly give a definition

of the idea of praman_a in general or of agama, anumana and pratyaks

_a in particular.

This has the effect that reconstructing Bhartr_haris thought is at times a somewhat

speculative enterprise, in which definitions that Bhartr_hari does not give and

conclusions that he does not draw need to be supplied by us. Nor, indeed, should

this be seen as a shortcoming or failure on the part of Bhartr_hari. His main interest

lies elsewhere, therefore he is not required to deal systematically and exhaustively

with issues of epistemology and perception.

What Praman_as Does Bhartr

_hari Accept?

Before we analyze agama, anumana and pratyaks_a, there are two issues that require

investigation: (1) Does Bhartr_hari indeed accept agama, anumana and pratyaks

_a

as praman_a? (2) Is it really the case that he does not accept any other praman

_a?

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Once I have established that Bhartr_hari accepts these three, and only these three

praman_as, I will proceed with my analysis of the individual praman

_as.

Aklujkar (1989a) has dedicated an article precisely to the question of how many

and which praman_as Bhartr

_hari accepts.15 My discussion of the same issues will

start with an evaluation of Aklujkars arguments and conclusions. Aklujkar (1989a,

pp. 152153) argues as follows: Bhartr_hari never explicitly says how many praman

_as

he presupposes; however, he discusses the issue of praman_ya (which Aklujkar renders

as validity of the means of cognition) with pratyaks_a, anumana and agama . . . as

perimeters.16 The argument can be restated thusly: when Bhartr_hari discusses

praman_ya, he does so employing the terms pratyaks

_a, anumana and agama.

Therefore, these are the praman_as he presupposes. Aklujkars main line of reasoning

relies on an argument ex silentio. For Aklujkar, the fact that Bhartr_hari is, when

dealing with praman_ya, silent on praman

_as other than the three aforementioned

is evidence that he does not accept any other apart from pratyaks_a, anumana and

agama. Aklujkar adds these supplementary considerations:

(a) Bhartr_hari nowhere declares pratyaks

_a and anumana to be unacceptable

or always unreliable, and he clearly argues for the acceptance of agama in

VP I.3043.

(b) The author of the Yogasutra (1.7), to whose thought Bhartr_hari seems close,

acknowledges precisely the same three praman_as.

(c) Bhartr_haris guiding light in grammar, Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhas

_ya,

indicates awareness of only these three praman_as.17

While one may or may not be persuaded by the argument ex silentio taken

in isolation, by adducing these three supplementary considerations, I think that

Aklujkar has made a convincing case for Bhartr_haris acceptance of pratyaks

_a,

anumana and agama as praman_as. However, before we can definitely conclude that

Bhartr_hari accepts only these three praman

_as and no other, there is one more issue

that needs to be addressed: this is Bhartr_haris notion of pratibha. Now, dealing

exhaustively with pratibha, which is related to the notion of sphot_a, one of the most

fundamental and discussed concepts in Bhartr_haris thought, would lead us too

far; therefore, I will limit myself to analyzing it in the context of the praman_as.18

My starting point is verse II.147, which belongs to a passage (II. 143152)19 where

Bhartr_hari discusses pratibha at some length:

The whole world looks upon pratibha as a praman_a;

undertakings of even animals proceed on account of it.20

I will leave the terms praman_a and pratibha untranslated for the time being.

This passage naturally raises the question as to whether Bhartr_hari holds pratibha

to be a fourth praman_a.21 To answer this, we need to understand what

pratibha means in this context. Obviously, it does not have the connotation of the

meaning of a sentence, as it does elsewhere in the VP,22 as evidenced by the fact

that here at II.147 animals are also involved.23 Rather, it should be understood

as a kind of non-linguistic, personal intuition or insight or, as Iyer put it,

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a flash of understanding.24 Apart from the consideration about animals, there

is another piece of evidence which points to the non-linguistic nature of pratibha:

if it were linguistic, it could be explained or at least repeated with the exact same words

in which it occurred to us. However, at II.144 Bhartr_hari says that pratibha

can in no way at all be expressed to others as it is this.25 Furthermore, the

same verse says that pratibha is personal and cannot be reflected upon even by the

subject of the experience.26 According to II.146, pratibha is a sine qua non of ones

activities:

