asimetrica reciprocidad
TRANSCRIPT
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 1/24
Asymmetrical Reciprocity: A Contribution to the Theory of Political Legitimacy [and
Comments and Reply]Author(s): Henry Orenstein, Claude Ake, Eugene Cooper, Carol S. Holzberg, Lawrence Krader,Donald V. Kurtz, John Liep, Kazunori Oshima and Dennis H. WrongSource: Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 69-91Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2741743 .
Accessed: 01/09/2013 10:52
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology.
http://www.jstor.org
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 2/24
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
Vol.
21,
No.
1, February
1980
?
1979 by The Wenner-GrenFoundation for Anthropological Research
0011-3204/80/2101-0002$02.75
Asymmetrical
eciprocity:A
Contribution o
the Theory of Political Legitimacy1
by Henry Orenstein
WHEN AN ARMED THIEF
givesorders
o
his
victims,
e need
not
provide
reasons hat they houldobey. His
weapon is
reason
enough.ndividual riminal cts apart, suchpower ometimes
erupts
uring imes
f
violent
olitical
pheaval,
s
in
military
conquestsor coups, but it is
usually
transient.
onquerors,
f
theyremain o rule, nd
soldier-rebels,
f
they
win and
choose
to reign
penly-as they
arely
o
(Finer
1962)-almost always
voice some
compelling
easons
hat
they
hould be
obeyed,
n
the
hope,
often
ltimately
ewarded,
hat t least
the veneer f
not he
ubstance f heir
ubjects' ubmission
illbe "willing.
Among
these reasons there
will always be
some
notions,
"legitimizing
rinciples," earing
irectly pon the
"rightness"
of the
particular orm fdomination.
hese principles
shall
refer o as "political
deology" using
the term n a
narrower
sense
than s usual.)2
The topic of
political
egitimacys
indisputablymportant.
Max Weber uses a typology f legitimacy-his well-known
"traditional,"
charismatic," nd "rational"
types-as
a
point
of departure n
his mainwritings n
politics. n
anthropology
we have been
remiss.Apart
from
volutionary chemes nd
classificationsf
political
ystems,
ome
ofour
best efforts ave
been
on
the tactics and strategies f political truggle
e.g.,
Burling 974,Bailey 1969).
To
the extent hat nthropologists
have discussed egitimacy, hey have rarely considered he
content
f the
"reasons for domination."The reasons are
generally reated bstractly nd taken o be, at best,
imiting-
placingboundaries
bout the tactics nd strategieshat domi-
natorsmay employ. here are, for nstance, irth's
1964) ob-
servations
hat
political ominatorslways eek the
support f
the
dominated,
ence
re
always constrained y them;Balan-
dier's
1976) cogent
butgeneraldiscussion fthe nterrelated-
ness ofpower, oercion,
nd ideology; nd discussions f myths
as
"charters" orpolitical
uthoritye.g., Leach 1954,Bohan-
nan 1952). In such studies deology s viewed as
sustaining
persistent olitical ystems nd sometimes s restricting
he
actions
of
political eadership.The effects f the
content f
legitimizing rinciples
n the politicalprocesshave rarely, f
ever,beenconsideredn detail n anthropology.
I approach this topic under the influence f
Weber. My
concern
s
with the viability nd practical
effectiveness
f
political deology nd
with the degreeto which an ideology
may (or may not) coexistwithor replace nother,
ong-estab-
lished n a society. ike Weber, hold that political
deologies
often
entail
a potentialfor their own alteration
nd/or for
altering he social
and
politicalrelations hey
re intended o
sustain.
depart
fromWeber n
being
more
mphatically
unc-
tional.
ndeed, my
functionalisms of
a
fundamentalist
ort,
leaningheavilyupon
Durkheim n a concern or ocial solidar-
ity.3 his perspective ill uggest, mong
ther ses
n
theory,
a useful efinition
f
political egitimacy.
Political deologies
xist
n
almost
ll
societies. espite much
variationndetail, believe heyfall nto limited umber f
types.Examples
of
uch
typesmay
well
be all
or
some
of
those
used
by
Weber.
Here
describe
worelated
ypes-two
variants
on
a
single
modeof
thought-that
he does not
discuss.
The
two
are related
n
that
they
have their
ource
n
what
ppears
to be
a
panhuman
moral
predisposition,
he
norm of
reciprocity.
This
is
the
belief, imply
tated,
that a favorreceived
arries
with
t an
obligation
o
return
favor. n the
history
fWestern
thought,
he
universality
f
this
norm
was
first
uggested,
formally
nd
forcibly,y
Aristotle
1943:162): "People
seek to
return
.
.
good
for
good."
In
recent
imes t has been treated
HENRY
ORENSTEIN
s Professor
f
Anthropology t
Brooklyn
College
Brooklyn,N.Y.
11210,
U.S.A.)
and
the
Graduate
Cen-
ter
of
the
City
University
f
New
York.
Born n
1924,he was edu-
cated at the
University f California
t
Berkeley B.A.,
1950;
Ph.D., 1957).
He has
taughtat
Syracuse
University
1957-58)
and at
Tulane
University
1958-67).
His
research
nterests re
political
nd legal
anthropology,
tructural
nalysis,method
nd
theory
n
anthropology,
hilosophical
anthropology
especially
ethical
theory),
pplied
anthropology,
nd
South
Asia. His
publi-
cations
nclude Gaon:
Conflict
nd Cohesion n an
Indian
Village
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1965);
"Accumulation
and
Disjunction
n
Ethnographic
Method"
(Humqan
rganization
30); "A
Preliminary
Application
of
Ethnological
Analysis to
Ethical and
Meta-ethical
Theory,"
n
Human Values
and
Natural
Science,edited
by E. Laszlo
and J.
Wilbur
New
York:
Gordon
and
Breach,
1970);
"The
Structure f
Hindu Caste
Values:
A
Preliminary
tudy
of
Hierarchy nd
Ritual Defilement" Eth-notogy); and "Death and Kinship n Hinduism:Structuralnd
Functional
nterpretations"
American
Anthropologist
2).
The
present
aperwas
submitted n final
form 5
xi
78.
I
I am
grateful
or he
assistanceof
many persons n
the
construc-
tion of
this
paper.
Aaron
Shotten'scriticisms nd
suggestions
ave
been
exceedingly
aluable.Jean
Orenstein ave me
both
encourage-
ment and
helpful
suggestions.
My
colleagues,John
Beatty and
Stephen
Wilde,made
many useful
omments.
n
particular, am in
debtto
Ned Polsky
forhisacute
criticisms f
another
version.
2
In the
past I
have used the
term
ideology" in the
usual way,
following
Mannheim
1936); see
Orenstein
1968:274-75).
I
Weber'sworkhas
been nterpretedn what seem to me
functional
terms by Parsons (1937),
but Bendix's (1960) synthesis
s quite
different. hile these re
matters est eft o the
decision
of
scholars
who have closely tudiedWeber's work,myown reading eadsme to
see it
much as
does Bendix.
This
is
especially rue
of Weber's
treat-
mentof typesof authority.
Vol. 21 * No. 1 February
980 69
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 3/24
as
universal
y many
students f
society e.g.,
Westermarck
1908:154; Hobhouse
1951:12;
Thurnwald
1932:106;
Simmel
1950
1908]:387;
Mauss 1954
1925];
evi-Strauss
969;
Homans
1958; Gouldner
1960).
Its
universalitymay
be
due
to
some
innate arithmetic
f the human
mind,"
r
it
may
be
that, n
Aristotelian
hrasing
1943:163),
"it is this
nterchange
hat
holds
society
ogether."
Whether
xplicit
r
implicit,
whether
innate
to the human
mind
or
a condition
ecessary
or
ocial
life, r
whetheras seems
ikely
o
me)
all
of
these,
eciprocity
is
a moral
mperative eeply
mplicated
n
many
actions
nd
beliefsn all human ocieties t all times.
While
I
believe
the
norm
s
universal,
suggest,
however
paradoxically,
hat some of
its most
mportant
onsequences
consist
n
its
socially pproved
violationn the
political
ife
of
communities.
repeat,
ocially
pproved;
do not mean ndi-
vidual
or group violations
or covert evasions
that
may
be
censured
if
discovered)
s
errors
r immoralities.
ather,
mean
violations f
the rule
that
are
contemplated
s
proper-
violations
hat
are
themselves
referredr
prescribed
y
rule
in
particular
political
conditions.
uch violations re often
understood s
one
of
the
main
reasons
or
ollowing
leader.
shall refer o them
s
instances
f
asymmetrical
eciprocity.
The
approved
deviations
may
be
in
either
f
two
directions.
The
leader
may
be
conceived s
giving
more n
goods
and/or
services
hanhe
receives-or, fyouwill, s giving y grace nd
receiving
s of
right; ence,
he eader s a
"creditor" nd
must
be
obeyedby his
constituency,
is
"debtors."
Alternatively,
the
constituency,
aving
elevated
one
of its
members o a
position fpolitical
minence,may now hold
him
n
its
debt
for hat
honor,
debt thathe can never
ully ischarge
s long
as
he
remains n
office; encehe must
comply or
appear
to
comply)
with their demands
for
goods
and/or
services.
n
either
orm,
he
flow
f
material
benefitss
thought
o be in
the
same
direction-from
he
center,
he
politically
minent,
to the
periphery,
he
constituency.
n
one
form, owever, he
demand-right
ies
with the
leader; commands manate from
the
center;
he
symmetry
s
centrifugal.n theother
orm,
he
demand-right
esides,
ot
with he
center,
he one
elevatedto
office,
ut with he
periphery,
is
constituency;
ence he sym-
metry s centripetal.4
"Violations"
ike these
do not
involve
suspension
f
the
norm
f
reciprocity.
n thecontrary,
he
nticipated
eviation
is
accompanied y
a
belief
n
the
propriety f the
norm. t is
the
persistence
f
this
belief hat
places
constraints
pon the
beneficiary
o
obey his
benefactor.
I
stress
hat
asymmetrical
eciprocitynd its
subdivisions
are
purely emic"
categories; hey
ubsume
peoples'
political
ideas
and
ideals. One
need not
treat them n
this way. For
instance,
Burrows nd
Spiro
(1953:173) point
out that
the
Ifaluk
viewthe
gifts iven
y their
hiefs s
"one-way ransac-
tions."
The
ethnographers
refer o
conceptualize he
process
differently.hey hold
that
reciprocity
s, in fact,
achieved
through
the
dignity
nd
authority
ccorded the
chiefs;
..
thenatives hemselves o notconnect hetwo.... It is only
to the
foreign bserver
hat the
two
seem
reciprocal." My
types
refer
xclusively
o
the
"native's"
perspective,
lthough
I
am
much
oncerned,n
addition,
with he
processes, micor
etic,
hat
are
related
o this
perspective.
My
subject
nd
economic
nthropology
verlap,but, as
the
examples
o
followwill
show, the
concepts
suggestdo
not
always coincide
with
hose
urrently sed
in economic
nthro-
pology.
Centripetality
r
centrifugality
an, and
the latter
often
does,
coincidewith
redistributive
conomies, ut
either
political
orm
an
coexist
with
reciprocal,
redistributive,
r
even a
market conomy. or example, f the political
deology
is centripetaln a redistributiveconomy,
he
demand-right
resideswith he
constituents,owevermuch r ittle heymay,
infact, ave
contributedo the entral tockpile.f thepolitical
ideology s centrifugaln a reciprocal conomic
ystem, oods
and services re exchanged rather han accumulated
nd re-
distributed),
ut
the demand-rights heldby the
eader,forhe
is believed o give more han he receives.
In
the
first
art of thispaper willdiscuss he main
charac-
teristics
f he
wokinds f
symmetricaleciprocity-to xpose
the bare bones of the opposition etween entrifugalitynd
centripetality.
n
the secondpart will examine
entrifugality
in
depth. It is by far he
morewidespread ind.) n the third
I
will uggest ome of
the mplications f the concept f asym-
metrical eciprocityor ractice nd theory. willgive
a num-
ber of hypotheses hat
believereliablebut that may be dis-
confirmedf
examined
t greater ength han a paper such as
this nd my imited
xpertise ermit.My purpose, insist, s
not to uphold this or that generalization s
confidentlyon-
firmed-they ll have
the virtue f beingdisconfirmable-but,
rather, o convince he
reader hat the conceptsput forward
here will help elicit
theoreticallymportant nd practically
useful ypotheses or n anthropologyf political ife.
CENTRIFUGALITY
AND CENTRIPETALITY
Centrifugality,ecently
ut to nterestingse by Sahlins 1963),
has been aptly
described y Mauss (1954
[1925]:72,
73):
Between assals
nd chiefs,etween assals nd their
enchmen,he
hierarchys establishedymeans f .. gifts. o give s to how ne's
superiority,o how hat
ne s something ore ndhigher,hat
ne
is magister.o acceptwithout eturningr repaying ore
s to face
subordination,o become
lient nd subservient,o becomeminister.
... In those arly ivilizationsne had interestsut they iffered
from
hose
f
ur ime. here,fonehoards,t s only o
spend
ater
on, oputpeople nder
bligationsnd towin ollowers.
Rural
India provides
good example f centrifugality.
he
caste that s
politically ominant
n
village ndia
is
usually
not
thehighestnritualrank.One of the reasons or ts dominant
position s that, n
theory
t
least, t owns
the
site
on which
others, he service astes including hoseritually igher
han
it), build theirhomes
e.g., see Srinivas1955, 1959,
1966:151-
52; Mandelbaum
1970:207-8; Orenstein 965:157).
The domi-
nant
group distributes gifts" besides residence
ites;
its
members rovide the largerpart of the finances eeded
for
village eremonies,
nd
they end
to be
the
most
frequent
nd
largest
onors f lms to
the villagepoor. Most
important,
he
dominant aste stands t
the
center
f
the
ajmani
system,
he
traditional
conomic
ystem
revalent
n much
of
rural
ndia.
In
this
system-as
found
n
Maharashtra
nd
probably
lse-
where
n
India-service castes
provide
the
dominant aste
(and
one
another) with
goods
and services
rope, pottery,
villagewatchmen, tc.) of limited ind no largerwaterpots,
for
nstance)
n
unlimited
uantities
n
exchange
or
roughly
understood
ercentage
f
theharvest
e.g.,
ee
Orenstein
962a;
1965:204, 24). The
system ieldsmuchpower
o thedominant
group,
so much that
some anthropologists
ave called
it
exploitative Lewis
and Barnouw
1958,
Beidelman
1959,
but
cf. Orenstein
962b).
Yet
the ideal
behind
the
system s,
as
expressed
n a
village
n
Mysore,
"Give
More,
Receive
ess"
(Ishwaran 1966:40).
As
is
recognized y
all
participants in
Maharashtra,
t
least),
the dominant aste
in fact
gives
far
more n
value, as comparedwith
what could
be had
in the
(readily vailable) marketplace,
n the
crops
t distributes
han
it receives n goods and services Orenstein
962a;
1965:225-
26). This is the main
reasonfor ts power; ervice astes
con-
struethemselves s debtors nd fearthe disaffectionfthose
fromwhom they seek
economicgain. Its power is
limited,
primarily ecause its ranks re tornby internal
ivalry
e.g.,
4
My use
of the
terms
centrifugal"
nd
"centripetal"
may
seem
odd to
some
readers.The
term
"centrifugal"
has been
applied to
societies n a senseimplying,s I interpret he intendedmeaning,"fragmenting"r,perhaps, falling part." My use
is
unrelated o
the
condition f
society;
t
focuses
on the
deas
regardinghe
rela-
tionship
f
the
center
leadership) o
ts
periphery
followers).
70
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 4/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
ee
Cohn
1955;
Lewis
1958;
Orenstein
965:188-97).
It
is,
however, y far the
mostpowerful
aste
in
the
village
nd
is
so perceived.
n
Maharashtra,
members
of
this caste
are
sometimes
ddressed r
referred
o
as
"owner"
mdlak),
be-
cause
they
wn the
village."
Their
position
s due
solely
o
the
fact hat
they
re
conceived s
the
village reditors.
Thus, we
find
entrifugality
n
nearlypure
form
n
village
India, where ocial
organization
s
elaborate
and
technology
relativelyomplex.
his
kind
of
deology
s
found,
owever,
t
virtually
very
level" of
technological
omplexity,
nd
it
may
dependupontheownershipr control fvirtuallynykindof
economic
ood.
To
make the
contrast
harp,
turn
to
some
tribes
f
Amerinds
f
northwestern
alifornia, eoples
with
"Mesolithic"
echnology.
mong
many
of
these
peoples,
most
notably he
Yurok
and
Hupa, therewere no formal
olitical
offices
nd, indeed,
veryfew
scribed,
anked
positions Gold-
schmidt
1951:509, 511,
512).
Leadershipwas
determined y
wealth. n these
ocieties,
therewere the
rich
nd the
poor,
class differentials
hich
represent continuum
f
status"
(p.
511). Wealth
could be achieved,
but it was
usually
nherited;
"authority ested
n
large measurewith
the
strong, nd .. .
this
trength as
fiscal trength"
p. 512).
Economicposition
was
the
determinant
f
political
power,
because
"owners of
resources nd
of wealth
could surround
hemselveswith a
greater
ody
of
personswilling
o
stand
by them t timesof
crisis.Directly, heowner fresources ould
support
larger
family.
ndirectly,
wealthy
man was
central n a
system
f
mutual
bligations,nd
lesserpersons
ound t
useful o stand
with him"
(p.
513). North of the
Yurok and
Hupa lived
the
Tolowa-Tututni, herewealth
was
so
important hatthe
"rich
man
functioned s a
state surrogate"
Du Bois
1936:54-55;
see
also Drucker
1937:245).
Althoughnone
of
these native
peoples
of
California
ad formal
hiefs, heyhad
firm eader-
ship,
men
who
dominated
thers ecause
heywere
he reditors
oftheir
ociety,while
thers
weretheir
ebtors.
Centrifugality,
ither n
pure
form r
supplemented
y other
political
deologies e.g.,
charisma
r
rationality), as an
im-
mensely
ide
distribution.o
widespreads t
thatwhen
come
upon a
little-known
ociety
anywhere
n
the world
I
am
tempted o assume t holds this deology ntil find ontrary
evidence. t is
foundnot
only n
Hindu ndia, but
also among
some
tribal
groups
of
the South
Asian
subcontinent
Orans
1965:24-25;
Barth
1954:48-49, 76-81,
108), as well
as in
Southeast
Asia
(Leach
1954). Among
Amerinds t
existed
n
the
Great
Plains, t least, s
well
s in
northwestern
alifornia
(Sahlins
1965:207).
Among
the
Yir Yoront
of
Australia,
he
ownership f
a
stone xe
was the exclusive
rerogative f older
males,
who could,
thus, reaffirm
heir
dominant
ositionby
allowing
othersto use it
(Sharp
1952:73-79). The
ideology
was
held
n
many-perhaps most-chiefdoms
nd
monarchies
in
traditional frica,
where t
often upplemented ther
deo-
logical
supportsfor
formal
political
positions
generally he
routinized
harisma
f
kingship) nd
where t was,
in
many
cases, thebulwarkof informaleadership e.g., see Richards
1939:135, 148,
150,
cited by
Sahlins
1965:213; Mair
1964:66-
67,
76-77, 96-97,
100-115; Maquet
1961). t is
also
an
impor-
tant
ideology mong
the peoples
of Oceania
(e.g., see
Duff
Missionaries
799:224-25,
Rodriguez
1919[1774], irth
1959:
133,
all
cited
by Sahlins
1965:208,
210-11;
Sahlins 1962;
Burrows nd
Spiro
1953:72-73).
This is
especially true of
Melanesia;
the
reader
may
have
recognized
n
centrifugality
the
eadership
deology
f
the
Melanesian
big
man"
(Sahlins
1963). Politics
n
traditional ri Lanka
are of
nterest; he king
distributed
and in
returnfor
specifically
efinedformsof
service,
ncluding he
obligation
o fight or
him
n
wartime
(Knox
1911:68-69). The
Sri Lankan
system s
reminiscentf
Western eudalism,
nd one scholar
Ryan 1953 45)
considers
the two systems trictly omparable.There are important
differences,ut
both are
examples f a verynearly
ure
type
of
centrifugality.
The quintessence f centripetalitys expressed y the apho-
rism whosoever fyou willbe
the hiefest,hallbe the ervant
of all" (Mark 10:44). In this
kind of ideology he leader is
thought o give by right nd receiveby grace. The ordinary
people,having levated ne of heirmembers o a superordinate
place, hold him n their ebt for
hat honor nd require imto
supply their expressedneeds.
What the leader gives to his
constituency
s their
ue; what
he
getsfrom hem-largely he
honor f high ffice-isby their race.
A
good example, irtually pure type, f this deology s in
Levi-Strauss's ccount of the
Nambikwara, unting-gathering
nomadswho do a bit of
desultory armingn a desolate and
impoverished art
of
Brazil.
Each littleband of Nambikwara
has a chief.The only "material" advantage accruing o the
chief
s the
right,
ot allowed o
other
men, o have more han
one wife Levi-Strauss
1961:302, 309). This right onstitutes
"the
means
put
at
the
disposition
f
their
hief n
order o help
him
carryout his duties" (p. 307). Women re economically
more mportanthan men pp.
278-79, 305-8), and polygyny
is essential
to a chief's
uthority.He must control urplus
goods,
for
when
an
individual, family
r
a band as a whole
wishes
or
needs
something,
t
is
to the
chief hat
an
appeal
mustbe made" (p. 304). The chiefneedsto be a good singer
and
dancer,
he better
o
entertain
is
people. He makes the
rubber alls they
se in
sports nd the rrow oison hey se in
hunting.
ll of
his kills, n
hunting,couting, nd
in
the
manu-
facture f goods,
re
at the disposal
of his
band (pp. 304-5).
For
example,
ne
chief ed his band via
a
roundabout oute
to
their esired estination;
s a
result, hey
were
delayed
nd
soon found hemselves ithout
ood.
nstead
of
pooling
heir
efforts
o
collect
food,
the
disgruntled
subjects" simply
at
back and rested,
s if
to
say,
"You
got
us into
this,
now
get
us
out." The chief,with the help of one
of
his
wives, pent
the
day collecting rasshoppers
or
he others
o
eat
(Levi-Strauss
1961:287-88). One is not surprised
o hear
that
men often
resist ccepting
he
office f
chief,
or
he Nambikwara hief
s,
indeed,
he
servant
f
his
people.
Their political ideology nd practicehold perils for the
Nambikwara.
Although
man
is
selected
hiefbecause
he
is
thought
o be the most
ble in
his
band,
his
authority
s
feeble,
his powervirtually
onexistent.
e
is like
"a
politician trug-
gling
o
maintain
n uncertain
majority" Levi-Strauss
961:
303-4). He must
be
highly esponsive
o
the
expressed
ishes-
or whims-of
his
constituency,
nd
these,
s
the
grasshopper
incident llustrates, ay
be
as much he
consequence
f
pique,
prejudice, r the
ike
as
of considered oncern
or he
strategic
interests f
the
group.
Leadership"
acks
the
ndependence
o
permit redictable
nd
consistent
movement oward
ong-range
groupgoals. Moreover,
entripetality
esults n a
fragile
ocial
group.
f a band
udges ts chiefwanting,
he members
imply
drift
way
until he
group
s too
smallto fend or
tself,
here-
upon t dissolves nd mergeswith ther roups p. 300).
The
tendency
oward ocial
and
politicalfrailty
nder the
centripetal deology
s illustrated
n
a
societyvery
different
from
he Nambikwara.
n
contrast o
the
Nambikwara,
who
eke out an
existence ittle
above subsistence
primarily y
hunting
nd
gathering,
heAnuak of the Sudan
live in stable
villages
and
are
horticulturalists
ho
also
practice
animal
husbandry.
heirholdon
a
level
rather
much bove
subsistence
is
secure.Yet amongmany
Anuak-not
all, only mong
hose
I
willcall
"village
Anuak"-there
are
clear
similarities
o the
Nambikwara
n
political
deology
nd
practice.
The
village
Anuak
headman's
subjects"
assert hat
theyprefer
im
to be
"like
a
woman,"
utwardly
ubmissive
ut
covertly
irm.
hey
say theywant
a
strong-willed
an
but one
who
can
veil his
strength.ometimes, hough think nly arely, hey etwhat
they say they want (Evans-Pritchard940:-42;
Lienhardt
1957:350-51; but cf. Evans-Pritchard 947:43). In fact, the
Vol.
