assessment of development results...

Assessment of Development Resultse v A l u A t i o n o f u n D p ’ s C o n t R i b u t i o n monteneGRo

Evaluation Office, September 2006United Nations Development Programme

REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ADR SERIES

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EVALUATION TEAM

Team Leader Mr.RichardFlaman

Team Members Dr.BeataCzajkowska Ms.RankaŠarenac

UNDP Evaluation Mr.DavidRiderSmithOffice Team Member and Task Manager

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EvaluationOffice

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CONTENTSForeword .....................................................................................................................................vi

Acronyms and Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................viii

Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................xi

1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................21.1 BackgroundandContext....................................................................................................................21.2 RationalefortheEvaluation................................................................................................................21.3 ObjectivesandScopeoftheEvaluation..............................................................................................31.4 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................41.5 Limitations,AssumptionsandDependencies.....................................................................................51.6 StructureofthisReport......................................................................................................................61.7 NoteontheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro...........................................................................6

2. National Challenges and Strategies ........................................................................................92.1 PoliticalEvolutionoftheRepublic.....................................................................................................92.2DevelopmentChallenges.................................................................................................................132.3 NationalDevelopmentGoalsandStrategies................................................................................... 17

3. UNDP Programme Positioning..................................................................................................... 213.1 ChallengesandOpportunities......................................................................................................... 213.2 UNDPProgrammeStrategies..........................................................................................................22

4. Assessment of Development Results..............................................................................................284.1 SocialandEconomicParticipation...................................................................................................284.2 EnergyandEnvironmentforSustainableDevelopment.................................................................. 374.3 InstitutionalandJudicialReform...................................................................................................... 554.4 TheMontenegroPRSPProcess........................................................................................................634.5 Coordination.....................................................................................................................................66

5. Management of UNDP Assistance................................................................................................. 705.1 SourceandApplicationofFunds..................................................................................................... 705.2 Planning,OrganizationandHumanResources.............................................................................. 725.3 MonitoringandEvaluation............................................................................................................... 745.4ProgrammeDeliveryModalities....................................................................................................... 76

6. Conclusions Lessons and Recommendations............................................................................... 786.1 StrategicIntentoftheOverallProgramme...................................................................................... 786.2 UNDPProgrammePerformanceandResults................................................................................. 806.3 MainRecommendations..................................................................................................................82

ANNEXES

1. TermsofReference/InceptionReport................................................................................................. 872. IndividualsConsulted.............................................................................................................................. 933. DocumentsReviewed.......................................................................................................................... 974. UNDP-MontenegroProgrammeMetrics......................................................................................... 1035. UNDPCorporateSurveyData......................................................................................................... 1506. UNDPLiaisonOfficeinMontenegro:OrganizationalStructure.................................................... 1067. UNDP-MontenegroProgrammeMaps............................................................................................ 1078. Serbia&Montenegro:MapofIntendedDevelopmentResults.........................................................1109. Serbia&Montenegro:GoalsandIntendedOutcomes..................................................................... 11310. DiscussionPointsonPartnerships.................................................................................................... 115

FIGURES

Figure1:PublicOpiniononIndependence............................................................................................. 11Figure2:HumanDevelopmentIndexValueforMontenegro,1991-2003............................................. 13Figure3:MontenegroProgrammeFunding,2001-2005........................................................................ 21Figure4:StaffingLevelsofUNCountryTeamMembersinSerbiaandMontenegro,.......................... 66

December2005Figure5:SourceofUNDPMontenegroProgrammeFinancing,2001-2005......................................... 71Figure6:BudgetTrendbyCluster,2001-2005...................................................................................... 72

TABLES

Table1:MacroeconomicIndicatorsforMontenegro.............................................................................12Table2:RegionalDisaggregationoftheHDIinMontenegro,2000-2003.......................................... 14Table3:ResourceMobilization,2001-2005.......................................................................................... 70Table4:Projects,BudgetsandExpenditures,2001-2005..................................................................... 71Table5:UNDPStaffing,Montenegro,2001-2005.............................................................................. 73

BOXES

Box1:EvaluabilityReview......................................................................................................................4Box2:MontenegroataGlance............................................................................................................. 10Box3:PopularOpinionisPositiveonEuropeanIntegration................................................................ 11Box4:NationalGoals&UNDAFIntendedOutcomes.......................................................................26Box5:CampaigningtoPreserveanEnvironmentalTreasure...............................................................30Box6:UNDPSupporttoAnti-corruptionInitiatives........................................................................... 32Box7:ChangingtheCourseofMountainTourism.............................................................................. 47Box8:PositiveFeaturesofCDPSupporttoMEIREI......................................................................... 57Box9:UNDP’sRoleasPartnerintheCapacityDevelopmentProgramme..........................................60Box10:Inter-agencyCooperation:ThecaseofUNESCOandUNDP................................................68

vi F o r e w o r d

This report presents an Assessment of Develop-mentResults(ADR)inMontenegro.TheADRisanindependentevaluationconductedbytheEval-uation Office of UNDP. It assesses the relevanceandstrategicpositioningofUNDP’s supportanditscontributionstoacountry’sdevelopmentoveragiven period of time. The aim of the ADR is togenerate lessons for strengthening country-levelprogrammingandcontributetotheorganization’seffectivenessandsubstantiveaccountability.

Sincethebreak-upofYugoslaviain1991,Monte-negrohasfacedpoliticalandeconomictransitions,regional conflict, economic sanctions andNATOinterventions. During this period, the collapse ofthe economy, influx of refugees, the ‘brain drain’outofMontenegro,socialdisintegrationandchal-lengestoidentityallservedtolimitpeople’schoices.Theseproblemshavebeenfurthercompoundedbyweak state administration, widespread corruptionand the uncontrolled exploitation of the environ-ment. Since 2001, Montenegro has embarked onanambitiousprogrammeofreform,drivenbytheEU accession process and independence. Marketreformshaveyieldedmoderate success,withcon-trol over inflation and a reduction in unemploy-ment.Independencehasbeenachieved,with55.5percent of the population voting in favour in the21May2006 referendum.As the implicationsofindependenceunfold,alongwiththechallengeofacceding to the EU, the progress of Montenegrotowardsmodern liberaldemocracywill facemul-tiplechallenges, includingitsabilitytoeffectivelypursuereform.

The evaluation found that UNDP has played anextremely important role in Montenegro giventhe organization’s limited size and mandate. Byprovidingassistance indeveloping thecapacityofkey ministries, UNDP helped focus attention onpovertyandhumandevelopmentandbridgegapsbetweengovernmentalandnon-governmentalsec-

tors. An especially noteworthy accomplishmentwasUNDP’sentrepreneurialroleinestablishingapolicydialoguebetweentheGovernmentofMon-tenegroandCostaRica,acountryknownworld-wideforitssuccessasan‘eco-state’.TheinitiativeprovidedanewvisionanddirectionforMontene-gro.ItalsoresultedinthecreationoftheMonte-negro Sustainable Development Programme, forwhichUNDPiswidelyrecognized.Thisinitiativealigns UNDP with the country’s reform agendaandEUaccession,withsustainableanddiversifiedtourismasoneofitstopmacroeconomicdevelop-mentpriorities.

The evaluation notes that, as a new nation, andwithinthecontextofEUaccession,therearelikelytobeincreasingdemandsfromtheGovernmentforsupportinareasinwhichUNDPhasaccumulatedexpertise.UNDPnowhasanopportunitytodecidewhatrole,ifany,itshouldcontinuetoplayinthecountry.Theprogrammehasbuiltupconsiderablecapacity,withstaffseentobecommittedandhighlymotivated,andthemanagementoftheprogrammehasbeeneffective.TheevaluationrecommendsthatUNDPshouldcontinue tobuildon its strengths,and the Government has indicated that UNDP’smainadvantageisinsupporttoeco-tourisminthecentralandnorthernregionsofthecountry,wherethere is adisproportionate shareofpoverty, envi-ronmental degradation and inequitable economicdevelopment.Withgovernanceasamajornationalchallenge, the evaluationfinds thatUNDPhas aroletoplayincombatingcorruption,rangingfromsupportforUNconventionsontheissuetofactor-inginanti-corruptionmeasuresinitsprogrammes.Theevaluationconcludesbyrecognizingthat,asamiddle-income country, Montenegro could soongraduate to ‘net contributor country’ status. Forthisreason,UNDPshouldbeginthinkingserious-ly about an exit strategy that could coincidewithMontenegro’s strategy for EU accession and eco-nomicdevelopment.

FOREWORD

A number of people contributed to this evalua-tion,particularlytheevaluationteamcomposedofRichard Flaman, team leader, Beata CzajkowskaandRankaŠarenac,teammembers,DerekBlink,duringtheinceptionphase,andDavidRiderSmith,theEvaluationOfficeteammemberandtaskman-ager.WewouldalsoliketothankMichelleSyandAnishPradhanfortheiradministrativesupport.

Theresearchandpreparationoftheevaluationwasalsothankstotheexcellentcollaborationandopen-ness of the staff of the UNDP Liaison Office inMontenegro, led by Resident Representative, a.i.,GarretTankosić-Kelly,andtheCountryOfficeinSerbia,ledbyResidentRepresentativeLanceClark,his predecessor, Resident Representative, a.i.,Arturo Hein, and Deputy Resident Representa-tiveRastislavVrbensky.Iwouldalsoliketothankthe Regional Bureau for Europe and Common-wealthofIndependentStates,particularyDirectorKalman Mizsei, Deputy Director Marta Ruedas,and Senior programme Adviser for the WesternBalkansMoisesVenancio,fortheircooperation.

This report would not have been possible with-out the commitment and support of theGovern-mentofMontenegro.Inparticular,theevaluationteam would like to thank the Prime Minister ofMontenegro, Milo Đukanović, for his time andinsights. The team is also indebted to those civilsociety, private sector, donor country and UnitedNations Country Team representatives, includingthosefromtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions,whogenerouslygavetheirtimeandfrankviews.

Withindependence,Montenegrohasbecomeana-tionstateforthefirsttimesincetheendofWorldWarI.UNDPhasbeenapartnerofMontenegrosince1952,andcontinues toprovideassistanceasitstrivestoforgeanewnationalidentity,gainin-ternationalrecognition,establishapresenceontheworldstageandcontinuetheprocessofaccessiontotheEU.Ihopethatthefindingsandrecommenda-tionsofthisreportwillassistUNDPinimprovingtheeffectivenessof itsassistance inrespondingtothecountry’schallenges,andinprovidingbroaderlessonsthatmaybeofrelevancetoUNDPanditspartnersinternationally.

SaraswathiMenonDirector,EvaluationOffice

F o r e w o r d vii

ADA

ADR

BDP

CBF

CBP

CCA

CCF

CDP

CEDEM

CIDA

CPAP

CPD

CRNVO

DEG

DEX

DFID

DPS

DPRS

EAR

EC

EU

FINNIDA

FONDAS

FOSI-ROM

GDP

GEF

GEM

GIS

AustrianDevelopmentAssistance

AssessmentofDevelopmentResults

BureauforDevelopmentPolicy(UNDP)

CapacityBuildingFund

CapacityBuildingProgramme(forNGOsandcivilsociety)

CommonCountryAssessment

CountryCooperationFramework

CapacityDevelopmentProgramme

CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights

CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency

CountryProgrammeActionPlan(UNDP)

CountryProgrammeDocument(UNDP)

CentrefortheDevelopmentofNGOs

GermanInvestmentandDevelopmentCompany

Directexecution(byUNDP)

UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DemocraticPartyofSocialists

DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy

EuropeanAgencyforReconstruction

EuropeanCommission

EuropeanUnion

DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentCooperation(Finland)

FoundationforDemocraticAlternativesinSociety

FoundationOpenSocietyInstitute–RepresentativeOfficeinMontenegro

Grossdomesticproduct

GlobalEnvironmentFacility

GenderEmpowermentIndex

GeographicInformationSystem

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

viii A C r o N Y M S A N d A B B r e V I A T I o N S

GTZ

GZP

HDI

HDR

ICT

IDA

IDP

IMF

INTRAC

IOM

IPA

ISSP

LSCG

MANS

MDG

M&E

MIEREI

MonGIS

MSDP

MYFF

NATO

NCC

NEX

NGO

NSSD

OCHA

OECD

OSI

Germantechnicalcooperationagency

GroupforChanges

HumanDevelopmentIndex

HumanDevelopmentReport

InformationandCommunicationTechnology

InternationalDevelopmentAssociation

Internallydisplacedperson

InternationalMonetaryFund

InternationalNGOTraining&ResearchCentre

InternationalOrganizationforMigration(UnitedNations)

InstrumentforPre-accession

InstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses

LiberalAllianceofMontenegro

NetworkforAffirmationoftheNGOSector

MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

Monitoringandevaluation

MinistryofInternationalEconomicRelationsandEuropeanIntegration

MontenegrinGeographicInformationSystem

MontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme

Multi-YearFundingFramework(UNDP)

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

Netcontributorcountry

Nationalexecution

Non-governmentalorganization

NationalStrategyforSustainableDevelopment

UNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

OpenSocietyInstitute

A C r o N Y M S A N d A B B r e V I A T I o N S ix

PAR

PMU

PRSP

RAE

RBEC

RBM

REC

ROAR

SAP

SCG

SDP

SIDA

SRF

TOR

TRAC

TTF

UNDAF

UNHCHR

UNHCR

UNICEF

USAID

WSSD

WTTC

WWF

PublicAdministrationReform

ProgrammeManagementUnit

PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

Roma,AshkaeliaandEgyptian

RegionalBureauforEuropeandtheCIS(UNDP)

Results-basedmanagement

RegionalEnvironmentCentreforCentralandEasternEurope

Results-orientedAnnualReport

StabilizationandAssociationProcess

StateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro

Socialist-DemocraticParty

SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgency

StrategicResultsFramework

Termsofreference

Targetforresourceassignmentfromthecore

GlobalThematicTrustFund(UNDP)

UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework

OfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights

OfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforRefugees

UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

WorldSummitonSustainableDevelopment

WorldTravelandTourismCouncil

WorldWildlifeFund

x A C r o N Y M S A N d A B B r e V I A T I o N S

__________________________________________________________________________1.AssessmentswerecarriedoutforbothSerbiaandMontenegroprogrammesconcurrently,reflectingtheirprogrammaticrela-

tionshipundertheauspicesofaCountryOfficelocatedinBelgrade,andaLiaisonOfficeinMontenegro.WithMontenegro’sindependence,theassessmenthasbeendividedintotwodocuments–anADRMontenegroandADRSerbia.

On21May2006,Montenegrinsvoted for inde-pendence and withdrawal from the State UnionwithSerbia.Abouttwoweekslater,on3June,theMonenegrinParliamentproclaimedtheRepublicofMontenegroindependentbyadoptingadecisionandadeclarationon independence, thusmakingMontenegroanationstateforthefirsttimesincethe endofWorldWar I.This act completed thedissolutionofYugoslaviathatbeganwiththede-partureofSloveniaandMacedoniain1991.

Following a decade of regional warfare and theendofMiloševićregimein2000,thedemocratictransition has been shaped by both Serbia andMontenegro’s long-term goal of membership intheEuropeanUnion (EU),and forMontenegro,thecountry’sindependence–agoalnowfulfilled.Democratic and economic reforms have beenongoing in Montenegro since the late 1990s,andithasachievedadegreeofsuccessinrespectto economic growth, political stability, coherentpolicy evolution, improvements in the legislativeframework and social sectors. However, muchremains to be done in this newly independentcountry.

UNDP, under its predecessor organization, hasbeenactive inYugoslavia since1952.Operationsweresuspendedduringtheconflict-ridden1990s,and UNDP only officially reopened its office inthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001. InMontenegro, UNDP focused on the republic’scontinuing reform efforts. This Assessmentof Development Results (ADR) reviews the lastfive years of UNDP’s support to Montenegro,from 2001– 2005, within the context of itsrelationshipwithSerbiaanditscurrentandfuturedevelopmentchallenges.

PURPOSE AND APPROACH OF THIS ASSESSMENT

The selection of Montenegro and Serbia1 foran Assessment of Development Results to beconductedinlate2005andearly2006wasbasedin part on the prospect of monumental changesahead:ThestatusofKosovo–oneoftheworld’sfewUNprotectorates–wasyettobedetermined.Montenegro’s referendum on independencewas scheduled. And both republics had met thepoliticalcriteriatobegintheprocessofaccessionto theEuropeanUnion.TheUNDPprogrammeitself had been through one complete CountryCooperation Framework cycle (2002−2004) andwas refining its new programme (2005−2009)withinthebroadercontextoftheUnitedNationsDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF).Further, a new resident representative had beenintroduced to the Country Office (based inBelgrade)inNovember2005.Allofthesefactorsprovidedastrongrationaletoevaluatetheresultsachieved over the last programming cycle, andanopportune (thoughchallenging) time todrawlessonsforfutureprogramming.

The scope and focus of this assessment is basedonanevaluationofcurrentandpastprogrammesand extensive stakeholder consultations. TheADRprovidesananalysisoftheextenttowhichUNDPhaspositioneditselfeffectivelytoidentifyand respond to national needs and changes inthe national development context. It also offersan overall assessment of the development resultsachievedinpartnershipwithotherkeydevelopmentactors, primarily the Government. In particular,theassessmentidentifieshowUNDPhassupportedtheoverarchinggoalofaccessiontotheEuropeanUnion,andanalysesachievementsintheareasofgovernance and sustainable development. While

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y xi

theassessmentfocusesonoutcomes,theissuesofcomplementarity, sustainability and coordinationarealsoaddressed.

While the assessment is comprehensive, it wasrestrictedinitsdepthbythetimeandresourcesthatwereavailablefordeploymentacrosstworepublics.The strong base of evidence from programmeevaluations commissionedby theUNDPLiaisonOffice in Podgorica provided a foundation uponwhich the ADR could build. Limitations wereidentified, notably the comparability of suchevidence and the weaknesses in results matricesand monitoring data. Nevertheless, the ADRteamisconfidentthatitsobservationsarebroadlyrepresentative of the effectiveness of UNDP’ssupportandthatitsrecommendationscanserveasusefulinputtoUNDP’sfuturestrategicplanning.

MONTENEGRO – NEW COUNTRY, ONGOING CHALLENGES

The full ramifications of independence forMontenegro are still unfolding. Since victory inthe1998parliamentaryelections,theDemocraticParty of Socialists (DPS) has been the mostsignificant player on a fractured Montenegrinpolitical scene and firmly behind a separateMontenegrinstate.Politicalstabilitywilldependonwhetherthepro-unionpartiesaccepttheresult1andresignthemselvestotheendofatwo-republicstate.Parliamentaryelections,duetobeheldlaterin2006,shouldmakethesituationclearer.

Since 1998, the DPS has held the positions ofpresident and prime minister in Montenegro. Inaccordancewiththe2003ConstitutionalCharterof the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro,the republic has had its own institutions ofGovernment,includingaParliamentandjudiciary.Independence and EU accession have been thetwin pillars of this party’s manifesto, and sincecomingtoofficeithasbeguntoimplementsomeofthereformsrequiredtofulfilitsobligationsunder

theEU’sStabilizationandAssociationProcess.

Prior to the conflict and isolation of Yugoslaviaduring themid-1990s, thecountrywas relativelywell integrated within the world economy, witha higher standard of living than other countriesin Eastern Europe. The conflict and subsequentbreak-upofYugoslavia,combinedwitheconomicmismanagement, resulted in hyperinflation anda virtual collapse of the economy. In January2001, Montenegro embarked on an ambitiousprogrammeaimedatrapidtransitiontoamarketeconomy, the normalization of relations withforeign creditors, and integration with regional,EUandworldmarkets (aspartof these reforms,theGermanmarkwasintroducedasMontenegro’scurrency2).Theprogrammehasyieldedmoderatesuccess,withanaveragegrowthrateof3.3percentsince2001,controloverinflationandareductioninunemployment.

As measured by UNDP’s Human DevelopmentIndex(HDI),Montenegroisintheuppermediumcategory of human development, comparable toBulgaria,theRussianFederation,andTheformerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, it isalsoamongthecountrieswiththehighestdegreeof inequality in the region. Poverty is greatestamong minority groups, refugees and internallydisplacedpersons.Itisalsogeographicallyuneven,with the rural northern region exhibiting twicethepoverty rate of central and southern regions.Thenorthisalsothefocusofmuchenvironmentalexploitation – forest use, the conversion ofagricultural land and illegal construction (whichoccursacrossthecountry)–asituationsimilartothat of most OECD countries two decades ago.Pollution problems caused by obsolete industrialequipment and poor pollution controls havebeenexacerbatedby thehighdemand forenergyfrom households and industry, perpetuated bylow, subsidized energy prices. Furthermore,Montenegro has transboundary water resourcesand global environmental responsibilities. These

xii e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y

__________________________________________________________________________1.Whileclearedas‘freeandfair’bythestateelectioncommission,andacceptedbytheSerbiangovernment,themainopposition

partyrequestedarecountinaccordancewiththeMontenegrinLawonReferendum.Thefinalresultswereconfirmedon3June,atwhichpointMontenegro’sParliamentproclaimedtheRepublicofMontenegroindependentbyadoptingtheDecisiononproclaimingtheindependenceandaDeclarationonIndependence.

2.WiththechangeofEUmonetarypolicy,theGermanmarkwassubstitutedbytheeuro,makingMontenegrotheonlynon-EUcountrythatusestheeuroasitsofficialcurrency.Serbiadidnotfollowsuit,andretainstheformer-Yugoslavdinarasitsunitofcurrency.

include the protection of unique species of floraand faunaaswell as culturalheritagedesignatedby the UN Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO) as World HeritageSites:BokaKotorskaandDurmitorNationalPark.These sites also represent economic assets, withtourism considered one of the potential driversoftheeconomyoverthenextdecade.Theoverallframework for tackling these challenges is theconstitution,underwhichMontenegrohaspledgedtoreachthestandardsofan‘ecologicalstate’.

ThebiggestchallengeforMontenegroisgovernance.In2004,TransparencyInternationalrankedSerbiaandMontenegro106outof133countriesintermsofthedepthofpoliticalcorruption.Inaddressingthis issue, theGovernmentadoptedastrategy tofightcorruptionandorganizedcrime,passedasetofanti-corruptionlaws,andestablishedanumberofinstitutionsandhigh-levelpositions.Asidefromcorruption,thelegaciesoftheformersocialistsystemofgovernment–lackoftransparencyindecision-making,weakpublicparticipation, supply-drivenservice delivery, inadequate skills and capacitiesthatcontributedtoacultureofnon-performanceand little accountability. However, with theadoptionoftheStrategyonPublicAdministrationReform in 2003, the Government has showndetermination to improve the functioning of thesystem. Increased participation of civil societyinthepublicspherehasalsobeenevidentbythegrowth in the non-governmental sector, withthenumberof registeredNGOs increasing fromaround 1,100 in 2000 to more then 3,500 in2005. However, few of these (an estimated 50)are active, and the capacity of the sector is stillweak and lacks transparency. The future ofMontenegro will be determined by its ability toaddressthesechallenges.

UNDP RESPONSE

With the initiation of reform efforts in the late1990s, and the democratic overthrow of theMilošević regime in late2000,UNDP– amongothers–sawanopportunitytosupportMontenegro.However,thedauntingchallengesassociatedwithpost-conflictgovernanceandpublicadministrationin Montenegro presented a difficult context for

the start of a UNDP programme. UNDP didnothaveaphysicalpresenceinMontenegrountilmid-2001andreportedlyhadapoorreputationfordelivery,withonlyoneNGOprojectunderway.All UNDP regular or core funding was under asinglecountryprogrammefortheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia, controlledby theUNDPoffice inBelgrade. The size of the new UNDP LiaisonOfficeinMontenegrowassmall–onlythreestaffmembers–andsituatedinverymodestfacilities.Moreover, it was regarded as an outpost of theUNDPoperationinBelgrade,wheremostUNDPattentionwasbeingfocused.

The first major opportunity arose in the area ofpoverty reduction and civil society development.ThroughanagreementwiththeWorldBankandtheGovernment,theLiaisonOfficewassuccessfulin coordinating the preparation of Montenegro’sfirst Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.1 Thiswas followed by a second major opportunity intheareaofenergyandenvironment.TheLiaisonOfficewasabletoattractsupportfromanumberofsources–particularlytheRockefellerBrothersFund–toestablishapolicydialoguebetweentheGovernment of Montenegro and Costa Rica, acountryknownworldwideforitssuccessasan‘eco-state’. This entrepreneurial effort resulted in thedevelopmentofthelargeMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme.

Atthesametime,UNDPexpandedthecapacitiesof the Montenegro office, acquired top-notchnationalprojectandprogrammestaff,maintaineda constant dialogue with a broad stakeholdercommunity,andmanagedacomplexrelationshipwith the Belgrade office. Aside from these coreinitiatives, UNDP sought opportunities in otherareas,suchascapacitydevelopment,coordinationamong UN agencies, including on AIDS, thedevelopment of a National Human Development Report, and in networking and buildingpartnerships. Discussions with GovernmentandotherdonorsontheadaptationoftheSerbiaCapacity Building Fund led to the formulationof Capacity Development Programme in 2003.Resourcemobilizationwasgivenspecialattentionsince therewerevery limitedUNDPcore funds,and income earned from the delivery of directly

e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y xiii

__________________________________________________________________________1.Laterrenamedthe‘DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy’.

executed donor-funded projects was needed tofinanceprogrammeoperations.

The current programme strategies for UNDP inMontenegro remain highly relevant. They arealigned with the new country’s macroeconomicreform agenda and EU accession, and they con-tinuetoreceivethehighest levelofsupportfromthe current Government. The Government hasset sustainable and diversified tourism (of whicheco-tourism is a niche) as one of its top macro-economic development priorities. Moreover, theGovernmentanddonorpartnershavestatedtheirintent tocontinue theirpartnershipwithUNDPintheimplementationoftheMontenegroSustain-able Development Programme, with special em-phasisontourism/sustainabledevelopmentinthecentralandnorthernregionsofthecountry–ar-easwhereother fundingpartnersarenot,asyet,especiallyactive.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Even as a relatively small actor in Montenegro,UNDP has, over the past five years, providedvaluableassistanceindevelopinginstitutionalca-pacityinkeyministries,helpedfocusattentiononissuesofpovertyandhumandevelopment,bridgegapsbetweengovernmentalandnon-governmen-talsectors,andputdefinitionandactionintotheeco-stateconcept.UNDPhasestablisheditselfasa trusted development partner, and considerablepotentialremainsforcontinuedUNDPsupporttonationaldevelopmentpriorities.Thefollowingaresomeof the key areas inwhichUNDPhas sup-portedtheachievementofresults:

Institutional and judicial reform. Montenegro’s Capacity Development Programmewasasuccessfulpilotthatcontributedtothereformanddevelop-mentofpublicadministration.UNDP,withGov-ernmentand its fundingdonorpartners, assistedinfillingcapacitygapswithinthreekeyministries.MostimportantamongthesewastheMinistryofInternational Economic Relations and EuropeanIntegration.Theeffortstartedalmostfromscratch,withaministernewtogovernmentandaminimalstaffthatwereeithertransferredfromothermin-istriesorfreshlyrecruitedforprobationaryservice.Withsupportfromtheprogramme,theministrywastransformedintoafullyoperationalunit,using

relativelymodernmethodsofmanagingboththepolicy-making process and its own organization,andcapableofformulatingitsownneedsandplansin relation to other administrations and interna-tional donors. The ministry has since developeditsorganizationandbusinessproceduresand,withtheexitofUNDPandtheCapacityDevelopmentProgramme,hasbecomefullysustainable.

Energy and environment for sustainable devel-opment. The challenges to the sustainable man-agementofthenaturalenvironmentinMontene-gro are manifold, and the Government has longacknowledgedtheneedtorespondtothesechal-lenges while achieving national economic andsocial goals. Through the Montenegro Sustainable Development Programme, UNDP helped Monte-negroadvanceinthisdirectionthrough‘earlysuc-cess’pilotinitiativesandmedium-termsupportforMontenegrin institutions, within the frameworkofasustainabledevelopmentstrategy.Bydevelop-ing a strategy for sustainable tourism as a viabledevelopmentmodelinnorthernandcentralMon-tenegro, and supporting NGO-led campaignsagainstinitiativesthatarepotentiallydamagingtotheenvironment,theprogrammehasbeenprovid-ingacounterweighttomainstreammasstourismconcepts.Alongsidethestrategy, theprogrammehas been central to the drafting of the SpatialPlanningAct,whichhassincebeenpassedbyPar-liament.Theprogrammehasalsoinitiatedtwopi-lots,apublic-privatepartnershipthatisfacilitatingentrepreneurshipand theprotectionofanationalpark,andageographicinformationsystemforfor-estrymapping,whichisbeingscaledupforuseasacross-sectoralplanningtool.

Social and economic participation.UNDPwasone of the few international agencies in 2001 torecognizethepotentialoftheNGOsectortosup-portcitizen’srightsandshapethecountry’sdevel-opment.UndertheauspicesoftheNGO Capacity Building Programme,newopportunitieshavebeencreatedforNGOrepresentationanddialoguewithvariousgovernmentbodies.Thesehavetakendif-ferentforms,fromprovidingaconduitforcitizenengagement in policy formulation (through theDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy)tostrengthening NGOs’ ‘watchdog’ role over gov-ernmentandprivatesectorinitiatives.

xiv e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y

Despite the limited capacity of many of theseNGOs, the increased communicationwithGov-ernment has been seen as extremely positive. Aworking group, comprised of civil society andgovernment representatives, will be workingonamodelforintegratingcivilsocietyparticipa-tioninthedesignandimplementationofpoliciesandlaws.

TheDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy(DPRS)wasthefirstcomprehensivepovertypro-fileinMontenegro,definingthemultidimensionalnatureofpovertyanditscausesandleadingtofor-malrecognitionbytheGovernmentofa ‘povertyproblem’. Involvement in the DPRS (under theWorldBank-ledPRSPprocess)wasthefirstma-joropportunityforUNDPintheareaofpovertyreductionandcivilsocietydevelopment.Abroadparticipatory process was organized, including aseries of consultative meetings with stakeholdersacrossallMontenegrinmunicipalities.WhilethestrategyisnottheprimarydevelopmentframeworkforMontenegro, it isnonethelesscomplementarytotheEconomicReformAgenda,andcouldserveasthebasisfororinputintoaneworconsolidatedNationalDevelopmentPlan.ThroughitsnetworksandestablishedroleinthePRSPprocess,UNDPcouldadvocate–bothdirectlyandindirectly–thatsuchafuturedevelopmentstrategygivedueatten-tion to poverty, human development and relatedissueshighlightedintheUNMillenniumDevel-opmentGoals.

UNDP’S PERFORMANCE

UNDP has served primarily as the implement-ingpartnerforGovernmentbydirectlyexecutingprojects.Inthiscapacity,UNDPdeliveredawiderange of services, from policy advocacy and dia-logue to procurement, recruitment and contract-ingsupport.Aconsiderableamountofassistancewasdeliveredintheformof‘softservices’,suchascoaching,mentoring,networkingandteam-build-ing–assistancethatwasfoundtobeespeciallyval-uedby theministries.UNDP’sperformancewasassessedaccordingtothefollowingcriteria:

Effectiveness and efficiency. Theevaluationteamfound that UNDP-supported programmes inMontenegro have been effective insofar as theyhavebeenalignedwithnationaldevelopmentpri-

orities,compatiblewiththedevelopmentprioritiesoffundingdonorsandpartners,andhaveexploitedUNDP’s comparative advantages. The processesadoptedbyprogrammeactivitieshavebeentrans-parentand,inmanycases,innovative,employinga wide variety of consultative and participatorytechniques. The efficiency of UNDP-supportedprogrammesismuchmoredifficulttomeasureaslittleexistsinthewayofmarketcomparisons.Thatsaid,UNDPhasbuiltupconsiderablestrengthandcapacityinitsLiaisonOffice.UNDPprogrammeandprojectstaffareseentobewellcompensated,committed and highly motivated, and the man-agementoftheMontenegroprogrammehasbeeneffective.Aviablebusinessplatformhasbeenbuiltto support both existing programmes as well asto allow for future programme expansion. Thestrategies thatwere initially envisagedhavebeenimplementedandadjustedperiodicallytoadapttochangesintheexternalenvironment.UNDPhasperformed exceptionally well in resource mobili-zation.Thebulkofprogrammefinancingisfromnon-coreresources,andthistrendwillmostlikelycontinue in the future.ThemanagementservicesfeeschargedbyUNDPforprojectimplementationaregenerallyseentobecompetitive.

Complementarity.TheMontenegrocountrypro-grammewasfoundtobecomplementarytoboththeDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy(DPRS) and to the national Economic ReformAgenda. As the DPRS may, in future, be inte-grated into a single national development plan,thechallengeforUNDPwillbetoensurethatitsongoingandnewprogrammeswillbecorrespond-inglyaligned.Theenergyandenvironmentclusterintheoffice,andtheMontenegroSustainableDe-velopment Programme in particular, have exhib-itedquitestrongoverallcoherence,inpartthroughdesign,andinpartthroughdevelopingincomple-mentary areas.Moreover, projects targetedundertheCapacityDevelopmentProgrammehavebeendesigned to be complementary to and support-ive of the NGO Capacity Building Programme,the Montenegro Sustainable Development Pro-grammeandotherinitiativesintheareaofcapacitydevelopment.

Sustainability.Itistooearlyintheprogrammecy-cletopredictwithanycertaintythatUNDP-sup-portedprogrammeswillbesustainable.However,

e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y xv

early indications suggest that many of the com-ponentswillbe institutionalizedwithinGovern-mentandothernationalorganizations,ifadequateprogramme financing can be obtained. Throughthe Capacity Development Programme, UNDPandotherdonorsaretargetingprioritytasks,andthecaseoftheMinistryofInternationalEconom-icRelationsandEuropeanIntegrationservesasanexampleofsustainable institutionaldevelopment.ThestatedintentofUNDPandtheGovernmenttomovetowardsafullnationalexecutionmodal-itymay,however,notbethebestcoursetotake.Itwouldseemthatfutureprogrammedeliverymo-dalitiesshouldemphasizethepartnershipmodel,which provides far greater flexibility on all sidesto adjust roles and responsibilities according toprogramme circumstances. Furthermore, shouldgovernment corruption continue to be a signifi-cantissue,thenUNDPshouldretain,attheleast,administrative responsibility over inputs (such asprocurement, contracting, payments, cash man-agement and related reporting, accounting andcontrols).Asnotedabove,amoreflexiblemodalityforexecutionandimplementationusingarangeofpartnershipscouldalsohavethebeneficialeffectofbetterbuildingnationalcapacities(governmental,non-governmentalandprivatesector),thusfacili-tatinganeventualUNDPexit.

UN system coordination.TheheadoftheUNDPLiaisonOfficeinMontenegrohasneverhadafor-mal mandate to lead inter-agency coordination,although it has had some delegated authority tosupporttheresidentcoordinatorfunction,inpar-ticularwithregardtotheestablishmentofcommonpremises.ThoughtheCommonCountryAssess-ment, UN Development Assistance Framework(UNDAF)andjointprogrammingresponsibilitieswere not functions delegated by the UN Coun-tryTeam inBelgrade,UNDPhasheldmonthlymeetings to facilitate coordination on a numberof issues.UNDPhasalsobeenactive in supportofnon-residentagencies.Forexample,throughitswork with UNESCO to protect the Tara RiverCanyon,UNDPforgedabridgebetweenthisnor-mative agency, often perceived as having only a‘watchdog’role,withanoperationalagencyabletoactonthebasisofUNESCO’sexpertise–provid-ing a concrete example of UN harmonization inpractice.Nevertheless,theviewsfromotheragen-ciesontheextenttowhichUNDPhaseffectivelyexercisedacoordinatingrolearemixed.

ThereisabeliefamongallagenciesthattheUN-DAF and the move towards common premises(thefirstUNzero-energy‘ecopremises’)provideatremendousopportunityformeaningfulharmoni-zationandcoordination(includingjointprogram-ming in select areas),which couldbe consideredcriticalfortheUNinacountrythesizeofMon-tenegro.Whileconsiderableprogressonthecom-monpremiseshasbeenmade,moreworkneedstobedoneontranslatingtheUNDAFintocommonoperationalplansfortheUNsysteminMontene-gro.Asthestatusofthecountryhasshifted,itisexpected thatgreaterUNsystemcoordination islikelytoresult.

Donor and government coordination. Generalcoordinationamongdonorshasalsobeenweak.Inpractice,ithastendedtobeadhoc,addressingis-suesofduplication,alignmentorcoordinationonspecific issuesandsectors.However, as therearemanyotheractorsintheareasinwhichUNDPisactive, theneed formore formaldonorandgov-ernmentcoordinationmechanismsinthesesectorsandotherswillincrease.Intheabsenceofeffectivedonor coordination, a number of ministries andagencieshavevocalizedsupportforUNDPtotakea more proactive role. UNDP’s effectiveness inbringingtogetherdiverseinterestgroupsandpar-tiesincommondialogueiswidelyacknowledged.In these cases, UNDP has played an organizingrole,whichshouldbecontinuedandstrengthened.However, this may be best confined to areas ofcurrentactivity,ratherthanseekinganoverallco-ordinationfunctioninviewoftherapidchangesinthecountryanddonorenvironment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

UNDPhasplayedanextremelyimportantroleinMontenegroinviewoftheorganization’ssizeandmandate. It is consideredby theevaluation teamtobeatellingstoryoffocusedstrategicintentandthinking, perseverance, finding niches, network-ing, partnering, teamwork and entrepreneurialmanagement. With new statehood, UNDP nowhasanopportunity todecidewhatrole, ifany, itshouldcontinuetoplayinthecountry.

In the team’s opinion, UNDP should continuetobuildonitsstrengths,notablyitsflagshippro-grammeonsustainabledevelopmentandeco-tour-ism.Itshouldseektostrengthenitsstrategicman-

xvi e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y

agement, reducing theportfoliowherenecessary,andensuringthatprogrammesareclearlyalignedwiththeEUaccessionagenda.Themedium-termphasingoutoftheUNDPprogrammeasMonte-negro potentially moves towards ‘net contribut-ingcountry’statusshouldalsobeconsideredandplanned for early on. In more detail, the mainrecommendations specific to Montenegro andUNDP-wideareasfollows:

RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO MONTENEGRO

• Align strategically with Montenegro’s goal of EU accession.DevelopmentpolicyinMon-tenegroisdominatednowandfortheforesee-able future by the needs associated with EUaccession.ThedominantplayersinthisprocesswillcontinuetobeEUentities–theEuropeanAgency for Reconstruction (EAR), its succes-sor,andEUbilateraldonorsastheycollectivelyassistMontenegrointhiscomplexprocess.Thisyear (2006) is expected to be the last year ofEARprogramming,thustheJune2004Memo-randumofUnderstandingbetweentheECandUNDPshouldbeusedasthebasisforworkingout concrete collaborative arrangements. TheGovernmentmaywelllooktoUNDPtoassistinthemobilizationofresourcestomeetarangeofdevelopmentprogrammeimplementationneeds,particularlyinthoseareaswhereUNDPiswellpositioned and is currently providing support.HavingworkedintheEUaccessioncountries,UNDPhassubstantialinstitutionalexperiencesupporting national governments and civil so-ciety in the process of European integration.It could be of great benefit for Montenegro ifUNDP facilitated information exchanges andknowledge sharing with other East-CentralEuropeancountries.

• Use the Sustainable Development Pro-gramme, especially eco-tourism, as a flagship. TheSustainableDevelopmentProgrammeandotherrelatedinitiativesshouldcontinuetobethemainfocusofUNDPprogramminginMonte-negro.TheGovernmenthasindicatedthatUN-DP’smainadvantage in thisbroadsector is ineco-tourisminthecentralandnorthernregionsof thecountry,where there is adisproportion-

ateshareofpoverty,environmentaldegradationandinequitableeconomicdevelopment.UNDPcan support the design and implementationof integrated eco-tourism and related sustain-able development initiatives by balancing andbringingintheinterestsofcivilsocietyandtheprivatesector.

• Support anti-corruption at all levels of pro-gramming.Therecentconferenceonanti-cor-ruption and organized crime in Montenegrorevealed the seriousness of these issues andhowengrainedtheyareinsociety.TheUNDPinMontenegrohasaroletoplayincombatingcorruption,whichcouldrangefromsupportingUNconventionson thesubject to factoring inanti-corruption considerations in programmedesign,performancemeasuresandtargetedca-pacitydevelopment.

• Advocate human development and poverty reduction. UNDP should strengthen its roleasoneofthe leadingadvocates forhumande-velopment andpoverty reduction– issues thattoooftengetagreatdealofpolicyattentionbutlittleinthewayofconcreteaction.Programmesin sustainable development could apply a spe-cialfocusonimpoverishedgeographicareasandmarginalized or vulnerable groups. Moreover,UNDPisinagoodpositiontoadvocatefortheinclusionoftheseissuesinthemacroeconomicdevelopmentagenda.

• Strengthen strategic management and main-tain programme focus.TheUNDPprogrammeinMontenegroisinitsveryearlystages.Indi-vidual programmes supporting such areas aspublicadministrationreformorsustainablede-velopment require a long time to generate re-sults,outcomesorimpacts.AstheUNDPofficegrowsandpossiblybecomesa formalCountryOffice with resident coordinator designation,greaterattentionwillneedtobegiventostra-tegicmanagement.Withoutanyconcretebase-lines or measures of performance, other proxyorqualitativeindicatorsmaybeneededtoassessperformanceoftheoverallcountryprogramme.However,shouldgreaterfundingbecomeavail-able from the EC or other sources, UNDPshould resist becoming the preferred imple-mentingagentsimplybecauseofexpediencyorUNDP’s execution and implementation mo-

e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y xvii

dalities.OneofthemainlessonsthatUNDP-Montenegro learned from the Serbia countryprogrammewastomaintainfocus,andnotgetinvolvedinawiderangeofprogrammessimplybecausefundingmaybeavailable.

• Think early about an exit strategy.TheformerYugoslaviawasafoundingmemberoftheUnitedNationsandaninitialcontributor.Montenegrotodayisamiddle-incomecountrythatcouldsoongraduate to net contributor country status andbeacceptedasacandidateforEUmembership.The argumenthas beenmade thatUNDPes-tablishedapositioninMontenegroandexpand-ed its programmes because it had a legitimaterole to play as a UN agency. Serious thinkingaboutUNDPexitingfromMontenegroshouldcoincidewithitsstrategyforEUaccessionandeconomicdevelopment.Onemechanismtoen-sure that such strategic thinking occurs is toplace a ‘sunset clause’ for theUNDPpresencein Montenegro in the UNDAF and CountryProgrammeDocument,tobereviewedannuallyin the Country Programme Action Plan. Thecurrentprogrammecycleendsin2009,andthismaybeagoodjuncturetoreviewanddecideoncontinuedUNDPpresenceinthecountry.

UNDP-WIDE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bring greater national balance into program-ming. UNDPhasmadesignificantprogressinsupportingpolicyandcapacitydevelopmentinGovernmentandcivilsociety,whileatthesametimebuildingbridgesbetween the two.How-ever, while it is not a major issue at the pres-ent time, there is the risk that future UNDPprogramming and implementation could tiltmoretowardstheNGOsectortooffsetcorruptionor capacity weaknesses in Government. Thiscould produce national imbalances where theroleofGovernment(inpolicy,insomeareasofservicedelivery,orinprogrammemanagement)could be undermined. UNDP might strive inthefuturetoattainagreaterdevelopmentbal-ance in consultationwithandparticipationbyGovernment,thebroadercivilsocietyandpri-vate sector throughsuch initiativesas theUN‘globalcompact’.

• Use partnership as a means to better coordi-nation and capacity development.Atthesec-torallevel,thechallengeforUNDPistostrikea balance between meeting national prioritiesthatmightoftentaketheformofreactive‘quickfixes’,andadvocacyforalong-termapproachtoimprovegovernance.Thenotionofpartnershiporsector-wideapproachestoprogrammingandthe channellingof development assistance canbeusedasameanstoaddressprogrammingandcoordinationproblems.UNDPisinagoodpo-sitiontoprovidecoordinationleadershipintheareas of sustainable development and capacitydevelopment.Attheprogrammeexecutionlev-el,UNDPshouldendeavour touse structuredandcollaborativepartnershipmodalitiesfortheexecution and implementation of projects andprogrammes.UNDPmaywellfindalternativemethodsforprojectandprogrammeimplemen-tation through sub-contract and/or subsidiarypartnership arrangements. This would reducethesizeofitsdirectlycontractedprojectperson-nelwhilespreadingthebenefitsofimplementa-tionandcorrespondingcapacity-buildingtothenon-governmentalandprivatesectors.

• Develop a UNDP policy on net contributor countries. The countries in Eastern EuropeareaspecialcaseforUNDPfromanumberofperspectives. A major differentiating factor indevelopmentanddevelopmentassistanceisthereality and potential of EU membership. Fur-thermore, there is considerable likelihood thatMontenegro and others in the region couldachieve‘netcontributorcountry’statuswithinareasonablyshortperiodoftime.Itcanbetempt-ingtorationalizeanongoingroleforUNDPinsuchsituations.However,UNDPoperationsinMontenegro andother countries of the regionare expensive relative to other regions of theworld,wherescarceUNDPresourcesandtalentmaybebetterdeployed.ItisrecommendedthatUNDP develop a formal policy on its role inEUandEU-candidatecountriesinEasternEu-ropethathaveorareexpectedtosoongraduateto net contributor status. Such a policy wouldguidethedevelopmentofcountryprogrammesand the nature of the UNDP relationship tohostgovernments,theEUandotherparticipat-ingdonors.

xviii e X e C U T I V e S U M M A r Y

1.1 BACkGROUND AND CONTEXT

On21May2006,Montenegrovotedforindepen-denceandwithdrawalfromtheStateUnionwithSerbia,thuscompletingthedissolutionofYugosla-via.Withtheindependencevote,Montenegrohasbecomeanationstate for thefirst timesincetheendofWorldWarI.Governmentinstitutions,in-cludingparliamentaryandjudiciarysystems,wereestablished independently for both republics inthe1990s.Nevertheless,independencewillbringmany other challenges – including internationalrecognition,establishingapresenceontheworldstageaswellasthecontinuedprocessofaccessiontotheEuropeanUnion(EU).

Adecadeofregionalwarfare,interventionbytheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)andtheauthoritarianpoliciesoftheMiloševićregimehadamassivesocial,politicalandeconomicalim-pactonMontenegro.Italsoledtothesuspensionofvirtuallyall internationalcooperationandiso-lated the two remaining republics of Yugoslavia,Serbia and Montenegro, from the internationalcommunity.Thedemocratictransitionsince2000hasbeenshapedbybothSerbiaandMontenegro’slong-term goals of membership in the EU. ForMontenegro, independencewasalsoanambitionofrecentyears,whichisnowagoalfulfilled.

Democraticandeconomicreformshavebeenon-going since the late 1990s, and Montenegro hasachievedadegreeofsuccessinrespecttoeconomicgrowth, political stability, coherent policy evolu-tion, improvements in the legislative frameworkandsocialsectors.However,muchremainstobedoneinthisnewlyindependentstate.

1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

The United Nations Development Programme(UNDP),under itspredecessororganization,hasbeenactiveinYugoslaviasince1952.1Operationsweresuspendedduringthe1990s,andtheUNDPoffice thereonly reopenedofficially in2001.TheUNDPprogrammehas sought to establish itselfasamajorforceinassistinginthestabilizationandgrowthofMontenegroandSerbiaandthereinte-grationofitspeople.Indoingso,UNDPhasbeenworkinginanumberofareas,notablyinbuildingcapacity of non-governmental organizations, ininstitutional,publicadministrativeandjudicialre-form,andinsupportingsustainabledevelopment.

AssessmentsofDevelopmentResults (ADR)areindependent evaluations that assess and validateUNDP’s contributions to development results atthe country level. They seek to ensure UNDP’ssubstantiveaccountabilityasanorganization,pro-videabaseofevidenceforlearningonsubstantivemattersandsupportprogrammingattheCountryOfficelevel.Notallcountriesaresubjecttosuchevaluation; rather, specific countries are chosenwithstrategicpurposesinmind.

Montenegro, under the auspices of the previousstateunionwithSerbia,wasselectedforevaluationin 2005 through an agreement among UNDPsenior management, the Government and theUNDPEvaluationOffice.TheUNDPprogrammeinbothrepublicshadbeenthroughonecompleteCountry Cooperation Framework cycle (2002-2004)andwasrefiningitsnewprogramme(2005-2009) within the context of the broader UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework.NewseniormanagementwasintroducedtotheCountryOffice in November 2005, which presented anopportunity to evaluate the results achievedover

Chapter 1

Introduction

_________________________________________________________________________1.UNDPcameintoexistenceon1January1966,followingUNGeneralAssemblyresolution2029toconsolidatetheExpanded

ProgrammeofTechnicalAssistanceandtheSpecialFundintotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.

2 C h A p T e r 1

the last programming cycle. Furthermore, thepotential forchange in thepolitical statusof theunion,andMontenegro’sindependence,madethisanopportune(ifchallenging)timetoevaluate.

1.3 OBjECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Objectives.Theevaluationhas twoprimaryob-jectives. First, to analyse the extent to whichUNDPhaspositioned itself strategically inbothrepublicstoaddvalueinresponsetonationalneedsandchangesinthenationaldevelopmentcontext.Inparticular,theevaluationaimstoidentifyhowUNDPhas supported thepriority goal of acces-sion to the European Union. Second, the evalu-ationprovidesanoverallassessmentofthedevel-opmentresultsachievedthroughUNDPsupportand in partnership with other key developmentactors since2001,withaviewto results thatareontracktobeachievedduringthecurrentcoun-tryprogrammeperiod (through2009).Basedonan analysis of positioning and achievements, theevaluation seeks to present major findings, drawkey lessons, and provide clear, forward-lookingrecommendations for pragmatic strategies thatmightbe consideredbyUNDPandpartners to-wardsintendedresultsinthefuture.

Scope and issues addressed. The scope of theevaluation−itscoverageandfocus−wasdefinedthrough extensive stakeholder consultations con-ductedduringthepreliminaryphaseoftheassess-ment.Thesefindings,inturn,wereframedundertheoverallobjectivesofevaluatingstrategicposi-tioninganddevelopmentresults,and in termsofcoordination,complementarityandsustainability.

In terms of UNDP’s strategic positioning, theevaluationconcentratesonthreeareas:

• Strategic intent.Hastheorganization’slong-terminvolvementplayedanyroleinitscurrentpres-ence in the country? Did its re-entry in 2001reflectastrategicresponsetospecificeventsand

needs?Howisitperceivedinthislightbyvari-ousdevelopmentpartners?

• Governance.1UNDPhasbeenconsistent in itscommitment to government capacity-build-ingatboththestateunionandrepubliclevels.Hasthenichedevelopedinthedeliveryofgov-ernance programmes been recognized by thegovernmentsanddonors?IsUNDPseenasthemost appropriate agency to provide these ser-vices?IsitsapproachappropriateinthecontextofchangefactorssuchasthefutureoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro?DoesaroleremainforUNDPinrespecttobuildingacon-stituency for change and capacity-building fortheGovernmenttodealwiththeseissues,basedonUNDP’swidelyperceivedneutrality?

• Sustainable development. UNDP Montenegrohasastrongfocusonsupportingtherepublic’scommitmenttobecomeanecologicalstate.Howhasitdistinguisheditselfasacontactpointforthe delivery of programmes that support this?Areitscurrentinterventions,manyatthepilotstage,sustainable,andhowaretheygoingtobescaledup?

TheapproachtoassessingthedevelopmentresultsachievedorcontributedtobyUNDPisbasedonthe standard evaluation criteria2 of effectiveness,efficiency and sustainability of programme com-ponents.Inaddition,itlooksatcomplementarity,ownershipandcoordination:

• Effectivenessisassessedbyjudgingtheextenttowhichspecificobjectiveswereachieved,orareexpected to be achieved, taking into accounttheirrelativeimportance,thequalityofpartner-ships,andthetimelinessofresponsetolessons.

• Efficiency3attheleveloftheoverallcountrypro-gramme is considered in termsof the applica-tion of strategic resource mobilization in pro-grammes.

_________________________________________________________________________1.Governancefocusesprimarilyontheareaofpublicadministrationreform.2.Theremainingstandardevaluationcriterion,‘impact’,hasnotbeencovered.TheassessmentofUNDP’simpactrelatestothe

fundamentalquestionofwhatresultshavebeenachievedand,beyondthis,whatdifferencehasbeenmadebytheseresults.SincetheADRdoesnotincludeacomprehensiveprimarysurveyoftheeffectofallinterventions,norlooksoverasufficientperiodoftimetodeterminesuchchange,thiscriterionhasbeenleftout.

3.ThelimitedresourcesavailablefortheADR,thelackofdataonprogrammeinputcosts,andthelackofmarketcomparisonsmeantthattheteamcouldnotundertakeafinancialoreconomiccost-benefitanalysisoftheUNDPportfolio.

I N T r o d U C T I o N 3

• Complementarity among and between projects,clustersandoperationalunitsisassessedaspartofoverallperformance.Linkagesareconsideredbothvertically,betweentheorganization’sworkatthecentralandlocal(community)levelsandhorizontally,acrosssectorsandprogrammes.

• Sustainabilityreferstowhethertheorganizationisdevelopingpermanentstructures,proceduresandprofessionalcadrewithininstitutions.Isitbuildinglong-termcapacityorisitbuildingca-pacitytodeliverparticularprojects?

• Ownership. Capacity-building relates to issuesof national ownership of programmes. MostUNDPprogrammesinMontenegroaredirectlyexecuted(DEX).Whathasthismeantforthenationalownershipoftheprogrammessupport-ed?Whatdoesitimplyfordirectversusnationalexecutionmodalitiesinthefuture?

• Coordination.UNDPinMontenegroispartofabroaderUnitedNationsCountryTeam.Howhascoordinationfaredamongtheagenciesandwhat are the implications for the effective de-

liveryofprogrammes,jointandalone?Hastheresidentcoordinatorfunction,localizedinBel-grade,playedaneffectivecatalyst inbrokeringstronger partnerships in supporting the coun-try’sprogresstowardsEUaccession?

1.4 METHODOLOGY

Thedesignoftheevaluationmethodologyisbasedontheobjectivesandscope identifiedduringtheconsultations, and a subsequent review of pro-grammeevaluability,whichaddressed the extentto which the structures and data streams enablethe programme to be evaluated effectively (seeBox1).Basedonthereviewfindings,andinlinewiththeEvaluationOffice’sADRmethodologicalguidelines,theanalyticaltoolsandtechniquesareasfollows:

• Documentation review: An initial compila-tion of documents was followed by extensivereviewsofthebreadthandqualityofdatafromsecondary sources. This was broadened duringtheprocesstoincludereviewsofnationalplan-

Box 1: Evaluability Review

Areviewofthequalityofprogrammeobjectivesandstrategies,existenceandqualityofmonitoringandevaluationdata,evaluationreportsandexternalstudieswasconductedduringthestart-upphaseoftheevaluation.Thereviewmadeanumberofobservations:

Results Linkages

n overallcountryprogrammeobjectivesarereasonablywelldefinedinthemacrodocuments(CountryCooperationFramework,UNdevelopmentAssistanceFramework,CountryprogrammeActionplan),althoughsomewhatambitious.

n Theclarityandconsistencyofproject-levelobjectives,designindicatorsandmonitoringsystemsvaryconsiderably.

n Thereisreasonableavailabilityofdataonnationallevelchangeandindividualprojectactivitiesandoutputs,butlittlethatlinksthetwo.

Evaluations

n overtwothirdsofthecountryprogramme(includingSerbia)hasbeencoveredbyexternalevaluation,addressingallthemajorcomponents.

n Thequalityandcredibilityoftheseevaluationsaregenerallyhigh,andthusserveasastrongevidencebaseforperformance.

n Theseevaluationvaryintheirfocusandapproach;theyarethereforenotstrictlycomparable,andag-gregateassessmentsofresultsmaybechallenging.

4 C h A p T e r 1

ningdocuments,donorreportsandthelike,andwasfedintotheevaluationasbothguidingandvalidatingmaterial.Annex3 contains a listofdocumentsthatwerereferenced.

• Meta-analysis of external evaluations:Twelveoutcomeandprojectevaluations,sevenexternalreviews,andaprojectauditandpartnersurveywereusedasthebasisuponwhichprogrammeperformance was considered and cross-refer-enced with internal monitoring data (drawnfromtheResults-orientedAnnualReport,proj-ect reports, a country programme review andglobalstaffsurvey)andvalidatedthroughsemi-structuredinterviews.