With respect to ones duties, no one can transcend that [pratibha] produceddirectly through words or by following predispositions.27

Let us unpack this a little: itikartavyata, which I translate in the plural, means

the state of being necessary; necessity, task; duty and the like. I take it to mean here

all the things that one has to do and goes about doing. It can be rendered, as Iyer

(1977, p. 61) does, as activities, but I think that it also includes a modal component,

which activity does not fully carry.28 As for predispositions, this is my choice for

the Sanskrit bhavana. Now, bhavana is a term with a wide semantic range and

both technical and non-technical meanings. I follow Iyer in rendering it as

predispositions. These predispositions include the predisposition to language

(sabdabhavana) that babies have and without which they would not be able to use

their vocal organs.29 This sabdabhavana is further explained to have no beginning

and to exist as a seed in the mind.30 As far as the issue of whether, according

to Bhartr_hari, pratibha is a praman

_a or not is concerned, the passage I have just

analyzed points to this: pratibha is not a means through which we acquire knowledge

of the sort that is acquired through agama, pratyaks_a or anumana and as such it

cannot be a praman_a, if we take the latter term with the technical meaning generally

used in Indian epistemological discussions.31

Bearing in mind the above considerations, we are justified to conclude that the

term praman_a in the passage we saw above (VP II.147), in which Bhartr

_hari says

that the whole world looks upon this [pratibha] as a praman_a, can be translated

as reliable intuition and the passage as the whole world looks upon this flash of

understanding as a reliable intuition or something similar.

Regarding the reason why Bhartr_hari chose to use the term praman

_a here, I do not

think that a definitive answer is possible, nor indeed needed. Once again, it is worth

reiterating that Bhartr_hari is neither entirely consistent nor systematic in his

treatment of the praman_as and a non-epistemological usage of the term is perfectly

acceptable, just as is the case in II.158,32 where the word praman_a is used with the

meaning of size or quantity with reference to water. At II.307 too, we find the same

word but used with yet another meaning: here praman_a refers to the measure

or length of a syllable in Sanskrit.33 Moreover, Bhartr_hari was writing in meter,

so his choice of words was constrained metri causa.

The evidence just considered is sufficient for us to draw the following conclusion:

Bhartr_hari does indeed accept agama, pratyaks

_a and anumana as praman

_as, but he

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does not regard pratibha as such. Now that this has been ascertained, we are in the

position to analyze Bhartr_haris actual understanding of the praman

_as.

Bhartr_hari on the Individual Praman

_as

As I mentioned above, neither the VP nor the VPV contain an explicit elaboration

of Bhartr_haris understanding of the concept of praman

_a. Even so, I will try to

extrapolate from this material a coherent view, hoping that this view is a plausible

appreciation of the issues under examination.The word praman

_a appears a total of seven times in the VP,34 but in none of these

instances is the word used in the technical, epistemological sense of means or

instrument of knowledge. Therefore, to understand Bhartr_haris position regarding

such an issue, we have to look for clues elsewhere. In particular, by examining what

Bhartr_hari says about the individual praman

_as, we can draw some generalizations on

the notions of praman_a and praman

_ya.

The most relevant passage in the whole of the VP is the one I have already alluded

to in the introduction of this paper, that is, I.3043. Here, Bhartr_hari is preoccupied

with showing that anumana and pratyaks_a are not infallible and that certain things

can only be ascertained through tradition (agama). He begins by considering reason.