21
* No. 1 * February
980
71
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 5/24
main
criterion
sed in
picking
headman
is not so
much
strength f character
s
wealth
(Evans-Pritchard
940:43).
Once
selected,
heheadman
cquires
more
wealth;
number
f
his
followers ssist
him in
cultivating
is
fields, ookinghis
feasts,
nd
building
is huts
Evans-Pritchard
940:40,42,
44;
Lienhardt
1957:347).
These
helpers
serve
much the
same
purpose
s
the Nambikwara hief's
xtra
wives,
for
he
head-
man's position carries with t onerous
obligations"
Evans-
Pritchard
940:43-44),
and his
helpers rovide
he
assistance
necessary
o
meet them. He is
expected
to
distribute
oods
lavishlyfor his followers' ridewealthnd to give feasts for
them
frequently Evans-Pritchard
1940:43).
His
followers
"never eave
him n
any
doubt that
t is for
heirbenefit ..
that he is investedwith he
dignity
f
officend
the court
nd
its
ceremonies nd
social
entertainments
re maintained"
(Lienhardt
1957:350).
In
Lienhardt's words
(p.
349),
the
people
"receive
s of
right,
nd
give
and
serve
out of
grace."
While n individual eadman
may
have
power
n
some
cases,
it
does not
derive
fromhis
office. he
office estows none
(Evans-Pritchard
940:44).
Rather,
t
constitutes
point
of
mobilization or
ublic
pinion,
n
important unction
f
which
is
curtailing he
all
too
frequent
village
conflicts Evans-
Pritchard
940:43;
1947:94-95; Lienhardt
958:30-31).
Clear-
ly, the
office s
highly
ignificant or
village Anuak
social
organization.
Despite
the
mportance
f
the
office,
ts
occupant
s
in a
very
unstable
position.
He is not
a
private
person
but
a
village
functionary
nd
f
he
does
not ct
as
such,
ut
he
goes"
Evans-
Pritchard
940:43).
If he is to
meet
the
expectations
f
his
people,he
must gain and
again distribute o
themhis material
resources. o
frequent
re his
distributionshat his
wealth
s
soon
depleted.
At thispoint
he
s
ousted
Lienhardt
957:348).
"Revolutions," sually
bloodless,
re
frequent, orthe
people
stand to
gain from
he nstallation f
a
new
headman-that
is,
from
the new man's as
yet
unstrained
resources
Evans-
Pritchard
940:43;
Lienhardt
958:35).
Thus, among
the village
Anuak
we find ne
office
f
much
political ignificance
etfrequent
nd
often
apricious
isplace-
ment f ts
occupants.
This
may,
t
times, eprive
villageof
a headmanwho has thehighly rized virtueofinnerpsychic
strength. he
importance
f
the
office
s
indisputable;
nder
poor
headman
village can
be
completely ispersed
Evans-
Pritchard
940:48).
Even if
thisdoes
nothappen, he
frequent
rivalries
within he
village nd
the
uncertainty
urroundinghe
headman's
abilities
nd
tenureplace
the village n
jeopardy
(e.g.,
see
Evans-Pritchard
947:92-94).
In
these
xamples
we have two
ocieties,widely
eparated n
space
and
very
differentn most ther
espects, hat hold
much
the
same
political deology,with imilar
onsequences: eaders
who
have
ittle, f ny,
power,who
must ttend
o much o
the
immediate emands
f their
eople that
their apacity o
guide
their
group
nd
hold
t
together
s
eroded.
The
leader
cannot
act even "as
an
honestmotorman
riving
streetcar," orhis
riders'whimsmayrequirehim to departfrom hetracks-to
depart,
hat
s,
for
hort-run
easons,
rom
he
often
mplicit)
strategic oals
of
the
group s
a
whole.
This
weakness
s not
a
necessary
onsequence f
centripetal-
ity. When the
deology s
accompanied
y others,
uch as the
alleged
rationality f
the eader or
his
charisma, e may
have
considerable
olitical
ndependence. ther
factors
may invest
independent
ower n the
central
uthority nder
entripetal-
ity.
For
instance, t is
possible hat a
centripetal
elationship
existed n
the
Roman
Empirebetween
he residents
f Rome
and
their
emperor.
Within the
city of Rome, the
emperor
"supplied he
Roman
peoplewith
heir ood ndtheir
leasures.
They ikedto have
himwith hem
n Rome,where
he could
be
immediately
onscious
f their esires. f
he failed hem,
hey
could demonstraten theirmassesat the publicshows. t was
vital or
the
Empteror
o keep
his clients
ontented"
Mattingly
1957:40-41, mphasismine).
n most ities n the
empire
here
was
self-governmentf
some
kind,
while
n
Rome
itself he
emperorsmade
decisions orthe
people; but "Rome ...
was
their spoilt
child" (Rostovtzeff
960:231). The
emperors'
decisions
egarding he city
of Rome
weredetermined y
their
"subjects'"
demands, enceobviating
he need for too
many
"demonstrations."
Yet
theRoman emperor ad
muchpower.
Political trength,
I
hypothesize, ill
often ccompany he
deology nd
practice
ofcentripetality
hen most of the
activities f the eader
are
directed utward, way from he group o whichhe is respon-
sible; and even then the
constituencymust be
one that is
either gnorant f or ndifferent
o those
ctivities f ts
eader
that
do
not
directly ffect hem.This seems
to have been
true
of
ancient Rome, and it
may hold for other
societies, oo.
Nevertheless, believe these
are special
cases, explicable
exceptions o
the rule that
centripetality,f fullyput
into
practice,
tends to
result
in
weak
leadership
and a
fragile
social group.
This
seems to me
to explainwhy
centripetalitys so rare.
am
not certain hat
the centripetal
deologyfits he
Roman
case. I
know
of
very few cases apart from hose
discussed n
which his
deology
s
significant
ven s a
supplemento
others.
Some Plains
Indians
and
some
South AfricanBushmen
are
possible ontenders,utthedataare notclear e.g., ee Mandel-
baum 1940:222
and Hunter 1823:317,
both cited in
Sahlins
1965:207;
Thomas 1958:183).
We know hat
something
ike
this
kind
of
egitimization
as
appeared from ime to time n
Western
history. he ruler
re-
garded
s
the ervant fthe
ruled s, s
Weber 1954 1922]:
30)
sees t,
found n purest orm
n "immediate
emocratic dmin-
istration."
Examples
he
gives are
the
Swiss township,
ome
towns
n
the United
States,
nd
some
Western niversities.
Perhaps
t has
been
as
evident o the
reader
s
it has been
to
me
that the dea of
centripetalitys one
of the most mportant
constituentsf
modern
emocratic
deology.
As
Weber 1947a
[1922]:389)
observes,
he
electedofficial
n
America becomes
the
servant' f thoseunderhis
authority."
entripetality
s
an
important art of
the appeal for ffice
made at every evel in
democratic overnment,ut I think t is at theheartof the
appeal
and
importantlyffects he actions of
United States
congressmen.
n
Congress
he claim
to
"service"
very
nearly
overwhelms he
claim to
"statesmanship" i.e., substantive
rationality).
A
congressman's
onstituency
s not
comparable
to
an
Anuak
village;
t
s
rarely,fever, solidary
roup
nthe
first
lace,
and
it s
certainly
ot often n
aggregation
f
people
amongwhom
persistent elationships
to the extent hat
such
exist)dependupon
political eadership.
he
pull of
the
centrip-
etal dea s
strong, owever,
nd
t
deeply ffects
he
functioning
of the
officeholder-witness
he
frequency
f
pork-barreling.
t
goes beyond
that.
According
o the
ournalists
Anderson
nd
Kalvelage 1972:24-25):
For neight-centtamp,ny itizen anbuy he ervicesf $42,500-
a-year
ombination
egislator,
essenger,xpediter,
rouble
hooter,
travel
uide
nd
nformationureau. hese re
the orts
f
chores
routine o 435
Representatives
nd
100
Senators
ho
represent
he
home olks
n
Congress.
heir
onstituents'
equestsange
rom
list
of
"everything
hat
hasn'tbeen nvented
et"
to
information
n
"how
o build
pigpen."
A
typical ongressman
verages
bout100
etters
very
working
day
while
ongress
s
n
ession.
When
t's ut
he
gets
hem
t
home.)
He
may
ebel
t
playing
he rrand
oy heprefers
o
play tatesman),
but hemail
ives
im
n
nsight
nto hevoters'
hinking
nd
points
up problems
inor
egislation ight
emedy.
ven the rrands
re
worth
heir
eight
n
votes.
Apart
from he price of the stamp
and the size of the
salary,
this
tatements, believe, fairlyccurate description fthe
position f most ongressmen.
he congressman's
main
venue
to political ndependence
esides-as probablydid
the
Roman
72
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 6/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
mperor's-in
the
indifferencef his
constituency
oward
legislation hat
does not
directly
ffect
t,
although,
n
many
cases, he cannot
be sure
ust
how
much ndifference
xists
nd
about
what
ssues.
These,
then,
re
the two
forms f
political
deology
o
which
I
wish to draw attention.
f our attention
s to
be
rewarded,
we
must take care
at the outset
to avoid
confusing
hese
concepts
with
others f
a sort morefamiliar
o social
science.
Because
discern
ut
twovariants
f
symmetrical
eciprocity,
the
types
may
be confounded
with the trouble-laden
aired
concepts-genuinevs. spurious, radition s. modernity,nd
so on-that
have,
to
my
mind,
more ften
mpeded
han
ided
our
understanding
f
social relations.The
types
I
suggest
differ rom
ichotomies
f this
ort
n a
number f
ways:
1.
Polar dichotomiesn
social science
re
intended
o be
all-
inclusive.
All
societies
re seen as
falling
nto
one
or
the
other
type
or
somewhere
etween he two.
My
types
re
but two
of
a
number.
hey
are
variants n
a
single
general
ype,
ompa-
rable to
Weber's subdivision f
rational
uthority
nto
formal
and
substantive
ationality.
symmetrical
eciprocity ay
play
a
minor
ole,
ossibly
vennone t
all,
n
some
political
ystems.
For
example,
a
political
system
may
be
sustained
almost
exclusively
y
routinized
harisma
possibly
mperial
hina
or
Ptolemaic
gypt) or
by
substantive
ationality
possibly
ome
Plains ndians).2.
Dichotomous
oncepts
generally
re intended
o
charac-
terize
and
contrastwhole
societies.
For
instance,
he
terms
"folk"
nd
"traditional"
enotekinds f
behavior
nd
ways of
thinking hat are believed
to
characterize
many different
domains
f
culture-religion,
inship, rt,
politics,
nd so
on.
While am
much
concerned
with
the
effects
ach
of.
he
two
forms f
asymmetrical
eciprocity
may
have
upon
political
efficiencynd social
solidarity,
he
typology
recommend
subsumes
olitical
deology
lone, not
"total
social
systems."
Indeed,
under each
of
my
types we
find
societies
classed
together
hat
differ
widely
n
features
therthan
ideology
(something
f
a
methodological
dvantage,
n
that t
mayhelp
us
more
asily
o
solate
adhesions"
etween
kind
f
deology
and other olitical rsocialphenomena).
3.
In
most
olar
dichotomies
e find
t one
extreme
Western
society,
or
societies
much
affected
y the
West
("urban,"
"Gesellschaft,"
spurious,"
tc.), while
at
or
near
the
opposed
pole there
re "folk"
societies,
genuine"
societies, nd
the
like.
Most
such
dichotomies
mply
or assert
a
process of
development-a
movement, or
nstance, rom
tradition"
o
"modernity."
he
types
recommend
ave
nothing odo
with
this
sort
of
thinking.
While
centripetality
s
important
n
the
modern
West,
its
importance
s
quite
recent.
The
village
Anuak
and
Nambikwara,
ndisputably
ot "urban"
civiliza-
tions,
may for
ll
we
know
have
adopted
centripetalityong
before t
arose
n
the
West. The
types
here
described re
not
connectedyanyorderly istoricalrocess. pecifically,deny
that there s a
recent
istorical
endency
oward
ither
ype.
In all
or
mostof
the
usual
dichotomies
here s at
least
one
serious
hazard
(apart from
he
oversimplifications
nvolved):
the
preferencesf
the
observer re
likely
o be
implicated n
the
typology
nd
to
determine is
delineation
f ts
characteris-
tics.
T6nnies
1940:38)
has been
explicit n
this:
"[A]
young
man is
warned
against
bad
Gesellschaftsociety],
but
the
expression
ad
Gemeinschaft
community]
iolates
he
meaning
of the
word."
Like
Tonnies,
have my
biases-I am
drawn
o
the
centripetal
ype-but my
classification
s
sufficiently
imple
and
empirically
oncrete
o
circumvent
my
biases; and
this,
believe,will
be evident
hroughout
y
treatment
f the
types.
I
should
dd that,
hough
o consistent istorical rocess sintended
o connect
he types
suggest,
istorical
nd
political
processes
will
be hypothesized
n the
consideration
f ach
type.
CENTRIFUGALITY
A
persistent
deologywill lmost
nvariably e
accompanied y
an
appropriate
oliticalprocess.The
process
may
comprise
mere
gesturemade
from
imeto
timeby the
politically
omi-
nant.When
the
process s so
remote
rom he
professed,
find
nothing
f
nterest
n
the atter.
t is
commonplace
ypocrisy,
a
thin
disguise for
sheer
coercion,
ittle
different
romthe
commands fan armedbandit, nd that s an endof t.
Such
hypocrisies
re not
only
uninteresting,
ut
usually
ephemeral.
ar
more
widespread
nd
far
more
ntriguingre
conditions
herein
n
ideology
s
convincingnd
yet s
under-
mined
because
entangledwith
other
firmly
eld values
that
strip t of
much f ts
potential
or
ealizationn
political
ction.
This
may take
place
with
either
f
the
two
forms fasym-
metrical
eciprocity.
illustrate
with the
centrifugal
ype
as
found n
two
very
different
ocieties. n
both,
centrifugality
was
virtually he
sole
ideology
ustaining
olitical
ction. One
is
Western
eudalism,n
which he
centrifugal
deologywas
of
heroicproportions
ut
little
practical
efficacy.
he
other
s
Melanesia,
where
the
ideology
was
often
fully
manifestedn
practice.
My
intent s
to
suggest he
smallest
possible
differ-
ences-"lowest commondenominators," o to speak-that
help
explain
why
an
ideology s
effective
nd
what
happens
when t
is
ineffective
r
when
t
is
influenced
y other ocial
phenomena.f I can
make
plausible-ideally, provocative-
suggestions, hen even
if
they
are shown
to
be
not
entirely
correct
heywill erve s
evidence
or he
heuristic
alue
of
the
concepts here
propose.
WESTERN
FEUDALISM
Feudalism
n the
West has
been a
center f
attention or o
long
among
so many
scholars
hat the
account
give
below,
intended
s it
is for
comparative
nthropologicalurposes,
shouldbe
understood
s a
highly
ondensed
ketch f
number
of historians'nterpretationsf its mostsalientfeatures nd
failings.My
own
interpretation,n
even
more
abbreviated
form, illbe
given
n
my
omparison f
feudalwithMelanesian
politics.
While
Europe
in
the
heart
of
the
Middle
Ages
was
socially
no more
homogeneous
han would be
expected
f
so
large
nd
geographicallyaried
n
area,
therewere
distributed
ver
most
of
the
continent
ertain
eneral
eatures
f human
relations-
perhapsbetter alled
ideas
and
ideals
regarding
uman
rela-
tions-that we have
come
to
call
feudalism.
hese involved
"the
peculiar association of
vassalage
with
fief-holding"
(Stephenson
942:14).
Vassalage
consisted f
a
personal
rela-
tionship
etween
leader nd a
follower,
ne that
was held
to
bestow
highhonor
n
both
men
pp. 2-5,
10).
"The
vassal was
really servant, . . but thisposition fservantwas mingledwith a
sentiment f
comradeship
which, without
effacing
differences,reated
a
close
relationship f
mutual
devotion"
(Seignobos
1912:38). With
few
exceptions,
he
obligations
n-
volved
were
military; thevassal
was the
oldier
f
he
eigneur;
he
must
id
him n
his wars"
(p. 42).
The bond
between
ord
nd
vassal was
created
y
a
ceremony
usually
entailing he
grant f a
portion f
the
ord's
and,
the
fief-also
called
the
beneficium,
recarium,
r
Lekn
(Bloch
1961:164-65). The
vassal's
subordination
was
created and
sustained,
n feudal
theory, y
his
continued
cceptance
of
hegemony
ver the and
granted
o him.
"Since
the
grants
f
land were n
theory
emporary,
hehabit
developed
f
describ-
ing
them
by
a
term]
whose
meaning
was
'to
hand
over tem-
porarily,
o
end.'The
fief as
a
loan-Lehn"
(Bloch1961:167).The fiefwas,thus, militaryeneficeStephenson
942:12),
a
benefice n
the sense
that "it
was a boon
(beneficium)
n
the
part of
the grantor"
p.
7).
Vol. 21
*
No.
1
*
February
980
73
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 7/24
While control
ver a fiefwas
economically dvantageous, t
was
what
we
would term
political ontrol,
or
t
involved he
right
o administer
ustice,
o collect
ines,
nd
by
subinfeuda-
tion to create
vassals of one's own without he
consent f the
lord (Stephenson1942:7, 12-13, 29; Ganshof1962:144).
In
short, t involved ontrol verpeople's ives.
What
of
"the
people,"
the
people
who
actually
worked
he
land? Some of these, freemen,"ppear to have been bound to
their ords
by
ties
similar
o those
obtaining mong
the
ords
themselves.
he
freeman
ived
on
and
cultivated he
land of
his ord nd, n return, ad to givehim id and obedience. he
freeman
as
far
nferior
o his
ord,
but
he
was,
as
it
was then
understood, ree.
If
he
sold,gave away,or
abandoned
his and
to go and live elsewhere, othing ny longer ied him to the
lord fromwhom his plot was held" (Bloch 1961:265-66).
Relationsbetween ords
and
freemen ere without
nnobling
ceremonies, ut,
as in
relations
mong nobles,
the ties that
bound the partieswere suppliedby the ideology f centrifu-
gality.
The
serf
was
different.
is
was
not
a
contractual
ond to his
lord,but
a
bond
of
"blood";
he
was
"un homme e
corps." He
was
unfree,
n
the
thought
f
those
times.
He
served
his
ord,
not because
he
had
received
boon and
owed obedience
n
return, ut
because he was
the son
of omeone
who
had served
his ord'sfather Bloch 1961:261-65).
The
distinction etween
erf
nd
freemanwas, however,
n
fact f not in law, far from harp Seignobos 1912:5, 12-13;
Bloch 1961: chap. 19). Some modern historiansmake
no
distinction
etween
he
two
(e.g.,
see
Hay 1964:42-47). Serfs
were sometimes
freed"-to become
freemen-while
reemen
sometimescultivated and designated for serfs Seignobos
1912:5, 12-13; Bloch 1961:258-59, 65). Both erfs
nd
freemen
were simply villeins." Whether erfs r freemen, hey were
lumped ogethers a subservientnd socially nsignificantlass
(Green 1971:54), and open, violentrebellionwas exceedingly
rare-absent
prior
o
the 13th entury Hay 1964:45). It was
not until he 14th nd 15th enturies hat uch rebellions ook
place with any frequency Hay 1964:124). The relationship
between oble nd villein
eems o have been
firmnd clear-cut,
somuch o that"the rights fthe ord nd his peasantsdid not
disappear
s
genuine eudalism id, but survived n new forms
to a
much aterdate" (Hay 1964:42).
On first
lance,
t seems
that, apart
from
he serf
t the
bottomof the
social
order,Westernfeudalismwas knit to-
gether rimarily y the deology f centrifugality.his surely
was the
dea,
but
to
what extentwas it
acted on?
The
answer s
that, by
and
large, t was not. It was
not
merely hypocritical askfor oercive ower.Like all persis-
tent
deologies,
t
had
some
activity ppropriate
o
it;
the
dea
was
not
only sincerely eld, but highly onored. t served
s
the reason
given
for
political
ubordinationnd
coordination.
However,
t was
deprived f muchof ts substance n practice
by
a
deeply
held value
of
another ind-that
of
the nviolable
proprietyfpatrilinealnheritance, social rulefarolderthan
feudalism
Ganshof 964:10). Fiefswere nherited.
In
medievalviews, the tie [between assal and lord] asted
.so long
as
the two lives whichbound t together, ut as
soon
as
one
or the other
of
thesewas terminated y death
t
was
automatically
dissolved"
(Bloch 1961:147, 175).
"The
contract ..
excluded
any
idea
of
heritability" Ganshof
1964:46).
This was
the deal,
and
the deal was not
to
be cast
aside
as
of no
account.
For instance, he
vassal was
always
under ome
constraint o pay homage
o his
lord,
n wartime
to
help ecurehis fief nd in peace to attend ourt Stephenson
1942:23; Bloch 1961:190). Vassalage,moreover, ad
some
force
in law. True, f a deceasedvassal had a male heir,his ord, n
the eyes of feudal aw, had
to accept the heir'soath of fealty
(Bloch1961 190); but ftherewereno heir, hefief everted o
the ord,
who could within nderstoodimits ispose f t much
as he wished Bloch 1961: 28-29; Stephenson 942: 4; Ganshof
1964:97-98).
Centrifugalityven
had
sufficient
orce
o
affect
patriliny.
eudal law
contemplated
ndivisible
iefs,
husfixing
the
responsibilities
f vassals; hence
t stimulated
tendency
toward
rimogeniture
r
systems aving
imilar ffects
parage,
joint
holdings,
tc.). One
might erm ll
such systems
focused
inheritance"
nd
distinguish
hemfrom
diffusenheritance,"
such as
was found
n manyparts
ofEurope,
where he fief
was
divided
mongheirs nd
payments
"relief")
given o the
fief's
grantor
Bloch
1961:205-8).
Still,
he njury
nflicted y
patriliny
n political
deals was
grave.Political ontrol ver erritoryas crucial n nheritance.
When the
bond of vassalage
nvolved
orms f payment
ther
than and, we
find hat the
bond terminated,
s law
required,
at the death
of either arty
Ganshof
964:101).
On some
few
occasions
n
the early
phases
of feudalism,
he territorial
iefs
of "felons"-vassals
who had
violated
theiroaths-reverted
to their rstwhile
ords, ut
eventhen he
fiefs ere
distributed
to
someone
of
"proper
blood" (Bloch
1961:195).
As early
as
the
9th century,
harles he
Bald attempted o rupture
is tie
with
a vassal and retake
possession
f "his" land.
He failed
(Bloch
1961:193).
n byfar he
majority fcases,
felons-more
than ikely
enying
he ppellation-refused
o
relinquish
heir
fiefs
e.g.,
ee
Ganshof
964:99). Vassalage
nvolved,
bove
all,
military ervice;
yet we
find nfant
ons,far too
young o
heft
a swordorride
a
horse,
ndertakinghomage"
to
their ords
(Bloch
1961:201).
In the absenceof a male heir, daughters
inherited
iefs. heirspouses
could
fight,
s was required,
ut
this
was
not the
ntensely ersonal
ond
vassalage
nticipated.
Worse,
we
find
men,
urely
or
ersonal
ain,
becoming
assals
of more han
one
ord.
For whom
hould uch men
fightf one
of
heir
ords ought
nother?
See
Bloch
1961:235-36;Stephen-
son 1942:34, 38;
Ganshof 1964:102). Thus
there arose
the
concept
f
"liege
homage,"
what
we
might all primary
om-
age-homage
owed more
firmly
o
one lord
than to others.
Then
theserelationships
hemselves
roliferated,
nd
one man
might
we liege homage
to
many
ords (Bloch
1961:211-18
Ganshof 964:103-4).
These
are
but
a
few xamples
f theways
in
whichpatrilineal
nheritance
f the
Lehn entailedpractices
that
denied
ts
contingent
nd
temporary
haracter.
he con-
sequencewas that, nfactthough ot n law or ideals,"fealty
became
an
object
of trade"
Bloch
1961:210).
