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Pyrrhic Victory in the “Tournament of Shadows”: Central Asia's Quest forWater Security (1991-2009)Samuel Chan a

a S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Online publication date: 13 May 2010

To cite this Article Chan, Samuel(2010) 'Pyrrhic Victory in the “Tournament of Shadows”: Central Asia's Quest for WaterSecurity (1991-2009)', Asian Security, 6: 2, 121 — 145To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14799851003756584URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799851003756584

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Asian Security, vol. 6, no. 2, 2010, pp. 121–145Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 onlineDOI:10.1080/14799851003756584

FASI1479-98551555-2764Asian Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, mar 2010: pp. 0–0Asian SecurityPyrrhic Victory in the “Tournament of Shadows”: Central Asia’s Quest for Water Security (1991–2009)Central Asia’s Quest for Water SecurityAsian SecuritySAMUEL CHAN

Abstract: Central Asia’s Soviet past continues to haunt the five successor sovereign states withwater, a contentious issue. Although fundamental to survival and livelihood, regional cooperationover the precious resource remains a patchwork of short-term stop-loss agreements at best andan exercise in “frameworks without content” at worst. This article seeks to explain why this is so,based on a theoretical position derived from hydro-political discourse. The eclectic explanationsinclude the hydro-hegemonic void created by the removal of Soviet authoritarianism; thesecuritization of the hydro-political complex in Central Asia; unilateral and bilateral substitutesfor multilateral water resource cooperation; and the ineffectiveness of international law – all ofwhich contribute to the impasse over water cooperation.

IntroductionIn the not so distant past, the Russian and British empires engaged in a geostrategictussle which the former dubbed the “Tournament of Shadows” in their quest forwarm sea ports and the latter called the “Great Game” in an effort to protect BritishIndia – the British Empire’s “crown jewel” – against tsarist aspirations.1 Like thatbygone era, post-Soviet Central Asia (PSCA) is once again a strategic maneuveringground on many levels. Today, the United States, Russia, China, and others like Iran,Turkey, and India jostle for influence in a region blessed with abundant hydrocarbonresources and geostrategic significance but also one scarred by environmental exploitationand degradation under Soviet rule.2 The poisoned chalice inherited by the five sovereignCentral Asian Republics (CARs) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan includes the moribund Aral Sea, desiccated rivers, extirpated fishspecies, numerous derelict toxic-storage sites, large-scale deforestation, desertification,and swathes of uninhabitable areas.3

As part of the grim landscape within this highly strategic region of great powercompetition, the multifaceted legacies of Soviet past pose particularly formidablechallenges. Cooperation over water resources is one issue which traces its nascentmanifestation to the Soviet era. Although the Bolshevik ethnonationalistic policyimposed artificial territorial boundaries across Central Asia, massive irrigationprojects fostered interdependence between them and transmogrified the arid landscapewith cotton, livestock, fruit, vegetables, rice, and grains.4 Until the collapse of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), central planners in Moscow regulated the

The author is extremely grateful to Julie M. Newton, Makio Yamada, Henning Tamm, and two anonymousreviewers for their invaluable suggestions and assistance.Address correspondence to: Samuel Chan, Military Transformations Program, Institute of Defense and StrategicStudies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Level B4,Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. E-mail: [email protected]

Downloaded By: [Chan, Samuel] At: 06:45 14 May 2010

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region’s superficial hydro-political milieu. Infrastructure in the upstream and water-rich republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were designed to meet the region’s irri-gation and electricity requirements through reservoirs and hydroelectric generationduring the “vegetation” (summer) period from April to September. The downstreamand water-poor but hydrocarbon-rich republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, andTurkmenistan in turn provided electricity, gas, coal, and fuel oil to meet upstreamenergy requirements during the “non-vegetation” (winter) period from October toMarch. This water-energy barter system continued briefly after independence in1991 but was soon derailed by divergent economic interests, energy shortages, and adecrepit water infrastructure.

The perennial concern of hydro-politics is essentially “who gets how much of thewater, how, and why?”5 With water a fundamental component of livelihood andeconomic security, the CARs pledged maintenance of the water-energy trade-off asthe USSR headed for extinction. The five sovereign states have since made variousdeclarations and agreements, ostensible signs of addressing the hydro-political concern;however, in reality, the system remained “Soviet in its ambitions, scale, and mentalitybut [was] unable to adapt to Central Asia’s evolving political and economic systems.”6

The unraveling of the barter system coupled with contrasting endowments of naturalresources led to chronic power shortages during bitter winters. Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan turned to hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) to meet domestic energydemands in winter, but such actions invariably flood valuable farmland downstreamand result in concomitant water shortages in summer. Intrastate relations soured fur-ther over accusations of water pollution (salt and pesticides) and exceeding waterquotas. Furthermore, ramshackle irrigation facilities and prodigal water usage havealso led to mismanagement-induced water scarcity and detracted the CARs from themanifestation of various threats to common water security. The perilous state of theAral Sea continues to pose a major health hazard, and it no longer functions as nature’stemperature regulator resulting in hotter summers, colder and longer winters, anddrier climate.7 The dire situation is further exacerbated by cyclical droughts andfloods, while climate change presents a clear and present threat to mountain glaciers,the cardinal source of water in Central Asia. Indeed, some observe that “the glaciers inTajikistan [have] lost a third of their area in the second half of the twentieth centuryalone, while Kyrgyzstan has lost over 1,000 glaciers in the last four decades.”8

What Is to Be Done?The solution to such woes lies in a comprehensive and enforceable long-term regionalwater agreement that encompasses the entire Aral Sea Basin (ASB) and addresses thewater-energy-environmental nexus through supervision by a single neutral institutionempowered by member states with relevant and legally binding powers. Ideally, theconcept of “integrated water resource management” (IWRM) should be implementedas holistically as possible to coordinate the “development and management of water,land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and socialwelfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vitalecosystems.”9 Some experts believe that the tangible benefits of such an agreement, ifreached, could include a 15 percent savings in water and 20 percent in energy thereby


Central Asia’s Quest for Water Security 123

delaying foreseeable physical shortages.10 IWRM, however conceptually sound, hasshortcomings. Criticisms leveled at the “comfortable” but “vague and ambiguous”century-old concept that has been “rediscovered” include the lacunae between theoryand practice, science and politics, institution and public, and how it should be“designed, implemented, and evaluated.”11 In addition, the interests of some waterusers might be marginalized due to constraints or conflicting priorities, leading to thedeterioration of their situation as a result. IWRM has shortcomings, but one mustrecognize that it is merely: “1) a theory about, 2) an argument for, and 3) at best a setof principles for a certain approach to water resources management,” with no guaranteesthat it “is either practical or achievable.”12 In lieu of a better alternative and despite itslimitations, IWRM remains an attractive framework with 90 countries attempting toimplement its concept at varying degrees.13

Why Is Such an Agreement Nonexistent?Various reasons have been put forth: the reluctance of the young independent states tocede any sovereignty, especially when acceptable trade-offs are absent; conflictingneeds and interests; political obstinacy and leadership that hinders implementation andrenders existing declarations and agreements “frameworks without content,” and;very importantly, a lack of unity and trust between the CARs.14 Such reasons are,however, symptoms and not causes of the hydro-political malaise in PSCA. Thehypothesis presented in this article postulates that four factors are responsible for theCARs’ failure to reach a comprehensive and enforceable regional water agreementbetween 1991 and 2009. First, the removal of Soviet authoritarianism and indepen-dence has created a hegemonic void leaving the region to its own devices. Second, thehydro-political complex in PSCA has been securitized because water is now an issue ofnational security. Third, unilateral and bilateral substitutes for multilateral IWRMexist which allow individual states to address their water or energy dilemmas in waysthat inhibit serious attempts at water resource cooperation. Fourth, the contents andenforcement of international law have been ineffective in inducing, maintaining, andenforcing regional cooperation. Combined, such barriers not only curtail cooperationbut could even hasten physical water shortages. Once this Rubicon is crossed, cooper-ation and implementation of IWRM will perhaps prove redundant and superfluous.

Hydro-political DiscourseSince the late 1970s, “riparian states have moved from comfortable water endowmentsand easy hydro-politics to seriously conflictual relations [aggravated by] the contradictoryprinciples of upstream sovereignty and downstream integrity,” leading John Waterburyto coin the term hydro-politics in 1979.15 This section examines the relevant literatureand theories within hydro-political discourse with the intention of deriving a theoreticalposition.

Frederick Frey and Thomas Naff framed water conflict within the “interest-position-power matrix,” which focuses on a riparian’s location along the river, the significanceit places on the disputed sources of water, and its hard-power capabilities.16 In PSCA, theupstream riparian states are in a relatively advantageous position, but because theyare devoid of regional dynamics, Frey and Naff’s matrix does not possess adequate


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explanatory power. Acknowledging the complexities of trans-boundary waterrelations, Michael Schulz expanded on Barry Buzan’s “regional security complex”resulting in a “hydro-political security complex,” which consists of states that share awater body and consider that body a national security issue.17 It is also assumed thatthe balance of power lies with the riparian furthest upstream for its monopolistic holdon water usage.18 Ground realities in PSCA indicate that water is an issue of nationalsecurity for the downstream states but the upstream position accords only relativeadvantages and does not rule out the need for cooperation.

Why Is This So?Anthony Turton’s refinement of Schulz’s “hydro-political security complex” theorysheds more light on the issue. Turton defines a “hydro-political complex” as a systemin which “a nation’s dependence on shared water systems is of such a strategic naturethat this dependence starts to drive interstate relations in a discernable manner.”19

Turton omits the term security because while trans-boundary water systems have apolitical dimension, they can either be securitized or desecuritized. The former occurswhen water resources are elevated to an issue of national security. Under such condi-tions, common water resource management structures remain stunted, and hydrologicaldata are kept out of public domain. Relationships between riparian states remain tenseover water issues with potential for a rapid spiral toward conflict should water flowbecome threatened, such as through water capture or diversion.20

When all riparian states collect and share data, and water resource management istreated as an issue outside the national security domain in an open and transparentmanner, the “hydro-political complex” is considered desecuritized. Relationshipsbetween states enter a configuration favorable to peaceful settlement of outstanding waterissues.21 With regional cooperation in PSCA a perfunctory exercise at best, Turton’snuanced definition indicates that the PSCA “hydro-political complex” is indeed securi-tized, but it also suggests conditions for which the system could be de-securitized.“Hydro-political complex” theory thus provides a partial explanation of the cooperationimpasse but is in itself insufficient. Accounting for the nonprimacy of upstream states,despite inherent advantages provided by geography, remains outstanding and is impera-tive because it explains conditions that give rise to the cooperation impasse.