On verse 30 and 31, he uses the word tarka instead of anumana, but then continues

the discussion abandoning the former and only using the latter. Bhartr_hari argues

(I.30) that Dharma cannot be established through reasoning alone without tradition

(agama), and even the knowledge ( jnana) of r_s_is is preceded by agama.35

Furthermore, he claims (I.31) that no one can invalidate (badhate) the paths of

Dharma through reason, because they are recognized by the world.36 Another

interesting point is made at I.34:

Even a matter inferred with effort by skilled reasonersis proven otherwise by others more versed.37

The general idea Bhartr_hari is pointing at is this: the religio-philosophical discourse

in which Bhartr_hari took part was inconsistent. That is, even though there were

commonly accepted ideas, there were also plenty of cases in which thinkers put forth

inconsistent positions. What one held, another person objected to; an argument put

forward by one, someone else showed to be wrong, and so forth. Hence, by means

of a pessimistic induction Bhartr_hari is able to claim that, at the very least, the means

of knowledge anumana used to infer such matters (artha) is fallible. While

the fact that our intellectual endeavors are likely to need revision in the future is

acceptable in philosophy or science for example, this is not good enough for

Bhartr_hari in matters pertaining to Dharma,38 because he is after nothing less

than certainty. For this reason, since anumana can only give defeasible knowledge,

it can not give Bhartr_hari what he needs. Not only does anumana not provide the

certainty that Bhartr_hari wants, but in a famous passage he also claims that relying

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too much on reasoning can actually lead one to ruin:

Like a blind person running on a rugged path by feeling with the hands,falling isnt improbable for one to whom reasoning is chief.39

The religious significance of this passage is clear from the comments that Bhartr_hari

adds in the VPV:

[O]ne who, without the help of the eye of Tradition, relies on reasoning [tarka]and, after having attained confidence in some matters through inference[anumana] only, proceeds, without the help of tradition [agama], to performacts having visible and invisible results, inevitably incurs great sin.40

Even though nowhere does Bhartr_hari give a precise, technical definition of

anumana, we can draw some conclusions from his remarks: (1) anumana is fallible,

i.e. it does not give incontrovertible knowledge; (2) though he holds it to be fallible,

Bhartr_hari does not claim anumana to be always unreliable either; (3) the VPV seems

to suggest that anumana/tarka should be supplemented by agama, because otherwise

one will incur trouble, just as, in Bhartr_haris metaphor, without the help of the eye,

a blind mans reliance on his sense of touch leads to trouble but let us now turn our

attention to pratyaks_a.

As with the terms anumana, agama, and praman_a, so also in the case of pratyaks

_a,

Bhartr_hari does not give a definition. Furthermore, this lack of definition is

compounded with the fact that it is not always clear whether he is using the term

in a technical or non-technical way.41 He does, however, give a number of clues

about his understanding of pratyaks_a in the same passage (I.3043) that I have been

discussing about anumana. Pratyaks_a is introduced in verses I.36 and 37:

The existing powers of the ancestors, of the raks_as and of the pisacas, which surpass

perception and inference, are born from karma only.

The knowledge of the past and the future of those whose brightness has becomemanifest and whose mind is not afflicted does not differ from perception.42

As can be evinced from the VPV ad I.36, the faculty that surpasses pratyaks_a and

anumana is the indefinable power of adr_s_t_a, the result of deeds done in previous

births.43 Now, the purpose of verse I.37 seems to be to explain that there exists a

different type of pratyaks_a, which, as the VPV elucidates, only those whose impurities

have been washed away have it.44 Bhartr_hari does not give a special name for this kind

of superior pratyaks_a, which of course reminds us of the yogipratyaks

_a which authors

such as Dharmakrti uphold, but it seems to be a pure, unmediated perception. This is,

again, supported by what Bhartr_hari says in the VPV ad I.37:

[C]ultured persons [sis_t_a],45 whose impurities have been burnt away by austerities

[tapas], whose cognitions [khyati] are free from all limitations, see everythingvividly reflected in their cognitions.46

Some more information can be garnered from I.38 and 39:

The words of those who see supersensory, imperceptible things47 with sagely eyecannot be invalidated by inference.