Other
actors
weakened entrifugality.
f
these,
econd
only
in
importance
o
patrilineal
nheritance
was the
ideal of
a
perfect
yramid
f
authority
mbracing
he
"world"
i.e.,
the
Christianworld),
feudal
hierarchy
scending
rom
base
of
peasants
through
assals-often
themselves
aving
subinfeu-
dated
vassals-to lords
to
"liege
ords"
to
kings,
ulminating
in
an
enduring mperor.
his
aspiration
tood n
stark ontrast
to the
only slightly
more
realistic)
heory
hat
contemplated
Christendom
n
its
secular
aspect
as
properly
ivided nto
a
plurality
f
independent
ingdoms.
oth
ofthese
deals were
accepted
by
differentchools
of medieval thought
Taylor
1914:304-6;
Cantor
1963:375),
but
there
s
little
doubt that
the deal ofempire-inheritedromRome,stimulated y the
Carolingian
uccess
however
phemeral),
nd
possibly
modeled
on the
sacred
realmof
the
Church-was
the
dominant
heory
and,
more mportantly,
he
main motivation
or
he
aggressive
militarism
f
many
nobles e.g.,
ee Strayer
nd Nunro1959:41,
60;
Brooke
1963?:375;
Parkes
1970:15,
29-30, 95, 172;
Bloch
1961:390-91).
mperial
mbitions nfected
many
nobles, spe-
cially
but not
exclusively
talian
ones,
nd
a
number
f
nobles
were
ctually
rowned
mperor y
the
pope (Bloch
1961:377).
Few,
however,
ere
cknowledged
s such
by other
nobles,
nd
none, part
from harlemagne,
as able
fully
o act
as such.
The
emperor
was
an
idea,
not
a
person,
nd
certainly
ot
an
office ccupied
by
a
genealogically
istinct
ine
of
persons.
Apart
from he brief eign
f the Carolingians
nd the
rather
ineffectualttonian ffort,he emperor as a fiction. he post
was, n fact,
up forgrabs,"
nd whilemany
grasped, o
man,
certainly
o family ine,
could hang on
for ong.
74
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 8/24
Orenstein:
ASYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
ings
had their
fiefs,
hey
had
chrism,
nd
they
had
the
idea of oyal
ords,
but most
had little
more.Too few
would
rest atisfied
ultivating
heir
ardens
t
home;
thusthere
was
frequent
ivision
nd diffusionf
authority
nd
deep dissatis-
factionwithin
king's
ealm.
n
Burgundy, ings
eemed
never
"to
have seen
in their lands
...
anything
but
a
convenient
starting oint
for
..
Italian
conquest,"
and
this
attitude,
through
nternal eakness
onsequent
pon
attentions
irected
outward, way
from
heir own
lands,
was
probably argely
responsible
or
heir
ultimate
ncorporation
nto
the
Ottonian
Empire Bloch 1961:378-79). ndeed,becauseofthe ntensity
of
effort
pplied
beyond
their wn
borders,
nternal
olitical
chaos was
prevalent
mong
the
Ottonians
themselves
see
Strayer
nd
Nunro
1959:155;
Brooke 1963?:
165;
Bloch
1961:
427-29).
In
contrast,
hen
kingly
ine did
not have
imperial
ambitions, t
often
had
firmer
uthority
within
ts borders.
Western
rancia,
for
xample,
oon
abandoned the
quest
for
empire-probably
because of
geographical
emoteness
rom
Rome-and
achieved
ar
more
tability,
n
particular
nder
he
late
Capetians,
han
xisted
mong
ts
eastern
eighbors.
uch
the ame
was true
f
Norman
ngland
see
Bloch
1961:377-78;
Strayer
nd
Nunro
1959:177-94;
Cantor
1963:247,
339-47,
462-63,
476-77).
Such
cases,
however,
were
not
the rule.
European
kingdomswere
usually very
nsecure;
orders luc-
tuated;
the
authority
f
the
king
was
often
masculated, ndkings ad toexpendmuch ffort erelyn
suppressing
ebellions
within heir
wn
fiefs
Bloch
1961:408-9).
In
some
nstances
kingship as so
meaningless
hat,
despite
he
king's hrism,
e
had no more
uthority,
nd
sometimes
ess
power,
han some
of his own
vassals.
n
one
case-unusual,
I
admit,
but nstruc-
tive-a
king
became the
vassal of his own
vassal
(see
Brooke
1963?:98-99;
Strayer nd Nunro
1959:175-76;
Cantor
1963:
225,
235, 244,
247, 460-61,
475-76).
Lords were
often n a
similarly
mbiguous
osition
especting heirvassals.
Instead
of
centralized
uthority,
herewas
onlyprivate
power,
which
exercised
overlapping
urisdiction
n
a
crazy
patchwork
f
decentralized
uthority"
Cantor
1963:244).
The feudal
pyra-
mid
was
a
purely
mic deal
whose
onsequencewas mainly
o
fire
further
he
ambitions f
anyone who
thought
he had a
decentshot at a moreelevatedstatus-a status for which
virtually
nyone
of
noble birth ould
dredge
up from
roadly
defined
enealogies ne
oranother laimto
propriety.
The
result
f
he
doubly ompromised
deologywas an
unsafe
world
of
unpunished
rigandage nd
murder,
onstantminor
uprisings,nd an
ever present
resentiment,
ortifiedy per-
sistent
preparation nd
frequent
practice,
of war
(Bloch
1961:
hap. 30).
The ideology
was so
feeble hat at
least one
historian
Brown
1974) has
argued that the
very term
feu-
dalism"
should be
discarded.
The ideal
of
centrifugalityas
reshapedby
patriliny nd
by the
feudalfiction f
a perfect
pyramid
f
authority. Like
Victorian
irgins
ubbing
n
their
nightgowns,"eudal
nobles
mmersed
hemselvesn
thecentrif-
ugal deology ut
rarely
roubled o give
their owns,
et alone
themselves, thorough ash.
The
only
lear
and
firm ond n
feudalism
as that
between
the
fief
older
nd
his
peasantry. ere,
despite hefact
hat he
right
o
inherit
and
detracted rom
ure
centrifugality
Bloch
1961:130-32)-indeed, I
believe, n
partbecause
of t-the
po-
litical
tie between
men was
upheld.The reasons
or his,
which
will
also
help us to
understand he
chaotic
relations
mong
nobles,
ad bestbe
discussed
ater, fterwehave
ooked nto
he
politics
f a
people far
differentnd far
removed n
time and
place
from
eudal
Europe.
MELANESIA
Among
he
Kapauku Papuans
of New Guinea
the most
mpor-
tantfactors ontributingo political minence re wealthand
generosity
Pospisil
1958a:45-46).
The Kapauku
headmnan's
"extension
f credit
onstitutes he
primary venue
of
social
control. People
usually
follow
decisions of
a
wealthy
man
because they re his debtors
nd are afraid f
being sked
to
return
hat they we,or
out of gratitude or ast financial
id
or because they xpect
uture inancial avors. o
comply
with
the requests
nd decisions f
a
wealthy
man means
economic
security."
o create political
followers ne
distributes
wealth
and extends redit; o apply anctions
ne withdraws
r refuses
credit.
Political ituations imilar othis re found hroughout ost
of Melanesia.
Here we
find
numerous ocieties
wherein en-
trifugality
tands
nearly lone,
virtually ncontaminated
y
other
olitical deas, and thereforet is herethat we can
come
close
to
isolating
he
political
mpact
of
the
dea, in particular
the
mount
f
power
t
can
yield
nd
the onditions
nderwhich
thatpower
may
be
limited
r
expanded.
hose conditions
ear
some resemblance,
n an
abstract evel,
to the ideas that
compromised
eudal
ideology; hence they
may help us to
understand
ot only Western
eudalism, ut,
because of the
magnitude
f the differences
etween he cultures,
he general
significance
f
centrifugality
nd
the factors
hat affect ts
political
potency.
herefore
will
now
brieflyurveyMelane-
sian politics.
An
intensive xamination ould
be out of place
in a paper of this sort
and, more mportantly,
eyond my
present
ommand f the data.
The
Kapauku "big
man" has
impressive
owers.
n
virtually
all
societies,
the
rules
regulating
inship
nd marriage re
among
hosemostresistant
o rapid change,
specially hange
instigated
y
a
single
ndividual;yet one
Kapauku "big
man"
abolished
ome
f
hisgroup's ong-standing
ules
f xogamy
nd
substituted
ew nd very ifferent
nes.His motivewas simple:
he wantedmany
wives
nd found urdensomeheweight
f
he
old
rules
egulating arriage.
e decided o violate
herules
nd
to
cloak
hisbehaviorwith egitimacy
y promulgating
ew,
ess
restrictive
ules
of exogamy.
Followinghis precedent
nd
by
his
command,
is
new
ruleswereobeyed,
lbeitwith
muttered
protests
Pospisil1958b: 32-34).
To
facilitate
he
operation
f
one of his new rules-that people
from
pposite
ides of the
village formerly holly xogamous) ould marry-he further
ordered
hat the village,
n
irregular
rrangement
f
houses,
be reorganizedntotwo
traight
inesofhouses,
ne ine to
the
north,
he other o the
south. Such
a
change
would
create
a
sharp, ocalized
moietyorganization
pp. 834-35).
The per-
sonal
whims
of a
politically owerful
womanizer,
veritable
Papuan Henry
VIII, thus
threatened
drastic
eorganization
of an
entire ocial system.
There reother
xamples
f
powerful
big
men"
n
Melanesia.
In
anotherNew
Guinea society,
he Chimbu,
"big
man"
murdered wo of his wives
on two separate
occasions.
With
impunity,
ut with no
moral or legal right,
he same
man
killed hose fhis followers
hoopposedhim.
Equally contrary
to law and
custom,
he
confiscated
is followers' roperty
nd
beat them severely f they protested Salisbury1964:227).
Powerful
big
men" seem
to exist n anotherpart
of New
Guinea Hogbin 1951:150-63;
for nterpretation,
ee
Salisbury
1964:237)
and amongthe Kaoka-speaking
eoples
of Guadal-
canal
(Hogbin
1964:63).
Examples
of
thiskind
re not unusual,but
even
more ften
the
ethnographies
escribe
Melanesian "big
men"
as
having
little
power.
n
one
society
n
the
Solomons he
actions
of the
"big
man" are said to
be curbed
by the fact
hat
his
position
depends
n
the goodwill nd help
of his followers.
e
dare
not
incur
heir
ispleasure
r they
may refuse
o work
orhim
nd
go
ive elsewhere."
n
this ociety he big
man"
s
an
organizer
who
is
responsive
o
the wishes
of his
followers,
ot
a
despot
(Hogbin
1939:74, 81).
It
is
much
the
same
among
the
Mae
Enga ofNew Guinea Meggitt 965:97).Among heKumaand
Siane
of New Guinea, "big men"
initiate he labor of
work
teaims
by
consm)iciioislv ettinz
about the tasks
themselves,
n
Vol. 21
*
No.
1
*
February
980
75
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 9/24
the
hope,
usually rewarded,
hat others
will follow heir
ead
(Reay
1959:129; Salisbury
1962:28-30,
52-54, 56-57,
60).
"Big men" in one
group
have so little ctual
power
that
the
ethnographer
efers o them s
"managers"
Burridge
960:
75-
80; 1969:38).
"Big
men" have
been so often bserved
o
be
leaderswithout
ower
hat
one scholarhas
argued,
ncorrectly
it
seems,
that
all instancesof
"big-man"
despotism
re
a
consequence
f contact withthe West
(Brown
1963,
but
cf.
Salisbury 964).
Thus we have two
contrasting
escriptions;
ne
depicts
despots, he othermildmanagers. he difference,believe, s
due to
a limitednumber f
conditions. ome
may
be
more
apparent
han actual,
nvolving
thnographic
echnique
ather
thanpersistent
olitical
ractice;
hese
need
not
be
discussed.5
Some
are
relevant; hey
have to do
withthe
amount
of
effort
a
"big
man"
must
expend
n
order
to
raise
and
sustain a
following,.e.,
with
he
ntensity
f
competition
or
position.
The
amount feffort eeded o
get
followers
epends
n
arge
part on rulesof
nheritance.
f
a
well-off
an
has
an
heir
who
inherits
ll or
most
of his
wealth,
ncluding
redits nd
liquid
assets-that is,
if
nheritance
s
focused-then his
heir has
a
head
start ver hose
f
ess
wealthy
men.He can
more
uickly
establish
bodv
of followersnd
expend
muchof his
time
nd
effort
n
consolidating
is hold over
them
nd/or
n
expanding
hissway. f,on thecontrary,here s diffusenheritance,here
willbe
a
tendency
or
veryone
o
start t
about the ame
point
in
the race
forposition.
n
such
circumstanceshere
s
likely
to
be
intense
ompetition
mong bigmen,"
who will
have
to
expend
much effort
n
wooing ollowers,
r,
alternatively,ry
to
reach a
modus vivendi
that allows
leadership roles to
several
men, ach
role
carrying
ith
t
less
power
han
would
be
held by any one
"big
man"
standing lone.
The
Kapauku "big
man"
mentioned
arlier
robably
had a
head
start. n this
group,while dead man's and is
generally
divided
mong
his
sons,
the
eldest
on
gets
a
larger
hare
and
first
hoice
(Pospisil
1963a:736).
With
qualifications,
e
in-
herits most of
the
liquid assets
of
the
deceased-pigs and
chickens,
manufactured
tems, nd,
significantly,ully
0%
of
his
father's hell
money
Pospisil
1963a:212, 220,
296, 357).
Furthermore, e inherits he "total financial tatus" of the
deceased,
ll
ofhis
debts
nd credits
p. 357).
In
the
pursuit f
positions f
power mong the
Kapauku
Papuans,
some have
marked
dvantages ver
others.
The
Kuma,
who
have
weak
"big men,"
may serve
as a
contrastingxample.
When
Kuma
man
dies,
his
heirs
divide
his
ands
and
liquid assets
equally.
Moreover, ome of
his pigs
are
slaughtered,nd
many f his
valuables re
destroyed t his
funeral
Reay
1959:9,
96-97).
In
this
group, as
might be
expected,
umerous
eaders ompetewith
one another;
more
than half
the
Kuma
men
become
eaders t
some time,"
nd
"nearly third
f the men
.. are either
uthorized r spon-
taneous
eaders
t any given
ime" Reay
1959:116).
Similarly,
in
the Solomon
slands
group
have mentionedn
which he
"big men"wereweak, much of the wealth of the dead was
distributed
t their
unerals
Hogbin1939:73).
My impressions
that n
much of
Melanesia the
wealth of
"big
men"
s
destroyed
r
dispersedwhen hey
die. f this s
so,
one would
expectfew
Melanesian
despots. am
not, however,
here
uggesting
n
inflexibleule.
For instance,
where ustom
prescribes
hat wealth
be
destroyed r
dispersed t funerals,
one
can
still
have
powerfulbig men,"
or ther
ocial onditions
can
stimulate
eople
to
circumventheir
ustoms, nd
inheri-
tance,
n
effect,an be
focused.
Among heTolai of
New Britain,
ix eaders
re discussed y
the
ethnographers,
nd of
these three
have
impressive ower
(Salisbury 970:313,
315-22). Yet in
thisgroup,
s appears to
be the
case among
manyother
Melanesians, t is
customary o
distribute
much of the
wealth of
the deceased
at his funeral
(Epstein 1968:26).
The
explanation eems o me
to be thatthe
Tolai are
matrilineal;
man's sister's on
customarily
nherits
what
remainsof his
wealth after
the funerary
istribution.
Consequently,t seems
o me and,
infer, o one
ethnographer
(Salisbury
1970:329) that
men are
prompted o give to
their
own sons
during heir
ifetimes
s
much as they
can of their
wealth norder o circumventheruleof nheritancee.g., see
Salisbury
970:307-8).
Of
the six
leaders
mentioned,
ourhad
been
started n
their
areersby their
athers p.
330); "none
was born
poor" (p.
313).
The
situation
mong
the matrilineal
Busama
of
Guadalcanal appears
very similar,
hough bit
morecomplex n
that a man's
son is entitled
o a partial
inheritance
f
his
estate,
ncluding redits
nd debts
Hogbin
1951:122; 1963:17,
41, 112).
If
this
explanation olds,
t should
pply, as a
tendency, o
all the
matrilineal
ocieties
fMelanesia.
am by no
means ure
of
myself, owever,
nd, indeed,
this is not
my reason for
discussing he
ubject. have done
o because
wish o empha-
size what
think
s an
essential
ondition
wherebymuch
power
can
be
wielded
nder
he
aegis
of
centrifugality.
his
condition
is connected otdirectlywith nheritanceules,but with the
absence of ntense
ompetition or
positions f
political
ower,
to
which,
n
turn,
ppropriatenheritance
ules an
contribute.
One
might
ay that
politicalpower
depends, n part,
on the
supply
f
eaders:
f
t
is
large,power
will be
modest;
f
small,
powerwill be
greater.
Another ondition
ffects he power of
the
"big man,"
however:
the
supply
of
followers.
We
must
look
at
both these
onditions
ogether.
A
"big
man"
usually
has
littledirect
olitical ole
beyond
small
group,
which will call his
"primary
rena,"
but
he
can
get
renown
hroughout is
entire
ribe,possibly
beyond,by
means of
widespread
distributions
f goods, for
example, n
competitive
easting
Hogbin
1964:70;
Oliver
1955:388-94).
His
followers ork o help
spread
his
reputation
n
return or
the "reflected
enown" is
reputation
asts
upon
them
Oliver1955:390,408,409). It isevident hat he arger his secondary
arena" and
the
more
he
prestige
ought
within
t,
the
greater
will
be
the
need of
the
"big
man" for
material
goods
to
dis-
tribute.
All
such
goods
are drawnfrom is
primary
rena.
Yet
success
or
failure
n the
quest
for
restigewithin
he
econdary
arena
has
little
irect
nd
immediate ffect
n his
power
within
his own
group Oliver
1955:394-95).
It
may
have
an
important
ong-range
ffect,
however.
According
o
Sahlins's
(1963:289-94)
analysis,
well-estab-
lished
econdary
rena
nsures llies
n
case of
war,
whichwas
endemic
n
Melanesia,
and
it
attracts
both
women,
who are
economically
ost
mportant
n Melanesian
ocieties,
nd
stray
men,
who are
potentialwarriors.
ut,
Sahlins
points
out,
the
quest
for
enown
ften
eads
the
big
man"
to tax
everely
he
re-
sources fhispeople,which an ead to genuinematerial epri-
vation,
esentmentf
the
"big
man,"
and
even
revolt
gainst
him.
As I
see
it,
thisprocess
s
not
automatic.
A
"big
man" s
like
any
eader
nywhere;
e is
not
an
automaton ut
can
and
does
make
ritical hoices
egardinghenature f
his ctions is-a-vis
his
primary nd
secondary renas.This
pointmay
best
be
seen
ifwe
view the
choices
f
"big
men" as
if
at
oppositepoles
of
a
continuum.
t
one
extreme,
"big
man"
can,
fhe
chooses, o
all the
way
in
attempting
o
maximize is
position
within
is
secondary
rena. Then he
will
end
up taking
much
from is
followers-more,
erhaps,
n
their
abor,
han he
can
return
o
them
n
material atisfactions
nd reflected
enown. n
this
case he willprobably
isk evolt nd
deposition. t the
opposite
extreme, emay choose o gnore issecondary rena a course
I believeno one
willfollow ully).
This policywillyield
neffec-
tual leadership,
or n due time
t may result n
desertions
nd
I
Because an
ethnographer's
esidencewith
a
group s
of
rather
limited
uration, e or
shemay
have
the
opportunityo
observe
nly
"bigmen"who, fter rolongedffort,aveachievedmuchpower;or
the
thnographer
ay
be
exposed to
conditions
nderwhich
number
of
potential
or
actual
"big men"
are in
the
process
of
competing or
power,
hence re
able to
wield ittle
more
than
managerial
uthority.
76 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 10/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
t
no time s
t
ikely o attract ecruits
r
allies. t will
probably
result n thereplacementfthe "big
man,"
the
gradual
disinte-
gration f his group,or the group's
destruction
n battle.
A
"big
man"
need choose neither
xtreme. nly
the
very
mbi-
tious
would select the
first
nd,
I
think,
he
very
foolish he
second.
Thus,
t seems o
me,
n
effectivetrategy ould
be to
tread
a delicate middle
ground
between
"expansionist"
nd
"isolationist" olicies.
A
"big
man"
on
this
course would
try
to extract
rom
is
group
ufficient
abor
to
accumulate
nly
s
much enown
s was necessary o keepfollowersrom
efecting
and to gaina few llies andperhaps omerecruits. hat is, he
would
ttempt
o maintain is
position
within is
group
without
closing
his
eyes
to the
mportance
f his
secondary
rena
and
without
rying
o
go
all
the
way
to
greatness
within
t. From
the perspective
f his
followers, conjecture,
he
"big
man"
who
successfully
aneuvered ithin hismiddle
ground
would
be
the most
atisfactory.
is
position, hypothesize, ould
be
among
he most table.
FEUDALANDMELANESIANOLITICS OMPARED
One can
easily
notice esemblances
mongvery
differentinds
of societies
f one's interests re well
enough
and
broadly
enough
defined.Melanesia
and
feudal
Europe
are
similar
because
their
olitical deologies
were
nearly urely
entrifugal.
In addition, oth wereverywarlike.The differencesetween
the
two
are farmore
vident,
o
much
o
that mention
nly
one forthe
present,
nd that
only
to
forestall
premature
criticism.
olitical
relations n
Europe
nvolved
tatus
distinc-
tions,
while
n
Melanesia, by
and
large, political differences
were
purelypersonal.
set aside this
differencet
the
outset
for
wo
reasons.
One
s
that ts
mportancean
be
exaggerated.
In
Europe
there
were
numerous
tatus
distinctions
mong
nobles
nd
a
theoreticallyharp
tatus
differenceetween
ings
and other
nobles,
ut these
had
little
eal
political mportance.
The
other s that t will
facilitate
omparison
etween
he two
societies
f
we look
at
the
differences
etween
eudal
ord
and
feudal
peasant
in the
light
of
the
concept
of
centrifugality
rather han
n
terms f status.
The magnitude f thedifferencesetween he twosocieties
requires
hat
comparison mployhighly
bstract
premises.
suggest
hat
we view
political
onditions
n
both
ocieties
much
as
we
have
Melanesian
politics,
s
depending pon variations
in
the ntensity
f
competition
or
eadership.
he
greater he
competition,
he
less
power
a
leader will
have,
for
the
effort
required
o
gain and/or
retain
power
will
detract from he
power
he
can
exert over his followers.
onversely, he less
effort eeded o hold
power, he
more an be
applied to control
constituents' ehavior.6
I
can be clearer
n
employing
his
premise
f
bring p
two
matters ow
that
willbe
important
ater.
These are the
goods
involved
n
centrifugal
istributions
nd
the
way they
are
transferredrom
ne
generation
o
the
next.
Becausecentrifugalitynvolves he distributionfgoods,we
must
onsider ot only he quantities
f
goods
nd
the number
of
people
holding
nd
distributinghem, ut
also the kindsof
goods
nvolved.
Goods
can have
different
olitical alues,
values
only ndirectly
elated
o their
conomicworth.
Thus,
a
con-
stituency
an
be maintained
y
distributingoods
the
larger
part
of
which
s
directly
onsumed
roast pork at
a
feast, or
instance),
hough
ome of
which live sows, for xample) can
produce
more
goods i.e.,
more
pigs).
The
latter
re
economic
capital, but,
however
mpressive
heir
conomic
worth,
heir
political
value is
precarious
nd
onlypotential.
A
sow may be
cooked nd
consumed oon after
istribution;
hen t
provides
little
benefit
eyond
the
actual
eating-plus, perhaps,
few
fellow-feasters
rateful or he food. f it is not directly
on-
sumed, t has
to
be fed, ared for,
nd thenmated n order o
produce iglets,whichwill n turn,
equire he sametreatment
as the nitial ift
igbefore ssuming olitical alue.
This takes
time, ime
duringwhich he recipient emains nder
bligation
to thedonor,who,
ll
thewhile,
an continue o make distribu-
tions hat strengthen is politicalposition. ood consumed
t
a feast s at one
endof he ontinuumfpolitical alue;
however
great ts economicworth, ts politicalworthfor the eater is
miniscule. t the
opposite nd s the outright rant
f political
power.
A
territorialief n feudalEurope was such
a "gift." t
had
invested n
it the means
whereby he recipient ould
directly xercise owervia the right, ften xercised,
f sub-
infeudation.
The otherfactor hat can affect ompetitions inheritance.
In discussingMelanesia, have suggested
hat f nheritances
focused, oods will generally e
concentratedn thehands of
veryfewpersons,
who will,hence,have an advantage
n com-
peting
or
ower.
