associated detection/extinction systems d. swoboda

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Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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Page 1: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

Associated detection/extinction systems

D. Swoboda

Page 2: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

2

Scope

Cold smoke extractionFlood detection/protectionHigh expansion foam systemOther fire extinction systems

Page 3: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

3

acknowledgements

High expansion foam system Courtesy S. Fratianni

Cold smoke extraction Courtesy B. Pirollet

Page 4: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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ConceptUX... experimental caverns.US... protected areas - technical

caverns

Cold smoke extraction

Page 5: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Cold smoke extractionDetection

All the air handling units of the area concerned are

automatically stopped by TS/CV Smoke extraction mode activated by fire men (fire men cubicle)

Fire men

Air handling units in normal mode

restarted by TS/CV

End of fire men actionDuring extraction mode

extraction filters will be by-passed

No action with RP

Material designed to 400°C/2h

Page 6: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

6

Cold smoke extraction

Controls status in TI room

-start/ stop status of ventilation system controlled by fire men cubicles-status of each air handling unit ( on/off/fault).-status of each external components (dampers).

Page 7: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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LHC experimental areas. Cold smoke extraction

Experimental cavern; 2 separate & independent areas:

Experimental caverns

(UX pts 1/2/8

or UXC55 pt5) Protected areas- technical caverns

(USA 15 pt1

UX 85 pt8

USC55 pt5)

Page 8: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

8

UX 15

PX14

USA 15

PX15

PX16

BRR/T

SUPERVISEUR : J.ROCHE

INDICECERN ORGANISATION EUROPEENNE POUR

LA RECHERCHE NUCLEAIRE

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCHGENEVE

C.MARTEL 22/02/2000

UAPE-122 / 123-SUX1-1D-G / UAIE-124/125-SUX1-1D/GPulsion rafraichissement UX15 / UX15 cooling supply Schéma de principe - Principle schematic

LHCU.3199.1004.4

SUX1 - 3182 - Local confiné / Confined room

Pulsion UX15

FU A

60 000 m3/h

UAPE-122-SUX1-1D

UAPE-123-SUX1-1G

UAIE-124-SUX1-1D

UAIE-125-SUX1-1G

D

M

N

S L

M

M

-

L

L

-

-

L

L

E

E

-

E

E

V

V

M M

L L L

FU AM M

L L LV

D

M

NS L

M

M

L

L

-

L

L

-

-

L

L

E

E

-

E

E

V

M

M

Normal : standbyUrgence : run

S

P

L

S

P

L

BRR/T

Pulsion UX1560 000 m3/h

Normal : 30 000 m3/hUrgence : 60 000 m3/h

P

P

BT2

BAY

BLP

MRM

BLP

MRM

BLO

MREBTT

BT2

BTB BTT

BLO

MREBTB

Normal : 30 000 m3/hUrgence : 60 000 m3/h

Normal : 30 000 m3/hUrgence : 60 000 m3/h

Normal : 30 000 m3/hUrgence : 60 000 m3/h

BLP

MRM

BLP

MRM

BRR/T

MRE

x 10

x 10

BD1

BT5

BD1

BT5

BLP MRMBLP MRM

BRR/T

Instrumentation : idem autre veine / idem other stream

BLO MRE

BLO MRE

BLO

MRE

BLO

MRE

BLO

MRE

BAY BAY BAY BAY

BLO

MRE

BLO

MRE

BAY

BAY

BA6

BA6

BAY

BFY

BRR/T

BTO

BAY

BFY

BRR/T

BTO

BTB

BTA

BTB

BTABTB

BT2

BAY

BLP

MRM

BLP

MRM

BLO

MREBTT BTT

BLO

MREBRR/T

BTB

BTA

BTB

BTA

BAY BAY BAY BAY

P

BTB

BTA

+

E

E

L

LP

+

BT2BT2

PRB

P

BTB

BTA

+

E

EP

+

PRB

BT2

210

210

180

180

180

180210

210

BTB

BTB

Instrumentation : idem autre veine / idem other stream

BTBBTB BTB

BLO

MRE

BLP

MRM

BLP

MRM

BLO

MRE

BLO

MRE

L

L

UIAE UIAN

Pt1

Ventilation Principle

Page 9: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Experimental cavern – Pt2