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He who doesnt doubt his own seeing and likewise doesnt doubt the knowledge of[aptas, i.e. trustworthy men, such as those mentioned in the previous verse],48

how could another contradict him, who is on the side of pratyaks_a?49

Interesting to note here at I.38 is the expression nanumanena badhate, which clearly

echoes I.31: na . . . tarken_a badhate. Verse I.39 is somewhat cryptic, but it becomes

clearer with assistance from the corresponding passage in the commentary:

There are in every branch (of the Veda) and for everybody, some trustworthypersons (apta). Their words are not scrutinized and are not to be doubted anymore than ones own perception.50

If I understand him, Bhartr_hari is claiming that someone who neither doubts his own

perception51 nor the knowledge of aptas, such a person who has taken a position

with regard to pratyaks_a cannot be contradicted or proven wrong by another using

reasoning. Bhartr_haris, almost needless to say, is not an argument but a statement

of belief, which can either be accepted or rejected but against which there is little

point arguing, for the simple reason that in these matters Bhartr_hari holds anumana

to be fallible.

The verses I.3639 and the Vr_tti thereto, are not only noteworthy for what they

say and do not say about pratyaks_a, but also for the light they shed on the

relationship that according to Bhartr_hari inheres between the praman

_as. First, there

is a complete lack, in this passage and elsewhere, of a technical analysis of pratyaks_a.

As with anumana, Bhartr_hari does not seem interested in discussing in technical

detail how everyday pratyaks_a works. Rather, by focusing on the extraordinary

perception of sages (sis_t_a; apta), on what their perception is like, he is indirectly

telling us what some of the limits of the perception of ordinary worldlings are.

For, surely, while he does not quite tell us explicitly, the properties with which

Bhartr_hari describes the perception of sages are not shared by our ordinary

perception. By emphasizing the superior status of the perception of sages vis-a`-vis

that of inference, he is also furthering his agenda as religious apologist, in the sense

that by securing the words and perceptions of sis_t_as/aptas from inference, he is

securing his own tradition from possible criticism leveled through reasoning.

So far, we have seen some of the conclusions that it is possible to draw from the VP

and VPV on Bhartr_haris understanding of anumana and pratyaks

_a. We have already

encountered several times the notion of a tradition. This tradition includes a body

of knowledge, which is not accessible through the two praman_as we have examined.

That is to say, through tradition we can come to know matters that are out of the ken

of inference or logical reasoning and the perception of ordinary beings. Let us now

turn our attention to this last means to acquire knowledge.In this paper, whenever I have translated the word agama, I have rendered it with

tradition. This is probably the single English word that best captures its semantic

range as the word is used in the VP. According to Aklujkar (1989b, p. 17), the various

shades of meaning of the term agama in VP can be divided in three groups:

1. inherited lore, conceptual inheritance, knowledge that one inherits because

of birth in a particular biological species or linguistic community;

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2. tradition, traditionally inherited body of knowledge, a traditionally preserved

view, traditional instruction or conduct, body of knowledge and views

preserved by the adherents of a system, authoritative literature;52

3. sruti and smr_ti, the revealed and revelation-based authoritative literature of

Brahmanism.

Aklujkars helpful summary of the various meanings the word agama takes in the VP

is a good starting point to discuss agama as praman_a. Above (p. 13), I paraphrased

VP I.30 because of what it said about reasoning, but now let see it again in more

detail, since it discusses reasoning in relation with Dharma and agama:

Without tradition (agama), Dharma cannot be established through reasoningalone, and even the knowledge ( jnana) of r

_s_is is preceded by agama.53

Here we are not given any information about either reasoning or agama as such, but

it is clear that, without the latter, the former cannot guide us in the all-important

Dharma. A similar message is put forward at I.41:

One who is devoted to this agama, which proceeds uninterruptedly like the soul,cannot be contradicted by arguments.54