Competition or eadership s likely
o be less
intense, ence
eaders
will morefrequently ave
morepower.
Where nheritance
s
absent
or,
n some circumstances, here
it
is
diffuse,
he opposite ffect, elatively eeble eadership,
s
to be anticipated.
Ideology nd political tability.
n Melanesia, the goods dis-
tributed usually
had
little
political
worth.
Where diffuse
inheritance
as
practiced,
he
consequencewas authorityittle
more than managerial.Now, if
we recall that virtually ll
Melanesian
men
were,
ike
feudal
nobles, ighting
en,we can
see the analog
of
their situation
among the
nobles. Most
vassals
were the
recipients
f
goods
that
had immediate
political
worth.
A
vassal
invested n his fief; aving nhanced
the
fief's
value,
he
would resist
alienation
and
encourage
inheritance.
nce nheritance
as
accepted, he
fief
older
was
all
the
more
secure
in his
holding
and
could
risk, urther
increasing
ts
political
worth.
Where
money iefs
ere
requent,
the central
authority
was
far
stronger
han
elsewhere;
ee
Bloch
1961:174-75.) Consequently,he position
f the
vassal
was littledifferentrom hat of his lord.Thus, the hold of
superior
ver
inferior as
very
weak
both
in feudal
Europe
among
nobles
and
in
Melanesia
wherever iffuse
nheritance
was
practiced.
The
political
alue of thefief
was
not
crucial
n
itself;
t was
the
right
of
inheritance
hat made it so.
At the outset
of
feudalism,
nder
Charles,
fiefs
were
more often
uccessfully
recalledby their
donors han ater,
n
classic
feudalism.
nce
territorial
iefswere
nherited,
he
potential quality
of
donor
and
recipient
as insured
Bloch
1961:chap. 16).
While
nheritance as
essential n
weakening olitical
ties
among nobles, he
kind
of
nheritance oes
not
seem
to have
been
important.
t mattered ittle whether
nheritance
was
focused
r
diffuse.When
n
any
region
nheritance
as
diffuse,
in general t was diffusen thefamilyinesofboth ords and
vassals;
hence
there
tended
to
be numerous
ompetitors
or
power,
each
having
ittle
power
with
which
to
compete
for
more.
f inheritance as focused
n
both lords'
and vassals'
family ines,
there were fewercompetitors,
ut
they
had
stronger ositions,
lbeit about
equal force,
with
which
to
struggle.
ompetition
ended
to be
equally
ntense
under
he
two
forms
f
inheritance, hough
he
number
f
competitors
differed.
Risking
edundancy, emphasize
hat
nheritance
fbenefits
is
simply
ne side
of
the
coin
of
political railty;
he
tendency
toward
political frailty
s
pronounced
nly
when
goods
of
political
alue
are
nherited. he inheritance
f
conomic
oods,
by itself,
eed not have this
effect.
easants
as well
as lords
had theright o inheritnEurope,butpolitical nstability as
marked nly among the atter.
Peasants inherited urely co-
nomicgoods, nd relations mong
themdo not seem to have
6
My way of treating he relationshipbetween competitionfor
political
position and the exercise
of powerhas been
influenced y
some
features fBailey's approach
to political
anthropology, spe-
ciallyhis
StratagemsndSpoils
(1969).
Vol. 21
* No.
1
* February
980
77
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 11/24
been
unusually nstable.
Relations etween
easants
nd
lords
were quite
secure and stable.
Further,
hose
nobles
having
money iefs ouldnot
easilypass
them
n to
their
ffspring,
nd
these
noblesweremore
losely
ound o their ords.
n
England,
where
money
iefs
ereused
earlier
nd
more
frequentlyhan
elsewhere, olitical
tability
was
greatest,
nd it
was
here
that
there rose
the first
uropean
nation-state f
modern
imes
(Bloch
1961:174-75;
Ganshof
1964:114-15;
Strayer
1970:28,
29). It is the combination
f
the distribution f
goods
having
political alue
and
the
nheritance
f
such goods that
produces
political nstability.
Thus,
despite
he
differences
etween
he
two
societies,
we
may
conclude that
political
conditions n
Melanesia under
diffusenheritance re
comparable
n
kind
withthose
among
feudal
nobles.
Amongboth
peoples
the
hold of
superior
ver
inferior as
feeble.
However,
hereremains
large difference
in
degree
etween he
two n their
olitical
ondition.Melane-
sian
politics ntailed
uthority hat
ften ad
shiftingersonnel
and
was quite
frail, ut relations
mongfeudal
nobleswerefar
less
stable,
ndeed,virtually
narchic.The
explanation f
this,
I
believe, s to
be
found n
the fact that
n
Melanesia
political
ideology
was, by
and
large,
observed n
practice,
while in
Europe it was
very often vaded. In
Melanesia
constituents
accepted the
authority f their
big
men"-if
not of
one
par-
ticularman, hen f nother, erhaps aised opower ia revolt.In Europethe vassal
who asserted
qualitywith
his lord vio-
lated his oath.
Centrifugality
as bypassedby
fear, hreat, r
the
exercise
f
rmed
might. urther,
vassal
often ad vassals
of his
own;his
example
is-a-vis
is ord
could
serve s
a
guide
to his
ownvassals.
When he
recipient f fief
ouldclaim
t for
his
family ine and
redistribute
ortions f
it, the process
of
redistribution
ould
be,
and was,
continued o the
point
where
we find
ut
the
ghost
f
a
hierarchy,
nsubstantial ecause
ts
substance-the
power of the
giver over
the
receiver-was
destroyed
n
the
giving.
ach link nthe
chain, xcept
ossibly
the
bottom
ne, had the
ame flaw s
thefirst; he
upper ould
always be turned
round o
become he
ower.
In
Melanesia
centrifugality,
n theory
nd practice,
was
channeled
within
distinctly efined
rimary renas. Within
thesediscrete oundariesherewasoftenmuch ompetitionor
power but little
bloodshed.
Within the
secondary rena
the
struggle
or
power
and renown
ften
nvolvedwarfare, s is
true
of
many
ntergroup
elations-including resent-dayn-
ternational
elations.
f
thequestfor
enown as too
ambitious,
the
resources f
thecommunity ithin
which he
"big man"
exercised irect
ontrol
ouldbe so
much trained
hatreflected
renown
would
no
longer
ompensate
ormaterial
deprivation.
The
outcome
was
often
evolt,
ut t was
revoltwithin
clearly
circumscribed
rimary rena.
The too
ambitious big
man"
was
simply
eplaced y
another,
deally ne more
restrained
n
foreign
elations.
Struggle
or
owerwithin
he
Melanesianprimary rena
was
conceived s
appropriate nly
f
under he
egis
of
the
deology
of centrifugality.t took place in conformity ith deology;
hence,within
mostMelanesian
ommunities
t rarely
nvolved
armed
combat.
n
contrast, ecause
feudal
deology licited
little
more than
formaldeference,
he
distinctions etween
primary
nd secondary
renaswere
lurred,nd
there emained
only
individual
nobles with
overlapping
urisdictions. his
blurring
f
borders s
directly
ssociated with
the fact that
virtually
ll
political
ontestswere
potential r
actual armed
conflicts,
hether
within
r
among the
(amorphous) olitical
entities f
Europe.
Political
egitimacy
s
founded pon
people's
cceptance
f
a
leader's
rule
because they
accept the
reasons for t. These
reasons
must be sufficiently
nacted
to be convincing.
his
clearly
depends upon
the way a leader
behaves toward
his
followers;ut talso depends, lthough o a lesserdegree, pon
the extent
to which
a leader's followers
elieve
neighboring
political
groupscontemplate
im as
worthy f political
emi-
nence.
His renown eflects
pon them.
f outsiders o
not think
of him as a
worthy lly or
antagonist, he
people themselves
will
often
come
to doubt
the propriety f
his leadership.
Legitimacys bestowed
romwithin
group, ut its
bestowal
often
epends, t least
n part, n theperceptions
fforeigners.
In Melanesia
these perceptions
were easily
understood. n
feudalEurope,
members f the
nobility erefrequently
nsure
who recognized
heir eader to be worthy,
ecause they
hem-
selveswere ometimes
ncertain ho
their eaderswere
or who
others' eaders were. The
distinction etween
nternal nd
externalvalidationof authoritywas shaky. Hence, warfare
knew
no boundaries.
Melanesianswere
warlike,
ossibly ven
more o thanfeudal
nobles,
but Melanesian"big men" existed
formany
purposes
apart
fromkilling
nd raiding. n
contrast,warfare
was the
sole
raisond'etre
f a
feudal
noble.Feudalism
was exploitative
in
Schumpeter's
1955) sense
of the term, n that
t was able to
persist
s itdid
only
because the political ntities t
subsumed
werenothing
more han
machines
or wagingwar.
Extralegal
(not llegal)
cceptance f political
ontest y
mutual ffortst
murder ervaded
olitical elations
within nd
amongpolitical
entities-to the extent hat
such entities ould
be delineated.
The reason
or
his
ay, n argepart,
n an ineffectual
olitical
ideology.
Centrifugality,tatus, nd political tratification.p to this
point
our
comparison
as included feudal
nobles and those
Melanesianswho
practiced
diffusenheritance.
here remain
to be considered
easant-noble
elations,
n the one hand,
nd,
on
the other, elations
etweenMelanesians
nd those
of their
"big
men"
who
had benefited rom ocused
nheritance. he
similarity
s
almost elf-evident.
"big
man" whohas been the
recipient
f
focused nheritance,
iewed gainst
background
of
relativelympotent
otential ompetitors,
as
in
hand goods
of
political
alue.
His
possession
f
uch goods
does
not disturb
relations
etween uperior
nd
inferior
s amongfeudal
nobles,
because
he is
the only one,
or one
of
veryfew,
holding uch
wealth
within
clearly
defined
rimary
rena. Within
this
arena, ompetition
or
highposition
s more ikely
o be
guided
by
centrifugality
han armed combat.
The
position
f such
a
"bigman"vis-a-vis is fellow illagers s,hence, heanalogof
that
of the noble
vis-a-vis
his
peasants.
Noblemen,
ike these
"big
men,"
hold
goods
of
political
value;
their
peasants,
ike
the
followers
f these
big men,"
do not.
The
existence
f tatusdifferences
n
feudalism
s
historically
important,
f
ourse,
ut t
s not ssential
nour
omparison
ith
Melanesian olitics.
tatus
distinctions
mong
eudal
obleswere
of
ittle
olitical ignificance
ecause most
not ll)
noblesheld
and
inherited
oods
f
political
worth.
Nobles
of
high
tatusdid
not
necessarily
ave
power
verthose
f
ow
status,
ut
nobles
did dominate
easants,
or
he atter
did
not
have
such
goods.
Hence t was
not so much
tatus
that
gave power
s the
kinds
of
goods
nvolved
n
the
centrifugal
elationship.
n
this
regard
a
Melanesian
big
man"
who
had
received
focused
nheritance
was ina
position
omparable othatof feudalnoble.He may
have had
even
more
power
over
his followers
han
did the
noble over
his
peasantry.
As
I
have
pointedout,
some
"big
men"
had
positions
o
despotic
that
they
could
kill
thei
followers
ith
mpunity.
n
the
Kapauku
case,
a
"big
man"
was
able more
horoughly
o
reorganize
is
society
han could
a feudalnoblethe ives
of his
peasants.
In
any event,
n
classic
feudalism
here
existed
a
sharp
distinction etween
oble
nd
peasant,
nd
the
cutting dge
of
the distinction
ependedupon
the
inheritance
y
nobles
of
territorialiefs
nd
the
nheritance
y peasantsonly
of tillable
land. This distinction rovided
continuity
nd
stability
n
relations etween
ersons. he freeman's
ight o eave his
and
and quit himselfof his obligations o his lord was rarely
exercised. istributions
f goods having
only economic
worth
by donors
olding oodsofpolitical
alue meant hat
thenoble
78
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 12/24
Orenstein:SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
ould
rest
assured
that his
peasants'
sons
would
remain
the
peasants
of
his sons.
Centrifugality
ay subsume
elations
f status or
relations
ofcontract
etween ersons.
here s a
possibility
f
change
n
either
irection
e.g.,
see Leach 1954), lthough
t seemsto
me
that
once
statusrelationswere stablished
t wouldbe
difficult
to
convert hem
nto
personal,
ontractual
nes.
Western
eudalism
itnessed shift n the reverse
irection
from
hat
adumbrated
n
Henry
Maine's
general
volutionary
theory-not,
must
dd,
to
the
credit f thatfinemind,
n
his
interpretationffeudalismtself.7While differencesf status
existed
n
Europe prior
o
feudalism,
hese
were
probably
not
based upon centrifugality.
assalage
n
Merovingian
imeswas
contractual.
he term
vassal" in thesetimes
nd even ater,
in early
feudal imes,
ad pejorative onnotations;
he
oath
of
commendation
eems
to have
implied
demeaning
orm
of
servitude
Ganshof
964:6-12,23-25).
Only ater, nder lassic
feudalism, id the
title
of vassal
assume an aura
of
honor.
think t quite possible
hat
family
inesof omewho
undertook
oaths
of
fealty
n the Merovingian
eriod ended
as villeins
while hose
fothers nded
s noblevassalswhen
eudalism as
in
full
flower see
Ganshof
1964:9-12, 19-20,
23-25, 27, 28,
32).
The rise of
feudalismnvolved
change
n
relations,
or
some
but
not
ll donors
nd
recipients,
rom
ontract
o status.
Steps alongthese ines seemto have takenplace in parts
of
Melanesia. Among
some
Melanesians
there were what one
might erm
ristocraticineages,
ineagesholding
he exclusive
privilege
f upplying
big men"
Burridge 960:139).
n other
groups,
we
find even closer approximations
o noble lines
(Malinowski
922:62-65).
The movement
rom
ontract
o status is always possible
when
some
persons
hold
and
inherit
goods
having political
value
under
entrifugality.
t will
most
ikely ppear
when
hese
persons
re donors
f
goods
having
ittle
olitical
worth.
t
can
also
come
bout n the
equivalent
ituation,
s
may
have
hap-
pened
in Melanesia, where
there
s
focused
nheritance f
goods,
he analog
of goods
havingpolitical alue.
Centrifugality,
he centralization
f power,
nd the rise
of
kingship.
o far
have
emphasized
he
supply
f
eaders-i.e.,
the intensityf competitionmong eaders-as a majorde-
terminant
f the
amount of
power
a
leader can wield
under
centrifugality.
turn,now,
to the
supply
of followers.
mong
feudal
nobles his
s
not
relevant;
he
ine between eader
and
follower
as not
clear,
nd
virtually
ll
nobleswere
potential
or actual competitors.
imilarly,
n Melanesia where
diffuse
inheritancexisted,
ll
able-bodied
males were
potential om-
petitors.
Where
there s
a
clear
division etween
eaders
and
followers,
owever,
he
number
f
oyal
followers an
make
a
difference.t
is
plausible
that,
n
most cases,
the larger
the
number
f
subjects, he
stronger ill
be thecentral uthority.
This
poses
another
roblem
or
he
politically
mbitious
man
whereverhe
centrifugal
deology
xists.
Obviously,
he
must
not
distribute oods
of politicalworth,
ut difficulties
emain;
the mount fgoodshe can distributes not unlimited. ven if
everyone,
ncluding he
eader,produces
oods for he
eader's
storehouse,
he amount he can distribute
s limited
by the
productive
apacityof the
total work
orce t his disposal.
He
would
ike
to
be able to
strengthen
is hold
on,
or
increase he
number
f, his followers,
ut he cannot
giveout more goods
than
they
produce.
One
way
this
problemmay
be resolved
s
by conceptually
redefining
he
leader's
rights nd
capacities.
These may
be
conceived
s
symbolic
r
supernatural,
bviating
he need
to
acquire
material oods
for istribution.
he chiefmaybe
viewed
as having
he apacity
o benefit
ispeople
by bringingain;
his
physical
well-being
aybe seen
s bestowing similar
ondition
upon
his
people;
he may be thought
f as having n
intrinsic
right
o
all of henatural esources
fhis ocietynd "allowing"
his people
to
use those
resources.
These
beliefs entail
the
centrifugaldea,but they ranscendt; a leaderwithqualities
and capacities
ike these
will be contemplated
s an
awesome
being,
as
something
more than ordinarily
uman. One
who
possesses
uch capacities
bestows
benefits,
ot as
an ordinary
creditor,
ut as
a
symbol f
his society.His
legitimacy
ests
more
n routinized
harisma
hanon centrifugality.
his
topic,
however mportant,
oes beyond
he subject
underdiscussion
in
this
rticle.
Another olution
o the problem
one
that could,
but need
not, eventually
esult
n charismatic
uthority)
esides
not
n
the
quality
r
kindof
benefits
he eaderdistributes,
ut
n the
way
he
apportions
is
distributions.
e can
select
fraction f
his followers
or pecial ttention.
o them
he can
make heavy
distributions,eaving
ittle
or nothing
or others.
f this
is
carried o extremes,hemajority f thesocietywillbe denied
any
incentive
o obey; the
fraction s
likely to
becomehis
faction,
grouphe
can use to
coerce thers nto
bedience.
his
process
may
have taken place
among
some peoples
in New
Guinea e.g.,
see Barnett
959:1014;Hogbin
1951:150-63).
n
such
cases the
dea
of
centrifugality
s abandoned
s
respects
everyone
n
a
leader's
group
xcept
his faction.
This
process
s not peculiar
o Melanesia.
The
Eskimos,
or
instance,
re generally
n
egalitarian eople.
Yet among
ome
Eskimos
bordering
n the Bering Strait,
unusually
wealthy
men-owners
fumiaks--chose
o
distribute
heir xcess
wealth
not
among
the villagers
t large,
but only
among
a
small
group
of
physically
trong
young
men. These
recipients
on-
stituted
he
leaders' factions,
irtuallyprivate
armies,
who
exacted
obedience
from
thers
under
the
threat
of
physical
harm r death Weyer1967:9).
The
building-or
buying-of
a limited
clientage
of firm
loyalty
n
place
of
a
larger
onstituency
ith
ooser oyalties
s
familiar
rom
ast
and
from
resent
imes.
t
is
a
major
means
for
tightening
ontrol
of the central
uthority
ver
a
large
group.
t is
a
part
of
the process
nvolved
n the
rise
of the
nation-state
n
Europe.
The central
authorities
sed
their
wealth
to bind
particular
ersons
directly
o
themselves
nd
used such
persons-the
baillis,
he sheriffs-to
ypass
vassals
and asserttheirpersonal
upremacy
hroughout
heir
ealms.
By
the
12th
nd 13th enturies
n
England
and
France,kings
were
ble to
employ
heirresources
n
this
way,
and
it is
in
these
regions
hat
we
find he
beginnings
f
the
state in
the
West
(see
Cantor 1963:477-78;
Bloch
1961:425, 430;
Strayer
1970:28,29, 33-35, 50-51). The power f theking ncreased s
his
"faction" rew
maller
nd its
dependence
pon
him
greater
(Strayer
970:92).
"Clientage,"
s Mair
(1964:166)
has
observed, may
wellbe
the
germ
romwhich
tate
power prings."
f this
s so-as
I
think
ikely-I
would
wish
to see
clientage
understood
s
a
special
case
of
centrifugality,
herein
patron's
clients
om-
prise,
not
necessarily
ll of his
people,
but
a
favored ew-his
court-whom
he
can
use
to overawe
he rest.
ASYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
AND
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
THEORY
Asymmetricaleciprocityubsumes deologieswhose study
makes sense
in a number
f political
processes, ut
not
all
political
processes.
Centrifugality
nd centripetality
o
not
7
Maine's interpretationf feudalism aries n his differentubli-
cations. He
held
that feudalismmay have evolved from he
"pure
lines" of "primitive" ocieties
1875:166;
1876 [1871]:141-42, 144-
46). Elsewherehe suggested hat,once feudalism ad developed, he
recipient f a benefit rom chief underwent n alteration n social
and politicalposition;the effect was to produce not merely con-
tractual iability, ut a status" (see 1875: 154-61,
163;
but cf. 1883:
305; 1954
[1861]:304).
I discuss this matter t greater ength lse-
where Orenstein 968:267-68).
Vol.
21
* No.
1
* February
980
79
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 13/24
exhaust all
political ideologies.
The
process
accompanying
others an
be
quite
differentrom hosediscussed
ere.
For example,
have
agreed
with Mair that
clientage s
probablynecessary
or herise of the state.
Clientage,
have
suggested,
s a
special
kind
of
centrifugality
hat confers
much
power
nthe central
uthority.
et the
practice
fthiskindof
centrifugality
ntails ts
partial
bandonment.
hus
centraliza-
tion
of
power among
some Eskimos
and
some
Melanesians
involved
constriction
f
entrifugaluthority;
t was
exercised
over a minority
f
followers,
hile
thers
were
ubject
to
pure
coercion.Similarly,with the rise of the state in the West,
centrifugality
ost
importance
or
everyone
xcept
the imme-
diate
agents f the
king;
his routinized harisma ustained
his
position
with he
majority.
While
uch hiftsn
deology
nd
political racticemay
take
place
in
any kind
of
group, hey
must
ake
place
in
the
nation-
state.Neither
ind f
symmetrical
eciprocity,naccompanied
by
other
egitimizingrinciples,
an be effective
n
large-scale
societies.
he
creditor-leader
ith vast
number f
debtors
s
all too
likely
to be seen
by
them as
an
abstract, mpersonal
creditor-much
s
many
of us
perceive
he nternal
Revenue
Service-to
whom
bligations
re felt s less
binding
han
they
wouldbe felt o
a known
uman
being.
The
situation s similar
with
centripetal uthority.
"servant
of
the
people"
whom
peoplerarely xperiences a tangible erson s likely o incur
distrust,
o
find
that his
constituents
iew the services
he
performs
nd
the
benefits
e
distributes
s
insufficient
ustifica-
tion
forhis elevation o
eminence
witness
he
ritual
disparage-
ment
f
politicians
n
the
West,
where he
very
erm
politician"
is
often sed pejoratively).Consequently,
n
the
nation-state
we
will
lwaysfind ther egitimizing
rinciples,s well s some
coercion,
ide
by
side
with
symmetricaleciprocity.
Differentrocesses
ccompany ifferentdeologies.
or
exam-
ple,
problems egarding he supply of
followers hange when
the
sustaining deology s, as
in
all
kingdoms, he ruler's
routinized
harisma.
nder
entrifugality
he
quantity
f
oyal
followers-constituents
ho
are
not
primarily bjects of
coer-
cion-is
limited
y
the
total
productive apacity
of
the
work
force.
o
increase he
oyalty
f
clients, he
rulermust ncrease
their emunerationydecreasingheirnumber.Where haris-
masustains
uthority,
he
pecialposition
f
the eader s more
evident nd
more
awesome
when the
number
f
followers
s
increased see Shils 1965).
While
I
believe other
kinds
of
ideology
an
profitably
e
analyzed
n
a
manner imilar
o
that
attempted
n
this rticle,
the
concept
of
asymmetrical
eciprocitylone can contribute
much
to an
understandingf politics.
have shownhow the
centrifugaldeology,
f
neffectively
mplemented,s
in
Western
feudalism, ay
result
n
political
haos.
My
use
of
entrifugality
has
suggestedhow political domination
by persons can be
converted
nto
political
tatusheld by a group.We have
seen
how,
under one
form
of
centrifugality,lientage
unequal
apportionment
f
benefits)may helpcentralize olitical
ower.
This astprocess, lientage,mayhave an analog n one found
in
centripetality.hus, f
am correct bout the position f
the
Roman
emperor, he theory ehindhis
authority equired hat
the
demand-right
ie with
he citizens fRome. n fact,how-
ever,
o
long
s he
satisfied heir emands, ispower,
xtending
as it
did
far
beyond
Rome's borders,was impressive.t
was
secure
only
if
he
met their
demands; hence,while they
may
have
been
a
rather assive "faction,"
heir cceptanceof his
supreme
uthority reed
him
to deal as
he wishedwiththose
living outside the city.
The power he exercised eyond
the
borders
f
he
citywas
sustained y neither four twoforms
f
asymmetrical eciprocity,
tut
y
routinized harisma nd/or
coercion.
Whether
reciprocity s
centrifugal r centripetal,
restricted, elective
allocation of resources an lend
much
independence o thecentral uthority.