• Semi-structured stakeholder interviews: Through extensive semi-structured interviewsofacross-sectionofstakeholders,primarydatawas gathered on upstream issues (such as theeffects of policy and advisory work, advocacy,etc.).Theinterviewsalsoservedtovalidatethefindings of programme evaluations and self-assessments. The selection of interviewees wasbasedonamappingexercisetoensureabalancebetween internal knowledge and views andexternalperspectives.AninitiallistwasdrawnupbytheevaluationteamwiththeassistanceoftheCountryOffice.Thislistwasrevisedseveraltimestoensurethisbalanceandwasaugmentedduringthemainmissionthroughvariousleadsestablished.Themainmission,whichtookplaceover the course of three weeks in December2005,wasdividedbetweenPodgorica,BelgradeandVranje(southernSerbia),withaone-weekfollow-upmissiontoBelgradeinJanuary2006.This mission was central to primary data-gathering and validation. In total, 75 personswereinterviewedinrelationtotheMontenegroprogramme.1 The list of interviewees can befoundinAnnex2.

Thus,theprincipalmethodologiescomprisedsec-ondarydatareviewandsemi-structuredinterviews

for primary data-collection and validation. Theevaluation team considered but rejected carryingoutadditionalsurveywork,sincetheyconcludeditwouldnotaddvalue.2Thefour-personevaluationteamcomprisedthreeinternationalconsultants(ateam leader, principal consultant and secondaryconsultant/researcher),andtheUNDPEvaluationOfficetaskmanager.Theevaluationitselfwascon-ductedbetweenJuly2005andMay2006.

1.5 LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS AND DEPENDENCIES

Limitations to the analysis. While the evalua-tivebasefortheassessmentwasstrong,gapswerefoundbothforthepurposesofcross-comparison,andtoattributereliablytohigher-orderresultsandimpacts. The non-availability of certain govern-mentpersonnelandrepresentativesoftheprivatesectoralsoreducedtheintendedbalanceininter-viewees.

Analytical and reporting structure. Theestablish-mentoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegrocreatedafederationoftwodistinctentities,Serbiaand Montenegro, respectively, sharing a limitednumberof competencies at the state union level.Inmostrespects,thetwoconstituentelementsoftheunionoperateasseparateentities.UNDPde-signed its programmes to support the particularneedsofeach republic.Hence, thedifferences infocusofUNDP’soperationsinthetwoconstituentelementssuggestthattheADRhastotreatSerbiaandMontenegroseparatelyfromthepointofviewof the overall purpose, intended outcomes andstrategicpositioningofUNDP’sprogrammes.TheprogrammesinMontenegrostartedmorerecentlythanthoseinSerbia.Consequently,theADRwasmanagedasoneevaluationwithseparatecompo-nentsforSerbiaandMontenegro.Withindepen-dence,thetwocomponentshavebeencleavedandproducedastwoseparatereports.

__________________________________________________________________________1.Thestakeholdergroupsweredefinedasfollows:NGOs,privatesector(chambersofcommerce,entrepreneurs,etc.);others

(journalists,tradeunions,etc.);donors/internationaldevelopmentpartners(fundingandnotfundingUNDP);Government(lineministries,aidcoordinationunitsandchiefpolicymakers);UNagencies(seniorandprogrammestaff );UNDP(management,programmeandprojectstaff ).

2.Theassessmentofevaluabilityconcludedthatthemajorityofcriticalareaswithinthescopeoftheevaluationhavestrongorfairevidence,oraresufficientlystructuredtoenableappropriatedatatobegatheredthroughthemethodsdescribedabove.


Kosovo.KosovoisadministrativelyapartofSerbia,buthasbeenundermandatedUNadministrationsince 1999. Kosovo was included in the Decem-ber2001FirstCountryCooperationFrameworkforYugoslavia(2002-2004)andintheJune2004Country Programme Document for Serbia andMontenegro(2005-2009).However,UNinvolve-mentinKosovohas,incooperationwithmanybi-lateralandmultilateraldonors,givenrisetoalargenumber of assistance programmes that are quiteseparate from the programmes implemented un-dertheauspicesoftheCountryOfficeinBelgrade.Consequently,theMarch2004UNDevelopmentAssistanceFramework for theperiod2005-2009doesnot refer toKosovo.1For these reasons, theADRshallnotincludeanassessmentofdevelop-mentresultsrelatedtoUNDP-sponsoredandim-plementedprogrammesinKosovo.

Period and cut-off date. AlthoughUNDPanditspredecessororganizationhavebeenpresentinYu-goslaviaforover50years,thecurrentprogrammescan be held to have emerged with the establish-mentofUNDP’sCountryOfficein2001.Itwasatthistimethatthegeneraldirectionofcurrentpro-grammingwasdeveloped.ThepresentADRshallthereforecovertheperiod2001tothepresent,butdrawonpreviouseventsandfindingswheretheybearrelevancetotheexistingprogramme.Becausean accurate assessment of resources deployed re-quiresaformalcut-offdateforfinancialinforma-tion,thecut-offdatewassetat31January2006.However, in view of rapidly changing circum-stances,someinformationafterthisdatehasbeenincluded.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

The UNDP programmes for the two republicsformingtheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontene-gro are, in many respects, two separate ‘republic(country) programmes’. This report presents theADRforMontenegro,whichisbrokendownintothefollowingsections:

Chapter 1isanintroduction.

Chapter 2describesthenational contextspecifictotherepublic,outliningthemainde-velopmentchallengesandpriorities.

Chapter 3presentstheUNDP programming and positioning context,anddescribesthestrategies UNDP developed and im-plementedovertheperiod2001–2005.

Chapter 4provides an assessment of develop-ment results for each of the mainprogrammes and projects for whichthere exists reasonable documentaryevidence. The main programmes arecovered, and these are organized forthemostpartintotheexisting‘cluster’structureoftheUNDPLiaisonOfficein Podgorica. Other aspects of pro-grammeperformance,suchascoordi-nation,arecoveredinthissection.

Chapter 5examines the programme portfolio (growthandothermetrics)andman-agementoftheprogrammesintheLi-aisonOffice, includingorganizationalstructure,deliverymodalitiesandper-formancereporting.

Chapter 6presents summary conclusions andmain lessonsandrecommendations.

TheannexescontaintheADRtermsofreferenceanddetailedsupportingdata.Thefollowingsub-sectionpresentsabriefoverviewandsummaryofUNDPprogrammingatthestateunionlevel.

1.7 NOTE ON THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro wasproclaimedon4February2003aftera ‘BelgradeAgreement’ between Serbia and Montenegro in2002totransformatwo-republicentity,theFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia,2intoalooserandpo-tentially temporary union of two equal memberstates.TheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro

__________________________________________________________________________1.AsstatedintheCountryProgrammeDocument2005-2009,noformalUNDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkhasbeenpre-

paredforKosovo.Instead,theUNDevelopmentGroupinKosovowillbeguidedbybi-annualstrategicplans,whichprovidetheframeworkforcoordinatedUNdevelopmentassistance.

2.TheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasestablishedin1992duringthebreakdownofYugoslavia(discussedinADRSerbia,Chapter2).

6 C h A p T e r 1

wasnotasuccessorstatetotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,butanewstateand“a single personal-ity in international law”(Article14oftheConsti-tutionalCharter).TheaimsoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroweretoupholdtheprin-ciplesofhumanrights,tocreateamarketeconomyandcommonmarketonitsterritoryandtojointheEuropeanUnion.Belgrade,thecapitaloftheRe-public ofSerbia,was an administrative centre ofthe State Union with seats of the Assembly, thepresidencyandthefiveministries.TheCourtwasseatedinPodgorica,Montenegro’scapitalcity.

The relations between the State Union of SerbiaandMontenegroanditsmemberstatesweregov-ernedbytheConstitutionalCharter.TheConsti-tutional Charter, article 60, stipulated that afterthreeyearsfromtheinceptionoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro,“member states shall have the right to initiate the proceedings for the change in its state status and for breaking away from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.”Montenegroex-ercisedthisright,andon21May2006,inarefer-endum,votedforindependence,thusmakingtheStateUnionobsoleteandcompletingthedissolu-tionofYugoslavia.

FollowingtheConstitutionalCharter,SerbiawillbecomeasuccessorstateandhasarighttoassumetheinternationalpersonalityoftheStateUnionofSerbia and Montenegro. Serbia will also assumeobligationspertainingtotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia– inparticular,UNSecurityCouncilresolution1244regardingtheprovinceofKosovothat,since1999,hasbeenadministeredbytheUNInterimMissioninKosovo.

1.7.1 IMPACT OF THE STATE UNION

The establishment of the State Union was a ne-gotiatedprocessbetweenSerbiaandMontenegro,andtheConstitutionalCharterreflectedthepecu-liarityofrelationsbetweenthetwomemberstates.Theunionhasbeendesignedtoadministertheserelations.ThetemporaryarrangementoftheStateUnion of Serbia and Montenegro weakened theimpactof stateunion institutions from the start,and created an environment of uncertainty over

thecountry’sfuture.Longbeforethereferendum,the anticipation of this event and a potential forbreakdownoftheunionhadeffectivelystalledac-tivities at the state union level and strengthenedthe commitment of the republics to pursue theirdomesticandinternationalaffairsseparately.

TheSerbiaandMontenegronationalgovernmentsdevelopeddomesticandinternationalpoliciesbestsuitedtotheirnationalneedsandpriorities.Uponentry into the union, each republic retained itsstatestructureswiththerepublic’sownpresidency,legislatureandjudicialsystem.Inadditiontotheministriesatthestateunionlevel,bothstateshadtheir ministries for international economic rela-tions.MontenegroalsohadaseparateMinistryofForeignAffairsandMinistryofNationalMinori-tiesandEthnicGroups,whiletheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro’sMinistryofHumanandMinority Rights had been responsible for bothstateunionandSerbianaffairs.Atthesametime,the state frameworks of the republics remainedincomplete: Although required by the Constitu-tionalChartertodraftnewconstitutions,neitherMontenegronorSerbiahavedoneso.

1.7.2 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: TWO-TRACk APPROACH

In response to the arrangements of the StateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroanditsmemberstates, international organizations adjusted theirpoliciestoreflectthedominantroleplayedbythenational governments in policy-making. A two-track approach was developed to provide for theimplementation of one policy, but through sepa-ratemeasurestailoredtotheneedsofbothSerbiaandMontenegro.

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro anditsmember states shared thegoalofaccession tothe European Union. Since only internationallyrecognized independent states can be admitted,theEU– recognizing that sufficientpolitical re-formshavetakenplaceinSerbiaandMontenegrotostartnegotiationsontheStabilizationandAs-sociationAgreement1–formallyopenedtalkswith

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheEuropeanUnionandSouthEastEuropeStabilizationandAssociationProcessproposedby theCommission inMay

1999.ItcoversAlbania,BosniaandHerzegovina,Croatia(candidatecountry),TheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia(candidatecountry)andSerbiaandMontenegro,includingKosovo.ThegeopoliticalrationaleisthestabilizationoftheregionandgradualrapprochementwiththeEuropeanUnion.See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union,Brussels2005.


theStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroinOc-tober2005.Atthesametime,itinitiatedseparatesectoral talksontheagreementwithbothSerbiaandMontenegro.TheWorldBankandtheInter-nationalMonetaryFundusedasimilar,two-trackapproachinpreparationofthePovertyReductionStrategyPapersbySerbiaandMontenegro,witheachrepublicdraftinganationaldocument.1

1.7.3 UNDP PROGRAMMES

Sincethere-openingoftheUNDPCountryOf-ficein2001,2thefocusofUNDPprogrammesinSerbia andMontenegrohas been at thenationaland subnational levels of the two republics. The Country Cooperation Framework for Yugosla-via (2002-2004) reflected the emphasis that theCountry Office placed on the stabilization anddemocratizationprocessesinSerbiaandactivitiessupportingtheenvironmentsectorinMontenegro.Infact,theUNDPStrategicNote2002anticipat-edapotentiallyviolentbreakdownoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia.

As that fear did not materialize, and after theStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegrowasfound-edin2003,theUNDPCountryOfficeestablishedcooperation with its administration and imple-mented institutional development programmes atthe State Union’s ministries under the CapacityBuildingFund.

The Country Programme Document (2005-2009)andtheCountry Programme Action Plan,signed jointly by the Government of the StateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroandtheGovern-mentsofthetworepublicsinJuly2005,reflectedcontinued UNDP commitment to building stateunion institutions to improve “efficiency, account-ability and transparency in governance structures.”3However,inlightofthereferendumandapotentialbreak-upoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMonte-negro,UNDPdidnotdevelopnewprogrammesatthestateunionlevel.

__________________________________________________________________________1.ThePovertyReductionStrategyPaperprocessandUNDPsupportforitisdiscussedinChapter4.4.2.UNDPstrategicpositioninginSerbiaandMontenegroisdiscussedindetailinChapter3.3.CountryProgrammeDocument2005-2009,p.4.

� C h A p T e r 1

Sincethebreak-upofYugoslaviain1991,Monte-negrohasfacedpoliticalandeconomictransitions,regionalconflict,economicsanctionsandNATOinterventions.1Montenegrinscontinue tosufferamajoridentitycrisis,withopiniondividedwithre-spect to the independent status of the Republic.Withinthiscontext,twostrategicobjectiveshavebeendrivingreform:theEUaccessionprocessandindependence.2006isacriticalyearfortherepub-lic.Asof 21May, the independenceprocesshasbegun.2 As this process unfolds, along with thechallengeofacceding to theEU, theprogressofMontenegro towards modern liberal democracywilllargelydependonitsabilitytoeffectivelypur-suereform.

2.1 POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

Montenegrin statehood over the past century.The independence of Montenegro from Turkeywas established in the Treaty of San Stefano in1878. Later that year, Montenegro was formallyrecognizedbyalltheleadingEuropeanpowersattheConferenceofBerlin.ThisindependencewaslostattheendofWorldWarI,whenastrongas-pirationtounifywithSerbialedtothecreationoftheKingdomofSerbs,CroatsandSlovenes,laterrenamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. With thedissolutionofYugoslaviainthe1990s,theideaofstatehoodforMontenegrore-emerged,althoughareferendumheld in1992foundthatover95per-centofcitizenswereinfavourofremainingwithintheFederalRepublic.Thedebatecametothefore

againin1997,afterthesplitoftherulingpartyinMontenegro.3 But this was overshadowed in theinternationalarenabythefocusontheMiloševićregime.“With the demise of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and the change of administra-tion in Belgrade in autumn 2000, an extraordinary period in Montenegrin history came to an end. Since then…the political landscape has been transformed. As political changes in Belgrade reduce Montenegro’s strategic importance to the West, donor priorities are changing and Montenegro can no longer count on ex-ternal subsidies continuing at the extraordinary level of the past years….This significant foreign aid pack-age succeeded in its primary objective – strengthening Podgorica in its confrontation with Belgrade – but did little to promote change within Montenegro.”(Reportof theEuropeanStabilityInitiative,2001).Since2000,internationalassistancetoMontenegrohasbeendecreasing,thoughitremainsatahighlevelrelativetoitssize.Theyear2006hasbeenmarkedwith another historical change in Montenegro.Montenegrinstatehoodhasbeenrestoredasaresultofthereferendumonindependence.ThechallengesofenteringtheinternationalarenaarenowbroughttotheforefrontoftheMontenegrinGovernment,along with already set EU accession priorities.For additional background on Montenegro, seeBox2.

A decade of change. Thepastdecadehasbeenchar-acterizedbyfrequentelectionsatbothnationalandlocallevels,fracturedrelationsbetweentheoppo-sitionandtherulingcoalition,andamajordividein societyover the future statusof theRepublic.Since winning the 1998 parliamentary elections,

N A T I o N A l C h A l l e N g e S A N d S T r A T e g I e S �

Chapter 2

National Challenges and Strategies

__________________________________________________________________________1.Montenegrodidnotdeclareastateofwar,asdidSerbia,duringthe1999Kosovocrisis,andremainedfairlyneutral.Still,

therewereseveralNATOinterventionsinMontenegroin1999sincefacilitiesoftheYugoslavarmywerescatteredacrossitsterritory.

2.Atthetimeofwritingtheresulthadnotbeenofficiallyratified.Whileclearedas‘freeandfair’bythestateelectioncommis-sion,andacceptedbytheSerbiangovernment,themainoppositionpartyrequestedarecount.InaccordancewiththeMonte-negrinLawonReferendum,thefinalresultswillbeissuedon3June.

3.Themajorrulingparty(DPS)andthemajoroppositionparty(SNP)inMontenegrousedtobeoneparty,thedirectsuccessortotheMontenegrinCommunistPartythatsplitin1997.

theDemocraticPartyofSocialists(DPS)hasbeenthemostsignificantplayerontheMontenegrinpo-liticalscene,holdingboththepositionsofpresidentandprimeminister.Extraordinaryparliamentaryelections in April 2001 resulted in MontenegrohavingaminorityGovernmentforthefirsttimeintenyears.The ‘Victory forMontenegro’coalitionoftheDPSofPresidentMiloĐjukanovićandtheSocial-Democratic Party (SDP) gained sufficientseatsthroughamergingwiththeLiberalAllianceofMontenegro(LSCG).1

Thesigningofthe‘BelgradeAgreement’inMarch2002ontheredefinitionofrelationsbetweenSer-biaandMontenegrohadaconsiderableimpactonthedomesticpoliticsofMontenegro,inparticularthe pro-independence parties. The LSCG with-drew its support for the Government and joinedforceswithitsformeropponents,themainparlia-mentaryopposition andpro-federation ‘TogetherforYugoslavia’ toensure thepassingofamotion

ofno-confidence in theprimeminister.Thepar-liamentary alliance of LSCG and ‘Together forYugoslavia’–knownasthe‘NewMajority’–votedfor the early dissolution of Parliament, and thenewparliamentaryelections2wereheldinOctober2002,followedbyearlypresidentialelections.3Thenew Government of Montenegro became opera-tionalinJanuary2003.4Theoutcomeoftheelec-tions showedagain the seriousdivide inMonte-negrin societybetweenpro-independencepartiesandthosefavouringcontinuedunionwithSerbia.

New political developments. The political envi-ronmentinMontenegrohasrecentlybeensubjectto considerable change, with the dissolution oftheoldLiberalAllianceandemergenceofanewLiberalParty,andanewplayeremergingfromthecivilsocietyrealm,anon-governmentalorganiza-tion(NGO)calledtheGroupforChanges(GZP).TheGZP,comprisedofacademicsandcitizensdis-satisfiedwith theexistingpolitical spectrum,are

__________________________________________________________________________1.AtraditionalopponentoftheGovernmentbutonthesamepoliticalwavelengthwithrespecttotheissueofindependence.2.Allparliamentaryandlocalelectionssince1998weregenerallyconductedinaccordancewithinternationalcommitmentsand

standardsfordemocraticelections.3. “Montenegro, after a real electoral marathon, managed to get, in the third attempt, the third head of state in the 13-year long history of

the multi-party system. As was the case with both republic prime ministers, the third president comes from the party which has, in almost the last decade and a half, alone or in coalitions, completely dominated political life in Montenegro. In fact, both prime ministers and the last two presidents of the Republic are the same persons, who simply swapped their positions in the system of rule currently valid in Mon-tenegro.”(Source:CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights.April-June2003.TransitioninMontenegro.ReportNo.18.)

4.AcoalitionoftheDPSandtheSDPsecured48percentofthevoteand39seatswhileacoalitionoftheSocialistPeople’sParty(SNP), theSerbianPeople’sParty(SNS),andthePeople’sParty(NS)took38percentand30seats.Sincethen, theMontenegro’srulingcoalition(DPS-SDP)hasheldadominantposition.

10 C h A p T e r 2

Box 2: Montenegro at a Glance

on21May2006,MontenegrovotedforindependenceandwithdrawalfromthestateunionwithSerbia.priortothistime,MontenegrowasaconstituentrepublicwithintheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro.Montenegro’sterritorycovers13,812squarekilometres(approximatelyonesixththatofSerbia),andhasapopulationof620,145inhabitants(lessthanonetenththatofSerbia).

Montenegrosharesabordertothesouth-eastwithAlbania,tothesouthwithItalythroughtheAdriaticSea,tothewestwithCroatiaandBosniaandherzegovina,andtothenorthwithSerbia.Therepublicisdividedinto21localgovernmentunits,outofwhich1�aremunicipalities,oneisthehistoriccapital(Cetinje),andoneistheadministrativecapital(podgorica).

TheethniccompositionispredominantlyMontenegrinandSerbian,withlessthen30percentBosnian,Alba-nian,Croatianandothers.Montenegro’s2003censusrecordedadramaticchangeintheethnicstructureofMontenegro,notablyintheproportionofethnicMontenegrinstoethnicSerbs.The1��1censusindicatedaratioofMontenegrinstoSerbsof61percentto�percent,respectively,whilethe2003censusindicatedaratioof40percentto30percent.

The1��2ConstitutiondeclaredMontenegrotobeademocratic,socialandecologicalstate.

N A T I o N A l C h A l l e N g e S A N d S T r A T e g I e S 11

Box 3: Popular Opinion is Positive on European Integration

Theresultsofadecember2005publicopinionpollinMontenegrooneuropeanintegrationrevealedthefol-lowing:over42percentofMontenegrinssurveyedsaidthattheeuropeanUnionwastheirmosttrustedin-stitution,aftertheSerbianorthodoxChurch,whichwasatthetopofthelistof58percentofthosesurveyed.Nearly44percentofcitizenssaidthattheirknowledgeoftheeUwassatisfactory.ThesupportofcitizenstoincludeeducationabouttheeUinprimaryandsecondaryschoolsisaround81percent.Morethan45percentofthosesurveyedsaidtheyfeelMontenegrowillachieveeUmembershipfasterasanindepen-dentstate,andnearly36percentfeltthattheprocesswouldbequickerinunionwithSerbia.Themajority(71percent)ratedtheirinformationabouttheStabilizationandAssociationprocessasaverage,while17percentbelievetheyarenotinformedatall.ThemostcommonwaytoreceiveinformationabouttheeUisthroughtelevisionandradio.Themajorityofcitizens(81percent)saidthateUmembershipwillbegoodforMontenegro.

Source:TheMonitoringCentre-CeMI,december2005

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheprimarypublicopinionpollinMontenegrohasillustratedincreasingpublicconfidenceintheleaderoftheGZP,Nebojša

Medojević,placinghimasthemosttrustedofallpoliticiansandpublicfiguresin2004and2005.Thecurrentprimeministercameinthirdin2004,andsecondin2005(Source:CEDEM,2004/2005).

2.CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights(CEDEM)PublicOpinionPolls,www.cedem.cg.yu.

Figure 1: Public Opinion on Independence (prior to referendum)

50

45

40

35

30

2003 2004 May05 dec.05

AgainstFor

positioningthemselvesasanewalternativetothecurrentpoliticalestablishment.ThecurrentpublicopinionpollsestimatethattheGroupforChangesmaybeadecisivefactor inthenextgeneralelec-tionswithapossibilityofchangingthestatusquocharacterizingMontenegrinsocietyformorethanadecade.1ThenextparliamentaryelectionstobeheldinOctober2006willbeanothergreatchal-lengeforMontenegrindemocracyandwilldeter-minewhetherthecurrentDPS-SDPGovernmentwillremaininpower.

Independence. The Montenegrin Government’smajorgoalfor2006–tobecomeanindependentstate–hasbeenrealized.Thetrendinpublicopin-

ionon independencehasoscillatedover thepastthreeyears(seeFigure1),2butwithaturnoutof86percentatthe21Mayreferendum,thefinalresultfound55.5percentinfavourofindependence,justpassing the threshold of 55 percent agreed uponwith the European Union. The result was con-firmedon3June,whenMontenegro’sParliamentproclaimedtheRepublicofMontenegroindepen-dentbyadoptingadecisionandadeclarationonindependence. In both of these documents it isstatedtheRepublicofMontenegrowilltakeoverallthecompetenciesthatusedtobeundertheStateUnionandwillacceptalltheprinciplesandrespectalltheobligationsalreadystatedinthedocumentsoftheUN,CouncilofEuropeandtheOSCEas

perc

ent

wellasotherinternationalorganizations,initiatingtheprocedureformembershipintheseorganiza-tions(seeBox3onattitudesconcerningEuropeanintegration).

The economy. Prior to the conflict and isolationofYugoslaviaduringthemid-1990s,Montenegrowas relatively well integrated within the worldeconomy, with a higher standard of living thanother countries in Eastern Europe. The conflictandsubsequentbreak-upoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,combinedwitheconomicmisman-agement, resulted inhyperinflationanda virtualcollapseoftheeconomy.By2000,GDPpercapitaincomes had fallen to less that one half of their1989levels,withthecountryexperiencingchronichigh inflation. Since 1990, absolute poverty hasdoubled. Over the same period, unemploymentroseby50percent.Between1990and2002,im-portsnearlydoubledandexportswerereducedby65percent.1Insteadofboostingeconomicgrowth,unconditional foreign assistance up until 2000“…preserved a political economy based on heavy indus-

try, a bloated administration and a large security ap-paratus.”2IntroductionoftheGermanmarkasthenewcurrencyduringthatperiodwasconsideredavery effective economicmeasure.Later,with thechange of the EU monetary policy, the Germanmarkwassubstitutedbytheeuro,makingMonte-negrotheonlynon-EUcountrythatusestheeuroasitsofficialcurrency.

In January 2001, Montenegro embarked on anambitious programme aimed at rapid transitionto a market economy, the normalization of rela-tionswithforeigncreditors,andintegrationwithregional, EU and world markets. As Table 1 il-lustrates, thishas yieldedmoderate success,withagrowthrateof3.3percent,controloverinflationandareductioninunemployment.

Despitethisimprovement,anumberofmacroeco-nomicandstructuralreformsarerequiredto:3

• Boost economic growth to improve living standards. Although the annual populationgrowthratehasaveraged0.5percentayear,per

12 C h A p T e r 2

__________________________________________________________________________1.GovernmentofMontenegro.November2003.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy.2.Inaddition,thecostofsupportinggovernmentadministrationabsorbedtwothirdsoftheMontenegrinbudget,whichwasmet

onlythroughmassiveandunconditionalforeignassistance.In1999and2000,theEUandtheUnitedStatespledgedsomeDM485millioninassistancetoMontenegro,andanotherDM280millionfor2001.(Source:EuropeanStabilityInitiative,2001,p.ii).

3.TheWorldBank.June2005.MontenegroEconomicMemorandum(MEM),APolicyAgendaforGrowthandCompetitiveness.

Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators for Montenegro

Macroeconomic Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

grossdomesticproductinmillionsofeuros(currentprices)

1,022.20 1,244.80 1,301.50 1,433.00 1,535.00

population 612,4�6 614,7�1 617,085 618,233 620,706

gdppercapitaineuros(currentprices) 1,668.�1 2,024.75 2,10�.11 2,317.�0 2,473.00

realgdpgrowthrate(%) 3.10 -0.20 1.70 2.30 3.70

publicexpenditure(%ofgdp) 1�.5� 27.00 26.58

Inflationretailpriceindex(%) 24.8 28.0 �.40 6.70 4.30

Unemploymentrate(%) 32.7 31.5 30.45 25.82 22.6

humandevelopmentIndex 0.764 0.772 0.777 0.7�1 0.7��

Sources: MontenegroeconomicreformAgenda(2002-2007)and Human Development Report 2004

capita incomegrewbyonly1.3percent a yearoverthe2000−2004period.

• Reduce unemployment and enhance job cre-ation. The limited economic recovery has notbeen accompanied by growth in employment.Registered employment declined in 2004 andunemployment remained high (at 23 percent).As a result, approximately 12 percent of citi-zensfellbelowtheconsumptionpovertylinesof2003.

• Increase competitiveness, especially in view of the goal of EU accession. Montenegro hasbecomelesscompetitiveoverthelastfouryears,withamuchmorerapidincreaseinlabourcom-pensation than in productivity. With this de-clineincompetitiveness,themainpotentialforgrowth,tourism1,hassuffered.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

Thepolitical isolation, insecurityanduncertaintyexperiencedinMontenegroduringthe1990shada negative impact on human development. Dur-ing thisperiod, thecollapseof theeconomy, theinfluxofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons,‘brain-drain’, socialdisintegrationandchallenges

to identityhaveall servedto limitpeople’s rangeofchoices,affectingsomesegmentsofthepopula-tion more than others. Overcoming poverty andinequality,andreachingthestandardsofaneco-logical statewill remain challenges toMontene-gro’sdevelopment.

2.2.1 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Asawhole,Montenegroisintheupper-mediumcategoryofhumandevelopment.ItsHumanDe-velopment Index (HDI) valueof 0.785 (2003) iscomparabletoanumberofothercountriesintheregion,notablyBulgaria(0.796),theRussianFed-eration(0.795),TheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia (0.793) and Bosnia and Herzegovina(0.781),butbelowthatofanumberofothertransi-tioncountries,suchasSlovenia(0.895),theCzechRepublic (0.868), Slovakia (0.842) and Croatia(0.830).2

Based on the estimates of the 2005 Montenegro Human Development Report (Figure 2), humandevelopment, as measured by the HDI, was al-most the same in1991 as in2003,with a sharpdeclinein1999andagradualrecoveryafterwards.Between1991and2003,therewasaslightfallinaverage lifeexpectancy(from75.2to73.1years).


__________________________________________________________________________1.A2005studybytheWorldTravelandTourismCouncilrevealedthatthecontributionoftourismtoMontenegro’seconomy

wasabout8.5percentoftotalGDPand9.1percentoftotalemploymentin2005,suggestingevenmorerapidgrowthinthefuture.However,aspointedoutbytheWorldBank,giventhesmallsizeofMontenegro’sdomesticmarket,itsfuturegrowthandprosperitywilldependtoalargeextentonwhetheritcandevelopitstourismindustryinasustainableandenvironmentallyresponsibleway.

2.TheHDIscoresforothercountriesweretakenfrom2002.(Source:Montenegro Human Development Report, 2005.)

Figure 2: Human Development Index value for Montenegro

0.8

0.75

0.78�

0.7540.75�

0.766

0.771

0.785

1��1 1�� 2000 2001 2002 2003

However,thegrowthoftheHDIafter1999waspredominantlyinfluencedbyanincreaseinthelit-eracyrate,from95percentin1991to98percenttenyearslater,alongwithanincreaseingrossdo-mesticproductpercapita,from$5,347in1991to$6,641in2004.

Poverty and inequality. Theofficialpovertyline1inMontenegroin2003wasestablishedat€116.2perpersonpermonth.Whileonly12.2percentofMontenegro’scitizensfallbelowtheofficial(con-sumption)povertyline,agreatnumberofcitizensarehighlyconcentratedaroundthepovertyline.Itisestimatedthata20percentincreaseinthepriceof basic goods and services would force many ofthesepeopleintopoverty,effectivelydoublingthepovertyrate.

Despitetheupwardtrendinhumandevelopmentindicatorsandtheeconomy,notallsectorsofso-cietyhavebenefited,anda rise in inequalitywasoneof thevisiblesignsof transition.As inothercentrally planned economies, Montenegro hasrecordedan increase in inequality sincebreakingwith past. As measured by the Gini coefficient,Montenegrohasmovedfromacountrywithahighdegreeofequality(inregionalterms)toalevelof

inequalitythatischaracteristicofotheremergingmarketeconomies.Measuredbythedecileratio,2Montenegro is now among those countries withthegreatestdegreeofinequalityintheregion.

Poverty is highest among minority groups, inparticular the Roma, Ashkaelia and Egyptians(RAE),3 and among refugees and internally dis-placedpersons(IDPs).ThepovertyrateisseveraltimeshigheramongtheRAE(upto60percent),refugees(upto48percent)anddisplacedpersons(up to 46 percent) than among the mainstreampopulation(9.6percent,whichisslightlybelowthenational poverty rate of 12.2 percent).4 The eco-nomictransitionhasfurtheraggravatedtheposi-tionoftheRAEinMontenegro.Theirlowlevelsofeducation(only7.1percentofRoma,forexam-ple,areenrolledintheeducationsystem)andwageemploymentremainamajorobstacletoimprovingtheirpositioninsociety.

Regional differences.Althoughbroaderdataonthe living standards of various ethnic groups inMontenegroareunavailable,differences in livingstandardsfordifferentregionsaresignificant.Gen-erally,thepovertyrateinnorthernMontenegrois

__________________________________________________________________________1.GovernmentofMontenegro.November2003.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy.2.Thedecileratioexpressestheincome/consumptionofthetop10percent(the‘rich’)asamultipleoftheincomeofthosein

thepoorestdecile(the‘poor’).Itignoresinformationaboutincomes/consumptioninthemiddleoftheincome/consumptiondistributionanditdoesnotuseinformationaboutthedistributionofincomewithinthetopandbottomdeciles.Ontheotherhand,asapovertymonitoringtool,insomewaysitismoreappealingthantheGinicoefficient.WhiletheGiniindexissensi-tivetochangesthroughoutthedistribution,thedecileratiomaybemoresensitivetochangesinthemiddleandmaycompletelyoverlookchangesaffectingthepoor.

3.Accordingto2003researchbytheInstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses(ISSP),thesizeoftheRAEpopulationinMontenegroisdifficulttoestimatesincemembersoftheRomacommunitydonotnecessarilydeclarethemselvesasRoma,butratherasmembersofotherminoritygroupsorMontenegrins.The2003censusindicatesthatthenumberofRAEisalmosttentimeslowerthanunofficialdatagivenbyRomaNGOs(2,875versus19,549).ExpertsestimatethenumberofRomatobearound20,000,whichmakesthemthefourthlargestminorityinthecountry.

4.Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses (ISSP). October 2003. Research on Household Income and Expenditure ofRoma,RefugeesandIDPsinMontenegro.

14 C h A p T e r 2

Table 2: Regional Disaggregation of the HDI in Montenegro, 2000−2003

Region 2000 2001 2002 2003

Northern 0.707 0.710 0.737 0.753

Central 0.781 0.787 0.786 0.800

Southern 0.761 0.770 0.777 0.78�

Source:Human Development Report 2004, p.34

twice that of central and southern regions.1 ThispatternisalsoreflectedinregionalHDIrankings(Table2).ThetraditionaldivisionofMontenegrointo three regions (northern, central and south-ern)correlateswiththeurban-ruraldivision.Morethan60percentofthenorthernregionhasaruralcharacter,whereasalmost80percentofthecentralandabout60percentof thecoastalareasareur-ban.MostvulnerablearetheresidentsofnorthernMontenegro,whichhasanoverallpovertyrateof19.3percentandishometonearlyhalf(45percent)thecountry’spoor.2

Population pressures. As a result of conflict inneighbouring countries, a large number of refu-gees (currently numbering more than 120,000)andIDPsfoundshelterinMontenegro,increasingitspopulationby20percentovertheperiod1991-2004.3Asallsocio-economicindicatorsshow,IDPsandRAEhavesignificantlylowerlivingstandardsthantherestoftheMontenegrinpopulation.4De-spite very limited resources, the Government ofMontenegrohas approvedanational strategy forrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsinMon-tenegro,offeringthreeoptions:repatriation,localintegrationanddeparturetoathirdcountry.

Health and aging issues.Montenegrohasalargeshareofpeopleabovetheageof65(12.4percentof the total population in 2003), and the overallhealthindicatorsfortheMontenegrinpopulationarenotfavourable.Thetraumaticeventsassociatedwith thedissolutionofYugoslavia and transitionburdensresultedinanincreasedlevelofstress,fol-lowedbyariseinmentalillnessandthenumberofsuicides.ThemeasurementofHIV/AIDSincidenceisnotprecise,butexpertcalculationssuggestthatitmaybesixto11timeshigherthanthecurrentestimate:31personslivingwithHIV,outofwhich11haveAIDS.5Inadditiontotheincalculablehu-mansufferingitbrings,HIV/AIDSposesathreat

toMontenegro’shumancapital,whichhasalreadybeenaffectedbyamajorexodusinthe1990softheyoungandeducatedinsearchofbettereducationand employment prospects abroad. This drain ofhuman capital included more than 2,000 skilledprofessionals(mostlyelectricalandcivilengineersandothertechnicians).

Gender. The Office for Gender Equality, estab-lishedin2003,haspreparedadraftlawongenderequalitythatwill,forthefirsttime,definegenderdiscriminationinMontenegrinlegislation.Womenarediscriminatedagainstinrespecttotraditionalinheritance practices and career opportunities;they generally hold lower-paying jobs than menand lack decision-making power. Even thoughmenhistoricallyhavehadgreateraccesstoeduca-tion,anincreasingnumberofwomenarepursuinguniversitydegrees.Startingabusinessandgettingloansisequallypossibleforbothmenandwomen.However, theunemployment rate amongwomenisalmosttwicethatofmen(35percentforwomen,21percentformenin2003).Andinthecaseofre-dundancy,womenareusuallyfirsttobedismissed.InthemostrecentsurveyoftheOfficeforGenderEquality,12percentofwomenreportedthattheyarephysicallyabusedintheirhomes(2005 Nation-al Human Development Report for Montenegro).

Political participation of women remains low.From 1946, when women were given the rightto vote and to be elected to national office, thenumber of women in Parliament rose to 15percent in 1963, dropping to 3 percent in the1990s,andrisingto17percentin2005.Only13percentofwomenfillministerialpositions,and31percentfillsubministerialpositions.BasedontheGenderEmpowermentIndex(GEM),Montenegrofallswithinthecountrieswithamediumlevelofhumandevelopment.6


__________________________________________________________________________1.Source:InstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses&theWorldBank.2002.LivingStandardsandPovertyinMontenegro.

Datarefertoresidentialcitizens.2.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy.3.Montenegro Human Development Report, 2004.4Ibid.5Accordingtothelatestavailabledata(December2004).6Though the indexvalue is low incomparison todevelopedcountries, it isquite close to thatofmost transitioneconomies

(RussiaFederation–0.467;FYRMacedonia–0.517;Romania–0.465).

Millennium Development Goals.ThefirstMDGreportforMontenegrowaspublishedin2005.TheGovernment has stated that achievement of theMDGsispartoftheoverallreformprocess.Sinceextreme poverty, hunger and access to primaryeducationarenotmajorissuesinMontenegro,theadvicewasgiventhattheGovernmentshouldsetforthmorespecificandcountry-relevant targets.1However,eveninthefieldswheretheformaltasksrelated to the MDGs have been achieved, theexisting information regarding the maintenanceandimprovementofthesegoalsmustbecontinu-allyverified.

2.2.2 CIVIL SOCIETY

Even though there is an active labour union inMontenegro,independentmediahousesandnon-governmental organizations tend to be referredto as the most prominent representatives of civilsociety.EversincethefirstNGOlawwaspassedinMontenegro (July1999), theNGOsectorhasbeen growing and becoming more vibrant, withthenumberof registeredNGOs increasing fromaround 1,1002 in 2000 to more then 3,500 in2005.3 In thebeginning, the sectorhadno clearpurposeor identity,wascharacterizedby lowin-stitutional capacity, a lack of cooperation amongorganizations and a weak funding base. Severalanalyses of the sector4 indicated a lack of capac-ity to plan strategically, poorly defined internalmanagementstructures,weaktechnicalresources,and subsequently poor performance in outreach,constituency-buildingandlobbying.CompetitionratherthancooperationcharacterizedmanyNGOsrelationships,withreluctanceamongtheseorgani-zations to share information, create networks orformcoalitions,Moreover,thereisanevidentlackofunderstandingoftheroleofNGOsbyboththepublicandtheGovernment.

TherewasprogressincooperationamongNGOsin2003.5However,alackoftransparencyinNGOoperations was still evident, resulting in projectoverlap.Intheyearsthatfollowed,therehasbeena noticeable increase in the presence of NGOsin public life. However, further NGO capac-ity-buildingisneededtoensurethattheneedsofcommunitiesandcitizensareaddressedinamoresystematicway.

The most recent analysis (November 2005) esti-matesthatonly50outof3,500registeredNGOsareactive,whilethemajorityareeitherinactiveorbusinessesoperatingasNGOs,thusharmingthereputationofthegenuineandactiveNGOsector.Intermsoftheirfunctioning,NGOsscoredhigh-est in community outreach and NGO relations/partnering, and the lowest in resource mobiliza-tion.Along-termsustainabilitystrategywasnon-existentformostoftheNGOsinterviewed.

TheEconomicReformAgenda(2005)statesthatthetwobiggestachievementsoftheNGOsectorare the fact that they have become a significantsourceoffinancingatboththerepublicandlocallevels,andthatacertain levelofcooperationhasbeenachievedamongtheNGOsectorandcertainministries and local governments.6 Among thegreatestproblemscitedarethecurrentNGOlaw,whichdefinestheeconomicactivityofNGOstoobroadly(andwhichinpracticeisoftenabused),andthe absence of a formal memorandum of under-standingbetweentheGovernmentandtheNGOsector,whichdiminishesNGOinfluenceinpublicdecision-makingprocesses.

2.2.3 GOVERNANCE

Weak administration of the state. Despite thesmallsizeofMontenegro,separatepartieswithinthepreviouscoalitionGovernmentssecuredpow-

16 C h A p T e r 2

__________________________________________________________________________1.ByProfessorJeffreySachs,whovisitedMontenegro inAugust2005.Hisviewsarereflected inSessionIV:Reportonthe

MDGs.2.NetworkforAffirmationoftheNGOSector(MANS).2001.StatusofNGOsinMontenegro.3.FoundationforDemocraticAlternativesinSociety(FONDAS).2005.NGOsNeedsAssessmentReport.4.MANS.May2000.‘NeedsAssessmentofNGOsinFiveRegionsofMontenegro’;CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights.

March2001.‘TheMontenegrinNGOSector;UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID).March2001.CapacityDevelopmentofIndigenousMontenegrinNGOs.Draft;UNICEF.January2001.‘AssessmentoftheCapacityofNGOscurrentlyoperatinginMontenegro’.

5.MANS.2003.NGOStatusandTreatment.6.EconomicReformAgenda2002-2007,p.53.

erthroughthecreationofnewministriesorotherpublic bodies, resulting in increased fragmenta-tion, reduced coordination and the politicizationofthecivilservice,especiallyattheseniorlevels.Thecollapseof the federationalso resulted inanincrease in the number of state employees and acorresponding increase and non-sustainability incivil service salaries. The legacies of the formersocialistsystemofGovernment–lackoftranspar-encyindecision-making,lackofpublicparticipa-tion, supply-driven service delivery, inadequateskillsandcapacities–contributedtoacultureofnon-performance and little accountability. How-ever,withtheadoptionoftheStrategyonPublicAdministrationReformin2003,theGovernmenthasshowndeterminationtoimprovethefunction-ingofthesystem.

Corruption. In 2004, Transparency Interna-tional rankedSerbiaandMontenegro106outof133 countries in terms of the depth of politicalcorruption.Inaddressingthis issue,theGovern-ment adopted a strategy on fighting corruptionandorganizedcrime(August2005),passedasetof anti-corruption laws,1 and established a num-berofinstitutionsandhigh-levelpositions.TheseincludetheAgencyforAnti-corruptionInitiative,the Anti-money-laundering Agency, the Pub-lic Procurement Commission, the Commissionfor Establishing Conflict of Interest and a Spe-cial Prosecutor for the Fight against OrganizedCrime.Still, the latestpublicopinionpoll (Cen-tre forMonitoring,knownasCEMI,December2005)showedthattheleasttrustedinstitutionsinMontenegro are theParliament (27percent) andthejudiciary(25percent).

2.2.4 ENVIRONMENT

Thesituationof theenvironment inMontenegroissimilartothatofOECDcountriestwodecades

ago,withanumberofchallengesrequiringurgentattention.First,thereisevidenceofexcessiveanduncontrolledexploitationofnaturalresources,in-cluding illegal construction, forest use and con-versionofagriculturalland.2Thethreatofcoastalzone deterioration due to uncontrolled construc-tion, lack of wastewater treatment and a coastalzonemanagementstrategyhasbeenhighlightedinparticular.3Second,therearedeterioratingtrendsinwater, sanitationandwastemanagement.Ap-proximately45percentofmunicipalwasteisdis-posedofonuncontrolled siteswithout treatmentormanagement;industrywastewaterisdischargeddirectly into themunicipal systemorwaterways.Third,airpollution levelsexceedpermittedstan-dardsincertainmunicipalities.Airpollutionhot-spotsexistinseveralindustrialareas,and,insomecases,ahigher-than-averageincidenceofrespira-toryproblemshavebeenobservedinnearbysettle-ments.4Thepollutionproblemcausedbyobsoleteequipmentandpoorpollutioncontrolsisnothelpedby the high demand for energy from householdsandindustry,perpetuatedbylow,subsidizedener-gyprices.Fourth,Montenegrohastransboundarywaterresourcesandglobalenvironmentalrespon-sibilities. These include the protection of uniquespeciesoffloraandfaunaaswellasculturalheri-tagedesignatedbytheUNEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)asWorldHeritageSites:BokaKotorskaandDurmitorNa-tional Park. The overall framework for tacklingthesechallengesistheConstitution,underwhichMontenegrohaspledgedtoreachthestandardsofan‘ecologicalstate’.

2.3 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES

TheMontenegrindevelopmentchallengesidenti-fiedabovearebeingaddressedwithinthecontextofEUaccession,whichisamajorstrategicgoalof


__________________________________________________________________________1.TheLawonFinancingPoliticalParties,theLawonthePreventionofConflictofInterest,andtheLawonFreeAccessto

Information.2.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,p.38.3.WorldBankCountryEnvironmentalAnalysis.2003,p.iv.4.Accordingtothe2003WorldBankreport,thepowerplantinPljevlja,analuminiumprocessingplantinPodgorica,andiron

worksinNiksichavesomeofthehighestemissions(See:WorldBank.February2003.SerbiaandMontenegroCountryEnvi-ronmentalAnalysis,p.iv).AregionalreportinthesameyearestimatedthatsulphurdioxidelevelsinMontenegrowerebyfarthehighestamongfivecountriesintheregion(See:RegionalEnvironmentCentreforCentralandEasternEurope.August2003.DevelopingaPriorityEnvironmentalInvestmentProgrammeforSouthEasternEurope,p.36).

Montenegrinsociety.Nationaldevelopmentstrat-egies are alignedwith this goal and complementtheEU-accessionprocess.

2.3.1 EU ACCESSION AND THE IMPLEMENTA-TION PLAN FOR EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP

TheprimarygoalofMontenegroistojointheEu-ropeanUnion,NATOandotherbodiespromotingEuro-Atlantic integration.Adeclarationonjoin-ingtheEU,passedbytheMontenegrinParliamentinJune2005,1reaffirmsthisstrategicorientation.ItinvitestheParliamenttotakeappropriateactionforswiftadjustmentofMontenegrinlaws,apply-ingEuropeanstandards,andaskstheGovernmenttoprepareastrategyonEUintegration.Thedecla-rationalsoreflectsdecisiveactiononthepartoftheMontenegrinGovernmenttofulfilitsobligationsunder the Stabilization and Association Process(SAP);theEU-WesternBalkanThessalonikiSum-mitAgendafortheWesternBalkans(June2003);andtheconclusionsoftheMinisterialCounciloftheEUfromLuxembourg(October2004)onthe‘twin-track’approachoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroinharmonizingitstwoeconomicsystems.Politicalpartieswithopposingplatforms(pro-independence versus pro-state union), haveagreed to facilitate theprocessofEUintegrationand the application of EU standards despite po-litical differences. Citizens, associations, politicalparties,NGOs, religiousandnational communi-ties,media,localandnationalinstitutions,aswellasotherstakeholdersinMontenegroareinvitedtocontributetotheEUintegrationprocess.

Tothisend,theGovernmentofMontenegrohasadoptedacommunicationstrategy2forinformingthepubliconprogresswith theEU,with clearlystatedobjectivesandwaysofdisseminatinginfor-mation.Thevastmajorityofcitizens(81percent)areinfavourofEUmembership(CentreforDe-mocracyandHumanRights,December2005).

ThepoliticalconditionsimpliedundertheStabili-zationandAssociationProcess,whichwasestab-lishedin1997forSouthEasternEuropeancoun-tries,includeadherencetothefollowingprinciples:

• Democraticgovernance

• Humanrights,ruleoflaw

• Respectforandprotectionofminorities

• Amarketeconomy

• Regionalcooperation.

Specific responsibilities were imposed on BosniaandHerzegovina,CroatiaandtheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro,namely:thefulfilmentofinternational obligations under the InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia,theDaytonPeaceAccordsandUNSecurityCouncilresolution1244.3

Following the decision of EU foreign ministersto introduce a twin-track approach for talks oneconomic and customs matters with Serbia andMontenegro, Montenegrin officials began press-ingforthesametwo-trackstrategytobeappliedinthepoliticalsphereaswell.Acampaigntode-finenewrelationshipswithSerbia,launchedbytheMontenegrinleadership,wasgainingmomentum.ThiswasfollowedbyanattemptbyMontenegrinstodistance themselves fromSerbia and from theInternational Criminal Tribunal for former Yu-goslavia.4 To gain further international support,several diplomatic initiatives were undertaken byMontenegrinofficialsvisitingBrussels,Washing-ton,DC,Berlin,ViennaandMoscow.

According to a 2005 Feasibility Study for theState Union of Serbia and Montenegro, knowl-edge of EU integration processes on the part ofparliamentariansandadministrativestaffmustbeenhanced ifParliament is to effectively carryoutitsfunctions.AEuropeanIntegrationCommitteehasthereforebeencreatedtomonitorandinitiateharmonizationwiththeacquis communautaire,but

1� C h A p T e r 2

__________________________________________________________________________1.AdraftdeclarationwaspresentedbyagroupofNGOs(see:http://www.cemi.cg.yu/ei/deklaracija.php).2.PreparedbytheMinistryofInternationalEconomicRelationsandEuropeanIntegrationinSeptember2004(Seewww.gom.

cg.yu).3.Michael Karnitschnig (External Relations Directorate-General, European Commission). Presentation on the European

Union’sStabilizationandAssociationProcess,Trento(Italy),10March2005.4.TheDPShadcalledfortheestablishmentoftwoseparatenationalCouncilsforCooperationwiththeInternationalCriminal

TribunalforformerYugoslavia.

withlimitedresultstodate.Cooperationwithcivilsocietyhasbeenimproving,especiallyonEU-re-latedissues.InNovember2004,theGovernmentamended its Rules of Procedure, introducing amandatorystatementoncompatibilityofdraftbillswithEUstandards.InterministerialcoordinationonEU-relatedissueshasbecomemorestructuredwiththeimprovedfunctioningoftheMinistryforInternational Economic Relations and EuropeanIntegration. However, further improvements areneededintermsofmoreregularcoordinationwiththelineministries.FollowingtheendorsementoftheFeasibilityStudy,andofthedraftnegotiationdirectives presented by the European Commis-sion, theECauthorizedthestartofnegotiationswith the State Union of Serbia and MontenegroinOctober2005.Itwasstatedthatthepaceandconclusionsof thenegotiationswoulddependonthecountry’sprogressindevelopingitslegislativeframework, administrative capacity, the effectiveimplementationoftheConstitutionalCharterandfull cooperation with the International CriminalTribunalontheformerYugoslavia.1

Implementation plan for European Partnership.TheThessalonikiEuropeanCouncilendorsedtheintroduction of the European Partnership as ameanstorealizetheEuropeanperspectiveoftheWesternBalkanswithintheStabilizationandAs-sociation Process (SAP). Based on the Council’sdecision of 14 June 2004 on the principles, pri-oritiesandconditionscontainedintheEuropeanPartnershipwithSerbiaandMontenegro,includ-ing Kosovo, the Montenegrin Government ad-optedtherespectivecomponentsoftheactionplanaddressing the European Partnership priorities.Theactionplansfocusonshort-termandmedium-termpriorities in the followingareas:democracyand rule of law, the economic situation, humanrights and the protection of minorities, coopera-tioninjusticeandhomeaffairs,regionalissuesandinternationalobligations, sectoralpolicies (on in-dustryandsmall-andmedium-sizedenterprises,agriculture and fisheries, environment, transportpolicy,energy,informationsocietyandmedia,andfinancialcontrol).

BasedontheEuropeanCommission’s2005Prog-ressReportontheStateUnionofSerbiaandMon-tenegro, includingKosovo, the secondEuropeanPartnership identified new priorities for action.Thesewereadaptedtothespecificneedsandstageofpreparationofthecountryandwillbeupdatedasnecessary,servingalsoasguidanceforfinancialassistance to the State Union, including Kosovo.Short-termprioritiesareexpectedtobeachievedwithinonetotwoyears,andmedium-termpriori-tieswithinthreetofouryears,relatingbothtoleg-islationandimplementation.AssistancefromtheEuropean Commission under the SAP dependsonfurtherprogressinsatisfyingtheCopenhagencriteriaalongwiththeprioritiesoftheEuropeanPartnership, andwill be conditionedon the tworepublics’ progress in democratic, economic andinstitutionalreforms.Thekeyshort-termprioritiesinclude:fullrespectoftheConstitutionalCharter,ensuringeffectivefunctioningoftheStateUnion;furtherreformofpublicadministration;reformofthe judiciary toguarantee its independence,pro-fessionalism and efficiency; and full cooperationwiththeInternationalCriminalTribunal.2

2.3.2 DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM STRATEGIES

Startingin1998,theGovernmentofMontenegroembarkedonanambitiousprogrammeofgovern-ment reform, which benefited from considerabletechnical, financial and material assistance fromthe international community. Montenegro doesnot have one overall national development strat-egy,butcross-cuttingstrategiesadoptedoverthelastthreeyears.Thesecovertheareasof:economicreform; development and poverty reduction; andimplementationoftheplanforEuropeanPartner-ship.Inaddition,ithasanumberofsectoralstrat-egies that elaborate reformprocesses inareas in-cluding public administration, local government,education,health,andsustainabledevelopment.

Montenegro Economic Reform Agenda 2002-2007. ThisReformAgenda,whichrepresentsthemost comprehensive strategy document of theGovernment,wasinitiallyadoptedinMarch2003


__________________________________________________________________________1.EuropeanCommission.9November2005.SerbiaandMontenegro2005ProgressReport.Brussels.2.CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities.Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained

in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolu-tion 1244 of 10 June 1999.Brussels.9.11.2005COM(2005)558final.

fortheperiod2002−2006.In2005,itwasupdat-edinlightoftheEUaccessionprocess.Asstatedin the document: “...the Economic Reform Agenda should become a specific European Agenda for Mon-tenegro.” 1Theagenda represents a visionofwhatneedstobeaccomplishedandprovidesaconcep-tualframeworkforoperationalactivitiesthatwillbring Montenegro closer to its strategic goals ofjoining the EU and NATO. The four tasks thatcut across the entire Economic Reform Agendainclude:monitoringandreportingontheactivitiesandoutcomesoftheeconomicreformsontheEUaccessionpath;theEuropeanintegrationprocess;communicating the progress and impact of eco-nomicreformsontheEUaccessionprocesstothecitizensofMontenegro; and full participationofthecivilsocietyinthepolicy-makingandlegisla-tiondevelopmentprocess.2

Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy.Given that poverty reduction is primarily basedon equitable economic growth, the Poverty Re-duction Strategy Paper in Montenegro was re-named the Development and Poverty ReductionStrategy. It was adopted by the Government inNovember2003.Thestrategy focusesonachiev-ingmacroeconomic stability, combating thegreyeconomy,3promotingeconomicdevelopmentandthe labour market, and enhancing social welfareandregionaldevelopment.Thestrategy’sprioritiesareharmonizedwiththeMDGsandcomplementtheEconomicReformAgenda.TheDevelopmentand Poverty Reduction Strategy aimed to makespending projections for the period 2004−2006,however,implementationhasbeenslowduetolackofresources.

Public Administration Reform Strategy (2002−2009). This strategy was adopted in 2003withthesupportoftheEU,outlininganumberofobjectivesbasedonEuropeanprinciplesandideasabout‘NewPublicManagement’.Themainpriorityisthedelegationofresponsibilitiesfromhighertoloweradministrativelevels,whichshouldenhanceflexibility of the administrative system and giveseniorservantsgreaterlatitudeinperformingtheirfunctions.4Newlaws5havebeenadoptedsincethen,andtheHumanResourcesManagementAuthoritywasestablishedin2004.

Local government reform.Anew systemof lo-calgovernment,which is in accordancewith theEUCharteronLocalSelf-government,hasbeenintroducedinMontenegrothatenvisagesindepen-dent,self-financingmunicipalities,6accountabletothewishesandneedsofalocalelectorate.Thenewset of laws (the Law on Local Self-government,theLawonLocalGovernmentFinancing,andtheLawontheDirectElectionofMayor)waspassedin July 2003, and the implementation process isnowunderway.ThelegislativeframeworkwillbecompleteoncetheLawonTerritorialOrganizationofMontenegro,theLawonHistoricalCapitalandtheLawonAdministrativeCapitalareadopted.

Judicial reform.Considerableimprovementshavebeenmade inbothcriminalandcivil legislation,butimplementationremainsaconcern,andthereisstillevidenceofpoliticalinfluenceoverthejudicia-ry(StabilizationandAssociationProcessProgressReport,November2005).Administrativeandap-pellatecourtswereestablishedinJanuary2005.ASpecialProsecutorforOrganizedCrimehasbeenappointed,butonlyslightprogresshasbeenmadeinimplementingthelawonwitnessprotection.