Here it is worth quoting a passage from the corresponding VPV:

[Agama, which has the characteristic of sruti and smr_t_i] is not violated in the

matter of what should be done and what should be not done, what can be eatenand what cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which woman onecannot marry by the followers of different doctrines. One who closely follows sucha tradition observed by the elders cannot deviate from the right path by acceptingthe reasoning [tarka] of logicians. Thus, he remains irreproachable in the eyesof the world.55

This statement echoes verses I.30 and I.38 that we have seen above. Once again,

Bhartr_hari seems preoccupied with establishing the primacy of agama, rather than

with giving definitions. Attempting to bring together what Bhartr_hari says about

agama, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) agama is a sine qua non for

determining Dharma, that is, pratyaks_a and anumana are not sufficient with regard

to Dharma; (2) one who follows agama cannot be contradicted by employing

reasoning. This seems to mean that if one follows tradition, then logical arguments

cannot show that his behavior is not appropriate; (3) even the extraordinary

knowledge of r_s_is is dependent on, or at least preceded by, agama.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have seen that there are a number of good reasons to take Bhartr_hari

to accept exactly three praman_as. These three anumana, pratyaks

_a and agama are

not given a precise, technical definition by Bhartr_hari, but some general remarks can

nevertheless be drawn. First and foremost, both anumana and pratyaks_a are fallible.

This is noteworthy because a number of other Indian philosophers took praman_as

to be infallible by definition. That is, if something is a praman_a, then it provides right

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knowledge, but for Bhartr_hari, this is not the case. However, Bhartr

_hari does not

go to the extreme of saying that anumana and pratyaks_a are always fallible or

unreliable either, hence, these two praman_as do have their place.

As for agama, it is clear that Bhartr_hari accords it the primacy in matters related

to Dharma. Again, Bhartr_hari does not discard anumana and pratyaks

_a entirely.

Rather, he seems to suggest that they have to be supplemented by agama, which

is the unimpeacheable judge of tradition.

Notes

[1] Bhartr_haris authorship of the VP seems to be established beyond doubt. As for the Vr

_tti,

there are differing opinions. I follow Pind (2003) and accept Bhartr_haris authorship of at

least the VPV on kan_d_a I and II, which are the parts of the VP we will be concerned with

in this paper. On the issue of authorship, see also Iyer (1969, pp. 69 and 1636) andHouben (1995, pp. 1213), who all accept Bhartr

_hari as author of the VPV. Notable

exceptions to this view are those of Madeleine Biardeau and Johannes Bronkhorst, who have

been criticized by Aklujkar (1993. See ibid. for precise references to Biardeaus andBronkhorsts works).

[2] See Houben (1995, pp. 210) for a brief but balanced discussion of primary and secondarysources on Bhartr

_haris life and time. Houben (pp. 1122) can also be fruitfully consulted

for a general introduction to the main contemporary sources on the VP.[3] As far as praman

_as are concerned, Unebe (1998: p. 113 ff.) can be consulted for refences

to Indian authors and texts that discussed Bhartr_hari.

[4] Lindtner (1993, pp. 195197), who quotes Paul Hacker as support, sees an obvious influence

of Vasubandhu on Bhartr_hari.

[5] Houben (1995, p. 24, n. 50).[6] On the relationship between grammar and philosophy in India, in particular from the point

of view of the beginning of Indian philosophy, see generally Bronkhorst (2004).[7] asannam

_brahman

_as tasya tapasam uttamam

_tapah

_/

prathamam_

chandasam a _ngam ahur vyakaran_am

_budhah

_// I.11

All the VPs Sanskrit passages quoted in this paper are from the edition available through

GRETIL Gottingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages: http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ebene_1/fiindolo/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/1_gram/vakyp1pu.htm

[8] Henceforth, a Roman numeral followed by a number without any text being explicitelymentioned should be understood to refer to the VPs kan

_d_a and verse number respectively.