Are Downstream States Always at the Mercy of Those Upstream?Most definitely not. “Hegemonic stability theory” posits that cooperation arises whenit serves the interests of the dominant power. Miriam Lowi explains that cooperationis contingent on the hegemon’s “inferior” downstream position and the importance itplaces on the supply of water.22 In contrast, Thomas Homer-Dixon contends thatconflict would result from such a scenario, because fear of the upstream states’monopoly on water will force the hegemon to flex its military muscle to prevent sucha possibility. Furthermore, the situation is most volatile when the downstream riparian:(1) depends greatly on external water sources for its national livelihood; (2) believesthat it holds the military edge; and (3) perceives upstream states as a threat to waterflow.23 Hence, downstream states are not always at the mercy of those upstream, buttheories diverge as to whether conflict or cooperation is most likely to prevail.



Mark Zeitoun, Jeroen Warner, and Jonathan Allan’s “hydro-hegemony theory”shows that a hegemon’s exertion of power concludes water conflicts but not throughhard power alone. Based on Steven Luke’s “Three Dimensions of Power,” a riparianachieves hydro-hegemony when it has the capacity to: (1) use power mechanisms togain the compliance of the other (i.e., hard power); (2) apply “bargaining power” andmanipulate the hydro-political game (i.e., soft power); and (3) (re)write the rules andagenda for specific contestation(s) through active participation in water policy discoursein an accepted way (i.e., achieve ideational consensus).24 Hydro-hegemony is mostbeneficial for all riparian states along a water source when the hegemon takes a leadingrole in dispute resolution by applying pressure on conflicting parties to reach an ami-cable settlement and follows up with implementing an integration strategy. However,it is most problematic for the nonhegemonic riparian states if the hegemon is positionedupstream and exploits its power and geographical advantage to control or captureresources, such as through the construction of dams and reservoirs.25 A successfulhegemonic strategy employs an effective mix of coercion and compliance by attrac-tion, rather than pure intimidation, just as Moscow displayed during the Soviet era.26 Itwill be shown that Russia and Uzbekistan – candidate states for the region’s hydro-hegemonic crown – are in fact pretenders, and the hydro-hegemonic void robs PSCAof leadership and pressure to settle outstanding water disputes.27

Overemphasis on geography and power is perhaps myopic, according to PeterGleick, who emphasizes four causes of strategic rivalry which lead to transboundarydisputes short of violent conflict: (1) the degree of water scarcity; (2) the extent towhich the body of water is shared; (3) access to alternative sources of water; and (4) thepotential to use of a water source as a political tool by another state.28 These causes areparticularly poignant for states “at risk” where: (1) the ratio of annual water with-drawal to annual renewable supply exceeds one-third; (2) the annual per capita wateravailability is below 250 m3; (3) hydroelectricity accounts for more than half of thetotal electric supply (susceptible to flow alteration); and (4) one-third or more of thestate’s water originates outside the borders and is controlled by (an)other sovereignstate(s).29 Based on the last criterion, the downstream CARs are classified “at risk.”30

What about Empirical Evidence?Indeed, Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe, and Mark Giordano’s seminal empirical studyof 1,831 water disputes between 1948 and 2000 reveals that 1,228 (67.1 percent) dis-putes ended in cooperation, 507 (27.7 percent) in conflict, and 96 (5.2 percent) in neu-tral or nonsignificant outcomes.31 By matching disputes against an event intensityscale, 62 percent (1,138) fell between “official verbal support” and “official verbal hos-tility.” More important, none of the disputes resulted in war.32 Wolf et al. also postu-late that “water stress” is not a sufficient indicator of conflict, and the most significantparts of the hydro-political equation are: (1) “internationalization” of process whenempires like the USSR break up; (2) convergence of key factors like population,wealth, and water availability; and (3) unilateral basin development in the absence oftransboundary institutions. Although empirical evidence weighs in on the side of non-violent water conflict, basins without treaties were significantly more prone to conflictthan basins with treaties.33


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Various aspects of the theories presented are very helpful in explaining PSCA’sincapacity to coordinate water management today. However, with no theory sufficienton its own, an eclectic theoretical framework is constructed as follows: Hydro-hegemonytheory helps by asserting that a hydro-hegemonic void exists where no riparian state ispowerful enough to force a solution leading to the current impasse. With water anational security issue and mutually acceptable compromises unavailable, the regional“hydro-political complex” becomes securitized, and riparian states, especially those“at risk,” adopt postures that harden the impasse. Although such disputes are unlikelyto result in armed conflicts, tensions in the hydro-political milieu between riparianstates are further stoked through substitutes that allow individual riparian states toaddress their own concerns but in doing so may aggravate the dilemmas faced byothers. Finally, it is assumed on an a priori basis that international law is largely impotentto stop this unfortunate string of developments.

Legacies of the Soviet EraPSCA spreads across seven river basins which provide approximately 140 km3 ofwater annually with surface flow accounting for 122 km3 with the remainder subterra-nean. The ASB is often the main focus of study in PSCA, because it accounts for90 percent (112 km3 to 126 km3) of all regional water resources of which nine-tenthsflow through the Amu Darya (73 km3 to 77 km3) and Syr Darya (34 km3 to 37 km3).34

The 2,540 km-long Amu Darya begins as the Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers in the Pamir(Persian for “Roof of the World”) mountain range that straddles Tajikistan andAfghanistan, and transits through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan oncemore before emptying out in the southern portion of the Aral Sea. Water from the TianShan (Chinese for “Heavenly Mountain”) mountain range along the Chinese-Kyrgyzborder cascade down the Naryn river and Kara Darya before convoluting to formthe Syr Darya, which meanders through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, andKazakhstan before concluding its 3,019-kilometer journey in the north of the Aral Sea.

Under both Zoroastrianism and Islam, water was viewed as a “gift from God” to beused responsibly.35 An abrupt change followed the tsarist conquest when the regionwas recognized as the solution to end Russian reliance on America cotton imports.36

Under Bolshevik rule, the state became the sole landlord and on Lenin’s decree of 1918commenced the metamorphosis of the arid region into an agricultural productionoasis.37 The grandiose Soviet scheme opened up another 4.9 million hectares of landbringing the regional total to 7.5 million hectares, or two-fifths of all irrigated land inthe USSR.38 As Soviet-built infrastructure attest, the division of labor favored thedownstream states as producers and the upstream states as water suppliers. BehindUzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, the region accounted for 90 percent of theSoviet Union’s cotton output, making it then the third largest producer after Egyptand the United States.39 Substantial quantities of rice (40 percent of USSR total), grains(20 percent), wheat (28 percent), and fruit (one-third) were also cultivated, largelyfrom the vast “virgin lands” of Kazakhstan.40 In addition, Kyrgyzstan emerged as akey supplier of wool and precious metals while Turkmenistan provided fossil fuels.41

Hailed as socialist victory over nature and liberating the USSR from foreign cottonimports, the vastness of the scheme and its associated management, engineering, and



ecological problems were exposed early, prompting the creation of various institutionslike the Central Research Institute of Irrigation (1925), the Institute of Water Problemsand Hydraulic Engineering (1956), and eventually Minvodkhoz, the Ministry ofReclamation and Water Management (1966).42 A network of more than 20,000 miles ofcanals, 45 dams, and more than 80 reservoirs was designed to harness the basin’s irriga-tion and hydroelectric potential and buffer cyclical water patterns of two to threeyears of relative abundance, sometimes floods, followed by five years of insufficientwater including droughts.43 Evidently, irrigation efficiency was not a priority then andneither is it today. A 2004 World Bank estimate placed regional water losses attributedto percolation and evaporation from unlined and uncovered irrigation canals at 79percent, compared with 60 percent in other developing countries.44 To circumvent thisproblem, artificial drainage systems were constructed returning 11 km3 to 16 km3 ofwater annually to the ecosystem.45

Increasing irrigation and drainage created a plethora of problems that grew tonearly insurmountable proportions by the early 1980s despite efforts to address suchinefficiencies. First, the reduced river inflow to the Aral Sea – from 56 km3 annuallybefore 1960 to 43 km3 in the 1960s, 17 km3 in the 1970s, and negligible amounts inthe 1980s – kick-started Central Asia’s “environmental holocaust.”46 Receding waterlevels tripled salt concentration and eliminated spawning grounds, leading to theextermination of at least four-fifths of the fish species.47 The current ecological crisisis also the first in the Aral Sea’s 10,000-year history to involve non-natural chemicalpollutants which severely reduce water quality.48 Dust storms currently scatterbetween 40 million and 150 million tons of sand, salt, pesticides, and fertilizers fromthe seabed annually, with the provinces of Kyzyl-Orda (Kazakhstan), Karakalpakstan(Uzbekistan), and Dashhowuz (Turkmenistan) the worst affected, and carcinogensrender crop harvests unfit for consumption.49 Experts conclude that such conditionscoupled with pathogenic microbes from raw sewage were responsible for the highprevalence of circulatory, respiratory, and diarrheal diseases.50 The Aral Sea’s role asa climate regulator was also disrupted as continental and desert regimes replacedmaritime conditions along a 100 km-wide band which circumvents the formershoreline leading to warmer summers (higher evaporation) and cooler winters(shorter growing season).51

Second, Soviet irrigation methods continued to be employed across Central Asiaresulting in widespread land degradation due to water logging and high salinity. Theoft-quoted example is the 1,100 km-long, 250 m-wide, and 8 m-deep Karakum Canalwhich took eleven years (1954–1965) to construct and serves as both the provenance oflife in the inhospitable Turkmen terrain and a catheter of death for the Aral Sea.52

Diverting water from the Amu Darya across the Karakum Desert to Ashgabat and ontoward Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) on the Caspian Sea, the canal irrigatesapproximately 1 million hectares of land.53 Although Turkmen officials place irriga-tion efficiency at 49 percent, experts consider the true figure to lie between 25 percentand 30 percent.54 Central planners capped annual diversions at 6 km3, but realizationswere closer to 12 km3 which by the 1970s resulted in land degradation that forced officialsto abandon more than 46,000 hectares of land annually.55 Elsewhere, the accumulationof excess water in depressions has resulted in the formation of two large brackish and


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pesticide-laden lakes – the 30-km3 Aidar-Arnasai Lake in Uzbekistan and the 100-km3

Lake Sarykamysh in Turkmenistan – both of which have devastated vast areas offarmland.56

Finally, the quality of cotton (based on fiber content) harvested deterioratedrapidly in the 1970s with inferior varieties rising from 14 percent to 29 percent.57

Crops like grapes and melons had better market potential and sparked calls, mainlyin Uzbekistan, of, “Down with the cotton; long live the orchards!” Such localdemands were ignored by Moscow and local elites who shared a parochial obses-sion with cultivation quotas.58 By the mid-1980s, alarm bells rang constantly overmismanagement-induced water scarcity, a situation worsened by cyclical bouts ofdroughts and floods. Such signs did not suddenly appear but were results of politi-cal inertia as Moscow continually fell for its own socialist propaganda. Thedemand-based distribution system that allowed inefficiency and prodigal uses ofwater to flourish was eventually replaced with a supply-based system whichreflected water availability. Interim distribution treaties were drafted to ensureequitable water distribution among the union republics of Soviet Central Asia.Unfortunately, such measures were too little, too late – an ironic reflection ofMikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika.