20 C h A p T e r 2

__________________________________________________________________________1.EconomicReformAgenda2002-2007,p.7.2.Ibid.,p.11.3.Thegrey(market)economyreferstotheflowofgoodsthroughdistributionchannelsotherthanthoseauthorizedorintended

bythemanufacturerorproducer.Unlikethoseontheblackmarket,greymarketgoodsarenotillegal.Instead,theyarebeingsoldoutsideofnormaldistributionchannelsbycompaniesthatmayhavenorelationshipwiththeproducerofthegoods.ThegreyeconomyhasbeenoneofMontenegro’sbiggestchallenges,withestimatesshowingthatbetween40and60percentofallbusinessactivitiesinMontenegrooccurinthiszone.IthasalsobeenestimatedthatonethirdofMontenegro’sworkforce—70-100,000people,maketheirlivingbyparticipatinginsomeformofblackmarketactivity(AIMPodgorica,6September2001).

4.See: Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Montenegro. 2003. Public Administration Reform Strategy of Montenegro.Podgorica.

5.The Law on the State Administration (2003), The Law on Inspections (2003), The Law on the General AdministrativeProcedure(2003),TheLawonCivilServants(2004),etc.

6.Theprimarysourceofrevenueformunicipalitieswithinthenewsystemarepropertytaxes.

U N d p p r o g r A M M e p o S I T I o N I N g 21

__________________________________________________________________________1.See:UNDP.12December2001.FirstCountryCooperationFrameworkforYugoslavia(2002-2004).DP/CCF/YUG/1,p.1.

Chapter 3

UNDP Programme Positioning

3.1 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The daunting challenges associated with post-conflict governance and public administration inSerbiaandMontenegropresentedatoughcontextforthestartofaUNDPprogrammein2001.TheRepublicofMontenegrohadembarkedonapathtowards liberalization in 1997, but the constitu-tional character of the Federal Republic of Yu-goslavia remainedan itemof continuingdebate.1Montenegro’s relative insulation from much oftheconflictintheregioncontributedtosomesuc-cesses in economic reform, growth and stability,coherentpolicyevolution,andchangesintheso-cialandlegislativeframework.Butmuchremainedtobedone,especially ifMontenegrowastogain

membershipintheEuropeanUnion.TheUNDP–amongotherdonors–sawtheneedtosupportMontenegroin itscontinuingreformefforts,andthedemocraticoverthrowoftheMiloševićregimeinlate2000providedthatopening.

ThechallengesfacingUNDPinMontenegrowereconsiderable.UNDPdidnothaveaprogrammeorphysicalpresence inMontenegrountilmid-2001and reportedly had a poor reputation for deliv-ery, with only one NGO project under way. AllUNDPregularorcorefundingwasunderthesin-gle countryprogramme for theFederalRepublicofYugoslavia, controlledby theUNDPoffice inBelgrade.ThesizeofthenewUNDPLiaisonOf-ficeinMontenegro(inthecityofPodgorica)wassmall–onlythreestaffmembers–andsituatedin

Figure 3: Montenegro: Programme Funding, 2001- 2005

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

02001 2002 2003 2005

2005

Сore

other

Total

US$

Tho

usan

ds

2004

22 C h A p T e r 3

verymodest facilities.Moreover, itwas regardedasanoutpostoftheUNDPoperationinBelgrade,where most UNDP attention was being focused–atthefederalandSerbianRepubliclevelsofgov-ernmentandcrisispreventioninsouthernSerbia.1

The2001–2002periodwasnonethelessseenasawindowofopportunityforestablishingaphysicalUNDPpresenceinMontenegroandacrediblepro-grammeofsupportforreformpriorities.TheseedsofanewprogrammeweretobefoundinUNDP’sStrategicResultsFrameworkfor2002,anditssuc-cesswasseentodependonthreefactors: (1)tar-getinginterventionswhereUNDPcouldaddvaluetonationaldevelopmentgoals,(2)developingkeypartnerships,and(3)resourcemobilization.

Regarding the first factor: UNDP had alreadytargeted sustainable development and support totheNGOsector andcivil society as areaswhereitcouldaddvalue.Andseveralopportunitieshadalready presented themselves in the area of net-working and building partnerships with donors,Government and civil society organizations. AsnotedinChapter2,onlyafewotherdonorswereactiveorhadaphysicalpresence inMontenegro,anddevelopmentassistanceat that timewas tar-getedmore atmacroeconomic issues.UNDPal-readyhadasmallpresencewithintheNGOcom-munity,thoughithadyettoestablishitscredibilityand credentials with Government in those areasforwhichithadtargetedsupport.

Thethirdsuccessfactorwasproblematic.UNDPwas seen as a very small player in terms of thefunding at its disposal. The funds that could bemadeavailabletotheLiaisonOfficeinMontengrowereatthediscretionoftheUNDPofficeinBel-grade–andprioritiesforTRACandotherflexiblemodalities of UNDP financing were dominatedbytheSerbianandfederallevelsofGovernment.

Allkeydecisionsonfundingandoperationsweremade fromtheBelgradeofficewith littlediscre-tionary authority delegated to the Liaison Of-fice, even though a smallUNDPcore budget of$50,000wasearmarkedin2002todevelopprojectandprogrammeactivitiesintargetedareas.

However, within two years there was a strongprogrammeandCountryOfficepresenceinPod-gorica. From a ‘zero-base’ start-up in 2000, theMontenegroprogrammehadgrownover30-foldto$1.4millionby2003(seeFigure3).Itthenin-creasedbyanother50percenttoslightlyover$2.1million by 2005.2 As discussed below, the suc-cessoftheMontenegroprogramme–ifmeasuredbyrapidgrowthinprogrammefunding–maybeseenastheproductofacombinationofapproachesto positioning, strategic management and pro-grammedevelopment.

3.2 UNDP PROGRAMME STRATEGIES

This Assessment of Development Results forMontenegroisbasedonprogrammestrategiesde-velopedduringthefirstthreeyearsoftheUNDPpresenceintheRepublic(2001-2003).3Thesectionbelowexaminestheevolutionandnatureoftheseearly approaches. Current programme strategiesarethennotedbriefly.

3.2.1 BASELINE NEEDS ASSESSMENT: 2000

ImmediatelyafterthefalloftheMiloševićregimein late2000,UNDPfieldedahighprioritymis-sion to Belgrade to identify the main challengesand priorities for administrative reform, but ap-proached this from the angle of enhancing gov-ernance for human development. The resulting‘Governance for Human Development’ report4containedageneralassessmentofthepoliticaland

__________________________________________________________________________1.NeithertheCountryCooperationFramework(2002-2004)northesubsequentCountryProgrammeDocumentfortheperiod

2005−2009gavemuch attention toMontenegro.Theoverwhelmingpriority and focus forUNDPprogrammingover theperiodwasatthefederalandSerbianRepubliclevels.Furthermore,therewassomesensitivityinestablishingtoostrongandvisibleaUNDPpresenceinMontenegroinviewoftheRepublic’saspirationsforindependenceandaccessiontotheEU,sincethatcouldbeinterpretedasUNDPsupportforsuchaspirations.TherewereongoingdifferencesofopinionbetweenSerbiaandMontenegroonfederalandrepublicanstatuswithintheoverallfederalstructure,whethertherewouldbeaone-ortwo-trackapproachtoEUaccession,andtheroleandauthorityoffederal-levelministries,amongotherissues.

2.The‘other’categoryoffundingisacombinationofnon-corecost-shared,trustfunds,GEFandregionalTRAC.3.Itistooearlytoprovideanassessmentofresultsforthecurrentcountryprogrammesinceitcoversthe2005−2009period.4.See:UNDP.December2000.‘GovernanceforHumanDevelopment:AnOverviewofKeyIssues’.Belgrade.Thereportwas

usedfordiscussionsatamajordonorscoordinationmeetingonassistancetotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,co-organizedbytheWorldBankandEuropeanUnionfor12December2000inBrussels.


economiccontextofthethenFederalRepublicofYugoslavia, with a more focused analysis on re-formanddevelopmentchallengeswithinthesocialsector,centralandlocalgovernment,thenon-gov-ernmentalsectorandthemedia.Priorityareasforrebuilding capacities were identified and generalproposals were forwarded on democratic gover-nance,theadministrationofjustice,economicandfinancialmanagement,publicadministration,so-cialdevelopment,andmodalitiesforinternationalcooperation.

The report focused primarily on the federal andSerbian Republic levels of government.1 How-ever, in terms of the general governance situ-ation in Montenegro, the report found that:“… the Government had already some time ago de-cided to make a fundamental shift to pluralism and democracy and to social justice and a market-oriented economy. In 1998, they launched an extensive judi-cial, economic and institutional reform programme that includes public administration at central and local levels. They also started to take an independent path in formulating their own laws which did not neces-sarily conform to the Federal Constitution because of their differences with the past Serbian Government.”(p.11).

Furthermore, the report noted that the Gov-ernment of Montenegro had made considerableprogress in the privatization of state enterprises,theinstitutionofsomejudicialreforms(thatis,anewJudiciaryAct,anActonCourtsProcedures,an Act on Local Government, and a regulatoryframework forbanksand investment funds), andthe establishment of the Institute of Public Ad-ministration, combined with the initiation of aprocess of administrative decentralization to lo-cal government in 1998. Of particular note – asdiscussed inChapter4of this report–wasgov-ernmentsupporttoNGOsandtheirroleindevel-opment.Outsideofageneralrecommendationontheimportanceoftourismfordevelopment, littleattentionwasgiventoMontenegroasacandidate

for UNDP assistance. How, then, did UNDPdevelop its programme and establish a presenceinMontenegro?

3.2.2 EARLY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Flowingfromthe‘GovernanceforHumanDevel-opment’ report, the strategy for theUNDPpro-gramme in Montenegro evolved through severaltracks, some official and some less so. The firsttrack comprised the set of formal UNDP docu-ments – the Country Cooperation Framework,theCountryProgrammeDocument,andtheUNDevelopment Assistance Framework – and di-rectly supporting analyses such as the CommonCountryAssessment.Butthesestrategieswerenotdevelopedforthemostpartuntil2004–2005.TheunofficialtrackconsistedofaseriesofdiscussionsandpolicydialogueamongUNDP,donors,Gov-ernment andother stakeholders; internalUNDPmanagementdecisions;andtheproductionofin-ternalreportsandmemorandacontainingarangeofanalysesandrecommendationsonUNDPposi-tioningandprogramming.Clearly,thereisalinkbetweentheofficialandunofficialroutes,butitisthesuccessofthelatterthatresultedintheestab-lishmentoftheUNDPpresenceinMontenegro.

Thefirstmajor stepwasadecisionbyUNDPtoestablish aphysical presence inMontenegro,de-spitethefactthatthe ‘official’andlegalbasis forUNDPpresencewastheformerFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaand the subsequentStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro.

However,thenewstateunionarrangementresult-edde facto intheestablishmentoftwostates(re-publics),eachwithitsownpriorities,policiesandsystems of governance. This was recognized, inpart,bythefactthatthetworepublicsdealtsepa-ratelywiththeWorldBankandotherdonors(suchastheUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment– USAID), were about to develop two separatePovertyReductionStrategyPapers,andhadsepa-rateanddifferentreformprogrammes.Inaddition,

__________________________________________________________________________1.ThemissionchargedwithdevelopingthereportconductedabriefvisittoPodgoricaand,alongwithresultsofsomeearlier

UNDPmissionstoMontenegro,incorporatedfindingsandsomerecommendationsofageneralnatureintothereport.ThemainrecommendationswereforthedevelopmentofaCapacityBuildingFundandjointUNanddonorsupportforcrisispre-ventionandstabilizationinsouthernSerbia.

24 C h A p T e r 3

theprofilesofthetworepublicswerequitedissim-ilarinsofarasthesmallerMontenegrinRepublic(onetenththesizeofSerbia)hadestablisheditselfasaeurocurrencyopeneconomywithanempha-sisoneco-state tourism.Serbia,by contrast,hada dinar-based currency, and a more protectionisteconomywithalargetextileandindustrialbaseinneedofmajorreformandrestructuring.Fortheseandotherreasons,thedecisionwasmadeinearly2001toopenaphysicalofficeinPodgorica1andtoestablishaprogramme.

The second major step in UNDP’s positioningwas in the form of a brief ‘handover note’2 thattheUNDPRegionalBureauinNewYorkhadre-questedfromthethenheadofthe localUNOf-ficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)inmid-2001.Thepurposeofthehando-vernotewastoensuresomecontinuityofoperationsfromOCHAtoUNDP,butmoreimportantly,itsuggestedareasforUNDPprogramming.Thefo-cusof thenotewas theEco-development Initia-tive,sincetheRepublichadearlieridentifieditselfasanecologicalstate.EnvironmentorsustainabledevelopmentwasalsoanareaofUNDPglobalex-perience(thatis,underthepracticeareaofenergyand environment and, more generally, UNDP’smissionasa‘humandevelopmentagency’).

Themainchallengesatthetimewerenotedtoin-cludetheGovernment’spreoccupationwithotherreformpriorities,andpotentialcompetitionfromUSAID and the European Agency for Recon-struction (EAR), (whose programmes were seento potentially overlap with the Eco-developmentInitiative). Opportunities were seen to outweightherisks,however,andOCHArecommendedthatUNDP pursue activities in environment, NGOcapacity-building,andsomesupporttothedevel-opment of small- and medium-sized enterprises(Chapter4ofthisreportassessesresultsineachof

theseareas).Thenotereportedlyreceivedsupportfrom the Government of Montenegro but onlymarginalinterestfromtheUNDPCountryOfficesincethebulkofUNDP’sattentionwasbeingap-pliedtothefargreaterdemandsattheSerbianandfederalgovernmentlevels.TheDonorConferencefortheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaheldinJune2001elevatedtheprofileandvisibilityofthesmallRepublicofMontenegro.Atthisconference,over$1.28billionwaspledgedfromdonorstosupportreform,rehabilitationanddevelopment,ofwhichapproximately10percentwasallocatedforMon-tenegro–muchofthatfocusingonenvironmentaland‘eco-state’needs.

A follow-up situation report prepared by theUNDPLiaisonOffice inMontenegro inAugust2001 amplified both the opportunities and therisks. Additional risks to developing and imple-menting programme assistance (especially in theenvironment sector) were foreseen, since therewere serious limitations in the absorptive capac-ityofgovernmentministries,compoundedbyin-creases inaidflows(especially fromUSAIDandEAR).Furthermore,theLiaisonOfficeitselfhadextremelylimitedcapacityandwouldnotbeableto sustain a major programme without a properstrategythatsetoutthepurposeoftheoffice, itsobjectives,anticipatedresultsandtime-frames.

While no formal strategy or plan was preparedfor the UNDP Liaison Office, the second trackin strategy development comprised a number ofinternal organizational, management and staff-ingdecisionstakenduring2001and2002.UNDPfielded a few missions to Montenegro from theUNDPCountryOffice inBelgrade to followuponthehandovernote.Inlate2001,UNDPiden-tified a senior programme officer to serve as theliaison officer for the new Podgorica office, withtheappointmentformalizedinJanuary2002.3The

__________________________________________________________________________1.UNDPhadbythistimeconcludeddiscussionswithUN-OCHAonthetransferofitsPodgoricaofficetoUNDP,whichhad

been‘handedover’toUNDPformallyinFebruary2001.TwonationalOCHAstaffmemberswerepartofthetransfer:oneprogrammestaffmemberassignedprimarilytoNGOprojectwork,andonepersonwithcombineddutiescoveringregistry,administrativesupport,logisticsanddriver.

2.OCHA.10August2001.NotesonHandover,Challenges,andShort-termPriorityTasksforUNDPLOinPodgorica.In-ternaldocument.

3.TheappointmentmaybeseenasagoodstrategicdecisiononthepartofUNDP.TheindividualhadpreviousandextensiveUNDPexperienceincrisisandpost-conflictprogrammemanagementinBosniaandHerzegovinaandalsosouthernSerbia,hadapost-graduatedegreeinenvironmentalimpactassessmentandmanagement,hadpriorUNDPmanagementandteamexperienceand,havingsupportedafewUNDPfact-findingmissionstoMontenegrothepreviousyear,haddevelopedagoodunderstandingoflocaldevelopmentissues.ThepositionwasformalizedasassistantresidentrepresentativeinMarch2003,andasdeputyresidentrepresentativethefollowingyear.

mandate of the liaison officer was to further es-tablishtheUNDPpresenceinMontenegroandtodevelopaprogrammeofsupport.1

Strategycontinuedtoberefinedthroughaseriesofbriefannual‘strategynotes’ontheFederalRepub-licandlaterStateUnionfromtheUNDPCoun-tryOfficeinBelgradeovertheperiod2002–2005.These were submitted to UNDP HeadquartersinNewYorkseekingfeedbackandapprovalonanumberofprogramme,funding,staffingandop-erationalmatters.Thefirst suchnote, in January2002,hadonlyonespecificreferencetoMontene-gro.ItsummarizedthekeychallengeforUNDPasaddressing theconstitutional instabilityof theFederalRepublic,withmajorimbalancesbetweenits two republics, andbetweenMontenegro (andincreasingly,Serbia)andthefederalGovernment.SubsequentstrategynotespreparedbytheCoun-tryOfficeinBelgradehighlightedtheimportanceof energy and environment (sustainable develop-ment),capacity-buildingandassistancetothecivilsocietysector.Inearly2003,accessiontotheEUwas seen as a strategic niche by UNDP in areassuchasgovernance,publicadministration,judicialandenvironmentalpolicyreformandcapacityde-velopment.Sincethattime,accessionhascontin-uedtobeseenasaprioritygoal.2

3.2.3 FORMAL PROGRAMME STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

UNDP strategy and positioning for both Serbiaand Montenegro were formally secured throughthedevelopmentofthefirstCountry Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Yugoslavia in late 2001.Theoverall and ratherambitiousobjectiveof theCCFwasto“…consolidate democracy and social eq-uity through reform and recovery with a special focus on governance and policy advocacy through programmes that are designed to be mutually supportive and linked

regionally.”3Thestrategyfocusedonthreeclusters(democratic governance, crisis prevention and re-covery, and energy and environment) and fourthemes(humanrightsandgenderequality,policyreformand consensus-building, constituency em-powerment,ande-governance). Issuespeculiar toMontenegroweregivensparseattention,butthreeareaswereidentified.

Thefirstnotedthatpovertyrateswereseentobesignificantly higher in the northern part of thecountry,andgenerallymirroredsuchregionaldis-parities throughout the Federal Republic of Yu-goslavia (the significance of this was the officialrecognitionthatpovertywasanissue).Thesecondreferencewas tocomplications topovertyarisingfromthelargenumberofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons.Thethirdandmostsignificantreferencewasaddressedtoprogrammingpriorityintheareaofsustainabledevelopment,referredtoastheEco-developmentInitiative,whoseaimwas“… to ensure coherency, transparency, accountability and progress in the areas of environmental protection and poverty eradication; the integration of environ-mental and energy-sustainability objectives into mac-roeconomic and sector policies and in environment-re-lated public.”(CountryCooperationFramework,p.8). Chapter 4.2 of this report describes in detailthecontextandevolutionofthisinitiative.

Throughout2002,theLiaisonOfficepursuedthedevelopment of projects and programmes in theareas identified in the CCF, the handover andstrategynotes.Thefirstmajoropportunityaroseintheareaofpovertyreductionandcivilsocietyde-velopment.ThroughanagreementwiththeWorldBankandtheGovernment,theLiaisonOfficewassuccessfulinexecutingtheDevelopmentandPov-ertyReductionStrategyinitiativefortheRepublic(discussed in Chapter 4.4). This was followed byasecondmajoropportunityintheareaofenergy


__________________________________________________________________________1.ThisprocesswasassistedinpartbythesecuringofdonorfundingforUNDP’sfirstcivilsocietydevelopmentprojectinmid-

2001.Whilethiswastheonlyprojectin2001,itdidestablisha‘programmepresence’.UNDPsupportinthisareaisdiscussedinChapter4.1.

2.InbothSerbiaandMontenegro,UNDPprovidedsubstantialcapacity-buildingsupporttotherespectiveministriesrespon-sibleforinternationaleconomicrelationsandEuropeanintegration.Section4.3highlightsthecaseinMontenegroundertheUNDP-implementedCapacityDevelopmentProgramme.

3.CommonCountryFramework2002-2004,SectionIII,p.4.

andenvironment.TheLiaisonOfficewasabletoacquire support fromanumberof sources–par-ticularlytheRockefellerBrothersFund1–tocarryoutpreparatoryworkandtoestablishapolicydia-logue between the Government of MontenegroandCostaRica,acountryknownworldwideforitssuccessasan‘eco-state’.Thisentrepreneurialworkresulted in thedevelopmentof the largeMonte-negroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme(dis-cussedindetailinSection4.2ofthisreport).

Atthesametime,UNDPexpandedthecapacitiesof theoffice, acquired top-notchnationalprojectandprogrammestaff,maintainedaconstantdia-logue with a broad stakeholder community, andmanaged a complex relationship with the Bel-grade office. Regular status and strategy reportswerepreparedbytheLiaisonOfficeandsubmit-ted to the UNDP Country Office in Belgrade.2A reviewof these reports showed that, from theoutset, UNDP had aggressively pursued the de-velopmentofprogrammesincivilsocietyandsus-tainabledevelopment(orenergyandenvironment,as itwas thencalled) and soughtoutopportuni-tiesinotherareas,suchascapacitydevelopment,UN subsystem coordination, development of theNational Human Development Report, UN-AIDS

coordination, networking and building partner-ships. Discussions with Government and otherdonors on the adaptation of the Serbia CapacityBuilding Fund led to the formulation of Capac-ityDevelopmentProgrammein2003(discussedindetailinChapter4.3).Resourcemobilizationwasgivenspecialattentionsincetherewereverylim-itedUNDPcorefunds,andincomeearnedfromdeliveryofdirectlyexecuteddonor-fundedprojectswasneededtofinanceprogrammeoperations.3

Bytheendof2002,UNDPhadestablisheditselfasacrediblepartnerofGovernment,civilsocietyanddonorsinsupportingtargetedprioritynationalreforms.4Chapter6ofthisreportpresentsanas-sessmentofUNDP’sstrategiesandtheirrelevancetonationaldevelopmentgoals.

3.2.4 NOTE ON CURRENT STRATEGIES: 2005–2009

CurrentstrategiesforMontenegroarefoundintheUnited Nations Development Assistance Frame-work(2005-2009),theCountryProgrammeDoc-ument(2005-2009),andtheCountryProgrammeAction Plan: 2005. The Common Country As-sessment(CCA),carriedoutinlate2003,wasthe

Box 4: National Goals & UNDAF Intended Outcomes

National priority or goal Intended UNDAF outcome

Improvedandequitableaccesstopublicservice Anefficient,accountableandpeople-centredpublicsector

Increasedsocialcohesionandrealizationofrightsofvulnerablegroups

Strengthenedruleoflawandequalaccesstojustice

Useofpolicyinitiativesandglobalgoodsandcon-cernstopromotesustainabledevelopment

Increasedmunicipalcapacitytopromotelocalsustain-abledevelopment

Source:Cpd2005–200�(resultsFramework)

26 C h A p T e r 3

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheRockefellerBrothersFundhadidentifiedfour‘pivotalplaces’intheworldintheirfundingstrategy,oneofwhichwasfor

inter-communityreconciliationinSerbia,andtheotherforsustainabledevelopmentinMontenegro.TheFundwaskeyinpro-vidingfinanceatveryshortnoticeforstrategicinterventions,especiallywheretherewerefundingshortfallsfromtheUNDPCountryOffice.AsdiscussedinChapter4.2ofthisreport,theRockefellerBrothersFundhascontinuedtobeacriticalfactorinUNDPeffectivenessinMontenegro–measuredintermsofitsflexibilityandpartnership,ratherthanfundinglevels.

2.Thestart-upofthePodgoricaLiaisonOfficewasnotwithoutsubstantialmanagementchallenges,whicharediscussedinSec-tion5ofthisreport.

3.Concurrenttoalloftheseactivities,considerabletimewasspentindefiningandrefiningtheroleandresponsibilitiesoftheLiaisonOfficevis-à-vistheBelgradeOffice.

4.TheimplementationandmonitoringofUNDPprogrammestrategiesarereflectedintheStrategicResultsFramework,Multi-YearFundingFrameworkandResults-orientedAnnualReport,allofwhicharepartofUNDP’scurrentapproachtoresults-basedmanagement.ThesemanagementaspectsarediscussedinChapter5ofthisreport.

base document for the development of UNDP’scurrentstrategiesandplans.TheCCA,unlikepre-viousofficialdocuments,coveredarangeofissuesspecific to Montenegro. These included poverty,gender,humanandotherrights(forexample,theright towork,healthandeducation),governanceand the rule of law, security, corruption and or-ganized crime, and especially the environment.The assessment resulted in recommendations forprogrammestrategiesinthreepriorityareas:insti-tutionalandpublicadministrationreform,judicialreformand the ruleof law, and sustainable localdevelopment (these subsequently laid the basisfor revised ‘cluster’ organizational structures inboth the Liaison Office and the Country OfficeinBelgrade).

The UN Development Assistance Framework(UNDAF) and closely associated Multi year Funding Framework (MYFF) and ProgrammeDocument(CPD)coveringtheperiod2005–2009incorporatetherecommendationsstemmingfromtheCommonCountryAssessment.TheUNDAFwas a cooperative effort of the United NationsCountryTeamduring2004,inconsultationwithabroadcommunityofstakeholders(seealsoChap-ter4.5oncoordination).BythetimetheUNDAFwasdeveloped,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviahadbeenreplacedbyalooserStateUnionofSer-bia and Montenegro, with certain competenciesassignedat the state level.The recommendationsfromtheCCA,alongwiththosederivedfromtheMillennium Declaration and eight MillenniumDevelopment Goals, were reflected in the UN-DAFandCPD.ThenationalgoalsofbothSerbiaandMontenegroandintendedUNDAFoutcomesarenotedinBox4.ThosedealingwithsustainabledevelopmenthavespecialrelevanceforMontene-gro. Other than providing a general frameworkfor thecountryprogrammeand fosteringgreater

cooperationamongUNagencies,thereappearstobe littleuse for thesedocumentsasmanagementtools tomonitor, evaluateoradjustongoingpro-grammeactivities.

The Country Programme Document, like theearlierCommonCountryFramework,givesprom-inencetoSerbiaandthestatelevelsofgovernment.For Montenegro, specific consideration has beengiven to poverty-related issues, civil society andenvironment. It is theCountry Programme Ac-tion Planthat,forthefirsttime,presentsaspecificprogrammestrategyforMontenegro,theprimaryuse of which is to secure an agreement betweenUNDP and national partners on the general di-rectionandscopeoftheprogramme.1Programmepriorities are set out in the three ‘clusters’ notedin the CCA and CPD (that is, institutional de-velopmentandpublicadministrationreform,ruleoflawandaccesstojustice,andsustainabledevel-opment).Continuingdevelopmentofpartnershipsisakeyfeatureofprogrammeimplementationineachofthethreeclusterareas.

Chapter6presentsa summaryassessmentof theoverallrelevanceofthecountryprogrammestrate-giesdevelopedand implemented inMontenegro.The next section of the report examines perfor-mance of the main projects and programmesimplementedormanagedby theUNDPLiaisonOfficeinPodgoricaduringtheperiod2002–2005,and the degree to which they followed or influ-encedongoingprogrammestrategydevelopment.


__________________________________________________________________________1.SpecificstrategieswerealsodevelopedfortheStateUnionandtheRepublicofSerbia.See:Country Programme Action Plan

between the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro, Government of the Republic of Serbia and Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the United Nations Development Programme,2February2005.TheCountryProgrammeActionPlanistheinstrumentfortheimplementationoftheCountryProgrammeDocument.ItwasendorsedbytheUNDPExecutiveBoardatitsJanuary2005sessionwithinthecontextofthebasicagreementsignedbetweenthepredecessoroftheStateUnionCouncilofMinistersandUNDPin1988.

Over theperiod2001–2005,UNDPprogrammeactivity in Montenegro focused on three mainareas: social and economic participation, energyandenvironmentforsustainabledevelopment,andinstitutional and judicial reform.Thedesign andeffectivenessofUNDP-supportedprogrammesintheseareashasreliedheavilyondevelopmentpart-nerships with Government and donors. This hasrequiredintensiveandongoingcoordinationwithdonors,Government,civilsocietyandarangeofotherstakeholders.

Thissectionofthereportpresentsthemainfind-ingsfromanassessmentofthemajorprogrammesand projects in each of these areas. As noted inthe introduction, the findings rely primarily onindependentprogrammeandproject reviewsandevaluations that have been carried out, supple-mentedbyconsultationswithallkeystakeholders.Manyofthefindingsarebasedontheperceptionsofthosewhohavebeenmostinvolvedoraffectedbytheprogrammes.Wherethedocumentaryevi-denceexists,avalidationoftheseperceptionshasbeenmadeorqualified.Itistobeexpectedthatinmanyofthecomplexprogrammes,theperceptionsofperformanceorresultsareamatterofviewpoint.Nonetheless, the analysis attempts to draw outthe main findings, lessons and conclusions fromUNDPprogrammeimplementationexperience.

EachofthefourmainareasofUNDPprogrammeactivityisaddressedinseparatesubsectionsbelow.At the end of each subsection, summary find-ingsarepresentedandgeneralconclusionsdrawn.Chapter6ofthisreportattemptstobringoutthemain conclusions and recommendations pertain-ing to the overall country programme, and pro-poses a number of recommendations on futurestrategicprogramming.Annex7containsgraphic‘programmemaps’foreachofthemainclusterorprogrammeareas.

4.1 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

4.1.1 UNDP ENTRY INTO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION SPHERE

UNDPwasoneofthefewinternationalagenciesin2001thatrecognizedthepotentialofMontene-grincivilsocietyasaviableentrypointfordevel-opmentassistance.TheNGOsectorat that timehad been facing several challenges that neededurgentassistanceif itwastosurviveandhaveanimpactonthecountry’sdevelopment.TheUNDPStrategicResultsFramework reinforced theneedfor building NGO capacity, and stated that oneof its expected outcomes was: “Increased involve-ment of the third sector in policy-making and monitor-ing of government activities.”Consideringthe factthatpovertyandtheenvironmentwereimportantfor UNDP globally, and that they were alignedwith Montenegro’s development goals,1,2 UNDPsupporttotheNGOsectorfocusedonthesetwostrategicareas.TheNGOCapacityBuildingPro-gramme for Civil Society Development was themajorprogrammewithinthesocialandeconomicparticipationcluster.

4.1.2 NGO CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME FOR CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

TheNGOCapacityBuildingProgramme(CBP)beganinAugust2001,shortlyaftertheopeningoftheUNDPLiaisonOfficeinPodgorica.Itlastedforfourandahalfyears.Theprogrammewascar-riedout infourphases: thepilotphase, lasting6months;thefirstphase,of12months;andthesec-ondand thirdphases,of18monthseach. Initialfunding was approximately $40,000, which in-creasedto$1millionbytheendoftheprogramme.

Chapter 4

Assessment of Development Results

2� C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheAgendaofEconomicReforms2002-2007,MontenegroEconomicPolicy2003/2004,DevelopmentandPovertyReduc-tionStrategy2003.2.DeclarationonMontenegroasanEcologicalState,1991.

Theprimarygoalwastodevelopaneffectiveadvo-cacyplatformon issues affecting the social, eco-nomicandenvironmentalpillarsofsustainablede-velopment.NGOsworkingonthesamethematicissueswereencouragedtoforminformalcoalitionsandworkbothindependentlyatthelocallevelandthrough coalitions at the republic level. Genderequalitywas introducedasacross-cutting themethroughout programme implementation, alongwiththepromotionofinter-grouprelations.

Theprimary local implementingpartnerwas theCentrefortheDevelopmentofNon-governmen-tal Organizations (CRNVO). Priority was giventoNGOsfromnorthernMontenegro,sinceitwasthe least developed area of the country with theweakestNGOsector.TheNGOsparticipatingintheprogrammedealtwithawidevarietyofissues,including gender, children/youth with specialneeds, inter-ethnic relations,drugaddiction,andtheenvironment.Thelatterincludedgroupsfocus-ingonissuesrangingfromsustainableforestryandorganic food production to water and soil pollu-tion,illegalhunting/fishing,andillegalbuilding.

Thefirstphaseoftheprogrammewasorientedto-wardstrainingforinstitutionalcapacity-building,grantsforprojectswithmicro-to-macrolinkages,andcoachingduringprojectimplementation.Thesecondphasewasdesignedtorespondtothevary-ingneedsoflocalNGOs,expandingthe‘learningbydoing’approachtoinclude:

• Assisting NGOs in making quality contribu-tions to national strategy documents in thefields of gender, the Roma, poverty reductionandsustainabledevelopment.

• Organizing multi-stakeholder events aimed atbuilding consensus on common concerns andinvestinginjointeffortstofindviablesolutions.

• Helping NGOs translate experience into les-sons learned and other learning tools; and as-sistingtheminthedevelopmentofcasestudiesforpublicationasanNGOhandbookonhowtoinfluencegovernmentpolicy.

Thissecondphasewasalaunchingpadforthethirdphaseoftheprogramme,whichhadaclearpolicyfocus.Inphasethree,selectedNGOswereexpect-edtoprovideinputtonationalstrategicdocuments,butalsotoworkaspartnerswiththeGovernmentintheirdesign.

During this third phase, more than 6,000 citi-zens, experts and NGO activists participated indesigning the Development and Poverty Reduc-tion Strategy and ensuring compliance with theMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsandtheNationalStrategy for Sustainable Development. This par-ticipationwas facilitatedby theNetwork forAf-firmation of the NGO Sector (MANS) and theEducoCentre.Inaddition,theInstituteforStra-tegic Studies and Prognoses (ISSP) conducted ahouseholdsurveyamongtheRomaanddisplacedpopulation to establish an accurate poverty pro-fileofMontenegro;29localNGOsworked1withan environmental group focusing on sustainabletourism, organic food production and the pro-tection of water and soil; and NGOs concernedwithpovertyreductionworkedonissuesrelatedtomarginalizedgroups.

Results Achieved through the NGO Capacity Building Programme

Greater accuracy in measuring poverty. As a2004externalevaluationnoted,surveyresultsfromtheISSPsucceededincorrectingtheofficialpov-ertyrateusedinthefinalDevelopmentandPov-ertyReductionStrategyfrom9.6percentto12.2percentofthetotalpopulation.2ThiswasthefirsttimethatgroupsincludingtheRoma,Ashkaelia,Egyptians, refugeesand internallydisplacedper-sons fromKosovoandSerbia,whoaccount foralargeproportionofthepoorinMontenegro,werefactored into poverty statistics. The findings re-vealed that the poverty rate among these groupswas5.5timeshigherthanthemainstreampopula-tion. The survey was conducted by a network of16 Roma NGOs, coordinated by ‘Početak’, theleadingRomaNGOinMontenegro.Thoughthe

A S S e S S M e N T o F d e V e l o p M e N T r e S U l T S 29

__________________________________________________________________________1.Thirtylocalprojectsweresupported,withbudgetsrangingfrom€1,178to€17,767.2.The2003UNDPreport,‘HouseholdSurveyofRoma,AshkaeliaandEgyptians,RefugeesandInternallyDisplacedPersons’

andthesurveyitwasbasedon,conductedbyISSP,wereintendedtocomplementtheexistingsourcesofhouseholddataforthemainstreamMontenegrinpopulation.

finalstrategydocumentreflectedamoreaccuratepoverty assessment, itneglected tomake specificrecommendations regarding the Roma and dis-placed populations – as was hoped for by theNGOsinvolved.

Improved relations between the Government and the NGO sector. Government attitudes to-wardsNGOshavechangedsignificantlyasa re-sultoftheprogramme,andkeynationalstrategieswere designed in a participatory manner. Now,evenwithoutdonorpressure, theGovernment isreachingoutforNGOinvolvementandexpertise.The programme has created new opportunitiesforNGOrepresentation anddialoguewith vari-ousgovernmentbodies,whichhavethepotentialto become institutionalized through continuedinvolvementand theadoptionofa constructivelycriticalattitude.TheprogrammehasenabledleadRoma NGO, Početak, to have regular and di-rectcontactwithhigh-levelgovernmentofficials,which was unimaginable before the programmestarted.TheNGO‘Expeditio’hasestablishedanongoing relationship with the Ministry for En-vironmental Protection and Spatial Planning. Intheperiodfrom2005through2006,theGovern-mentobjectiveistosetupa‘legalandregulatory

framework’ that promotes effective partnershipsbetween Government and the NGO sector inthe provision of government-funded services.TheGovernmentwillalsoconsider signingaMemo-randumofUnderstandingwithNGOstoregulatethe relationshipbetween the two sectors and setoutbasicprinciplesofintersectoralcooperation.1

Increased capacity of participating NGOs. A2004evaluationoftheNGOprogrammeshowedthattraininginorganizationalcapacityhadapar-ticularly strong impact indevelopingpublic rela-tionsandmediarelationsskills.ThisgaveNGOsthe confidence they needed to design and runsuccessful campaigns, raising their profile in lo-calcommunities.Traininginorganizationalman-agementalsohelpedininternalrestructuringandwriting job profiles. However, according to thesamereport,“advances in capacity appear to have been stimulated in project-related performance only, and the majority of organizations in the programme show scant understanding of how they may advance and de-velop their internal organizations.” Approximately80percentofsupportedNGOsareactive,andatleast20percentto30percentoftheseareself-sus-taining.ForsomeNGOs,theirincomeincreased

30 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.Forexample,aMemorandumofCooperationwassignedbetweentheMinistryofInternationalEconomicRelationsandEU

IntegrationandsixpartnersfromtheNGOsectorintheareaofEUaccession.

Box 5: Campaigning to Preserve an Environmental Treasure

ItallstartedwithafewNgosorganizingtostopthegovernmentfromallowingfloodingoftheTarariverCanyon(thedeepestcanyonineuropeandaninternationallyprotectedsite).whydidthegovernmentwanttopermittheflooding?SothatahydropowerplantcouldbebuiltontheriverdrinaintherepublicofSrp-skainBosniaandherzegovina.Inresponse,acrisisgroupformedthatwascomposedofNgosparticipatingintheCapacityBuildingprogramme.AnevenlargerNgomovementwassoonestablished,includingsome50organizations,manyfromneighbouringcountries.Themovementdrafteda‘declarationonTarariverprotection’withtheaimofsubmittingittotheparliamentofMontenegroforadoption.TheNgoinitiativeattractedexceptionalmediaattentionandpublicsupport.Morethan10,000peoplesignedthedeclaration,televisionshowsdocumentingthecampaignwerebroadcastregularlythroughlocalandregionalstations,andeventheBritishBroadcastingCorporationfollowedthecampaignclosely.TheNgosapproachedUNdpforhelp,anditwastheonlyinternationalorganization,asidefromUNeSCo,thatprovidedassistance.eventhoughthefundsofferedwereatokenamount,UNdpinvolvementwasimportantinleveragingwidersup-portandinterestfromtheinternationalcommunity.Bydecember2004,theMontenegroparliamenthadadoptedthedeclarationontheprotectionofTarariver.

significantly,programmestaffexpanded,andtheymanagedtoattractotherdonorsthroughUNDPsupport. For Expeditio, support from UNDP in2003accountedforoveraquarteroftheirbudget;in2004,itwasamere4percent.TheNGO‘Most’increaseditstechnicalcapacitiesandgainedpublicrecognitionbeyondexpectations,consideringthattheyonlyregisteredasanNGOin2003.1

NGOs as agents of change.Throughspecializedtraining, NGOs also strengthened their ‘watch-dog’capacitiesandknowledgeintheareasofpov-erty reductionandsustainabledevelopment.Thisfurther enhanced their ability to monitor imple-mentationofkeynationaldocuments.2The ‘TaraRiverCampaign’ (seeBox5)proved thatNGOsareabletoinfluenceparliamentarydecisionsiftheissueisimportantenough.Somedoubtshavebeenexpressed about the actual influence of NGO inspheresnotlinkedtosustainabledevelopment.Butthe Government is taking steps to ensure theirwider involvement. In 2004, the Government ofMontenegroincludedamongitsspecificinitiativesonecalled ‘ParticipationofCivilSocietyinEco-nomic Policy-making and Preparation of Laws’.3Aworkinggroup, comprisedof civil society andgovernment representativeswill beworkingonamodel for integrating civil society participationinthedesignandimplementationofpoliciesandlaws.It isalsoforeseenthattheEconomic-socialCouncil will be strengthened to include govern-ment,businessandthecivilsocietyrepresentativesinpolicyformulationandimplementation,makingtheCouncilapowerfultoolforinvolvingcitizensandkeystakeholdersinthereformprocess.

UNDP’s role and contribution to the NGO Capacity Building Programme

Theprogrammefeaturedatailored,thoughcom-prehensiveapproach.Fromthestart,itwasbasedontheactualneedsofNGOsandathoroughas-sessment of the NGO sector within a broadercontext.4 Two external evaluations led to moreeffective project design and more efficient use ofresources.Going from thebasics (grass-root ini-tiatives) to seriouspolicydocumentswasamajorachievement.OneNGOreferredto itas ‘closingthecircle’,thatis,utilizingnewlyacquiredcapaci-tiesandexpertisetoinfluencethedevelopmentofstrategicareas.

Relevance. The programme provided participat-ingNGOswith theassistance theymostneededat thetime.Forsomeof theNGOs, itwas theirfirstexperienceofcloseandongoingcooperationwith an international agency. NGOs previouslyunfamiliar with public advocacy have surprisedeven themselves in their ability to attract theat-tentionofthemediaandlocalconstituenciesandauthorities. Participating NGOs confirmed thatthe ‘learningbydoing’approachwasaneffectivemethodofstrengtheningtheircapacities.UNDP’sstrategy for fostering NGO skills by connectinggrass-rootsandpolicyissueswasaneffectiveandrelevant means to promoting sustainable humandevelopmentinMontenegro.

Responsiveness. According to NGO represen-tatives, the programme was especially helpful toNGOsthathaveonlyrecentlystartedtofunction.Various training workshops, followed by smallgrants,providedapackageofassistancethatmadeNGOsfeelthattheywerepartofthesystemanddevelopingarealpartnershipwithUNDP.UNDPstaffwereprofessional,service-oriented,approach-ableandreadytohelp.Theyassistedinredesigningprojectswhenneeded,andactivelyapproachedpo-tentialNGOpartners,encouragingthemtoapply


__________________________________________________________________________1.The staff of the NGO ‘Most’ received training in public relations. Since April 2005, the NGO has been involved in the

‘UnleashingEntrepreneurship’project.2.ProgressReportsPhaseIII.March2005.3.EconomicReformAgenda,p.65.4.Forexample,UNDPstaffvisitedlocalRomaNGOstoassesstheirspecificneedsandselectthemostqualifiedcandidatesto

advancetheRomasituation.

totheprogramme.TheNGOCapacityBuildingProgrammewasimplementedduringacriticalpe-riod inMontenegro’sprocessofdemocratic tran-sition, with both civil society actors and UNDPrising to the task.1Oneof theNGOrepresenta-tivescommentedthattheprogrammewascrucialinhelpinghiscolleaguesdecidetostaywithintheNGO sector. Assistance came at an opportunetime,andprovidedcrucialinputsforanumberoffledgingorganizations.

Effectiveness.TheprogrammeprovidedtrainingthatwasappropriatetotheNGOs’levelofcapac-ityandwassuitedtotheiractivities.Moreover,itwascarriedoutbycompetentandcreativetrainers,was interactiveand stimulating inapproach, andconveniently scheduled. Less developed NGOswerepairedwithmoredevelopedonesfortransferofskillsandknowledge.UNDPexpertsfromoth-erUNDPofficeswerealsoengagedtocontributetospecificissues.

Bringing diverse interests together. Primarilythrough the Development and Poverty Reduc-tionStrategy,andlaterthroughothergovernmentpolicydocuments,UNDPhasmanaged tobringtogether government and NGO representatives,providingaforumforsharingideas.Diversepar-ties converged for dialogue, joint initiatives, andtheestablishmentofbroad-basedworkinggroups,whereideasandcapacitiescouldbeinstitutional-ized.AunanimousfeelingamongNGOswasthat

theycouldnothavepenetrated‘thesystem’ifitwasnot for UNDP. For the Government’s part, theviewwasexpressedthatitwouldhavebeendiffi-culttoforthemtobranchoutinthisnewdirectionontheirown.TheNGO‘MANS’mentionedthatoneofUNDP’sgreatestachievementswasbring-ing them togetherwith theMinistry forLabourandSocialWelfare.

Dealing with sensitive issues. UNDPdeservestobecreditedfordelvingintoareasthatotherdonorsshied stay away from – such as poverty, sustain-abledevelopment,urbanplanningandcorruption(seeBox6).UNDPhadthegoodsense toknowhowtoinitiateaction–forexample,byfollowingupimportantpolicychangeswithconcreteactivi-tiesthatwouldkeepthingsmovingforward.Ac-cordingtointerviewees,atthetimewhenUNDPstarted its support forNGOs,manypeoplewerein thedark aboutparticular issues.For example,povertywasnotconsideredaprobleminMonte-negrinsociety2untiltheDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategyexercisegotunderway.Simi-larly,UNDPintroducedtheconceptofsustainabledevelopment into every sphere, forcing theGov-ernmenttoconsidertheenvironmentalimpactofalloftheiractivities.

The choice of implementing partners.Thechoiceofimplementingpartnerswasnotstraightforward.MANS’involvementinmobilizingthelocalNGOcommunitywithintheDevelopmentandPoverty

Box 6: UNDP Support to Anti-corruption Initiatives

ThefirstnationalconferenceoncorruptionwasorganizedbytheCouncilofeurope,UNdp,thegovernmentAgencyforAnti-corruption,andMANSinoctober2005.ItwasthefirsttimeinMontenegrothatcorruptionwaslinkedtoeconomicissues,eUintegrationandpovertyreduction,insteadofjustpolitics.Theconferencewasdifficulttoorganize,butwhengovernmentrealizedthatitwasgoingahead,itwantedtobeassociatedwithit.UNdpbroughtspeakerswholinkedcorruptiontoeconomicdevelopmentandpovertyreductionandplayedasignificantroleinnegotiationsamongvariouspartners.Theconferencewasanexcellentforuminwhichtodiscussthenatureandmagnitudeoftheproblem,aswellaspotentialactionstocombatit.Inter-viewedstakeholdersagreedthattheconferencehadapoliticalimpact,eventhoughitwouldtakeconsider-abletimeandchangeinpoliticalwilltogetafirmgripontheproblem.onemajorresultoftheconferencewasanagreementtodevelopastrategyormasterplantofightcorruption.

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_________________________________________________________________________1.Ibid.2.WhentheNGOCapacityBuildingProgrammestarted,therewerenoNGOsfocusing“on the issue of poverty as such, but rather

on many different issues which are directly or indirectly connected to poverty, or what might be termed ‘Socio-economic issues/needs’.”(Firstnarrativereport.2002,p.9).

Reduction Strategy process and in organizingconsultationsonthenewLawonUrbanPlanningwasevaluatedasextremelypositive.AndtheroleofCRNVOasakeyimplementingpartnerraisedsomeissuesinrespecttotheiractualinvolvementincoachingandmentoringparticipatingNGOs.1However, some NGOs were quite satisfied withCRNVO’s ongoing support throughout projectimplementation.Thequalityoftrainingprovidedandtransferofskillsandknowledgewasappreci-atedbyall.

Remaining a neutral partner.ThefactthatNGOsperceiveUNDPas‘public-oriented’,andtheGov-ernmentviewsUNDPas‘NGO-oriented’,atteststothenotionthatUNDPhasmanagedtoremainonneutralground.PublicperceptionoftheUnitedNationsinMontenegroispositive,eventhoughitisperceivedthat itsmainmission is tocooperatewith Government, whose ratings were less thanpositive. Interviewed UNDP counterparts ex-pressed the view that the UN and UNDP havedifficult diplomatic roles to play in Montenegro,andthatUNDPperformsthemwell.

Having a clear exit strategy.TheNGOCapacityBuilding Programme will continue to add valueto existing and new initiatives by giving NGOsachance topractisewhat theyhave learned.TheNGOcapacity-buildingcomponentwillbe inte-gratedintotheothertwoclusters(sustainablede-velopment and institutional and judicial reform)as the technical capacities and project portfoliooftheparticipatingNGOsdevelop.TheultimategoalistomakeNGOsanintegralpartofnewpro-grammes.2

Sustainability. While most stakeholders agreedthattheprogrammehasledtosustainableresults,therewassomedoubtexpressedthatmostpartici-patingNGOshave the capacity for efficient andcontinuous operations. External evaluation andsectoranalysishavealsoshownlackofstrategicand

organizational focus among NGOs, along withdeficienciesinmobilizingadditionalresourcesfortheiractivities,whichisevidentintheirrepeatedrequestsforassistance.SomeNGOssaidthattheywouldnotsurviveifUNDPdecidestopulloutitsfinancing. Considering that international agen-cies are still the major source of NGO funding,and that such agencies aregraduallymovingoutoftheregion,thefuturedevelopmentofthesectorwilldependtoagreatextentontaxincentivesforbusinessestosupportNGOs.UNDPcouldassistNGOsinattractingthesupportofthecommercialsectorandinamendingexistingtaxregulations,aswellasinhelpingthemunderstandtheimportanceofdiversifyingtheirfundingbase.

Building coalitions among NGOs.Eventhoughtheprogrammeaimed tobuild coalitions amonglike-minded NGOs, this was not achieved tothe extent hoped for. UNDP managed to bringstakeholders together on various issues (floodingoftheTaraRiverCanyon,forexample).Butsomeoftheserelationshipshavenotbeensustained(forexample,cooperationbetweenMANSandCRN-VO). While NGOs in the socio-economic fieldweremorewillingtoformcoalitions,environmen-talNGOsfelttheymightlosetheirindividualitywhen working in close collaboration with othergroups.3Astheexternalevaluationstates:“…par-ticipants appeared incapable or unwilling to imagine giving up direct involvement in their own particular local or specialist field, in favour of joining forces to cre-ate a critical mass to achieve strategic impact.”4Net-workingasapermanentcharacteristicoftheNGOsectorisyettobeachieved.

Conclusions and recommendations. UNDPshouldcontinuetobuildonitscurrentbasethroughcontinuedsupporttotheadvocacyandpolicyworkofNGOs.MonitoringandevaluationinallareasofUNDP/NGOengagementshouldbestrength-ened.Monitoringimplementationoftheadopted


__________________________________________________________________________1.InphaseI,NGOswerenotgivenanyfeedbackonprojectreportstheysentonamonthlybasistoCRNVO.InphaseII,theywerenotrequiredtosendreports,andtheydidnotknowwhotocontactiftherewasaproblem.2.Projectproposalsforcombatingcorruption,improvingthesocio-economicpositionoftheRomainMontenegroandsupport-

ingtheSocialInnovationFundwererecentlysubmittedtopotentialdonors.3.NGOCapacityBuildingProgramme.2002.Narrativereport,p.9.4.NGOCapacityBuildingProgramme.August2004.Externalevaluation,p.10.

strategydocumentsshouldbeincorporatedintoallprogrammeareas, alongwithNGOnetworking.UNDPcouldalsocontinuetopromoteUNcon-ventionsrelatedtogender,andsupportNGOsandotherorganizations in the implementationof thenewGenderLaw.

Another area thatUNDPhasbegun to address,asnotedabove, issupporttoanti-corruptionandanti-organizedcrime initiatives.ThedraftactionplanoncombatingcorruptionhasrecognizedtheroleofNGOseveninareaswhereitisnotneeded,whichsuggeststhatitismerelyapro-formadocu-ment.SincethecapacityofMontenegrinNGOsisuneven,continuedtailoredsupportwouldbeuse-ful. Since most international assistance currentlygoes to central and local government, UNDPshouldconsiderallocatingmorefinancialresourc-es1insupportofNGOinvolvementinthepublicsphere,butwithaclearexitstrategy.

UNDPhasworkedthroughNGOs,buttheyareoftennotrepresentativeofallcitizensorcivilsoci-etyinterests.ItwasstatedintheNGOCBPproj-ectproposal that theprojects identifiedforsmallgrant support would be community- rather thendonor-driven. The question is: How much havetheprojectsreallyreflectedcommunityneeds?ThemostrecentanalysisoftheNGOsectorinMonte-negro2showedthatthemajorityofNGOsdonotengage at all in community-needs assessment ordosoonlyonanadhocbasis.Inthefuture,apri-maryneedsassessmentofthecommunitymaybesetasapreconditionforaprojecttobeconsidered.Itwouldalsobeusefultoinformthegeneralpublicpriortoorganizingaconsultationprocesssothattheylearnmoreabouttheconceptstowhichtheyare expected to contribute. When the Develop-mentandPovertyReductionStrategyprocesswasinitiated,peoplewerenotsurewhatitwasorwhatitwasintendedtoaccomplish.Thesamewastrue

fortheStrategyonSustainableDevelopment.

TheNGOCapacityBuildingProgrammehaspri-marilysupportedlocalNGOs.Sincetheaimoftheprogrammewastostrengthentheadvocacyroleofcivilsocietyinrespecttosustainabledevelopment,itmightbeworthconsideringtheinvolvementofothercivilsocietygroups(suchasunions,businessassociations3andtheindependentmedia)infutureprogramming.Thiscouldhelpbuildamoresub-stantialbasisforstrongcivilsocietyinvolvement,andcouldhelpovercomethepopularmisconcep-tionofidentifyingcivilsocietyonlywithNGOs.

Interviewed government representatives felt thatsupport to NGOs and the government sectorshouldbemorebalanced–thatis,supporttotheNGOsectorshouldnotbestrongerthansupporttotheGovernment.CooperationwithNGOsontheDevelopmentandPovertyPovertyReductionStrategy started almost a year before the Gov-ernment was involved, so the general impressionwas that NGOs were more concerned about theproblemofpovertythanGovernment.Theirearlyinvolvementmayalsohaveconveyedthemessagethat UNDP was more supportive of the NGOthanthegovernmentsector,thusunderminingthelegitimacy and role of government. “…Ultimately effective implementation will be achieved only with the complicated task of reform and capacity-building of government departments and social institutions.”4

4.1.3 OTHER SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PARTICI-PATION PROGRAMMES

Otherprojectsandprogrammeswithinthisclus-terinclude:theLocalEconomicSustainableDe-velopment Programme, with only one project innorthernMontenegro;5PolicyAdvocacy/Report-ing, which included assistance to the Govern-ment inpreparing theMillenniumDevelopment

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__________________________________________________________________________1.LocalbusinessesarenotgenerallyinterestedinsupportingNGOs(aftersendingaround60letterstodifferentbusinesses,a

localNGOreceivedsupportvaluedat€100fromoneofthem).2.FONDAS.November2005.NGONeedsAssessmentReport.Podgorica.3.Abusinesssectorrepresentativepointedoutthattherewasamajorneedtodevelopthecapacitiesofbusinessassociations,in

particular inpolicyandresearch,sothattheycouldinteractmoreeffectivelywithGovernmentandexpandawarenessandunderstandingofthebusinesssectorasafactorineconomicreformandsustainabledevelopment.

4.NGOCapacityBuildingProgrammeEvaluation.p.4.5.TheLocalEconomicSustainableDevelopmentStrategywasadoptedbyRozajemunicipalityin2004.AmunicipalDevelop-

mentFundofapproximately200,000wasestablishedjointlywithUNDP(amunicipalcontributionof25percentandUNDPcontributionof75percent)in2005tosecurefundingforprioritysustainabledevelopmentprojectsoutlinedinthestrategy.Itisexpectedthatpriorityprojectswillbeimplementedin2006.

Goalsreport;the Montenegro Human Development Report ; activitiesunder theEarlyWarningSys-tem; Assistance in Response to HIV/AIDS andHIV Prevention among Vulnerable PopulationsInitiative (Montenegro component); and recentinvolvement in theSub-regionalGenderProject.Selectedfindingsonafewoftheseinitiativesarepresentedbelow:

(1) The Montenegro Human Development report and the Millennium Development Goals report. UNDPrevampedthenationalHuman Development Report(HDR)processtoallowthepreparationofseparatereportsforSerbiaandMontenegro.Twonationalexpertteamswerecreated,sincemulticul-turalissuesweresubstantiallydifferentinthetworepublics.TheUNDepartmentforEconomicandSocial Affairs was engaged to provide technicalbackstopping and human development expertiseto local implementing partners. In Montenegro,theInstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses,a local think-tank, was selected to take the leadindevelopingthereportforMontenegro.UNDPinvolvementhadtwointer-relatedobjectives:

• Contributingtoahumandevelopmentperspec-tive in Montenegro through the involvementofMontenegrinexpertsandthinktanksinthepreparationofthereportandtheirintroductionintoaninternationalnetworkofhumandevel-opmentpractitioners;and

• Publication of a 2004 Montenegro Human De-velopment Report,reflectingthedifferentaspectsofmulticulturalismthroughahumandevelop-ment lens.Thereportwouldbe launchedcon-currently with the global HDR, dedicated tothesameissue.