[9] On grammar as door to liberation in Bhartr_haris philosophy, see Bronkhorst (1996).

[10] idam adyam_

padasthanam_

siddhisopanaparvan_am /

iyam_

sa moks_aman

_anam ajihma rajapaddhatih

_// I.16

In my translations I have taken the liberty of omitting parentheses on some occasions. I hope

it is clear that I have added religious to perfection (siddhi) because this is what Bhartr_hari

is implying.[11] The word Dharma will be left untranslated in this paper. Aklujkar (2004, p. 693) writes that

Bhartr_hari uses the word Dharma with three main meanings. The one intended here is

Aklujkars meaning (a): what an individual person is expected to do or what the sastraor agama advises one to do.

[12] I am perfectly aware that anumana is often translated as inference. This is the bestrendering in certain contexts, but not necessarily here. The problem is that Bhartr

_hari does

not tell us exactly what anumana is, and he seems to use tarka with the same meaning.Inference is a more technical and specific term than reasoning and I do not think we are

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justified in superimposing such a specific meaning on Bhartr_haris use of anumana.

Therefore, in the present paper I will generally (with a couple of exceptions; see below)

render both as reasoning.[13] It is worth noting that these three praman

_as, viz. pratyaks

_a, anumana and agama are

frequently introduced in just such an order but in the VP the order is reversed: agama,

anumana and pratyaks_a.

[14] Tellingly, as reported by Iyer (1969, p. 69), when Madhavacarya included the philosophy

of Pan_ini in his Sarvadarsanasam

_graha, . . . though he has given the name of Pan

_inidarsana

to the philosophy of the grammarians, it is the Vakhyapadya of Bhartr_hari which he quotes

in abundance in order to describe that philosophy, not the sutras of Pan_ini or the Varttikas

of Katyayana or the Mahabhas_ya of Patanjali. See also Pillai (1971, p. XI).

[15] Though Iyer deals at some length with the issue of the praman_as in the VP (see his seminal

work published in 1969 (pp. 8397) and also the collection of lectures published in 1982

(pp. 5169)), he does not do so systematically and does not give explicit definitions or

information on the number of praman_as accepted by Bhartr

_hari.

[16] Aklujkar (1989a, pp. 152153). On p. 152 Aklujkar gives a list of passages in the VP, in the

Vr_tti thereto and in the Tripadi or Mahabhas

_yat

_ka, which discuss the issue of praman

_ya.

Akamatsu (1999, p. 21) gives a more exhaustive list of all the occurrences of the term

anumana and grammatically related terms (e.g. anumyate, anumita, etc.) in the VP and

Vr_tti. On the notion of praman

_ya in the VP see also Aklujkar (1989b, p. 16ff.).

[17] These three points are quoted directly from Aklujkar (1989a, p. 153), with the difference that

I have written Bhartr_hari instead of just B as Aklujkar does.

[18] On pratibha according to Bhartr_hari in general, see Tola and Dragonetti (1990). See Iyer

(1969, pp. 8397; 1982, pp. 5169) for more information on pratibha and the praman_as.

[19] Apart from this passage, pratibha is mentioned only at I.122 and II.117.[20] praman

_atvena tam

_lokah

_sarvah

_samanugacchati /

samarambhah_

pratayante tirascam api tadvasat // II.147

Compare Iyer (1977, 61): The whole world considers that to be the authority (in daily life).

Even the activities of animals develop because of that. Parentheses in the original. Aklujkar

(1989a, p. 155) has samanupasyati instead of samanugacchati.[21] Aklujkar (1989a, pp. 153155) mentions the commentator Vr

_s_abha as holding that

Bhartr_hari accepted a fourth praman

_a. However, Aklujkar reports that Vr

_s_abha does not

have a name for this further praman_a.