Hydro-political Friction in PSCAThe dissolution of the USSR transformed constants into variables. This epoch forcedindependence on the CARs and bestowed on them the liberty to pursue divergentpaths with varying intentions, capabilities, and opportunities. The Soviet legacy,however, bequeathed PSCA with two broad contentious issues, namely water-energyinterdependency and limited agricultural reform, both causes of hydro-politicalfriction. Incipient manifestations of the former arose from the hydrocarbon windfall,energy shortage, and an irrigation system that unraveled as Moscow’s once omnipres-ence receded, while strife from the latter rested on the vicious cycle of cotton addictionand worsening land degradation which costs PSCA approximately $2 billion annually.59

The CARs’ pledge to maintain the Soviet-era water-energy trade-off was initiallymaintained, but although access to global markets raised hydrocarbon prices, the priceof state-produced electricity remained superficially low and water continued to be“free.”60 Post-independence economic decline was especially detrimental on thehydrocarbon-poor states – Kyrgyzstan’s economy plummeted and Tajikistan’seconomic woes were stoked by civil war (1992–1997) – whereas hard currency revenuesprovided some relief to the hydrocarbon-rich states.61 Cracks in the water-energy barterbetween Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan first appeared in the early 1990s. InSoviet times, Kyrgyzstan was entrusted with the scheduled delivery of water in thespring and summer and was “rewarded” with $600 million annually from the federalbudget in addition to reliable deliveries of gas (1 billion m3), coal (1 million tons), andheating oil (400,000 tons) during the autumn and winter.62 Problems surfaced onceMoscow’s allowance ceased and delivery of fossil fuels became erratic, forcing cash-strapped Kyrgyzstan to increase reliance on the Toktogul HPP to meet winter energydemands from 1993 onward.63 A similar situation also developed in postwar Tajikistanwith the Nurek HPP in the late 1990s but with fewer detrimental effects.64



Such actions and reactions have caused friction arising on two broad fronts. First,the immediate effect of using HPPs to generate electricity in winter contributed tomassive flooding at various chokepoints downstream. For example, Kyrgyzstan’s winteroperation of Toktogul HPP caused overflow in Kazakhstan’s Chardara reservoir andspill-over into the nearby Aydarkul Lake and the Aidar-Arnasai Lake in Uzbekistan,because river flow downstream was blocked by ice.65 In 2004 and 2005, matters werecomplicated when Uzbekistan blocked the waterways to the Aidar-Arnasai Lake, andfour years later, winter floods displaced 13,000 and caused more than $100 million indamage.66 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also suffered similar repercussions attributedpartly to Tajik actions albeit on a smaller scale.67

Second, winter operation of HPPs results in water shortages in downstream statesduring the summer with losses estimated at between $120 million and $960 million outof the combined regional agricultural production of $3.6 billion.68 Mismanagement-induced water scarcity in summer is magnified by the dilapidated irrigation systemthat fell into disrepair amidst confrontations over sovereign ownership of reservoirs.69

Infrastructure maintenance fell from $80/ha to $120/ha annually in the Soviet era to apaltry $14/ha to $15/ha, with the majority allocated to primary (international) canalsleaving secondary (provincial) and tertiary (district) canals in disrepair.70 Renovatingthe entire irrigation system could save an estimated 12 km3 of water annually, but the$16–40 billion price tag is one PSCA can scarcely afford.71 Based on historical trends,the July 2009 agreement by downstream states to share the cost of infrastructure main-tenance upstream must also evince a sense of circumspection.72 Apart from the intentionand capability of undertaking such a critical task, the ensuring debate would mostlikely revolve around the return on investment and the equitable contribution offunds. Furthermore, plans for the construction of new HPPs have riled those down-stream, especially Uzbekistan which compared those upstream to “the best Soviettraditions of uncontrolled violence against nature.”73

Limited agricultural reform has also caused friction with the continuing cultivationof water-intensive crops (mainly cotton), declining land productivity, and Soviet-stylepolicies. Despite the decrease in cotton as a percentage of the total irrigated areacoupled with falling demand and international prices, cotton still contributes signifi-cantly to the region’s economies.74 Water requirements for cotton are, however, drivenby varying motivations. Powerful individuals with vested interests and close ties to theruling regimes in the “nonmarket” economies of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, andTajikistan seek to perpetuate current practices. This includes: (1) state-controlledproduction quotas and prices; (2) rent seeking where yields are underreported andchanneled abroad for sale at higher prices; and (3) exploitation of child labor and state-subsidized inputs.75 In contrast, the agricultural sectors in the “transition” economiesof Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are privatized and growing even though farmers facemarket prices for inputs but receive regulated prices for output. Furthermore, theylack direct access to global markets and are besieged by widespread corruption.76 Evenwith these constraints, Kazakh and Kyrgyz farmers earn between 22 percent and 600percent more than their state-controlled Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek counterpartswho toil on land that is ostensibly private.77 Most crucially, “transition” economiesseek water security to develop the private agricultural sector, whereas “nonmarket”


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regimes are driven to secure water supplies out of self-interest by oligarchic elites.78

Although water efficiency in the “transition” economies may improve in the long runwith greater market transparency and governance, the constraints placed on farmersacross PSCA have inhibited their active participation in supporting the water sector.This in turn stymies the funding required to address infrastructure atrophy, waterlogging, salinization, and the absence of crop rotation and land nourishment.79

Prior to the USSR’s formal dissolution, the CARs declared in 1991 that “unity andmutual coordination” were the keys to efficient solutions of water-related problems inthe region. They pledged not to “undertake any actions which can cause negativeconsequences for neighbors” and recognized the “equal rights and responsibilities” ofmember states.80 The “Cooperation in the Management, Utilization, and Protection ofWater Resources of Interstate Sources” agreement was reached at subsequent meetingsand the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) was established in1992 to plan and allocate water consumption limits through its constituent BasinWater Organizations (BWO): the BWO Syr Darya and BWO Amu Darya.81 In March1993, the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) was established and laidthe institutional framework for water management in relation to the Aral Sea andsustainable development in PSCA.82

In the eighteen years since, many other agreements and declarations have beenmade, but there are five reasons why beneath the veneer they remain “frameworkswithout content.” First, the interim principles and quotas for inter-republic waterallocations established in 1984 by the Minvodkhoz were preserved and affirmed. It ishardly surprising that problems in a post-Soviet world could not be addressed effec-tively by frameworks drafted in the Soviet era. For example, the agreements did notdefine procedures and conditions for the construction of new HPPs on transboundaryrivers. Water allocation quotas also remained in temporal suspension despite increas-ing water requirements from population growth, agricultural expansion, and Uzbek andTurkmen strategies for food self-sufficiency.83 Second, the water-energy nexus that liesat the heart of hydro-political friction was not addressed in entirety and not reformed.Third, the United Nations has been unable to take a leading role, because its expertiseis spread out among its constituent bodies. The CARs have also been reluctant tocooperate under institutional frameworks like the ICWC and IFAS which werecreated under the auspices of international agencies, in particular the World Bank.84

Fourth, only 30 percent of funding from international agencies reached beneficiarieswith the remainder attributed to various costs and expenses.85 Finally, a sizablenumber (> 500) of projects have been initiated with good intentions, from data collec-tion and environmental monitoring to transboundary environmental agreements, butthe lack of coordination has resulted in duplication of efforts and even confusion.86

Although the current hydro-political milieu is far from ideal, the CARs havesurvived thus far on various annually negotiated treaties, such as those betweenUzbekistan and Turkmenistan (1996); Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan(1998); and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (2000).87 Limited compensation is also madeto upstream states for maintenance of water facilities and scheduled control of riverflow. For example, Kazakhstan pays Kyrgyzstan for water facilities on the Chu andTalas rivers, and Uzbekistan compensates Turkmenistan for the Tuyamuyun reservoir



on the Amu Darya.88 These short-term stop-loss efforts have averted immediate con-cerns and deferred cooperation, but this cannot persist in perpetuity, not when expertsforesee physical water shortages by 2020 to 2025 when projected withdrawals reach149 km3.89 Theoretically, the “ideal solution” to address the conflicting needs andinterests in the region begins with the establishment of some supranational institutionto manage and enforce the unitary basin-wide development of water resources.90 As thenext section illustrates, however, ground realities continue to take a vastly different path.

The “Tournament of Shadows”This section explains the sources of the region’s inability to reach a comprehensive andenforceable regional water agreement. Such an agreement eludes PSCA becauseMoscow’s absolute control over regional water issues dissipated once the USSR andits autocratic hierarchy collapsed, creating a hydro-hegemonic void.91 Although eachCAR had national water agencies to address intra-republic issues, no supranationalinstitution had authority to enforce inter-republic water issues. The combination ofnewfound independence, sovereignty, and the symbiosis between water resources andits elevation of an issue of national security in turn leads to the securitization of theASB. This securitized context also compels the individual CARs to undertake separatecourses of action to address their respective water or energy dilemmas. In manyaspects, unilateral and bilateral substitutes inhibit serious attempts at multilateralIWRM at a juncture when collective decisions and regional cooperation are vital. Tomake matters worse, international water law provides little help in establishing coop-eration because of inherent contradictions and should be viewed merely as a set ofrecommendations and not a panacea for all water tensions and conflicts.

Self-Interests and the Absence of HegemonyDuring the Cold War, the USSR exercised hydro-hegemony in the ASB through acombination of overwhelming material capacity, superior “bargaining power,” and itsability to write the rules and agenda for specific contestations. Moscow dictatednondebatable “solutions” to water problems among the union republics. In the inter-national arena, it adopted a dominant leadership posture characterized by unilateralismand exploitation, most evident in its relations with Afghanistan over the Amu Darya.Although the river formed the international border, and agreements over “boundaryissues, navigation and water quality” were reached in 1921, 1946, and 1958, the super-power ignored Afghanistan’s rights to water withdrawals.92 With the USSR’s fragmen-tation, Moscow’s role as the final arbiter in the region’s hydro-political affairs wasabrogated, and festering water tensions were uncapped.

Currently, Russia and Uzbekistan are the only realistic claimants to the hydro-hegemonic crown in PSCA, but although both are highly influential, they do not meetLuke’s “Three Dimensions of Power.” Russia possesses considerable hard and softpower, but it is not a riparian within the ASB. Moreover, Moscow’s clout in theregion, though considerable, is no longer comparable to its Soviet-era omnipotence.93

As for Uzbekistan, its energy resources, infrastructure, and geographical position atthe heart of Central Asia and the ASB are trump cards that underwrite its regionalimportance. Beyond soft-power mechanisms, its regional aspirations are bolstered by


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its population size, relative military strength, and essential participation in waterpolicy discourse.94 Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for the other CARs, whileTashkent continually seeks to manipulate the hydro-political game, it has been unsuc-cessful in securing the compliance of the other riparian states and in achievingideational consensus.