SD

SX

SUSUH

SH

SUX

PX

PM

US25

UL24

UJ24

PX24

PM25

UW25

UX25

UL26

UJ26

RB26

H=45mVers Point 1

Vers Point 32

SDH

SHB

POINT 2STCV- 97- C:/ DES/ EXP21.DS4

DESENFUMAGEZONESD'EXPERIENCES

Gaine de PulsionGaine d'Extraction

UICN 101 Coffret pompiersLiaison coffret unite

Cheminement de l'air

UICN 204

POINT 2

FOLIO 2-21

BOUCHON OUVERT

UAIE et UAIF à l'arrêt

Désenfumage via tourelles sur

Bâtiment SX.

Action Marche/Arret depuis

coffret UICN 204

Détections

- Gaz

- Feu / fumée

Doublement Automatique

des débits

Concrete cap open

Page 10: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Experimental cavern – Pt2

SD

SX

SUSUH

SH

SUX

PX

PM

US25

UL24

UJ24

PX24

PM25

UW25

UX25

UL26

UJ26

RB26

H=45m

FOLIO 2-20

Vers Point 1

Vers Point 32

SDH

SHB

POINT 2STCV- 97- C:/ DES/ EXP20.DS4

DESENFUMAGEZONESD'EXPERIENCES

Gaine de PulsionGaine d'ExtractionCheminement de l'airPOINT 2

BOUCHON FERME

Action automatique en cas

de détections :

- Gaz

- Feu / fumée

Doublement des débits

Concrete cap closed

Page 11: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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US... - technical caverns. VentilationExtraction

UX 15

PX14

USA 15

PX15

PX16

Pulsion Air primairePrimary air supply26 000 m3/h

-

M

UAPZ-130-SUX1-USA15L LS L V

M

E

MD

M

26 000 m3/h

BT2

BTTBAY

BAY

BTB

BLO

MREMRE

BLO

S

P

L

SUPERVISEUR : J.ROCHE

INDICECERN ORGANISATION EUROPEENNE POUR

LA RECHERCHE NUCLEAIRE

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCHGENEVE

C.MARTEL 2//02/2000

UAPZ-130-SUX1-USA15 / UAPZ-131-SUX1-USA15Pulsion air primaire / primary air supply Schéma de principe - Principle schematic

LHCU.3199.1007.4

E

BTT BTB

-

M

UAPZ-131-SUX1-USA15L LS L V

M

E

MD

M

26 000 m3/h

BT2

BTTBAY

BAY

BTB

BLO

MREMRE

BLO

E

BTT BTB

Standby

SUX1 - 3182

BRR/T

BFY BTO

P

BTB

BTA

+

E

BT2

PRB

180 160

180 160

P

BTB

+

E

BT2

PRB

BTB

BTA

E

BTB

BTA

E

BT5

UIAE UIAN

Supply

Page 12: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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US...technical caverns. Cold smoke extraction

Page 13: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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PX

SZ

FOLIO 2-81

POINT 8STCV-97-C:/DES/EXP81.DS4

DESENFUMAGEZONESD'EXPERIENCES

Gaine de PulsionGaine d'Extraction

UICN 101 Coffret pompiersLiaison coffret unite

Cheminement de l'air

TRAPPE OUVERTE

UAIE et UAIF à l'arrêt

Désenfumage via tourelles sur

Bâtiment SX.

Action Marche/Arret depuis

coffret UICN 804

Détections

- Gaz

- Feu / fumée

Doublement Automatique

des débits

RB84

UJ84

US85

UX85

UJ86

UL86

UW85

UL84

PX84

UA83

PM85

SY

PZ85

RA87

RB86

Vers Point 7

Vers Point 1

SX

UAIR 871

SUX UICN 804 UAEX 892

UAEX 893UAPE831

UAPE832

Wall

UX85 experimental area

UX85 protected area

- technical caverns. Cold smoke extraction

Page 14: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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Smoke Extraction CapacityPoint Area Mode Pulsion Extraction

1 UX 15 Normal 2x 30 000 2x 30 000

    Smoke extraction (*) 2x 60 000 2x 60 000

         

  USA 15 Normal 1x 25 000 1x 15 000

    Smoke extraction 1x 25 000 1x 10 000

2 UX 25 Normal 1x 45 000 1x 45 000

    Smoke extraction (*) 2x 45 000 2x 45 000

5 UXC 55 Normal 1x 45 000 1x 45 000

    Smoke extraction (*) 2x 45 000 2x 45 000

         