[22] For further information on pratibha and the meaning of the sentence, see Iyer (1969,

181203), Akamatsu (1993) and Patnaik (1994, pp. 5557).[23] See also II.117, where pratibha is mentioned in relation to children and animals (balanam

_ca

tirascam_

ca).[24] Iyer (1977, p. 61). Matilal (1990, p. 97) accepts Iyers use of the expression flash of

understanding for pratibha and adds that it is also declared to be holistic. We dont obtain

it bit by bit.[25] idam

_tad iti sanyes

_am anakyeya katham

_cana.

[26] pratyatmavr_ttisiddha sa kartrapi na nirupyate. I confess that I had some trouble with this

passage. Compare Iyer (1977, p. 61): It is experienced by everyone within himself and even

the subject (of the experience) is not able to render an account of it to himself. See also the

translation of Pillai (1971, p. 71): Having been formed from the function of ones inner self,

its nature is not known even to the person. Parentheses in the original.[27] saksac chabdena janitam

_bhavananugamena va /

itikartavyatayam_

tam_

na kas cid ativartate // II.146

Compare Iyer (1977, p. 61): None can avoid in ones activities that (flash of understanding)

produced either through words or through the working of ones predispositions.

Pillai (1971, p. 71): In the matter of the knowledge of what to do, no one transgresses

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it (i.e. this flash of insight) which is either produced directly from speech or is a resultof recollection. Parentheses in the original.

[28] The modal component of the noun itikartavyata is retained in Pillais rendering(see previous note) and also in Akamatsus (see 1998, p. 52).

[29] adyah_

karan_avinyasah

_pran

_asyordhvam

_samran

_am /

sthananam abhighatas ca na vina sabdabhavanam // I.130Note that in the translation of Iyer (1965, p. 110) and Pillai (1971, p. 110) this is verse I.122.Pillai renders sabdabhavana in this passage with verbal imagination. I think thisinterpretation does not quite capture the correct meaning in the present context.

[30] This is according to the translation of the VPV ad I.130 by Akamatsu (1998, p. 187).I have no Sanskrit for the VPV available at present.

[31] Apart from the technical meaning of means of acquiring prama, Monier-Williams (s.v.)gives the following for praman

_a: standard, authority, evidence, correct notion and

many others. Furthermore, praman_a can simply be a synonym of prama. Aklujkar (1989a,

p. 155) comes, by a different route, to a conclusion similar to mine: although pratibha ispraman

_abhuta (something people generally rely on) in B[hartr

_hari]s philosophy, it is not

a praman_a in it, at least not in the sense in which pratyaks

_a, anumana and agama are

praman_as. Parentheses in the original. The square brackets are mine.

[32] sam_

khyapraman_asam

_sthananirapeks

_ah

_pravartate /

bindau ca samudaye ca vacakah_

saliladis_u // II.158

This corresponds to II.156 in Iyer (1977, p. 65).[33] nirdese li _ngasam

_khyanam

_sam

_nidhanam akaran

_am /

praman_am ardhahrasadav anupattam

_pratyate // II.307.

[34] II.34, 147, 158, 307; III 1.4, 1.5 and 7.38. Related nouns, such as prama and pramiti,and both finite and non-finite forms of the verb prama are completely absent.

[35] na cagamad r_te dharmas tarken

_a vyavatis

_t_hate /

r_s_n_am api yaj jnanam

_tad apy agamapurvakam // I.30.

[36] dharmasya cavyavacchinnah_

panthano ye vyavasthitah_

/na tam

_l lokaprasiddhatvat kas cit tarken

_a badhate // I.31.

[37] yatnenanumito py arthah_

kusalair anumatr_bhih

_/

abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapadyate // I.34.Iyer (1965, p. 45): Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explainedotherwise by cleverer ones.

[38] It is worth bearing in mind that the whole passage started at I.30 with a discussion of howto determine Dharma.

[39] hastasparsad ivandhena vis_ame pathi dhavata /

anumanapradhanena vinipato na durlabhah_

// I.42.Iyer (1965, p. 50): Fall is not unlikely in the case of one who relies on reasoning, as in thecase of a blind man who walks along a difficult path by groping with the hands.