Russia is eliminated from hydro-hegemony in PSCA due to three factors. The firstis the region’s lack of trust in Russia, underlined by caution over bestowing anyhegemonic legitimacy on its former political master. This is accentuated by the Kremlin’sdismal regional leadership record within regional frameworks like the Commonwealthof Independent States (1991), Economic Cooperation Organization (1992), EurasianUnion (1994), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC, 1994), Central Asian RegionalEconomic Cooperation (1997), Central Asian Customs Union (2004), and the CentralAsian Cooperation Organization (2005), all of which have remained largely perfunc-tory and rhetorical.95 The security realm also suffered a similar fate until the glaringthreat posed by religious militants became a clear and present danger.96 The ShanghaiFive (1996) expanded to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2001)and has made significant progress.97 Significant divisions have, however, appeared inthe Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, 2002), the successor organizationof the Collective Security Treaty (1994).98 Overall, the varying degrees of commitmentby the CARs to these institutions demonstrate: (1) a mnemonic weariness of Moscow’spossible hidden agenda; (2) the aim to maintain balanced relationships with Russia,China, and the United States; (3) the will to cooperation only if self-interests match;and (4) the reluctance to grant Russia a carte blanche in this portion of the “near-abroad.”99 Russia is thus forced to rely on bilateral relations to address strategicinterests, but results have been patchy at best.100

The second concomitant factor is Russia’s decreasing influence over functioningregional frameworks and individual states. Russia’s inability to control CentralAsian leaders was well illustrated during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in whichthe SCO and CSTO proved that they were not mere rubber stamps inked by theKremlin. Both organizations met Russia’s actions with lukewarm endorsements butrefused to recognize the secessionist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.101

For the CARs, the conflict presented an opportunity to display sovereign foreignpolicy despite the importance of their respective ties with Russia. Russia’s decreas-ing influence over the region is further exposed by its attempts to check Americanpresence in Central Asia. A generous Russian aid package to Kyrgyzstan was sup-posed to result in the U.S. military’s eviction from Manas Airbase and allow Moscowto reassert its suzerainty over Bishkek.102 The Kremlin’s elation proved ephemeral asgeopolitical merry-go-round turned once more. Tashkent and Ashgabat ingratiatedthemselves with Washington through offers of logistical cooperation, and afterrenegotiations, Manas remains the key aerial transit hub for U.S. operations inAfghanistan.103

The third factor of Russian nonhegemony lies in its murky policy toward PSCA.Russia covets the region’s abundant natural resources and seeks to preserve its strong-hold on energy transit routes. This is beyond reasonable doubt, but Moscow’s roleand policy toward regional hydro-politics is opaque and beset by ambivalence and



ambiguity. As a facilitator, Russia continues to walk a tightrope between the CARs, aprecarious position that earned Moscow comparisons to an unwelcomed “third party”and caused it to be notably absent from the guest list at the 2009 IFAS summit.104 Asan investor, it has pledged funds for the construction of HPPs in Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan which have rattled downstream states, especially Uzbekistan.105 In anattempt to ameliorate Russian-Uzbek relations, Russian president Dmitry Medvedevcommented in April 2008 that the construction of HPPs should be approved by allriparian states and that Moscow would refrain from projects lacking legal accords.106

Such comments in turn upset the upstream states amidst mounting suspicions overMoscow’s intention and general ambivalence toward PSCA. Hence, the inability toforce a solution or offer acceptable solutions prevents Russia from manipulating thehydro-political game and from achieving ideational consensus on hydro-politicalissues.107

Uzbekistan’s quest “to become the new center of cultural, social, and politicalpower in Central Asia” highlights its regional aspirations.108 Indeed, Tashkent’s poten-tial for hydro-hegemony is strong on three fronts. The first is energy, which inducespolitical fits in Dushanbe and Bishkek every autumn as they scurry to secure Uzbekgas for the winter. The second is Soviet-designed transport infrastructure. Uzbekistanmay be double-landlocked but it remains a critical energy and transport corridor forboth Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.109 Finally, Uzbekistan’s use of gas supplies as bar-gaining chips against Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been reflected in steadilyincreasing prices. The upstream states faced charges of $55 per 1,000 m3 (tcm) of gas in2006, $115 in 2007, $145 in 2008, and $240 in 2009, whereas the Kazakhs only paid$84/tcm in 2009.110 The price increases can be attributed to two explanations. Econom-ically, they reflect market forces and Gazprom’s quest to secure Central Asian gassupplies. The Russian gas company paid $130/tcm to $150/tcm for Turkmen gas in2008 and agreed to pay more than $300/tcm for Uzbek gas in 2009.111 Strategically, theincreasing prices reflect Uzbekistan’s sinister use of energy to compel upstream neigh-bors to pay market rates and adhere to scheduled releases of water.112 Because Tajikistanand Kyrgyzstan can scarcely afford to import sufficient amounts of gas at such prices,they resort to HPP operations in winter which result in unscheduled releases of water.This seasonal clash of wills has produced only losers, yet the three states remain stead-fast and at loggerheads.

Uzbekistan’s geographical position and transit infrastructure provides it withanother form of bargaining power. This is evident by frequent disruptions to Turkmengas destined for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan via Uzbekistan and the interruption ofKyrgyz electricity to Tajik industries using Uzbek energy grids.113 Uzbekistan’s spuriousdecisions to close borders also impacts Tajikistan greatly where 87 percent of over-land imports, 92 percent of such exports, and all ground freight and passengers aretransported by rail through Uzbek territory.114 In addition, fees and payments, bothofficial and unofficial, compound transportation costs. Faced with such problems,Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan warmly welcomed Kazakhstan’s initiative for a CentralAsian Union to streamline regional transit transportation. Uzbekistan’s swift rejectionof new regional alignments was, however, hardly surprising as such initiatives pose achallenge to Uzbek (and Russian) influence in PSCA.115


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Even when mutually beneficial outcomes are present, Tashkent’s prima donnatendencies have curtailed implementation. Such pretentious hegemonic tantrums werein full display at the 2008 EEC meeting in Bishkek. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyr-gyzstan, and Uzbekistan achieved verbal consensus over the region’s water-energynexus and pledged to utilize their resources to mutual advantage.116 The Uzbeks, how-ever, delivered an eleventh-hour coup de grâce by refusing to sign any multilateraltransboundary water agreements and subsequently withdrew from the EEC.117 Russiabrokered a hasty follow-up meeting in Almaty between the five CARs, a reflection ofthe desperate situation.118 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan concluded an agree-ment, albeit one that expired at the end of winter in February 2009, regarding the SyrDarya and underpinned by water and energy reciprocity. More importantly, Uzbeki-stan’s abstention and geographical position (upstream relative to Kazakhstan) meanthat scheduled water releases were not guaranteed to reach southern Kazakhstan.119

Besides snubbing its neighbors, Uzbekistan’s recalcitrance further dented Russia’sregional reputation.

In light of its influence and leverage on the upstream states, what disqualifiesUzbekistan as a hydro-hegemon? It has to be recognized that Uzbekistan is not asstrong as it thinks, and the upstream states are not as weak they seem. Despite itsbargaining power and pivotal role in any effective discourse on regional water policy,Uzbekistan is simply not strong enough to convince the upstream riparians to agreeon its terms.120 Tashkent’s last resort is the employment of capricious prima donnaantics in what it views as a zero-sum game – the delivery of commodities with tradableprices (oil, gas, and electricity) upstream in return for a “free” commodity (water) withno tradable price. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also demonstrated that asimple change in dam operations, from water storage to electric generation modeduring winter when Tashkent fails to deliver on energy promises, provides them withconsiderable leverage at the negotiation table. The upstream states are still releasing the“official quotas” of water, albeit at an “inconvenient” timing to those downstream.121

Finally, if and when more HPPs become operational in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, theimpact of Uzbekistan’s “energy card” will become even less pronounced.122 Suchreasons disqualify Uzbekistan from achieving hydro-hegemony.

Both Russian and Uzbek influence have been further diluted by the arrival ofChinese and Iranian participation in PSCA’s hydro-political sphere. Beijing hasexpressed interests in funding hydropower projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan buthas remained cautious over PSCA’s “internal bickering.”123 In contrast, Tehran hasmade steady strides. In Turkmenistan, with which it shares a common border, Iran hasinked water distribution agreements along the Tejen, Harirud, and Murghab Rivers. InTajikistan, where it shares common linguistic ties, Iran has pledged to aid in theconstruction of HPPs. Construction of roads and tunnels linking northern and southernTajikistan have commenced. The Economic Council of the Persian-Speaking Unionhas also been established between Afghanistan, Iran, and Tajikistan.124 In addition,China and Iran have proven invaluable to the upstream states as bargaining chips. Forexample, after Russia-Tajik talks ended in stalemate in 2004, Iran’s offer of $250million to finance energy projects in Tajikistan was promptly met by the Kremlin’spromise to invest $2 billion in an effort recapture Tajik attention.125



Securitization of the Aral Sea BasinRiparian states in the ASB find long-term regional water agreements elusive due to theabsence of a hydro-hegemon. Agreements that surface are largely frameworks withoutcontent or are short-term stop-loss measures. Without a common water-securityumbrella, water is elevated to a matter of national security which obliges individualstates to secure the precious resource. For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, water securiti-zation arises from energy insecurity and takes the form of national laws, verbal threatsto divert water, and hydroelectric production in winter which leads to summer short-ages. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, securitization takes the form ofartificial lakes and water capture. The cumulative effects of such actions stun the devel-opment of water resource management structures, leading to even greater efforts ofsecuritization. Thus, a vicious cycle ensues where securitization is both cause andeffect of the water-energy impasse.

The “water–national security–securitization” triune is most pronounced in thethree downstream states. Although the constitutions of all five CARs enshrine stateownership of water resources, this is not a reason for water securitization.126 Instead, athree-step process highlights this phenomenon. First, Turkmenistan (98 percent),Uzbekistan (91 percent), and Kazakhstan (43 percent) rely extensively on exterritorialsources of water. Hence, the energy giants are susceptible to alterations and disrup-tions of water supplies by upstream states as winter floods and summer water short-ages attest.127 Next, the codification of Kyrgyzstan’s right to profit from waterresources within its territory (1997) and classification of water as a commodity (2001)causes great alarm downstream. Furthermore, consternation arose over Bishkek’sthreat to sell or divert water to China if Uzbekistan refuses to compensate Kyrgyzstanfor lost revenues resulting from water storage for summer irrigation instead of winteruse to generate hydroelectricity.128 Finally, Kyrgyz and Tajik HPP proposals areviewed as nascent manifestations of even greater threats to water supplies downstreamand therefore to national security.129 Securitization remains the only viable option.