The report, ‘Diversities – Potential for Develop-ment’ was published in September 2005. Ac-cordingtoUNDPstaff,finalizationofthereportwas difficult due to the rapid sequence of recentevents and lack of familiarity on the part of na-tionalexpertswithhumandevelopmentpracticesand methodologies. Nevertheless, important re-sultswereachieved:Thepublicationofindicators

ofinequality,forexample,helpedlocalNGOscallattention to the unequal distribution of incomein Montenegro, the disappearance of the middleclassandgrowingpoverty.TheMontenegroHDRwasalsousedinthepreparationofnationalactionplansongenderandontheRoma.

InJuly2004,theMinistryofInternationalAffairsoftheRepublicofMontenegroaskedUNDPforsupportinpreparingthefirstMillenniumDevel-opment Goals (MDGs) report for Montenegro.The Government asked for assistance in coordi-nating the consultation process with UN agen-ciesand inprovidingguidanceandadvicetotheministryandothergovernmentauthoritiesduringthereportpreparation.Ayearlater,inJuly2005,the Government adopted the first MDG reportforMontenegro.ThedocumentwasbasedontheDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategyandcontains information on the achievement of theMDGsinMontenegroaccordingtointernationalindicators. It also included projections to 2015,andindicatedareaswheremonitoringmechanismsneed to be established. In September 2005, theMontenegrinministerofforeignaffairspresentedthereporttotheUnitedNations.ProfessorJeffreySachs1emphasizedthattheMDGswillgiveMon-tenegroadecade-longperspectiveforchartingitsfuture course, lending some stability to nationalpolicies, but at the same time requiring a soundfiscal strategy: “One has to figure out how much it costs, who will pay and how to get the public invest-ment side accomplished in a context of a private-sec-tor led economy.”2TheMDGProgressReporthasbeenusedalongwiththeMontenegro Human De-velopment Reportasasourceofstatisticaldatafornationalstrategiesandasavaluablesourceofin-formationforUNagenciesandinternationalandlocal NGOs preparing project proposals tailoredtothedevelopmentneedsofthecountry.

UNDP role and contribution.Forboth thena-tionalHDRandMDGreports,UNDPprovidedexpertiseandtechnicalsupporttotheGovernmentandinvolvedNGOs.UNDPstafffromPodgorica,


__________________________________________________________________________1.MDGSpecialAdvisertoUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan.2.Forfurtherreferencesee:‘TheVisitofProfessorJeffreySachstoMontenegro,SvetiStefan,17August/SessionIV:Reporton

theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals’,p.4.

BelgradeandBratislavaservedasmembersoftheUNDP Programme Strategy Group for HDRpreparation as part of UNDP corporate report-ingresponsibilities.TheMDGreportpreparationshowed a high level of efficiency1 on the part ofUNDPincoordinatingandcollectinginputfromthevariousUNagenciespresent inMontenegro,that is, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),Officeof theUNHighCommissioner forRefu-gees(UNHCR),theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO), and the International Organization forMigration (IOM). Government officials publiclyexpressedtheirgratitudetoUNDPforitssupport.UNDP staff were creative and flexible in usinglimitedresourcestothemaximum.

(2) HIV/AIDS.Themain aimof theHIVPre-ventionamongVulnerablePopulationsInitiativeistodevelopacoherentapproachtoHIVpreventionandcontrolintheStateUnionofSerbiaandMon-tenegrothatinformsworkthroughouttheregion.In2004,whentheprogrammewasinitiated,therewerefourdemonstrationprojectssupportedwithintheMontenegrocomponent.However, therewasnotyeta focalpointappointedwithin theMon-tenegroLiaisonOfficeandcoordinationwashan-dledthroughBelgrade.TheprogrammeisfundedbytheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelop-ment (DFID) and managed in close partnershipwiththeImperialCollegeLondonandtheOpenSocietyInstituteinNewYork.

PositivemovesonbehalfoftheGovernment(suchastheestablishmentoftheRepublicanCommis-siononAIDSandthecompletionofaRapidAs-sessment&Response),resultedintheadoptionofa National HIV/AIDS Strategy for Montenegroand led to greater involvement of UNDP in thearea. The new programme was initiated to sup-porttheCountryCoordinationMechanismintheGlobal Trust Fund Application on HIV/AIDS,ensurecoordinationofallHIV/AIDSactivitiesinMontenegro,andassisttheworkoftheRepublicanCommissiononAIDS.InAugust2005,UNDPhiredaprojectassistanttocoordinateallactivitiesrelatedtoHIV/AIDS.

While most expressed the view that UNDP in-volvementinthisareaprovidesaddedvalue,someUNagenciesarescepticalandthinkthatUNDPshould think more strategically about the initia-tivesitrespondsto.Theyemphasizedthatitisim-portantthattherightagencyleadsorparticipatesintherightinitiatives,especiallywheretheremaybeoverlap.ConfirmationofthevalueofUNDP’srole,however,didcomeintheformofadecisiononthepartoftheRepublicanInstituteforHealthto designate UNDP as the primary recipient ofgrantsemanatingfromtheGlobalFundtoFightAIDS,TuberculosisandMalaria.2

(3) UNDP Gender Equality Project. A subre-gionalgenderprojectsupportedbytheCanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA) be-gan in July 2005 with a central project office inSarajevoandUNDPfocalpointinPodgorica.Themainobjectivesareto:pressuretheGovernmenttointroduce/implementgenderlegislation,developapool of gender experts within the Government,andstrengthentheOfficeofGenderEquality.Itisatwo-yearproject(endinginMarch2007),withtotalfundingofC$1.2million.

Resultsachieved:

• Increased visibility of the Office for GenderEquality

• Identification of gender-related training needswithintheGovernmentofMontenegro

• EstablishmentofaProjectBoardinMontenegrotointegrategenderequalityintotheRepublic’spoliciesandstrategies

• Promotionofapartnershipbetweencivilsoci-etyorganizationsandtheGovernment’sOfficeforGenderEquality

• DevelopmentofthefirststrategicdocumentfortheOfficeforGenderEquality,whichisexpect-ed to strengthen its statuswithin theGeneralSecretariatoftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro.

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__________________________________________________________________________1.ThefinalUNDPreportontheMDGprocess.2.Totalling€2.5millionbythesecondyearofprojectimplementation.

4.1.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sincethesocialandeconomicparticipationclus-terwasonlycreatedinearly2004,itisdifficulttoprovideanoverall assessmentof its effectiveness.That said, theprojects andprogrammes it covershaverepresentedoneofthreemainfocusareasforthe UNDP Liaison Office in Montenegro. Andeventhoughtheseprojectsmaynotcontributetopovertyreductiondirectly,theyareestablishingasolid basis for future programming. The projectspointtoanexpansionofthesocialdimensionandagreaterfocusonjobcreationfortheRomaandothervulnerablegroups,givingmorelegitimacytotheorientationofthesocialandeconomicpartici-pationcluster.

The importance of the NGO Capacity BuildingProgrammecanbeseenmoreintermsofitsvalueas a catalyst for change, rather then servicepro-vider to the host Government. The programmeanticipatedandrespondedtoneedsinatimelywayandwasrelevanttotheRepublic’sneeds.UNDPstimulatedactiononissuesthatwerecrucialtotheRepublic’s future, but that were not necessarilypart of the Government’s or donor community’sagenda.Theseissuesincludedcivilsocietypartici-pation, sustainable development, NGO-Govern-ment relationships, and development of north-ern Montenegro. The programme was coherentwithaclearvisionandunderstandingofwhereitwasgoing.

NGOs,governmentcounterpartsandinternationalorganizationsuniformlyperceivedtheprogrammetobe a success–one thathasmanaged tobringtogether the NGO and government sectors, en-ablingthemtoworktogetherforthebettermentofthesocietyasawhole.Participatoryprocesseshavebeensetinplaceandwillcontinue,evenintheab-senceofUNDP.NGOcapacityhasbeenbuilttoensurecontinuationoftheworkthathasstarted.And UNDP has managed to position itself wellbetween the various requests coming from Gov-ernmentandcivilsocietygroups.Byplacingpov-ertyreductionandsustainabledevelopmentonthepublic agenda, UNDP has built a solid basis forhelpingMontenegromoveforwardinmeetingtheneeds of its society, while responding to its owncorporatemandate.

4.2 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

4.2.1 THE CHALLENGES OF AN ECOLOGICAL STATE

ThechallengestothesustainablemanagementofthenaturalenvironmentinMontenegroaresteep,1includingexcessive anduncontrolledexploitationofnaturalresources;deterioratingtrendsinwater,sanitation and waste management; and excessiveairpollution,particularlyinanumberofindustrialareas.Furthermore,Montenegrohastransbound-arywater resourcesandglobalenvironmental re-sponsibilities, including the protection of uniquespecies of flora and fauna in designated WorldHeritageSites.Theprioritiesof theGovernmentintacklingtheseissuesstemfromtwoobjectives:harmonizing existing and new efforts with thelegislation and standards outlined by the EU asprerequisitesforaccession,andprovidingbalancedeconomic growth in potentially important areas,notablytourism.

TheGovernmentofMontenegrohaslongacknowl-edgedtheneedforsustainablemanagementofnat-uralresourcesinachievingnationaleconomicandsocialgoals.In1991,theMontenegrinParliamentadopted a declaration on Montenegro as an ‘eco-logicalstate’,whichwasformalizedintherepublic’sConstitutionof1992.Afteraperiodofprotractedeconomicandpoliticalhardshipandconflict, thiscommitmentwasrestatedin2001throughthegov-ernment strategy document, ‘The DevelopmentalDirectionsofMontenegroasanEcologicalState’,andmorefirmly in2002when it re-launched theecological state concept at theWorldSummit forSustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannes-burg. In November 2005, the Government pre-sented the first draft of its National Strategy forSustainableDevelopmentinMontenegro.

4.2.2 INITIATION OF UNDP INVOLVEMENT

HavingestablishedaLiaisonOfficeinMontene-gro in2001, and in the contextofMontenegro’scommitmenttoanecologicalstateandtheforth-comingWorldSummit forSustainableDevelop-mentin2002,UNDPidentifiedwhatittermeda


__________________________________________________________________________1.Forafullerdescription,seeChapter2.2.4ofthisreport.

“ready-made opportunity to take on a coordination role in a key corporate outcome − improved capacity of au-thorities to plan and implement integrated approaches to environmental management and energy develop-ment that respond to the needs of the poor.”1Withthisopportunity at hand, UNDP managed to securefuturecommitmentsonbothGlobalEnvironmentFacility (GEF) and WSSD (Rio+10) funds, andgenerateddonorinterestinfundingprojectsintheareasofenergy,naturalresources,wastemanage-mentandeco-enterprise.

As a consequence of discussions with the Gov-ernment and relevant NGOs, including a mis-sionbytheassistanttotheUNsecretary-generaland UNDP director for Europe and the CIS tosupportthedialogueonwhereUNDPmightas-sist, itwas suggested that a ‘South-South’ coop-erativemodelcouldbedevelopedbetweenCostaRicaandMontenegroas fellowecological states.TherelevanceoftheexperienceofCostaRicawasseen as the successful implementation of neededeconomic,socialandpoliticalreformsinamannerthathasdrawnandutilized thenatural resourcebasesustainably.2

Capitalizing on this proposal, and with finan-cialsupportfromtheRockefellerBrothersFund,UNDPorganizedtwomissionstoMontenegroin2002,ledbyDr.ReneCastro,aformerCostaRi-canministeroftheenvironmentandsenioradviserto UNDP. Based on extensive consultations, in-cludingmeetingswiththenPresidentĐjukanovićand Prime Minister Vujanović, three courses ofactionwererecommended:

• ToestablishaNationalCouncilonSustainableDevelopment to coordinate the formulationofnewandintegrateddevelopmentstrategiesandpolicies,reportingdirectlytotheOfficeofthePresident.

• To seize the WSSD as an opportunity to re-launchtheconceptofMontenegroasanlogicalstateontheglobalstage.

• Todevelop‘earlysuccess’cases(so-called‘low-hanging fruits’) in the framework of a long-termsustainabledevelopmentstrategy,andthusdemonstratetoGovernmentandthepublicthefeasibility and efficacy of such an approach.Eco-tourism,energyefficiency/renewableener-gy,andsustainableforestrywererecommendedastargetareas.

Attherequestofthepresident,theteamfocusedthesecondmissiononkeyareasfortheimplemen-tationof aSustainableEcologicalStateStrategy.These recommendations, accepted by the thenestablishedNationalCouncilonSustainableDe-velopment,providedaplatformforUNDPtoes-tablishaquorumofinterestwithNGOsandtherelevantgovernmentdepartmentsandtoengageindiscussionswithpotentialdonors.ThisresultedinthedesignofaSustainableEcologicalStateStrat-egy Programme (later renamed the MontenegroSustainable Development Programme), whichwaspresented to theGovernment foracceptanceinAugust2003.TheenergyandenvironmentforsustainabledevelopmentclusteroftheUNDPLi-aisonOfficewassetupasthecoordinatingunit,li-aisingwiththeMinistryofEnvironmentalProtec-tionandPhysicalPlanning,thefocalpointfortheNationalCouncilonSustainableDevelopment.

4.2.3 MONTENEGRO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-MENT PROGRAMME

TheobjectiveoftheMontenegroSustainableDe-velopment Programme (MSDP) was defined aspartofacountrywideeffortofUNDPinSerbiaandMontenegro to achieve the strategically definedoutcome:3“Capacity of constituent authorities to plan and implement integrated approaches to environmental management and energy development, including the in-tegration of global environmental concerns and commit-ments in national development planning and policy.”4

3� C h A p T e r 4

_________________________________________________________________________1.OccasionsReport,UNDPMontenegroOffice,ReportNo.0,January2002.2.In1994,thegrossdomesticproductofCostaRicawassimilartothatofMontenegrotoday.CostaRicawasimporting15

percentofitsenergyandacquiringamountingforeigndebt.By2002,thecountrywasexportingrenewableenergyandhadathrivingeco-tourismbusiness,alongwithaninnovativeandlucrativeseriesofenvironmental-servicesprojects.

3.Yug/03/010,SustainableDevelopmentintheEcologicalState:FromVisiontoCommitmentandPractice.ShortTitle:MSDPPhaseI,p.5..

4.ThisintendedoutcomerelatestoUNDPcorporateStrategicResultsFramework2000-2003Goal3:“To protect and regenerate the global environment and natural resource asset base for sustainable human development;”Sub-goal1:“Promote the integration of sound environmental management with national development policies and programmes.”

ThisobjectiveisinlinewithMillenniumDevelop-ment Goal 71 and supports a number of expect-ed results outlined in the Country CooperationFramework for Serbia and Montenegro 2002-2004.2

To achieve the objective, the MSDP identifiedseveral areas in which it would focus its activi-ties:sustainabletourism,renewableenergy,spatialplanningandsustainable forestry.Cuttingacrossthese, the programme document states that spe-cialattentionwouldbepaidtoensurerepresenta-tionofwomeninalltrainingevents,conferences,etc.3 Beneficiaries were identified as businesseswithin the communities that could benefit fromsustainabletourism,forestrypracticesandamoresustainableenergysector;directbeneficiariesweredefinedasincludinggovernmentinstitutions(no-tably the Ministry of Environmental ProtectionandPhysicalPlanning,theMinistryofEconomy,theMinistryofTourism,theNationalCouncilforSustainableDevelopmentaswell asNGOs,mu-nicipalauthoritiesandpublic institutionssuchasthe National Tourism Organization, the PublicCompaniesforNationalParksandtheElectricityCompanyofMontenegro).

At the timeof theMSDP’s approval, theRock-efeller Brothers Fund had approved a budget of$54,000, within an overall indicative budget fortheprogrammeof$74,000.Resourcemobilizationwithdonorswasongoing.Thus,whilespecifying

four main work areas, the MSDP was also con-ceivedasaflexibleplatformtooutlinemajorissuesfor further analysis andassessment in communi-cation with the Government and other donors,whichcouldpotentiallyresultinfurtherprojects.Thisresponsivenesstochanginggovernmentneedswas noted as being particularly necessary in adynamic transition economy, in which UNDPcoreresourceswereverysmallandhadtobesup-plemented by additional donor resources.4 It iswithinthisevolvingcontextthattheMSDPwillbeassessed.

(1) Sustainable Tourism

TourismhaslongbeenanimportantpartofMon-tenegro’s economy, but after almost a decade ofdecline, the republic’s position in the sector wasdefinedas“weak… lacking financial resources, a com-mercial product and adequately qualified specialist personnel. The number of overnight stays has declined from just about 11 million in the 1980s to 5 million to-day… and all the foreign markets have broken away.”5Despitethisdecline,tourismiswidelyregardedasthe republic’s main prospect for export-orientedeconomic growth in the coming years. Both theGovernment and the World Travel and TourismCouncil (WTTC) have made optimistic projec-tionsforgrowthintouristnumbersandrevenuesoverthenextdecade.6

ThechallengeraisedbyDr.Castroandhis team


__________________________________________________________________________1.MDG7,ensureenvironmentalsustainability,includesthefollowingparts:integratetheprinciplesofsustainabledevelopment

intocountrypoliciesandprogrammesandreversethelossofenvironmentalresourceswithfocuson:a)proportionoflandareacoveredbyforestb)landareaprotectedtomaintainbiologicaldiversityc)energyefficiencyinlinewithGDPperunitofenergyuse,andd)carbondioxideemissions.

2.TheexpectedresultsforSerbiaandMontenegrooutlinedintheCommonCountryFramework2002-2004include:(a)globalenvironmentalconcernsandcommitmentsareintegratedintonationaldevelopmentplanningandpolicy;(b)theinformationbaseandavailabledataonenvironmentalissuesareenhanced;(c)governmentfinancialresourcesforenvironmentalmanage-mentactivitiesareincreased;(d)aframeworkforsustainabledevelopmentissuesisdevelopedanddisseminatedforanalysisanddebate;(e)legalandregulatoryframeworksforenvironmentalplanningandmanagementareestablished,includingthelegalbasisforrejectingunsustainablemethodsandoverexploitationofenvironmentalresources;(f)thenumberofskilledandtrainedlocalauthoritiesemployedforprogrammedesignandimplementationinthissectorincreases;(g)sustainableenergystrategies,includingenergysavingprogrammes,aredeveloped.

3.Yug/03/010,p.6.4.Personal communication, responseofUNDPLiaisonOffice toADRInceptionReporton theStateUnionofSerbia and

Montenegro,September2005.5.GermanInvestmentandDevelopmentCompany.2001.TouristicMasterPlanforMontenegro.Executivesummary,p.1.6.The2005TourismSatelliteAccount(WTTC,2004)estimatesthecontributionofthetravelandtourismindustrytoMon-

tenegroat8.5percentoftotalGDP(over€132.61million)in2005,and9.1percentoftotalemployment.Realgrowthisesti-matedatabout9.7percentforthetourismindustry,and15.8percentofemployment.Withaprojectedaveragerateofincreaseofover10percentayearoverthenextdecade,by2015thetourismindustryshouldaccountforabout13.6percentofGDPand14.5percentofemployment.Source:WorldBank.2005.Montenegro Economic Memorandum: A Policy Agenda for Growth and Competition,pp.77-78.

duringhisinitialvisitin2002wasnotthegrowthoftourismperse,butthedirectionandnatureofthatgrowth. In2001, theGovernmentendorseda Touristic Master plan (2001) prepared by theGermanInvestmentandDevelopmentCompany,which identified a high-growth, high-standardnichefortourismdevelopment,focusedmainlyonthe coast.1 This projected growth, it was arguedbytheexpertteam,wouldbeunsustainable,sinceMontenegro does not have infrastructure (watersystems, solidwaste treatment capacities, sewagetreatment, electricity, etc.) in place to cope witheventhecurrentnumberoftourists,andadequateresourceshadnotbeensetasideforthesepurposesintherepublic’sbudget.Countertotheassertioninthemasterplanthatsustainabledevelopment,de-finedintermsofenvironmentalstandards,istakenforgrantedbythemarketandaffordsnocompeti-tiveadvantage,itwassuggestedthatMontenegrohasresourcesandthepotentialtorespondtosuchmarket demands sustainably through protection/conservation measures, better management andcapitalizationofitsnaturalresources.Thus,Mon-tenegro should concentrate its efforts to attracthigher spending, ecology-orientated independenttravellers, and includea focuson inland forestedareas.Asaprerequisiteforachievingthis,theteamsuggestedaneco-tourismstrategytogivedirectionandbasisforsustainabletourismdevelopment.2

Strategic framework for northern and central Mon-tenegro: Based on these recommendations, andthrough the existing partnerships built with rel-evant government institutions and NGOs, theUNDPMSDPoutlinedaprojectinlate2002tosupportthedevelopmentofasustainabletourismstrategicframework,focusedonnorthernandcen-tral Montenegro. The objective was to ensure that sustainable tourism was given at least equal priority in development as mass tourism.3Theproject,man-agedbytheUNDPLiaisonOfficeteam,workedwith theMinistry ofTourism andother institu-

tionsthroughseveralphases:theassessmentofpo-tential, market analysis, institutional frameworkmappingandultimatelytheproductionofastrate-gicframework.

Unleashing Sustainable Tourism Entrepreneurship:Based on one of the framework objectives, thisprojectwasdevelopedinDecember2004tocreateamodelforpublic-privatepartnershipsintheareaaroundDurmitorNationalPark,leadingtothede-velopmentofnewsustainabletourismproductsintheparkandtheirmarketing.Thebroaderobjec-tiveoftheprojectwasdefinedaspromotingmoreeffective protected areas management, includingopportunitiesforsustainabletourismandhelpingentrepreneurship in rural development and foodproduction through public-private partnerships.The14-monthpilotprojectbeganinApril2005.

Results Achieved in Sustainable Tourism

Adoption of a strategic framework. TheStrategicFrameworkforDevelopmentofSustainableTour-isminnorthernandcentralMontenegrowasad-optedbyGovernmentinSeptember2004.AstheNational Strategy for Sustainable Developmentnotes,numerousstrategicdocumentsfordevelop-mentoftourismexist,butveryfewhaveaddressedthe implications for the environment.4 The mainadded value of this framework was channellinginterestinsustainabletourismasaviabledevelop-mentmodelfornorthernandcentralMontenegro,simultaneouslydealingwithsocialissues(poverty),encouraging debate on development alternativesand educating government and local stakehold-ersintheprocess.5Astheleastdevelopedregionin Montenegro, the proposed strategies for thenorthernpartofMontenegroare targetedat realchange in the poverty and unemployment situa-tionamonglocalcommunities.

Providing a counterweight to the mainstream. Theprimeobjectiveoftheprojectwastoprovide

40 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.Themasterplandefinedtheaimasfollows:“inthesummerMontenegrowillbecomea‘highqualityMajorca’andinwintera

qualifiednicheproviderwithspecialproducts.”Itprojectedhotelbeddingcapacitygrowthinthethreestartofivestar(verygood-exceptionalquality)marketfrom26,000in2001to50,000in2010and100,000by2020.

2.AssessmentandrecommendationsproducedbyDr.ChristInman,atourismexpertwithexperienceinCostaRicaandCroatia,aspartof:MissionIIReport,CastroTeamVisittoMontenegro,7-22December2002,pp.17-24.

3.Yug/03/010,p.10.4.GovernmentofMontenegro.November2005. National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD).Firstdraft,p.32.5.Oja,A.2005.ExternalEvaluationofMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme,p.32.

abalanceinthedebateonthefocusandnatureoftourism.EvidenceofthiscomesnotonlyfromtheNational Strategy for Sustainable Development,buttheEconomicReformAgenda1andtheprimeministerhimself.2TheWorldBank’sanalysisalsorefersdirectlytothestrategicframework,andsug-geststhatMontenegroshouldfocusitsinvestmentonadiversifiedtourismproduct,withdueatten-tiontoenvironmentalsustainability.Furthermore,whiletheTouristicMasterPlanof2001remainstheGovernment’sofficialtourismstrategy,ithasbeensuggested that this may not always be the case.3Thishas been achieved through the strategies ofseveralactorswhoengagedpolicymakersandsup-portingNGOsinthedebate.However,thedebatehasnotceased,andtheTouristicMasterPlanre-mainsthecurrentstrategy.Anumberofkeyactorsandstrategicdocumentsclassifytheapproachout-linedintheframeworkasaneco-tourismniche,4andcontinuetoarguethatanapproachcentredonEuropeanexamplesofhigh-gradetourism,withinthe appropriate environmental framework, willbesustainableandmoreeconomicallyviable.Thelack of a legal framework that necessitates stra-tegic environmental assessment, compounded bythe lackof aNationalAreaSpatialPlan (due tobecompletedin2006)andtheNationalStrategyforSustainableDevelopment (draft inNovember2005)leavesanumberoftheseissuesopen.How-ever, the level of interest and engagement acrossawide spectrumof stakeholders (NGOs,privatesectorandvariousgovernmentministries),includ-ingtheestablishmentoftheOfficeforSustainableDevelopmentintheOfficeofthePrimeMinister,

suggeststhattherewillbeanexpandingpresenceof those who will seek and lobby for a balancedapproach.

Platform for public-private partnerships. Theframeworkforsustainabletourismoutlinedanum-berofstrategiesfordevelopment.Theyfocusedoncreatingpublic-privatepartnershipsfortheimple-mentation of projects and raising the awarenessoflocalentrepreneurstoincreasetheircapacitytotakeadvantageofsustainabletourismopportuni-ties.ApilotinitiativeledbyUNDP,‘UnleashingSustainable Tourism Entrepreneurship’5 in thearea of Durmitor National Park, began in April2005. According to the external evaluation, theeffort has succeeded in bringing all stakeholdersarounda table for thefirst timeto talkandplantheir future actions, improve basic park servicesandreviewalternativemodelsthroughastudytourtoBulgaria.Overtheperiod2004-2005,thenum-beroftouriststotheparkdoubled,andanincreasein rafting activities has resulted in revenue gen-erationofjustover€1.0million,adoublingfrom2004.6Whiletheprojectisstillnew,thepartner-shipestablishedbetween thenationalpark, localgovernment,NGOsandlocalbusinesseshasbeenassessedasextremelyeffectiveinaddressingbothenvironmentalandeconomicissues.

(2) Spatial Planning

Legacy of the socialist planning system. Aswith most other sectors of the environment andeconomy, the planning system in MontenegrowasinheritedfromtheSocialistFederalRepublic


__________________________________________________________________________1.TheEconomicReformAgenda’sobjectivesontourismrefertoasustainableanddiversifiedtouristproductandoutlinethe

parametersofsustainabledevelopmenttoprotectenvironmentalandculturalheritageandaregionalbalancethatrecognizesdifferentneeds, circumstances andpotential of northern, central and southernMontenegro.Government ofMontenegro.2005.Economic Reform Agenda for Montenegro 2002-2007.Update,p.137.

2.Inaninterviewwiththeprimeminister,hereferredtotheimportanceoftourismdevelopmentinMontenegro,withafocusonthecentralandnorthernregionsofthecountryundertheSustainableDevelopmentModel.Personalcommunication,6December2005.

3.BasedoninterviewsconductedwithofficialsinandoutsideofGovernment.4.EconomicReformAgendaforMontenegro2002-2007.Update,p.141;DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,p.31.5.Withstart-upfinancingthroughUNDPHeadquarter’s ‘GrowingSustainableBusiness ’initiative,andbasedonthereport

preparedfortheUnitedNationssecretary-general,‘Unleashingentrepreneurship–makingbusinessworkforthepoor’.6. Mrdak, D. An Economic Evaluation of the Tara River.Draft.ConductedfortheWorldWildlifeFund’sMediterraneanPro-

gramme,September2005.Whilethisrepresentssignificantgrowthovera12-monthperiod,itshouldbeseeninthecontextofnationaldata,illustratingthatthecontributionofthetravelandtourismindustryin2005was€132.61million,andthegreatertravelandtourismeconomywhichcapturesbroadereconomy-widelinkagesassociatedwithtourism,at€231.9million.Thus,thecurrentimpactoftheTaraRiverrepresentsbetween0.45-0.80percentoftotalrevenueinthesector(Source:WorldBank,2005,p.78).

ofYugoslavia.Assuch,itwashighlycentralized,complex, incoherent and procedures-driven, andsimply not responsive to the demands associatedwiththetransitiontoamarketeconomy,toemerg-ingdemocracyortonewmodelsofurbanandre-gional development. Existing laws and practicessufferedfromanenforcementlacunabetweenthecentral and municipal authorities, generally poorcompliance, a lack of transparency in decision-makingandanabsenceofpublicparticipation.Theweaknesses in the socialist legacy systems inhib-ited improvements to basic infrastructure (water,sewage,electricity,transport)andpresentedmajorhurdles for foreign investment in tourism, espe-ciallyamongothersocio-economicsectors.

Allthisproducedasystemthatwascost-ineffectiveandunaccountable.Furthermore,theseconditionscombined to create opportunities for corruptionandtheproliferationofunplannedorillegalbuild-ingconstructioninthedenselypopulatednarrowcoastalandotherzones.AnewPhysicalPlanningandDesignActhadbeenadoptedin1995,which,intheory,emphasizedcohesionbetweenthevari-ouslevelsofplanning(nationalthroughurbanandlocal), but in practice was seen as cumbersome(forexample,longanddifficultland-useapprovalsprocesses),non-relevant,unenforceableand resis-tant toengagement fromcivil society.Therehadbeensomeshort-termbutad-hoceffortsatthelo-calleveltoresolveillegalbuilding.Decisionsweremadeinanon-transparentmanner,thepublichadlittle access to information and regulations wereappliedunevenly–allofwhichservedtoalienatelocalpeople.

The need for assistance. By 2003, the Govern-ment of Montenegro had become increasinglyawareoftheproblemsandweaknessesassociatedwiththeexistingplanningsystem.TheMinistryofEnvironmentandPhysicalPlanninghadsetupaworkinggrouptoproposerevisionstotheexistinglaws and recommend thedraftingof anewLawonPlanningandDevelopment.1TheGovernment

sawthatimprovedspatialplanning,supportedbytransparentandparticipatoryprocesses,wereneed-ed tobetteralign thegoalsofeconomicgrowth,poverty reduction and sustainable development–especiallywithrespecttotourismasanimpor-tantgeneratorofeconomicgrowth.Thetaskofre-forming theoverallplanning systemwas seenassubstantialandlong-terminnature.TheGovern-mentrecognizedthatforeigntechnicalassistancewouldberequiredforinstitutionalstrengthening,capacity-buildingandforspecializedadvice.Asaconsequenceofasuccessful studyvisit toIrelandformunicipalgovernmentofficialsandNGOstogaininsightintotheplanningandlegalsystemofanEUcountry,theGovernmentinvitedUNDPtoproposehowitcouldhelpinreformingtheplan-ningsystem.

The UNDP-supported project. In response,UNDP, in cooperationwith theministry, devel-oped a project to assist the Government in re-drafting the Planning Act and to build capacityinpublicparticipationinspatialplanninganden-forcement (entitled ‘Strengthening GovernanceSystemsinUrbanPlanninginMontenegro’).Themainobjectiveoftheprojectwastostrengthenthecapacities of the central and municipal levels ofGovernmentandtosupport theestablishmentoftransparentandparticipatoryplanningprocesses.

Itwasrecognizedthatmajorchangesinthepoli-ciesandpracticesassociatedwithspatialplanningwould take considerable time and resources. Theprojectthereforefocusedonsupporttothedevel-opmentofseveralimmediateandpracticaloutputs:new legislation, clarification of the institutionaland accountability frameworks, better coordina-tion mechanisms, streamlined licensing and re-latedproceduressuchasthosedealingwithjuris-dictionaldisputes(compliantwithEUstandards,including anti-corruption measures), monitoringsystems on the implementation of the new law,andtheestablishmentofconsultativeandpartici-patoryprocesses,especiallyatthemunicipallevel.2

42 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.Spatialplanning,physicalplanning, land-useplanning, andurbanor townplanningare terms thathavebeenused inter-

changeably, but in essencemean the same thing.The common feature is that they concern theplanning, controlling andregulatingofland-use.Theterm‘spatialplanning’ispreferredinMontenegro,sinceitisgenerallyusedbyarchitects(whichisthemainprofessionaltrainingofmostplannersintherepublic),whereastheterm‘physical’or‘land-use’planningismostoftenusedinotherdevelopedcountries(wherethemainprofessionaltrainingofplannersisbasedonamorecross-sectoralandmulti-disciplinarycurriculum).

2.Thefull titleof theproject is ‘TechnicalAssistance,Capacity-BuildingandAwareness-RaisingSupport to theMEPPforReformofthePlanningLaw’,December2003−hereafterreferredtoastheSpatialPlanningProject.

Theprojectproposalwasforaninitialphase,andreceived funding from theSwedish InternationalDevelopment Agency (SIDA) in the amount of$759,000 over a period of about 2.5 years. Theprojectwasoriginallyplannedfordraftingthelawonly, but has since been extended to incorporateworkonfiveby-laws.Thesubsequentfundingex-tensionwasacceptedbySIDA.1

Theurbanplanningproject’sinputsandprocessesweremodelledonthoseappliedbythetourismandothercomponentsoftheMontenegroSustainableDevelopment Programme: supporting the work-ing group that had been established to draft thenewlaw,reviewingexistinglegislation,organizingstudyvisitsandworkshops,sponsoringarangeoftrainingevents (that is, for staffatboth themu-nicipalandrepubliclevels,forthejudiciaryontheimportance and practices for enforcement of thenew law, and forNGOs), andorganizing ‘facili-tationgroups’ toensurebroad-basedconsultationandparticipation.

Results achieved. Even though the project hasonlybeenunderwayfortwoyears,ithasproducedseveral tangibleoutputs, anumberofnotable re-sultsandshowseverysignofbeingontrackincre-atingthenecessarybaseforasustainable,reformed‘physical planning systemoutcome’ over theme-diumtolongerterm.2Perhapsthemostsignificantoutputoftheproject,asrevealedbyarecentevalu-ation, was the strengthened, more cross-sectoraland institutionalized capacities for transparentandparticipatoryplanning in the republicanandmunicipal levelsofGovernment.Theseprocessesweredevelopedinlargepartthrougha‘learningbydoing’approach–aseriesofjointworkshops,theuseoffeedbackmechanisms,thepublicationofareporton‘citizen’scomments’regardingthedraftlaws,otherreportsonexperts’debates,andpublicpresentationsanddebates.

Moretangibleoutputswereproducedthanorigi-nally envisaged. In addition to drafting the newSpatial Planning Act, five by-laws and regula-

tions fordealingwith ‘informal settlements– il-legal building’ were/will be developed. The newplanningactrequirespublicconsultationandtheincorporation of non-professional stakeholderopinionthroughoutvariousstagesofdevelopment,thusassuringtransparencyofthespatialplanningprocess.Also integrated into the lawaremanda-toryenvironmentalimpactassessments.ThedraftofthenewSpatialPlanningActwasdiscussedbythe Government in November 2004, submittedtoParliament inDecember2004andadopted inApril2005.ThediscussionattheParliamentreliedheavilyonapresentationpreparedbyUNDP.

Aninterestingandpromisingresultfromtheover-allprocessisasenseofrenewedhopeonthepartofthepublic,municipalplannersandtechnicalstaffthatthenewlawandthewayitwasdevelopedwilleventuallyhaveapositiveimpact.Thisrepresentsamajorshiftfromtherecentpastthathasseenadeclineinpublictrustandrespectofthelawsandtheirenforcement.Inthewordsofoneseniormu-nicipalplanner:“Initially, we did not want to be in-volved in this project. We were too busy on other tasks, and I was somewhat sceptical of change. But UNDP persisted in getting our involvement and finally we agreed. It was one of the best decisions we ever made. We have learned a whole new way of approaching plan-ning, of dealing with the public, of working together for a common end.”

Asisthecasewithsimilarlawsinothercountries,theefficacyandlegitimacyofthenewlawwillde-pendonenforcement,andespeciallyenforcementoftheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentAct,theStrategic Impact Assessment Act and the Inte-gratedPollutionandPreventionControlAct, allofwhichwerebeingdebatedinParliamentatend-December 2005. Implementation may be post-ponedto2007or2008onthejustificationthattheministrylacksthecapacityforimmediateenforce-ment.ThisisanareaoffuturepotentialassistancefromUNDPandotherdonors(forexample,fromtheCapacityDevelopmentProgramme).


__________________________________________________________________________1.TheprojectwasalsocloselycoordinatedwiththeEnvironmentGeographicInformationSystem(GIS)project,fundedbythe

MinistryofForeignAffairsofFinland,thefirstphaseofwhichfocusesonforestryandbiodiversity.2.ThefindingspresentedherearebasedontheaforementionedexternalevaluationoftheMontenegroSustainableDevelopment

Programme,andtwomonitoringreportsproducedbytheSIDAconsultant,PerIwansson.Theseare:‘StrengtheningPhysicalPlanningProcessesinMontenegro–SupportthroughUNDP’,ConsultantFollow-upReportNo.1(2July2004)andCon-sultantFollow-upReportNo.2(12July2005).

TheSpatialPlanningActlistsanunusuallylargenumberofdifferentplans linkedtovariousplan-ninglevels,andtherestillappearstobesomeun-certaintyastoresponsibilities.Amajorissuewheredifferencesofopinionprevailisinthesubordina-tion between central (republican) and municipalplanning levels, and in the future rollout of themore detailed planning procedures, which couldproducemorebureaucracyandredtape.Themin-istryunderstandsthatthenewlegislationmustbe‘dynamic’andthuswillneedtobereviewedfromtimetotimeaccordingtolessonslearned.

Also deserving mention is training on the newlaw for NGOs involved in spatial planning, en-vironmentalissues,localdemocracyactivitiesandrelatedareas.Thetrainingaddressednotonlythetechnicalaspectsofplanning,but‘softer’areasaswell,suchasparticipatoryrightsandresponsibili-tiesintheplanningsector.Theprojectconductedtwo training events on new legal frameworks inurbanplanning, and forneighbourhoodprojects.BotheventsaimedatbuildingNGOcapacitiesthatmay lead to better implementation and enforce-mentoftheSpatialPlanningAct.Anotherfeatureofthetrainingwaslinkingtheproblemofillegalhousing development to enforcement (since it isNGOs that have a ‘watchdog’ role at the neigh-bourhoodlevel).

A‘BestPracticeExchangeConference’wasorga-nizedbyUNDPinlate2004inwhich20oftherepublic’s21municipalitiesparticipated,andthathave,insomecases,continuedunaided.Examplesofbestpracticesincluded:(1)asoftware/databaseofallconstructionplanningpermits(fromthemu-nicipalityofKotor);(2)asystemforcapturingin-formationonillegalbuildingsandcomparingthemto official plans (from the municipality of BijeloPolje);and(3)asuccessfulimplementationofnewzoningplans(fromTivat).InformationwassharedonSlovenianexperiencesontheuseofGeographicInformationSystems(GIS)inspatialplanning.

Finally,questionsonthesustainabilityoftheproj-ecthavebeenraised.Thesehavebeenansweredin

part by the Government itself: The ministry hasinternalizedthenew(law)planningmodelthathassincebeenadoptedbysomeof thesouthernmu-nicipalities in the development of by-laws. Also,through considerable media coverage, there isbroaderpublicawarenessofthesenewprocesses.

(3) Environmental GIS for Montenegro

Anestimated45percentofMontenegro’s landisforested, of which one third is production forestthatcanbeusedasrawmaterialforwoodprocess-ingindustries.Thesetreesarelocatedmainlyinthenorthofthecountry,whichisthemosteconomical-lyimpoverished,andrepresentsthebestprospectsforsustainabledevelopmentoftheregion.1Forestmanagementrepresentsasignificantproblem,withunplannedcutting,poorenforcementregulations,unfavourableexploitationmethods,damage fromforestfires and illness frompathogens causedbyairpollution.In2000,morethan250forestfiresoccurred,inwhichmorethan2,000hectareswereburneddownandaround150,000cubicmetresofwooddestroyed.

TheGovernment’sDevelopmentandPovertyRe-ductionStrategy identifies significant changes inboth legislative and institutional frameworks askeytoimprovementsinforestmanagement.Gain-ing sustainable forest certification is also centraltoaccessingexportmarkets,andisdependentonrestructuring and retraining of bodies manag-ingforestsandpublicworks,preparinganationalinventory and introducing Geographic Infor-mation Systems to catalogue and monitor forestresources.

WithasmallgrantfromaUNDPThematicTrustFund,oneof thefirstprojectsof theUNDPLi-aison Office was to conduct an Information andCommunicationsTechnology(ICT)needsassess-mentandorganizeaninterministerialforumdeal-ingwiththeuseofGIS.Withthistechnologicalentrypoint,anddrawingontherecommendationsoftheearlymission,2theMontenegroSustainable

44 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.EconomicReformAgendaforMontenegro2002-2007.Update,p.147;DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,p.39.2.Anassessmentcarriedoutconcludedthatthepoorstateoftheforestindustry,togetherwiththelackofdataonforests,has

resultedinpoorforestmanagement.Muchofthedataavailableisoutdated,withweakcapacityintermsofavailableICTin-frastructureandtraining,makingtheprocessofforestcertification,preventionofforestwilting,protectionanduseofpristineforestareasdifficult.(Birchmore,December2002).

Development Programme included a componentonbuildingtechnicalandhumancapacityforbet-termanagementandprotectionofforestresources.The objective was defined as evaluating “the real situation on the ground and facilitation of the updat-ing of information… [enabling] sustainable planning and management in the forestry sector and facilitate effective response to illegal logging, forest fires and forest disease.”1Thiswasidentifiedascriticaltofa-cilitatingtheprocessofforestcertification,2with-out which sustainable management of forestryisdifficult.

Basedonthisplatform,aproposalforanenviron-mentalGIS forMontenegrowasdevelopedwiththekeyinstitutions,theMinistryforAgriculture,Forestry and Water Management and the Min-istry for Environmental Protection and PhysicalPlanning. The proposal received funding fromthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland viaFINNIDAamountingto$550,000fora15-monthproject (begun May 2005) to achieve a series ofphasedoutputs, startingwith the forestry sector.Thesefocusedinitiallyonproducingadatabaseforforestryandbiodiversityevaluationbasedonsatel-liteimagesandexistingpaper-baseddata;creatingbasic tools for forest inventory; digitalizing vari-ousmapsandcreatinglayersonbiodiversity;andtrainingstaffintheforestryandbiodiversitysectortouseandworkwiththeGIS.Itwasanticipatedthat,ifsuccessful,therewouldbeopportunitiestorolltheinitiativeoutwithintegrationandpoten-tialsynergiesforICTinenvironmentalprotection,planningandbiodiversity.

Results achieved. Despiteinitialdelaysinreceiv-ing the funds, at the time of assessment the es-tablishmentoftheprojectunit,selectionofstaff,formingof the team,developmentofworkplansandhighlevelofintegrationofministryrepresen-tatives in the project were all seen as strong in-dicatorsoflikelyachievementofintendedresults.Regular bilateral meetings between the projectunitandgovernmentalinstitutionstakeplace.Thequalityandavailabilityofbasiccomparabletopo-

graphic and geographic data also proved to be alarger thanexpectedchallengetotheteam,withthemostcurrentaccuratemapsover30yearsold.Problemsinobtainingairphotosandpapermapshavebeensolvedbyusingsatelliteimages.

Capacity development. Five staff from the for-estrysectorandonebiodiversityexperthavebeentrained in GIS application. The project sharedfacilitieswithacontrolandplanningbodyoftheCentralManagementUnitoftheMinistryofAg-riculture, Forestry and Water Management, andthiscontributedinformallytotechnicalcapacity-building,improvedskillsandorganizationofwork(action plans, objectives, feedback, separation ofduties,delegationofauthority,etc.)attheCentralManagementUnit.

Promoting information as a public good. Thelackofaccurate,consistentandpubliclyavailablecadastral data remains a constraint to develop-ment in Montenegro and inhibits public choice.The public information law requires that all in-formationispublic,butinpracticeinformationonlanduse,borders,resourceutilizationandthelikehasnotalwaysbeeneasilyaccessible.ApilotGISdatabase was created that contains currentlyavailable forestrydata.Aswithallproductspro-duced by the project, the database will be madeavailabletoawideaudiencethroughtheInternetandothermeans.

Creating an institutional and technical basis for upscaling.Themostsignificantresultoftheproj-ect is its potential applicationofGIS as a cross-sectoral planning tool.Aby-lawhasbeen issuedpertainingtoaMontenegrinGeographicInforma-tionSystem(MonGIS) that isexpected to resultincoordinateddatamanagement.Thesystemwillensurethatestablishedskills,softwareandhard-waresystems,networks,maps,anddatabaseswillbe used continuously after theproject concludes.Thecooperationschemesthatdevelopedbetweengovernmental institutions, especially in forestryandenvironmentalprotection/nationalparks, are


__________________________________________________________________________1.Yug/03/010,p.12.2.TheLUXDEVELOPMENT–FODEMOprojectsupportsforestcertificationaccordingtotheForestStewardshipCouncil

standardandfieldworkforGISdatacollection.TheForestAgencyandFODEMAprojectcontinuetotrainregionalforestofficers.Properequipment(computeraccess)hastobemadeavailabletoallregionaloffices.

valuableinrelatedandfuturework.1Othersectors,suchasspatialplanning,rescueservices,transportand public infrastructure, can, in future, be in-cludedinusingtheservicesofMonGIS.

However,theissueoftheeventualsustainabilityoftheGIShasbeenraisedbyfunders,inviewoftheneedforawell-establishedoperationalandorgani-zationalinfrastructure.Thesystemincludeshighlytechnical components, and the work involved inthemaintenanceandupdatingofdata,andprovid-inglinkagestoothersystems(forexample,satellitesources),canbeconsiderableandexpensive.More-over,morecost-effectiveGISsolutionsmayappearon the market. UNDP and the Government ofMontenegroarecurrently lookingatasemi-stateinstitutionalarrangement,whichwouldmixpub-licandprivatesectorsourcesoffunding,depend-ingontheservicerequiredandthebodyrequest-ing it. However, there is a need to be careful inchoosinganeventualsolution,sinceongoingop-erationsandmaintenancemaybemoreexpensivethaninitialdevelopment.Thechallengewillbeinpromotingandexpandingtheuseofthesystemtoothersectorsthatcanbenefitfromtheinformation(forexample,universitiesandresearchinstitutions,internationalorganizationsthegeneralpublic).ItmaynotbeinthebestinterestsoftherepublictoinstitutionalizesuchafacilityinsidetheGovern-ment;apublic-privatepartnershipmaybeamoreappropriate solution, or a separate organizationthathas assured independence, transparency andaccountability.

(4) Renewable Energy

Montenegro’senergyproductioncapacityisinsuf-ficienttomeetitsneeds,duetotheuseofobsoleteequipment,theenormousenergyrequirementsoftwoantiquatedmetalprocessingfacilities,2risingpublic demand – particularly for private heating(whichincreasedthreefoldovertheperiod1980-

2000),weaknesses inthedesignandfunctioningofthepowermarket,andinsufficientparticipationoftheprivatesectorandindependentenergypro-ducers. The republic currently spends about $48millionayearimporting1,500gigawatt-hoursofpower, almostone thirdof its energyneeds.TheStatePowerUtilityCompanyisthesolenationalproducer, burning low-grade fossil fuels (lignite)with large associated external costs.Comparisonofcurrentestimatedrealcostsforproduction/pur-chase, transmissions and maintenance (includingdepreciation)indicatesover100percentundeclaredsubsidiesforprivateandindustrialconsumers.3

In June2003, theParliamentadoptedanewen-ergylaw,compliantwiththeEUenergydirectiveofthesameyear.Followingthis,anindependentregulatory agency was established in 2004, issu-inglicenses,preparinggridcodesandworkingontariffmethodology.Initialassistancefortheagen-cy’sstart-upwasprovidedbyUSAIDandDFID.The European Agency for Reconstruction planstofundtechnicalassistancefromtheendof2005inwhichanenergyefficiencystrategy,workplanand the restructuring of the State Power UtilityCompany,includingassistancewithprivatization,are all outputs.Oneof the tasks outlined in theEconomic Reform Agenda update of 2005 is ananalysisofnewenergysources,whichreflectsthelimiteduseofrenewableenergysources inMon-tenegro,despiteitsnaturalresourcepreconditions.

In 2002, it was reported that the estimated un-tappedpotentialofhydropowerinMontenegroisinexcessof80percent.4AconferencesupportedbyUNDPonrenewableenergyandorganizedbytheNGO ‘Zeleni’ looked into the options availableforMontenegro.Itconcludedthatthebuildingofsmallhydrostationsrepresentedthebestcombina-tionoflocaldevelopmentthroughsmall-andme-dium-sized enterprises, while also strengthening

46 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.Anumberofagencieshavebeenworkingonclassificationofhabitatsforprotectionthatprovideanexcellentinformationbase

toenhancetheGISdata.Forexample,bytheendofDecember,10percentofthesitesintheEmeraldproject(anetworkundertheBernConventionof1989),whichitselfrepresents30-50percentofallforestcoverinMontenegro,willhavebeencapturedbytheGIS.

2.KombinatAluminiumPodgorica(KAP)isa1970sbuiltfacilityforaluminiumproductionusingFrenchtechnologyfromthe1960sthatwasneverupgraded.KAPandtheNikšićSteelPlantjointlyconsumeapproximately45percentoftheRepublic’scurrentenergyrequirements.

3.Sources:EconomicReformAgendaforMontenegro2002-2007.Update,pp.161-162;DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,pp.34-35;Yug/03/010,p.6.

4.Intheperiodfrom1980to1986,viabilitystudieswereconductedforconstructing70unitsofmini-hydropowerplantswiththecapacityofupto10megawatts.

the grid periphery, producing minimal environ-mentalimpactandfacilitatingsustainabletourismdevelopment.1ThispresentedanalternativetotheplansoftheStatePowerUtilityCompany,whichfocus on the building of large-scale hydropowerprojects that would require considerable capitalinvestment andcouldhaveapotentiallynegativeimpactontheenvironment.

PriortotheestablishmentoftheMontenegroSus-tainable Development Programme, UNDP out-lineditsintentionstorespondtospecificneedsintheenergysector.AsearlyasNovember2001,theUNDPLiaisonOfficesoughtfundingopportuni-tiesfromtheUNDPThematicTrustFundtocon-ductresearchandoutreachontheenvironmentalimpact of energy infrastructure policies. And inearly 2002, it established an agreement with theGovernment to be its official partner on climatechange issues,pavingtheway forpotentialGEFfunding.Followingtherecommendationsmadebytheexpertmissionsof2002,2theUNDPLiaisonOfficefocusedonrenewableenergyasaniche,andapproachedseveraldonors to fundanassessmentproject.

Under the auspices of the Montenegro Sustain-able Development Programme, UNDP outlineditsintentiontosupportsmall-andmedium-sized

enterprises and municipal authority capacity de-velopmentinrenewablehydro-energyproduction.TheprojectproposedtoassisttheGovernmentinpreparing the strategy for the development of small hydropower plants, through drawing on the posi-tive experience of Slovenia3 and on the success-fulWorldBankminihydroprojectinTheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia.Inparallel,theproposaloutlinedaplantomobilizeresources tocontract assessments to identify potential loca-tionsanddeterminecost.Atermsofreferencefortheprojectwasdrafted inAugust2004,andtheprojectwas launched inMay2005with fundingfrom the Rockefeller Brothers Fund ($35,000),USAID-CommunityHousingFinance($25,000)and UNDP ($7,000). The stakeholders includedtheDeputyPrimeMinister’sOffice,theMinistryof Economy, Ministry of Environmental Protec-tionandPhysicalPlanning,theEnergyRegulationAgencyandtheStatePowerUtilityCompany.

Results achieved. Though renewable energy hasbeen recognized by the Government as an areathat requires further legislation, research anddevelopment,4 this project was only launched in2005.Thedifficultyofobtainingfundingsincetheformulationofproposalsin2002reflectspoorco-operationbetweentheUNDPofficesinBelgradeand Podgorica in preparing the Thematic Trust


Box 7: Changing the Course of Mountain Tourism

TheprogrammefordevelopmentofMountainTourismwasdevelopedbytheInternationalTourismInstitutefromljubljanafortheMinistryofTourism.Theideahaspotential.Thetroubleis,someoftheproposedactivi-tiesweredeemedunsustainable(suchastheconstructionofski-liftsinanationalpark).withsupportfromUNdp,theNgoNaturaorganizedaroundtabletodiscusstheplan,invitingabroadrangeofstakeholderstoparticipate.Basedonconstructivedialogue,papersweresubmittedtotheministrythateventuallyconvincedtheministeroftourismtopubliclycommittoforegoingtheprogrammeuntilithadaddressedthesesustain-abilityissues.

__________________________________________________________________________1.Theenergylawof2003makesprovisionsforIndependentPowerProducers,outliningthebasicpreconditionsforsmallhydro-

powerdevelopmentanddefiningtheregulatoryagencyastheinstitutioninchargeofthelicensingprocess.2.TheexpertmissionsofDr.Castro’steamin2002identifiedanumberofpossibleshort-terminterventionstoimproveenergy

efficiencyandconservation,focusedprimarilyontax-basedsanctionsandincentivesforconsumerstoreduceuseandswitchtomoreefficientmethods.See:MissionReportI,DrReneCastro’sVisittoMontenegro,15-18July2002,p.11-12,typescriptandMissionIIReport,CastroTeamVisittoMontenegro,7-22December2002,pp.30-31,typescript.

3.Slovenia,anex-YugoslavrepublicwithwhichMontenegrohasanexcellentrelationshipandveryclosecooperation,wentfrom1.4percentoftotalgrossproductionofelectricalenergyproducedinsmallhydroplantsin1990to2.3percentin1999and3percentin2001.Overallitisasuccessstory,buttherewerelessonslearnedintheprocessthatcouldbevaluableforMontene-gro,especiallyintheareaofenforcingenvironmentalregulations.

4.TheGovernmentintendstodraftlegislationandconductstudiesontheconstructionofnewrenewablehydro-energyfacilitiesandexpansionofexistingsources,andsupportsaplanforusingrenewableenergy.EconomicReformAgenda,p.163.

Fundprojectproposal,1abroaderweaknessinco-operationbetweentheGovernmentanddonorsontheissueofenergy,andabeliefamongdonorsthattheprimaryissuestoberesolvedpertaintocross-subsidy, consumption and conservation, ratherthangeneration.Inviewofthisstance, itcannotbeconcludedatthisstagethatthiswasnecessarilyanareaofinvestmentwithearlyreturns.However,thecontinuedcommitmentofUNDPinrenewableenergydoesrepresentpartofthebroaderefforttoraise the profile of sustainable development. Itsimportanceasapotentiallymajorsourceofenergyfor Montenegro is increasingly being recognizedbyGovernmentanddonors..

(5) Cross-cutting Cooperation

Capacity development. Establishing an Office of Sustainable Development:Akeygovernmentpart-nerforUNDPintheMSDPhasbeentheNation-alCouncil forSustainableDevelopment, chairedbyPrimeMinisterĐjukanović.2Oneoftheinter-ventionsdefinedintheMSDPisstrengtheningoftheNationalCouncil,andinlate2005,adecisionwas made to establish an Office for SustainableDevelopmentwithinthePrimeMinister’sOffice.TheOfficeforSustainableDevelopment3willen-abletheprimeministertosupporttheCouncilasasenior-levelpolicydecision-makinginstrumentforGovernmentonallaspectsofsustainabledevelop-ment,includingtourism.

Strengthening the Ministry of Environmental Pro-tection:Thedemandforcapacity-buildingofcivilservantsattheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtec-tionandPhysicalPlanningwasidentifiedduringthe development of a different project under theumbrellaoftheMSDP.4Throughcross-clusterco-operation,theCapacityDevelopmentProgrammewas requested to support the ministry through

thedevelopment andmanagementofpolices, ITsystems,etc.

Results achieved.TheOfficeforSustainableDe-velopmenthasbeensetuponaone-yeartrialbasis.Ithasthepotentialtoactasaclearinghouseforsus-tainabledevelopmentprojectsthatmaycomefromanysectororministry.Itwillalsoprovideabasisforsupportingpolicyandstrategydevelopmentfroman intersectoral vantage point. The prime minis-ter himself identified the workings of the Officeas ahighpriorityof theGovernment–one thatwillprovideabasisfordiscussionswithdonorstoestablishitsroleandcapacityinsupportoftheNa-tionalCouncilforSustainableDevelopment.Ex-ternalpartieshaveidentifiedtheestablishmentoftheOfficeasasignofstrongcommitmentbytheGovernment to support environmentally sounddevelopment, and see its potential as an agenda-settingbody.TheestablishmentoftheOfficehasbeen managed as a cooperative project betweentheGovernmentofMontenegroand theUNDPCapacityDevelopmentProgramme,whichissup-portedbytheFoundationOpenSocietyInstitute,theGovernmentoftheNetherlandsandtheEuro-peanAgencyforReconstruction.TheGovernmentisproviding facilities,while theCapacityDevel-opmentProgrammeisfundingtheposts,technicalequipmentandworkprogramme.