  USC 55 Normal 1x 12 000 1x 12 000

    Smoke extraction 2x 10 000 2x 10 000

8 UX 85 Normal 1x 22 500 1x 22 500

    Smoke extraction (*) 1x 45 000 1x 45 000

         

  UX 85 PA Normal 1x 22 500 1x 22 500

    Smoke extraction (*) 1x 32 500 1x 32 501

*Extraction gas = smoke extraction

Page 15: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Cold smoke extraction M & O

Included in TS-CV maintenance plan

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Each experimental cavern equipped with a sump.

Leak detection sensors and sump pumps installed at low point.

Action: L2 alarm to TCR @ 2nd pump starts L3 alarm to TCR @ both pumps at 100%

and/or high water level

Flood Detection/Protection

Page 17: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Water Evacuation System

Page 18: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Water Evacuation Schematics

Page 19: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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Pumping Station Equipment

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ATLAS/CMS Foam Injection

TWO main requirements: 1) passive; i.e. no pumps to pressurize the system at the

working pressure, no electric components, everything should be manual Point 1 water is provided by the pumps of the LHC ring, but even

without them the 100m pressure head provides enough pressure to run the system

Point 5 equipped with 150 m3 pool for HP foam system & hydrants. 2) static foam blowers = very low maintenance !

no fan turning inside the blowers to generate the foam Specification to code NFPA11

successfully demonstrated by the commissioning test of CMS UX55 Feb 2006

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Foam injection Details

foam loss factor: 1.2 foam shrinkage factor: 1.4 foam destruction factor: 1.2. expansion rate: ≥ 700:1 Fill time: 2 + 5 mins. Static foam generators Delivery date: ≤ Aug. 2003

Experimental Caverns Free Volume [m3]

CMS (UXC5) 16500

ATLAS (UX1) 18100

Page 22: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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Foam system M & O

Weekly inspectionMonthly inspectionAnnual maintenance

Manually open/close all valves Remove & clean filters of the system Take foam sample and have it analyzed by

authorized lab.

Page 23: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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ATLAS schematics

Page 24: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

14 February 2007 D. Swoboda @ LHC safety system review

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CMS HE foam Test Feb 2006

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Other fire extinguishing systemsN2+H2O mist high pressure (100 bar) H2O mist high pressure (70 bar) N2+H2O mist low pressure (10 bar)N2 injectionCO2 injection (previous talk)

Page 26: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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Other fire extinguishing systems (cnt’d) CMS, LHCb high pressure N2+H2O mist @

control room, PC farms CMS high pressure H2O mist @ counting room

false floor, UXC trenches ATLAS low pressure N2+H2O mist @ UG PC

farms & false floors ALICE, CMS N2 injection in detector

Min. 3 volume changes ≥ 5 – 10 mins (O2 ≤ 15 %) ALICE

120 m3?? CMS

2 x 80 m3 @ 16 bar

Page 27: Associated detection/extinction systems D. Swoboda

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N2-H2O systems operation

activation can be made by:

remote control with solenoid valve by DSS default operation mode manually using the lever on the top of the gas actuator.

activation by remote control means a detection system sends an activation command to the solenoid valves (24VDC).

For each system both solenoid valves must be activated. As soon as the solenoid valves are open, the N2 will pressurize the

accumulator unit and the gas actuator valve on the other N2 cylinders. The water mist – nitrogen mixture is discharge into the barrack by a network

system. The system discharge is divided into two phases by a change in the

water-nitrogen ratio in the discharge mixture. The initial phase has a high water-nitrogen ratio. The second phase has a much lower water-nitrogen ratio and produce a finer

airborne mist. The two phases cannot be strictly separated.

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N2-H2O systems M & O

Semi-Annual Inspection Carry out functional actuation checks. Replace the actuator valves to the gas cylinder valves. Visual check the DAU-R units Re-commissioning the entire system in accordance with the system

commissioning procedure.

Annual Inspection Carry out all the procedure as for the semi-annual inspection. Change the water inside the accumulator units. Follow the filling procedure.

In case the client permit a real discharge test, the N2 cylinders must be also replaced.