A hydro-political complex is securitized when water becomes an issue of nationalsecurity and the development of common water resource management structuresbecomes stunted. In PSCA, the latter is embodied in the ICWC and its constituentBWOs. These institutions have grown little since their establishment almost twodecades ago and have resolved even less.130 The underlying problem remains one ofstringent protection over data collected by the respective national water ministries.Having the BWOs domiciled in Uzbekistan allows the host to exert undue influenceand render them untrustworthy to other riparian states.131 Common water resourcemanagement structures are further restricted by inadequate hydro-meteorologicaltechnical systems that impair data collection leading to inefficient forecasting. Addi-tionally, protocols for sharing information are so inadequate that they result in poorexchanges of information.132

With water a matter of national security and common water resource managementstructures in abeyance, the corollary is for downstream states to initiate water capture.This is all the more pressing as upstream states possess great spatial-temporal leverageover water flow. This is especially acute with Kyrgyzstan and the Syr Darya whereasTajikistan has lesser control over the larger Amu Darya. To mitigate these effects,


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Uzbekistan has started digging reservoirs at Rezak (North Fergana Canal), Karaman(Southern Hungry Steppe Canal), Pskem (Chirchik River), and Akhangaran (AkhangaranRiver) to conserve winter releases from Kyrgyzstan.133 Likewise, Kazakhstan has com-menced work on the Koksaray reservoir off the Syr Darya to minimize the impact ofwinter floods and save water for summer use.134 The most grandiose water capturescheme lies in northwestern Turkmenistan where the Altyn Asyr (Golden Age Lake) isexpected to reclaim up to 10 billion m3 of water annually that would otherwise be lostthrough irrigation and infrastructure inefficiency.135 Skeptics, however, foresee nothingmore than a giant salty broth of pesticides and fertilizers, as drainage waters evaporateand percolate through unlined collector canals.136

Unilateral and Bilateral Substitutes for Multilateral IWRMThe hydro-hegemonic void in PSCA and subsequent securitization of the ASBcircumvents, or at very least postpones, the possibility of a regional solution to thewater-energy impasse. These problems are made more intractable when there are uni-lateral and bilateral substitutes for multilateral IWRM. For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,substitutes to cooperation take the form of hydropower projects which have thepotential to address energy security needs. As for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, theperennial theme of diverting the Ob-Irtysh and Volga rivers has been floated as apossible answer to their water security needs. On a more positive note, Kazakhstanhas recognized the futility of relying on neighbors and has taken unilateral steps tostabilize its portion of the Aral Sea.

As water-rich states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are keenly interested in exploitingtheir vast water supplies to meet domestic energy demand, minimize reliance on externalsources, and reap hard currency from electricity sales. The illustrative point is that thelong-term benefits of investing in their hydropower industry far outweigh any water-energy barter-style agreement. Four highly compelling reasons make such hydro-power projects irresistible to the upstream riparian states. First, they have no substitutefor hydropower in terms of cheap, renewable energy, because they are hydrocarbonpoor. Kyrgyzstan has small amounts of low-quality coal and high-cost gas whileTajikistan has enough top-quality coal and natural gas to meet domestic demand butno investors.137 Tajik solar and wind projects, if deemed efficient and economicallyviable, would by 2020 only account for a tenth of all domestically produced elec-tricity.138 In contrast, Central Asia has harnessed less than one tenth of its estimatedrenewal hydro-energy potential.139 Second, hydropower is three to four times cheaperthan hydrocarbon-fed thermal plants.140 Third, hydropower frees Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan from unreliable and increasingly unaffordable Uzbek gas and frequentlydisrupted Turkmen supplies that transit Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s domesticenergy consumption has increased as it seeks energy autarky even though its energyintensity is four times higher than that of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.141 Tashkent’sdecision leaves upstream states with surplus electricity in summer but does not easeshortfalls in winter.142 This is where hydropower will help immensely.

Finally, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are motivated by the prospects of selling theirhydropower abroad – to Kazakhstan, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran, andAfghanistan – for handsome prices and where demand is high.143 To meet this lucrative



demand, the Kyrgyz and Tajiks must construct individual electricity transmissionlines, despite the extra expenditure and inefficiency of transmitting power in this fashion.However, investors and funders have lined up to finance such initiatives. In 2005, theWorld Bank approved a $100 million loan to construct a 500 kV, 475 km-long north-south power grid that would transport Tajik and Kyrgyz energy northward toKazakhstan, Russia, and possibly China. The Asian Development Bank followed upwith a $56.5 million loan in 2006 to finance transmission lines from Tajikistan toAfghanistan.144 Such loans provide huge relief to Dushanbe considering their annualgovernment expenditure is approximately $600 million.145

Such unilateral and bilateral water-exploitation projects, while lucrative for the twoupstream states, are highly problematic for their downstream neighbors. Indeed, suchprojects may eventually render the barter system useless and leave downstream stateswithout any assurances over water supplies. At present, water scarcity in PSCA arisesfrom mismanagement and inefficiency rather than physical limitations, but withoutregional cooperation, the only alternative is to secure exogenous sources of water. Theconcept of diverting the flow of rivers in Siberia toward Central Asia was proposed asearly as 1871, surfaced periodically throughout the late Tsarist and Soviet periods, andmost recently in 1995, 2001, and 2006.146 Planners envisage diverting one-tenth of thetotal annual flow of the Ob-Irtysh (385 km3) and Volga (240 km3) at a cost of$25 billion to $200 billion.147 Diverting water sources this way will also have thor-oughly negative and irreparable effects on ecology. Kazakh president Nursultan Naz-arbayev promptly dismissed such claims, although he admitted that “the issue is quiteserious and complex.”148 At present, river diversions seem more remote than regionalcooperation, leaving downstream states even more vulnerable to water shortages.

As the riparian states continue bickering amidst individual pursuits of unilateraland bilateral alternatives to prudent multilateral water management, the desiccation ofthe Aral Sea continues unabated. Despite various regional declarations to save the AralSea at Nukus (1995), Almaty (1997), Ashgabat (1999), and Dushanbe (2002), onlyKazakhstan’s unilateral efforts with the northern Aral Sea have made any progress.149

The restoration of the Aral Sea to its former size requires an annual inflow of 56 km3

which is unrealistic given current trends.150 Despite the challenge, Kazakhstan pressedon with resurrecting the portion within its territorial boundaries. Attempts to isolatethe northern Aral Sea by constructing the sand and reed Karateren-Kokaral dykefailed dismally in 1992 and 1997. Despite the setback, Kazakhstan in cooperation withthe World Bank constructed the $85.8 million concrete Kok-Aral Dam and repaired a100-km network of dilapidated canals in 2001.151 The resultant spectacular rise in waterlevels allowed the reintroduction of Black Sea flounder and secured a new $126-millionloan from the World Bank aimed at reconnecting the former port of Heralsk to thesea.152 Kazakhstan’s unilateral effort, though commendable, will not stabilize the restof the Aral Sea. Perhaps it takes the appearance of the Aral “Desert” before the CARsrealize that their collective futures face great peril.

The Short Arm of International Water LawInternational water law has not assuaged or ameliorated hydro-political tensions inPSCA and has contributed little to facilitate and enforce any regional water agreement.


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The ambiguity and contradiction of its legal principles and clauses have, at best, servedas hints and suggestions for states to resolve water disputes.153 Furthermore, anyexpectation of international water law as a “one-size-fits-all” convention is illusive,because “international water law does not attempt to provide countries with specificguidelines for dispute resolution. Rather it attempts to codify customary law in themost general terms. As an umbrella agreement, it does not pretend to replace individualagreements negotiated between countries over specific disputes.”154

The ineffectiveness of international water law as the enforcer of water agreements isattributable to contradictory principles. On one end of the legal spectrum stands the“Principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty” in which an upstream state has theright to fully utilize its water resources, even if this is detrimental to downstreamstates. At the other end lies the “Principle of Absolute Territorial Integrity” in whichdownstream states possess the right to unhindered river flow originating upstream.Legal frameworks during the last century encompass both the right to use water fromshared water courses and the responsibility to use one’s property in a way that will notcause significant harm to others.155 Finding middle ground remains elusive eventhough “the major area of the debate on international water law for the last half acentury has been the relationship between those two principles.”156

For all its shortcomings, international water law remains crucial. Proponents ofinternational water law who wish to “balance the scales” among riparian statesthrough the codification of “equitable and reasonable” water must be mindful thatconventions are only binding on signatories and that “the arm of water law is not verylong.”157 It could, however, form the multilateral structure through which the CARswould cede a measure of sovereignty in exchange for a comprehensive and enforceableregional water agreement. In the end, implementing such an agreement would only beas efficacious as its signatories would allow.

Conclusion and Prospects for CooperationAs the CARs approach 19 years of independence, the region continues to grapple withthe perennial hydro-political problem of “who gets how much of the water, how, andwhy?” Then again, this is perhaps an oversimplification that ignores the symbioticrelationship between water, energy, and the environment. Indeed, PSCA must face thefact that the era of Soviet brotherhood is over, but this must not preclude the new eraof Central Asian solidarity. Ironically, the tendency has been one of embracing Soviet-erapractices and rejecting neighbors, even though realities dictate the need to embraceneighbors and reject Soviet-era practices. It would be simple to attribute the complexand seemingly insurmountable problems to seven decades of Communism, but theproblems have their roots in the present as much as they do in the past.

To break the current impasse, the region as a whole must recognize that the onlyfeasible solution lies in a comprehensive and enforceable long-term regional wateragreement that incorporates IWRM and addresses the water-energy-environmentalnexus. Such an agreement must fall under the supervision of a single neutral institutionempowered by its signatories and endowed with relevant and legally binding powers.The numerous declarations, summits, and agreements made since 1991 have beensuperficial signs of cooperation but remain “frameworks without content.” The



employment of short-term stop-loss measures may have aborted immediate concerns,but they have also deferred the possibility for workable multilateral solutions. Thesituation is further encumbered by issues of trust, sovereignty, self-interests, politicalwill, and leadership.

Using literature and theoretical arguments from hydro-politics, this article identi-fied four factors responsible for the region’s failure to reach a comprehensive andenforceable water agreement. First and foremost, the disintegration of the USSRremoved Soviet hegemony and Moscow’s role as the final arbiter over the water-energy-environmental nexus. It was highlighted that a hydro-hegemonic void exists inthe region – even when Russia and Uzbekistan are taken into consideration – deprivingit of necessary pressure to force a settlement of disputes and implement an integrationstrategy. This leads to the second factor – the securitization of the “hydro-politicalcomplex” – where water was elevated to an issue of national security. This stunted thedevelopment of water resource management structures and resulted in unilateral waterresource capture by downstream states. Third, unilateral and bilateral substitutes forcooperation – namely hydropower and energy transit infrastructure – exist that allowupstream riparian states to pursue their own self-interests at the expense of multilat-eral IWRM. Finally, the effectiveness of international law has been severely restrictedbecause of inherent contradictions and because its strength is predicated on how muchsovereignty signatories are willing to cede to uphold the legal tenets.