Supporting the National Strategy for Sustain-able Development. The preparation process forthe National Strategy for Sustainable Develop-menthasbeenledbytheMinistryofEnvironmen-talProtectionandPhysicalPlanningandtheUNEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP),withsupportfromUNDPintheareasofpublicandexpertpar-ticipationandconsultation.5Thissupporthasbeenprovidedthroughthesocialandeconomicpartici-pation cluster of UNDP, with the NGO ‘Expe-

4� C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.EffortstoseekfundingthroughGEFhavealsobeenslow,inpartduetotherequirementstonegotiateatthefederallevel.Poor

communicationbetweentherepublics,andtheselectionofUNEPastheprincipalrecipientinSerbia(ratherthanUNDP)requiredthebuildingofinter-agencyrelationshipsbeforefundingcouldbesecured.

2.Anationally recognizedexpert insustainabledevelopmentandenvironmentalprotection issueshasbeenappointedas thedirectoroftheOfficeforSustainableDevelopment.

3.TheNationalCouncilforSustainableDevelopmentiscomposedofrepresentativesfromGovernment,NGOs,businessandacademia,withthemandatetocoordinatetheformulationofnewandintegrateddevelopmentstrategiesandpolicies,andtoachievetheinvolvementofallrelevantinstitutionsandsocietyingeneraltoensurewideacceptance.

4.IncludingthedraftingprocessoftheSpatialPlanningAct,ledbytheenergyandenvironmentcluster(seemoredetailsintheearliersub-sections),PhaseIoftheGEF-fundedproject‘ImprovementoftheProtectedAreaNetworkandManagementintheDinaridesMountainEcoregion’,etc.

5.ThisagreementwasbrokeredafterdiscussionsattheAdriaticIonianMeetingchairedbyMontenegroinMiločerin2004.

ditio’ providing expertise, and the NGO ‘Most’facilitatingthepublicparticipationprocess.1Whilethispreparationprocessisongoing,ithaspresentedregularopportunitiesfortheenergyandenviron-mentclusterofUNDPtoengageinthesubstan-tiveissuesaddressedbythenationalstrategy.

Advocating for change.Anumberofspecificac-tivitieshavebeenimplementedasaresultofclosecooperationbetweenallthreeLiaisonOfficeclus-ters, notably the Tara River campaign2 and theround-table on the Mountain Tourism Develop-mentProgramme(seeBox7).Ineachcase,infor-mation, support and/or financial resources havebeenmobilizedfromallthreeclusters.Anevalu-ationoftheMSDPfoundthatUNDP’s involve-ment in these public campaigns and debates hasfurthereditsstandinginthecommunityofstake-holders(Government,donors,NGOs,academics)inpromotingsustainablesolutions.

4.2.4 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

The objective of Montenegro Sustainable Devel-opment Programme was defined as building thecapacityof authorities toplan and implement in-tegratedapproachestoenvironmentalmanagementandenergydevelopment.Themeanstoachievethiswasdefinedthroughsupportingpoliciesandlaws,institutionaldevelopmentandtheestablishmentofpilotinitiatives.Thoughtheprogrammewascon-ceived in 2002, it was not fully operational untilAugust2003.Thus,ithadonlybeenactivefortwoyearsatthetimeofassessment.Theevaluationoftheprogrammepriortothisassessmentconcludedthatitsobjectiveshadbeenachievedalmostfully,with a six-month, no-cost extension required forcompletion. The objectives of the programme areasfollows:

Advocating sustainable development. StartingfromtheproposaltobringDr.CastroandhisteamtoMontenegroin2002,UNDPhasmaintainedasteady force in bringing sustainable developmentissues tobearongovernment institutionaldevel-opment, policy formulation, public debate, pri-

vate investmentanddonor involvement.ThishasbeenachievedbysupportingNGO-ledcampaignsagainstpotentiallyenvironmentallydamagingini-tiatives;developingastrategyforsustainabletour-ismasaviabledevelopmentmodelinnorthernandcentral Montenegro, thereby providing a coun-terweight to mainstream mass tourism concepts;promotingtheconceptofinformationasapublicgood;changingattitudesthroughinvolvingpublicparticipationinthedesignoflaws;andbyorganiz-ingorsupportinglocal,nationalandinternationaleventsthatraisetheprofileofthesustainablede-velopmentcause.3

Adoption of policies and laws.Twomajorachieve-mentsoftheMSDParetheadoptionbytheGov-ernmentofthestrategicframeworkforsustainabletourisminnorthernandcentralMontenegro,andthe support for the drafting and passing of theSpatialPlanningAct.Whiletheadoptionoflawsrepresents outputs only, they are also intermedi-ateindicatorsofthedirectionandnatureofprog-ress,which,incombinationwithsupportiveworkontheGIS,theNationalStrategyforSustainableDevelopment,andthepublic-privatepartnerships,areimportantmilestones.

Capacity development.Workingwiththosegov-ernmentministries,institutions,NGOs,commu-nities and entrepreneurs that are stakeholders intheMSDP,theCapacityDevelopmentProgrammeand activities of the energy and environmentcluster have sought to train and build awarenessand capabilities. Pertinent examples include thestrengthened,morecross-sectoralandinstitution-alizedcapacitiesfortransparentandparticipatoryplanningintherepublicanandmunicipallevelsofGovernment through the spatialplanning initia-tive;andtheinformaltechnicalcapacity-buildingoftheMinistryofAgriculture,ForestryandWa-terManagement,which share a facilitywith theGISteam.

Pilot initiatives with potential. Pilots are notnecessarilyexpectedtobesuccessfulbeyondtheirexperimentalphase.Nevertheless,anevaluationof


__________________________________________________________________________1.SeeChapter4.2formoredetails.2.Ibid.3.ExamplesinthelastfourmonthsincludetheinternationalmeetingheldinLakeSkadar,organizedbyUNDPandUNESCO,

whichbroughttogethertheprimeministersofMontenegroandAlbaniatodiscussthesustainabledevelopmentofthelakeundertheDinaricArcInitiative.Anotherexampleisathree-daysustainabletourismfestivalheldintheDurmitorNationalPark,incooperationwiththeMinistryofTourism,NationalParksofMontenegro,andtheNGO‘Most’,aspartofthe‘Un-leashingEntrepreneurship’project.

theMSDPfoundthatpublic-privatepartnershipsare‘unleashingentrepreneurship’and,thoughstillnew, represent an exemplary process worthy ofmorestudy.TheworkondevelopingaGISforfor-estrymappinghasalsobeenidentifiedasacross-sectoralplanningtool,andaby-lawpertainingtoa Montenegrin Geographic Information Systemhasbeenissuedthatwillresultincoordinateddatamanagement.

The extent to which these achievements reflectthe intendedresultsof theMSDP,theCommonCountry Framework, and contribute to largerobjectives,notablyMDG7of ensuringenviron-mental sustainability, varies.To a certain extent,thisisindeterminable.TheobjectiveoftheMSDPandresult(f)oftheCommonCountryFramework(citedearlier)havebeendefinedwithoutclearpa-rameters(Whichauthorities?Towhatlevel?Howassessed?Towhateffect?)andthuscanbesaidtohave been achieved, and are yet to be achieved.CertainlyUNDPiscontinuingtoexpanditssup-portinthisarea.

FiveoftheCommonCountryFrameworkresultspertaintointegrateddevelopmentplanninginen-vironment,energyandaframeworkforsustainabledevelopmentandassociatedlegalinstruments.TheNationalStrategyforSustainableDevelopmentisin draft, an energy law has been adopted that iscompliant with the EU directive, and a strategyfor sustainable energy options is being drafted.Environmental legislation, including lawsonen-vironmental impact assessment, were passed bythe Parliament in 2005, however the capacity toimplementtheseremainsweak.

Athirdresultrelatestotheinformationbaseandavailable data on environmental management,whichisbeingaddressedbytheworkofanumberof agencies onhabitat classification and theGISproject. This in itself will assist in the measure-mentsrequiredbytheMDG7ontheproportion

oflandareacoveredbyforestandbiodiversity.Thefinalresultrequiresthatgovernmentfinancialre-sources for environmental management activitiesareincreased.Thismayincludelookingatoptionsfordevelopingpartnershipswiththeprivatesector,and/orincludecost-recoverymechanisms,suchascharginguserfeesfordataaccess.

Overall achievement within the time-frame ofoperations can thus far be viewed as promising.However,muchremainstobedone.Asnotedina2004workshopontheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals, one area in which Montenegro may fallshortisthatoftheenvironment.1

UNDP Role and Contribution

Thissectionaddressestheoverallrelevance,coher-enceandeffectivenessofUNDP’scontributiontoMontenegro’s challenges in energy, environmentand sustainabledevelopment through the vehicleoftheMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentPro-grammeanditscomponentprojects.

Relevance. The critical energy and environmentissues facing Montenegro in 2001−2002, whichstillexisttoday, involvetheexcessiveanduncon-trolledexploitationofnaturalresources;deteriorat-ingtrendsinwater,sanitationandwastemanage-ment;industrialpollutionandexcessivehouseholdenergyuse;andtransboundaryresources.Amongthepressingeconomicprioritiesthatinterfacedi-rectlywiththeseissuesaretourism,therehabilita-tionandprivatizationofagriculture,forestryandwoodprocessingandtheenergysector.

Withinthiscontext,theidentificationofecologi-cal/sustainabletourismasanentrypointwasstra-tegic.Withturn-keysupportfromtheRockefellerBrothersFund,aframeworkforthedevelopmentofnorthernandcentralMontenegrowascreated,which became a catalyst for other activities. The

50 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.VisitofProfessorJefferySachstoMontenegro,p.14.TheMDGReportof2004identifiesseveralchallengestothemonitoring

andachievementofMDGGoal7,onenvironmentandsustainabledevelopment.Fromameasurementandtrackingperspec-tive,theseincludethelackofsystematicannualmonitoringofthechangesinterritorycoveredwithforests,lackofconsistencyinmeasuringenergyefficiencyandcarbondioxideemissions.Of therelevantdata thatdoexist,7.2percentof the land isestimatedtobeprotectedtomaintaindiversityagainstatargetof15percentin2015;theaspectsofenergyconsumptionandefficiencymeasureddemonstrateveryhighconsumptioncomparedtocountrieswithasimilargrossnationalincomeandalowlevelofgrossdomesticproductgeneratedperunitofenergyuse.

primaryvalueofUNDP’sworktodateinsustain-abletourismhasbeentoprovideanalternativetothemainstreamapproach.Ithasalsodemonstrat-ed the potential economic returns from an eco-logicallyorientedapproach.Andithasprovidedaplatformfordiscussingsustainabilitymorebroadlyatinternational,nationalandlocallevels.Theval-ueofUNDPsupportwasrecentlyacknowledgedbytherepublic’sprimeminister,whoencouragedUNDP’scontinuedinvolvementinthisarea.

In addition to eco-tourism development, UNDPregarded energy efficiency and conservation aspossible areas that could potentially show earlysuccess.Theforestrysectorwasidentifiedasmoreof a mid-term opportunity, particularly forestmanagementorbiodiversityresearch.UNDPhadalreadyinitiatedsupportfromtheMinistryofEn-vironmentalProtectionandPhysicalPlanningforimprovingpoliciesandpracticeslinkedtophysicalandurbanplanninganddevelopment,andaneedsassessment for information and communicationstechnologyfordevelopmenthadbeencarriedout.Whilethepursuitoffundstosupportenergycon-servationwas aligned to the identifiedpriorities,difficultywiththeGEFThematicTrustFundpro-cessdelayedaccesstofinancing.Workonrenew-ableenergywasalsonotseenascriticalbydonors,andthuswasnotfunded.

Oneofthechallengesforallactorshasbeenad-dressing the nexus between energy and environ-mentasitpertainstoissuesofpolicy,managementandcontrol.Pollutionlevels(andassociatedhealthrisks)andenergyuse,notablyfromtwoindustrialsources,arewelldocumentedandsubjecttoregularpublicdebate.ThepressureplacedonGovernmentto restructure the State Power Utility Companyand address the major pollutants has come frommultiple sources, including UNDP. While morecouldbedonetosupportenvironmentalprotectionactivities,theweaknessofGovernmentinthisre-gardandtheonlyrecentriseininterestamongdo-norshaslimitedeffortstodate.1

Effectiveness and efficiency. The evidence forthisassessmentsuggeststhatUNDPhasgenerallybeen a very effective advocate, coordinator, part-nerandimplementingagency.Particularstrengthsinclude:

Leveraging. It is broadly acknowledged thatUNDPwasaforerunnerin2001−2002inunder-standingandcapitalizingontheopportunitiestosupporttheGovernmentofMontenegroinfulfill-ingitscommitmentsasanecologicalstate.UNDPhadidentifiedCostaRicaasapartner,andmobi-lizedsupportfromtheRockefellerBrothersFundtohelp fundanexpertmission,whichgeneratedclearandusefulprioritiesandthuscontinuingandexpanded support. This use of an internationallycrediblethirdpartytoadvocatepolicyinanareaofcommoninteresttoUNDPandtheGovernmentwasperhapsthekeyleveragingtoolforUNDP.Ithelped theUNDPLiaisonOfficegain thecred-ibility itneeded togenerate support for thepro-grammeitlaterdeveloped.

Acting as a neutral broker. TheperceptionoftheUNinMontenegrowasfoundtobegenerallyverygood, and UNDP has built on this reputation.Previously,relationshipsamongtheprivatesector,NGOsandgovernmentinstitutionswerecharac-terizedbymistrustanddisagreement;UNDPhasbeenabletofacilitateexchangesbetweenallpartiesasaneutralbroker.Thisroleisnotlimitedtoissuesinvolvingsustainabledevelopment.However,itisthearea,asidefromcorruption,wherethegreatestantagonismandmisunderstandingshaveexisted.2ThefactthatUNDPhasmanagedtobringmanyoftheseactorstothetableistotheorganization’scredit,andreflectstheastutenessandcapabilityofkeystafftosupportsensitiveinitiativeswithoutbe-comingimplicatedinpotentiallydivisivenationalpolicydebates.

By taking the lead inconveningeventson issuesof common concern, and conducting them in aparticipatorymanner,UNDPhasacquiredarepu-tationforbringingtogetherdisparateparties,andbuilding ownership in the process. A number of


__________________________________________________________________________1.UNDPprovidedlimitedassistance,withtheItalianGovernment,forworkontheKombinataluminiumfactoryinPodgorica,

butthishasnotbeenhighlightedinanyplanningdocuments.EAR,USAIDandFinlandareamongthedonorsinvestinginenvironmentalprotectionactivities.FinlandhasbeensupportingthedevelopmentoftheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentandtheStrategicImpactAssessmentAct,thoughworkhasbeenpostponeduntil2008.

2.Ingeneral,NGOsseetheprivatesectorasbroadlylinkedtothecausesofenvironmentaldestruction,andtheGovernmentregardscertainNGOsasextreme(misguided)environmentalists.

workshopsonthestrategicframeworkforsustain-abletourismbroughtNGOstogetherwithgovern-ment representatives, againstwhosepolicies theyhave,onoccasion,advocatedagainst.AndthroughtheUnleashingEntrepreneurshipproject,UNDPwasabletobuildlocalpartnershipsandreconcilepotentially conflicting views on the developmentofanationalpark.

Providing high-quality implementation. Acrossa range of projects, UNDP has been recognizedasanextremelycompetent,well-organizedandef-ficient implementation partner. Inputs have beenprocured and managed in a timely manner; theorganizationofworkshopsandconferences,publi-cationofmaterials,andcontractingofoutsideex-pertisehaveallbeencarriedouttoahighstandard;and outputs have been achieved almost entirelywithintheoriginaltime-frames.UNDPstaffarerecognizedfortheirexpertiseandenthusiasm,andteamspiritandmanagementhavebeencharacter-izedasexcellent.

TheprocessofdevelopingastrategicframeworkfortourismdevelopmentprovidesastrongexampleofUNDP’sprofessionalism.Theframeworkwasthesubjectofdebate in two sessionsof theNationalCouncil forSustainableDevelopment,fivework-shops and round-tables that included more than100 representatives from different local, nationalandinternationalinstitutions,ahigh-levelconfer-ence in New York and ministerial delegation toCostaRica.1Ineachinstance,UNDPwaseithertheprimaryorganizerand/orfacilitatorinpartner-shipwiththeGovernment(asinthecaseinvolvingtheNationalCouncilforSustainableDevelopmentandMinistryofTourism),orasupportingpartnerwhereothershavetakenthelead,suchasthecon-ferenceinNewYork,arrangedbytheRockefellerBrothersFund.

Piloting projects effectively. Both the environ-ment GIS and Unleashing Sustainable Tourismprojects are pilot initiatives that are progressingwell.ThetourismprojectisbothapilotforUNDP’sglobalinitiativeforpublic-privatepartnershipsandfor the implementationof recommendationspre-sented in the strategic framework for northernand central Montenegro. In both cases, the aimhasbeentoprovideanumbrellaforfutureinitia-tives that seek to unleash business opportunitiesinsustainabletourism,protectingbiodiversityandreducingpoverty.2Thetourismprojectisrelativelynew (initiated in April 2005). Nevertheless, it isdemonstratinganinnovativeapproachtotheman-agementofnationalparksthatinvolvesahighlevelofcoordinationbetweenpublicandprivateinterestgroups,needsassessment,theintroductionofSlo-venianexpertiseandastudytourtoBulgaria.Theprojectisregardedasasuccessstoryforsustainabletourism,onethatcouldbeadoptedelsewhere.3

Engaging the private sector. Littlementionhasbeengiventotheroleoftheprivatesectorinsus-tainabledevelopment,andprivatesectorrepresen-tationonbodiessuchastheNationalCouncilforSustainable Development has been regarded asinsufficient.The lackof trustandconfidencebe-tweenthesectors(private,state,non-governmen-tal),coupledwiththelackofcapacityofbusinessassociations inresearch,policyandlobbying,hasmeant that this sectorhasnot reallyhad a voicein deliberations on the integration of sustainabledevelopmentconceptstothetourismindustry.Asearly as 2002, UNDP advocated for greater pri-vatesectorparticipationinvariousforaandplan-ning processes.4 By launching the public-privatepartnerships model in the north of Montenegroin2005,UNDPhasfacilitatedconsultationswithentrepreneurs.However,thelevelofengagement

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__________________________________________________________________________1.AconferenceinNewYorkwasorganizedbytheRockefellerBrothersFundinassociationwithUNDP.Montenegro’sprime

ministerattended,andfocusedonthechallengesandopportunitiesforMontenegroasEurope’sfirstecologicalstate.ThiswasfollowedupbyaministerialdelegationfromMontenegrotoCostaRicatodiscussandseefirst-handCostaRica’ssuccessfulimplementationofasustainabledevelopmentpolicyoverthepast15years.

2.UnleashingSustainableTourismEntrepreneurshipintheareaofDurmitorNationalPark.March2005.Projectdocument(enumerated),p.5.

3.Oja,A.p.39.4.In2002,UNDPadvocated forprivate sectorparticipation in theNationalCouncil forSustainableDevelopmentandalso

metextensivelywithprivatesectoragenciesinrelationtothereformofthePlanningLaw.ThishasrecentlybornefruitwitharequestforUNDPtoactasneutralbrokerintheestablishmentofa‘one-stopshop’forbuilding-regulationpermits.Also,whengovernmentrepresentativesvisitedNewYorktomeetwiththeRockefellerBrothersFund,UNDParrangedaseriesofworkingmeetingsbetweenGovernmentandprivatesectoragencies.


shouldbeviewedwithinthecontextofthesizeofthetourismsectorasawhole.1

Building national ownership. It can be arguedthat UNDP has been relatively less effective inensuring national ownership in the determina-tion, process and outputs of some initiatives ofthe programme.2 The framework for sustainabletourismitself,forexample,wasseenasdevelopedbyUNDP incooperationwith theGovernment,rather than the other way around, and this mayhaveundermineditsuptakeamongkeypartners.

Coherence and complementarity. Theenergyandenvironmentcluster,andtheMontenegroSustain-ableDevelopmentProgrammeinparticular,haveexhibitedstrongoverallcoherence,inpartthroughdesign,andinpartthroughtheirdevelopmentincomplementary areas. The initial design of theMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgrammewasbuiltontheplatformofrecommendationsre-sultingfromexpertmissionsin2002.Thesemis-sionsfocusedon‘earlysuccess’demonstrationproj-ects that would not require big investments andcouldgainpublic support, and long-term invest-mentstosupportpolicyandinstitutionalcapacity.In thesemissiondocuments, as in theMontene-groSustainableDevelopmentProgrammeprojectdocument,thepotentialsynergiesforworkintheareas of renewable energy, environment (forestryandbiodiversity) and eco/sustainable tourismareclearandcouldmakeasubstantialcontributiontosustainabledevelopment.

The evaluation of the Montenegro SustainableDevelopment Programme found that there wasintensiveinformationexchangebetweentheproj-ectmanagersworking indifferent sectorswithinUNDP.Theseincludeprojectmanagersinvestigat-ingtheuseofGISinurbanandspatialplanningandinitspotentialasaplanningandmanagementtool for participatory national park management

(in the context of the GEF Dinaric Eco-regionProject3).Thelevelofcooperationinrelatedinitia-tivesofotherLiaisonOfficeprogrammeshasbeenexcellent: regular, strategic and operational rela-tionshipsformedintheareasofcapacity-building,socialandeconomicparticipationandsupport toNGOs, and sustainable development are devel-oping into synergies, particularly in the area ofplanning.

Realizing this coherence within the context ofprogrammedevelopmenthasbeenmoreofachal-lenge.Asdetailedearlierinthisreport,theMon-tenegroLiaisonOfficehashadvery limitedcoreresources and has had to expand through cost-sharing agreements with donors. While expertmissionsprovidedastrongrationaleforinvestingin certain areas, consistent programme develop-mentduring2002-2003has beenmoredifficult.The development of the strategic framework forsustainable tourism represents a continuum fromthisearlierwork.Whilesmall in resource terms,itledtofundingforworkonunleashingentrepre-neurshipthefollowingyear.TheprojecttoimprovespatialplanningandstrengthentheMinistry forEnvironmentalProtectionandPhysicalPlanning,and subsequently the Environmental GIS initia-tive,areoperatingatdifferentlevels,thoughbothprovide a basis for integrated planning and thusachieving sustainability objectives. The smallerandmorerecentsuccessinsecuringworkinsmall-hydropower development, and in pursuing GEFfunding,alsositwellwithinthiscontext.Overall,each element to date makes a clear contributiontosustainabilityobjectives, thoughthemantelof‘energyandenvironment’maynotfullyreflectthenatureoftheinterventionstodate.


Retaining a balance on sensitive issues. Toremain a development partner in Montenegro,

__________________________________________________________________________1.Morethan4.5milliontouristsovernightedinMontenegroin2004,andthetotalrevenuegeneratedfromthetourismindus-

trywasestimatedatbetween€132millionand€232million.WhilerapidgrowthintourismhasbeenevidentinDurmitorNationalPark,itscontributiontotheoveralltravelandtourismeconomyinthecountryisverysmall.Theestimatednumberoftouristvisitorsin2005wasfoundtobebetween5,000-15,000persons,andtheestimatedeconomicreturnfromraftingas€1.0million(seepreviousreferences).

2.ItshouldbenotedthattheevaluationdidnotfindthistobethecaseforallaspectsofUNDP’swork.Onthecontrary,itssupportofNGOshasbeenstrongwhileremainingsuccessfullyneutral(seeearliersection).3.Thefirstphase(PDFA)oftheGEFprojectonImprovementoftheProtectedAreaNetworkandManagementintheDina-

ridesMountainEco-regionwasinitiatedthroughtheProjectDevelopmentFacilityoftheGlobalEnvironmentFacilityinJune2005andwasexpectedtocontinueforsixmonths.

UNDP must continue to assume a delicate bal-ance,andnotallowitsprogrammesofpolicydia-loguetomoveintotheareaofpoliticaldebates,orbeseenassupportingonegroupoveranother.ThisbalancehasbeenlargelyachievedbyUNDP,butitwillbeparticularlydifficulttomaintainintheareaofsustainabledevelopment,sinceviewsonenergyuseandtheenvironmenttendtobedivisive.

Advocating integration while specializing. IfUNDPwantstocontinueworkinginsustainabledevelopment, itwillneedtonarrowandhoneitsspecialistareas,whileretainingstrongandbroadlinkages.AsMontenegrocontinuestoharmonizewithEU legislation and standards, andnewEUagencies enter the field, increasingly specializedexpertisewillberequired.UNDPshouldnotnec-essarilyseektobuilditsowncoherenceandcapac-ityinallthevariousfacetsofthatsupport.WhiletheexpertmissionsandtheMontenegroSustain-able Development Programme were a useful ba-sis for conceptualizing an integrated approach,this integration shouldbe soughtwithin thena-tional space, and not within UNDP. UNDP’sinterventions should thus be two-pronged: one,it should continue to clarify, educate and advo-cate for sustainable development;1 and two, itshouldtargetspecificinterventionsincriticalentrypoints.Thefollowingactionsarerecommendedtoachievethis:

Supporting policy coherence.Thereissomecon-fusionoverthemanystrategiesoftheGovernmentastheypertaintoissuesofsustainabilityandtheenergyandenvironmentnexus–notablythroughthe items in the Economic Reform Agenda, theDevelopment and Poverty Reduction Strategy,the National Strategy for Sustainable Develop-ment, the MDGs and others. There needs to beasinglestrategyandpolicyagendaagainstwhichallstrategiesarealignedandsupportive.ThroughitssupportoftheNationalCouncilforSustainableDevelopment,theOfficeforSustainableDevelop-mentandtheNationalStrategy,UNDPhasdonethis,andshouldcontinuetodoso.Inthespecif-ic caseof tourism, there is apotential vacuum in

terms of a long-term vision for sustainable tour-isminMontenegro, inviewof thedifferencesofopinionoverthemasterplan.Toavoidhavingsus-tainabletourismsidelinedasa‘niche’market,theeffortsbeingmadetostimulateabroaderbaseforsupport,encourageotherdonors,andseekalterna-tive models from the region are to be supportedandstrengthened.

Supporting policy implementation. ThecurrentstatusofmanyGovernment-led,UNDPsupport-ed initiativesareat thepolicyorplanning stage,withnew laws recently inplaceacrossnumeroussectors.Thechallengenowis in implementation,and ensuring that the momentum generated isnotlost.Inthecaseofthenewplanninglaw,forexample,seriousquestionsarebeingposedaboutexisting capacity for implementation at themin-isterialandmunicipallevels,andintheassociatedenforcement responsibilities implied. Supportingthe building of government implementation ca-pacityisaclearnichethatUNDPisinvestingin,andplanning isanareathatmaybe investigatedforfutureassistancethroughtheCapacityBuild-ingProgrammeforNGOsandcivilsociety.ThisisanexampleofwhereUNDP’scoherencewillbeachieved–byfocusingondoingwhatitdoeswell,but within a strategic, sustainable development-oriented,nationalgoal.Inthecaseofplanning,itisrecognizedthatthefulltransformationofthenewsystem will take time, particularly in the north-ern,moreimpoverishedregionofthecountry.ThisisanareawhereUNDPmaycontinuetoseektoconsolidate,andapplyprioritysupport for futuretourismdevelopment.ThispointstotheneedforamorestrategicprogrammefornationalcapacitydevelopmentwithinGovernment,NGOs,univer-sitiesorotherprofessional/technicaltrainingbod-iesandtheprivatesector.

Engaging the private sector. It has been recog-nizedthatthestructuresandincentivesforgreat-er private sector involvement in tourism need tobe improved inamarket thathas,until recently,focused almost exclusively on a captive domesticaudience.Therehasalsobeenlittleroleforthepri-vatesector insustainabledevelopment,especially

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__________________________________________________________________________1.Inviewoftheneedforbalanceandconsolidation,andinlightofthesomewhatopportunisticentryintosustainabledevelop-

ment,theLiaisonOfficemaybenefitfromestablishingahigher-levelboardforthefutureMontenegroSustainableDevelop-mentProgramme.Thiscouldbecomposedofabroaderarrayofstakeholders,includingstrongrepresentationfromtheprivatesector,andhelpguidetheprogramme’sdirectionanddeliveryofresults.


sincecertainpartsoftheprivatesectorareviewedasexploitative,ratherthansupportive,oftheen-vironment.Privatesectorinvestmentisimportanttothelong-termviabilityoftourism,forestryandenergy,andthisisanareauponwhichUNDPcanbuild.Entrypointshavealreadybeenestablishedthrough UNDPs facilitation role at the centrallevel and through its support tograss-rootspilotprojects,suchasthepublic-privatepartnershipinDurmitorNationalPark.

Furthermore,thispilotpublic-privatepartnershiprepresentsapotentiallycriticalcasestudyfor thediversificationofthetourismindustry inMonte-negro.Tobeeffective,itshouldabsorbandaddressthe challenges felt in the tourism industry morebroadly,particularlyas theypertainto thegreat-er involvementof theprivate sector. It is recom-mended,therefore,thattheprojectitselfestablishamanagementgroupincludingkeyrepresentativesoftheprivatesector(chamberofcommerce,entre-preneurs,etc.)toprovidethisinput.

4.3 INSTITUTIONAL AND jUDICIAL REFORM

AmodernsystemofpublicadministrationinMon-tenegroisapreconditionforachievingMontene-gro’sEconomicReformAgendaandforaccessiontotheEU.Thecapacityofpublicadministrationisessentialindeterminingwhethertheimplementa-tionofadoptedreforms–envisagedtotakeseveralyears–willsucceedorfail.Afterseveralyearsofstop-and-goreforms–duetotheunstablepoliti-cal situation, frequent coalition reshuffling, earlyparliamentary elections and repeatedpresidentialelections – a major breakthrough in the processof public administration reform (PAR) occurredin2003withtheestablishmentofanewcoalitionGovernmentthatplacedPARhighonthenationalpolicy agenda. In March 2003, the GovernmentapprovedthePublicAdministrationReformStrat-egyinMontenegro:2002–2007.1

TheMontenegroPARstrategyrespondstoanum-berofsevereproblemsinapublicadministrationthat deteriorated throughout the 1990s. Despitethesmallsizeofthecountry,separatepartieswitin

thepreviouscoalitionGovernmentssecuredpow-erthroughnewministriesorotherpublicbodies,resultinginincreasedfragmentation,reducedco-ordination and politicization of the civil service,especiallyattheseniorlevels.ThecollapseoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaalsoresultedinanincrease in the number of state employees and acorresponding increase and non-sustainability incivil service salaries. The legacies of the formersocialistsystemofGovernment–lackoftranspar-encyofdecision-making,lackofpublicparticipa-tion, supply-driven service delivery, inadequateskillsandcapacities–contributedtoacultureofnon-performanceandlittleaccountability.

ThePARstrategythusputsforwardkeyobjectivestacklingmajorpolicy,institutionalandlegislativereformsforthetransformationofpublicadminis-tration.ThedocumentsuggeststhattheGovern-mentofMontenegroiswellapprisedofboththesalienceandtheenormityofthetaskofmoderniz-ingthestructuresandproceduresofpublicadmin-istration, including, especially, the civil service.TheGovernmentseemsalso tohave thoughtouttheconsequencesforitself,andhasadoptedaPlanofActivitiestoberealizedinthreeperiodsuptotheendof2009,designed tobring theproposedPARstrategytorealization.

4.3.1 UNDP ENTRY INTO INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Following the establishment of the State UnionofSerbiaandMontenegro,UNDPreaffirmedtheprimaryobjectiveof itsprogramme for theStateUnionasaUNMemberStateanditstwoconstituentmemberstates.ThiswasdoneinthefirstCommonCountry Framework for the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia 2002-2004: namely, to consolidatedemocracy and social equity through reformand recovery with a special focus on governanceand policy advocacy. This general objective waspursued throughactivitiesgrouped into the thenthree UNDP programme clusters of democraticgovernance, crisis prevention and recovery, andenergy and environment. The framework forsupport provided by UNDP fell within the first

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheGovernment’sPARstrategywaspreparedbythePublicAdministrationReformproject(PARIM)withfundingfromthe

EuropeanAgencyforReconstruction.

oftheseclusters.Itwasconcernedprimarilywiththespecificobjectiveofhelping theGovernmentdevelopavisionforpublicservicereform,promotethe development of a modern and professionalcivil serviceanddevelopand implementapublicadministrationreformstrategytorevitalizepublicinstitutions.

UNDP had been working towards fulfilment ofthis specific objective since 2001, in partnershipwiththestateunionandSerbianrepublicgovern-mentsandotherinternationaldonororganizations,throughtheCapacityBuildingFund(CBF).1TheCBFhad,uptothatpoint,beenfundedbyseveraldonorsandused toassist severalSerbian institu-tions,andtwoministriesatthestateunionlevel.

A Strategic Roundtable on Governance Transi-tionwas sponsoredbyUNDP inmid-2002, andattendedatthehighestlevelsbyrepresentativesofthefederalandtworepublicangovernments.TheRoundtablereviewedtheBelgradeAgreementonrestructuringrelationsbetweenSerbiaandMon-tenegro,adoptedon14March2002,andrecom-mended that special measures be put in place tostrengthencapacitiesineachmemberstateoftheStateUnioninordertoenablethemtobetterper-formtheirincreasedresponsibilities,inaccordancewiththeConstitutionalCharter.

Furthertothis,amid-termreviewoftheCBFin2003 by a team of international consultants re-ported that, followingtheconstitutionalchangesnowinstitutedinimplementationoftheBelgradeAgreement,aneffortshouldbemadeinter aliatoextendtheexistingapproachtoservetheGovern-mentofMontenegro.WithsupportfromtheOpenSociety Network’s Local Governance and PublicSector Reform Initiative, the Foundation OpenSociety Institute-Representative Office in Mon-tenegro(FOSI-ROM)hadbeenpursuingsimilarobjectivestothosementionedabove.Inparticular,theProgrammeforPublicAdministrationandLo-calGovernmentcontinued,underits2003strategy,toinitiatelegislationdealingwith,andraisepublicawarenessabout,governanceissues.

Against thisbackgroundandat the invitationofthe prime minister of Montenegro, UNDP, to-getherwithFOSI-ROM,exploredwiththeGov-ernmentthefeasibilityofestablishingaCapacityDevelopment Programme (CDP) for Montene-gro. After extensive consultation, agreement ontheCDPwas reachedandaprogrammesupportdocumentwassignedinSeptember2003withtheGovernment of Montenegro, FOSI-ROM andUNDPasthemainfundingpartners.

4.3.2 MONTENEGRO’S CAPACITY DEVELOP-MENT PROGRAMME

ThemainobjectiveoftheCDPisto“…contribute to successful achievement of reform and development of the system of public administration in Montenegro, as a vital element in the pursuit and achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals, and in ac-cordance with the Government’s own Strategy and Action Plan for reform of public administration, and thus in conformity with the Constitutional Charter, and general European principles of democratic ac-countability and the rule of law, and with the ultimate purpose of improving the quality of life of the citizens of Montenegro.”2

Theinitialprogrammewastocoveraperiodof18months, but is now extended to end-June 2006.Withamodestinitialbudgetof$550,000,itpro-videdassistancetothreeministriesonapilotbasis,with theaimofhelping themdevelop theirowninstitutionalcapacityinaccordancewiththeirpar-ticular state of readiness, sectoral objectives andfunctions.Theassistanceisprovidedunderasingleframeworkprogrammecapableoffurtherenlarge-mentandadjustmentatalaterdate.

TheCDP’spartnersrecognizethatthereformofpublic administration anddevelopmentof its ca-pacity,inaccordancewithprinciplesofdemocracyandruleoflaw,willprovideanessentialfounda-tionfortheGovernmentofMontenegrotoimple-ment the eightMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Atthesametime,theGovernmentremainscom-mittedtodevelopingitsinstitutionsinaccordance

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__________________________________________________________________________1.TheCBFwasadministeredbyUNDPinaccordancewithprinciplesandguidelinessetoutinanearlierProgrammeSupport

Document,projectnumber:YUG/01/006/A/01/34,signedbythecontractingpartieson12March2001.TheCBFisdis-cussedindetailintheADRreportforSerbia.

2.See: Government of Montenegro, Foundation Open Society Institute - Representative Office in Montenegro, andUNDP (Serbia and Montenegro). September 2003. Capacity Development Programme for the State Administration of Montenegro - September 2003−February 2005.Programmesupportdocument,p.5.


withbenchmarksofbestEuropeanpractice, andgraduallytobuildthecapacityofitspublicadmin-istrationtoalevelappropriateforitseventualposi-tion within the European Union, and consistentwithitscommitmenttoharmonizationwithSer-biaunderthejointActionPlan.

Theenvisagedoutcomeoftheprogrammeisthatthe Government of Montenegro should obtain asystemofpublicpolicyandmanagementappropri-ate to its eventual position within the EuropeanUnion,andovertheinterveningperiodto:(1)en-ableMontenegrotorealizedthebeneficialeffectsofEuropeanintegrationand(2)fulfilitsroleandshare in meeting the international obligations ofthe State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, in-cludingthoseofaneconomicnature.

The CDP’s primary objective is to contribute tothe reform and development of public adminis-tration in Montenegro. The secondary objectiveis tofill capacitygaps,which ismore relevant tothe pilot stage as it is based on the productionofoutputs seen tocontribute toPARresultsandlonger-termobjectives.Intermsofthesecondaryobjective,theintendedoutputshadbeenproducedorwerewellinprocess.Further,theCDPoutputscontributedpositivelytothefillingofpriorityin-ternalministry capacity gaps in those functionalareasprescribedby theprogramme(forexample,policy-making and administration, developmentoflegislativeframeworks,organizationaldevelop-ment,workplanning,training,andtheprovisionof informationsystems).It isrecognizedthattheneeds forcapacitydevelopment insupportof the

Government’sPARand related reform strategiesaregreatandthattheCDPhascorrectlytackledalimitedsetofprioritygaps.ThefollowingpresentstheperformancehighlightsoftheCDP.

Asapilotprogramme,themajorstakeholderssawthat itwas important tomeasureperformanceatanearlystage,sothatdesignandprioritiescouldbe adjusted in a timelymanner tomeet evolvingchangesintheexternalenvironmentandtolearnfromexperience.Consequently,theCDPstrategycalled for -and executive management commis-sioned – an independent mid-term evaluation inlate 20041 to measure achievements in terms ofoutputs and track expected outcomes and over-allmanagementperformance.TheADRmissionteamrevisitedtheCDPoneyearlatertodeterminetheextent towhichthereviewrecommendationshadbeenacteduponandtogenerallyassessper-formanceoverthatextendedperiod.

Themid-termevaluationconcludedthattheCDPhad,forthemostpart,achieveditsintendedout-puts and results. Both the partners of the pro-grammeaswellasthebeneficiaryministrieshavecontinuedtoexpressahighdegreeofsatisfactionwith theprogramme.TheCDPhasdemonstrat-ed what can be achieved by a relatively modest,but speedy and flexible pilot response to urgentneedsinacomplexandrapidlychangingpolicyen-vironment.Moreover,thedesignoftheprogrammewas found to be a better suited quick-responsemechanismthanthelargerandoftenmorecumber-someprogrammestypicalofsomeotherfundingagencies.

__________________________________________________________________________1.See:Independent Review of the Capacity Development Programme,13December2004.Thisreportistheprimaryevidentiary

baseformostofthefindingsontheCDPreferencedinthisreport.

Box 8: Positive Features of CDP Support to MEIREI

nSpeedandrelevanceoftheresponsetourgentneedsoftheministry,withminimumbureaucraticproceduresfordelivery.

nTransferofrelevantknow-howandexpertise(useofregionalexpertswithdirectexperienceofhigh-levelworkinministrieshasprovedparticularlyappropriate).

nemphasisonchangemanagement,andinstillingasenseofcommitmentandpurposeinministrypersonnel.

nInnovationinmethodsandtechniquesofpublicmanagement,basedonbestpractices.

nemphasishasbeenlessondirectprovisionofpolicyadviceassuch(whichwasnotrequested)thanonenablingtheministrytodeterminewhatadviceitneeds,howtogetit,andhowtouseitonceobtained.

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(1) The Case of MEIREI

Ofthethreepilotministries,itistheMinistryofInternational Economic Relations and EuropeanIntegration(MIEREI)thatreceivedthemostsub-stantiveassistanceattheoutset,andcanserveasacasestudyforsuccessfuldevelopmentofadminis-trativecapacityandpublicmanagement.1

Starting from scratch. MIEREI was formed inFebruary2003. It combined functionspreviouslyallocated by the Government of Montenegro totheministriesofforeignaffairsandoftrade,alongwith some new functions relating to actual andanticipated consequences of European integra-tion.Whilethenewministry’scompetenciesweremainlycoordinatingpolicywithotherpartsoftheGovernment, and representation in internationalinstitutions, it was also charged with promotingexports anddomestic investment, and regulatingexternal trade that directly affects the country’smaineconomicinterests.Thisministrymay,there-fore, be exposed to new conditions arising fromtheopeningoftheinternalmarketandtheeffectsof European integration, and obliged to assumefunctionsininternationalrelationsthatarenewtoMontenegroattherepublicanlevel.

Ineffect,theministrystartedfromscratch,withaministernewtogovernmentandaverybasicstaffthat was either transferred from other ministriesor freshly recruited for probationary service. Themajor challenge facing the ministry was how toreconcilethedemandswithinMontenegroforanindependent treatmentof international economicrelations and separate approach to European in-stitutions in particular. This included the inten-tionofEuropeanandinternationalorganizationsthemselves to enforce theBelgrade agreementofMarch2002andapply strictly theconstitutionalprovisionsestablishing theStateUnionofSerbiaand Montenegro. While those provisions nomi-nallyassignedcompetenciesforexternalrelationstotheStateUnion,thereremainedsufficientam-biguity anduncertainty to allow theRepublicofSerbiatoretainitsownMinistryforInternationalEconomicRelationswithactiveresponsibilityforSerbianinterestswithregardtoEuropeanUnion.

Cominglateronthescene,theMontenegrinmin-istryhadmuchlessdirectaccesstoexternalassis-tance,andfacedasituationinwhichthesubstanceofmostofitsareasofcompetencehadalreadybeenassignedtoaMinistryofExternalEconomicRe-lations at the levelof the stateunion,which rel-evantEuropeanandinternationalactorstreatedasthecompetentrepresentativeofbothrepublicsforthesematters.

Alternative sources of external assistance.Atthetime,theEuropeanUnionmayhaveappearedtobetheobvioussourceofassistancetothenewmin-istryinbuildingadministrativecapacity.Supportwas available from the Community Assistancefor Reconstruction, Development and Stabiliza-tion (CARDS) programme and from EAR. ButithadtobechannelledthroughtheStateUnion,andthroughtheOfficeofEuropeanIntegrationinBelgrade.Supportwas thusprovided fromEARfor basic ICT equipment and for a succession ofinternationalconsultantstotheminister.Thisin-cludedbasictrainingofMontenegrincivilservantsin European integration (through a general pro-gramme for Serbia and Montenegro). However,theministry’scapacitytomakeuseoftheseoppor-tunitieswasseverelylimited,whileitsownpowerof decision-making was extremely restricted, forexample, inselectingandmanagingtheadvisoryortrainingfacilitiesprovided.

Meanwhile, the EAR office in Podgorica hadconcentrated itseffortsonassistance toageneralprogramme of public administration reform forMontenegro, in which normative and strategicaspectswerebeingemphasizedratherthanactivemeasuresofcapacitydevelopment.ThelatterwereexpectedtobeavailablefromtheAgencyforHu-man Resources Management, which at the timewasbeingestablishedwithEARsupport(mainlyfor construction of the agency’s new premises).However, this agency would not have been fullyoperationalforsometimeandneededfundingtoprovidesuchassistance.Meanwhile,theministryobtained support from USAID to establish andstaffasmallofficeforWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)affairs.

__________________________________________________________________________1.ThefindingsonMIEREIareextracteddirectlyfromthepreviouslymentionedIndependentCDPReview,pp13-15.

Support provided by CDP. Following a moregeneral proposal submitted by MIEREI in thesummerof2003during initialnegotiationswithFOSI-ROMandUNDPonestablishmentoftheCDP(finallyachievedinSeptember2003),aworkplanforspecificoutputsandactivitieswasnego-tiatedwiththeministerandherimmediatestaff.Themainlinesofdirectsupportwereasfollows:

• Responsestospecificrequestsfromtheministerin drafting policy statements and speeches onbehalfoftheGovernmentofMontenegro.

• Design of a longer-term plan of activities fortheministry’sDepartment forEuropean Inte-gration.This included specialguidanceon thetrainingprogrammeprovidedbytheOfficeforEuropeanIntegrationinBelgradeandtheset-upoftheCDP’sProgrammeManagementUnitto provide stop-gap substitute capacity, in theformofshort-termnationalconsultants.

• Focused analytical and advisory services frominternationalandregionalexpertsinanoverallorganizationalreviewandimprovementofbusi-nessprocedures;areviewoftheDepartmentofEuropeanIntegration;recommendationsfortheestablishmentofaspecialunitforaidcoordina-tion;andthefieldingofapart-timeexpertfromSlovenia (with direct experience in managingEuropeanaffairs in theGovernmentofSlove-nia)toprovidecontinuingadviceandguidancetotheminister.

Results of assistance to MIEREI. After sixmonths of focused CDP support, the ministrywastransformedintoafullyoperationalunit,us-ingrelativelymodernmethodsofmanagingboththepolicy-makingprocessand itsownorganiza-tion,andcapableofformulatingitsownneedsandplansinrelationtobothotheradministrationsandinternationaldonors.Moraleof theexistingstaffhad noticeably improved, while additional keystaffhadbeenappointed.Theministryhas sincedeveloped its organizational and business proce-duresinaccordancewithinitialrecommendationsmadebytheexpertsandstaffusingthelanguageandconceptsintroduced.Theministryisnowself-sustainingwithnofurtherneedofassistancefromtheCDP–hence,acaseofasuccessful‘exitstrat-egy’onthepartofUNDPandtheotherdonors.The performance features of CDP assistance aresummarizedinBox8.

(2) Other Notable Results of the CDP

WhileMIEREIwastheinitialandmainfocusfortheCDP,theprogrammedeliveredresultstotwootherpilotministries.Thefollowingresultspointto a sustained demand for capacity developmentsupportviatheCDP:

Ministry of Environment and Physical Plan-ning.TheCDPhaschannelledarangeofcapacitydevelopmentandinstitutionalsupporttothemin-istry, with funding from the Government of theNetherlands.This support,whichbegan inmid-2005,istargetedatimprovingthestructureoftheministry;strengtheningcapacitiestodevelopandmanagepolicies;buildingmechanismsassociatedwithcompliancetotheEUacquis communautaire,and strengthening public information, the infor-mation technology system and documentationmanagement.

Office of Sustainable Development. The CDPwasrecentlyrequestedbytheGovernmenttosup-port the institutional strengthening and capacitydevelopmentofthenewOfficeofSustainableDe-velopment, which is being set up to support theNational Council for Sustainable Development.ThisisahighpriorityareafortheGovernmentasdiscussedinChapter4.2ofthisreport.Amongitsseveral roles, the Office of Sustainable Develop-mentwillserveasthesecretariattotheNationalCouncil,whichischairedbytheprimeminister.Thisinitiativereceivedconsiderablesupportfromtheenergyandenvironmentclusterandservesasanexampleofprogrammaticlinkagesamongclus-ters.

Central Government. The CDP was recentlyrequested by the prime minister to assist in theinstitutionalstrengtheningandcapacitydevelop-mentofcentralgovernmentstructuressuchastheGeneralSecretariat.Theproject,whichistostartin early 2006, aims to strengthen competencies,organizationalstructure,functions,activities,andhumanresourcesofthe‘centreofGovernment’toactasacoordinatorofthedecision-makingsystemand, as such, play a crucial role in the Govern-ment’scapacitytodefineandpursueitscollectiveobjectives.FundingisexpectedfromtheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgency.

Civil service reform. The CDP has also beenrequested to support the Government’s Human


ResourcesAgencytocarryoutaperformanceas-sessmentofthecivilservice.Theproposedproject,developedinlate2005,isanactivesteptowardstheestablishment of a merit-based professional civilservice in Montenegro. In the short term, it willalsoservetoincreaseincentivesforimprovedper-formanceintheministriesandbuildtheircapacityforhumanresourcesmanagement.

Ministry of Education and Science.SupportwasprovidedtotheBureauofEducationinthedevel-opmentofamethodologyfortheintroductionofQualityAssuranceintheEducationSystem–be-ginningwithprimaryandsecondaryeducation–amongotherchanges.Initialresistanceonthepartofsomestafftoreformswasovercomeinlargepartthrough CDP-managed workshop approaches totraining.Anothersignificantoutputwasthemin-istrywebsite,reportedatthetimetobethemostpopularofallgovernmentwebsites.

Ministry of Justice. Supporthasbeenmarginaltothispilotministry,primarilyduetolimitedabsorp-tivecapacityandtheabsenceofanycomprehensivecapacitydevelopmentplans.TheJudiciaryDepart-menthadreceivedtheservicesofaCDP-deployedresearchassistant,butitwasnotclearifthispar-ticularinputwasfocusedondevelopingcapacitiesorsimplysupplementingtheworkofinternalstaff.SimilarinputswereprovidedtotheDepartmentofLocalSelf-government,whichwasandcontinuestoexhibitmajorcapacityconstraints.CDPinputsprovided some stop-gap supplemental capacitysupport,includingstrategicadviceonthedevelop-mentofimplementationstrategiesassociatedwithlocalself-governmentreformstrategies.

Ministry of Finance. The CDP worked closelywiththeMinistryofFinanceandtheWorldBankin the development of draft Fiscal Impact As-sessmentguidelines.Thiswasseenasanexampleof support for horizontal or cross-cutting capac-itydevelopment,oneoftheareasthatthedeputyprimeministerhadsuggestedthattheCDPcon-centrateon.

Resource mobilization and delivery.Oneoftheobjectives stated in the design of the CDP wasresource mobilization, to which UNDP was as-signedaleadrole.Basedonaseriesofprojectpro-posalsandconceptpapersnotedabove,theCDPbudgethasgrownfrom$550,000toabout$1.22millionoverthepastyear–growthofmorethan100percent.Ofthisamount,atotalof$800,000,or66percent,hadbeendeliveredbyend-2005.

The CDP, in cooperation with the Ministry ofHealth and Institute for Public Health was alsoinstrumentalindraftingarecentprogrammedoc-umentfortheUNDPGlobalFundon‘Strength-ening Institutional Capacities for CombatingHIV/AIDSinMontenegro’.TheproposalhassincebeenapprovedandUNDPhasbeennominatedasthe‘PrincipalRecipient’ofthe€2.5milliongrant,whichwillbeexpendedoverafour-yearperiod.1

CDP-sponsored paper on democratic participa-tion of vulnerable groups.TheExecutiveCom-mitteeoftheCDP,withfundingfromtheUNDPGovernanceThematicTrustFund,hasproposedastudytoexaminetheimpactofpotentialindepen-denceintermsofchangesneededinGovernment,capacitydevelopmentandnewfunctionsandroleofgovernmentinordertoensureeffectiveprotec-

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Box 9: UNDP’s Role as Partner in the Capacity Development Programme

n processfacilitation nexpertadvice nTechnicaladvice npolicyadvocacy/analysis nAnalyticalsupport npolicyadvice nNetwork-building nCoaching&mentoring nworkplanning norganizationaldevelopment ndevelopmentofTors nSupporttobidprocesses nInformation-sharing nTraining&skillsdevelopment nSeminars&workshops nTeam-building npartnershipdevelopment nTransferofknow-how

__________________________________________________________________________1.TheprojectwillmostlikelybeimplementedbythesocialandeconomicparticipationclusterduetothelargeNGOcomponent.Itisseenasagoodexampleofacross-cuttingacitivityofCDP,whichnotonlysupportscapacity-buidingingovern-mentbutalsooftheotherUNDPinitiatives.

tionoftherightsofcitizenswhomightbeaffectedbypoliticalchanges.Thismayleadtofurtherre-quests to support priority capacity developmentreformsassociatedwithindependence.

UNDP Role and Contribution to the CDP

UNDP served primarily as the ‘implementingpartner’ for the CDP, through direct executionmodalities. In this capacity, UNDP delivered awiderangeofservices, frompolicyadvocacyanddialogue to procurement, recruitment and con-tractingsupport.ThediversifiednatureofUNDPissummarizedinBox9.Aconsiderableamountofassistancewasintheformof‘softservices’,suchascoaching,mentoring,networkingandteam-build-ing–assistancethatwasfoundtobeespeciallyval-uedbytheministries.

Professional services were provided through acombinationofnational,regionalandinternationalexpertsandUNDPprogrammesupportstaff(theProject Management Unit). CDP experts gener-allyworkedcloselywithGovernmentcounterpartstaffand, inmost cases,becamemembersof the‘ministryteam’–andinturnsupportedteamde-velopment.Suchworkingarrangementsfacilitatedtheoveralltransferofknow-how,learningandthemainstreamingofadviceandotherformsofassis-tance/outputsintoministryoperations.TheCDPapproachverymuchenabledbyUNDPofferedamorepreciseandflexiblekindofassistance,whichwillcontinuetobeneededbyministriestoenablethemtotakeadvantageofexpertise, informationandknow-howtodevelopandimplementcapacitydevelopmentandoveralladministrativereforms.

OneconcernabouttheroleofUNDPisthecon-tinuing operation of the Project ManagementUnit,whichhasresidedintheUNDPofficesandisstaffedbyUNDPresources.Thishasallocated,toacertainextent,disproportionate ‘visibility’ofthe programme to UNDP. Consequently, someperceivetheCDPtobemoreaUNDPprogrammethan that of Government. The mid-term reviewsuggested that the Project Management Unit beformallyinstitutionalizedinGovernment,butthishasyettotakeplace.

Summary Assessment

TheMIEREIcasediscussedaboveservesasacom-pelling example of successful CDP and UNDP

support in line with initial design and strategyparameters. An assessment of the overall perfor-manceoftheCDPmightbefoundintheanswertothequestion:WhatistheCDP’svalueadded?In theviewof thebeneficiaryministriesand thefundingdonors,theansweristobefoundingoodmanagement, underpinned by good people andtrust.Soundprogrammedesignalsoleadstoposi-tiveperformance.

Good management.Thusfar,goodmanagementhas proved to be the single most significant fac-torinpositiveperformanceandachievement.Al-thoughtheCDPemployedwhatwouldappeartobefairlyconventionalarrangements, theirdistin-guishing features were their workability, activeparticipationand commitment fromallpartners,and clear understanding and acceptanceof roles,responsibilitiesandaccountabilities.Managementensured that needs were first assessed before so-lutions were devised and deployed. Managementprocesses benefited from a sound programmegovernance structure featuring open, transparentdecision-making,andstrongcommunicationsandprogrammesupport.

A high-level Supervisory Board, chaired by thedeputyprimeministerresponsibleforPAR,servedits intended purpose of affirming governmentleadership, setting of priorities and laying thegroundwork for the strengthening of subsequentexecutive andcoordinatingmechanisms.AnEx-ecutiveCommitteewasthepivotaldecision-mak-ingmechanismsinceitensured:(1)continuedgov-ernment ownership anddirection, (2) a practicalworking partnership for the three funding part-ners,(3)adherencetoCDPprogrammedesignandconcept,(4)effectivemanagementcontroloverpro-grammeinputs(forexample,selectionofexperts),and(5)adherencetoapprovedrollingworkplansand monitoring of work performed. Meetings oftheExecutiveCommitteewereheldonamonthlybasiswith regularminutes servingasa recordofdecisionsmade.AProjectManagementUnitwassetupandaccountabletotheExecutiveCommit-tee,butadministeredbyahighlycompetentstaffmemberofUNDP.

Good design.ThetimeandeffortinvestedinCDPprogrammedesignpaidoffintermsof:

• Partnership. The CDP employed a crediblecollaborative structure that, on the one hand,


preserved the notion that the programme isGovernmentmanagedand,ontheotherhand,that implementation is a shared responsibilityamong partners – that is, through a workingExecutiveCommittee chairedby theGovern-mentwithfundingdonorsasmembers.