Beyondthis,the processes
ccompanying he two forms
f
asymmetrical
eciprocity ay be quite different.or
instance,
centripetality
s
probably
ess sensitive
o
inheritance ules.
do not think entripetality ill be much ltered n practice o
long as the benefitsnherited nd distributedre not extraor-
dinarily arge; the coffers f
an
affluenteadership, uch as
existed mongthe village Anuak,will be too readilydepleted
by constituents' emands. In large-scale ocieties, uch as the
modernWest, vast differencesn amounts f nheritedwealth
do, of course, eeply ffect olitics, ut differenceso large re
likely to have grave political effectsrrespective f political
ideology.)
Why, hen, lace the twoforms fasymmetricaleciprocity
under the
same
rubric?One
reason
have mentioned: oth
have their source in the same
panhuman predisposition o
reciprocate enefits. aradoxically, nother eason ies in the
very act
f heir
pposition
o
one
nother. uthorityustained
by routinized
harisma
nd, think,
lso
rational uthority an
be
accompanied y
either orm f
symmetricaleciprocity,or
these deologies
do
not,
of
necessity, lash with either f its
variants.
The
two
forms
f
asymmetrical eciprocityre ideo-
logically ncompatible recisely ecause theycomprise evia-
tions
from henorm n
totally pposeddirections.
If,
for
nstance,
we
find
entrifugality
n
the interstices f
political emocracy,
e
generally xpress isapproval.We may
refer
o
the creditor-leaderss
"crookedpoliticians," owever
cynicallywe may contemplatehem s "partofthesystem."
This is
why
bossism s
so
widely condemned
n
the United
States.
t
is
not
egitimate.
t involves
ranting avors, sually
material enefits,
n
return orwhich he boss expects olitical
loyalty Merton 1949:70-81). The demand-righties withthe
boss.
It is
centrifugality,
hich
n
the United
States
s
usually
covert
r,
f
vert,
estricted
n
geographiccope.
The
dominant
political
values
of
the
country
re
democratic, nd thisentails
centripetality. entrifugality
annot
persistfor ong
in
this
context
without
liciting ngrydenunciationsnd, frequently,
reform
movementsntended o
"cleanse the
body politic."
Evidence
for
the oppositionbetween the two formsof
asymmetricaleciprocitynd for he general sefulness f the
concept
an
be seen in
present-day olitics
he
world
over-
assuming hat "current
vents"
are not to be disqualified
s
evidence imply ecausethey re current. have discussed he
particulars f its contemporaryelevance n some detail else-
where
1979)
and
will attend o it here
onlybriefly.
Western-styleemocracy,
o
which
entripetality
s
essential,
is prestigious hroughouthe modernworld.Yet virtually ll
contemporaryations,
he new
nation-states,"
s well s those
not so
new,
have
either iscarded e
facto
democracy
r
never
troubled
o
try
t n thefirst
lace; and their nhabitants,part
from
hose ew mong hem
who
have been thoroughly estern-
ized, do
not
protest vermuch.My discussion
f
asymmetrical
reciprocity rovides
two
plausible
reasons
for this state
of
affairs. ne
I
have alluded
to
already: centripetality
s
politi-
cally
inefficient.
his
charge
has
been
so often directed
t
democracy
hat t is
banal,
but banal ornot t seemsto me to
holdevenmore ruth handemocracy'setractorsmaybelieve.
The inefficiency
f
centripetality
annot be attributed
lone
to the
complexity
nd
large
scale
of
modern
ation-states.
t
was about
equally
inefficient
or
the
Nambikwara and
the
village
Anuak.
It
tends
to
be
inefficient
rrespective
f
the
scale
or
complexity
f
the
ociety
n
which t exists.
One
reason
that eaders
of
new
nations
have
rejected
de
facto
democracy
is that they, possibly along
with their
followers,
ense
its
politicalweakness.
eaders
may
want
to
"get
the
ob
done."
Followersmaywant trongeaders
whocan
do
this.
Confronted
with ocial
and
economic
roblems
ar
more
erious
han we
in
the West
face,
these
people generally-not nevitably-have
been effectivelyempted ypotentiallynd often ctuallymore
efficientolitical ystems han democracy. hus new nation-
statesrarely hoosedemocracy.
The choice of centrifugality akes most sense from the
perspective f the leadership. Indeed, for some leaders the
80
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 14/24
Orenstein:SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
hoice s
not
between ne
or
the other
kind
of
asymmetrical
reciprocity s a
way
of
achieving egitimacy,
ut
between
legitimate ule,
n
the
one
hand, nd unimpeded ower nd its
perquisites,
n the
other.) Assuming
hat leaders choose
to
legitimate heir
ositions
ia
centrifugality,here emains he
questionwhy
followers
o
readily cquiesce.
This
brings
me
to
my secondreasonfor
holding hat the ascendancy
f
centrifu-
gality s
to
be anticipated mongnon-Western
eoples.
have
just argued hat
the
two variants
n
asymmetrical
eciprocity
oppose one
another; rom his
t
follows hat the existence f
one will act as a barrier o the diffusionf the other.Among
most, though not all, societies prior to
very recent times,
centrifugality
as
been
accepted
without
uestion.
Choice
did
not exist,
because centripetality as either unknown r as
remote nd
exotic
s for s
would
be
the dea
of
governance y
an
awesome, bsolute "Orientaldespot."
Now,
most new na-
tions ubsume
single ociety
r a
number f
different
ocieties
forwhom
entrifugality,hilenot always
the sole deology,
s
one very important
nd pervasive way of thinking bout
politics.Because centrifugalityeems
elf-evident,
he
absence
of
democracy s not felt s a deprivation.
ts presencewould
more ikely e
felt s a peculiarity, ossibly s an absurdity.
Oneform f
symmetricaleciprocityannot eadily upplant
the other s
if
by amputation nd
grafting.When
a
people
contemplate
heir
eader as
a
creditor, hey are
not
likely,
without thoroughgoingrainwash, bruptly o transpose im
into
an
obedient ebtor;no morewould a
people (such as we
of he
Western
world)
who
re flattered
o
believe leader eads
only
n
order
o
servethem
bruptly nd openly vow
him to
be
their ord. The
secure
escape
from
reedom"
rovidedby
the oneand the
prideprovided y the
alternative deology o
not easilymix.
The
preceding iscussion s intended s a
contributiono an
anthropologicalerspective n political
deas and processes
n
the
past and
at the
present ime.
However,
the
way we ap-
proach
ny
compartment
f
culture-whether olitics, inship,
economics,
r
religion-usually mplies general heory rans-
cending
hat
compartment,nd
it
has
implications
or
other
theories.
I have beendiscussing he impact f a particular eature f
society,
ts
political deology, pon the
goals
of
a society
nd
itsviability. hat is to say,my pproach s
functionalnalysis-
no longer ashionable, know,but
perhaps because fashion's
fortunes ften
hinge
on
matters
ranscendingither
eason
or
fact.
suggest
hatwe
think fthe
concept
f
functionmuch
s
did
the
founder
f
this
approach,
Emile
Durkheim.
By
func-
tionalism meanthe
study
f
society
whose
entral
oncern s
group solidarity. t is a way of studying
ociety that takes
fully
nto
account how
customary ctions may enhance
or
enfeeble
olidarity.
The
approach
I
suggest
should
not be
understood
n
thesophomoricensethat
n
every ulture or
even
in
most
cultures) "everything
s
related
to
everything
else."
Quite
the
contrary.
or
instance,
entripetality
s found
in societies s differents theNambikwara, he Anuak, the
contemporary est,and possibly mperialRome. It is not
a
consistent
onstituent f
any particular type
of
"organic"
whole.
The really nterestinghing bout
t is that t seems o
have
similar
onsequences n
extraordinarilyifferenttotal
social
ystems.")Moreover, unctionalism,s
I
see t (following
Durkheim),
does
not
imply changelessnesssee also Cancian
1968).
It
does not necessarily ocus on
the ways whereby
antagonisms
re
resolved; olidaritytself lmost
lways
entails
antagonisms,
s
Durkheim
made clear (1947[1893]:266-68,
365;
see
also
Gluckman
956). Nor do
functional
tudies,
n
the
sense
in
which use
the
term, roperly ircumambulate
he
far
broader
oncept
f ocial
cohesion. ohesion an be as
much
a product f
pure coercion r raw,narcissisticelf-seekings
of
socialsolidaritye.g., see Gluckman 956: hap.6). Functional
analysisrightly
ocuses n solidarity, he sense people have
of
being
"as one" with others in their crroin-
others
with
whom
they
mayconflictnd
sideby side
withwhom heymay
change.
One feature
f Durkheim's
unctionalismas
been, to my
mind,
given far too
littleprominence,
specially n
social
anthropology.
his is his
view of crime.
As Durkheim
aw it
(1939[1895]:xxxviii;
1947[1893]:
1-74, 81-89,
102, 108-9),
crime s
a "normal" ccurrence
n a society. hat
is to say, t s
an activity equired
by a society f the
society s to
remain
"healthy"
solidary). n large
part agree,
but I would
prefer
to extend hefamiliarmeaning ftheterm crime" as used by
Durkheim)
somewhat
metaphorically
eyond
the contentof
penal
codes much
f
which would,nfact, xclude)to
include
all
deviations
rom
evoutly eldbeliefs
nd customs.
Moreover,
I would dd that
crime" s so necessary
or ocial
health hat t
is sometimes nstitutionalized.
Criminal" deviations
an
be
encouraged
n
virtually
ny domain
f
culture.
or example, n
Western
music cordatura
see
Trainor 1972:31) requires
hat
the musicians
n
string nsembles eliberately
nd systemati-
cally
"mistune"
one
or more
strings
f
their nstruments
n
order
o achieve pecial
ffects. his contrasts
ith ccordatura
wherein
he ultimate
esthetic spiration
s perfect
armony
(the
analog,perhaps,
of
perfect eciprocity).
n scordatura
musician an
mistune ownward
n
the
scale, trying, erhaps,
for groaning, eeping esonance,
r he can mistune
pward o
achieve
shrill,
tartling
hriek.
n
neither ase
does scordatura
allow
impromptu
nnovations, s
in
syncopation
n
jazz
(and,
similarly,
n
anticipated,
but uninstitutionalized,
eviations
from
norms
n
aspects
of
culture
ther han music,
crimes"
that are
expected
but not
"orchestrated").
Scordatura s
planned.
t is
purposive.
he
composer
sets thetune"-sets it,
so
to
speak,
n
deliberate efiance
f "the
concept
f
the
perfect
fifth."
cordaturas
a
"source of mmense reative otential,"
because
t
serves
s
a
medium
f
"escape
from he bondage
of
the conventional."
ts
purpose
s to
"strengthen
he
mpact
of
the total
composition."8
Institutionalized
crime" s widespread.
t is
fairly
requent
in religious
ehavior.For
example, he
Hopi hold a ceremony
that is
to
them highly acred,
yet they
anticipate-indeed,
provideand plan for-a simultaneous eremony hat is a
grotesque, arcical
mockery
f
its
sacred counterpartTitiev
1971).
The
farce
eems acrilegious;
t
shocks nd offends
any
Hopi.
The
offensiveness
f the farce
serves
to
enhance,by
contrast,
the
significance
nd
solemnity
of the
authentic
ceremony.
he sacred
ritual
s set side
by
side
with,
hence
n
striking
ontrast
o,
that
which
mocks
t;
thus
t is the
less
likely o
become routinely
nacted
itual,
taken
for
ranted"
by
participants
r
observers.
Moreover,
he
offense
s
shared;
hence
the
solidarity
f
the devout,
the
empathy
hey
feelfor
one
another,
s intensified.
similar
ffect
s attained
hrough
all rituals
f rebellion
Gluckman
954)
or
of
conflict
Norbeck
1963).
Functionaldeviations
from
outine, ay-to-day
ways
need
not consist nlyofrebellions r conflicts. s in thescordatura
effect, ny
sort
of
highly
visible
or audible
irregularity
ay
servethe
same
purpose.
This is evident
n
political
ystems.
If
people
are
to have sharedgoals,
hence
social
solidarity,
they
must
have
leadership-not
necessarily
o
push
them his
way or that
toward trategic oals,
but
at
the east
to
serve
s
a
focus
or
irectives r,
ometimes,
s a concrete
ymbol
f
the
group's
nity.
ocial
solidarity
annot
xist
without
eadership,
formal
or
informal,
nd
the
group
cannot
remain
solidary
unless
t has
some
reason(s)
for
ccepting
ts
leader
(e.g.,
see
8
The
relevance
of the
concept
of
scordatura
or asymmetrical
reciprocity
asbrought
o
my ttention
yJeanOrenstein.
ts
poten-
tial
as a
metaphor
or
ocial
conditionss,
I
think, mpressive.
ntire
culturesmight e conceived s tending ither oscordatura
r
accorda-
tura
much s RuthBenedictcharacterizedertain ulturess Diony-
sian
or
Apollonian.
use
it in a
limited
ense,
as but
one
instance
of the
function
f
nstitutionalized
crime"
n
a culture.
Vol.
21 * No.
1 *
February 980
81
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 15/24
Sherif
1952;
de Grazia
1948:74-75,
110-13, 189;
Friedrich
1968;
Bernard 1961:636, 639,
641). The
reason-what
I
call
political
deology-may be a belief
n
the charisma or the
rationality f the
political uthority.t
may be seen, s
I
have
said,
as
residing
n
the
way
the
eaderdeviates, y
rule,
rom
firmly
eld and felt ule.
An
illustration ifferentrom
he
one
I
have dweltupon n
thispaper may
make my meaning lear.
Incest s a crime
n
all societies, ut
n
a few
ocieties he eader
can-or even
should-commit ncest
Murdock
1949:13).
This
"crime"
encourages
he view
that the
eader's charisma s as
thatofthegods,beings o awesome hat theordinary ulesof
ordinary
mortals
ught not
to
restrain hem.
Supported
by
such
routinized
harisma,
he
leader's
position
s
such
that,
whilehe may
ymbolize hewholegroup,
e serves, t the ame
time, s a pointwith
which
he
group ees tself s
contrasted.
Ordinary eople can
more
eadily
ensetheir
ommon
ualities
and see their moral rules
as
all
the
more
binding
on
their
ordinary
aw-abiding
ives when
they
ontemplate hemselves
in
contrast o their
xtraordinary,wesome
verlord.
It is similar
with asymmetrical
eciprocity, hough the
"crime"
need not, nd usuallydoes
not,
nvest
he eaderwith
much
harisma-certainly ot harisma f
he ikes f hat f he
pharaohs
f
Ptolemaic gypt.Asymmetrical
eciprocitypposes
debtor
and
creditor.
n
centrifugality
he
"law-breaking"
leader
erves s the one to whom ll others reopposed
n
theircommon
urden
f
debt
and
in
their
hared
recognition
f his
havingviolated the rule of
reciprocityhat
theymust accept
as correct or
elations
mong
hemselves.
e
draws
he
group
together y
symbolizing
he
group; hey artake
fhis
reflected
renown. t the
ame
time,
e
stands
n
opposition
o the
group;
by
virtue f
the
contrast,
e
draws hem
ogether.
This
contrasts also
present
n
centripetality,
ut thedistinc-
tion between
eader and led
is now
often
light;
the credit
commoners hare
in
their
common debtor-their leader-
would
not rate highwith
"community" f bankers.
o this
must be
added the weakness
mentioned arlier-that
such
leadership an and often oes
nvolve nearly
ropistic
ollow-
ing of its followers'
ead. We are left
with a people whose
persistence s
a
solidarygroup must often
be
in
peril.
Cen-
tripetalitys frequentlyysfunctional.
It is old
hat-though ittleworn-that the
functionalist ust
look both
ways.
Centrifugality ay also be
functional
r
dysfunctional.
t
may
have been
dysfunctional
n
some
Melane-
sian
groups.
ither
entrifugality
r nheritance
ules,
ossibly
both,
may
have been
dysfunctional
n
feudal
Europe.
Cen-
tripetality
eems not
to have
been
dysfunctional
n
the
Swiss
township
r
in
the
Athens
of
antiquity.
However
much
or
little
ocial
solidarity btains
n
modern
America, think en-
tripetalityoes essen he
political ffectiveness
f
some
organs
of
American
government: he
House, probably;
maybe
the
Senate;possibly,
hough
o a
lesser xtent-how
much
depends
upon
the
ncumbent-the
residency
tself.
I
am
currently rying
o
resolve
nd clarify
ome
of these
questions. hope to "swell a progress"here and there.
recognize
hat
ome
nvolve
roblemswithwhich
may
not
be
able
to
cope,
but
they
re
problems
worth
ttempting
o
cope
with.Theyare
questions hat riseout of
functional erspec-
tive
on
political egitimacy, ut of a
search
for he
functions
and
dysfunctions
f
customary eliefs nd
behavior, nd they
are
important
uestions.Asymmetrical
eciprocityhould be
interpreted
unctionally;nd thisorientation-glib
ritics
o
the
contrary
otwithstanding-movess not to bypass
prob-
lems
of
ulture
hange r social
conflict,ut,rather, o focus n
them.
Asymmetrical
eciprocity,ike scordatura,
hould
not be
viewed
n
isolation
from ts effects n
social solidarity. ike
scordatura,
t
can
serve to "strengthenhe
mpactof the total
composition" nd by
so doing to endowpolitical
power
with
legitimacy.f theterm legitimacy"s tobe used n a manner
founded
n fact,yet neither rbitrary or
audatory, his s
one
reasonably
meaningful ay to
do so.
Comments
by
CLAUDE
AKE
School f ocial
Sciences,University
f
PortHarcourt,
.M.B.
5323,
PortHarcourt,
igeria.21
vii
79
I
have
many difficulties
ith this thoughtful
nd
interesting
paper,
but
I
will concentrate
n those associated
with
its
major
concepts,centrifugality
nd centripetality.
o begin
with,
he relationbetween
eader and
followers escribed
y
these concepts
s theclassic market
elation, nd the
nterac-
tionsbetween hem re essentiallymarket ransactions. oods
and
services re givenfrom alculations
f self-interestn
the
expectation
hat other
goods and services
will be received
n
return. he obligation
rising rom
his exchange elationship
is
only
the legal obligation
f contractual
rrangements.
he
relationship
ntails no moral
obligation nd
indeed excludes
any such obligation.
Therefore
t cannot
engender olitical
legitimacy.
Even
if
the
relations f asymmetrical
eciprocity
ere also
to entail moral obligation,
heconcepts f
centripetalitynd
centrifugalityould
still be grossly
nadequate for
xplaining
political egitimacy.
he question
fpolitical
egitimacyannot
be
reduced
to how leaders
and followers
eel about their
reciprocal bligations.
o personalize
t in this way
is to miss
itsessence.The legitimacyf a socialor political rderhas less
to do with
whatpeople feel
bout particular
eaders hanwith
the
acceptance
of the prevailing
norms,values,
institutions,
and
ideology
using the term
more conventionally).
his is
why
political stability
s possible
even when the
political
leadership
s highly
npopular. he
case of charismatic
uthor-
ity, n which
egitimacys personalized,
s an
exception, ut
it
is an exception
which roves
he rule;as Weber hows,
haris-
matic
uthoritys an
unstable nd transitional
henomenon.
The
concepts
f centifugality
nd centripetality
re highly
suspect as
meaningful ays
of looking t
the world. n the
case
of
centrifugality,he
leader
is
conceived
s "creditor,"
giving
more n goods
and services
han he gets from
his fol-
lowers.
n
the
case ofcentripetality,
t s the
reverse; he eader
is "debtor" and is obligated o serve.Can we meaningfully
talk
n
these terms? t
is
quite mpossible,
xcept
n
the very
shortrun,
for the balance
of the flowof
goods and
services
between eader
and followers
o
be
such that
the eader
gives
more
hanhe
receives.A leaderwho
givesmore han
he
receives
will
oon havenothingeft o
give and will ose
his eadership.
If
this
s
correct,
he
concept
f centrifugality
s
really
con-
tradiction
n terms.
The
example
of rural
ndia
brings
he
point
home.
Here,
the
politically
ominant
aste
is
said
to be
in
a
relation f centrifugal
symmetry ith
the
other astes.
It
gives
heothers
the
ervice astes) building ites,
istributes
gifts
o
them,
onates o
the
poor,
contributes
he bulk
of
the
expenditure
f
village
ceremonies,
tc.
How
is this
possible?
How can the dominant aste
continue
o
give
so much
more
than it gets and still remain economically ominant?The
jajmani system
nsures
he flow
f
goods
nd
services rom
he
lower castes
to the
dominant
ne.
The
system
yields
much
power
o thedominant
roup,
o
much
that
some
anthropolo-
gists
have called
it
exploitative."
The
leadershipgives
only
what
t has taken away-or,
betteryet,
only part
of
what
it
has taken
way.
The same
criticism
pplies
to the
concept
of
centripetality.
In
the case
of centrifugality,
e assume
unequal
exchange
between
he
political
enter
nd
the
periphery
n favour
f the
periphery-a
situation
which,
have
argued,
s
impossible.
In
the
case
of
centripetality,
e assume
unequal
exchange
between
he
center nd
the
periphery
n
favour
f the
center,
which s highly lausible.
The problem ere s that the
posited
conditions f egitimationf power t the centerdemandthe
acting
out of the eader's debtor tatus-that
is, the
unequal
exchange fgoods
nd services etween he enter
nd periphery
82
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 16/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
n favour f the
periphery.
his means return o the
xchange
conditions
f
centrifugality,
hich have been shown to
be
impossible.
These criticismsssume
that the
concepts
f
centrifugality
and centripetalityre
supposed
to be
describing
he
actual
patterns
f flowof
goods
and services.
t
may
well be-the
paper
is
not
clear on
this-that
what
they
are intended
o
describe
s not the actual
pattern
of
exchanges
but rather
perceptions, owever istorted,
f these
patterns.
f
that
s
the
case, the charge that
these
conceptsdescribe
n
impossible
situationno longerholds.However,we are then reducedto
explaining olitical egitimacy urely
n termsof false con-
sciousness.
by
UGENE
COOPER
Department
f
Sociology, niversity
f
HongKong,HongKong.
16
vii
79
Orenstein's roposed lassification
f societies n the basis of
asymmetrical
eciprocities oes astray
largely
because his
centripetal/centrifugalichotomy
s
based
on
ideology lone,
divorced
ompletely
rom
he structure
f social
relations.
y
his
own admission, his eads
to
a classing ogether
f
societies
which differ idely n features therthan ideology" nd in
which he resultant
ypes "are not connected y any orderly
historical rocess."Far from eing "methodologicaldvan-
tage," as Orenstein laims, his sort of classificationeems to
me neither
articularly sefulnor particularly roductive
f
the
kinds f results
which nthropologyenerally
eeks.
Surely, very
ruling lass
in the
history
f class
society
has
justified
ts
position
with
an ideology
which
claims
to
render
services emanded
by the ruled. mperialChina produced n
ideologywhich,
f
taken at face value, ncorporated he right
of
the
peasantryto
rebel,
a
right ustifiedby
success.To
characterize
mperial
ome
or imperial hina as centripetal
n
ideological ype s meaninglessf t does not differentiatehese
two
classic ivilizations rom
he
village
Anuakor Nambikwara
or from
he
contemporary nitedStates.
Orenstein's
entripetal/centrifugal
lassification
s
vaguely
reminiscentf Sahlins's 1963) distinction etween big man"
societies nd
cniefdoms,lthough,
he
taxonomy
erived iffers
substantially. or
Sahlins, he dynamic
f a chiefdom
s
one
involving xtraction
rom he population t large
n
favorof
the
chiefly
action
apparently
entrifugal
n
Orenstein's las-
sification, r
perhaps what
he
would
call
clientage),
while n
"big
man"
society hedynamic
s one of
extraction
rom
he
faction
f
he
big
man"
n
favor f distribution
o
the
popula-
tion t
arge apparently entripetal
n Orenstein's
lassification,
although
he classifies
big man" societies as centrifugal).
Sahlins characterizes
he "big man'
as
a prince mong
men
who s constantly orced o validate his claims to charismatic
powerby
distributiono an
ever
greedy opulation centripe-
tal?), while he chief s as the Prince f
Danes,
whose
ncipient
bureaucratic owerderives rom is office nd giveshim right
of
command centrifugal?).
Sahlins eems
o be
using
Orenstein's weak
big
man" as
his
archetype,whereasOrenstein akes the
Kapauku "strong ig
man" as his.
Orenstein
oes
on
to note
that a "big
man"
normallymust
strike
balance between
xpansionistnd solationist olicies-
he
cannot
push
his
own faction oo hard,but mustmake some
effort
o validate his
prestige hrough istribution utside.