Central Asia seems to have reached a dead end in the quest for water cooperation.Progress forward seems unlikely as along as member states do not reorient themselves tocurrent realities. The current status quo is the outcome of the “Tournament of Shadows”where “upstreamers use water to get more power, [and] downstreamers use power to getmore water.”158 Participants maneuver in a futile attempt to gain the upper hand on rivalswithout realizing that, at best, this “tournament” could only crown its “winner” with Pyr-rhic victory. It is perhaps ironic that the “Tournament of Shadows” only hastens thearrival of the ultimate form of hegemony – dramatic water shortages – one that does notdistinguish between upstream and downstream, powerful and weak, “right” and “wrong.”

NOTES

1. See Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire inCentral Asia (London: Abacus, 2001); and Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia(London: John Murray, 2006).

2. Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Robert Legvold, ed., Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and theCentral Asian Nexus (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran, and CentralAsia,” International Affairs Vol. 80, No. 3 (2004), pp. 503–517; and Gawdat Bahgat, “Central Asia and EnergySecurity,” Asian Affairs Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–16.

3. Igor Lipovsky, “The Deterioration of the Ecological Situation in Central Asia: Causes and Possible Conse-quences,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 47, No. 7 (1995), pp. 1109–1123; and Douglas L. Tookey, “The Environ-ment, Security, and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 40,No. 2 (2007), pp. 191–208.

4. Muriel Joffe, “Autocracy, Capitalism, and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation,” Russian Review Vol. 54, No. 3(1995), pp. 365–388.

5. Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-hegemony: A Framework for Analysis of Trans-boundary WaterConflicts,” Water Policy Vol. 8, No. 5 (2006), p. 436.

6. “ICWC Agreements” and “Intergovernmental Agreements of Central Asia States,” CAWaterInfo. Availableat http://www.cawater-info.net/; and International Crisis Group (ICG), “The Curse of Cotton: CentralAsia’s Destructive Monoculture,” ICG Asia Report, May 30, 2002, p. 6.


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7. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Aral Sea, 2000–2008,” Earth Observatory, August 26, 2008.Available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/.

8. High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, “Climate Change and Interna-tional Security,” Paper # S113/08, March 14, 2008, p. 7. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/.

9. Malcolm Newson, “Integrating the Biophysical and Social Science Frameworks for IWRM: Rationality andReality,” paper presented at Hydrology: Science and Practice for the Twenty-First Century, Imperial CollegeLondon, July 12–16, 2004; and Asit K. Biswas, “Integrated Water Resources Management: A Reassessment,”Water International Vol. 29, No. 2 (2004), p. 249.

10. Patricia Wouters, Victor Dukhovny, and Andrew Allan, eds., Implementing Integrated Water ResourcesManagement in Central Asia (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007), p. 138.

11. Biswas, “Integrated Water Resources Management,” pp. 249–250; Malcolm Newson, Land, Water, andDevelopment: Sustainable and Adaptive Management of Rivers (London and New York: Routledge, 2009),pp. 268–172; and Newson, “Integrating the Biophysical and Social Science Frameworks for IWRM.”

12. P. Jeffrey and M. Gearey, “Integrated Water Resources Management: Lost on the Road from Ambition toRealisation?” Water Science & Technology Vol. 53, No. 1 (2006), pp. 4–5.

13. Itay Fischhendler, “Institutional Conditions for IWRM: The Israeli Case,” Ground Water Vol. 46, No. 1(2008), p. 92.

14. Eric W. Sievers, “Water, Conflict, and Regional Security in Central Asia,” New York University Environmen-tal Law Journal Vol. 10, No. 3 (2002), p. 393; Jeremy Allouche, “The Governance of Central Asian Waters:National Interests Versus Regional Cooperation,” Disarmament Forum No. 4 (2007), p. 48; and BrucePannier, “Central Asian States Profess Unity but Grow Farther Apart,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,August 3, 2009.

15. John Waterbury, Hydro-Politics of the Nile Valley (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979); and MarkZeitoun and Jonathan A. Allan, “Applying Hegemony and Power Theory to Trans-Boundary Water Analy-sis,” Water Policy Vol. 10, No. S2 (2008), p. 5.

16. Frederick W. Frey and Thomas Naff, “Water: An Emerging Issue in the Middle East?” Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 482 (1985), pp. 66–78.

17. Michael Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydro-political Security Complex,” in Leif Ohlsson, ed., Hydro-politics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint (London: Zed Books, 1995), pp. 91–93, 96–98.

18. Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq,” pp. 96–103, 121.19. Anthony Turton, “Hydro-hegemony and Hydro-political Complex Theory,” paper presented at the Second

Hydro-Hegemony Workshop, Goodenough College, London, May 6–7, 2006.20. Anthony Turton, “A Southern African Perspective on Trans-boundary Water Resource Management,”

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Environmental Change and Security Project Report No. 9(2003), p. 79.

21. Turton, “A Southern African Perspective on Trans-boundary Water Resource Management,” p. 79.22. Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 5, 203–204.23. Quoted in Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, and Daene McKinney, Bridges over Water: Under-

standing Trans-boundary Water Conflict, Negotiation, and Cooperation (Singapore: World ScientificPublishing, 2007), pp. 144–145.

24. Zeitoun and Allan, “Applying Hegemony and Power Theory,” pp. 7–8, 11.25. Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-hegemony,” pp. 435–460; and Helga Haftendorn, “Water and International

Conflict,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 1 (2000), p. 63.26. Zeitoun and Allan, “Applying Hegemony and Power Theory,” p. 9.27. Ruth Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony? Multi-levelled Hegemonic Competition and Security in Post-

Soviet Central Asia,” Review of International Studies No. 35 (2009), pp. 159–165. For Kazakhstan’s exclusionto hegemony, see pp. 165–166.

28. Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” InternationalSecurity Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 84–85, 87, 92.

29. Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” pp. 90, 99–103.30. Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia: Utilization and Develop-

ment Issues,” Industry Report No. 2 (2008), p. 7; and Martin Kipping, “Can ‘Integrated Water ResourcesManagement’ Silence Malthusian Concerns? The Case of Central Asia,” Water International Vol. 33, No. 3(2008), p. 309. Percentage of water originating on own territory: Kazakhstan (2.1 percent to 3.9 percent),Turkmenistan (1.3 percent to 2.4 percent), and Uzbekistan (7.6 percent to 9.4 percent).

31. Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe, and Mark Giordano, “International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk,” WaterPolicy No. 5 (2003), p. 39.

32. Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, “International Waters,” pp. 33–34, 38–41.33. Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, “International Waters,” pp. 44–46. For various indicators of “water stress,” see

pp. 41–43.34. Philip P. Micklin, The Water Management Crisis in Soviet Central Asia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of

Pittsburgh, 1991), pp. 4–5; “International River Basin Register,” Oregon State University. Available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu; and Erkin Orolbayev, ed., “Diagnostic Report on Water Resources inCentral Asia,” report, 9th Session of the Project Working Group (PWG “Energy”) on Rational and Efficient



Use of Energy and Water Research in Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, July 10–12, 2002, pp. 2–4. Availableat http://www.cawater-info.net. The ASB encompasses most of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan, and the Kazakh provinces of Kyzyl-Orda and Southern Kazakhstan.

35. Sarah L. O’Hara, “Lessons from the Past: Water Management in Central Asia,” Water Policy No. 2 (2000),pp. 372–373.

36. Joffe, “Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire,” pp. 365–388; and O’Hara, “Lessons from the Past,” p. 374.37. Amin M. Mukhamedov, “50th Anniversary of the V. D. Zhurin Central Asian Research Institute of

Irrigation,” Hydro-Technical Construction Vol. 10, No. 2 (1976), p. 199.38. O’Hara, “Lessons from the Past,” p. 370.39. Micklin, The Water Management Crisis in Soviet Central Asia, pp. 9–10; and V. A. Dukhovny, “Water and

Globalization: Case Study of Central Asia,” Irrigation and Drainage Vol. 56 (2007), p. 489.40. Micklin, The Water Management Crisis in Soviet Central Asia, pp. 10–11; and Philip P. Micklin, “Soviet

Water Diversion Plans: Implications for Kazakhstan and Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey Vol. 1, No. 4(1983), p. 13.

41. Max Spoor, “Upheaval along the Silk Route: The Dynamics of Economic Transition in Central Asia,” Journalof International Development Vol. 9, No. 4 (1997), p. 579.

42. Mukhamedov, “50th Anniversary,” pp. 199–200.43. Trevor W. Tanton and Sonia Heaven, “Worsening of the Aral Basin Crisis: Can There Be a Solution?” Journal

of Water Resources Planning and Management Vol. 125, No. 6 (1999), p. 363; Michael Wines, “Grand SovietScheme for Sharing Water in Central Asia Is Foundering,” The New York Times, December 9, 2002; and“Irrigation Water Shortage Could Mean Disaster for Uzbekistan,” Ferghana.ru, May 12, 2008. Large reser-voirs include Toktogul (19.5 km3 capacity) and Chardara (5.2 km3) on the Syr Darya; and Nurek (10.5 km3)and Tuyumayun (7.3 km3) on the Amu Darya.

44. Luigi De Martino et al. “Central Asia: Ferghana/Osh/Khujand Area,” in Environment and Security (Geneva,Switzerland: UNEP, 2005), p. 26.

45. Victor Dukhovny, Pulat Umarov, Haldar Yakubov, and Chandra A. Madramootoo, “Drainage in the Aral SeaBasin,” Irrigation and Drainage Vol. 56 (2007), pp. S92, S98. The total volume of return waters from bothartificial and natural drainage is 14 km3 to 20 km3.

46. Kipping, “Can ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ Silence Malthusian Concerns?” p. 306; and FredPearce, Keepers of the Spring: Reclaiming Our Water in an Age of Globalization (Washington, DC: IslandPress, 2004), p. 118.

47. Allouche, “The Governance of Central Asian Waters,” p. 45; and Mohamed T. El-Ashry, “Policies for WaterResource Management in Semiarid Regions,” Water Resources Development Vol. 7, No. 4 (1991), p. 233.

48. Malin Falkenmark, “Aral Sea Basin Heads for a Brighter Future,” Water Front Magazine No. 1 (2003),pp. 4–5.

49. Pearce, Keepers of the Spring, pp. 115–116; Philip Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis and Its Future: An Assessmentin 2006,” Eurasian Geography and Economics Vol. 47, No. 5 (2006), pp. 552–553; Erika Weinthal, “WaterConflict and Cooperation in Central Asia,” UNDP Human Development Report Office, Occasional PaperNo. 32 (2006), p. 7; Bruce Pannier, “River Water in Kazakhstan Too Dirty Even for Irrigation,” Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, April 27, 2009; and “Soviet Pesticides Leave Bitter Legacy,” IWPR, July 13, 2009.According to Pearce, a typical acre of cotton “received more than 300 lb of fertilizer annually and 120 lb ofpesticides” at the peak of application.