• Ownership. The CDP was driven by govern-mentneedsandpriorities.Initially,programmeownershipremainedclearlyvestedwiththeGov-ernment.However,asnoted,theprogrammeisperceivedbysome(donorsandGovernment)asa‘UNDPproject’sincetheProjectManagementUnitstillresidesintheUNDPofficesandhenceisassociatedwithUNDP.Thisisaproblemre-latedtonationalversusdirectexecution,andisdiscussedinmoredetailinChapter5.4ofthisreport.Also,sincethescopeoftheprogrammehasrecentlyexpanded,andsupport tothe ini-tialmaincounterpartministryhas,forthemostpart,beencompleted,thereissomequestionastothecurrentandfuturegovernment‘locus’forownership.1

• Focus and complementarity. Focuswasmain-tained since only a small group of ministriesreceived support during the pilot period. ThisincludedancillarycooperationwiththeMinis-tryofFinanceandtheWorldBankinthedevel-opmentofFiscalImpactAssessmentguidelines.CDP support targeted capacity gaps and tookcaretoavoidareasthatweretargetedformoresubstantivesupportfromotherdonors,suchastheEAR, theWorldBankandUSAID.Fur-thermore,CDPsupportwasalignedwithotherprogrammesorclusters,suchastheMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme,totackleinstitutionalandcapacitydevelopmentneeds.

• Flexibility.TheshiftingenvironmentofMon-tenegro politics and reform priorities was fac-toredintothedesignoftheCDPprogramme.In this regard, the programme ‘framework’documentprovedtobetherightchoicebyini-tiallyidentifyingneedsataverybroadlevelandsubsequentlyallowingprogrammemanagementto define and deliver technical assistance on acase-by-case basis, determined by the specific

needs that emergedduringprogramme imple-mentation. This process continued with thedesign and channelling of capacity and insti-tutional development support to the MinistryofEnvironmentandPhysicalPlanning,and,atthetimeofthiswriting,supporttotheGeneralSecretariatoftheGovernment.

• Experimentation and learning.ThedesignoftheCDPasapilotprogrammewastherightap-proachunderthecircumstances:itwasphased,incremental and kept an eye on longer-termreforms. The pilot approach itself was seen asa learning exercise for both programme man-agement and for the ministries and their staffwhobenefited.Forexample,theuseofprocessfacilitationandconsultation,team-buildingandparticipatorymethodswereseentohavegener-atedapositiveimpactbybothministrymanage-mentandstaff,andhadthespin-offbenefitofexpandingawarenessandunderstandingofthevariousreforms.


TheCDPpilotcanbeseenasaprovenplatformfor future expansion. However, some changesmayneedtobemade.First,astheCDPincludesmore ministries and tackles more cross-sectoraland horizontal institutional development issues,thereisariskthattheprogrammecouldlosefocus.Second,withoutstrongcoordinationandstrategicmanagement,lessonsmaynotbelearnedandgoodpracticesmaynotbedevelopedandappliedtooth-erareas.Publicadministrationreformandrelatedsupport forcapacitydevelopmentcouldbebettercoordinated,harmonizedandstreamlinedunderasingulargovernmentPAR/CDPsectororpartner-shipapproach,andthisisdiscussedinChapter6ofthisreport.

Second, as the programme attracts new fundingpartners, there is thequestionofmembership intheExecutiveCommittee.Somedonorscannotbeinvolved in the management of the programmesthey fund, while others have a more flexibleapproach. As the committee expands, its termsof reference may need adjustment to ensure that

62 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.MEIREIwasoneofthreepilotministries.Itfunctionedasthemaincounterpartgovernmentministryforthedonorpartners

anditchairedtheCDP’sExecutiveCommittee.

agendasandcomparativeadvantagesofeach‘part-ner’areconsidered,andthatitcancontinueasaneffectivedecision-makingbody.

Third,thereisthequestionofthelocationof‘chair-manship’andgovernmentleadership.TheUNDP,alongwithGovernmentanddonors,arecurrentlydiscussingthis,withaviewtotransferringleader-shiptoahigh-levelcentralagencyofGovernment(for example, the General Secretariat) to ensurecross-sectoral coordination within Governmentand with donors and other non-governmentalentities.

Fourth,partnerswillneedtoensurethatthepro-grammeremainsalignedwithbroadergovernmentreform policies and priorities, particularly sincethesemayshiftovertheshorttomediumterm.Itwillbevital,also,todesignthenextphasewiththeassurancethatitistrulyalignedandcomplementa-rytoparalleldevelopmentsintheimplementationofthePARStrategy/ActionPlan.Finally, futuredesignshouldexplicitlyfactorinexitstrategiesforUNDPandotherfundingdonorsthataretiedtothesustainabilityofresults.ThecaseofMEIREIoffersusefullessonsinthisregard.

4.4 THE MONTENEGRO PRSP PROCESS 4.4.1 UNDP ENTRY INTO THE PROCESS

InSeptember1999,theWorldBankandtheInter-nationalMonetaryFund(IMF)initiatedthePov-ertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)processasanewapproachtoassistingdevelopingcountries.Followingproposalsmadebyinternationalfinan-cialorganizations, theGovernmentofMontene-grosetouttodefineitspovertyreductionstrategy.TheInterimPovertyReductionStrategywasap-provedbytheboardsoftheWorldBankandIMFinaJointStaffAssessmenton22July2002.

AsnotedinChapter3,involvementinthePRSPwas the first major opportunity for the UNDPLiaisonOffice inMontenegro to get involved inpoverty reduction and civil society development.WorkonthedraftPRSPstartedinMarch2003.SinceneithertheGovernmentnortheWorldBank

hadsufficienton-the-groundcapacity,UNDPwasrequested to execute the PRSP initiative, whichreceived support from the World Bank and theUK Department for International Development(DFID). The strategy paper was entitled ‘TheDevelopment and Poverty Reduction Strategy’(DPRS)inorderto“reflect the necessity of taking a single approach to both stimulating growth and reduc-ing poverty.”1TheDPRSdraftwasproducedasaresultofabroadparticipatoryprocessthatinclud-ed a series of consultations with stakeholders inall Montenegrin municipalities. Comments, rec-ommendations, additional researchonMontene-gro’spovertyprofileandintensiveworkbyexpertgroups, inclosecooperationwith lineministries,contributedsubstantiallytothequalityofthefinaldocument.

In2002,theUNDPLiaisonOfficereceivedfundsfromaThematicTrustFundonpovertyallocationtosupportthecompletionoftheinterimstrategy.In association with other UN agencies, UNDPalsocampaignedtoensurethatthelong-termfo-cusof thePRSPwas toachieve theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs).

PRSP development. Following the approval oftheInterimPovertyReductionStrategy,theGov-ernment completed and adopted the final docu-ment on 15 November 2003. A week later, theDevelopment and Poverty Reduction Strategywaspresentedat adonors conference inBrusselsto discuss funding support for implementation.Working groups, established in 2003, continuedworkingin2005onprojectprioritization.Anewgroupwasaddedoncorruptionasaresultofstrongpressure fromcivil society.Corruption issues in-fluenceddocument revision and the introductionofnewindicators.

4.4.2 PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

The most significant result of the PRSP processwas the formal recognition by Government thatpovertywasindeedaprobleminMontenegro.TheDPRS provided the first comprehensive poverty


__________________________________________________________________________1.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,p.1.

profileintherepublic,definingitscausesandmul-tidimensionalnature.1Productionof‘harddata’onpoverty-related issues,2 which was independentlycollected and validated, helped to expand theawarenessandunderstandingof thescopeof theproblemand to identify solutions.Also, throughtheprocess,thepovertyissuewasraisedwiththeMontenegrinpublic andgiven aprofile thathadbeen reserved in thepastonly for environmentalissues.However,whiletheunderstandingofpov-ertyhasexpanded,theDPRSwasnoteffectiveinarticulating and communicating specific strate-giestoaddresspovertyortoexpandsolutionsforvulnerablegroups,includingtheRoma,internallydisplacedpersonsandrefugees.3

Amain factor leading tonationalunderstandingand acceptance of poverty as an issue was activecivil society participation throughout the PRSPprocess,startingwiththeinterimstrategyin2002,andcontinuingwithdevelopmentoftheDPRSin2003.UNDP,incooperationwithCatholicReliefServicesandfivelocalNGOs,wereengagedinin-stitutionalizing theparticipatoryprocess throughconsultations at the local, regional and nationallevels,ensuringthatthe‘voicesofthepoor’wouldbeheardinthefinalDPRS.4ParticipatingNGOspostedinformationonthePRSPontheInternet,made telephone contact with interested citizens,preparedtelevisionbroadcasts,andpublishedbro-chures and leaflets. Meetings with citizens wereorganizedinall21municipalities,includingsepa-ratemeetingswith the representatives of vulner-ablegroups(unemployed,youth,theRoma,refu-gees)inbothruralandurbanareas.Throughthiseducation and communication process, citizensbegan to appreciate the multidimensional natureofpoverty–and the fact that itgoes farbeyondsimpleeconomicconsiderations.ThefinaldraftingprocesswascarriedoutbytheExpertTaskForce,which solicited input from key stakeholders: the

Parliament,civilsociety,thelocalcommunity,theprivatesectorandlabourunions,amongothers.

DPRS policy challenges. WhilethedevelopmentoftheDPRSisseenasamajorsuccess,itsimple-mentationhasprovedtobeamajorchallenge.

• Poverty and corruption.Civil societypartici-pation in examining the causes of poverty re-vealedthatcorruptionwasoneofthekeyfactorstobeconsidered.However,thefinaldocumentmadeno reference to tackling corruption.Theaforementioned Joint Staff Assessment (2004,p.3) noted that “…the issue of crime/corruption was barely mentioned in the case of Montenegro de-spite its prominence in the consultations.…”Con-sequently,in2005,withassistancefromUNDP,theGovernmentestablishedaworkinggrouponcorruptiontoensurethattheissuewasfactoredintotheDPRS.InOctober2005,theGovern-ment Agency for Anti-corruption participatedin organizing the first national conference oncorruption.5

• Policy linkages and funding constraints. Im-plementation of the DPRS is constrained byfundinglimitationsandambiguouslinkagestootherdevelopmentpoliciesandstrategiesoftheGovernment. As is the practice in most othercountries, theWorldBankhadenvisaged thatthePRSPwouldserveasanoverall development frameworktoenablethecountrytoreceivedevel-opmentcreditsfromtheinternationalcommu-nity.However,duringthetimethattheinterimpoverty reduction strategywas beingprepared(2002), theGovernmenthad alreadydesignedand adopted its prime development document– the Economic Reform Agenda. The DPRScould have been incorporated into the Eco-nomicReformAgenda,combiningthehuman,socialandpovertydimensions.Inthisway,theAgendawouldhavethencomplementedtheEU

64 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.DevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategy,p.122.2.Formoredetails,refertoChapter2.2ofthisreport.3.TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andInternationalDevelopmentAssociation(IDA),JointStaffAssessmentofthe

PRSP,18February2004;ExternalEvaluationoftheNGOCapacityBuildingProgramme(20044.ReportontheCausesofPovertyandRecommendationsoftheCivilSocietyfortheDPRSofMontenegro.May2003.Project

financedbyUNDP.Podgorica.5.ThiswasdoneincooperationwiththeCouncilofEurope,UNDPandalocalNGO(MANS).SeealsoChapter4.1ofthis

report.

PartnershipImplementationPlan,thusformingthe Montenegro Development Framework. Inthe case of the Republic of Serbia, the WorldBankhasindicatedthatthenexteconomicde-velopmentstrategycouldwellbereflectedinasingledocument,consolidatingthepovertyre-ductionandtheEUaccessionstrategies.1

• Managing expectations and setting priorities.TheDPRSinflatedexpectationsforsolutionsbyidentifying over 400 projects for implementa-tion,requiringhighlevelsofresourcesthattheGovernment and donors simply did not have.This resulted in the need to set priorities. In2005, UNDP provided support to the DPRSMonitoring Unit in setting criteria for projectprioritization.UNDPhas also initiated anewprojecttofollowuponDPRSrecommendationsandtoassistinimplementation.2

UNDP role in the PRSP process. As the mainexecutingagentforthePRSPprocess,UNDPfo-cused on process facilitation. It supported policydialogueandhelped tobuild theneededpartici-patoryandconsultativemechanisms,whichweregratefullyacknowledged.TheprimeministernotedtheroleofUNDPinfacilitatingtheparticipationofGovernment,NGOsandtheWorldBank.TheMinistry of Labour and Social Welfare regardsUNDP as the Government’s strategic partner,since it was the first international agency to notonly become involved in the process, but also toremainactiveinsupportingimplementation.

Seniorofficialsattheministryalsonotedtheim-portant role of UNDP in building institutionalcapacity by transferring know-how, conductingworkshopsandplanningsessions,andpromotingcommunicationwiththegeneralpublic.Theneedforcontinuedcapacitydevelopmentremains,par-ticularlywithrespecttoimplementationcapacities.Futureprojectswillinvolvemanyparticipants,es-peciallycivilservantswhowillrequirespecialized

training, information systems, and mechanismsformonitoringandevaluation.OnemajorNGO(MANS) noted that the key role of UNDP wasinhelpingtheorganizationlearnmoreaboutpov-ertyissuesandenablingthemtotaketheleadinmobilizing civil society. In 2004, MANS beganmonitoringtheimplementationoftheDPRSandEconomic Reform Agenda in Montenegro on avoluntarybasis.3


WhiletheDPRSisnottheprimarydevelopmentstrategyforMontenegro,itisnonethelesscomple-mentary to the Economic Reform Agenda. TheDPRScouldserveas themainbasis for input toaneworconsolidatedNationalDevelopmentPlanorupdatedEconomicReformAgenda–inotherwords, a single integrated development plan (ashas been suggested for the Republic of Serbia).Through itsnetworks andestablished role in thePRSPprocess,UNDPcouldadvocatebothdirect-ly and indirectly that such a future developmentstrategy addresses poverty, human developmentandrelatedMDGissues.

TacklingpovertyissuesinMontenegrowilllikelybe a long-term process, and Government recog-nizes that it alonecannot solveall theproblems.TheUNDPisseenbytheGovernmentasoneofa number of long-term strategic partners in ad-dressingpoverty issues.TheaforementionedJointStaffAssessment(oftheWorldBankandIMF)re-affirmedin2004thatgovernmentcommitmenttoPRSPimplementationisessential,butrequiressub-stantialtechnicalassistanceandcontinuedsupportfromthedonorcommunity,particularlyincosting,coordination,budgetingandmonitoringandevalu-ation–allseentobevital totheultimatesuccessofthePRSP.UNDPiswellpositionedtosupportcapacity-developmentintheseandotherareas.


__________________________________________________________________________1.AccordingtotheWorldBankandothersconsulted,Serbiaisnotregardedasa‘PRSP’country.2.Theprojectis:‘StrengtheningCapacitiesforImplementationofDevelopmentandPovertyReductionStrategyinMontenegro’.

Thefinancingplanincludes$498,470fromthePovertyReductionStrategyTrustFundand$180,000ingovernmentcontribu-tions.Oneofthemaincriteriawillbetoensurepolicylinkages.Oneofthesuccessindicatorsisstatedasfollows:“Different development agendas harmonized and an efficient and effective institutional framework for monitoring/implementing reforms estab-lished (measured through feedback on progress reports containing reliable and publicly accessible data/indicators on implementation of the Economic Reform Agenda, DPRS, and EU Partnership Action Plan.”(p.5).

3.FormoredetailsrefertotheMANSwebsite:www.mans.cg.yu.

4.5 COORDINATION

The Ministry of International Economic Rela-tions and European Integration (MIEREI) wasestablished inFebruary2003to take the leadonpolicy coordination with other parts of Govern-ment,andrepresenttherepublicindealingswithinternational institutions.1 Within the ministry,a smallunit for aid/donor coordinationhasbeenestablishedaspartofbroaderassistanceprovidedthrough the Capacity Development Programme.Formal support from the CDP has since ended,andtheministryisconsideredtobefullyfunction-ing,withself-sustainingcapacitytoformulatepol-icyandmanageinternalandexternalrelations.2

Despitethenewstrengthoftheministryandtheestablishmentoftheunit,thereremainslittledonorcoordinationbyGovernment.Theprimeministerchairsregulareconomicassistancestrategymeet-ingswithdonorstodiscusseconomicperformance,andtheirbilateralrelationswithspecificministries

(the World Bank with the Ministry of Finance,theEuropeanUnionwithMIEREI,etc.).How-ever,thereisnoformalcoordinatedandregulatedstructureorprocesstoaddressalldonors.Thislackofcoordinationanddirectionremainsproblematic,withmultipledonorsrelatingbilaterallytodiffer-entministries,creatinghightransactionscostsandreducingthechancesthatdonorinvestmentswillbealignedwithnationalpriorities.

4.5.1 DONOR COORDINATION

Generalcoordinationamongdonorshasalsobeenweak,withnoformalarrangements.Historically,humanitariancoordinationwasledbyOCHAandUNHCR.Thelatterchairedfortnightlyhumani-tariancoordinationmeetings,andOCHAchairedmonthlyheadsofagencymeetings.Whilethispro-videdabasisforinter-agencycooperation,thetwolargest agenciesduring the immediatepost-crisisperiod,theEconomicCommissionandUSAID,3

66 C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.TherecentformationofMIEREIreflectstheevolvingpracticeofautonomyofeachrepublicinmanagingexternalaffairsand

trade,andthewillingnessofexternalactors,notablytheEuropeanUnion,toacknowledgeatwin-trackapproach.2.SeeChapter4.3forfurtherdetailsonthesupportprovidedtoMIEREIthroughtheCDP.Theassessmentofthecurrentstatus

ofMIEREIistakenfromtheIndependent Review of the Capacity Development Programme,FMP,13December2004.3.Approximately$60millionperyearwasprovidedinODAbyUSAIDtoMontenegroin2001−2002,whichhasbeenreduced

annuallytoapproximately$10million−$15millionin2005(Source:USConsulate,personalcommunication,9December2005).TotalODAtoMontenegroin2000wasestimatedat437millionDEM(GermanDeutscheMarks),makingitoneoftheworld’slargestrecipientsofpercapitaODA(Source:OCHA,2000).

Figure 4: Staffing Levels of UN Country Team Members in Serbia and Montenegro, December 2005

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80

7060

50

40

3020

10

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UN

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UN

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UN

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UN

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UN

dp

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UN

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Montenegro

Source: residentCoordinator’sofficeinSerbiaandMontenegroandUNdpliaisonofficeinMontenegro,december2005

*housingandpropertydirectorate**UnitedNationsofficeinBelgrade

focusedtheirattentionmoreonbilateralrelationswiththeGovernment,andlessonforgingabroad-er quorum of inter-agency coordination (there isno EC delegation in Montenegro; all EU assis-tanceischannelledthroughtheEuropeanAgencyfor Reconstruction). As the humanitarian crisisabated,OCHApulledoutin2001,andUSAID,bydefault,tookmoreofa leadroleincoordinat-ingdonoractivities,providingaplatformforbroadstocktaking, general coordination and providinganupdateondonoractivity.Veryrecently,thishasbeenformalizedintomonthlymeetings,withtheprimeministerasthechair.Thelackoffullrepre-sentationofmanydonorsinMontenegroisprob-lematic in this regard.1 (Note: The ‘coordinationmeetings’ only pertain to the Economic ReformAgenda.UNDPcontributesprogrammaticinputstothe‘trafficlightsystem’ofthismechanism;whileEARandWorldBankattendthemeetings,theydonotincludeprogrammaticcomponentsintothereporting structure. EAR has recently set up aneconomic coordination system under the deputyprimeminister.)

Inpractice,coordinationhastendedtobeadhoc,addressingissuesofduplication,alignmentorco-ordinationonspecificissuesandsectors.Inwork-ing with the Ministry of Environmental Protec-tionandPhysicalPlanning, forexample,UNDP(throughtheCapacityDevelopmentProgramme)andEARhavearrangedtoworkwithdifferentde-partmentstoavoidoverlap.However,lackofcoor-dinationandoverlapwascitedincasesofworkonenvironmentalprotectionandmanagement.Posi-tive signs of future coordination were evident inthenetworkofagenciesprovidingassistancetotheRoma:AsteeringcommitteewassetupbytheOr-ganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope

(OSCE)andmetregularlyduring2005.Itconsist-edoftheGovernment,UNDP,FOSI,UNICEF,theGovernmentemploymentagency,thestatisticsagency,andthelocalNGO‘Pocetak’,representingthenetworkofRomaNGOsandOSCE.Regularmeetingsof theRomaNGONetworkwere alsosupportedbyUNDPthroughtheNGOCapacityBuildingProgramme.

4.5.2 COORDINATION OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES

Five of the current 14-member United NationsCountry Team2 in Serbia and Montenegro haveestablished a physical presence in Montenegro:UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, IOM and UNHCR.Priorto2004,theOfficeoftheUNHighCom-missioner for Human Rights, the World FoodProgramme and OCHA (until 2001) were alsostationedintherepublic.Anumberofotheragen-cies, including the UN Economic CommissionforEurope,UNCentre forHumanSettlements,the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN’sDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsandUNESCOhaveusedUNDPinitsroleasresidentcoordinatorasaconduitforactivitiesinMontene-gro.ThissmallUNsystempresence,exaggeratedwhen compared to the programme size of othermajordonors–notablyUSAIDandtheEU3–wasrecognizedbyUNDPearlyonasplacinggreatercurrencyontheneedforUNcoordination.4(SeeFigure4forstaffinglevelsofthevariousUNorga-nizationsrepresentedinMontenegro.)

UNDPhasthelargestpresenceoftheUNagen-ciesinMontenegro,themajorityofwhicharecon-siderably smaller than theirSerbianheadoffices.Though the head of the UNDP Liaison Officein Montenegro has never had a formal mandate


__________________________________________________________________________1.Forexample, theWorldBankhasa single representative,andnooffice;GTZ(theGermantechnicalcooperationagency)

openedanofficeandthencloseditagain.2.OtherUNresidentagenciesinBelgradeare:theFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUN,theInternationalCriminal

TribunalfortheformerYugoslavia,theOfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights,theUNEnvironmentPro-gramme,theUNCentreforHumanSettlements,theOfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforRefugees,theUNChildren’sFund,UNOffice/Belgrade,WorldFoodProgramme,WorldHealthOrganizationandtheInternationalOrganizationforMigration.Theycollectively interactwith the resident internationalfinancial institutions,which include the InternationalFinanceCorporation,IMFandtheWorldBank.

3.SeeChapter3ofthereportfordataonrelativeprogrammesizes.4.OccasionsReport.

to lead inter-agency coordination, it did receivesome delegated authority to support the residentcoordinator function, centred in Belgrade.1 Thissupportwasprovidedprincipallyinrelationtotheestablishmentofcommonpremises,andUNDP’sleadinthismatterhasbeenacceptedbyotherUNagencies. The CCA, UNDAF, common servicesand joint programming responsibilities were notfunctions thatweredelegatedby theUNCoun-try Team in Belgrade. However, monthly meet-ings are organized by UNDP, and coordinationhas centredon three issues: the establishmentofcommonpremisesandcommonservices;jointandinter-agencyactivities,inparticularthroughUN-AIDSandthepovertyreductionstrategyprocess;andprovidingaplatformfornon-residentagencycoordination and activity. Not surprisingly, theviewsfromotheragenciesontheextenttowhichUNDP has exercised its coordinating role effec-tivelyaremixed.

Common services.Since2002,theUNagenciesinMontenegroagreedtopursuetheideaofseekingsupportfromtheUN(throughacommonservicesgrant), the Government and bilateral donors toestablishcommonpremises.TheagenciesfeltthatestablishingasinglelocationwouldstrengthentheUNsystempresence,andmeetastatedgoaloftheUNsecretary-generalundertheSimplificationandHarmonization Initiative. Agreeing on this, theteamforgedtheideaofdevelopingan‘EcoPrem-ises’asbothaninnovativewayofraisingfundsandasymbolicgestureofrespecttotheRepublic’sas-pirationstobecomeanecologicalstate.

Basedonthisproposition,adealwasbrokeredin2003betweenthemayor’soffice,AustrianDevel-opmentAssistance (ADA), and theGovernmentofMontenegrotobuildsharedUNofficespaceinMontenegro.In2004,themayordonatedapieceoflandonthebankofariver(valuedatapproximately€2.5million).In2005,theADAdevotedafurther€70,000toorganizeanarchitecturalcompetitioninInnsbruckthattookplaceinJanuary2006.Inconcludingthearrangements,theADAagreedtofund the building at a cost of almost €700,000,withtheGovernmentagreeingtopaythedeficit.The total cost is estimatedat approximately€1.3million.2

The construction of common premises can beviewed as a positive achievement by: increasingcoordination among the agencies, establishing astrongrationaleforaUNpresencewiththeGov-ernmentandADA,andpioneeringaninnovative,ecologicallysensitiveapproachtothebuildingit-self,whichwillbethefirstofitskindintheUnitedNations.

Joint activities.CollaborationamongUNagen-ciesonspecificinitiativeshasbeenminimal,sincetheUNCountryTeamisbased inBelgradeandhasnothistorically–exceptforabriefperiodfol-lowing the formal appointmentof adeputy resi-dent representative – delegated much formal au-thority to the offices in Montenegro. The singleinter-agencythemegroupthathasbeenactivehasbeenonHIV/AIDS,workingontheprincipleofco-chairmanship among participating agencies.Thegroupwasestablishedin2002,andhasbeen

6� C h A p T e r 4

__________________________________________________________________________1.Thetermsofreferenceforthedeputyresidentrepresentative’spositionasheadoftheLiaisonOfficeincludes10percenttime

allocatedforsupporttotheresidentcoordinatorfunction.Thepositionhasthereforehadaformalmandateforconductingsuchactivities(theLiaisonOfficeheadwasappointeddeputyresidentrepresentativeinMarch2003).However,thisrolewasrescindedbyanactingresidentcoordinatorduring2005andthenreinstatedwiththenewresidentcoordinatorinearly2006,althoughthetermsofreferencewasneverformallyamended.

2.Thisisthearchitects’estimate,basedontheirinitialdrawings,andcanonlybetakenasindicative.

Box 10: Inter-agency Cooperation: The case of UNESCO and UNDP

UNdpandUNeSCojoinedforcesin2004astheonlytwointernationalagenciesinMontenegrothatsup-portedthecampaigntostopfloodingportionsoftheTarariverCanyon.BasedonUNdp’sinitialobjection,UNeSCoalsorecognizedtheproposedfloodinganddamconstructionathreattotheCanyon,whichhasbeendesignatedasaworldheritageSite.UNeSCoworkedwithandthroughUNdptoprovidingtechnicalexpertiseandfinancialsupporttoNgosleadingthecampaign.UNeSCohassincehighlightedthislinktoUNdpasanexcellentbridgebetweenanormativeagencyoftenperceivedashavingonlya‘watchdog’rolewithanoperationalagencythatwasabletoactonthebasisofUNeSCo’sexpertise.

expandedtoincludeparticipantNGOstoenhanceitsoutreachandtechnicalstrength.Whileastrat-egyandfunding-raisingapplicationtotheGlobalTrustFundwasdevelopedin2003,andjointcam-paignsandpressconferenceshavebeenarrangedbetweentheagencieswiththeMinistryofHealth,thereareno jointprogrammes. In2003,UNDPpassedtherotatingco-chairpositionontoUNI-CEF,andhassinceparticipatedinanHIV/AIDSprogramme component as part of the HIV Pre-vention among Vulnerable Populations Initiativedevelopedby theUNDPCountryOffice inBel-grade,whichinitiallydidnotenvisageafocalpointinMontenegro.1

UN agencies also collaborated in supporting theformulationofMontenegro’sPRSP(bothinterimandfinal)during2002−2003.Astheleadagencyindevelopingandmanagingtheprocess,2UNDPwasabletouseitspositionandrelationshipswithotherUNagenciestocoordinateearlyinputsandanoverallresponse.TheUNofficesalsocollabo-ratedinthepreparationoftheMontenegroinputtotheSerbiaandMontenegroCommonCountryAssessment/UNDevelopmentAssistanceFrame-work process in 2003. This was lead by the UNCountry Team in Belgrade, and coordinated lo-callyinMontenegrobytheOfficeoftheUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights.

ThroughitsLiaisonOffice,UNDPhasalsoactedasafacilitatorofactivitiesofUNagenciesthatdonothaveaphysicalpresenceintherepublic.Inthearea of the environment, UNDP has organizedprotocol meetings between the Government andthe UN Economic Commission for Europe aspartoftheirEnvironmentalPerformanceReviewand with UNESCO on the protection of WorldHeritageSites(seeBox10).Byprovidingthisser-vice,UNDPhasenabledotheragenciestobenefitfrom its contacts and communication channelswithGovernment,donorsandNGOs.Italsoof-fers them a physical base from which they canwork.Similarly,theinitiativehasenabledUNDPto raise its profile amongother agencies, and forthe joint project of UN harmonization to moveforwardinpractice.

Summary Assessment and Lessons

Theheadof theUNDPLiaisonOffice inMon-tenegro has never had a formal mandate to leadinter-agency coordination, although it has hadsome delegated authority to support the residentcoordinatorfunction,inparticularwithregardtothe establishment of common premises. Beyondthis,de facto,UNDPhassoughttotaketheleadincoordinationinseveralareasofinter-agencyactiv-ity,inparticularthroughUN-AIDSandthePRSprocess,andasaplatformfornon-residentagencycoordinationandactivity.However,despitehold-ingmonthlymeetings,theviewsfromotheragen-ciesontheextenttowhichithasexercisedthisroleeffectivelyaremixed.CertainlythelackofclarityoverresponsibilitiesforcoordinationinMontene-gro,particularlywherethefunctionisnotdistinctfromoperationalmanagementandwhereagenciesarepotentiallycompetingforresources,shouldnotbeunderstated.

However, there is a belief among all the agen-ciesthattheUNDAFandthemovetowardsjointpremises provide a tremendous opportunity formeaningful harmonization, which could be con-sideredcriticalfortheUNinarepublicthesizeofMontenegro.Whileprogressonjointpremiseshasbeenpromising,moreworkneeds tobedoneontranslatingtheUNDAFintocommonoperationalplansfortheUNsysteminMontenegro.

In the absenceof effectivedonor coordination, anumberofministriesandagencieshaveexpressedsupportforUNDPtotakeamoreproactiverole.UNDP’seffectivenessinbringingtogetherdiverseinterestgroupsandpartiesincommondialoguehasbeenacknowledged,andshouldbecontinuedandstrengthened.However,thismaybebestconfinedtoareasofcurrentactivity,ratherthanseekinganoverallcoordinationfunctioninviewoftherapidchanges in the country and donor environment.UNDPmayalsocontinuetoseekaprogrammaticroleinbuildingtheGovernment’scapacityfordo-norcoordination through theCapacityDevelop-mentProgramme.


__________________________________________________________________________1.UNDPwithdrawalfromcoordinatingtheinter-agencythemegrouponHIV/AIDS,anditsdevelopmentoftheHIV/AIDS

componentoftheHIVPreventionamongVulnerablePopulationsInitiativehasbeenseenbysomeasgoingbeyondUNDP’scoremandate,andintothemandateofotherUNagencieswithoutproperconsultation.

2.SeeChapter4.4onUNDP’sroleinthePRSPprocessforfurtherdetails.

UNDP’s programme strategies from 2001-2003identifywhatwastohavebeenaccomplished–theresults,outcomesandeventualimpacts.Theirsuc-cess or effectiveness depends on sound manage-ment strategiesandhowtheywere implemented.Anassessmentofdevelopmentresultswouldnotbecompletewithout lookingatthemanagementdi-mensionofUNDP’swork,whichcoversfinancialresourcestofundprogrammesandrecoverimple-mentation costs, human resources, planning andorganization,accountabilitystructures,supportingsystemsandinformation,monitoringandevalua-tion.Thissectionexamines thenatureandeffec-tivesofUNDPmanagementstrategiesacrossthesevariousdimensions.Itshouldbeclearattheoutsetthatthefollowingisnotanassessmentofmanage-mentperformanceperse,butratheralookatthebroaderstrategiesandperformancemeasures.

5.1 SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS

Financing sources. GrowthintheUNDPMon-tenegro programme has been substantial. By theendof2005, theLiaisonOfficehaddeliveredor

was in theprocessofdelivering22projectswitha total budgetof $5.4million (SeeTable1,An-nex4).Figure5liststhemajorsourcesoffinanc-ingofUNDP-implementedprojectsinMontene-gro.Non-corefundsfromdonorsandgovernmentcost-sharingconstitutebyfarthelargestsourceoffinancing(67percentofthetotal).The‘OtherThe-maticTrustFund’categoryreferstotheThematicTrustFundforCrisisPreventionandRecoveryandforsmallarmsreduction.Approximately$390,000wasprovidedoverthesameperiodthroughUNDPcoreTRACsources,representinglessthan10per-centoftotalfinancing.

Resource mobilization. ThegrowthintheMon-tenegro programme can be attributed primarilytoresourcemobilization.This, inturn, isseenasa functionofGovernment anddonor confidencein UNDP capacity to implement projects andprogrammes. Over the 2001-2005 period, closeto$4.5millioninfundshadbeenmobilized(seeTable3).ThemaindonorsweretheScandinaviancountries and the Netherlands, with significantfundsmobilizedfromfoundations,othergovern-mentsandtheGovernmentofMontenegro.

Chapter 5

Management of UNDP Assistance

70 C h A p T e r 5

Table 3: Resource Mobilization, 2001−2005 (US$)

Source TotalgovernmentofSweden-SIdA 758,8�3TheNetherlands 5�5,507governmentofFinland 556,000governmentofIreland 438,000CharlesStewartMottFoundation 300,000governmentofCanada-CIdA 300,000FoundationopenSocietyInstitute-representativeoffice,Montenegro 265,000worldBank 24�,000governmentofluxembourg 228,000UnitedKingdom-dFId 222,000governmentofMontenegro 200,000rockefellerBrothersFund 166,000governmentofNorway �0,�65globalenvironmentFacility(geF) 87,000

Total 4,456,365

Programming of funds. Since the re-organiza-tion of the Liaison Office in 2004, projects andprogrammeshavebeengroupedintothreeclusters(see Table 4). Budget growth by cluster over theperiod2001–2005,as illustrated inFigure6, re-vealsamixedpattern.

Therehasbeensteadygrowth inproject fundingin the social and economic participation cluster,andarapidincreaseingrowthintheenergyandenvironmentarea,dueprimarilytothelargeMon-tenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgrammeanda$759,000projectcalledStrengtheningGovern-mentSystemsinUrbanPlanninginMontenegro.Budget levels declined in the institutional andjudicialreformclusterin2004,butbouncedbackin2005with further increases expected through2006-2007with the additionof a coupleofnewprojects(discussedinChapter4.4).

Itwouldseemthattheareawiththegreatestpo-tentialforprogrammegrowthiseco-tourismandsustainabledevelopment–aprogrammeopportu-nitythatdevelopedin2001.Asnotedinthepre-cedingsection, theGovernmentcontinues to seethis as a toppriority for the republic andone inwhichUNDPhasestablishedasolidtrackrecordin facilitation, partnership-building and projectimplementation.

For the three cluster areas, UNDP funding hasbeen targetedprimarily to activities in the insti-tutionalandjudicialreformandenergyandenvi-ronmentclusters.(Table2inAnnex4breaksoutprogramme expenditures by cluster and fundingsourceovertheperiod2001–2005.)It is interest-ingtonotethatofthethreeclusters,thesocialandeconomicparticipationareahasreceivedtheleastamountofUNDPfunding.

M A N A g e M e N T o F U N d p A S S I S T A N C e 71

regionalTrAC

geF

otherTTF

UNTrustFunds

Cost-sharing

Core/TrAC

0 20 40 60 80

Figure 5: Source of UNDP Montenegro Programme Financing 2001-2005 (percent of total)

Table 4: Projects, Budgets and Expenditures, 2001−2005 (US$ millions)

Cluster No. of Projects Budget Expenditure Delivery Rate *

InstitutionalandJudicialreform 6 $2.0 $1.5 75%

energy&environmentforSustainabledevel-opment

11 $1.� $1.5 7�%

Socialandeconomicparticipation 5 $1.6 $1.1 73%

Total 22 $ 5.4 $ 4.1 76%

*Note:Measuredasexpenditure/budgetx100.

Programme delivery. The expenditure or ‘deliv-ery’ofprogrammesisoftenusedasameasureofperformance,andproxyforcapacitytoimplement.Basedonfiguresprovidedby theLiaisonOffice,thedeliveryratehasaveraged76percentoverthe2001−2005 period, with only minor variationsacrossthethreeclusters(seelastcolumninTable4).ThiscomparesfavourablytothecombinedSer-biaandMontenegrodeliveryrateof68percentandtotheUNDPaverageintheRegionalBureauforEurope and theCISof about65percent for theyears2004and2005.1Expendituresarealsobro-kenoutbyclusterinTable2,Annex4.

Expenditure patterns. Table3inAnnex4breaksoutUNDPprogrammeexpendituresbymainin-putitemandprogrammearea.Overthefive-yearperiod,expendituresoninternationalandnationalexpertsandofficestaffaccount forabout40per-centofallexpenditures.Procurementhasaveragedabout19percentoverthesametimeperiod.Train-ingandworkshopshavebeenoneof thehighestexpenditure categories ($509,000, about 12 per-centofthetotal).

5.2 PLANNING, ORGANIzATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Planning.AsdiscussedinChapter3ofthisreport,theUNDPMontenegroprogrammewaslaunchedwithout any formal strategy or plan. The initialmanagementapproachwasbasedonan informaland very general programme strategy, supportedbyaseriesofapparentlyadhocmanagementdeci-sionsonstaffingandfunding.Itwasnotuntillate2002,nearlya fullyearafter theappointmentoftheheadoftheLiaisonOffice,thatthebasicsofaprogrammeandmanagementstrategyweredevel-oped.2Atpresent,theredoesnotexistanyformalplanfortheLiaisonOffice,otherthanthehigh-levelprogrammestrategyoutlinedintheCountryProgrammeActionPlanfor2005-2009.

Organization and human resources. Despitesomeweaknesses inplanning, theLiaisonOfficewasabletogrowtheofficethroughcontinuedne-gotiationswiththeBelgradeCountryOfficeandtheRegionalBureauforEuropeandtheCIS.By2005,theofficehadexpandedconsiderablyinor-dertosupporttheexpandedprogrammeportfolio.TheorganizationofthePodgoricaofficeasofend-2005isillustratedinAnnex6.

Table5chartsthegrowthinstaffingovertheperi-od2001–2005.By2005,theofficehadacombined

72 C h A p T e r 5

__________________________________________________________________________1.InformationextractedfromtheUNDPcorporate‘ExecutiveSnapshots’database.Figurespriorto2004arenotavailablefrom

thisdatabase.2.Thedocument,undated,wasintheformofadraft‘OutlineStrategy2003’thataddressedthetopicsofcoordination,theongo-

ingandpotentialfutureprogramme,staffing,thehead-of-officefunction,UNfacilitationandresourcemobilization.Itwasbasedonanearlier‘SWOT‘analysis.Also,abasicofficeworkplanhadbeendevelopedforthefirsthalfof2002.

Figure 6: Budget Trend by Cluster, 2001-2005 (US$ 1,000)

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

InstitutionalandJudicialreform

energyandenvironment

Socialandeconomicparticipation

totalof47nationalandinternationalstaff.Thena-tional staffcategory included11expertsengagedin ministries on longer-term projects. Humanresources management also has been substantialintermsof thenumbersof internationalandna-tionalexpertsandconsultantsrecruitedasprojectand programme resources. Over the 2001–2005period,atotalof142contractshadbeenlet(40in-ternationaland102national).Someconcernshavebeen raisedover the sizeandcostof theLiaisonOffice.Forexample,theProgrammeSupportUnitfor the Capacity Development Programme hasbeenstaffedbyUNDPresourcesandisphysicallylocatedintheLiaisonOffice.

Outside of the preceding observations, however,resultsofthe2005UNDPGlobalStaffSurvey(forthefirsttimeconductedseparatelyfortheBelgradeandPodgoricaoffices1) reveal twodistinguishingfeatures(seeAnnex5).First,thattheoverallclar-ityofgoals,expectationsandcollaborationintheLiaisonOfficeisstrong,inallcaseswellabovetheaverageofUNDPCountryOffices in theregionandevenglobally.Thissuggeststhatinternalcom-municationsisstrong.Thesecondrelatestoofficeefficiency,wherethestaffscoredperformancewellabovetheregionalandglobalaverages.Thesere-sults indicate a high degree of commitment andmotivation,plusasenseof‘teamwork’.TheUNDPLiaison Office prides itself on functioning as a‘team’. Regular team meetings are held, involv-ingallstaffand,asdiscussedinChapter4,thereis a considerable degree of inter-cluster coopera-

tion.Clusterteamleadersaredelegatedauthoritytodevelopandmanageprogrammeswithintheirareas.TheLiaisonOfficehascontinuallyworkedonimprovingtheworkingclimatethroughinter-nalworkloadsurveys,retreatsandteammeetings.ThedeputyresidentrepresentativealsoattendedaUNDPManagementDevelopmentCentrecourserunby theHayGroup inearly2005and imple-mented, again with Hay, a leadership trainingmoduleinMontenegroforsevenofthekeyteammembersinlate2005.

Management accountability. TheUNDPCoun-tryOffice structure in theStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroconsistsofthreeseparatephysicaloperations: one inBelgrade that is officially reg-istered as the UNDP Representative Office, oneInter-agency Office in southern Serbia (Vranje),and one Liaison Office in Podgorica, Montene-gro.2The roleof thePodgoricaofficehasbeen amatterofconsiderablediscussionandnegotiationoverthepastfiveyears.TheinitialpurposeoftheLiaisonOfficewas“ … to act as an antenna for the UNDP Country Office and to ensure an adequate lev-el of coverage of and communication with the Republic of Montenegro.”3However,thedutiesandrespon-sibilitiesoftheactingheadfocusedverymuchonprogrammedevelopmentandimplementation,of-ficegrowthandestablishingthenecessaryopera-tionalcapacity.

WhiletheinitialdutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheLiaisonOfficewereconsiderable,therewaslittleinthewayofdelegatedsigningauthority.Itwasnot


__________________________________________________________________________1.Duetowhich,itisnotpossibletoassessanytime-serieschanges.2.AcomprehensiveauditconductedbyUNDPin2002questionedwhethertheLiaisonOfficeshouldbeconsideredasanofficial

UN/UNDPrepresentationofficeorwhetheritshouldbeconsideredsimplyasaprojectoffice.TheauditnotedthataccordingtotheUNDPBureauofManagement/AuditServicesDepartment,onlytheAdministratorcanauthorizetheopeningofaUNDPOffice.See:UNDP.May2002.‘ComprehensiveAuditoftheUNDPOfficeintheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia’.Report#IAS0072.

3.UNDP.August2001.TermsofReferenceforProgrammeManagerandActingHeadofthePodgoricaLiaisonOffice.

Table 5: UNDP Staffing, Montenegro, 2001–2005 (number of persons)

Posts 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

International 1 1 2 3 2

National 5 6 11 26 45

Total 6 7 13 29 47

untilayearlaterthatasignedinstrumentdefinedthecleardelegationofauthorityfromtheresidentrepresentative to the Liaison Office.1 A separateannualoperationsbudgetwassetupin2004,thusmakingiteasierfortheofficetoplanandbudgetforexpenditures.

5.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Country programme monitoring and evaluation.Approachestomonitoringandevaluation(M&E)are setout in theCommonCountryFramework(2002-2004)andtheCountryProgrammeActionPlan (2005-2009). The CCF states that “UNDP will assume a pro-active partnership role beyond tra-ditional forms of monitoring and evaluation – dis-tance monitoring will be replaced by monitoring and review through association and risk-sharing. Such an approach is consistent with the UNDP shift from the traditional role of a development donor to develop-ment agent and stakeholder.”(CCF,paragraph39).TheCCFdidreceiveanon-criticalmid-termre-view, andaResults-orientedAnnualReportwasproduced for 2004 (see below). Other than this,there is little furtherclarificationofhowUNDPshifted its practice of monitoring and evaluationbeyond ‘traditional forms’ to that of ‘associationandrisk-taking’,unlessthelatterreferstoUNDP’sresults-basedmanagement(RBM)approach,dis-cussedbelow.

TheM&EfunctiondescribedintheCountryPro-

grammeActionPlan ismoreexplicit.2Althoughonly the first year of the five-year Country Pro-grammeDocumenthasbeencompleted,M&Eofthe overall programme has yet to be carried outby the Government or UNDP. Furthermore, asstatedintheCountryProgrammeActionPlan,itwouldbedifficult for theGovernment to ensureaccountability,transparencyandprobityintheuseofprogrammeresourceswhensuchresourcesaremanaged by UNDP through direct execution orimplementedbyUNDPunderanationalexecutionarrangement.3And,asnotedintheUNDAF,“… quality data shortages and member states’ institutional weaknesses in collecting pertinent data makes tracking progress and trends difficult” (UNDAF,Section6,page19).AnassessmentoftheevaluabilityoftheoverallprogrammefoundthatneithertheCCFnortheannualstrategynotesprovidedclearintendedresultsnormeasurableindicatorsofperformance,and the evaluation team found little evidence ofbaselines,targetsorsystemstocollectsuchaggre-gateinformation.4

Project and programme monitoring and evalua-tion.Intheabsenceofmonitoringandevaluationat the countryprogramme level,M&Ehasbeencarried out at the project and programme levels.As noted in Chapter 4, independent evaluationswere carried out for the Capacity DevelopmentProgramme, the NGO Capacity Building Pro-gramme and the Montenegro Sustainable De-velopmentProgramme.5 In thecaseof theCDP,

74 C h A p T e r 5

__________________________________________________________________________1.ThiswasachievedthroughaninternalUNDPmemorandumsignedbyboththeresidentrepresentativeandtheheadofthe

LiaisonOfficeinPodgorica,dated26February2003.TheheadoftheLiaisonOfficehaddelegatedauthority,includingdeci-sion-making,forprogrammedevelopmentandimplementation,operationssupport,andasetoffinancialsigningauthority(forexample,forsub-projectswithavalueupto$30,000,forprocurementupto$30,000,andrecruitmentandsigningofSpecialServiceAgreementcontractsupto$25,000).

2.M&Eistobeundertaken“… in line with the UNDAF results matrix and monitoring and evaluation plan, and also the Country Programme Document. The Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro, Government of Serbia, Government of Montenegro and UNDP will be responsible for ensuring continuous monitoring and evaluation of the Country Programme Action Plan, with a view to ensuring efficient utilization of programme resources as well as accountability, transparency and probity.”CountryProgrammeActionPlan,2005–2009,PartVIII.

3.ThecurrentCountryProgrammeActionPlan, in the same section, also states: “As part of UNDP’s revised Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the strategy to enhance ownership, the progress of the results and resources framework will be monitored on a half-yearly basis, in collaboration with the State Union and State Members through strategic steering committees from state union level to projects level, comprised of relevant stakeholders (Governments, UN agencies and other development partners).”Thislevelofmonitoringhasnottakenplace.

4.Forfurtherevidenceofthis,seematerialdrawnfromthereviewofevaluabilitylocatedintheintroductionandchapteronUNDPstrategiesforassistanceofthisreport.Further,specificinformationontheevaluabilityofspecificprogrammecompo-nentscanbefoundinthedraftinceptionreport,August2005,foundinAnnex10.

5.TheseevaluationsweremanagedbytheLiaisonOfficeofUNDPthroughthecontractingof‘independentevaluators’.BothevaluationreportswereproducedbyUNDP.DuetothecontractualandfiduciaryrelationshipbetweentheevaluatorsandUNDP,thefullindependenceoftheevaluationsmaybecompromised.Theindependenceoffutureevaluationswouldbebetterassurediftheywerecontractedbythirdparties–perhapsthefundingdonorsthemselves.

generalmonitoringofperformancewasperformedby the joint donor-Government Executive Com-mittee,basedonperiodicreportsproducedbytheUNDP-staffed programme support unit. Thesewere not, however, based on pre-agreed perfor-mance measures or goals (see below). As noted,a mid-term review was carried out for the CCF(2002-2004),but littlecoveragewasgiventotheMontenegroprogramme.UNDPalsoconductedacomprehensiveauditoftheBelgradeofficeinearly2002,butthetimingwastooearlytoincludethePodgoricaoffice.

Intermsofmonitoringandevaluatingprogrammeperformance,theCDPprogrammeapproachwasconsidered successful and appropriate consider-ingthedynamicnatureofinstitutionalreform.Insuchareasaspublicadministrationreformandin-stitutionaldevelopment,programmeperformancebasedondetailedmeasuresandindicatorscanbeverydifficult, since the intendedoutcomesor re-sultsmaybemanyyearsdowntheroad,andsuccess(howevermeasured)maybeattributabletoawiderangeofstakeholders,notjustUNDP.Theconun-drumfacedbyUNDPanditsdevelopmentpartnersis how to cost-effectively manage for results andthusdemonstrateareasonablelevelofaccountabil-ityintheuseoffunds.Todoso,‘platform’-relatedprogramme documents could make better use ofclearlydefinedintendedresultsandhowtheyaretobemeasured,suchthatindividualprojectscanbebetterplanned,managed,monitoredandevalu-atedagainsttheseresults.Otherwise,thereistheriskthatprojectsindividuallymaybeeffective,butnotnecessarilycohesiveorsupportiveofeachotherinthecontextoftheoverallprogramme.ItwouldseemappropriatethatUNDPcarryouttraditionalproject-levelM&Eactivitiesuntilsuchtimethatalternativemechanismsareinplace.

Results-based management and reporting. Aspart of its overall results-based management ap-proach, UNDP’s Strategic Results Framework

(SRF),Multi-YearFundingFramework(MYFF),theUNDAFandResults-orientedAnnualReport(ROAR)aretheprimaryplanningdocumentsforSerbiaandMontenegro.AswiththeCCF,thesedocumentsdevelopedfor2002and2004appliedmoretothefederalrepublicasawhole,withmostemphasis given to the Serbian and state unionlevelsofGovernment.AmapoftheSRF/ROARgoals for 2002 and intended outcomes for 2004are listed in Annex 9. It was toward these goalsthat thenascentMontenegroLiaisonOfficewasto programme its activities and to contribute totheirrealization.1

Itwas thegoal on environment forbothperiodsthatwasdirectedprimarilyatMontenegrowherethe expected outcome in 2002 was: “Capacity of constituent authorities to plan and implement inte-grated approaches to environmental management and energy development, including the integration of global environmental concerns and commitments in national development planning and policy.” This was to beachievedinpartthroughaconcertedpartnershipstrategy.2

IndicatorsforratherambitiousSRFoutcomesandend-targetsincluded:(1)adoptionbytheGovern-ment of a national strategy/plan/programme asrequiredbyvariousconventions;(2)theestablish-mentandoperationofacentralcoordinatingbodyfornationalsustainabledevelopmentimplementa-tion; and (3) effective monitoring and reportingmechanisms. Targets set for end-2003 includedthecompletionofanationalenvironmentalcapac-ity assessment, cost-effective and reliable powergenerationandsupply,theestablishmentandop-erationoftwopilotnationalsustainabledevelop-ment programmes, and communiqués developedwith follow-upand fully fundedprogrammesonbiodiversityandclimatechange.

The 2004 Results Reports extracted from theUNDP 2004 Results Database combine report-


__________________________________________________________________________1.Outcomestatementsandindicatorswereintroducedonlyrecentlytocountry-levelplanningdocumentswiththeUNDAF/

CPD(2005–2009).Untilthebeginningofthenewcycle(forSerbiaandMontenegro,2005),theBelgradeCountryOfficewasrequiredtoapproximatetheintendedresultsfromtheirCCF,thusresultinginamismatch.Thesourceforthe2002and2004goalsisbroadlytheCCF(2002–2004),butsomelatitudewasgiventoeachCountryOfficeforreportingfortheResults-orientedAnnualReportonintendedoutcomespriorto2005.

2.Thisisstatedas“Foster partnerships with multi-bi donors, UN system, NGOs and Government using various existing mechanisms (GEF, EPR (Environmental Performance Review), NEAP(National Environmental Action Plan)) and new mechanisms (National Council for Sustainable Development in Montenegro - NCSD).”UNDP,StrategicResultsFramework2002.

ing for both Serbia and Montenegro. Reportingappliesonlytothenineintendedoutcomeslistedforthe2004SRF/ROAR,anditisnotpossibletofindassessmentsofperformancethroughtheSRF/ROARmechanism for earlier periods.Nonethe-less,reportingfor2004doeshighlightprogrammeperformanceinMontenegroinselectedareas,andisconsistentwiththefindingsonperformancedis-cussedinChapter4ofthisreport.1

While the weakness of results monitoring andreporting is recognized as a corporate issue, anumber of UNDP Country Offices have takenresponsibilityforimprovingthequalityofthede-signofprogrammesandprojects,andestablishingintegrateddatacollectionandfeedbacksystemstoprovideevidence-basedmanagementdecisions.ItisrecommendedthattheLiaisonOfficereviewsitsownsystem,drawingonthesegoodpractices.

5.4 PROGRAMME DELIVERY MODALITIES

AsnotedinTable1,Annex4,allUNDPprojectsareimplementedaccordingtothedirectexecution(DEX) modality. According to the UNDP Ex-ecutiveBoarddecision98/2,thisrole“shall remain limited to countries in special circumstances and apply only when it can be demonstrated that it is essential to safeguard the full responsibility and accountability of the Administrator for effective programme and project delivery.”ThejustificationfortheuseofDEXwasgivenintheCountryProgrammeDocument.2

Ifsuchspecialcircumstancesdonotexist,thentheGovernmentandUNDPmayoptfornationalex-

ecution (NEX). This is an arrangement wherebyUNDPentruststoGovernmenttheresponsibilityforthemobilizationofUNDP-financedinputsandtheireffectiveapplication,incombinationwiththeGovernment’sownandotheravailable resources,towards the attainment of project or programmeobjectives.ThisisUNDP’sstatedobjectiveforthecurrentprogrammingperiod.3Theaccountabilityfor management of nationally executed UNDPprojectsandprogrammes–whetherfundedfromcoreorotherdonorresources–isvestedwithna-tional government authorities. This includes ac-countability for theuse ofUNDP resources, theproductionofoutputsandtheachievementofpro-grammeorprojectobjectives.4

The project documents are jointly signed by theGovernmentandUNDP.TheGovernmenttakesthe leading role is settingdirection,determiningprioritiesand,insomecases,signing-offonorap-proving procurement and recruitment decisions.This is the case and practice with the CapacityDevelopment Programme, where the ExecutiveCommittee,chairedbytheGovernment,makesallkeydecisions,eventhoseofanoperationalnature,althoughUNDPstillprocessesmostoftheopera-tionaltransactions(anadministrativeservice)andsupportsothersubstantiveaspectsofimplementa-tion (such as provision of technical advice). TheCapacity Development Programme may be seenasade factopartnershipbetweentheGovernment,UNDP and the funding donors where each hasassignedresponsibilities,basedontheircompara-tiveadvantagesandagreeduponroles.However,

76 C h A p T e r 5

__________________________________________________________________________1.Forexample,forthefirstintendedoutcome,itwasreportedthatgovernmentinstitutions,civilsociety,thestatisticsoffices

andinternationalorganizationswereactivelyinvolvedinthepreparationoftheMDGreportforMontenegroandthatthisparticipationhelpedtobuildinternalcapacitiesandtofosterpartnerships(inadditiontosupportingachievementofthesecondintendedoutcome).Itwasinthesixthintendedoutcome,undertheareaofenergyandenvironment,thatMontenegrowasreportedtohaveachievednotableperformance,particularlywithrespecttofosteringanenablingpolicyenvironment(thatis,byadoptingtheStrategicFramework,theGovernmentpubliclydeclaredandcommittedtosustainabletourismdevelopmentinnorthernandcentralMontenegro).

2.“Due to the sub-optimal capacity of public administration, most UNDP assistance under the current CCF was provided through the direct execution (DEX) modality. While DEX allowed needed support to reach its target audience quickly and efficiently, it sometimes lacked full managerial ownership by counterparts. Continuing substantive policy dialogue must underpin project entry and exit strate-gies with potential counterparts on a case-by-case basis.”CountryProgrammeDocument(2005–2009),DP/CPO/SCG/1,June,2004,paragraph20.

3.“UNDP will work to develop capacity of its team members and those of the counterparts for the gradual institution of full counterpart execution (NEX) to promote efficient project implementation with greater counterpart ownership,”Ibid.paragraph33.

4.ThesameUNDPExecutiveBoarddecision98/2alsoacceptedCountryOfficesupporttoNEX,withconditions.Officially,CountryOfficesupporttoNEXmaybeseentoconsistofonlythoseactivitiesrelatedtothedeliveryofinputs(forexample, recruitment, procurement, etc.) while implementation refers to the conversion of inputs to outputs. In instances where aCountryOfficedoesnottakeonfullresponsibilityofexecutionbutfocusesonimplementationsupport,DEXandCountryOfficesupporttoNEXwouldhavemanysimilarities.

asnoted in thecaseof theCDP, the ‘ownership’oftheprogrammecanbecomeunclear,especiallywhentheprogrammemanagementorsupportunitisseentobeassociatedmorewithUNDPthanwiththeGovernment.