[40] VPV ad I.42. Translation in Iyer (1965, p. 51). The square brackets are mine.[41] Bhartr

_hari uses the term a total of seven times in the VP: I.36, 37, 39 and 102; II.141; III 7.5

and 10.1.[42] pratyaks

_am anumanam

_ca vyatikramya vyavasthitah

_/

pitr_raks

_ah

_pisacanam

_karmaja eva siddhayah

_// I.36.

avirbhutaprakasanam anupaplutacetasam /attanagatajnanam

_pratyaks

_an na visis

_yate // I.37.

Iyer (1965, p. 47): I.36. The extraordinary powers of the Pitr_s, the demons and the goblins,

going beyond perception and inference, are the results of their previous deeds.I.37. The knowledge of the past and the future of those whose insight has manifested itselfand whose mind is in no way tainted differs in no way from perception.

[43] Iyer (1965, p. 47). On adr_s_t_a see also Iyer (1969, pp. 8990). Adr

_s_t_a is one of the six causes

of pratibha, as explained in VP II.152.

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[44] Iyer (1965, p. 48).[45] According to Deshpande (1993, p. 95), The word sis

_t_a is used by the tradition of

Dharmasastra as well as Sanskrit Grammar to refer to a community of social and linguistic

elites whose socio-cultural and linguistic behaviour was considered to set the norm to be

described by the respective texts of Dharmasastra and Sanskrit Grammar, and to be

emulated by others. This notion is by no means static. With Bhartr_hari, however,

the ancient grammarians become the Sis_t_as with supernormal cognitive and mystical

abilities . . . the Sis_t_as are no longer a contemporary community of standard speakers

of Sanskrit, but the ancient sages of a golden age of Sanskrit grammar . . . for Bhartr_hari the

ancient grammarians are already mythologized and deified to a great extent. (ibid., p. 113).[46] Iyer (1965, p. 48). The brackets are mine.[47] According to the VPV, these things include the supreme inner Controller, the atoms which

are the abode of the initial cause of creation, the unmanifested WordAbsolute

[sabdabrahman] which is the substratum of its powers [sakti], the gods, the residual

forces generated by action . . . the divine otherwordly body, and other such things known

in all scholarly circles. Translation in Iyer (1965, p. 48). The brackets are mine.[48] That Bhartr

_hari is referring to the aptas, i.e. trusted or trustworhty people is made clear

in the VPV.[49] atndriyan asam

_vedyan pasyanty ars

_en

_a caks

_us

_a /

ye bhavan vacanam_

tes_am

_nanumanena badhate // I.38.

yo yasya svam iva jnanam_

darsanam_

natisa _nkate /

sthitam_

pratyaks_apaks

_e tam

_katham anyo nivartayet // I.39.

Iyer (1965, p. 48): I.38. The words of those who, with their divine vision see things which

are beyond the senses and unknowable, cannot be set aside by reasoning.

I.39. How can one who does not question the authority of such persons any more than his

own experience and has, therefore, taken his stand on direct vision, be set aside by others

(who follow reasoning)? Parentheses in the original.[50] Iyer (1965, p. 49). The second parentheses are mine.[51] Darsana, seeing is used here with a meaning similar to pratyaks

_a. This is also the case

at II.156.[52] Aklujkar actually gives more meanings under (1) and (2), but I think that what I have

reproduced here is sufficient to convey his idea.[53] Iyer (1965, p. 42): Dharma cannot be determined by reasoning alone, without the help

of tradition. Even the knowledge of the Seers is due to their previous observance of the

tradition. For the Sanskrit see above, p. 13.[54] caitanyam iva yas cayam avicchedena vartate /

agamas tam upasno hetuvadair na badhyate // I.41.

Iyer (1965, p. 50): One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the

I consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning.[55] Iyer (1965, p. 50). As before, the brackets are mine.

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