50. Sarah L. O’Hara, Giles F. S. Wiggs, Batyr Mamedov, George Davidson, and Richard B. Hubbard, “Exposureto Airborne Dust Contaminated with Pesticide in the Aral Sea Region,” The Lancet Vol. 355, No. 9204(2000), pp. 627–628.

51. Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis,” p. 553.52. Sarah L. O’Hara and Tim Hannan, “Irrigation and Water Management in Turkmenistan: Past Systems,

Present Problems, and Future Scenarios,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 51, No. 1 (1999), p. 25; and Tanton andHeaven, “Worsening of the Aral Basin Crisis,” p. 363.

53. O’Hara and Hannan, “Irrigation and Water Management,” p. 25.54. O’Hara and Hannan, “Irrigation and Water Management,” p. 37.55. Kai Wegerich, “Not a Simple Path: A Sustainable Future for Central Asia,” School of Oriental and African

Studies Water Issues Study Group, Occasional Paper No. 28 (2001), p. 12; and O’Hara and Hannan,“Irrigation and Water Management,” p. 27.

56. Vadim Sokolov, “Experiences with IWRM in the Central Asia and Caucasus Regions,” Water InternationalVol. 31, No. 1 (2006), p. 62; Sievers, “Water, Conflict and Regional Security,” p. 366; and Micklin, “The AralSea Crisis,” p. 547.

57. Max Spoor, “Transition to Market Economies in Former Soviet Central Asia: Dependency, Cotton andWater,” The European Journal of Development Research Vol. 5, No. 2 (1993), p. 146.

58. Spoor, “Transition to Market Economies,” p. 153.59. Konstantin Parshin, “Agreement on Regional Water-Management Pact Remains Elusive,” Eurasia Insight,

October 15, 2008.60. Raghuveer Sharma et al., Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: Improving Regional Cooperation in the Syr

Darya Basin (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004), p. 4. Transfers from the Union budget as a percent-age of total government revenue were the highest in Central Asia: Tajikistan (46.6 percent), Uzbekistan (42.9


142 Asian Security

percent), Kyrgyzstan (35.5 percent), Kazakhstan (23.1 percent), and Turkmenistan (21.7 percent). SeeAlexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 68.

61. Spoor, “Transition to Market Economies,” pp. 142–144, 151–153; and Luigi De Martino and Viktor Novikov,“The Case of the Eastern Caspian Region,” in Environment and Security (Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP,2008), pp. 18–19.

62. Dinara Kemelova and Gennady Zhalkubaev, “Water, Conflict and Regional Security in Central Asia Revis-ited,” New York University Environmental Law Journal Vol. 11, No. 2 (2003), p. 480.

63. EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” p. 15.64. Weinthal, “Water Conflict and Cooperation,” pp. 15–17; and Kai Wegerich, Oliver Olsson, and Jochen

Froebrich, “Reliving the Past in a Changed Environment: Hydropower Ambitions, Opportunities, andConstraints in Tajikistan,” Energy Policy No. 35 (2007), pp. 3817–3819.

65. Tanton and Heaven, “Worsening of the Aral Basin Crisis,” p. 365; Ian MacWilliam, “Central Asia’s RiverRivalry,” BBC News, February 19, 2004; and Bruce Pannier, “Severe Flooding Expected after Harsh Winter,”Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 9, 2008.

66. Marat Yermukanov, “Lack of Regional Coordination Facilitates Regular Flooding in Central Asia,”Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 6, 2005; Sergei Arbenin, “Central Asia Desperate for a Water Peace,”Ferghana.ru, March 30, 2008; and Joanna Lillis, “Water Woes Stoke Economic Worries,” Eurasia Insight,April 28, 2008.

67. Wegerich et al., “Reliving the Past,” pp. 3817–3819; “Turkmenistan Scrambles to Contain Effects of FrozenAmudarya River,” News Central Asia, January 22, 2008; and Pannier, “Severe Flooding Expected.”

68. EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” p. 13.69. Wegerich, “Not a Simple Path,” p. 12. Confrontations have erupted between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

(Kayrakum reservoir, Tajikistan), Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Tuyamuyun reservoir, Uzbekistan), andKazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Chardara reservoir, Kazakhstan).

70. Dukhovny, “Water and Globalization,” p. 495; and Kipping, “Can ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’Silence Malthusian Concerns?” p. 314.

71. ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” p. 28; and Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis,” p. 560.72. “‘Downstream’ Countries Agree to Share Water Costs with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,” Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty, July 24, 2009.73. Bruce Pannier, “Battle Lines Drawn in Central Asian Water Dispute,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,

April 19, 2009.74. Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis,” p. 560; Sokolov, “Experiences with IWRM,” p. 65; “Central Asia: Ferghana,”

p. 26; Dukhovny, “Water and Globalization,” p. 506; Alec Crawford and Oli Brown, Growing Unrest: TheLinks Between Farmed and Fished Resources and the Risk of Conflict (Winnipeg, Canada: International Insti-tute for Sustainable Development, 2008), p. 30; and Oxana Sivtsova and Marik Koshabaev, “Kazak CottonFarmers’ Poor Prospects,” IWPR, January 9, 2009. In 2000, about 35 percent of irrigated land was devoted tocotton cultivation, 30 percent to wheat, 12 percent to fruit and vegetables, 9 percent to fodder, 5 percent torice, and 9 percent to other minor crops. The relative returns are: cotton ($650/ha to $1,315/ha), rice ($675/hato $1,000/ha), wheat ($150/ha to $450/ha). Within PSCA, the most inexpensive grain is grown in Kazakhstan,most cost-effective sugar and potatoes are in Kyrgyzstan, fruit and vegetables in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,and maize in Uzbekistan.

75. Kathleen Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Caseof Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 61, No. 2 (2009), pp. 269–270.

76. Julia Bucknall, Irina Klytchnikova, Julian Lampietti, Mark Lundell, Monica Scatasta, and Mike Thurman,Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, Economic, and Environmental Considerations (Washington, DC: TheWorld Bank, 2003), p. 4; and Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism,” pp. 269–270.

77. ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” pp. 2–5, 7, 10–12; and Bucknall et al., Irrigation in Central Asia, p. 4.78. Wegerich, “Not a Simple Path,” p. 18.79. J. Michael Biddison, “The Study on Water and Energy Nexus in Central Asia” (Manila, the Philippines: Asian

Development Bank, 2002), p. vi; Victor A. Dukhovny, “The Aral Sea Basin: Rumors, Realities, Prospects,”Irrigation and Drainage Vol. 52 (2003), p. 115; ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” p. 29; Dukhovny et al., “Drain-age in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. S94; and Dukhovny, “Water and Globalization,” p. 500. From 1993 to 2003, theprice of rice decreased by 50 percent ($300 to $150 per ton), wheat by 40 percent ($200 to $120), and cottonby 55 percent ($1,760 to $800).

80. “Statement of Heads of Water Economy Organizations of Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan,”CAWaterInfo, October 10–12, 1991. Available at http://www.cawater-info.net.

81. “Statute of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia,” CAWaterInfo, February 18,1992. Available at http://www.cawater-info.net.

82. Weinthal, “Water Conflict and Cooperation,” p. 8.83. Kemelova and Zhalkubaev, “Water, Conflict, and Regional Security,” p. 485; EDB, “Water and Energy

Resources in Central Asia,” p. 9; O’Hara and Hannan, “Irrigation and Water Management,” p. 33; KaiWegerich, “Hydro-hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,” Water Policy Vol. 10, No. S2 (2008), p. 78; andErkin Akhmadov, “Uzbekistan Opts for Food Crops Production,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst(CACI Analyst), October 29, 2008.



84. Allouche, “The Governance of Central Asian Waters,” p. 48; and Alexander Carius, Geoffrey D. Dabelko,and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water, Conflict, and Cooperation,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsEnvironmental Change and Security Project Report No. 10 (2004), p. 62. UN water expertise is spreadamong the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP),UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and various UN economic commissions.

85. Dukhovny, “Water and Globalization,” pp. 497–498.86. Alexander Carius, “Environmental Peace-Building: Conditions for Success,” in Geoffrey D. Dabelko, ed.,

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Environmental Change and Security Project ReportNo. 12 (2006–2007), p. 66.

87. ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” p. 6.88. ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” p. 17; and Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony,” p. 82.89. Wines, “Grand Soviet Scheme;” and Wouters et al., Implementing Integrated Water Resources Management,

p. 116.90. Lowi, Water and Power, p. 1.91. See Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy, pp. 64–94, 109–125.92. Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony,” pp. 76–77.93. Stephen J. Blank, “Russia and China in Central Asia,” in Stephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds.,

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 41–51;Joseph P. Ferguson, “Russian Strategic Thinking toward Central, South, and Southeast Asia,” in GilbertRozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson, eds., Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 207–216; and Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony?” pp. 159–161.

94. Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony,” pp. 76–77; and Deyermond, “Matrioshka Hegemony?” pp. 162–164.95. Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism,” pp. 259, 265–266; and Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in

Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International Affairs Vol. 80, No. 3 (2004),pp. 486–489.

96. Ebon Lee, “Central Asia’s Balancing Act: Between Terrorism and Interventionism,” Harvard InternationalReview Vol. 23, No. 2 (2001), pp. 30–33.

97. Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism,” pp. 260–261. SCO members include China, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

98. Roger McDermott, “CSTO Rapid Reaction Exercises Get off to Discouraging Start,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 27, 2009. CSTO members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rus-sia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

99. Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet NationalIdentities,” Russian Review Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 201–226; and Lee, “Central Asia’s BalancingAct.”

100. See Charlotte Niklasson, Russian Leverage in Central Asia (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency,2008).

101. Gregory Gleason, “The Russo-Georgian War and Great Power Politics,” CACI Analyst, September 17,2008; and Stephen J. Blank, “Georgia: The War Russia Lost,” Military Review (Nov-Dec 2008), pp. 41–42.Russia (August 26, 2008) and Nicaragua (September 5, 2008) are the only UN member states which formallyrecognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.

102. “Reports: Kyrgyzstan to Close Key U.S. Base,” CNN, February 3, 2009; and Arkady Dubnov, “Bakiyev’sExpensive Gift to Moscow,” Vremya Novosti, January 12, 2009. The $2-billion financial assistance packageincluded a $300-million, 40-year loan and $180 million in debt reduction.

103. Roger McDermott, “Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Confirm New Supply Routes,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,March 5, 2009; and Bruce Pannier, “Shifting Tides of Influence in Central Asia,” Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty, August 1, 2009. Washington tripled its annual rent to $60 million and promised a $100 million secu-rity package.

104. Aleksandr Shustov, “The ‘Upstream’ against the ‘Downstream’ Countries,” Global Research, April 23, 2009;and Antoine Blua, “Central Asian Leaders Fail to Overcome Differences at Water Summit,” Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, April 28, 2009.