The eighth MDG goal focuses on ‘developing aglobal partnership for development’. One of themain drivers and measures of performance forUNDP in the SRF/ROAR, as noted, is ‘forg-ingpartnershipsforresults’.Inlightoftheabovenotedde factouseofpartnerships,thestatedintentof UNDP and the Government to move towardafullNEXmodalitymaynotbethebestcoursetotake.Itwouldseemthatfutureprogrammede-liverymodalities shouldbebasedonamore for-malpartnershipmodel,wherethereisfargreater

flexibilityonallsidestoadjustrolesandresponsi-bilities (of thepartners)according toprogrammecircumstances. Furthermore, should governmentcorruptioncontinuetobeasignificantissue,thenUNDPshouldretain,attheleast,administrativeresponsibility over inputs (such as procurement,contracting,payments,cashmanagementandre-latedreporting,accountingandcontrols).1

Amoreflexiblemodalityforexecutionandimple-mentationusingthepartnershipmodelcouldhavethe beneficial effect of better building nationalcapacities (governmental, non-governmental andprivatesector),thusfacilitatinganeventualUNDPexit.ThepartnershipapproachisdiscussedfurtherinChapter6.


__________________________________________________________________________1.ThisisconsistentwitharecentUNDPevaluationofDEXthatrecommendedamoreflexibleapproachtodeliverymodalities,

andexpandingtheapplicationofcountriesunderspecialdevelopmentcircumstances.See:UNDP.April2001.EvaluationofDirectExecution.EvaluationOffice,NewYork.

Thischapterofthereportbringstogetherthemainconclusions,findingsandsummarychallengesandrecommendationsregardingUNDP’sprogrammeinMontenegro.Indoingso,itmustbekeptinmindthattheRepublicofMontenegroisapproachingaprofound juncture in itsdevelopmentasanationstateandpotentialaccessiontotheEU–historiceventscloudedbypoliticaluncertainty.AlookintothefutureforUNDPinMontenegro,then,mustbedonewithacertaindegreeofhumility–thatitsrole is to support the implementationofnationaldevelopment agendas rather than driving them;andthatitisbutoneplayerinalargecommunityofdevelopmentpartners.

EvenasacomparativelysmallactorinMontene-gro,UNDPhas,overthepastfiveyears,providedvaluableassistanceindevelopinginstitutionalca-pacity in key ministries, has helped focus atten-tiononissuesofpovertyandhumandevelopment,hashelpedbridgegapsbetweengovernmentalandnon-governmental sectors, and has been instru-mental in putting definition and action into the‘eco-state’ concept. UNDP has established itselfasatrusteddevelopmentpartner,andconsiderablepotentialremainsforcontinuedUNDPsupporttonationaldevelopmentpriorities.

Inthischapter,mainconclusionsareprovidedfirstontheperformanceofthecountryprogrammeasawhole–lookingespeciallyatoverallprogrammerelevanceandpositioning–overtheperiod2001–2005.Next,conclusionsandlessonsareofferedonthe more specific objectives and issues to be ad-dressed by this ADR as set out in Chapter 2 ofthis report (that is,onresults–effectivenessandefficiency,complementarity,sustainability,coordi-nationandmanagement).Inthefinalsubsection,higher-level recommendations are offered on thefuture direction of the country programme andUNDPpositioninginMontenegro.

6.1 STRATEGIC INTENT OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

(1) Main Conclusions

ThesuccessoftheMontenegroprogrammethusfarcanbemeasuredbymorethanthesubstantialgrowthinprogrammesanddelivery–whichnone-thelesscanbesignificantmeasuresofpositiveper-formance.Rather,thesuccessofUNDPinMon-tenegroasdiscussedinChapters3and4isatellingstoryoffocusedstrategicintentandthinking,per-severance,findingniches,networking,partnering,teamworkandentrepreneurialmanagement.Inde-pendentevaluationscarriedoutforthemajorpro-grammes (MontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme, Capacity Development Programme,andNGOCapacityBuildingProgramme)revealrelevanceandpositiveperformancewithpotentialforsustainabilityofresultsandlikelihoodforim-pactinthosekeysectorsthatUNDPhadtargetedat the outset. Furthermore, UNDP programmestrategy development in Montenegro appears tohave learned fromthemany lessonsofpost-con-flictandtransitionalreforminternationallyandintheregion,andfromthelessonsinsimilarlarge-scaleprogrammesinSerbia(forexample,theCa-pacityBuildingFund).

The main lesson learned and factored into UN-DP’sMontenegroprogrammestrategiesandtheirimplementationisthatreformsarelongterm.Theyare also complex cross-sectoral processes of fun-damental, transformational change. The success-fuldevelopmentstrategies–evidencedthusfarinthe Montenegro case – employ partnerships, arefocused,buildnetworks,useexperimentationandpilots,startsmallandbuildcredibilitywithearlysuccesses.More important,however, theMonte-negro case demonstrates that successful countryprogrammestrategydevelopmentandimplemen-tation require top political and executive leader-ship and meaningful ownership in the country,broad-based participation and consultation, andopenandtransparentdecision-making.

Chapter 6

Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

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Another major lesson from country programmestrategydevelopment,however,isthatdevelopmentgoalsmustnotbeoverlyambitious–aspreviouslynotedintheCountryCooperationFrameworkfor2002-2004.Clearly, this lessonhasbeen appliedto the current UNDAF, which has moderatelystated goals and intended outcomes, but stillwithminimalbaselinesandindicatorstomeasureperformance.Anotherlessonlearnedandappliedin the dynamic and, at times, uncertainMontenegrocontext is thatstrategydevelopmentis an ongoing process, in need of constant fine-tuning and risk assessment to adjust to changesanduncertaintiesinboththeexternalandinternalUNDPenvironments.

The Country Cooperation Framework for 2002-2004 was subjected to a mid-term review in2003.1 The review is regarded as more of a self-assessmentandpromotionaldocumentforUNDPprogrammesand strategies, rather thana criticalreviewofperformance.Montenegroisgivenmar-ginal attention,but there is acknowledgementofsuccessfulcapacitydevelopmentinthecivilsocietysector,initialpolicydialogueandprogrammede-velopmentgroundworkintheareaofenergyandenvironment,andalsoofabroadercapacitydevel-opmentprogrammetosupportpublicadministra-tionreform.

The Country Programme Action Plan for 2005synthesizedlessonslearnedfromthereviewoftheCCFandvariousprojectandprogrammeevalua-tions.Theirmainmessages,whichare supportedinsomecasesbythisreport,canguidefuturestrat-egydevelopment.TheyapplyequallytoSerbiaandMontenegro:

• “Sound management structure, and a working part-nership with the State Union Council of Ministers, Government of Serbia and Government of Monte-negro, and donors, as well as positive institutional and professional relationships proved to be key to successful implementation of any programme.”

• “UNDP should invest more resources in policy dia-logue with the State Union Council of Ministers,

Government of Serbia and Government of Monte-negro to make them aware of the long-term approach to improve governance and discourage a quest for ‘quick fixes’.”

• “Lack of donor coordination might represent a seri-ous risk to future programme development and may lead to overlap and duplication of efforts.”

(2) Programme Relevance

The current programme strategies for UNDP inMontenegro remain highly relevant. They arealigned with the macroeconomic reform agendaandEUaccession,andtheycontinuetoreceivethehighestlevelofsupportfromthecurrentGovern-ment. The Government has set sustainable anddiversified tourism as a goal (of which eco-tour-ismisaniche)asoneofitstopmacroeconomicde-velopmentpriorities.TheGovernmentanddonorpartnershavestatedtheirintenttocontinuetheir‘partnership’ with UNDP in the implementationoftheMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentPro-gramme,withaspecialemphasisontourism/sus-tainabledevelopmentinthecentralandnorthernregionsoftherepublic–areaswhereotherfundingpartnersarenot,asyet,especiallyactive.AnotherpriorityfortheGovernmentanddonorpartnersiscontinuedcapacitydevelopmentandreformofthecentral executive management and coordinationfunctions of Government (General Secretariat);UNDPiswellpositioned toexpand itsCapacityDevelopmentProgrammeinthisarea.2AsnotedinChapter4,morecanbedonetoinvolvethepri-vatesector,andagreaterbalanceofsupportneedstobeappliedbetweenthegovernmentalandnon-governmental/civilsocietysectors.

TheassessmentofspecificprogrammesinChaper4ofthisreportdemonstratedthatUNDPsupportedgovernancereformsandprocesses,includingpub-licadministrationreform,andthedevelopmentofnationalcapacitiesinGovernmentandcivilsoci-ety,andtoalesserextentwithintheprivatesector.ThroughitssupporttothePRSPprocess,UNDPfacilitated the development of a broader aware-nessandunderstandingofpoverty–anissuethat

__________________________________________________________________________1.UNDP.2003.‘BuildingBlocksforReformandRecovery:Mid-termReport,2002-2003’.UNDP-Belgrade.2.TheADRTeammetwiththeprimeministerwhoindicatedthatboththeMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgramme/

tourismandcentralgovernmentreformwereareaswhereUNDPassistancewouldbeespeciallywelcomed,alongwithcontin-uedsupporttodevelopingpartnershipsandrelationshipsbetweenthegovernmentandothersectorsofsociety.

hadpreviouslybeenignoredorunderplayed.Withsuch expansion of awareness and understanding,combinedwithsolidmetricsontheproblem, fu-ture programmes targeted at poverty alleviationwillhaveagreaterlikelihoodofsuccess.

Perhapsthemostsignificantprogrammeresulthasbeeninsustainabledevelopment.UNDPasaneu-tralbrokerandfacilitatorwasabletobreakdownbarriersbetweenGovernmentandcivilsociety,andtobuildeffectiveandsustainablepartnershipsandmeansofcooperationonsustainabledevelopmentactivities.TheMontenegroSustainableDevelop-mentProgrammemaywellbecomeaflagshippro-grammeofnotonlyUNDP,butalsooftheGov-ernment,participatingdonorsandothersectorsofsociety.Ifanything, theMontenegroSustainableDevelopmentProgrammeandUNDP’sparticipa-tionaremorerelevanttonationalgoalsnowthantheywereattheoutsetoftheprogramme.Nation-alstakeholdershaveassertedahighdegreeofpro-grammeownershipandmost,ifnotall,sub-com-ponentsof theprogrammewillmost likelycarryon,withorwithoutUNDPsupport.

Another way of looking at UNDP programmerelevance is to ask the questions: (a) What hasUNDPbeentryingtodo?(b)Whatisitperceivedtobedoing?(c)Whathasitactuallydone?Whiletheanswers,ofcourse,continuetoevolve,itmaybe concluded that: (a) UNDP has attempted tosupporttheintegrationofsustainabledevelopmentconcepts into mainstream policy and planning(thatis,the‘eco-state’);(b)UNDPisperceivedtobedoingthisbysome,butintheareaoftourism,forexample,UNDPisperceivedtobepushingthe‘eco-tourism’ concept as a niche rather than as amainstreamingprocess,and(c)UNDPisactuallypursuing several agendas through the Montene-groSustainableDevelopmentProgramme,withaprimaryfocusongettingsustainabledevelopmentconceptson thedevelopmentpolicy agenda, intocertain sectors (tourism), and seeking integrationthrough the linkingofcomplementary initiatives(forexample,spatialplanningandGIS).

(3) UNDP Programme Positioning

TheUNDPdecisiontoestablishaprogrammeandphysical presence in Montenegro in the volatileanduncertainpoliticalcontextoftheFederalRe-publicofYugoslaviaandsubsequentStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegrohasthusfarprovedtobe

wellcalculated.AsandwhenEUaccessionagree-ments are formalized, and should Montenegrobecomeindependent,thenUNDP–withasolidbaseofexperienceandon-the-groundcapacity–iswellpositionedtofurtheritsstrategyofdevelop-mentcooperationuntilsuchtimethatMontenegro‘graduates’andthereisnofurtherneedforUNDPoranyotherdonorassistance.

Theinitial intentofUNDP,asstated inanearlyStrategyNote,was toposition itself as themosttrustedand strategicpolicy adviser to theFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia on a range of develop-ment issues. This has not been borne out by theevidence.Infact,therealityofUNDPpositioninginMontenegrowasmoremodest–thatthroughitsfocusedprogrammeactivities,UNDPpositioneditselfforthemostpartasatrustedimplementation partneroftheGovernment,offundingdonorsandof thenon-governmental sector. It is in its care-fullytargetedsupporttotheimplementationofna-tionalpolicythatUNDPhasdistinguisheditselfasaflexible,cost-effectiveandresponsivedevelop-mentpartnerinthoseprogrammethemesorclus-tersnotedabove.

6.2 UNDP PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

(1) Effectiveness and Efficiency

UNDP-supported programmes in Montenegrohavebeeneffective:that is,UNDPhasbeendo-ingtherightthingsinsofarasitssupporthasbeenalignedwithnationaldevelopmentpriorities,hasbeen compatible with the development prioritiesoffundingdonorsandpartners,andhasexploiteditscomparativeadvantages.Basedontheindepen-dentevaluations,projectandprogrammeobjectiveshavebeenachievedorareontrack.Thequalityofthemanyandvariedprogrammeoutputs(suchastraining,workshopsand seminars,draftsof lawsandregulations,publicationsandsoon)aresound.The processes adopted by programme activitieshavebeentransparentand,inmanycases,innova-tive,employingawidevarietyofconsultativeandparticipatorytechniques(includinguseofmedia).Specificexamplesofcontinuedprogrammeeffec-tivenessinclude:

• Keeping Montenegro’s ecological state ambi-tionsalive.

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• StrengtheningtheNGOsectoratacriticaljunc-tureinGovernment-civilsocietyrelationships.

• Integrating issues and concerns of the privatesectorandjobcreationwiththoseofpovertyre-duction.

• Ensuringcomplementarycapacitydevelopmentand institutional strengthening with sectoral(sustainabledevelopment)activities.

TheefficiencyofUNDP-supportedprogrammesismuchmoredifficulttomeasureaslittleexistsinthewayofmarketcomparisons.Civilsocietyorgani-zationsandtheprivatesectorarestillnascent,withlimitedcapacityforimplementation.Thesameap-pliestoGovernment.UNDPhasbuiltupconsid-erablestrengthandcapacityinitsLiaisonOffice.UNDP programme and project staff are seen tobewellcompensated,committedandhighlymoti-vated.Thisreportdidnotexamineprogrammein-putcosts(suchasstaffcosts,accommodation)andhowthesemightcompare toalternativesourcingmethods.UNDPmightlookintothefeasibilityoffindingmorecost-effectivemeansofimplementa-tion through theuseofnationalentities, suchasthe private sector and non-governmental organi-zations,therebyhelpingtobuildtrulysustainablenationalcapacities.

AsdiscussedinChapter5ofthisreport,UNDPhasperformedexceptionallywellinresourcemobi-lization.Thebulkofprogrammefinancingisfromnon-coreresources,andthistrendwillmostlikelycontinue in the future.ThemanagementservicesfeeschargedbyUNDPforprojectimplementationaregenerallyseentobecompetitive.

(2) Complementarity

TheMontenegrocountryprogrammewasfoundtobe complementary toboth theDevelopmentandPoverty Reduction Strategy and to the nationalEconomicReformAgenda.AstheDPRSmay,infuture,beintegratedintoasinglenationaldevel-opmentplan,thechallengeforUNDPwillbetoensurethatitsongoingandnewprogrammeswillbe correspondingly aligned. As noted in Chap-ter 4.2, the energy and environment cluster, andthe Montenegro Sustainable Development Pro-grammeinparticular,haveexhibitedquitestrongoverallcoherence, inpartthroughdesign,andinpartthroughdevelopingincomplementaryareas.

Further, the CDP-targeted projects have beendesigned to be complementary to and support-ive of the NGO Capacity Building Programme,the Montenegro Sustainable Development Pro-grammeandotherinitiativesintheareaofcapac-itydevelopment.

(3) Sustainability

Itisprobablytooearlyintheprogrammecycletopredict with any certainty that the UNDP-sup-portedprogrammeswillbesustainable.However,theearlyindicationsarethatmanyofthecompo-nentswillbeinstitutionalizedwithinGovernmentandothernationalorganizations,ifadequatepro-grammefinancingcanbeobtained.Through theCapacity Development Programme, UNDP andotherdonorsaretargetingprioritytasks,andthecase of the Ministry of International EconomicRelations andEuropean Integration serves as anexampleofsustainable institutionaldevelopment.However, in the Capacity Development Pro-gramme,forexample,toomuchattentionisgiventothesettingupof‘programmeimplementationormanagementunits’thatfocusmoreontime-boundimplementationofprojects,ratherthanonsustain-ableinstitutionaldevelopment.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the stated intent ofUNDP and the Government to move towards afull national execution modality may not be thebest course to take. It would seem that futureprogrammedeliverymodalitiesshouldemphasizethepartnershipmodel,where there is fargreaterflexibilityonallsidestoadjustrolesandresponsi-bilities (of thepartners)according toprogrammecircumstances. Further, should government cor-ruption continue to be a significant issue, thenUNDPshouldretain,attheleast,administrativeresponsibility over inputs (such as procurement,contracting,payments,cashmanagementandre-latedreporting,accountingandcontrols).And,asnotedabove,amoreflexiblemodalityforexecutionandimplementationusingarangeofpartnershipscould have the beneficial effect of better build-ing national capacities (governmental, non-gov-ernmentalandprivatesector),thusfacilitatinganeventualUNDPexit.

(4) UN System Coordination

AsnotedinChapter4.5,theheadoftheUNDPLiaisonOfficeinMontenegrohasneverhadafor-

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mal mandate to lead inter-agency coordination,although it has had some delegated authority tosupporttheResidentCoordinatorfunction.How-ever,theLiaisonOfficehas, de facto,soughttotakethe lead incoordination inseveralareasof inter-agencyactivity.However,despiteholdingmonthlymeetings, the views from other agencies on theextenttowhichithasexercisedthisroleeffectivelyaremixed.

There is a belief among all the agencies that theUNDAF and the move towards common prem-isesprovideatremendousopportunityformean-ingfulharmonizationandcoordination(includingjoint programming in select areas), which couldbeconsideredcriticalfortheUNinarepublicthesizeofMontenegro.Whileprogressoncommonpremiseshasbeenprogressive,moreworkneedstobedoneontranslatingtheUNDAFintocommonoperationalplansfortheUNsysteminMontene-gro. Should the Liaison Office become a formalCountryOffice, thengreaterUNsystemcoordi-nationislikelytoresult.

Further,intheabsenceofeffectivedonorcoordi-nation,anumberofministriesandagencieshavevocalizedsupportforUNDPtotakeamoreproac-tiverole.UNDP’seffectivenessinbringingtogeth-erdiverse interestgroupsandparties incommondialogue is widely acknowledged. In these casesithasplayedanorganizingrole,whichshouldbecontinued and strengthened. However, this maybebestconfinedtoareasofcurrentactivity,ratherthan seeking anoverall coordination function inviewoftherapidchangesinthecountryanddonorenvironment.UNDPmayalsocontinuetoseekaprogrammatic role inbuilding theGovernment’scapacity fordonor coordination through theCa-pacityDevelopmentProgramme.

(5) Donor and Government Coordination

As noted in Chapter 4.5 and above, general co-ordinationamongdonorshasalsobeenweak.Inpractice,ithastendedtobeadhoc,addressingis-suesofduplication,alignmentorcoordinationonspecificissuesandsectors.Forexample,inwork-ing with Ministry of Environmental ProtectionandPhysicalPlanning,UNDP(throughtheCa-pacityDevelopmentProgramme)andEARhavearranged to work with different departments toavoid overlap. However, as there are many otherplayers in sustainable development, the need for

moreformaldonorandgovernmentcoordinationmechanismsinthissectoraswellasotherswillin-crease.Asalsonoted,USAIDbydefaulthastakenonaleadroleincoordinatingdonoractivities,pro-vidingaplatformforbroadstock-taking,generalcoordination and providing an update on donoractivity.However,muchmoreneedstobedoneonactualprogrammingandpotentialharmonization,atleastinthemaindevelopmentsectors.

(6) Management

ThemanagementoftheMontenegroprogrammehasbeeneffective–aviablebusinessplatformhasbeen built to support both existing programmesaswell as toallow for futureprogrammeexpan-sion. The initially envisaged strategies have beenimplementedandadjustedperiodicallytoadapttochangesintheexternalenvironment.

6.3 MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

InChapter4ofthisreport,suggestionsandrecom-mendationswereofferedonprogrammingforeachofthespecificclustersandotherareasofUNDPprogrammeactivity.Inthissection,asmallsetofhigher-levelrecommendationsismadeastofuturedirection, scope and management of the over-all UNDP ‘country programme’ in Montenegro.ThefirsteightrecommendationsapplydirectlytotheUNDPcountryprogrammeforMontenegro,whilethefinalthreerecommendationsareappli-cableUNDP-wide.

RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO MONTENEGRO

(1) Align programmes with Montenegro’s goal of EU Accession

As in the case of Serbia, development policy inMontenegro is dominated now and for the fore-seeablefuturebytheneedsassociatedwithEUac-cession.ThedominantplayersinthisprocesswillcontinuetobeEUentities–theEAR,itssucces-sor,andEUbilateraldonorsastheycollectivelyas-sistMontenegrointheaccessionprocess.Theex-perienceofsomecountriesintheregionhasshownthatitisrelativelyeasytostarttheprocessofEUaccessionascomparedtobeing acceptedasamem-ber.Indeed,Montenegrowasabletostartnegotia-tionsontheStabilizationandAssociationAgree-ment with the EU in the absence of a complete

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stateframeworkanddespitethefactthatsomeofthereformsthattheEUrequiresformembership,suchasruleoflawandjudicialsystemreforms,hadnotevenstarted.

Inanycase,thedevelopmentofvariouslawsandregulationsand the settingupofvarious institu-tions is fairly straightforward compared to thelong,difficultprocessofimplementingthoselawsandregulations,anddevelopingthenecessaryin-stitutional capacities. Montenegro can expect toreceive considerable assistance from the EC, butthe availability of financial assistance (structuralcreditsandthelike)isnotexpectedtobeasgreatforcurrentandfuturecandidatesasithasbeenforpastcandidates.

TheGovernmentmaywelllooktoUNDPtoassistinthemobilizationofresourcestomeetarangeofdevelopment programme implementation needs,particularlyinthoseareaswhereUNDPiswellpo-sitionedandiscurrentlyprovidingsupport.Hav-ingworkedintheEUaccessioncountries,UNDPhassubstantialinstitutionalexperiencesupportingnationalgovernmentsandcivilsocietyinthepro-cessofEuropeanintegration.Itcouldbeofgreatbenefit for Montenegro if UNDP facilitated in-formationexchangesandknowledge-sharingwithotherEast-CentralEuropeancountries.

(2) Use the Sustainable Development Programme,especially eco-tourism, as a flagship

The Montenegro Sustainable Development Pro-gramme and other related initiatives shouldcontinue to be the main focus of UNDP pro-gramming in Montenegro. UNDP has built upcrediblecapacityandpresenceinthecountryasacost-effectiveimplementationpartnerandadvocateforenvironmentaldevelopmentandchange.Thereareandwillbemanyplayersinsustainabledevel-opmentinMontenegro,especiallyinthedevelop-mentofthe(eco)tourismsector.TheGovernmenthasindicatedthatUNDP’smainadvantageinthisbroad sector is in eco-tourism in the central andnorthern regions of the country,where there aregreater instances of poverty, environmental deg-radation and inequitable economic development.UNDPcan support thedesign and implementa-tionofintegratedeco-tourismandrelatedsustain-able development initiatives – by balancing andbringing in the interests of civil society and the

privatesector,developinglocalmarketeconomies,andsupportingservicedelivery/publicadministra-tionreformatthesubnationallevels(forexample,insmallermunicipalities).

(3) Support anti-corruption at all levels of programming

Therecentconferenceonanti-corruptionandor-ganized crime in Montenegro revealed the seri-ousnessoftheseissuesandhowengrainedtheyareinsociety.Anyandalldevelopmenteffortscouldbeseriouslyundermined–andevenfail– ifcor-ruptionandorganizedcrimearenottackledinaconcertedandcoordinatedmanner.TheUNDPinMontenegrohasaroletoplayandthiscanrangefromsupportingUNconventionsonanti-corrup-tiontofactoringinanti-corruptionconsiderationsinprogrammedesign,performancemeasuresandtargetedcapacitydevelopment.ExperienceinsomecountriesthathavejoinedtheEUhasshownsomeback-sliding on the anti-corruption front, and itcannotbeassumedthataccessiontotheEUalonewillsolvetheproblem.TheCouncilofEuropeandotherECbodiescanandshould takea lead roleinthisarea,whileUNDPcanplayanimportantsupporting role. For example, since corruptionandorganizedcrimeknownoboundaries,UNDPcan work with other UNDP Country Offices inthe region as well as with donors and interna-tionalNGOsinthedesignandimplementationofregional/subregionalanti-corruptioninitiatives.

(4) Advocate human development and poverty reduction

UNDP should strengthen its role as one of theleading advocates for poverty reduction and hu-mandevelopment–issuesthattoooftengetagreatdealofpolicyattentionbutlittleinthewayofcon-creteaction.Programmesinsustainabledevelop-mentcouldapplyaspecialfocusonimpoverishedgeographic areas and marginalized or vulnerablegroups. Future national development plans thatmay integrate theDevelopmentandPovertyRe-ductionStrategyshouldnotlosefocusonpovertyandhumandevelopment.Moreover,UNDPisinagoodpositiontoadvocatefortheinclusionoftheseissuesinthemacroeconomicdevelopmentagenda.

(5) Maintain programme focus

One of the main lessons UNDP Montenegrolearned from theSerbia countryprogrammewas


tomaintainfocus,andnotgetinvolvedinawiderangeofprogrammessimplybecausefundingmaybeavailablefromdifferentdonors.Shouldgreaterfunding become available from the EC or othersources, UNDP should resist becoming the pre-ferred implementing agent simply because of ex-pediencyorUNDP’s‘moreflexible’executionandimplementationmodalities,ortheneedtogener-ateincometofundtheofficeandprogrammeop-erations.Indeed,shouldtheoperationssideoftheofficebecometoolarge,thenUNDPshouldseekto outsource or contract out certain transaction-relatedprocesses–orprocessesandfunctionsthatarenotcoretotheprogrammerole.

(6) Strengthen strategic management

AstheUNDPPodgoricaofficegrowsandpossiblybecomesaformalCountryOfficewithresidentco-ordinatordesignation,specialattentionwillneedtobegiventostrategicmanagementand‘businessplanning’. The UNDP programme and office inMontenegrowillneedtodevelopitsvision,missionandrole inalignmentwithnationaldevelopmentpriorities,ontheonehand,andconsistentwithanamendedornewUNDAFforMontenegro.Poten-tially new Country Programme Documents andannual Country Programme Action Plans mayneedtobedevelopedspecificallyforMontenegro.Theorganizationalstructureoftheofficemayneedtochange,toensurethatitisalignedwiththepro-grammevisionandobjectives.Todate,the‘teamstructure’ of the office has been feasible in partbecause of the smaller programme portfolio andoffice size. In the future, should the programmegrow,thenthechallengeformaintainingtheteamapproachandassociatedsynergiesamongclusterswillbemoredifficult.

The UNDP programme in Montenegro is in itsveryearlystages.Individualprogrammessupport-ingsuchareasaspublicadministrationreformorsustainable (environment) development require alongtimetogenerateresults,outcomesorimpacts.The UNDP country programme over the period2001–2005maybeseenasthefirstphaseofalong-termpartnershiptoassistMontenegroinmeetinghuman and economic development goals. With-out any concrete baselines or measure of perfor-mance, other proxy or qualitative indicators maybeneeded tomeasure and assess performanceoftheoverallcountryprogramme.Allthisistosaythatmoreattentionwillneedtobepaidtoongoingstrategic management, performance monitoring

andreporting,evaluationand ‘businessplanning’to ensure that the UNDP programme operationremainsrelevantandcost-effective.

(7) Build a strategic alliance with the EC and Government of Montenegro

The June 2004 ‘Memorandum of Understandingconcerning the establishment of a strategic part-nership between the European Commission andthe United Nations Development Programme’shouldbeusedas thebasis forworkingoutcon-cretecollaborativearrangementswiththeECandtheGovernmentofMontenegroasEARfundingand operations are decentralized and deconcen-trated(2006isexpectedtobethelastyearofEARprogramming).During2006,anewprogramminginstrument(IPAorInstrumentforPre-accession)isbeingdevelopedbytheECandwillbeimple-mentedin2007.FuturegovernmentexecutionofEC funds may be hampered by limited govern-ment capacity, and UNDP, based on past expe-rience, may implement a number of governmentprogrammes. However, as mentioned above, thechallengeforUNDPwillbetomaintainfocusandabide by EC standards of project management,procurementandcontracting.

(8) Think early about an exit strategy

The former Yugoslavia was a founding memberof theUnitedNationsandan initial contributor.Montenegro today is a middle-income countrythatcouldsoongraduateto‘netcontributor’coun-trystatusandbeacceptedasacandidateformem-bershipintheEU.TheargumenthasbeenmadethatUNDPestablishedapositioninMontenegroandexpandeditsprogrammesbecauseithadale-gitimateroletoplayasaUNagency.

Astherepublicmovesfrompost-conflictandcri-sispreventiontodevelopment,thequestionmaybeasked:CouldothernationalandEUorganizations(NGOs,privatesector,othercivilsocietyorgani-zations,theGovernment)dothejobthatUNDPisnowdoingormaydointhefuture?ItshouldnotbeassumedthatUNDPwillplayaroleofindeter-minatedurationinMontenegro.TherewillcomeatimewhenUNDPshouldexitfromtherepublic,allowingnationalinstitutionsandorganizationstocarryon.

SeriousthinkingaboutUNDPexitingfromthere-publicshouldcoincidewithMontenegro’sstrategyforEUaccessionandeconomicdevelopment.One

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mechanismtoensurethatsuchstrategicthinkingoccursistoplacea ‘sunsetclause’fortheUNDPpresence in Montenegro in the UNDAF andCountry Programme Document, to be reviewedannuallyintheCountryProgrammeActionPlan.The current programme cycle ends in 2009, andthismaybeagoodjuncturetoreviewanddecideon continued UNDP presence or exit from thecountry. This question should also be formallyaskedandansweredinthenextCommonCoun-tryAssessmentandshouldalsobesubjectedtoanindependentandobjectivenationalpolicyanalysis.TheissueisalsorelatedtothebroaderquestionoftheUNDP role innet contributor countries (seealsorecommendation11,below).

UNDP-WIDE RECOMMENDATIONS

(9) Bring greater national balance into programming

UNDPhasmadesignificantprogressinsupportingpolicy and capacity development in Governmentandcivilsociety,whileatthesametimebuildingbridgesbetweenthetwo.However,whileitisnotamajorissueatthepresenttime,thereistheriskthatfutureUNDPprogrammingandimplemen-tationcouldtiltmoretowardstheNGOcommu-nitydue to corruptionor capacityweaknesses inGovernment.Thiscouldproducenational imbal-ances where the role of Government (in policy,in some areas of service delivery, in programmemanagement)couldbeundermined.Oneexampleis UNDP support to the Civil Society AdvisoryCommittee,anNGOinvolvedinthePovertyRe-ductionStrategyPaperthatanindependentevalu-ationrevealedtobeinneedofmajorreform.TheevaluationrecommendedthatUNDPre-thinkitsdecisionaboutdiscontinuingitssupport.Assug-gestedabove,UNDPmightstriveinthefuturetoattainagreaterdevelopmentbalanceinconsulta-tion andparticipationby involvingGovernment,thebroadercivilsocietyandprivatesectorentities.For example,UNDPmightuse the ‘global com-pact’ as a springboard for more affirmative par-ticipationof theprivate sector insustainableandespecially local development, in public and statesectorreform,andinservicedeliveryreform.Also,asnotedpreviously,thecurrentcorporategoalsandservice lines of UNDP encompass private sectordevelopment(seeAnnex9).

(10) Use partnerships as a means to better coordination and capacity development

Sectoral level. Related to the need for strategicmanagementisthechallengeforUNDPtobeabletostrikeabalancebetweenmeetingnationalpri-oritiesthatmightoftentaketheformofreactive‘quickfixes’,andadvocacyforalong-termapproachtoimprovegovernance.Theaforementionedpub-licadministrationreformcanserveasthestrategicframework for short-, medium- and longer-termsupport in the areaof governance.However, theGovernment, UNDP and other donors will re-quiretherighttypeofinstitutionalarrangementstoensureadequatemanagementcoordination.

As the development situation in Montenegromoves from post-crisis to development and EUaccession, the Government and its developmentpartnerswillfaceanincreasinglycomplexandin-terdependent set of development issues that canonly be tackled by more cooperative, integratedandcoordinateddialogueandfocusedapproaches.Thenotionofpartnershiporsector-wideapproach-estoprogrammingandthechannellingofdevel-opment assistance can be introduced as a meanstoaddresssomeoftheprogrammingandcoordi-nationproblems.UNDPis inagoodpositiontoprovidecoordination leadership in the subsectorsof sustainable development and public adminis-trative reform/institutional development. At theleast,UNDPmightworkwiththeleadinggovern-mentministriesandGeneralSecretariatinsettingup adhocor informal donor-Governmentwork-inggroups,perhapsadaptingcoordinationmodelsthathavebeensuccessfulinmanyothercountries.Thiswouldbeausefulavenueforpolicydialogue.Annex 10 provides some thoughts on the use ofpartnershipstoenhancedevelopmentcooperationanddonorcoordinationalongsectorallines.

Programme execution level. UNDP should en-deavour touse structuredandcollaborativepart-nershipmodalitiesfortheexecutionandimplemen-tationofprojectsandprogrammes,andmoveawayfromtheNEX/DEXdichotomy.Inotherwords,theprogrammeandprojectdocumentsshouldbeseenasapartnershipagreementsignedbyallmainstakeholdersofaparticularprogrammeorproject(Government, UNDP, funding donors, imple-menting agencies). The roles and responsibilitiesofeach‘partner’wouldbeclearlydefined,report-


ingmechanismsandotheroperationalprocedureswouldbeharmonizedtothemaximumextentpos-sible,andanyownershipor‘identity’issueswouldbesettledupfront.

UNDP may well find alternative methods forproject and programme implementation throughsub-contract and/or subsidiary partnership ar-rangements, thusreducingthesizeof itsdirectlycontracted project personnel while at the sametime spreading the benefits of implementationand corresponding capacity-building to thenon-governmental and private sectors. Should theoperations side of the office become too large,thenUNDPshouldseektooutsourceorcontractoutcertaintransaction-relatedprocesses–orpro-cessesandfunctionsthatarenotcoretothepro-grammerole.

Greater attention should be given to the role ofthe private sector in programme developmentandimplementation.UNDPmightdrawonbothits evaluation work and good practices derivedfrompastreviewsofUNDPinteractionwiththeprivatesector,aswellasseekingoutotherdonorexperiences in the role of the private sector. Infact,thenextCountryProgrammeDocumentandAction Plan might contain a strategy and somespecific targets for private sector involvement incertainprogrammes–especiallythosedealingwithdecentralization/local governance, eco-tourism,poverty reduction and public administrationreform. The Regional Bureau for Europe andthe CIS and UNDP globally might develop aconcretestrategyforprivatesectorinvolvementindevelopment programmes, derived in part fromtheglobalcompact.

Finally,inthecaseofGovernment,theuseofprojectmanagement and implementation units should bereplacedwithinternalorganizationalunitsthatarepart of the ongoing organizational establishment.This will ensure a greater degree of sustainabilityandfosteragreatersenseofnationalownership.

(11) Develop a UNDP Policy on Net Contributor Countries

ThecountriesinEasternEuropeareaspecialcaseforUNDPfromanumberofperspectives.Ama-jor differentiating factor in development and de-velopmentassistanceistherealityandpotentialofEUmembership(andthisiscertainlythecaseofSerbiaandMontenegro).Further,thereisconsid-erable likelihoodthattherepublicscouldachievenetcontributorcountrystatuswithinareasonablyshortperiodoftime.Itcanbetemptingtorational-izeanongoingroleforUNDPinsuchsituations.However,UNDPoperations inMontenegro andothercountriesoftheregionareexpensiverelativetootherregionsoftheworld,wherescarceUNDPresourcesandtalentmaybebetterdeployed.

OutsideoftheSerbiaandMontenegrocases,theroleofUNDP innet contributor countries is, inmany cases, ambiguous. A recent UNDP studyon the roleofUNDP in such countries revealedthatinsomeregions,UNDPincreasinglysawit-self as a ‘partner’ with national Governments inthe pursuit of development objectives. In someothercases,UNDPwasperceivedasanoutsourc-ing agent, enabling Governments to get aroundcomplexinternalrulesandprocedures.Thestudypresented a series of policy recommendations ontheUNDProleinuppermiddle-incomecountriesandnetcontributorcountries.1ItisrecommendedthatUNDPdevelopaformalpolicyonitsroleinEU and EU candidate countries in Eastern Eu-ropethathaveorareexpectedtosoongraduatetonetcontributorstatus.SuchapolicywouldguidethedevelopmentofcountryprogrammesandthenatureoftheUNDPrelationshiptothehostGov-ernments,theEUandotherparticipatingdonors.

�6 C h A p T e r 6

__________________________________________________________________________1.See:UNDP.January2003.NetContributorandMiddle-IncomeCountries–TowardaCorporateStrategy.BureauofMan-

agement.Internaldiscussionpaper.

T e r M S o F r e F e r e N C e / I N C e p T I o N r e p o r T �7

__________________________________________________________________________1.UNDPcameintoexistenceon1January1966,followingUNGeneralAssemblyresolution2029toconsolidatetheExpanded

ProgrammeofTechnicalAssistanceandtheSpecialFundintotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.

ANNEX 1

Terms of Reference/Inception Report

1. PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Thisdocumentisaworkplanoutlineforpresenta-tiontoanddiscussionwiththeUNDPEvaluationOffice and the UNDP Country Office in SerbiaandMontenegro(SCG)ontheAssessmentofDe-velopmentResults(ADR).Theworkplanisbasedon theADRframeworkpaperof theEvaluationOffice(July2002),andinformedbykeyissuesde-rived from review of the UNDP SCG portfoliothrough a desk study of documents collected bytheADRteam’sresearcherattheUNDPEvalua-tionOfficeinNewYork(June2005)andthroughdocuments collected and information obtainedthrough interviewsconductedby theADRteamduringafact-findingmissiontoBelgrade(UNDPCountryOffice inSCG),Podgorica(UNDPLi-aisonOfficeinMontenegro)andVranje(regionalUNDPofficeinSouthSerbia)duringtheperiod11-15 July2005 (the listof individuals consultedcanbefoundinanannex).

This work plan refines the objectives and scopeoftheevaluationandidentifiesinmoredetailtheissuesandpriorityareas tobeaddressed, theap-proachandmethodologytobeapplied,theactivi-ties, timing and expected outputs, assumptions,andthemanagementoftheoverallprocess.

2. RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

UNDP,underitspredecessorentity,hasbeenac-tive in Yugoslavia since 1952.1 Operations weresuspended during the 1990s, and the office onlyreopened officially in 2001. The UNDP pro-gramme has sought to establish itself as a majorforceinassistinginthestabilizationandgrowthofSerbiaandMontenegroandreintegratingitspop-ulation.Indoingso,UNDPhasbeenworkinginanumberofareas,notablyincrisispreventionand

recovery, in institutional, public administrativeandjudicialreform,andinsupportingsustainabledevelopment.

AssessmentsofDevelopmentResultsareindepen-dentevaluationsthatassessandvalidateUNDP’scontributionstodevelopmentresultsatthecoun-trylevel.TheyseektoensureUNDP’ssubstantiveaccountability as an organization, provide a baseof evidence for learning on substantive mattersandsupportprogrammingat theCountryOfficelevel.Notallcountriesaresubjecttosuchevalu-ation; rather, specific countries are selected withstrategicpurposesinmind.TheselectionofSerbiaand Montenegro for evaluation was based on anagreementamongUNDPseniormanagement,theGovernment and the UNDP Evaluation Officein 2005. The programme had been through onecompleteCountryCooperationFramework cycle(2002-2004), and the new programme (2005-2009)wasbeingrefinedwithinthecontextofthebroader United Nations Development AssistanceFramework. New senior managers were intro-duced to theCountryOffice inNovember2005,which presented an opportunity to evaluate theresultsachievedoverthelastprogrammingcycle.Furthermore,thepotentialchangeinthepoliticalstatusoftheunion,andtheissueofMontenegro’sindependence, has made this an opportune (ifchallenging)timetoevaluate.

3. OBjECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

Theevaluationhas twoprimaryobjectives.First,to analyse the extent to which UNDP has posi-tioned itself strategically in Serbia and Monte-negro toaddvalue in response tonationalneedsand changes in the national development con-text.Inparticular,theevaluationaimstoidentifyhow UNDP has supported the priority goal of

�� A N N e X 1

accessiontotheEuropeanUnion.Second,topro-videanoverallassessmentofthedevelopmentre-sultsachievedthroughUNDPsupportandinpart-nership with other key development actors since2001,withaviewtoresultsthatareontracktobeachieved during the current country programmeperiod(through2009).Basedonananalysisofpo-sitioningandachievements,theevaluationseekstopresentmajorfindings,drawkeylessons,andpro-videclearandforward-lookingrecommendationsinordertosuggesteffectiveandrealisticstrategiesforUNDPandpartnerstowardsintendedresultsinthefuture.

4. SCOPE AND ISSUES ADDRESSED

Thescopeoftheevaluation–itscoverageandfo-cus – was defined through extensive stakeholderconsultations conducted in Belgrade, Podgoricaand New York during the preliminary phase oftheassessment.Thesefindings,inturn,havebeenframedunder theoverallobjectivesofevaluatingstrategicpositioninganddevelopmentresults,andin terms of coordination, complementarity andsustainability.

In terms of UNDP’s strategic positioning, theevaluationconcentratesonfourareas:

• Strategic intent.Hastheorganization’slong-terminvolvementplayedanyroleinitscurrentpres-enceinthecountry?Diditsreentryin2001re-flect a strategic response to specific events andneeds?Howisitperceivedbydifferentdevelop-mentpartnersinthislight?

• Governance.1 UNDP has been consistent in itscommitmenttogovernmentcapacity-buildingatboththestateunionandrepubliclevels.Hastheniche developed in the delivery of governanceprogrammes been recognized by the Govern-ments and donors? Is the organization seen asthe most appropriate agency to provide theseservices?Isitsapproachappropriateinthecon-textofchangefactors,suchasthefutureofthe

StateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegroandtheinternational community’s insistence on Serbiacooperating with the International CriminalTribunal?DoesthereremainaroleforUNDPinrespecttobuildingaconstituencyforchangeandcapacity-buildingfortheGovernment(s)todealwiththeseissues,basedonUNDP’swidelyperceivedneutrality?

• Post-conflict transition. Responding to spe-cificpost-crisisneeds,notably inSouthSerbia,UNDPcommitteditselftoprogrammesofcrisisprevention,recoveryandstabilization.Indoingso,theevaluationaskswhethertheorganizationhasthecapacity,expertiseandabilitytoexpanditsportfoliointhisarea.Ifnot,howdoesitplantointegrateitsinterventionswiththoseofotherdonors?

• Sustainable development. UNDP Montenegrohas a strong focuson supporting the republic’scommitmenttobecomeanecologicalstate.Howhasitdistinguisheditselfasacontactpointforthe delivery of programmes to support this?Areitscurrent interventions,manyatthepilotstage,sustainable,andhowaretheygoingtobescaledup?

TheapproachtoassessingthedevelopmentresultsachievedorcontributedtobyUNDPisbasedontheuseofstandardevaluationcriteria2ofeffective-ness, efficiency and sustainability of programmecomponents.Inaddition,itlooksatcomplementa-rity,ownershipandcoordination:

• Effectivenessisassessedbyjudgingtheextenttowhich specific objectives were achieved, or areexpected to be achieved, taking into accounttheirrelativeimportance,thequalityofpartner-ships,andthetimelinessofresponsetolessons.

• Efficiency 3 at the level of the overall countryprogramme is considered in terms of the levelofstrategicresourcemobilization,coordinationandapplicationinprogrammes.

__________________________________________________________________________1Governanceincludestheareasofpublicadministrationreform,theruleoflawaswellasthesecuritysector.2Theremainingstandardevaluationcriterion,impact,hasnotbeencovered.TheassessmentofUNDP’simpactrelatestothe

fundamentalquestionofwhatresultshavebeenachieved,andbeyondthis,whatdifferencehasbeenmadebytheachievementoftheseresults.SincetheADRdoesnotincludeacomprehensiveprimarysurveyoftheeffectofallinterventions,norlooksoverasufficientperiodoftimetodeterminesuchchange,thiscriterionhasbeenleftout

3ThelimitedresourcesavailablefortheADRhasmeantthatitwasnotpossibletoundertakeafinancialoreconomiccost-benefitanalysisoftheSCGportfolio.

• Complementarity among and between projects, clusters and operational units is assessed as partofoverallperformance.Linkagesareconsideredbothvertically,betweentheorganization’sworkatthecentralandlocal(community)levelsandhorizontally,acrosssectorsandprogrammes.

• Sustainabilityreferstowhethertheorganizationisdevelopingpermanentstructures,proceduresandprofessionalcadrewithin institutions. Is itbuildinglong-termcapacityorisitbuildingca-pacitytodeliverparticularprojects?

• Ownership. Capacity-building relates to issuesof national ownership of programmes. MostUNDP programmes in SCG are directly ex-ecuted(DEX).Whathasthismeantforthena-tionalownershipoftheprogrammessupported?Whatdoesitimplyforthedirectversusnationalexecutionmodalitiesinthefuture?

• Coordination.UNDPinSerbiaandMontenegroispartofthe14-memberUnitedNationsCoun-tryTeam.Howhascoordinationfaredbetweenthe agencies and what are the implications fortheeffectivedeliveryofprogrammes, jointandalone? Has the Resident Coordinator been aneffectivecatalystinbrokeringstrongerpartner-ships in supporting the country’s progress to-wardsEUaccession?

5. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Theapproachandmethodsselectedfortheevalu-ationreflecttheteam’s judgementofhowbesttoaddresstheissuesandquestionsposedwithinthecontextofexistingevaluability.Thefollowingsec-tionhighlightsanumberofthecriticalevaluabilityissues,andthesetofproposedmethods.

5.1 EVALUABILITY ISSUES

Results linkages

Theevidencegatheredduringtheevaluabilitymis-sionforthisADRillustratesthatwhileboththeexpectedchangesatvariousprojectandprogrammelevels are well documented, it is not always easyto establish the link between higher-level resultsandoutputs.Thereisarelativeabundanceofevi-dencedealingwithnationalor aggregate change(MDGs, national policies and poverty reduc-tionstrategies),ontheonehand,andprojectand

programme activities and outputs, on the other.Thelinkagesbetweenthesetwo–throughexplic-itlystatedoutcomes,accompaniedbygoodqualityindicators–isnot,ineverycase,apparent.

Theprojectsreviewedtodatedisplayconsiderablevariabilityintheclarityandconsistencyofdesignof indicatorsandmonitoring systems.This raisesquestionsaboutmeasurementsofprogrammeandprojectobjectives.WhiletheareasofUNDP’sin-terventionsandoverallprogrammeobjectivesarewell defined (through, for example, the CountryCooperation Framework, Country ProgrammeActionPlan,andtheUNDevelopmentAssistanceFramework),therearequestionsastowhetherthecoreresultsandoutcomesofUNDP’sprogrammesmatchthehigher-orderobjectivesandpurposeofthese programmes and whether the identifiableservice lines are well served by the programmesandtheirdifferentconstituentelements.

External evaluations

AnumberoftheprojectandprogrammeelementsofUNDP’sSCGportfoliohavebeenthesubjectofexternalevaluationinrecentyears.Theseevalu-ationscoverabouttwothirdsoftheportfolio.Be-cause they have been commissioned by differentstakeholders–allwithdifferentrulesastothecov-erageandmethodologyofmonitoringandevalu-ation– theseexternalevaluationsarenot strictlycomparable.However,ingeneraltheyofferusefulstartingpoints,especiallybynarrowingdownthenumber of pertinent questions the present ADRmustaddressindepth.

Costs and resources

ApreliminaryreviewofavailablefinancialdataontheSCGportfolioandthewaytheyarerecordedattheCountryOfficeandUNDPheadquarterssug-geststhattheyarenotentirelysuitedtoadequateresource management at project and programmelevels.Inparticular,theavailabledatadonotap-pear suitable for drawing timely managementrecommendations. In addition, without propercost-benefit analysis at the programme level, theavailabledatamaynotbeuseable forassessment.However,thematterofresourcesdeployed–past,presentandfuture–hastobeaddressed.Forthisreason, theADRwill seek to summarize thefi-nancialpictureofUNDPprogrammesinSCGatthe cut-off date of the ADR (30 June 2005). In

T e r M S o F r e F e r e N C e / I N C e p T I o N r e p o r T �9

addition,theADRwillcontainapictorialrepre-sentationofUNDPresourcesdeployedduringtheperiodofcoverage(2000–mid-2005), separatedby core resources, donor contributions and ben-eficiarycost-sharing,andattributedtoindividualservicelineswhereappropriate.

5.2 METHODS PROPOSED

Documentation review

During the preparatory phase of the evaluation,theEvaluationOfficeengagedtheservicesofare-searcher to identify and assemble all key reportsand reference documents associated with SCGandthecountryprogramme.Keydocumentshavebeen assembled, documents in electronic formhavebeenuploadedtoaspecialwebsiteforusebytheteam,andthematerialhasbeensummarizedandsortedbySCGprogrammecluster.Aselectionofthismaterial,primarilyprogrammeandprojectdocuments andevaluation reports,havebeen re-viewed as part of the assessment of evaluability;strategicplanningdocumentsareoneinputtothisinceptionreport.Giventhelargeamountofdocu-mentation available, desk reviews will be carriedoutthroughoutmostoftheevaluationperiod.

Semi-structured interviews

The variety of programmes and programme ele-mentsinUNDP’sSCGportfolioissuchthatitistemptingtolimitinterviewstomanagement-relat-ed implementation questions. However, this willnotbesufficienttoarriveatfalsifiableconclusionsonmattersrelatingtohigher-levelconsiderations,in particular in the context of UNDP’s strategicpositioning inSerbiaandMontenegro.This,andrelativescarcityofappropriate indicatorsforpro-grammeoutcomes,arguefortheuseofstructuredinterviewsinordertoexpandtheavailablefactualbasisfortheADR.Intheareaswherethereislesspre-existing evidence, on such issues as strategicpositioning, interviews will serve as a source ofprimarydata;inothercases,theinterviewswillbeusedmainlytovalidateexistingdata.

Against this background, at least two forms ofquestionnaires will be developed for the ADR’s

main mission, to cover these differing scenariosand allow for variable contexts. These question-naireswillbeusedbyteammembersduringtheirsemi-structuredinterviewswithgovernmentrep-resentatives, representativesofdonorentities andotherstakeholders.Thequestionnairewillbede-signedinsuchawaythatitwillensure:(a)coverageofthesamesubjectswithallinterviewees,and(b)that itprogresses fromthedetailsofprogrammeimplementation to higher-level perceptions ofrelevance, effectiveness and (potential) impact ofUNDP programmes, as well these programmes’contributionstooverarchingobjectives.

Survey

Theassessmentofevaluabilityconcludedthatthemajority of critical areaswithin the scopeof theevaluationhavestrongorfairevidence,oraresuf-ficientlystructuredtoenableappropriatedatatobegatheredthroughthemethodsdescribedabove.1

However, there is one area where additional re-searchmaybebothwarrantedandpossiblewithintherelativelyshorttime-frameoftheADR.Thisarea concerns the impact, future and replicabil-ity of the South Serbia interventions in the areaof community-building, local government de-velopment and regional economic development.Although the relevant programmes (Rapid Em-ployment Programme, South Serbia MunicipalImprovement and Recovery Programme and theMunicipalImprovementandRevivalProgramme)undertaken by UNDP in that region have beenevaluated externally, there is a need to assess inmore detail the effects of these programmes onenhancing the involvement of local political andadministrative structures in current and futurepolicy-making. This research will focus in par-ticular on the extent to which the new (2003)LawonLocalSelf-government inSerbiaenablesmunicipalauthoritiestotakepracticalresponsibil-ity for exercising social and economic functionsdecentralizedfromthecentralanddistrict(okrug) levels.The researchwill consistof amini-surveyofmayors’andmunicipalcouncillors’attitudesonthesubject.Theteamhasyettodecidethemodal-

90 A N N e X 1

__________________________________________________________________________1.Onefurthermethodthatmaybeemployedduringtheanalysisofdataisthatofprocessmapping–amethodforassessinga

seriesofinterventionswheresimilarprocesseshavebeenusedtodeterminetheextenttowhichlessonshavebeenlearnedacrossprojects.Thismaybedeemedappropriateinthecaseofpublicadministrationreforminitiatives(Serbia)andtheenvironmentportfolio(Montenegro).

ityof this survey–whether itwillbe conductedthroughaconsultancyduringSeptember/OctoberorbymembersoftheevaluationteamaspartofthemainmissionproposedforlateNovember.

6. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND DEPENDENCIES

Analytical and reporting structure

TheestablishmentoftheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro created a federation of two distinctentities,SerbiaandMontenegro,respectively,shar-ingalimitednumberofcompetenciesatthestateunionlevel.Inmostrespects,thetwoconstituentelementsoftheunionoperateasseparateentities.UNDP designed its programmes to support theparticularneedsofeachrepublic.Hence,thedif-ferencesinfocusinUNDP’soperationsinthetworepublicssuggestthattheADRhastotreatSerbiaandMontenegroseparatelyfromthepointofviewof the overall purpose, intended outcomes andstrategicpositioningofUNDP’sprogrammes.TheprogrammesinMontenegrostartedmorerecentlythaninSerbia.Consequently, theADRcontainsseparatesectionsonSerbiaandMontenegro.

Kosovo

KosovoformspartofSerbiaandMontenegro,butit is under mandated UN administration since

1999.KosovowasincludedintheDecember2001FirstCountryCooperationFrameworkforYugo-slavia(2002-2004)andintheJune2004CountryProgrammeDocumentforSerbiaandMontenegro(2005-2009). However, the UN involvement inKosovohas,incooperationwithamultitudeofbi-lateralandmultilateraldonors,givenrisetoalargenumber of assistance programmes that are quiteseparate from the programmes implemented un-dertheauspicesoftheCountryOfficeinBelgrade.Consequently,theMarch2004UNDevelopmentAssistanceFramework for theperiod2005-2009doesnot refer toKosovo.1For these reasons, theADR shall not include an assessment of devel-opment results related toUNDP-sponsoredandimplementedprogrammesinKosovo.

Period and cut-off date

AlthoughUNDPhasbeenpresent inYugoslaviaforover50years,thecurrentprogrammescanbeheld to have emerged with the establishment ofUNDP’sCountryOfficein2001,whenthegen-eraldirectionofcurrentprogrammingwasdevel-oped.ThepresentADRshall thereforecovertheperiod2001tothepresent,butdrawonpreviouseventsandfindingswhere theybear relevance totheexistingprogramme.Becauseanaccurateas-sessment of resources deployed requires a formalcut-offdateforfinancialinformation,thedatewas

T e r M S o F r e F e r e N C e / I N C e p T I o N r e p o r T 91

__________________________________________________________________________1.AsstatedintheCountryProgrammeDocument2005-2009,noformalUNDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkhasbeen

preparedforKosovo.Instead,theUNDevelopmentGroupinKosovowillbeguidedbybi-annualstrategicplans,providingtheframeworkforcoordinatedUNdevelopmentassistance.

The ADR is to be conducted through a four-phase process

# phase/ActivityTimeline

June/July2005

Aug./oct.2005

Nov./dec.2005

Jan./Feb.2006

March2006

1 Start-up ============

2designandSup-portStudy1 ========= ====

3MainMissionandFirstdraft

====== =====

4FeedbackandFinalVersion

======== =========

1.ThetimingoftheproposedsupportstudyrelatingtotheSouthSerbiaprogrammeisstilltobedetermined.

set at 31 January2006.However, in viewof therapidlychangingcircumstances,someinformationafterthisdatehasbeenincluded.

7. INDICATIVE WORk PLAN

Thefirstphaseinvolvedbackgroundresearchandafact-finding/evaluabilityassessmentbytheevalua-tionteam,togetherwiththeUNDPOfficeinSCG,toidentifythestrengthsandgapsintheirevalua-tiveevidenceattheprojectandprogrammelevels.Thefirst phasewas conductedduring theperiod3-29 July 2005. This rapid assessment was con-ductedthrough:abriefingoftheevaluationteamatUNDPheadquartersinNewYork(5-8July);afive-dayevaluabilitymissiontoSCG(11-15July);andareviewofavailablesecondarymaterial(5-15July).ThelistofpersonsmetduringthebriefingatUNDPheadquarters andduring the evaluabilitymissionisannexed.Thebackgroundresearchwithregardtothegatheringofprogrammedocumen-tationandothersecondarymaterialhadbeguninJune2005.Therelevantdocumentationislistedinanannex.