This
appears o
me
to be striking balance between entrifugal
and
centripetal endencies,
which
Orenstein'spurely emic
categories llow himto overlook.
Generally, prefer he
typology ielded y Sahlins's nalysis
(a) because it is more closely tied to
the structure f social
relations fthe ocieties n question nd (b) because t produces
a classificationf societies onnected y an orderly istorical
nrocess.
In his discussion f
the Tolai, Orensteinmisinterprets
he
distributionfwealth
which ccurs t thefuneral
f deceased
"big man" as a means
of dissipation esigned
o circumvent
the demands
f matrilinealnheritance.
Were he familiarwith
Rosman
nd Rubel's work 1970, 1971),
he wouldhave realized
that this pparent issipation
s
nothingmore han
a potlatch-
like
distribution
hich alidates he
uccession f the SiSo and,
ratherthan circumventing
atriliny,s perfectly
onsistent
with t.
Finally,Orenstein's
iscussion f centripetality
nd centrif-
ugality
n
themodern
worldmakes mockery f
contemporary
world olitics. t is ironic
hat a paper which urports
o be a
scientifictudy f deology
ouldmake uch deologically
oaded
statements s
"Because centrifugality
eems self-evident,he
absence
of
democracy
s
not felt s a deprivation" r "When
a
people contemplate
heir eader as a creditor,
hey are not
likely,without thoroughgoing
rainwash, bruptly
o trans-
form
him
nto
an
obedient
debtor." Not only do such state-
ments ivert
ur attention rom he
nstitutionaltructures f
world apitalismwhich
upport ppressive egimes
hroughout
the ThirdWorld, ut
they re beliedby the truggles
f ibera-
tion movements ighting
o achieve the democracy
hat Oren-
stein rgues newnation-statesarely hoose."
by
CAROL S.
HOLZBERG
Erindale College,University
f
Toronto,Mississauga,
Ont.,
Canada
L5L
1C6.
24
vii
79
"Asymmetrical
eciprocity
.. can
serve
to 'strengthen
he
impact
f hetotal omposition'nd
bysodoing ndow olitical
power
with
egitimacy."
his statement
n Orenstein's onclu-
sion
best
summarizes
he
major
thrust f
his
article-a func-
tional nterpretation
f
the role
of
ideology
s it sustainsor
legitimizes
olitical eadership
n
any given
ociety.
Orenstein
deserves
redit
for
elaborating
n the
concept
of
reciprocity.
He has
made a worthwhilend suitable
ttempt t clarifying
why t s notreciprocity
er e, but "asymmetrical
eciprocity,"
the"socially pprovedviolation" f a reciprocal elation, hat
is
of
paramount
mportance
n a
discussion f
political rocess.
One wonders, owever,
ow
he
can
conclude
hat both entrifu-
gality
nd
centripetality
the opposing
irections
hat
socially
approved
violations f
reciprocitymay take)
can
strengthen
social solidaritywhen centripetality
s
inherentlyocially
di-
visive.AsOrenstein imself
otes,
n
centripetalocieties,
uch
as
those
organized
n the basis of
democratic
deology,
where
the
"demand-right"
or he flow f
goods
nd
services
ies with
the
constituency
ather
than
with the
political
centre,
the
system
results not
only
in "weak
leadership,"
but
also
in
"social
and political railty." entripetality
s "dysfunctional"
to the central
ower.
Hence
it
is
"inefficient."
ow, then,
an
it
endow
he
eader
with
egitimacy?
Orenstein houldbe commended orhisuseful ontribution
toward n understandingf
the "meaning"
f
egitimacy,
ne
that he
emphasizes
s
decidedly
emic" and hence
devoid
of
researcher
ias.
His
argument
s
persuasive
though
t
some
points
onceptually onfusingnd
hencenot
entirely
onvinc-
ing.
For example,
while he realizes that
a
series of
political
ideologies routinized
harisma, atrilineal
nheritance, ing-
ship,coercion,
nd rationality)might
oexist
r
even
compete
with ne another, e
seems o suggest hat
society
s charac-
terized
by
a
dominant
deology.
This is
true both
for feudal
Europe
and for he
"big
man"
societies
f
Melanesia,
but
is
it
true
of the
complex
ocieties
f
the
"modern
West," composed
of
plurality
f ocial
nd cultural
egments?
omplex
ocieties
are
not
structured
y
a
single and/or
dominant
political
ideology. o see them s suchwouldsuggest hat ocal-level
(community,
illage,neighbourhood)
alues
or
those
of differ-
ent racial, ethnic, nd social-classgroupings
were all of the
Vol.
21
* No.
1
February 980
83
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 17/24
same
ideological
mold-a
conclusion ot borne
ut
by
a
great
deal
of
ethnographyAronson
976,
Gonzalez
1970,Magubane
1969,Rubin
1960,
Smith
1965).
Even in
small-scale, irtually
homogeneousocieties
ike
he
Nambikwara,
he
thnographer's
depiction
of the "dominant"
political
deology
mightdiffer
depending pon
which
party faction)
n
the
politicalrelation
he/she
as consultedwith-the
"big man" or his
constituency.
Orenstein
uggests, erhaps
omewhat
ncorrectly,
hat
the
two versions f
asymmetrical
eciprocity
re
mutually ncom-
patible-"because
they omprise
eviations rom
he
norm
n
totally pposeddirections." his doesnot seemto be thecase
precisely
n
those ituations ustained
y
the
opposing olitical
ideologies f
centripetality
nd
centrifugality.
ere
centripetal-
ity
s neither
ysfunctional
or
nefficient.refer o the
sup-
posedly
contradictory olitics
of
"democratic
ocialism,"
a
political
deology
ound
n
developing
ations ike
Jamaica
nd
Tanzania
in which
he
state must be
obeyed
because
"it
sees
itself s givingmore
goods nd services
han t
receives,"
while
the
constituency
iews the
state as
the
servant
f
the
people,
bound
to
theirmaterial ocial
support
nd
in
power
by
virtue
of their
race Holzberg
1977).
t is
not so
much
he
frailty
f
the
democratic
deology
which s
at
stake,
but
the
frailty
f
centrifugality
n
the face
of
the
polarization
f classes n the
society.The masses are
free
o
orchestrate seriesof
strikes,
peacefully emonstrate,nd make public theiracts of civil
disobedience
through
ormal
nd
legal
politicalchannels)
n
order o
ensure
hat
their
asic
rights
re
maintained.
Basically, am
in
agreement ith
Orenstein's
eneralwork-
ing assumptions.
t is
important hat "ideas and
ideals" be
taken
nto account
n
a
consideration
f
human
relations.
t is
also mportant
hat
deology
e
examined s
a
sustainingharter
rather
han
merely
s
a
restraining
r
imiting orce.
Certainly
one cannot
dispute hefact hat
deology
as a
built-in
apacity
for
ccommodating
hange
as
well
as
for
ts
own
alteration;
but
to generalize rom
symmetrical
eciprocityo
the
"con-
tent"
of
political
egitimacy
hen
reciprocity
ay
be
only
one
of the
operatingpolitical
ideologies
makes
for
conceptual
ambiguity nd exaggeration ather
han
clarity
n
our
under-
standing fpolitical
egitimacy
n
society.
by
AWRENCE
KRADER
Institute
fEthinology,
ree
University
erlin,
riimmerstrasse
52, Dahlem,
Berlin 3. 17
vii
79
Orenstein as taken
up
analogies
between
entripetality
nd
centrifugality,reditor
nd
debtor, nd
medieval European
and
modern
Melanesian
political
systems
n
the
typology f
power.
Feudalism
n
this
regard
ppears
to
be a
much
bused
word
nd
is
here
represented ith
respect o ideological
aral-
lels.
Thought
ought to be
given, however, o
relations of
bondage nd to
andownership,irculation
ther han
xchange,
and relations
furban
nd
rural
ife, s
well s to the ize
of
the
political
nit.Thenthere
would
be a
widerbasis for
udgment
as to whetherheanalogy s apt or is morethan an analogy.
The
fundamentalaw
set down by
Orenstein s the
law of
reciprocity,nd
it
is
described s
a panhuman
isposition. he
matter s
more
omplicated han wouldappear
from is com-
ments,
or eciprocitys
distinguishedy
Aristotlen
connection
with
exchange
nd with
distribution;ittle
doubt s left s to
his
meanings, or
he introduced
othphilological
nd economic
precisions
n
regardto
them. These
reciprocal elations
re
further
onnected
to
distributiveustice and
right and to
commutative
ustice and
right,
espectively.The thirdkind
of
justice in
Aristotle's
ystem,
orrective, alls
outside our
purview.)
t
is
the
relation etween
istributiveustice,right,
and
reciprocity
hich s at issue
n
thenorm ited
by
Orenstein.
However, his s
unclear rom is
usage. t would ppear
from
his treatment f asymmetricaland by implication f sym-
metrical)reciprocity
hat he has commutative
eciprocity
n
mind, but the latter
has to do with
the principle f
equal
reciprocitynd its breach by the asymmetrical elation nd,
further,
ith
qualityof exchange, ontract f exchange, nd
equivalence
n
exchange arried ut in society. he arithmetic
calculationsOrenstein efers o are of central mportance n
theserelations. istributive eciprocity,ustice, nd right re
of anotherkind from he commutative nd are not connected
to any relations f this sort or to the calculations ertaining
to it.
There
s
a
second difficulty
n
the treatment f this funda-
mental aw, for the principle f ustice and right ears upon
the polis, ccording o Aristotle. hus references made to the
city-statend to complex,nternally ivided ociety. ut many
people do not ive n a polis; they ive nstead n
communities,
called
koinonia,
r in
community-likeonditions, hichmight
be takento correspond o life n a clan, a clan-village, tribe,
or the ike. The system f ustice developedby Aristotles at
the same
time a system f right, istory, conomics, olitics,
and
society.
hese
are
takenup by
him
n
his variousworks n
ethics, olitics, nd economics. have discussed hem lsewhere
(Krader 1976: chap. 1; 1979: chap. 4), where have dealt with
the relations etween he
various ocial conditions f the polis
and the community,tc., and shown them to have intercon-
nectionswithdifferentelations f ustice,right, uman ocial
development,nd social theory.
by
ONALD
V.
KURTZ
DepartmentfAnthropology,niversityfWisconsin-Milwau-
kee,Milwaukee,Wis. 53201,U.S.A. 26
vii
79
Orensteinmakes a valuable contribution o the analysis of
political legitimacy, n
uncommon
nthropological oncern.
His identification f ideologies derived from asymmetrical
reciprocity
eserves
ttention.
t is
gratifying
hat the
analysis
is
grounded
n
empirical ata and applied
to
stateless
ocieties
as well as
states,
wo other ncommon
spects
n
the
study
of
legitimacy. ven though functional olidarity rovides the
theoretical
remise
f the
paper, nsight s provided
nto the
role deology lays n the nstitutionalizationfpower hrough
redefinitionf authority odes, clientage, nheritance,nd so
forth. ince Orenstein ees this analysisas preliminary,he
following
ommentaries re offered o accommodatefuture
research.
Although
Orenstein
rgues
that the
polar oppositions
hat
centripetal
nd
centrifugalsymmetrical eciprocityepresent
are not to be
confounded
ith ther rouble-laden
ichotomies,
he
also argues
hat
the existence
f one
precludes
he
existence
of the
other. This
is the
dilemma,
because
it
impedes
the
analysis
of
process.
Even
though
Orenstein
rgues
that func-
tionalismdoes not
imply changelessness,
t
is
the
nature
of
change
that
s at
issue.
He
suggests
hat movement
rom
ne
level
of
solidarity
o another
s
possible.
Yet the functionalist
paradigm
till
tends to
structure
tructure
Coult 1966)
so as
to
impede
he
analysis
of
decision-makingrocesseswhich,
o
my thinking,s critical orpolitical hange.Also,theconcepts
tend to
preclude analysis
of
process because, despite
their
laudable
neutrality,
he
more ntricate
he behavior
nvolved
in
the
process
he
ess
capable
the
concepts
re
of
responding
heuristically;
s
presented hey
do
not
provide
the
flexibility
for
nalyzing rocess hat,
for
xample,
he
concepts
fnorma-
tive
and
pragmatic
ules
provide Bailey 1969).
Regarding
he
"emic"
categories
he
deologies epresent,
wonder romwhosepoint
of view
theymay
be
analyzed
most
fruitfully-that
f the rulers
r that
of
the ruled-and
under
what
specific
ituations.
Legitimacy
s effected
hrough
complex rocess Kurtz 1978,n.d.),
one critical
spect
of
which
is the inculcation nto the ruled
by the
rulersof
a
political
ideology hat s compatiblewith he rulers' oals Cohen 1969,
Kurtz 1978). Especially n states,rulers re likely o act out
one ideology nd espouserhetoricallynother epending pon
the situation. n the United States, cannot a congressman
84
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 18/24
Orenstein: SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
nvolve
himself
n
both
deologies
when
he
represents,
n
the
one hand,the nterests fhis constituencydebtor/centripetal-
ity) and, on
the other,
vested interest
roups
for whom he
provides avors nd/or argesse
n
exchange
or
upport credi-
tor/centrifugality)?
Finally,
Orenstein
eeds to
clarify
he
relationship
etween
material nd ideological
xplanations egarding
he
behavior
associated
with
the
ideologies.
He seems to favor
deological
explanations; et,
t
times,
e
implies
material
ausality
or
behavior. Another contributionmight
be to
specify
more
precisely he implications f material nd ideologicalfactors
for pecific spects
f
political rocesses
nd situationsn which
their ffect pon processmay
be
either
ongruent
r
divergent.
Orenstein as made
a
good
start
n a
difficult
roblem
rea;
he
should ontinue
his ine
of
nquiry.
by
JOHN
LIEP
InstituteorEthnology
nd
Anthropology,
niversityfCopen-
hagen, Frederiksholms
anal 4, DK-1220 CopenhagenK,
Denmark. 9
vii
79
Orenstein's
iscussion
f
reciprocity
s an element f
political
legitimacy
s useful
nd interesting,
ut sociological ypes
so
spacious
as
to make
room for
Nambikwara
chiefs,Roman
emperors,
nd
U.S.
congressmen
re too
general
or
my taste.
The cultural ontent fpolitical deologies nd their imiting
conditionsmust be specified
n more
detail
if
meaningful
explanations
retobe arrived t. Orenstein ttempts o do
this
for feudal
Europe
and Melanesia.
He
concentrates
n
the
variable
of
inheritance.
A realistic
nalysis
of
the
place
of
ideology
n a social formation
ould, however,
believe,
need
to take account of
more social and economic actors. nheri-
tance
may
be
the
significant
actor n
feudalism,
ut I do not
think
t is
the
primary
determinant
or
political
power
in
Melanesia
see below).
I
do
not
accept Orenstein's
haracterizationf centrifugal
reciprocity
s a
violation
f
the
norm f
reciprocity.
o me,
t
is
preciselymaking olitical
use of the
obligation
o
repay.
f
recipients
re
unable
to fulfill his obligation, hey re placed
in an inferiorosition.This is a consequence f theprinciple
of reciprocity
hich
Mauss spellsout
in the
passage
Orenstein
quotes Mauss 1954[1925]:72, 3). Centripetal
eciprocity,
n
theother
and,may
ndeed
be a
negation
fthenormal
ules
f
reciprocity. his,
at least,
is
Clastres's (1977) opinion.
He
describes ow
South
American
ndians
prevented
heir hiefs
from
xercising
uthority y placing
them n the
positionof
debtors.
his
is
dysfunctional,ays
Orenstein. lastres
rgues
that the Indians maintained communal
orms of
political
solidarity
while
they
abhorred ts
authoritarian orm. y
the
way, Clastres hows hatthe principle f the eader s servant
was
widespread mong
he
South American
orest eoples nd
inNorthAmerica s well. Thus the centripetal orm s not as
rare s
Orenstein tates.
Orenstein ightly oints to the significance f the goods
involved
n
centrifugaleciprocity,ut it is not
clear from is
discussion
what, exactly,
he
politically trategic
oods
are in
Melanesia.
t
is
not
easy
to assess the
relevance f
nheritance
rules
f
the
goods nd
their osition n the system f reproduc-
tion are
not
specified.
pace does
not
permit
me to take
the
subjectup
at
length. uffice
t
to say that "big
men" may play
two roles
ccording
o the bases of their ositions. his has to
do with two
economic
actors
n Melanesia. Firstly,Melane-
sians
place great mphasis
n successfulubsistence roduction.
The
"strength"
of individuals nd groups is expressedby
conspicuous
distribution f
subsistence
wealth.
Accordingly,
men
may
acquire standing n their ocalityby
generous is-
tributions. s representativesf their roups heymay become
managers f communal istributionsis-a-vis thergroups. n
this way theymay come to exert ome nfluence, ut there s
not much enduring ower to be had by the manipulation f
goods that everybody
roduces.This typeof "big man" is the
feast-maker. econdly,
n
large areas of Melanesia
another
factor nfluenceshe social economy.Here durable
representa-
tions of wealth n more general
forms
valuables, "primitive
money") have evolved.
When these formsof wealth have
penetrated
he
regulation
f
ocial relations hrough irculation
of bridewealth, loodwealth, tc.,
a
more ndependent
medium
of power has
been created.
Such
wealth
may
be monopolized
by a restrictedection f the population. ndebtednessmay be
more ystematically
xploited, ecause people need valuables
to
reproduce
their social existence
to get married,fulfill
kinship obligations,
tc.). Here the "big man" becomes a
financier.
Where
the
process
has
gone farthest,
xchanges f
durable
wealth are
de facto
arranged
between
powerful big
men,"
while he restof the people are continually orking ff
their ebts
Pospisil
1963b, arnett1959,
Kamma
1970). Here
centrifugaldeology
has become a mask for
exploitation
nd
even despotism.
ntense
competitionmay prevail n this
form
of
political conomy.Any single big
man" may have only
a
limited following,
ut
as
a
category big men" may
exert
considerable
ocial control.
ower
is
not simply
proportional
to the
number ffollowers.
he
extent f
power
ny eader
can
wield also has to do with the degree of social dependency
evolved n the ocioeconomicelations mong eople
n general.
The
development
f certain formsof
social capital,
which
constitute
more ontrollablend effectivefund fpower,"
s
the decisive
factor
n
traditional
Melanesian
politics,
rather
than nheritance
s such.
As
a
matter
f
fact,
he
Busama (Hogbin 1951, 1963)
are
in
the Huon
Gulf,
New
Guinea,
not on
Guadalcanal.
by
KAZUNORI
OSHIMA
Doshisha University,0-23 Horiike-cho, zumasa,
Ukyo-ku,
Kyoto 16, Japan. 9
viii
79
It
seems to me that
Orenstein's rgument
or
centrifugality
bypasses
one
important roblem
that the free world
faces
today,namely, heproblem f whethert can avoiddespotism.
Orenstein's
ssertion hat
"political egitimacy
s
founded
pon
people's acceptance
of
a leader's rule becausethey ccept
the
reasons
for
t" needs
qualification.
olitical
egitimacy
n na-
tions uchas the
Union
of
Soviet SocialistRepublics
nd the
People's Republic
of
China
s
not ounded pon
people's accep-
tance
of their
political institutions;
heir
supreme
political
powers
ave
notbeen
lected
reely y
the
people.Furthermore,
these
countries
ave
only
one dominant
olitical
party.
f the
people theredid
not like their
political
nstitutions, ould
it
be
possible
for
hem o
change
to
centripetality?
he answer
has
to
be
no,
because
the
upreme
uthorities
ouldnot
permit
them to do
so.
The
whole
question, herefore,
oils downto
this:
can
centrifugality
e
prevented
rom
degenerating
nto
despotism? thinknot. Of many cases in history, would
mention wo notorious
ecent
nes:
Japan's
fascism 1931-45)
and
nazism
1933-45).
Both were
entrifugal
nd
powerful,
ut
we
cannot say that
they were politically fficient. or this
reason find
t
hard to
agree
with
Orenstein's
tatement hat
"the choice of
centrifugality
akes most
sense from the
perspective
f the
eadership."
Democracy
s not
politically trong,
ut
t
can
keep eadership
fromdegeneratingnto despotism.
t
prevents
power
from
goingbeyond
ts
rightful
imits.
believe
that
centripetality
means neither he denial of
government's ower
nor freedom
from
overnmentuthority. entripetality
s well as centrifu-
gality
eeks
trong overnment;
t
attempts
o
choose
for tself
those
who
can set
up
such
government.
he
elected
uthority,
ofcourse,eads on the basisofthepower ntrustedo it.
I do not think hat the political ffectiveness
f some organs
of Americangovernment
s beyond criticism. owever,that
Vol. 21 * No.
1
* February 980 85
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 19/24
government
as established n the
basis ofthe deas and ideals
expressed
n
the
Declaration
f
ndependence
nd the Constitu-
tion.Any mprovement
n
it,
unless
ccomplished y violence,
must be made piecemeal by
the
appropriate rgans,
which
consist fpersons
lected
by
the American
eople.
s
there
ny
other rogram or hanging o centrifugalityn order o ncrease
its
political
ffectiveness?
by
DENNIS H. WRONG
Drakes Corner d., Princeton, .J. 08540,U.S.A. 7 viii 79
Orenstein's
hrase "asymmetrical eciprocity"
mounts vir-
tually
o a definitionf
power
s a social
relationship.
e
defines
asymmetrical eciprocity
ore
narrowly, owever, onceiving
of t as a "legitimizingrinciple"
n
Weber's
ense and even as
"political deology," xplicitly mitting
rom ts
scope
both
coercive
ower
nd absolutist orms
njoining
bedience
"rou-
tinized harisma"
n
his
terms, gain followingWeber)
which
do
not
expressly
ntail he dea of
reciprocal bligations.
think
that
his
definition
s too
narrow nd
that this ccounts or he
difficulties
have in
accepting
ome of his
applications
f
the
concept.
Orenstein
roperly
xcludes oercion
nderstood
s the use
of
force,
ut the hreat fforce
r the
apacity
o
applynegative
sanctionss often he basis of stablepower relations nd,as
Simmel
(1950[1908]:182-83) acutely perceived,
ncludes
an
element f "contract" r
reciprocity
ven
n
themostunilateral
and
oppressive elationshipsfor
xtended
iscussion,
ee
Wrong
1979:24-28,41-44).
As for
outinized harisma,
he
obligation
to
obey may
be stated
unconditionally,
ut there
s
usually
n
implicit orrespondingbligation n the part of the authority.
The
very dea of fatherhood, or example,on which the pa-
triarchal
heory
f
kingship
as based carries he
suggestion
f
protectionnd service s well s of uthority. his s so even
n
the
case of God's authorityndis a major ssue nthe problem
of
theodicy aced by all theistic eligions Weber 1968[1922]:
518-29).
I
would hereforeroadenOrenstein's ypologynto a
continuum
ncompassing oth coercive uthoritybut not the
actual
employment
f
force) nd routinized harisma s
forms
of asymmetrical eciprocity.his is consistentwithWeber's
inclusive oncept of "domination," s most translators ave
rendered
is
Herrschaftsee Wrong1970:54-58; 1979:36-38).
Orenstein's wo
types
of asymmetrical
eciprocity
re
richly
suggestive,
s is his
comparison f Melanesianpolitical rgani-
zation with
European feudalism, ut he seems to me to be
comparing atterns
f
social structureather han ideological
principles.
The
crisscross etwork f mutual obligations n
European
feudalism
ndeed pproximates is centripetal ather
than
his
centrifugal
orm
f symmetricaleciprocity.
t there-
fore
ontradicted
n
reality he stress n centrifugality
n the
dominant
deology
f
the
Great Chain of Being that provided
ultimate egitimation f the feudal order. The complex of
feudal onds
onsisted fparticular ights nd duties.
Orenstein,
infact, quates asymmetricaleciprocity ith he distribution
of
material
oods
and
resulting reditor-debtorconomic ela-
tions, nd he explicitly xcludesnot only coercion, ut also
purely ymbolic enefitsnd mputed ualities rom is concep-
tionof centrifugaleader-followeries. Social structure,nclud-
ing conomic elations,ertainlyonsists fmutual xpectations
possessing ormative uthority. o equate thesewithpolitical
ideology, owever,
s
to efface he distinction etween deology
and social
structurend rule
out the possibility hat
the atter
contradicts he
former, aking t an example f whatMarxists
call
"false consciousness." his is, to be sure, point that a
sociologistmightbe expected o make to an anthropologist.