105. Farangis Najibullah, “Moscow Seeking Alliances in Energy-Rich Central Asia,” Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty, September 4, 2008; and Dubnov, “Bakiyev’s Expensive Gift.”

106. Inga Sikorskaya, “Russian Leader Tries to Keep Uzbeks on Side,” IWPR, January 30, 2009; and Pannier,“Battle Lines Drawn.”

107. Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates, and Actions (New York: Routledge,2003), pp. 140–170; Andrei Kazantsev, “Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region,”Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 6 (2008), pp. 1073–1088; and Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asia’s GreatWater Game,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 4, 2009.

108. Ferguson, “Russian Strategic Thinking toward Central, South, and Southeast Asia,” p. 211.109. A country is double-landlocked if all its neighbors are also landlocked.110. Jypara Abdrahmanova and Elina Karakulova, “Uzbek Gas Hike Leaves Neighbors in the Cold,” IWPR,

January 11, 2008; Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asia’s Era of Cheap Gas Comes to a Close,” Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, January 6, 2009; and Pannier, “Battle Lines Drawn.”


144 Asian Security

111. Najibullah, “Central Asia’s Era of Cheap Gas;” and Erkin Ahmadov, “Identifying Priorities: Uzbek Gas –For Export,” CACI Analyst, January 23, 2008.

112. EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” p. 23.113. Alexander Sadikov, “Tajikistan’s Ambitious Energy Projects Cause Tension with Uzbekistan,” Eurasia

Insight, October 4, 2006; Sergey Medrea, “Tajikistan Once Again Plunges into Darkness and Cold,” CACIAnalyst, February 6, 2008; Najibullah, “Central Asia’s Era of Cheap Gas;” EDB, “Water and EnergyResources in Central Asia,” p. 23; and “Tajik Minister Says Uzbekistan Violating Energy Agreement,”Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 21, 2009.

114. EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” p. 25; and “Uzbekistan Closes Border with Tajikistan,with No Explanation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 1, 2008. Uzbekistan is also the keytransport cog within the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation corridors. See Michael Emersonand Evgeny Vinokurov, “Optimization of Central Asian and Eurasian Transcontinental Land TransportCorridors,” EU–Central Asia Monitoring, Working Paper No. 7, 2009.

115. Bruce Pannier, “Kazakh, Tajik Presidents Show Oil and Water Do Mix,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,May 14, 2008.

116. Turkmenistan is not an EEC member state.117. Parshin, “Agreement on Regional Water-Management Pact Remains Elusive;” and John C. K. Daly, “Iran

Enters Tajik Energy Market as United States and Russia Idle,” UPI, February 12, 2009.118. Monika Shepherd, “Regional Central Asian Water Politics May Benefit Kyrgyz President Domestically,”

The ISCIP Analyst, October 23, 2008.119. Bruce Pannier, “Central Asians Achieve Breakthrough over Precious Resources,” Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty, October 22, 2008; and Estelle Erimova, Asyl Osmonalieva, and Mukammal Odinaeva, “Tajik,Kyrgyz Concern at Moscow’s New Energy Policy,” IWPR, February 4, 2009.

120. This is unlike Egypt, which is furthest downstream along the Nile and has achieved hydro-hegemony by ful-filling Luke’s “Three Dimensions of Power.” See Daniel Kendie, “Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the BlueNile River,” Northeast African Studies Vol. 6, No. 1–2 (1999), pp. 141–169; and Ana Elisa Cascão, “Ethiopia:Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin,” Water Policy Vol. 10, No. S2 (2008), pp. 13–28.

121. Wegerich, “Hydro-Hegemony,” p. 87.122. Current HPP projects include Rogun (3,600 MWt), Sandtudin 1&2 (899 MWt), Shurob (850 MWt), and

Dashtijum (4,000 MWt) in Tajikistan; and Kambarata 1&2 (2,260 MWt), and a series of five power plantswith 1,500 MWt capacity in Kyrgyzstan. See EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” p. 13;and Evgeny Vinokurov, “Financing Infrastructure in Central Asia: Water and Energy Nexus,” WorldFinance Review, Spring 2007, p. 137.

123. Maria Golovnina, “Water Squabbles Irrigate Tensions in Central Asia,” Reuters, June 12, 2008; and David L.Stern, “Tajikistan Hopes Water Will Power Its Ambitions,” New York Times, September 1, 2008.

124. “Water, Trade, Energy Dominate Turkmenistan-Iran Talks,” News Central Asia, August 15, 2007; Sadikov,“Tajikistan’s Ambitious Energy Projects;” Stern, “Tajikistan Hopes Water Will Power Its Ambitions;”Farangis Najibullah, “Trip Cancellation Fuels Rumors of Rift in Tajik-Russian Relations,” Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, February 2, 2009; and Daly, “Iran Enters Tajik Energy Market.”

125. Stern, “Tajikistan Hopes Water Will Power Its Ambitions.”126. “National Water Laws of Central Asian Countries,” CAWaterInfo. Available at http://www.cawater-info.net127. Weinthal, “Water Conflict and Cooperation,” p. 6.128. Bea Hogan, “Central Asian States Wrangle over Water,” EurasiaNet, April 5, 2000.129. Pannier, “Battle Lines Drawn.”130. “Regional Water Management Lacks Cohesion,” IRIN, April 25, 2007.131. Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony,” p. 81.132. Asian Development Bank, “Improved Management of Water Resources in Central Asia,” Regional Technical

Assistance Report (September 2008), p. 2.133. Kemelova and Zhalkubaev, “Water, Conflict, and Regional Security,” pp. 487–489.134. Irina Kazorina, “Koksaray Water Reservoir Project Continues to Attract Heated Debate,” Ferghana.ru, July

8, 2008.135. Marina Kozlova, “Giant Turkmen Lake Sets off Environmental Alarms,” Asia Water Wire, June 19, 2006;

Pannier, “Kazakh, Tajik Presidents Show Oil and Water Do Mix;” and “Turkmen ‘Golden Lake’ May ProveGreen Disaster,” IWPR, July 31, 2009. The Altyn Asyr is constructed by filling the Karashor Depression(120 km) with drainage water channeled by the Dashoguz (432 km) and Great Turkmen (720 km) Collec-tors. At completion, the expected dimensions of the lake are: depth, 130 m; area, 3,460 km2; volume, 135 km3

to 145 km3; cost, $6 billion to $9 billion.136. Richard Stone, “A New Great Lake – or Dead Sea?” Science Vol. 320, No. 5879 (May 2008), pp. 1002–1005;

Pannier, “Central Asians Achieve breakthrough;” and ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” p. 25. Skeptics estimatethat the lake will require an additional 10 km3 annually from the Amu Darya.

137. ICG, “The Curse of Cotton,” pp. 10, 18; and Najibullah, “Central Asia’s Era of Cheap Gas.”138. Payrav Chorshanbiyev, “Tajik Researchers Launch Renewable Energy Use Program,” Asia-Plus, December

2, 2008.139. EDB, “Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia,” pp. 4, 10. The percentage of ASB hydroelectrical

potential and actual realization in PSCA: 68.9 percent of potential but realized only 3.7 percent in Tajikistan;



21.5 percent and 3.0 percent in Kyrgyzstan; 5.9 percent and 1.7 percent in Kazakhstan; 3.3 percent and1.3 percent in Uzbekistan; and 0.4 percent and 0.0 percent in Turkmenistan.

140. “Central Asian States Should Start Negotiations over Water, Give up Rigid Positions,” Ferghana.ru, August11, 2008.

141. Sharma et al. Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia, p. 20. Uzbekistan’s energy intensity is 6,716 kg of oilequivalent per dollar of gross domestic product.

142. Wegerich, “Hydro-hegemony,” p. 82.143. Parshin, “Agreement on Regional Water-Management Pact Remains Elusive;” Wegerich et al., “Reliving the

Past,” pp. 3820–3821; Evgeny Vinokurov, The CIS Common Electric Power Market (Almaty, Kazakhstan:EDB, 2008), p. 21; and Vinokurov, “Financing Infrastructure in Central Asia,” p. 138. Kazakhstan hasadopted a “virtual energy” policy which leverages on cheaper external sources of energy while preserving itshydrocarbons for export.

144. Vinokurov, “Financing Infrastructure in Central Asia,” p. 139.145. Wegerich, “Hydro-Hegemony,” p. 83; Pannier, “Kazakh, Tajik Presidents Show Oil and Water Do Mix;”

and Konstantin Parshin, “President Renews Push to Create Central Asian Water Consortium,” EurasiaInsight, July 8, 2008.

146. Sievers, “Water, Conflict, and Regional Security,” pp. 367–368; Micklin, “Soviet Water Diversion Plans,”p. 23; and O’Hara, “Lessons from the Past,” p. 369–370.

147. Ed Ring, “Siberian Water to Save the Aral Sea,” EcoWorld, November 6, 2005; and John C. K. Daly, “Cen-tral Asian Water and Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 13, 2008.

148. “Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev Swear Allegiance to Russia and Ask Water from It,”Ferghana.ru, September 4, 2006; and Joanna Lillis, “Central Asian Leaders Seek to Improve Regional Coop-eration,” Eurasia Insight, September 7, 2006.

149. Wouters et al., Implementing Integrated Water Resources Management, p. 87.150. Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis,” p. 550.151. “Saving a Corner of the Aral Sea,” World Bank Press Release, September 1, 2005. Available at http://

worldbank.org; and Ilan Greenberg, “As a Sea Rises, so Do Hopes for Fish, Jobs, and Riches,” New YorkTimes, April 6, 2006.

152. Micklin, “The Aral Sea Crisis,” p. 551; Natalya Antelava, “Kazakhs Get Loan to Save Aral Sea,” BBC, April 9,2007; and NASA, “North Aral Sea Recovery,” Earth Observatory, May 4, 2007. Available at http://earthob-servatory.nasa.gov/.

153. Shlomi Dinar, “Assessing Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Patterns in International Water Agreements: TheGeographic and Economic Connection,” Political Geography Vol. 25 (2006), p. 412.

154. Haftendorn, “Water and International Conflict,” p. 66; and Dinar et al., Bridges over Water, p. 149.155. Dinar, “Assessing Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Patterns,” p. 412; and Joshua Getzler, A History of Water

Rights at Common Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 3, 122–127.156. Salman M. A. Salman, “The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention, and the Berlin Rules: Per-

spectives on International Water Law,” International Journal of Water Resources Development Vol. 23, No. 4(2007), pp. 627–628; and Dinar, “Assessing Side-Payment and Cost-Sharing Patterns,” pp. 414–415.

157. Zeitoun and Allan, “Applying Hegemony and Power Theory,” p. 10.158. Wegerich, “Hydro-Hegemony,” p. 71.

Samuel Chan completed the Russian and East European Studies program at St. Antony’s College,University of Oxford, on a British Chevening Scholarship (2008–2009). He is currently an associateresearch fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.


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