Duringthesecondphase,whichbeganon18July2005, the evaluation team designed an approachand methodology for the ADR, including theplanning and conducting of in-country surveys,reviewsor evaluations in thoseprogrammeareasidentified as lacking in evidence during the firstphase.Afirstproductofthisphaseisthisincep-tion paper. Any necessary follow-up surveys, re-views and evaluations during this phase will beplannedandconductedinSeptemberandOctoberof2005.

The third phase will concern report construc-tionandthemainmission.Basedontheevidence

gatheredandsynthesizedfromsecondarysourcesduring the first phase, and from the additionalstudiesconductedduringthesecond,theevalua-tion teamwill construct the framework and evi-dencebasedonthereport.ThiswillbefollowedbyamainADRmissionoftwotothreeweekswiththeaimofgeneratingevidenceingapareas,trian-gulatingandvalidatingtheoverallfindings.ThisphasewillbeimplementedinlateNovember/earlyDecember2005.1

The final phase will be the production, finaliza-tionanddisseminationoftheevaluationreport,totakeplaceduringbetweenJanuaryandend-March2006.ThisphasewillincludethepreparationofafirstdraftoftheADR,reviewbytheEvaluationOffice and selected stakeholders, the preparationofafinaldraft,asecondreviewbytheEvaluationOffice and theproductionof thefinal versionoftheADR.

ADR Team

TheteamresponsiblefortheADRconsistsofthefollowingpersonnel:

• Mr.RichardFlaman2–TeamLeader

• Dr.BeataCzajkowska–TeamSpecialist

• Ms.RankaŠarenac–Researcher

• Mr.DavidRiderSmith–TaskManager,UNDPEvaluationOffice

EachoftheteammembershasbeenallocatedasetofspecifictasksintheADR.Thesearesetoutinthe individual team member’s terms of referenceandrequirenochangeonthebasisoffindingsdur-ingthefirstphaseoftheADR.

92 A N N e X 1

__________________________________________________________________________1.Theproposedtimingofthemainmissionhasbeenpushedbackfrominitialestimatesduetotheintroductionofanewteam

leader.2.Mr.DerekBlinkwasresponsibleforleadingtheinceptionmissiontoSerbiaandMontenegro.

I N d I V I d U A l S C o N S U l T e d 93

ANNEX 2

Individuals Consulted

1.0 UNDP – NEW YORk

BUREAU FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY (BDP)

Mr.JocelynMason SeniorPolicyAdviser,BDP

EVALUATION OFFICE

Ms.FadzaiGwaradzimba SeniorEvaluationAdviserMr.NurulAlam DeputyDirectorMs.SaraswathiMenon Director

REGIONAL BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Mr.KalmanMizsei RegionalDirectorandAssistantAdministratorMs.MartaRuedas DeputyRegionalDirectorMr.ShombiSharp ProgrammeManager,WesternBalkansMr.MoisesVenancio ClusterTeamLeader,WesternBalkans

2.0 MONTENEGRO

2.1 GOVERNMENT OF MONTENEGRO

PRIME MINISTRY

Mr.MiloĐukanović PrimeMinisterMs.SlavicaMilačić ChiefAdvisertothePrimeMinisterforEconomic

AffairsandEuropeanIntegration

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND WATER MANAGEMENT

Mr.MilosavAnđelić DeputyMinister

MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND PHYSICAL PLANNING

Mr.BoroVučinić MinisterMs.VesnaRakčević DeputyMinisterMs.MajaVelimirović DeputyMinister,PhysicalPlanning

HeadofDepartmentforEnvironmentalProtection

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr.JusufKalamperović Minister

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MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Mr.DraganĐurić DeputyMinisterforEUIntegrationMr.MiroslavŠćepanović Adviser

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Ms.SnežanaMijušković DeputyMinisterMs.Anita Bilafer SectorCoordinator,PovertyReductionStrategyPaper,Management

UnitOfficeMs.MirjanaKuljak IndependentExpertandProfessorofEconomics

MINISTRY OF TOURISM

Mr.PredragNenezić Minister

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Mr.ŽarkoŠturanović HeadofSecretariat

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

Dr.BobanMugoša Director

OFFICE FOR GENDER EqUALITY

Ms.NadaDrobnjak HeadofOffice

OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Mr.BrankoLukovac HeadofOffice

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL PODGORICA

Ms.JadrankaPopović

NATIONAL PARkS OF MONTENEGRO

Mr.TomoPajović DirectoroftheNationalParkDurmitor

2.2 UNDP LIAISON OFFICE IN PODGORICA

Mr.RobertAleksić ProjectManager,EnvironmentalGeographicInformationSystemforMontenegro

Ms.MarinaBanović ProgrammeManagerMr.MirkoBracanović Procurement/SecurityOfficer,OperationsMr.MirsadBibović TeamLeader,InstitutionBuildingandPublicAdministration

ReformClusterMs.SanjaBojanić TeamLeader,Energy&EnvironmentforSustainable

DevelopmentClusterMs.SnežanaDoljanica ProgrammeAssistantMr.MiodragDragišić TeamLeader,SocialandEconomicParticipationCluster

Ms.KaćaĐuričković GenderCoordinator,SocialandEconomicParticipationClusterMr.GarretTankosić-KellyResidentRepresentative,a.i.,andHeadofOffice

2.3 UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INSTITUTIONS

Mr.Georgio Andrian RegionalBureauforScienceinEurope,UNESCOMs.MiraDašić Director,CountrySub-officeinPodgorica,UN-WHOMs.BrankaKovačević AssistantProjectOfficer(Localrepresentative,Montenegro),UNICEFMs.CarolynJunger CountryDirector,WorldBank

2.4 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Ms.ArleenFarrel PrincipalOfficer,USConsulate,PodgoricaMr.DavidHudson FirstSecretary,HeadofPolitical,CivilSocietyandInformationSection,

EuropeanUnion,DelegationoftheEuropeanCommissiontoSerbiaandMontenegro

Mr.NeilBolland EU-EuropeanAgencyforReconstruction,Infrastructure,Transport&Environment

Ms.SnežanaDragojević ProjectOfficer,RegionalEnvironmentCentreMs.SanjaElezović Director,FoundationOpenSocietyInstitute,RepresentativeOffice

inMontenegroMr.HaraldHirschhofer ResidentRepresentativeinSerbiaandMontenegro,IMFMr.PerIwansson SIDAConsultantMr.LadoLaličić CARPO/PACOProjectOfficer,CouncilofEuropeMr.VladimirRistovski HeadofOffice,CouncilofEuropeMr.JussiViitanen MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofFinlandMr.VladimirRistovski HeadofOffice,CouncilofEuropeMr.WilliamMoody ProgrammeOfficerforSerbiaandMontenegro(includingKosovo),

RockefellerBrothersFundMs.JamieFactor HeadofDemocratization,OrganizationforSecurityandCooperation

inEurope(OSCE)

2.5 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIzATIONS

Mr.VeseljBeganaj Coordinator,PočetakMr.VasoBušković InstituteforNatureProtectionMs.VanjaĆalović Coordinator,NetworkforAffirmationoftheNGOSectorMr.GoranĐurović ProgrammeManager,CentreforDevelopmentofNGOsMs.BiljanaGligorić FinancialManager,ExpeditioMr.NebojšaMedojević ExecutiveDirector,GroupforChangesMr.DarkoPajović Director,oftheNGOGreenhomeMs.DraganaRadević ProgrammeDirector,CentreforEntrepreneurship

andEconomicDevelopmentMs.TanjaRajić ExecutiveDirector,ExpeditioMr.SinišaStevović President,Most


2.6 PRIVATE SECTOR AND LOCAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY

Mr.MarkCrawford FinancialDirector,OpportunityBankMr.DaniloGrubač EntrepreneurinraftingintheNationalParkDurmitorMr.BorisMarđonović ProfessionalAdviser,HotelAssociationofMontenegroMs.DraganaRadević ProgrammeDirector,CentreforEntrepreneurshipand

EconomicDevelopment

3.0 STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

UNION MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (AND EU INTEGRATION OFFICE)

Ms.JelaBaćović AssistantMinisterandDirectorofEuropeanIntegrationOffice

UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE IN SERBIA

Mr.LanceClarke ResidentRepresentativeandResidentCoordinatorMr.DavidCoombes FormerCBFExecutiveDirectorandChiefTechnicalAdvisorMs.OlgaGrubić Chief,OperationsUnitMs.JulietteHage FormerDeputyResidentRepresentative,SerbiaCountryOfficeMs.ShokoNoda FormerAssistantResidentRepresentative,SerbiaCountryOfficeMr.FrankO’Donnell FormerResidentRepresentativeandResidentCoordinatorofSerbiaand MontenegroMr.RastislavVrbensky DeputyResidentRepresentative

96 A N N e X 2


ANNEX 3

Documents Reviewed

GeneRAl RefeRenCes (seRbiA AnD monteneGRo)

3.1 GOVERNMENT: SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO NATIONAL STRATEGIES

GovernmentoftheRepublicofSerbia,Communication Strategy of the Republic of Serbia about the Stabilization and Association Process of the State Union Serbia-Montenegro,2004

GovernmentoftheRepublicofSerbia,National Strategy of Serbia for Serbia and Montenegro’s Accession to the European Union,June2005

Matković,Gordana,Overview of Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Western Balkans,paperpreparedfortheWesternBalkanForumonSocialInclusionandMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,Tirana,Albania,June2005

3.2 GENERAL UNDP/DONOR STRATEGIES, PLANS AND REVIEWS

TheCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,Communication from the Commission on the Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union, Brussels2005

TheCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999,Brussels,9.11.2005COM(2005)558final

TheEuropeanCommission,The European Union’s Stabilization and Association Process,presentationbyMichaelKarnitschnig,EuropeanCommission,ExternalRelationsDirectorate-General,Trento,10March2005

TheEuropeanCommission,Serbia and Montenegro 2005 Progress Report,Brussels2005

UnitedNations,United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF),SerbiaandMontenegro,2005-2009,Belgrade,March2004

UnitedNations,UN Policy on Payment to Government Staff,JointConsultativeGrouponPolicyinternalmemorandum,April1996

UnitedNationsCountryTeam,Common Country Assessment for Serbia and Montenegro,Belgrade,October2003

UNDP,Briefing note on the signing of the MOU between the EO and UNDP to launch new strategic partnerships,undated

UNDP,Comprehensive Audit of the UNDP Office in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,Report#IAS0072,May2002

UNDP,Country Programme Document for Serbia and Montenegro(2005−2009),ExecutiveBoardoftheUNDPandUNFPA,DO/CPO/SCG/1,June2004

9� A N N e X 3

UNDP,Discussion note on Assessment of Development Results (ADR),EvaluationOffice,internaldraft,January2004

UNDP,Evaluation of Direct Execution,EvaluationOffice,NewYork,April2001

UNDP,Evaluation Report Quality Standards,UNDPEvaluationOffice,extractedfromUNEvaluationStandards,UnitedNationsEvaluationGroup,2005

UNDP,First Country Cooperation Framework for Yugoslavia (2002−2004),12December2001

UNDP,Human Development Report 2005: The Strength of Diversity,2005

UNDP,Multi-year Financial Framework,internalmanagementreportsforvariousyears

UNDP,Results-Oriented Annual Reports,internalmanagementreportsforvariousyears

UNDP,Net Contributor and Middle-income Countries − Towards a Corporate Strategy,BureauofManagement,internaldiscussionpaper,January2003

UNDP(SerbiaandMontenegro),Evaluation Plan,internaldocument,2002–2004

UNDP(SerbiaandMontenegro),Management Results Framework − 2004 Balanced Scorecard Report,2002-2004

UNDP(SerbiaandMontenegro),Strategic Notes,internalmanagementnotespreparedannuallybytheresidentrepresentative/residentcoordinatorfortheyears2002−2005

UNDP(SerbiaandMontenegro),website:http://www.undp.org.yu

UNDP,theStateUnionandtherepublicsofSerbiaandMontenegro,Country Programme Action Plan Between the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro, Government of the Republic of Serbia and Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the United Nations Development Programme, 2February2005

UNDPandtheEuropeanCommission,Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the European Commission and the United Nations Development Programme, undated

TheWorldBank,Country Assistance Strategy,2004

TheWorldBank,Montenegro Economic Memorandum: A Policy Agenda for Growth and Competitiveness,June2005

TheWorldBank,Serbia and Montenegro Country Environmental Analysis,February2003

TheWorldBank,Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, An Agenda for Economic Growth and Employment,ReportNo.29258-YU,December,2004

TheWorldBank,Country Assistance Strategy for Serbia and Montenegro,ReportNo.30426,November2004

TheWordBank,Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Joint IDA-IMF Staff Assessment of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,ReportNo.24490,July2002

UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),Strategic Assessment of Civil Sector & Political Processes for Serbia,August2004

3.3 UN COORDINATION

UNAIDS,Annual Work Plan and Progress Report for the Year 2003,draft,2003

UNCountryTeam,Joint Programming Matrix 2004-05,Serbia,2004

UNDP,Resident Coordinator Annual Report for Yugoslavia,2002

UNDP,Resident Coordinator Annual Report for Yugoslavia,ResultsandUseofFunds,2004

UNDP,Annual Workplan for the UN Coordination System in Yugoslavia,2003

UNResidentCoordinator’sOffice,UNDAF Programme Retreat Notes,22November2005,typescript

monteneGRo RefeRenCes

3.4 MONTENEGRO STRATEGIES AND PLANS

CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights(CEDEM),The Montenegrin NGO Sector,March2001

CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights,PublicOpinionPolls,www.cedem.cg.yu

CentreforDemocracyandHumanRights,Transition in Montenegro,ReportNo.18,April_June2003

EuropeanStabilityInitiative, Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution-building in Montenegro 1998_2001,28June2001

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Communication Strategy for Informing the Public about the Process of Montenegro’s Association with the European Union, plus Action Plan,MIEREI,September2004

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy,November2003

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Economic Reform Agenda for Montenegro 2002_2007,2005

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Economic Policy of Montenegro for the Year 2004,RepublicSecretariatforDevelopment,December2003

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Economic Policy of Montenegro for 2005,Podgorica,February2005

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Millennium Development Goals Report 2004,Podgorica,2005

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Strategy of the Public Administration Reform in Montenegro,version1.1,January2003

InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andInternationalDevelopmentAssociation(IDA),Joint Staff Assessment of the PRSP,February2004

InstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses,Human Development Report for Montenegro,Podgorica,September2005

MANS(NetworkforAffirmationoftheNGOSector),Report on Anti-Corruption Conference – Impact and Monitoring,Podgorica,November2005

UNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA),Notes on Handover, Challenges, and Short-Term Priority Tasks for UNDP LO in Podgorica,internaldocument,10August2001

d o C U M e N T S r e V I e w e d 99

UNDPLiaisonOffice(inPodgorica),Key Programme Activities,October2003

UNDP,Occasions Report #0,MontenegroOffice,January2002

UNDP,Programme in Montenegro, Overview,December2002

UNDP,Report on the Millennium Development Goals Process,Montenegro,2005

UNDP,Strategy Notes and Reports,internaldocumentspreparedbytheheadofoffice

UNDP,Strengthening Capacities for Implementation of Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Montenegro,projectsupportdocument,Podgorica,2005

UNDP,UNDP-Podgoricawebsite:http://www2.undp.org.yu/montenegro/ijr/index.html

3.5 ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Birchmore,J.,CurrentCriticalIssuesFacingForestryinMontenegro,notespreparedforDr.Castro,December2002,typescript

DEG(GermanInvestmentandDevelopmentCompany),Touristic Masterplan for Montenegro,May2001

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Declaration on Montenegro as an Ecological State,1991

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD),firstdraft,November2005

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegroandUNDP,Sustainable Development in the Ecological State: From Vision to Commitment and Practice,projectsupportdocument,shorttitle:MSDPPhaseI,Yug/03/010,2002

Iwansson,P.,Strengthening Physical Planning Processes in Montenegro – Support Through UNDP,ConsultantFollow-upReportNo.1.,conductedforSIDA,2July2004

Iwansson,P.,Strengthening Physical Planning Processes in Montenegro – Support Through UNDP,ConsultantFollow-upReportNo.2,conductedforSIDA,12July2005

Mrdak,D.,An Economic Evaluation of the Tara River,conductedfortheWorldWildlifeFund(WWF)MediterraneanProgramme,draft,September2005

Oja,A.,An External Evaluation of Montenegro Sustainable Development Programme of UNDP Liaison Office in Montenegro,December2005

REC(RegionalEnvironmentCentreforCentralandEasternEurope),Developing a Priority Environmental Investment Programme for South Eastern Europe,fundedbytheEuropeanCommission,August2003

UNDP,Unleashing Sustainable Tourism Entrepreneurship in the area of Durmitor National Park,projectdocument,March2005

UNDP,Local Economic Sustainable Development in South-West Serbia and Northern Montenegro (2004-2005),projectsupportdocument,projectnumber:00035608

UNDP,Dr.ReneCastro’sTeamVisittoMontenegro,MissionReportI,15-18July2002

UNDP,Dr.ReneCastro’sTeamVisittoMontenegro,MissionReportII,7-22December2002

100 A N N e X 3

3.6 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ben-Gera,Michal,Strengthening Capacities of the Centre of Government in Montenegro,draftreportpreparedfortheCapacityDevelopmentProgrammeofUNDPPodgorica,5October2005

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,CDPWorkPlans(December2003–May2004;andMay–December2004),plusCDP Reports:December2003–February2004;February2004–May2004

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Financial Impact Assessment Form,preparedincooperationwiththeMinistryofFinanceandtheWorldBank

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Public Administration Reform Strategy in Montenegro 2002_2009,TheMinistryofJusticeoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Podgorica,March2003

GovernmentoftheRepublicofMontenegro,Terms of Reference of Supervisory Board, Executive Committee, and Advisory Group,CapacityDevelopmentProgrammeinternaldocuments

UNDP,Capacity Development Programme for the State Administration of Montenegro _ September 2003_February 2005,programmesupportdocument;GovernmentofMontenegro,FoundationOpenSocietyInstitute_RepresentativeOfficeinMontenegro,andUNDP(SerbiaandMontenegro),September2003

UNDP,Independent Review of the Capacity Development Programme,13December2004

UNDP,Project to Assist the Government of Montenegro for Introduction of Performance-related Assessment in the Civil Service,projectproposal,undated

UNDP,Signedcost-sharingagreementsbetweenUNDPandtheGovernmentofMontenegro,andbetweenUNDPandtheFoundationOpenSocietyInstitute,internaldocuments

UNDP,Strengthening Capacities of the Centre of Government in Montenegro,projectproposal,termsofreference,June2005

UNDP,Strengthening Capacities of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning to Deal with Problems of Environmental Management,projectdocument,May2005

UNDP,Strengthening the Prime Minister’s Office in Montenegro,OfficeofSustainableDevelopment(OSD),projectproposal,undated

3.7 POVERTY REDUCTION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

FoundationforDemocraticAlternativesinSociety(FONDAS),NGOs Needs Assessment Report,Podgorica,2005

TheGroupforChangeswebsite:www.gzp.cg.yu

InstituteforStrategicStudiesandPrognoses,HouseholdSurveyofRoma,Ashkaelia and Egyptians, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons,Montenegro,2003

InternationalNGOTraining&ResearchCentre(INTRAC),External Evaluation of the NGO Capacity-building Programme,Montenegro,November2002

INTRAC,External Evaluation of UNDP NGO Capacity Building Programme, Montenegro Phase II, August2004

MANS(NetworkforAffirmationoftheNGOSector)website:www.mans.cg.yu

d o C U M e N T S r e V I e w e d 101

MANS,Needs Assessment of NGOs in Five Regions of Montenegro,May2000

MANS,Status of NGOs in Montenegro,2001

MANS,NGO Status and Treatment in Montenegro,2003

MANSandCentreforDevelopmentofNGOs,Report on the Causes of Poverty and Recommendations of the Civil Society for the DPRS of Montenegro,Podgorica,May2003

UNDP,Capacity Building of NGOs for Civil Society Development in Montenegro,projectsupportdocument,projectnumber:YUG/01/003

UNDP,NGOCapacityBuildingProgramme,narrativereport,2002

UNDP,NGOCapacityBuildingProgramme,progressreport,March2005

UNICEF,Assessment of the Capacity of NGOs Currently Operating in Montenegro,January2001

UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),Capacity Development of Indigenous Montenegrin NGOs,March2001

102 A N N e X 3

__________________________________________________________________________

ANNEX 4

UNDP-Montenegro Programme Metrics

103 A N N e X 4

Table 1: UNDP-supported Projects in Montenegro (2001–2005)

Cluster Area / Project Title Execution Modality/Start–End Dates

Total Budget (US$)

Institutional and Judicial Reform

1.SupporttoprSpprocessinMontenegro deX:Aug.02-Aug.03 128,500

2.prSpforMontenegro deX:Feb.03-dec.05 448,000

3.SmallArmsandlightweapons deX:June04-Jan.06 1�4,�65

4.CapacitydevelopmentprogrammeforMontenegro deX:Sept.03-Jan.06 586,500

5.StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheCentreofgovernment deX:May05-Jan.06 161,500

6.StrengtheningtheMinistryforenvironmentalprotectionandphysicalplanning

deX:Aug.05-June06 462,507

Sub-total 1,981,972

Energy & Environment for Sustainable Development

1.planninganddevelopment;startup deX:2001-2002 50,000

2.ICTfordevelopment;start-upforgIS deX:2002-2003 35,000

3.SustainabledevelopmentInitiative(Castroinitiative) deX:2003 25,000

4.developmentofStrategicFrameworkforSustainableTourisminMontenegro

deX:2003-2004 74,000

5.StrengtheninggovernanceSystemsinUrbanplanninginMontenegro

deX:2004-2006 758,8�3

6.preparationofSmallhydroStrategyforMontenegro deX:2005-2006 45,000

7.Unleashingentrepreneurship deX:2005-2006 200,000

8.environmentalgISforMontenegro deX:2005-2006 556,000

�.geF−projectdevelopmentFacilityBlockA,dinaricecoregion deX:2005-2006 27,000

10.NationalCapacitySelf-assessment−geF deX:2005-2006 62,000

11.Track(growingSustainableBusiness) deX:2005-2006 46,5�0

Sub-total 1,879,483

Social and Economic Participation

1.NgoCapacityBuilding deX:2001-2005 �23,000

2.Nationalhumandevelopmentreport deX:2004-2005 50,000

3.Subregionalgenderproject deX:2005-2007 300,000

4.localeconomicSustainabledevelopment deX:2004-2006 228,000

5.TrAC2005roma,hIV/AIdS,TransparencyandCorruption deX:2005-2005 58,133

Sub-total 1,559,133

Total 5,420,588

U N d p - M o N T e N e g r o p r o g r A M M e M e T r I C S 104

Table 2: UNDP Expenditures in Montenegro, 2001-2005 (by source and cluster)

Theme/Cluster Funding Source Total Expenditures 2001−2005 (US$)

Institutional and Judicial ReformTotal 1,477,700

UNdpresources 4�2,500

governmentCost-sharing 112,000

otherCost-sharing 873,200

Energy and Environment for Sustainable Development

Total 1,4�1,804

UNdpresources 323,5�0

governmentCost-sharing 0

globalenvironmentFacility 24,683

otherCost-sharing 1,143,531

Social and Economic ParticipationTotal 1,141,000

UNdpresources 108,000

governmentCost-sharing 0

otherCost-sharing 1,033,000

Total UNDP Expenditures 2001−2005 4,110,504

Table 3: UNDP Expenditures by Cluster in Montenegro, 2001–2005 (US$)

Expenditure Category Institutional & Judicial Reform

Energy & Environment for Sustainable Development

Social and Economic Participation

TOTAL

Internationalexperts 204,852 213,677 4�,8�7 468,426

Nationalexperts 285,414 72,143 16,387 373,�44

officeStaff 371,�71 160,363 145,17� 677,513

procurement(informationtechnology,furniture,mediacampaign)

246,�02 442,043 81,42� 770,374

Training/workshops 165,�84 244,028 ��,134 50�,146

StudyTours 26,404 136,067 3,175 165,646

grantstoNgos 32,400 7,464 643,155 683,01�

other(Misc.andImplementationSup-portServices/generalManagementServices)

143,770 216,01� 102,644 462,433

Total 1,477,700 1,491,804 1,141,000 4,110,504

ANNEX 5

UNDP Corporate Survey Data

105 A N N e X 5

Table 1: Select Findings of the UNDP Global Staff Survey 2005

Question

Percentage of Favourable Responses

Montenegro Liaison Office

UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (RBEC) Country Office staff (minus Montenegro)

All UNDP Country Offices (minus RBEC)

Thegoalsofmyofficeareclearlysharedamongstaffmembersandmanagement(12.1)

�6% 76% 73%

Myofficeworksconsistentlytowardsachievinglong-termobjectives(18.4)

�3% 77% 73%

IclearlyunderstandtheresultsthatIamexpectedtodeliver(11.2)

�3% 87% 8�%

ThepeopleIworkwithinmyofficecoop-eratetogetthejobdone(12.10)

100% 7�% 75%

Inmyoffice‘results’ratherthan‘effort’areusedasabasisforperformancemonitor-ingandassessment(18.12)

88% 66% 66%

Theorganizationalstructureofmyofficesupportsefficientbusinessprocesses(12.4)

�6% 60% 58%

Inmyofficethereislittleduplicationofwork(12.5)

62% 55% 51%

workpressuresinmyjobareatacceptablelevels(23.1)

70% 57% 54%

U N d p l I A I S o N o F F I C e I N M o N T e N e g r o : o r g A N I z A T I o N A l S T r U C T U r e 106

ANNEX 6

UNDP Liaison Office in Montenegro: Organizational Structure (as of end-2005)

Deputy Resident Representative/ Head of Liaison Office garretTankosic-Kelly

progrAMMe UN Coordination/Communications AssistantAleksandraSegec

operATIoNSOperations Assistant (procurement/Travel)

MirkoBracanovic

Cluster Leader Institutional&

JudicialreformMirsadBibovic

Cluster Leadereconomic

participationMiodragdragisic

Cluster Leadere&efor

SustainabledevelopmentSanjaBojanic

CApACITYdeVelopMeNTprogrAMMedeputyprojectManagerMartinadragovic

Programme AssistantSnezanadoljanica

Consultants in MinistriesJelenadjonovicradovanrutesicMilicaKadicVeliborMilosevicTinarukvic

SMAllArMSANdlIghTweApoNS

Project AssistantKacadjurickovic

poVerTYredUCTIoNSTrATegYpAper

Senior EconomistMirjanaKuljak

IT Assistant Vladimir

djuraskovic

Finance Assistantdubravkaobradovic

HR/AdministrativeAssistant

AnaJankovic

NgoCApACITYBUIldINg

Mdg/NhdrreporTINgProgramme AssistantdusankaMilakovic

loCAlSUSTAINABledeVelopMeNTINNorTherNMoNTeNegroProgramme Coordinator edinSehovic

MoNTeNegroSUSTAINABledeVelopMeNTprogrAMMeDeputy Project ManagerTomicapavoic

Project AssistantAnadakovic

GEF Project AssociateVacant

phYSICAlplANNINgProject ManagerMarinaBanovic

Deputy Project Managerpredragdakovic

Project Assistantdejadragovic

gISproJeCTProject ManagerrobertAleskicSSA

DriverMuharem

ljuljanovic

Receptionist IgorCalovic

Cleaning Lady

AnaJocic

Cleaning Lady

Nevenkaradoajic

Project DriverradivojeNedovic

officeStaff

officeSupportStaff

project-fundedpersonnel

(1) Institutional and Judicial Reform

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

lessthan$100,000

$100,000 – $500,000

$500,000 – $1,000,000

LEGEND

ANNEX 7

UNDP-Montenegro Programme Maps

107 A N N e X 7

StrengtheningCapacitiesforprSpinMontenegro

SupporttopovertyreductionStrategy

paper(prSp)processinMontenegro

SmallArmsandlightweapons

CapacitydevelopmentprogrammeforMontenegro

StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheMinistryofenvironmentalprotectionandphysicalplanning

StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheMinistryofeducation

StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheprime

Minister’soffice/Centreofgovernment

StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheMinistryofJustice

StrengtheningCapacitiesoftheMinistryofInternationaleconomic

relationsandeuropeanIntegration

U N d p - M o N T e N e g r o p r o g r A M M e M A p S 10�

(2) monteneGRo: soCiAl AnD eConomiC pARtiCipAtion

NgoCapacity-building,pilotphase

NgoCapacity-building,firstphase

NgoCapacity-building,second

phase

NgoCapacity-building,thirdphase

Transparency&Anti-corruption

romaSupportServices

Nationalhumandevelopmentreport

localeconomicSustainabledevelopment–

MontenegroComponent

Subregionalgenderproject–MontenegroComponent

hIVpreventionamongVulnerablepopulations

Initiative–Montenegrocomponent

responsetohIV/AIdS

lessthan$100,000

$100,000 – $500,000

$500,000 – $1,000,000

LEGEND

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

109 A N N e X 7

(3) MONTENEGRO: Energy and Environment

StrengtheninggovernanceSystemsinUrbanplanninginMontenegro

planninganddevelopment

Unleashingentrepreneurship

preparationofSmallhydroStrategy

forMontenegro

environmentalglobalInformationSystemfor

Montenegro

NCSA−geF*

geF−pdFA**

leSd***

InformationandCommunication

Technologyfordevel-opment

developmentofStrategicFramework

forTourisminMontenegro

SustainabledevelopmentInitiative

* NCSA–GEF:NationalCapacitySelf-assessment(GlobalEnvironmentFacilityenablingactivity)

** GEF–PDFA:GlobalEnvironmentFacility–ProjectDevelopmentFacilityBlockA(initialfundingphase)

*** LESD:LocalEconomicSustainableDevelopmentinSouth–WestSerbiaandNorthernMontenegro

lessthan$100,000

$100,000 – $500,000

$500,000 – $1,000,000

LEGEND

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

M A p o F I N T e N d e d d e V e l o p M e N T r e S U l T S 110

Current Programme Component

Strategic Results Framework 2002

Outcomes

Country Cooperation Framework 2002-2004

Expected Results

Country Programme Document 2005-2009

Outcomes

UN Development Assistance Framework 2005-2009

Outcomes

Multi-year Funding Framework 2004-2007

Goals/Outcomes

publicAdministra-tionreform

Mdgs1,8

Nationalgoal

Improvedandequi-tableaccesstopublicservices

Governance

• Increasedusebydecisionmakersofsustainablehumandevelopmentconceptsinpolicyformulationandimplementation

• Increasedinvolvementofthethirdsectorinpolicy-makingandmonitoringofgovernmentactivities

• Improvedefficiency,accountabilityandtransparencyinthecivilservices

Democratic governance

• StrengthenedcapacityofSerbianandfederalinstitutions,measuredbythenumberofinstitutionsreceivingtechnicalassistanceandlevelofnationalexpertise

• Improvedlocalandmunicipalgov-ernancestructures,decision-mak-ingprocessesandplanningtools

• Increasedeconomicopportunitiesinaffectedcommunities,measuredbythenumberofmicrofinanceandbusinessdevelopmentservicesprovided

• IncreasingnumberofinitiativesundertakenbynationalNgos

• Strengthenedlocalgovernanceanddecreasedinter-ethnicten-sionthroughjointinitiativesanddialogue

Public administration reform

Improvedefficiency,accountabilityandtransparencyinthepublicsector

An efficient, accountable and people-centred public sector

Fostering democratic governance

• Strengthenedcapacitiesatthelocalandcentrallevelforlocalgovernanceandurban/ruraldevelopmentandinrelationtothedecentralizationprocess

• Improvedefficiency,accountabilityandtransparencyinthepublicsectorandstrengthenednationalcapacities

ANNEX 8

Serbia and Montenegro: Map of IntendedDevelopment Results*

*The2002-2004CountryCooperationFrameworkforthethenFederalRepublicofYugoslaviamarkedtheshiftinUNDP’sassistanceawayfromapost-conflictresponseandtowardsadevelopment-orientedagenda,concentratingonthreethematicareas:a)democraticgovernance,b)crisispreventionandrecovery,c)energyandenvironment.InlinewiththeCommonCountryAssessment/UNDevelopmentAssistanceFramework,theCountryProgrammeDocument2005-2009seekstofurtherdevelopthreethematicar-eas:a)publicadministration,b)ruleoflawandaccesstojusticeandc)Sustainabledevelopment.

__________________________________________________________________________1Multi-yearFundingFrameworkgoallistedintheCountryProgramDocument,AnnexI,under‘Sustainabledevelopment’.2Ibid.



Outcomes


Expected Results


Outcomes


Outcomes


Goals/Outcomes

ruleoflawandAc-cesstoJustice

Mdgs1,8

Nationalgoal

Increasedcohesionandrealizationofrightsofvulnerablegroups

Governance

• efficientadministra-tionofandaccesstojustice

Democratic governance

• Improvedaccesstothejudiciarybytrainingpersonnelandupgradingcourtservices

• Anincreaseinforeigninvestmentsasaresultofcredibilityintheruleoflaw

• effectiveandindependentjudicialsystemswithincreasedaccesstojusticeformarginalizedgroups

• relevantcapacity-buildingfortheStateUnionofSerbiaandMonte-negroandthetwomemberstates;mechanismsputinplacetofacilitatethecountry’scompliancewithinternationalhumanrightsobligations

• effectiveandrelevanthumanrightsinstitutionsestablishedandfunctioning

Strengthened rule of law and equal access to justice

Fostering democratic governance

• establishmentofeffectivehumanrightsinstitu-tionsandmechanismstofacilitatetheStateUnionofSerbiaandMontenegro’scompliancewithinter-nationalhumanrightsobligations

• effectiveandindependentjudicialsystemswithin-creasedaccesstojusticeformarginalizedgroups

111 A N N e X 8

M A p o F I N T e N d e d d e V e l o p M e N T r e S U l T S 112



Outcomes


Expected Results


Outcomes


Outcomes


Goals/Outcomes

Sustainabledevelopment

Mdgs1,7,8

Nationalgoal

Useofpolicyinitia-tivesandglobalgoodsandconcernstopromotesustain-abledevelopment

other

Environment

Capacityofconstituentauthoritiestoplanandimplementintegratedapproachestoenviron-mentalmanagementandenergydevelop-ment,includingthein-tegrationofglobalenvi-ronmentalconcernsandcommitmentsinnationaldevelopmentplanningandpolicy

Poverty

• Institutionalcapacitybuilttoplanandim-plementmultisectoralstrategiesatnationalandsubnationallevelstolimitthespreadofAIdSandmitigateitssocialandeconomicimpact

• Nationaldevelop-mentplans,povertyreductionstrategiesandbudgetaryal-locationsaddresstheimpactofhIV/AIdSondevelopmentandpovertyeradication

Gender

• Closepartnershipsamonggovernment,parliamentandcivilsocietyforsystematicanalysisofgenderissues

Conflict prevention & peace-building

• ConsolidationofpeaceinSouthSerbia

UN Support

• MonitoringprogresstowardsMdgs

• Sustainedandmoreeffectivecountry-levelmechanismswithintheresidentCoor-dinatorsystemforsubstantiveanalysis,advocacy,planningandprogramming

Energy & Environment

• globalenvironmentalconcernsandcommitmentsareintegratedintonationaldevelopmentplanningandpolicy

• Theinformationbaseandavailabledataonenvironmentalissuesareenhanced

• governmentfinancialresourcesforenvironmentalmanagementactivitiesareincreased

• Aframeworkforsustainabledevelopmentissuesisdevelopedanddisseminatedforanalysisanddebate

• legalandregulatoryframeworksforenvironmentalplanningandmanagementareestablished,includingthelegalbasisforreject-ingunsustainablemethodsandoverexploitationofenvironmentalresources

• Thenumberofskilledandtrainedlocalauthoritiesemployedforprogrammedesignandimplemen-tationinthissectorincreased

• Sustainableenergystrategies,includingenergysavingpro-grammes,developed

Crisis prevention and recovery

• Increasedstabilityaslocalauthori-tiesdesigncrisis-preventionpoli-ciesbasedonriskareas

• enhancedsecurityandconfidenceasthenumberofsmallarmsarereduced

• greaternumberofcommunityinitiativesundertakenbyyouthcouncils

• Increasednumberofpartner-shipsonactivitiestoreduceabuseagainstwomen

• developmentofanationalgender-mainstreamingstrategy

• establishmentofaninter-ministerialbodyforAIdSpreventionandcoordination

• reductionofsecurityincidentsinsouthernSerbiathroughanincreasein:inter-agency,multi-sectoralprojects,thenumberofmunicipalsteeringgroupsinvolvedindecision-makingandimplemen-tation,thenumberofjobscreated

• Sustainablede-velopmentplans/policieseffectivelyrespondtotheneedofstakehold-ersandpromoteemploymentandenvironmentprotection

Increased municipal capacity to promote local sustainable development

Achieving MDGs and reducing poverty

• patternofpro-poorandpro-jobsgrowthincorpo-ratedintokeystrategiesatcentralandlocallevels

• Statisticalandanalyti-calcapacitiesofnationalthinktanks,CSosandgovernmentalinstitutionsenhancedforpolicydia-logueandregularreportingontheMdgsandnationalhumandevelopment

• Barriersforprivatesectorgrowthidentified,keyalliancesfortheirremovalestablished,andstrategiesdeveloped

• Increasedinvolvementofcivilsocietyinpolicy-mak-ingandmonitoringofgovernmentpolicies

Energy and environment for sustainable development

Thefollowingareadoptedandeffectivelyimplemented:sustainabledevelopmentplans/policies,informationsystems/lawspromotingenvironmentalprotection,biodiversityandforestcon-servation,sustainabletour-ismthroughpublic-privatepartnershipsandrenewableenergyinimpoverishedareas

Use of GEF and other global goods towards sustainable development1

High-level policy initia-tives linking developing countries’ experiences in sustainability2

Crisis prevention and recovery

Improvedefficiency,ac-countabilityandtranspar-encyinthepublicsectorandstrengthenednationalcapacities

113 A N N e X �

DrawnfromStrategicResultsFramework(SRF)andResults-orientedAnnualReport(ROAR)documents:

SRF / ROAR – 2002 SRF / ROAR - 2004Goal Sub-goal Goal Service Line Intended Outcomes1

1. Governance

dialoguethatwidensdevelop-mentchoices

1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty

1.1Mdgcountryreportingandpovertymonitoring

(1)StatisticalcapacitiesandanalyticalprocessesforregularreportingontheMdgsandtheNationalhumandevelopmentreportestablished,addressingnationalpriorityissues

Keygovernanceinstitutions

1.7Civilsocietyempow-erment

(2)Increasedinvolvementofthethirdsectorinpolicy-makingandmonitoringofgovern-mentpolicies

2. PovertyNationalpovertyframeworks

2. Fostering demo-cratic governance

2.4Justiceandhumanrights

(3)effectivehumanrightsinstitutionsestablishedandmechanismsputinplacetofacilitatetheStateUnionforSerbiaandMontenegro’scompliancewithinternationalhumanrightsobligations

3. Environmentenvironmentandenergyforlivelihoods

(4)effectiveandindependentjudicialsystemswithincreasedaccesstojusticeformarginalizedgroups

4. Gender genderequality2.7publicadministrationreformandanti-corruption

(5)Improvedefficiency

5. Special Development Situations

Conflictpreven-tionandpeace-building

3. Energy and environment for sustainable devel-opment

3.1Frameworksandstrategiesforsustainabledevelopment

(6)Sustainabledevelopmentplans/poli-cieseffectivelyrespondtotheneedofstakeholdersandpromoteemploymentandenvironmentalprotection

6. UN Support

globalconfer-encegoals

(7)Contributionofbiodiversityandeco-systemservicestofoodsecurity,health,livelihoodsandreducedvulnerabilitytonaturaldisastersfactoredintonationalplan-ningfortheachievementofdevelopmentgoals,includingsafeguardstoprotecttheseresources

effectiveopera-tionalactivities

4. Crisis preven-tion and recovery

4.2recovery(8)Sustainablelivelihoodsrestored,en-ablingattainmentofpovertyMdg

4.3Smallarmsreduc-tion,disarmamentanddemobilization

(�)developmentandimplementationofnationalsmallarmsandlightweaponscontrolstrategy

ANNEX 9

Serbia and Montenegro: Goals and Intended Outcomes

__________________________________________________________________________1 Performance is assessed against six ‘drivers’ for each of the intended outcomes. These are: (1) developing national capacities,

(2) enhancing national ownership, (3) advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment, (4) seeking South-South solutions, (5) promoting gender equality and (6) forging partnerships for results. It would seem that the fifth driver is not especially relevant for Serbia or Montenegro, let alone other countries in the subregion, and hence more attention is given to sharing experiences, lessons, practices and solutions with countries in central and Eastern Europe, and with the EU.

S e r B I A A N d M o N T e N e g r o : g o A l S A N d I N T e N d e d o U T C o M e S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

STRATEGIC GOALS AND SERVICE LINES, 2004−2007

DrawnfromtheMulti-yearFundingFrameworkandStrategicResultsFramework:

Goal Service Lines

1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty

1.1Mdgcountryreportingandpovertymonitoring1.2pro-poorpolicyreformtoachieveMdgtargets1.3localpovertyinitiatives,includingmicrofinance1.4globalizationbenefitingthepoor1.5private-sectordevelopment1.6gendermainstreaming1.7Civilsocietyempowerment1.8Makinginformationandcommunicationstechnologyfordevelopmentwork

forthepoor

2. Fostering democratic governance

2.1policysupportfordemocraticgovernance2.2parliamentarydevelopment2.3electoralsystemsandprocesses2.4Justiceandhumanrights2.5e-governanceandaccesstoinformation2.6decentralization,localgovernanceandurban/ruraldevelopment2.7publicadministrationreformandanti-corruption

3. Energy andenvironment forsustainabledevelopment

3.1Frameworksandstrategiesforsustainabledevelopment3.2effectivewatergovernance3.3Accesstosustainableenergyservices3.4Sustainablelandmanagementtocombatdesertificationandlanddegradation3.5Conservationandsustainableuseofbiodiversity3.6National/sectoralpolicyandplanningtocontrolemissionsofozone-depleting

substancesandpersistentorganicpollutants

4. Crisis prevention and recovery

4.1Conflictpreventionandpeace-building4.2recovery4.3Smallarmsreduction,disarmamentanddemobilization4.4Mineaction4.5Naturaldisasterreduction4.6Specialinitiativesforcountriesintransition

5. Responding toHIV/AIDS

5.1leadershipandcapacitydevelopmenttoaddresshIV/AIdS5.2developmentplanning,implementationandhIV/AIdSresponses5.3AdvocacyandcommunicationtoaddresshIV/AIdS

Source: UNdp,Multi-yearFundingFramework,2004−2007,UnitedNationsdp/2003/32secondregularsession2003,8to12September2003,NewYork,page13.

115 A N N e X 1 0

AsthedevelopmentsituationinSerbiaandMon-tenegromovesfrompost-crisistodevelopmentandEUaccession,thetworepublics’Governmentsandtheirdevelopmentpartnerswillfaceanincreasinglycomplexandinterdependentsetofdevelopmentis-suesthatcanonlybetackledbymorecooperative,integrated and coordinated dialogue and focusedapproaches.1

Thenotionofpartnershiporsector-wideapproach-es toprogrammingand thechannellingofdevel-opmentassistancecanbeintroducedasameanstoaddresssomeprogrammingandcoordinationprob-lems,especiallyintheareaofpublicsectormanage-mentandadministrativereform.

However, there aredifferent approaches to bettercoordination to deal with issues of developmentcooperation,aidmanagement,servicedeliveryandinternalandexternalcoordination.Whileissuesofcoordinationmaybecommontomosttransitionaleconomies and developing countries, suggestingcommonsolutions,therealityisthatmostissuesarecountry-specific. The Governments of Serbia andMontenegrohaveseveralissuesuniquetotheirowntransitionalenvironment.ThebestapproachwouldbeonethatmeetstheparticularneedsofGovern-mentatitscurrentjunctureofdevelopment.Whilethe following discussion focuses on the Govern-mentofSerbia,asimilarargumentcouldbemadefortheGovernmentofMontenegro.

kEY PROGRAMMING AND COORDINATION ISSUES

• Generalconsensusthattheburdenofaid coor-dination and managementhasandwillcontinuetoincrease,thusaffectingthesustainabilityofdevelopmentcooperation.

• Government of Serbia ownershipofdevelopmentprogrammesmaynotbeasstrongasitshouldbe,andindeedmanyinitiativescouldbe‘donordriven’.

• Not enough national political and senior bureau-cratic leadership in developing and setting theoverall policy agenda for development, or forcoordinationofdevelopmentcooperation.

• Potentiallysomedisagreement on specific sectoral and thematic development priorities and approach-es, and possibly some duplication of implicitpolicythrustsandthesettingupofimplemen-tationmechanisms.

• Evidence of ad-hoc and ‘quick-fix’ approaches tosome complex development challenges, whereinitiativesarelaunchedwithoutadequateman-agement, consultation or study (sometimesdrivenbypressuresfromdonorstocommitanddisbursefunds,or to tie aid delivery to their own budgetary cycles).

ANNEX 10

Discussion Points on Partnerships

Mission Bombardment Syndrome

InaworldBankstudy,itwaspointedoutthatacountrywith200orsodonor-fundeddevelopmentprojectsgeneratesontheorderof600formalmissions,800-1,000formalreports,andinnumerablemeetings.Forcountrieswithlimitedseniormanagerialpersonnel,thisimposesanunacceptableburden.

__________________________________________________________________________1.Thisannexisadaptedfromasimilarannexonpartnershipapproachesthatwascontainedintherecent ‘UNDPMid-term

ReviewoftheCapacityBuildingFund’andothernationalpartnershipstrategydocuments.

• Weak systems of governance and accountability fornational and cooperative development (strate-gicplanning,financialmanagement,etc.)thatarenotup toa standard thatwouldengendernationalandinternationalconfidence.

• Institutional andcapacity limitationsofnationalorganizationslikelytoremainsevere.

• Government staff drawn to donor-funded projects(usuallywithhigherpayandincentives),alongwithcapacitygapsinthecivilservicebeingmetbyforeignexpertsandnationaladvisers,whichisunsustainableoverthelongterm.

• Process and input focus, with not enough focusonperformancemanagementandthemeasure-mentofoutcomesandimpacts.

• Non-transparencyofsomedonoractivities(suchasconductingstudies,preparingpapers,donor-sponsored missions, etc.) undertaken withoutadequate consultation among donors or be-tweenthedonorcommunityandGovernment.

• Likelihoodofincreasingcomplexity in the rela-tionshipsamongnationalplayers (government,civilsociety,privatesector),intherelationshipsbetweennationalorganizationsandthedonorcommunity,andintherelationshipsamongdo-norsthemselves.

• Generallypoor exchange of informationintermsofqualityandlackoftimely,completedataonexternalassistance,due,inpart,topossiblelackofdisciplineamongsomedonors in reportingandprovidinginformation.

THE NOTION OF A DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP

Manyof the issuesnotedabovecanbeaddressedthrougha sector-wide approach toprogramming,whichitselfcanbeseenasaformofdevelopmentpartnership.Theintentistofostergreatercoordi-nationanddevelopment inthecontextofspecificsectoral frameworks (which would be logical ex-tensionsorcomponentsofanationaldevelopmentframework).Thestrategicplanning,programming,coordination,andreportingofmultipleprojectsinaparticularsector(suchashealthorinfrastructure)wouldbedoneinamoreformalizedandstructuredmanner.Theparticipantsofsuchasector-widepro-grammeorpartnershipwouldconsistof thevari-

ousdonors interested insupporting that sectoraswellasdifferentgovernmentorganizations(centralandlocal,civilsocietyorganizations,privatesector)thatwouldhavea‘stake’inthesector.

Theapplicationofsuchanapproachtopublicad-ministration reform, capacity-building, decen-tralization or other major subsectoral area in aministry-by-ministry context would require someconsistency toensure coordination furtherup thechain(forexample,totheCabinet),oracrosssec-tors. A successful transition to a sector-wide ap-proachorpartnershipconceptmustbebasedonamutuallyunderstoodandaccepteddefinitionoftheconcept, and a general understanding and accep-tance of its implementation considerations. Somekeygoalsofsuchanapproachwouldinclude:

• From ‘donorship’ to ‘ownership’. Consistentwith OECD/DAC principles for improvingdevelopmentpartnerships,harmonization andsimplification,theGovernmentwouldneedtostrengthenitsstrategicmanagementcapacitiestoformulatepolicy,prioritiesandoverallstrat-egies for the implementation of the country’spublicadministrationreform,decentralizationor other (sub) sectoral development agenda.Inthefinalanalysis,itisthepeopleofthere-public, its Government and its institutions ofgovernancethatareultimatelyaccountablefortheachievementofnationaldevelopmentout-comes.

• From control to leadership.Astheprocessofdemocratization takes hold, the Governmentshould understand and accept that decision-making authority will increasingly be shared−throughpartnershipsandotherparticipatorymechanisms−withotherlevelsofadministra-tion,civil societyandprivate sectororganiza-tions, commensuratewith thedevelopmentofanappropriateenablingenvironmentandsup-portingcapacities.

• From ad hoc/piecemeal to programmed de-velopment. Multiple sector-wide arrange-ments are required to tackle complex prioritydevelopment objectives across key sectors andsubsectors.Giventheincreasingcomplexityofthedevelopment environment in termsof thenumbers and types of ‘players’ involved, thelikelihood of increased competition for scarceresources to meet development demands and

d I S C U S S I o N p o I N T S o N p A r T N e r S h I p S 116

the sometimes conflictingviewsas topriorityand approaches to be taken, the only feasibleandpracticalstrategyistostructureandbundledevelopment activities (policy, planning, pro-gramming,implementation)aroundtheenvis-aged development outcomes as set out by theGovernment.

• From informal coordination to increased col-laboration. The partnership concept, whichinvolvesGovernment,externaldonors,NGOsand foreign sources of private investment,shouldbeseenbyGovernmentasasetofstra-tegic management tools that can reshape andimprove existing coordination relationships,instruments, mechanisms and attitudes. Theuseofinternal partnershipsbetweenandamongdepartmentsandagencies,andbetweencentraland local levels ofGovernment (and, in turn,between the state sector and civil society andtheprivatesector)canbeseenasinstruments of governance,butalsoasimportantmanagementtools to implement development initiatives inservicedelivery,publicsectormanagementandtheachievementofdevelopmentoutcomes.

• From dependency to sustainability. There isnoillusionthattheGovernmentcancompletelyachieveitsnationaldevelopmentagendaonitsown − especially over the medium term. Therepublicwillcontinueforsometimetorequirefinancialsupportandtechnicalassistancefrombilateralcountries/donors,multilateralandin-ternationalfinancial institutions, internationalorganizations,privatesectorinvestorsandothersources.TheGovernmentwillincreasinglylooktocivilsocietyandtheprivatesectortoachievesocialandeconomicdevelopmentgoals,aswellastoincreasenationalsourcesofrevenue.

MAjOR CHARACTERISTICS OF A SECTOR-WIDE PARTNERSHIP

Itshouldbeacceptedthattherearedifferentlevelsandtypesofsector-wideapproachesorpartnershipstoachievevariousdevelopmentoutcomes.Howev-er,everysuchapproachisseentoembodyatightercollaborativearrangementamongpartners, and isseentoimplyspecificimplementationfeaturesandcommonoperationalcharacteristics.

• Common vision and shared objectives. Thestructuringofsectoralpartnerships(suchasinpublicadministrationreform,health,education,infrastructure, education or decentralization,amongothers)mustbeseenastheinstrumentwherebyallaffectedstakeholdersandinterestedpartnersdevelopandmaintainagreementandfocusonacommonvision,objectivesandout-comes.Thereisawell-definedcommonpublicdevelopmentpolicypurpose,andthispurposesupports the overall development goal of theGovernment.Whilesomedebateishealthyinarrivingatthemostappropriatesectoralorthe-maticdevelopmentpolicyandimplementationapproach,theremustbeconsensusandagree-mentatthepointofimplementation.

• Agreed accountability structures. Develop-mentbenefitsmustbedelivered ina fair, im-partial and equitable manner. The success ofa sector-wide approach or partnership wouldbe contingent on the structuring of practical,workable and agreed accountability structures(roles, responsibilities, authorities, controls,decision-makingprocesses),usuallywritten inunambiguous and legallybindingagreements.Suchstructuresmayvaryfromsectortosector,dependingonthespecificdevelopment/sectoralobjectivesandmixofpartners.Theremustbeclear and mutually agreed upon expectations ofwhodoeswhat.

• Harmonized strategic management with a goal of sustainability.Eachsectoranditsas-sociated sector-wide approachwill likelyhavedifferentlevelsofplanning,anddifferentpart-nersmayplaydifferentbutcomplementaryrolesinsuchplanning.Thestrategicplanningforthesector-wide‘partnership’itselfmustbenation-allyled(bytheGovernmentorinpartnershipwithcivilsocietyandtheprivatesector).Astra-tegicmanagementapproachimpliesathoroughassessmentofcurrentcapacitiesforthespecificsector,acleardefinitionofrealizableobjectivesandoutcomes,practicalandincrementalimple-mentationstrategies,andthesustainingoftheoutcomesanddevelopedcapacities.

• Harmonized operational capacities. Thesec-tor-wide ‘partnership’ to themaximumextentpossible should have adequate human, finan-

117 A N N e X 1 0

cial and information resources, and the ca-pacities to manage these resources efficientlyand effectively. This points to the direct andpressing need for the simplification, stream-liningandharmonization of operational policies,systems,standardsandpractices insuchareasas financial management, planning, report-ing, procurement, audit and evaluation, staff-ing,informationandcommunicationssystems,documentmanagement and related areas.Formoreadvancedarrangements,thiscouldmeanthepoolingandjointmanagementoffinancialresources. This also implies meaningful, cred-ible reporting and monitoring.Itistobeexpectedthat thepartnerswouldneedtoreport tooneanother as well as to their respective govern-ingbodies,andalsotothebeneficiariesthatthesector-widepartnershipisintendedtoserve.

• Learning and adaptation capacities.Allcon-cerned parties in the Government recognizethatthesettingupofinstitutionsofgovernanceanddevelopmentareverymuchalearningex-perience, where there must be experimenta-tion,testingandinnovation.Thisappliestoanycountry, but especially to the crisis/post-con-flict situationwhere thereare seriouscapacitylimitations, and where substantial resourcesand extended timelines will be needed to re-alize development outcomes. As a preferredprogramming and implementation model toachieve these outcomes, sector-wide partner-shipsthemselveswillneedtobe implementedcautiouslyandwithsufficientflexibilityinthearrangementstoensurethattheycanadapttothe requirements at hand, that each can gen-eratelearningandinnovationexperiences,andtheseexperiencescanbeadaptedandreplicatedacrosssectors.

• Building and maintaining trust and good faith.Itisthetrust betweenandamongallthepartnersinaparticularsector‘partnership’thatisthecementthatkeepsallthecomponentsofthe collaboration together, working toward acommonpurpose.Differentpartnershaveandwill continue to have their own institutionalagendas−whetherGovernmentordonors.Butitmustalsobemutuallyacceptedthatthereisagreement on a common agenda, and that a

spiritoftrustmustbepresentinordertoenterintomeaningfulnegotiationsattheoutset,andto sustain a meaningful implementation andsmoothongoingfunctioningofthesector-widepartnership mechanics. This means that thetraditional bureaucraticwayof thinkingmustgive way to power-sharing, interdependenceandjointmanagement.

SOME IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

Various national, international and developmentforces may push the Government and thosewith whom they interact into more collaborativearrangements. The Government and itsdevelopment partners will need to jointly discussthe need, the costs and benefits of implementingmore collaborative sector-wide approaches toprogramming and development. Existing modelssuch as variations of public-private partnershipsmay be adapted to the local context. Suchapproaches should not be considered a panacea– there isno solution that canbe ‘dropped’ in toaddressthemanyissuesnotedatthebeginningofthisdiscussionpiece.

The concept might be adapted separately topublic administration reform and economic andsocial services sectors, especially those in needof some priority attention (for example, trade,finance, infrastructure, agriculture, education,health, and public administration reform). Ineachofthesesectorstherearepressingneedsandcapacityconstraints,withmanydonorsandotherinternational organizations lining up to providetechnicalassistance.

If sector-wide programming and developmentpartnershipsshowpromiseofbeingacost-effectiveapproach, then the government will need tostrengthen national capacities for developmentplanning,policycoordinationandaidmanagement.Other legislative, regulatoryanddecision-makingstructures (centraland local)mayalsoneed toberationalized and strengthened in order to ensurethat collaborative development partnerships workintheinterestsofSerbiaandserveotherinterests,suchas transparencyand thecost-effectiveuseofinternalandexternalresources.

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