No doubt
the fit etween
deology nd social structure
s
much
tighter n the kindsof societies, ncluding hose of Melanesia,
that anthropologiststudy han t was in medieval urope.
There are clearly lements f centripetalityn representative
institutions, nd they are indeed often dominant n urban
machine olitics
nd in congressman-constituent
elations; ut
these
xamples re scarcely
xhaustive
f democracy,
s Oren-
steinpractically
oncedes.
op political eaders
re expected o
act
like statesmen,
iterally state's
men," and demand
acri-
fices.
Churchillpromised
nothing but
"blood, sweat,
and
tears"-in
the
midst f a war
for urvival, rue, ut
peacetime
American
residents ave
echoed him
in enjoining ask not
what
your ountry
an do foryou.
. ." and n calling
he energy
crisis the "moral
equivalentof
war." Orenstein rovides
an
interesting
ew version f
the argument
hat democracy
s not
suitedto the newstates,but their ack of a strong tatewith
an established
laim on its citizens' oyalty
s morecrucial
to
their
light
han
the
form
f the state.
State authority
n the
West,
fter ll,antedated emocracy. he American
resident,
as
was
widely
recognized y constitutionalists
t the time
of
Watergate,
s the
18th-centuryritish
kingwithout he
royal
trappings.
or do the "centrifugal"
ne-party
r military
ic-
tatorships
f the new states ook
very table or
effective-not
even Maoist totalitarianism,
s we have recently
earned.
Reply
by
HENRY ORENSTEIN
New York,N.Y.,
U.S.A.
15 x
79
Some
parts
f
my
rticle re
erroneous.
ome re
unclear. his is
apparent,
or nstance,
romHolzberg's
houghtfulomments.
She
and
Liep
indicate
hat view centripetalitys
inherently
divisive;
nd it may be
that overemphasizehis,
ormy data
on the Anuak and the Nambikwara,
where
have the most
detailed nformationn
the matter, ear
on this point.
How-
ever, do
assert n the article
hat this
s notnecessary-that
centripetality
may
be functional,
s in ancient
Rome,
or
dysfunctional.
do, indeed,hypothesize
hat politicalfrailty
tends
to accompany
his form f ideology,
nd Wrong,
with
Holzberg,
questions
his. The absence
ofa strong
tate
that
elicits ts citizens' oyalties,
e says, s more
rucial, specially
for the new nation-states,han the particular deology hat
sustains he central uthority.
My point
s
that
a
strong
tate
is less
ikely nder
entripetal
hanunder entrifugal
uthority.
Yet these
questions
ead
me to
conclude
hat
have
failedto
maketwo mportant
istinctions.
ne s between
he
ocial
and
political
ffects f
the
deology,
s
Liep
and
Holzberg
bserve.
Social
solidarity
learly
an
persist
long
with
political
neffi-
ciency.
his
I
merely
int t
in
myconclusion,
hereas
ought
to have been farmore explicit.
ndeed, solidarity
xists
in
"tribes withoutrulers";
formalpolitical
offices
though
not
informal
eaders)
are not
mandatory
or
solidarity.
Another
distinction
as
to do
with
hekind
of
centripetality
nticipated
in a
society.
The
central uthorities
an be
answerable
o
its
citizenry egarding
ocial
and
economic
onditions
n
general
rather han on this or that particular ssue. In the United
States,
for
nstance,
his tends
to
hold
most
for he
president,
less for
enators,
east
formembers
f
he
House.
One
may
have
"generalized
entripetality"
with apologies
for
yet
another
neologism,
n this case
ad
hoc)-"state's
men,"
following
Wrong,
n
place
of
passive,
nearly
tropistic
servantsof
the
people."
Still,
many
f
Wrong's
omments,
long
with
hose
f
others,
apply
to
democracy
n a broad
sense,
nd
I
openly
ssert
hat
centripetality
s
only
one
feature f
democracy.
do
not
dwell
on the
topic
n this
rticle,
owever
xplicit
may be,
but
do
in
another,
ot
yet
published Orenstein
979).
Contemporary
democracies
ften
ave
charismatic
residents,
nd
they lways
entail
rational authority
s well as centripetality.
ndeed,
thoughWeber says that electedofficialsn the U.S. are often
"servants"
f heir onstituencies,
e also says,
uite ccurately
I think,
hat elected fficials
nd party eaders
n the Western
86
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 20/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY
orld
in general are
not
infrequently harismatic
Webei
1947a:386-87;
1974b:80, 96).
Holzberg, oo,
nterprets e as
believing hat there
mustbe
but
one dominant
deology n
any
one
society.Her
misinterpre-
tation
s
probably ttributable
o my choiceof Melanesia
and
Western
eudalism
or
detailed
reatment.
selected hese
twc
deliberately,s
I
say
in
the
article,
recisely ecause centrifu-
gality s nearly
not quite)
unadulterated
n
them
nd therefore
one
may more
readily solate the effects f
the
ideologyon
other
features f social
life. n such
societies here s
but one
predominantdeology, ut I do not knowwhether e willfind
many
more xamples.
Holzbergsays I
generalize oo
much-from
asymmetrical
reciprocityo all other
deologies-in
claiming as I
understand
her) that the
legitimacy f a political
deology
dependsupon
whether
r not t s
functional. do, n
fact, uggest
his, nd I
give anotherexample
employing
outinized harisma
n
my
concluding
heoretical emarks.
ut this s a
tentative ugges-
tion
regarding sage, not a
definitive
onclusion which,
contend,
s
nonexistent
n any
science). My reason
for
recom-
mending he
conceptofasymmetrical
eciprocitys
precisely
that
t may open
the way to
such questions.
More
important,
she
makeswhat
ppears to mea
strange oint n
arguing hat
when
he two
forms f
asymmetrical
eciprocityre present n
the
samesocietywe will mostoften ind hatcentripetalitys
neither
ysfunctional
or nefficient.
he refers o
democratic
socialism n
Tanzania
and Jamaica. am
ignorant fconditions
in
those
nations.
assert,
owever, t the outset
hat am not
discussing conomic
edistribution.his
may
accompany
en-
tripetality.Within the
framework f
the concepts have
suggested,
we can
readily onsider uch
contemporary
tates
as
Britain r
Sweden, oth
of
whichhave
givenmuch fforto
economic
redistribution,oth
unequivocallydemocratic-so
much o
that the
direction nd, as we
have recently
een, the
amount
f
redistributions
subject
to
constituents'
ishes.
But
here, oo,
Holzberg's emarks re
helpful.
contend hat
one, nd
only ne,of
the
two
forms f
symmetrical
eciprocity
can
be the
fficialdeology fformal
uthority.f
the entripetal
ideology
s
accepted
as
appropriate o the
central
uthority,
then tsbranches-cities n theUnitedStates,fornstance,re
cited n
the
article-must take the same
position r
be
con-
demned
by the
population
t
large
as
illegitimate.
owever,
Holzberg
s
quite correct
n
indicating
hat
groups
with
no
formal
ond to the
central
uthority, uch
as
ethnic
groups,
may have
differentolitical
deologies. he
central
uthority
under
entripetality
s
often
nswerable, ot
only
o
ndividuals,
but also to
groups-perhaps
n
the modern tate
primarily
o
groups-each
having
ts
own
interests
nd
its own formof
political
deology. ocial relationswithin uch
groups
s
well
as
among
ndividuals
may
be
centrifugal,
hile
centripetality
remains the
ideology
of the
government
nd its
formally
affiliated
ranches.AncientRome is
one
example Mattingly
1957: 0-41);
social relations
n some
American cities are
anotherWarner ndLunt 1941:140-41). Holzberg's oint s a
good
one, well
taken.
In
contrast
o
Holzberg's ontentionhat assume
centripe-
tality
is
necessarily
eeble, other
commentators, ith less
justification,
ttribute
o
me
the
position hat
centrifugality
s
necessarily
trong,
ven
despotic.
Oshima
touches
one
matter
and is
rightly ritical;
remark, lbeit
fleetingly,
hat
egiti-
macy
s
founded
n
the
willing ubmission
f subjects.
This
is
an
initial
implification,
ater
ualified.
Moreover, deliberately
do notdiscuss
oercion, xcept
n
passing; my
topic precludes
it. t
may
be
true
hat itizens f
he
U.S.S.R. and
contemporary
China obey
because
of
fear nd
fear
lone.
Reports
rom hese
nations,
specially rom
he Soviet Union,
re contradictory.
reserve
udgment.
Oshima's misinterpretations understandablen light fmy
initial tatement,
ut his conclusion
hat centrifugality
ust
become
despotic,
and once despotic
cannot turn
back,
is
incorrect.
s the article
ndicates,
feudal ord
often ad little
controlover
his vassals, and
many "big
men" were
mere
managers, ar
fromdespots.
At the moment
f this
writing,
China may
be moving way from espotism.
et this may
be
merehope
founded pon
a fewhints.
ndeed, one
ofmy main
points,
partly
consistent
with Oshima's
remarks, s that
the
two forms
of asymmetrical
eciprocity
esist one
another.
China
may have become
ess despotic
n recent
imes,but
I
know fno evidence hat t sabandoningentrifugality.agree
with
Oshima
that the
Nazi regime
nd probably
hat of pre-
WorldWar
I Japanweredespotic,
ut these
egimeswerenot
centrifugal. he
dominant deology
n the
Third Reich
was
individual harisma;
n Japan it
was routinized
harisma.
believethat both
were egitimate
egimes,
owever
much one
may detest them.
I do agree
with Oshima
that,
whatever
ideology
people
hold, they
often-not
always; witness
con-
servative hought
n theUnited States-crave
strong overn-
ment see,
for nstance,
my discussion
f the Anuak).
Cooper
lso
confuses entrifugality
ith
trong
overnment-
but, then,
he
appears
thoroughly onfused
hroughout.
e
contends hat
my categories-emic
ategories,
hichhe seems
to
think rrelevant or
politics-result
n
my overlooking
matter boutwhich have much o say: a beliefn the eader-
as-creditor an
have different
tic effects.
As I indicate,
follow
ahlins
n
much
f
mydiscussion
fMelanesia.
According
to
Sahlins,
"big
man" can
undermine
is
position y
trying
too much to
maximize t
(etically).
n contrast,
f he neglects
his
prestige,
e is likely o lose followers.
ooper's
remarks n
the
Tolai are
especially
dd. Following pecialists
n
Melanesia,
I
argue
that wealthy
man
n
a matrilineal
ociety
may try o
circumventocial convention y giving
s
much
of his
wealth
as he can to
his son before
e dies.The funerary
istributionn
either matrilineal
r patrilineal
ocieties may
be
one
such
convention.
Liep objects
to my
characterization
f centrifugality
s
a
violation
f the
normof
reciprocity.
do not
know
why;
he
does notexplainwhy.
At the
outset,
n
defining
he
term, say
that thenormpersists espite hebelief n its violation.The
definition,repeat,
s emic.The
subject
distinguishes
etween
the
goods
nd services
e
receives
nd
his
consequent
bligation
to
obey;
he conceives
heformer
s a violation
fthe norm
hat
is to his
advantage.
Centripetal
uthority
s a violation
fthe
norm n much the
same
sense-though
the
direction
f
the
demand-right
s herereversed.
He objects
further
hat
I
do
not
specify
what
exactly
are
the
strategic oods
distributed
n
Melanesia,
lthough
e
does
mention
hat
consider he
mportance
f the
kind
as well
as
the
amount of
goods
involved
n
distributions.
am
by
no
means
specialist
n Melanesia-hence
my
error
egarding
he
Busama.
My
discussion
fthe
political
value
to the
recipient
of
distibuted
goods
is
intended
to
apply
to all
centrifugal
systems, ot to Melanesia in particular. hus, moneywould
have
high political
value for
the
recipient
n
Melanesia
but
relatively
ittle
n feudal
Europe
n contrast
o landed fiefs.
He considers
my
emphasis
n
Melanesian
nheritance
ules
incorrect.
y
sources
ndicate hat
am
correct-Liep's
paper
is not available
to
me-but
I
do
not
nsist.On
the
contrary,
explicitly
tate that
Melanesian
inheritance
s of
secondary
concern-that
the
most
important
actor
s
probably
the
number
f
persons
n
a
position
to
compete
for
"big
man"
status.
The entire
matter
s
discussed,
not
in
order
to make
generalizations
bout
Melanesia,
but
in order
o illustrate
ow
asymmetrical
eciprocity
an
be
put
to
use.
I
thought
had
made
this
quite
clear
n
the
article.
Liep implies
hat
believe
he
amount
f
power
held
by
the
central uthoritys increasedwhenthe number ffollowerss
greater. his
s a misunderstanding
orwhich am
responsible.
In
the sectionentitled Centrifugality,
he centralization
f
Vol.
21
* No.
1
February
980
87
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 21/24
power, nd the riseof kingship," he sentence eginning
It is
plausible
.. ."
should properly have been put "It may appear
plausible-howeveretically mprobable-that,
n most
cases,
the larger the number f subjects, the stronger
will be
the
central uthority."His point
s
the very one
I have made
a
centralpart
of
my theoretical iscussion.
hus
in
the
subse-
quent section
say
"To increase the loyalty
of
clients,the
ruler must increase their remuneration y decreasing
heir
number"-a
conclusion
erived
rom
my
earlier
iscussion.
I
must thankLiep for mentioningdditional
cases of cen-
tripetality. hey are welcome for personaland professional
reasons.Personally, prefer emocracy. rofessionally,
feel
I had too few ases of centripetality. onetheless,
he bulk
of
the
ethnographic
iterature
ndicates
hat t
is far ess
frequent
than centrifugality.
Ake and Oshima bserve hat overpersonalizesymmetrical
reciprocity-that,
n
effect,
fail to
distinguish
ffices nd
forms
f
governance
rom
ersons.
do this
only
n
comparing
Melanesia with Westernfeudalism;
do it
deliberately,
x-
plainingwhy
t
is
useful
or his
particular omparison.
Nor-
mally,
intended he
concepts
o
apply
to forms f
governance;
this
s
implied y
the
very
fact
that offer
n
explanation
or
an
unusual
pplication.
Ake, ike Cooper,
dislikes mic
categories. ndeed,
he seems
todisregardhefact hat define hetwokinds f symmetrical
reciprocity
s
ideological orms,
or
he
criticizes
hem
s
if
they
were lways
ctual
exchange rocesses.He
is incorrect ven
n
his
own etic terms.
He refers
o the
ajmani system
n
India
to
show
that the
system
annotwork.
n
the
past,
I
have shown
how the ajmani system
nvolves
overpayment, tically
and
emically Orenstein 962; 1965:224-28).
The
spirit
n which Kurtz's
criticisms re
offered
s
very
welcome.
His
remark
hat
I
favor
deological xplanations
s
helpful.
his
may
well be a
defect
n
the article. t was
not
my ntent;
material
nd ideological xplanations re relevant,
and
I
offer
oth. Because
my point
of
departure
s
ideology,
may
have
overemphasized
t.
I must take care
to
avoid
such
biases
n
the
future.
Along
with
Holzberg,
Kurtz asks from
whoseviewpoint
he
categories pply, hatof theruler rthatof the ruled. briefly
mention
onditionswherein
he ruler's deology
s
merely
hypocriticalmask, disguising purely coercive system.
I
identify
uch
conditions
with
coercive
domination,
which
hope
to
discuss
n
ater
publications. hey were
not
the subject
of
this
one,
and
theirramifications
re
too numerous nd
complex
o
bring p
in this
place. I mightmention, owever,
thatbothforms f
symmetricaleciprocityan be
anticipated,
etically,
n
politicalrelations, lthough nly
one
will be
con-
sideredproper n any one society.For the United States, for
instance,
bossism"
s
mentionedn the rticle.Other xamples,
I am
sure, xist,
ut
suggest hatthey re all viewedmuch s
is the
politicalmachine-withdisapproval, empered, erhaps,
with
ynicism. he legitimatedeology s centripetal.
There remainmisunderstandings.he kind of functionalism
I
espouse
eems o
be elusive
o many nthropologists-possibly
because we have
taken oo muchfrom adcliffe-Brown'snter-
pretation
f
Durkheim, oo littlefrom urkheim's wn work.
(I
have not
read Coult's article; will do so.) Why s decision
making n politics nhibited y solidarity? t is anomie that
often
eaves the
ndividual, olitician r otherwise,n a position
wherein ecisions re difficulto make (apart, perhaps,from
the
decision o take one's ife).
According o Kurtz, my position n the two typesof asym-
metrical
eciprocity-that hey are incompatible nd act as
impedimentso one another-hampers he analysis f process.
But I
discussprocessrepeatedly.Within he centrifugalype,
for nstance, take up the rise
of
dominant
tatus groups nd
the rise of the state in the West. Kurtz and I must mean
differenthings y the term
'process."~
My use of the concepts
put forward ere is intended o
supplement
ork uch as Bailey's,
not to substitute
or t.
I
intendthe
concepts
to help
us
discern
distinctions
mong
cultures
within
which
different
stratagems"
may be
more
effectively
mployed.
The comments
by
Wrong
make a number
of
important
pointsbut
many of
them o
briefly
hat I have difficulty
n
grasping
is
fullmeaning.
have
discussed ne
of them
arlier,
where
foundhim
argely
orrect.
emphatically
ispute
his
contention
hat
mydefinition
s too narrow-that,
or
nstance,
reciprocity
xists
even in the most coercive
and
absolutist
regimes. is referenceo Simmeldoes not clarify hematter.
Simmel
merely
tates
that
such
regimes
lways allow
their
subjects
at least some
personal
freedom,
owever ittle.
The
coercive
uthority
n such cases
gives nothing; t simply
re-
frains
rom
too much?)
killing
nd
allows a
small quantity
f
spontaneity,
or
whicht extracts
price.
n such
ircumstances,
gratitude
or
hefavor
estowed-the
"gift"
f refraining
rom
murder?-is
unlikely;
fear produces
obedience.
The
conse-
quences
re thoroughly
ifferent
rom hose
we have
discussed.
My response
mustbe the same
as that
made
to Kurtz:
it is
a
differentnd
complex
opic,
one that
I hope
to discuss
at
a
later date (after
having
read
Wrong's
book,
I might
dd).
Even
ifwe construe
oercive
egimes
s entailing
omereciproc-
ity, hey re
not relevant
or
hisparticular
iscussion,
which
entails the belief hatreciprocitys asymmetrical.f cases
of
this
sort are to be included,
he
subjects
would
believe
they
receive
more
from heir overeign
han they
give
to him-a
most
mprobable
elief n
coercive
egimes.
Wrong
suggests
we broaden the concept
yet
further
nd
include
ruler's ymbolic
ifts
nder
symmetrical
eciprocity.
I briefly iscuss
the
kind
of ruler
who is
believed
to bestow
rain,
o
maintain
eneral
well-being
y
virtue
fhis
own
bodily
well-being,
o sustain
nd
symbolize
ociety
tself.
hese
rulers
are
not
ooked
upon
as
lordswere ookedupon
by
their
assals
or
as a
Melanesian
big
man" was viewed
by
his constituency.
They are
conceived
as
extraordinary,
odlike
givers.
The
attitudes
generally
nvolve
awe;
the ideology
s routinized
charisma.
f we
so wish,
t is
almost
always possible
to find
some resemblances
mong
things;
hus
we may
classify
hem
underthe same heading,perhapsto form gradient.Yet I
believe
t far more
profitable
o draw
boundaries-not
arbi-
trarily,
ut
on the basis
of both
the
differences
e find
mong
phenomena
nd
the probable
effects
f
those
differences.
or
instance,
outinized
harisma ntails
different
eliefs
nd feel-
ings
from
those
involved
in
asymmetrical
eciprocity.
n
centrifugality
he leader
s
one's
creditor,
uman
ike
oneself.
His authority
s sustainedby
credit,
not
charisma.
And
the
effects
f
the
two
deologies
iffer.
he size
of the
population
subject
to each
kind
of leader
affects
im
in
opposite
ways.
Routinized
harisma
s
strengthened
hen he eader
s but
one
among
multitude;
entrifugality
s weakened
when he
eader
has
so
many
debtors
that he
is,
like the
Internal
Revenue
Service,depersonalized.
f we
classify
ocial
phenomena
s
I
suggest,we can more readilyformulateestable disconfirm-
able) hypotheses.
have discussed
his
topic
at
greater
ength
elsewhere
Orenstein
971).
It eludes me
why
Wrong
views asymmetrical
eciprocity
s
a feature
of social
structure
ather
than
an
ideology.
It
appears,
ometimes,
hat
he well
understands
hat
mean
by
asymmetrical
eciprocity-in
laces
even overemphasizing
ts
purely ognitive,
deological
ontent
in
the
symbolic
ift,
or
instance).
Yet elsewhere
e confounds
t with
ocial
structure
(orderly
nteraction,
uch
n the
manner fRadcliffe-Brown?).
I do
not.
The ideology
f Western
eudalism,
or
xample,
was
unequivocally
entrifugal,
s
Wrong ays.
In actual
relations
among nobles,
however,
t did not work that
way.
"Social
structure"
ntailed
ocial
and economic
haos, s I have
shown.
Whatwas there hat wouldbring ne to conceive t as in any
way centripetal?
Which ord
viewedhis
vassal as properly
is
creditor,
which vassal
viewed
his lord as
a debtor?
I
have
88
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 22/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
entioned ne possibility,he noble who became the
vassal of
his vassal.)
Wrong sserts hat
one-party entrifugal
tates nd
military
dictatorships
re often
ighly
nstable. he
latter
re,certainly
(Finer 1962),
but
single-party entrifugal tates, especially
those whose eaders believe
they
are
Marxists,may
well be
more table than
other
tates, ncluding
ew
democracies of
which here re so few).The leadershipn such new statesmay
well
be less cynical
nd
more edicated
han
ther uthoritarian
leaders, ossiblymore edicated han heir
emocratic
ounter-
parts. They believea highly ational ciencesupports hem.
Even
those
of
us
who think
Marxism
a
pseudo-science,
he
bulwark
f n authoritarianorm f
ocialism,
must
dmit hat
Marx put
forward
highly
ational
ystem-at
least as rational
as
the belief
n
an
original
ocial
compact that,
at one
time,
was the ubstantive heory ehind emocracyOrenstein 979).
Krader criticizesmy terminology: y referenceo Aristotle
should ightly e to
his
"commutative eciprocity" r, alterna-
tively, "commutative ustice," which, Krader says, would
render asymmetrical eciprocity" contradiction. he term
"commutative"
ppears
nowhere
n Aristotle. t is
Aquinas's,
interpretingristotle-anddoing o
in
a
manner
hat,with
he
exceptionof his treatment f barter, does not render my
usage a contradictionAquinas 1964[1271-72]:400-401, 18).
Reference o a saint moves me to contemplate he place
of faith in
anthropology.
Marx's often
quoted statement
(1884[1844]:42)regarding he medicinal roperties f religion
is, n fact, uotedout
of
context. t is preceded y the entence,
"Religion
s the
sigh
of
the oppressed reature,
he
heart
ofa
heartlessworld and the soul of a soulless condition."'Some
political eaders
and
some
of
theirfollowersmay be greatly
aided by this ortof faith, specially hose n the new nation-
states; a faiththe faithful ontemplate s the True Faith is
conceived y them s truth, ot faith. f anthropologistsver
require uch convictions-as Cooper and Ake seem to think-
our
requirements ay be, I fear, consequence f njunction.
Such
maybe
our
fate,
n
the ongrun.For thepresent, erhaps
fettered
y bourgeoisdeology, mayfail o recognize ecessity,
and, workingn short uns,withinwhat believe s theforesee-
able future, conceive of a numberof possible alternative
truths. am unsure. may be out of tep withhistory-not o
speak of "the kinds of resultswhich anthropology enerally
seeks." My conclusions, owever entative,may be "ideologi-
cally oaded." In thefinal nalysis, may be a living xemplifi-
cation of false consciousness, oping gainst others' hopes-
what have been the "objective" consequences f such hopes
thus
far-that the analysiswillnot be a Solution.
Referencesited
ANDERSON, ACK, nd C. KALVELAGE. 972. Americangovernment
(like t s). New York:
WarnerBooks.
AQUINAS, . 1964
1271-72).
Commentaryn theNicomachean
thics.
Vol. 1. Translated
by
C.
I.
Litzenger.Chicago:
HenryRegnery.
ARISTOTLE. 943.Nicomachean thics.
ranslatedby
J.
Wilson.
New
York:
Walter Black.
ARONSON,
AN R. 1976."Ethnicity as
a cultural ystem:An intro-
ductory
ssay," in Ethnicityn theAmericas.
Edited by
Frances
Henry,
pp. 9-19. The Hague: Mouton. [CSH]
BAILEY, F. G. 1969.
Stratagems nd spoils. New
York: Schocken
Books.
BALANDIER,
G. 1970. Political
anthropology.ranslated by A.
Sheridan
Smith.New York:
Pantheon.
1
Of
course,
Marx
and
Engels
have
generallv
been
antipathetic
o
religion, s
theyhave beento the social
and economic onditionwith
whichtheythink t necessarily ssociated,but those familiarwith
their
writings ouldanticipate
mbivalence.They also attacked
the
irreligiousntellectual
nd,
indeed,
viewed religion
n a way quite
similar
o that
of Durkheim Marx and
Engels 1964: 41, 71, 84).
BARNETT,H. G. 1959. Peace
and progress n New Guinea.
Amnerican
Anthropologist1: 1013-19.
BARTH,F. 1959. Political
eadershipmong
he watPathans.
London
School of Economicsand
Political Science Monographson Social
Anthropology 9.
BEIDELMAN, THOMAS 0.
1959. A comparativenalysis of
the
ajmani
system. ssociation
orAsian
Studies
Monograph8.
BENDIX, REINHARD. 1960.
Max Weber: An
intellectiual
ortrait.
GardenCity: Doubleday.
BERNARD, CHESTER. 1961.
"The theory f authority," n Thaeoriesf
society:Foundations fmodern ociological heory. dited by T.Parsons et al. Glencoe: FreePress.
BLOCH,
MARC. 1961.
Feiudal
society.Translated by L. Manyon.
London: Routledge nd Kegan Paul.
BOHANNAN,
L. 1952. A genealogical harter.Africa22:301-15.
BROOKE, C. 1963? Europe in the centralMiddle
Ages,
962-1154.
New York: Holt, Rinehart nd Winston.
BROWN, ELIZABETH. 1974.
The tyranny f a construct:Feudalism
and historians f
medieval Europe. American Historical Review
79:1063-88.
BROWN, PAULA. 1963. Fromanarchy to satrapy.
American
Anthro-
pologist 5: 1-15.
BURLING, ROBBINS.
1974.The passageofpower.New York: Academic
Press.
BURRIDGE,
K. 1960. Mambu:
A
Melanesianmillennium. ondon:
Methuen.
.1969. Tangu traditions.xford:ClarendonPress.
BURROWS,
E.
G.,
and
M.
E. SPIRO. 1953.An
atoll utlture:
thnography
of faluk n theCentral arolines. Behavior Science Monographs.)
New Haven: Human Relations AreaFiles.
CANCIAN,
F. 1968. "Functional
analysis of change," in Theory f
anthropology: soutrcebook.
dited
by
R.
Manners and D. Kaplan.
Chicago: Aldine.
CANTOR, NORMAN. 1963. Medieval
history.
ew
York: Macmillan.
CLASTRES,
P. 1977. Society
gainst he tate.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
[JL]
COHEN, Y. A. 1969. Ends
and
means
in
political control: State
organization nd thepunishment
f
adultery, ncest, nd violations
of
celibacy.AmericanAnthropologist1:658-87. [DVK]
COHN, BERNARD
S.
1955.
The
changing
tatus of
a
depressed aste,"
in
Village ndia. Edited by M. Marriott. Chicago: University f
Chicago
Press.
COULT, A. 1966.
The
structuring
f
structure.
A
merican
A
nthro-
pologist 8:438-43. [DVK]
DE GRAZIA,
S.
1948. The politicalcommunity: study of anomie.
Chicago: University
f
Chicago
Press.
DRUCKER, PHILIP.
1937. The Tolowa
and their Southwest Oregon
kin.
Universityf California
ublications
n
Archaeology
nd
Ethnology
36:221-300.
Du BoIs, CORA. 1936.
"The
wealth
concept
s an
integrative
actor
in
Tolowa-Tututni
Culture,"
n
Essays
in
anthropologyresented
to A. L.
Kroeber.
erkeley:University
f
California
ress.
DUFF MISSIONARIES. 1799.
A
missionary oyage
o
the outhern
acific
Ocean
performed
n
the
years
1796,
1797,
1798 n
the
hip
Duff.
London:
T.
Chapman.
DURKHEIM,
E. 1939
(1895).
The rules
of sociological
method.
rans-
lated
by S. Solovay
and
J. Mueller.
Glencoe:
Free Press.
. 1947
(1893).
The division
of
abor
n
society.
ranslated
by
G.
Simpson.
Glencoe:
Free Press.
EPSTEIN, T. S.
1968.
Capitalism,
rimitive
nd modern.
Manchester:
ManchesterUniversity
ress.
EVANS-PRITCHARD,
E. E.
1940. The
political
ystem f
the
Anuak
of
the
Anglo-Egyptian
udan.
London
School
of
Economics
and
Political
Science
Monographs
n
Social
Anthropology
.
1947. Furtherobservations n the political systemof the
Anuak. Sudan
Notes nd Records
8:62-97.
FINER,
S.
E. 1962. The
man on
horseback:
he role
of
the
military
n
politics.
ondon:
Pall
Mall Press.
FIRTH,
R.
1959.
The economics
f
he
New
Zealand
Maori.
Wellington:
R.
E.
Owen,
Government rinter.
. 1964.
Essays
on
social
organization
nd
values.
London:
Athlone.
FRIEDRICH, CARL, 1968. Some
thoughts
n
the
relation
of
political
theory
to
anthropology.
American
Political Science Review
62:
536-45.
GANSHOF,
F.
L.
1964. Feudalism.
Translated
by
P.
Grierson.
New
York:
Harper
and
Row.
GLUCKMAN,
MAX.
1954. Rituals
of
rebellion
n South-East
Africa.
(Frazer Lecture,1952.)
Manchester:
Manchester
University
ress.
.
1956.
Custom
nd
conflict
n
Africa.
Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
GOLDSCHMIDT,
W.
1951.
Ethics
and
the
structure
f
society:
An
ethnological ontributiono thesociology fknowledge.American
Anthropologist
3: 506-24.
GONZAL.EZ,
NANCIE . 1970.Social function f Carnival n a
Domini-
can city.Southwesternournal
fAnthropology6:328-42. [CSHI
Vol.
21
* No.
1 *
February
980
89
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 23/24
GOULDNER,
. 1960. The norm of
reciprocity:
preliminary tate-
ment.American
ociological
Review
5:161-78.
GREEN,
V. H. H. 1971. Medieval civilization
n Western
urope.
London:
Arnold.
HAY, DENYS. 1964.
Themedievalenturies.
ondon:
Methuen.
HOBHOUSE,
L.
T.
1951.
Morals in
evolution:
study
n
comparative
ethics.
ondon:
Chapman
and
Hull.
HOGBIN, IAN. 1939.
Experimentsn
civilization.
ondon:
Routledge
and Kegan
Paul.
-
. 1951.
Transformation
cene:
Thte hanging
ulture
f
a
New
Guinea
village.
ondon:
Routledge
nd
Kegan
Paul.
-
. 1963.
Kinship
and
marriage
n a
New
Guinea
village.
London:
Athlone.
-.
1964.A Guadalcanal ocie y:TheKaoka-speakers. ew York:
Holt,
Rinehart nd
Winston.
HOLZBERG, AROL . 1977. Social
stratification,
ultural
nationalism,
and political
conomy
n
Jamaica:
The
myths
f
development
nd
the
anti-White
bias.
Canadian
Review
of Sociology
nd Anthro-
pology
4:368-80.
[CSH]
HOMANS, . C. 1958. Social behavior s
exchange.American
ournal
ofSociology 2:597-606.
HUNTER, J.
1823. Memoirs
f
a
captivitymong
he ndians
of
North
America.London:
Longmans.
ISHWARAN,
K.
1966.
Tradition
nd
economy
n
village ndia.
London:
Routledge
nd
Kegan
Paul.
KAMMA, . C. 1970. 'A
spontaneous
capitalist'
revolution
n
the
Western
Vogelkop
area of West
Irian,"
in
Anniversaryontribu-
tions
o
anthropology,p.
132-42.
Leiden.
[JL]
KNOX,
ROBERT. 1911. An haistorical
elation f
Ceylon. Edited by
J.
Ryan. Glasgow: MacLehose.
KRADER,
LAWRENCE. 976.
Dialectic f civil society. ssen:
Van
Gorcum. [LK]
-
. 1979. Treatise
f
ocial labor.
Assen:
Van
Gorcum.
[LK]
KURTZ,
DONALD
V.
1978. "The
legitimation
f
the
Aztec state,"
in
The early tate.Edited
by H. J. M. Claessen and
P. Skalnik,
pp.
169-90.The
Hague: Mouton.
[DVKI
-.
n.d.
"The
legitimation
f
early
nchoate
tates,"
n The
study
of the state.Edited
by
H.
J.
M.
Claessen
and
P. Skalnfk.The
Hague:
Mouton.
n
press. [DVK]
LEACH, . R.
1954. Political ystemsf
highland urma.
Cambridge:
Harvard
University ress.
LEVI-STRAUSS, . 1961. Tristes
ropiques.ranslatedby
J.Russel.
New York:
Atheneum.
. 1969.
The
elementary
tructuires
f
kinshlip.
ranslated
by
J. H. Bell,
J.
R. von
Sturmer,nd R.
Needham.Boston: Beacon
Press.
LEWIs, 0.
Editor. 1958. Village
life in northern
ndia. Urbana:
University
f
llinois
Press.
LEwis, O., and V. BARNOUW.958."Caste and the ajmani systemin a North Indian village," in Village
life in northern
ndia.
Edited by 0. Lewis.
Urbana: University f
llinoisPress.
LIENHARDT,G. 1957. Anuak
village
headman. 1. Headman and
villageculture.Africa
17:341-55.
.
1958.
Anuak village headmen.
2. Village
structure nd
rebellion.
Africa
18:25-35.
MAGUBANE. . 1969. Pluralism
and
conflictituations
n Africa:
A
new look.African
ocial Research
:529-54. [CSH]
MAINE, SIR HENRY
SUMNER. 875. Lectures
n theearly history
f
institutions.
ondon:
John
Murray.
.
1876
(1871).
Village communitiesn the
East and West.
London:
John
Murray.
-
.
1883.
Dissertations n
early
aw
and
custom.
ondon:
John
Murray.
. 1954
(1861). Ancient
aw.
London:
OxfordUniversity ress.
MAIR, L. P.
1964. Primitive overnment.
armondsworth:
enguin
Books.
MALINOWSKI,. 1922. Argonauts f theWestern acific. London:
Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul.
MANDELBAUM,. G.
1940. ThePlains Cree.
AmericanMuseum of
Natural
HistoryAnthropological
ublications 7(2).
1970.
Society n India.
Berkeley nd Los
Angeles:University
of
California
ress.
MANNHEIM, . 1936.
Ideology nd utopia.
Translated by L. Wirth
and
E.
Shils.
New
York: Harcourt,Brace.
MAQUET,
J. J.1961.
Thepremisef nequalityn
Ruanda. London:
Oxford
University ress.
MARX,
KARL.
1884
(1844).
Critique fHegel's
philosophy fright.
Translatedby A.
Jolin and J. O'Malley.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
ress.
MARX,K., and F.
ENGELS.1964.
On religion.ew York:
Schocken.
(Reprinted
from
the 1957
edition,
Moscow: Foreign
Languages
PublishingHouse.)
MATTINGIY,
. 1957.Roman
mperialivilization.
Jondon:
rnold.
MAUSS,M.
1954(1925).The ift.ranslatedby I.
Cunnison.
London:
Cohen and West.
MEGGITT,M. J.1965. The lineage
ystem f theMae Enga of
Newu
Guinea. ondon:Oliver and
Boyd.
MERTON, R. S. 1949. Social theory nd social
structure.
lencoe:
Free Press.
MURDOCK, G. P. 1949. Social structure.
ew York: Macmillan.
NORBECK, E. 1963. African rituals
of
conflict.
AmericanAnthro-
pologist 5:1254-79.
OLIVER, DOUGLAS.
1955. A Solomon Island society. Cambridge:
Harvard University ress.
ORANS, MARTIN. 1965. The Santal: A
tribe n search f a great radi-
tion. Detroit: Wayne University ress.
ORENSTEIN, H. 1962a.
Exploitation r function n the nterpretation
of
ajmani. Southwestern
ournal fAnthropology8:302-16.
. 1962b.
Review of: A comparativenalysis of the
ajmani
system, y
T.
Beidelman
(Association
for
Asian Studies
Mono-
graph 8). AmericanAnthropologist4:633-35.
. 1965. Gaon:
Conflict nd cohesion n an Indian
village.
Princeton: rincetonUniversity ress.
-
.
1968.
The
ethnological heories
f Henry SumnerMaine.
American
Anthiropologist
0:264-67.
-
. 1971.
Accumulation
nd
disjunction
n ethnographic ethod.
Human Organization
0:267-76.
-
.
1979.
Whosoever
f
you
will be the chiefest,musthe be the
servant
of
all?: On the dearth of
Third World democracies.MS.
PARKES, HENRY B. 1970. The divineorder:Western ulture n the
Middle Ages and
theRenaissance. ondon:VictorGollancz.
PARSONS,
T. 1937.
The tructuref ocialaction.New York:
McGraw-
Hill.
POSPISIL, L. 1958a. Kapauku Paputans nd their aw. New
Haven:
Yale Universityress.
. 1958b. Social change
and
primitive
aw: Consequences
of a
Papuan
legalcase. AmericanAnthropologist
0: 832-37.
.
1963a.
Kapauku Papuan
economics.New Haven:
Yale
University ress.
-. 1963b. The
Kapauku Papuans of West
New Guinea.
New
York: Holt,Rinehart nd Winston.
[JL]
REAY, MARIE. 1959. The Kuma. Melbourne:
Melbourne University
Press,
RICHARDS, AUDREY
I.
1939. Land,
laboutr,nd diet n northernho-
desia.
London:
OxfordUniversity
ress.
RODRIGUEZ, MAXIMA. 1919 (1774).
"
Daily narrative kept by the
interpreterMaxima Rodriguez at the
island of Amat,otherwise
Otahiti,
n
the
year
1774,"
in
The quest nd occupation f
Tahiti
by
emissaries
f
Spain . . , 1772-1776,vol. 3. Edited
by B. G.
Corney.
London:
Hakluyt Society.
ROSMAN, ABRAHAM,
nd
PAULA RUBEL. 1970. Potlatch
and
sagali:
The
structureof exchange in Haida
and Trobriand societies.
Transactions f theNew York A cademy
f Sciences, Series2,
32:
732-42. [EC]
-
. 1971. Feasting
with
mine enemy. New
York: Columbia
University ress. [EC]
ROSTOVTZEFF,
M.
1960. Rome.
Translated by J.
D. Duff.
London:
Oxford
University
ress.
RUBIN,
VERA. 1960. Discussion
of M.
G. Smith's
social
and cultural
pluralism." Annals of theNew York
Academy f Sciences83:780-
85.
[CSH]
RYAN, BRYCE. 1953.Caste n modern eylon.
ew Brunswick: Rutgers
University ress.
SAHLINS, M. 1962. Moala: Cultutrend
natutren a Fijian
Island.
Ann
Arbor:University
fMichiganPress.
.
1963. Poor
man,
rich
man, big-man,
hief:Political
types
n
Melanesia and Polynesia. Comparative tuidies
n
Society
and
History
: 285-303.
.
1965.
"On the sociology
of
primitive xchange,"
in
The
relevance fmodels or social anthropology.
dited by M.
Banton.
London: Tavistock.
SALISBURY, RICHARD F. 1962. Fromstone
o
steel.
Melbourne:
Mel-
bourne
University
ress.
.
1964. Despotismand Australian dministrationn theNew
Guinea
highlands.
AmericanAnthropologist
6:225-39.
. 1970. Vienamami:Economictransformation
n
a traditional
society.
erkeley
nd Los
Angeles:
University
f California
ress.
SCHUMPETER,
J.
A. 1951.
mperialism
nd socialclasses.
Translated
by
H.
Norden. Oxford:Blackwell.
SEIGNOBOS,
CHARLES.
1912.
The
feudalregime.
ranslated
by
E. W.
Daw.
New
York: HenryHolt.
SHARP,
L.
1952.
"Steel
axes for
Stone
Age Australians,"
n
human
problems n
technologicalhange.
Edited
by
E.
H.
Spicer.
New
York:
Russell Sage.
SHERIF,
M.
1952.
"Group
influence
n
the
formation
f
norms
nd
attitudes,"
in
Readings
in
social psychology.
dited
by
G.
E.
Swanson,
T.
M.
Newcomb,
and
E. L.
Hartley,
t
al.
New
York:
Henrv
Holt.
SHILS,
E.
1965. Charisma, order,
nd status.
American
ociological
Review 0: 199-213.
SIMMEL, GEORG.
1950 (1908). The sociology
f Georg immel.Trans-
lated by K. Wolff.Glencoe: Free Press.
SMITH,
M. G. 1965.
Thle
plural society n the British West ndies.
Berkeley:University f California ress.
[CSH]
90
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 24/24
Orenstein:
SYMMETRICAL
RECIPROCITY
RINIVAS, M. N. 1955. "The social system
f a Mysore village,"
in
VillageIndia.
Edited
by
M. Marriott. Chicago: University
f
ChicagoPress.
-.
1959.
The
dominant aste in Rampura. AmericanAnthro-
pologist
1:1-16.
.
1966. Social change
n modern ndia. Berkeleyand
Los
Angeles:University
f California ress.
STEPHENSON, CARL.
1942. Medieval eudalism. thaca: Cornell
Uni-
versity
ress.
STRAYER, JOSEPH
R. 1970. On themedieval rigins f hemodern
tate.
Princeton:
rincetonUniversity
ress.
STRAYER, JOSEPH,
and D.
C.
NUNRO.
1959. The MiddleAges:
359-
1500. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
TAYLOR, HENRY
0.
1914. The medievalmind:A historyf he evelop-
ment
f
hought
nd emotionn theMiddleAges.London: Macmillan.
THOMAS,
ELIZABETH MARSHALL. 1958. The harmless eople.
New
York:
Vintage.
THURNWALD, RICHARD. 1932. Economics
n primitive ommunities.
London:
OxfordUniversity
ress.
TITIEV, M.
1971. Some aspects
of
lowning
mong heHopi Indians,"
in
Themes
n culture. dited by
M.
Zamora,
M. Mahar, and H.
Orenstein.
Manila:
University
f
Philippines
ress.
T6NNIES, F. 1940. Fundamentaloncepts
f sociology. ranslated
by
C. P.
Loomis. New York:
AmericanBook
Co.
TRAINOR, JOHN. 1972. Scordatura: ts origin
nd
development.
he
Strad
83(985):25-33.
WARNER,
W.
L., and
P. S. LUNT.
1941. The
social
lifeof
a
modern
community.
Yankee
City Series
1.) New
Haven: Yale
University
Press.
WEBER, MAX.
1947a
(1922). The
theory
f
ocial
and
economic
rgani-
zation.
Translated
by A. Henderson
nd
T.
Parsons.
New
York:
Oxford
University
ress.
--. 1947b
(1906-24).
From Max
Weber:
Essays in
sociology.
Translated
by
H.
Gerth and
C.
Mills.
London:
Kegan
Paul,
Trench,
Trubner.
--. 1954
(1922).
Max
Weber
on law in
economy
nd
society.
Translated by E. Shils; edited by M. Rheinstein.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityress.
---
.1968
(1922).
Economy
nd
society.
vols.Edited
by
Guenther
Roth and
Claus
Wittich.
otowa,
N.J.:
Bedminster
ress.
[DHW]
WESTERMARCK, EDWARD.
1908. The
origin nd
development
f moral
ideas.
London:
Macmillan.
WEYER,
E.
M. 1967.
The
structuref
ocial
organization
mong he
Eskimo," in
Comparative
olitical
ystems.
dited
by
R.
Cohen
and
J.
Middleton.
Garden
City:
Natural
HistoryPress.
WRONG,
DENNIS
H.
1970.
Max
Weber.
Englewood
Cliffs:
rentice-
Hall.
[DHW]
-
. 1979.
Power:
ts
forms,
ases, nd uses.New York:
Harper
and
Row.
[DHW]
Institutions
* The
NTERNATIONAL
WORK GROUP
FOR
INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS
was founded en years
go by
a
groupof anthropologistss a
nonprofit, onpolitical rganization.
ts
objectives
from
he
start were to publicize the
situation
f
oppressed ndigenous
peoples and
to
fosterworldwide
onsciousness
f the
dangers
that threaten
hese
peoples.
Another
bjectivewas
to
help
and
support he ndigenous
eoples'
own
organizations.
To
achieve these
goals,
the
IWGIA has
published,
s
of
December 1978, 36 documents written
by internationally
known
nthropologists,urists, ditors, nd
investigatorsnd
representatives f
indigenous groups-all individuals
who
throughheirworkhavebeen n closecontactwith ndigenous
peoples
nd
are
deeply
oncerned
bout their ituation.
everal
of these
documents
ave
been
the
first o
reveal some of
the
shocking
conditions
prevailing nd have thus contributed
substantially
o
the international ebate
on
measures o
be
taken
n
defence f oppressed
ndigenous roups.
Needless
o
say,
much
more
must
be
done,
s
the
ituation
f
indigenous
eoples
s
everyday moredesperate.
ublic debate
must
be
intensifiedo such an extent s to
put international
politicalpressure n the
governmentsoncerned. or this
to
be
accomplished,
continuous
low of reliable information
must
reach s manypeople as possible.
More
IWGIA subscribers
ot
only would
mean
that
its
documents ouldreach
more
people and that
t
could produce
more fthem, ut also wouldgive t a strong inancial ase for
its
continuing ork
towards nternational ecognition f the
rights
f
the Fourth
World.Subscription ates re U.S. $12 for
individuals, 24
for
nstitutions,nd include
both documents
and
newsletters. heques should
be made payable to IWGIA,
Frederiksholmsanal
4A,
1220
Copenhagen , Denmark.
*
The
Cuzco
CENTER FOR ANDEAN STUDIES
(see CA 20: 80) an-
nounces
n international
ummer chool or 980.The program
is
addressed o scholars
and students nterestedn acquiring
deeper
nsight nto the people of the
Andean region. t offers
tenweeks f classes-June 1 through ugust 5-supportedby
visits o nca and pre-Inca uins, ontemporaryeasantvillages,
and mportant istoricalites n the area and attendance t fes-
tivities nd ceremonials.ome classeswillbe taught n English
while thers, rimarilyoward he end of the program, ill be
taught n Spanish.Attendance t the ntensive panishcourse
offeredhould enable the student o speak basic Spanish by
the end of the firstmonth.The cost of the program s U.S.
$1,800;
this includes
tuition,
ocal
transportation,
nd
food
and lodging uring ours utsideCuzco. Room and board will
cost an additional 1,200. nternational ransportationan be
arranged at lower than normal rates through he Center.
Optional two-week ours, t a cost that will vary
with the
number f students nrolled, re planned for the end of the
summer o the centralAndean highlands, o Lake Titicaca,
and to the headwaters f the Amazon.For furthernformation
and application forms, lease write: International ummer
School 1980, Centro
de
Estudios Andinos, Apartado 582,
Cuzco,
Peru.
*
The
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(UGNAYNANG PANG-AGHAMTAo) has
lined up
a number
of
activities or
1979-80. Preparatory o its third
nnual
confer-
ence,
with he theme The Filipino nd His Changing
nviron-
ment," to be held April 21-27, 1980, at Mindanao State
University,
Marawi
City,
several
study groups
have
been
organized n various regionsof the country. ach group
s
addressing tself o issues of environmentalntegritynd the
quality
f
ife n the Philippines. he results f
these
nvestiga-
tions
will
onstitute he
mainpapers o be presented uring
he
conference. he firstvolume of the Association's ournal,
Aglhamlao,
s now in
press.
A
newsletter, esigned
o
be a
vehicle for
the immediate haring of information
n the
activities
f
anthropologistsnd anthropologicalnstitutions
n
thePhilippines,
s
nowbeing repared. ommunicationsegard-
ing the Associationmay be sent to Ponciano L. Bennagen,
Department
f
Anthropology, niversity f the Philippines,
Diliman,Quezon City,
The
Philippines.
Vol. 21
-
No. 1 * February 980
91