atlas of the world war ii

8/3/2019 Atlas of the World War II

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Page 1: Occupying German troops march

past the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, 1940.

Page 2-3: Italian troops on the Eastern

Front, 1942.

This page: US Marines at Iwo Jima plot

the position of a Japanese machine gun

post, February 1945.

Copyright 1985 Brompton Books Corp

This edition publ ished by Barnes & Noble, Inc.,

by arrangement with Brompton Books Corp.

2000 Barnes & Noble Books

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system or transmitted in any form by any

means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying

or otherwise, without first obtaining written

permission of the copyright owner.

Printed in China

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publicatio n Data

Natkiel, Richard.

Atlas of World War II.


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Contents

Introduction 6Blitzkrieg 10The War in Northern Waters 32The Desert War and the Mediterranean 42

Soviet Ambitions Betrayed 64The Course of Global Conflict: 1939-45 78The Japanese Juggernaut 96The Italian Campaign 108Ebb Tide in the Pacific 120Retaking Burma: The Forgotten War 138Russia Finds Its Strength 148Fortress Europe Overthrown 166Index 190


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12

The SwastikaAscendant

The German humiliation at Versail-

les was skillfully exploited byAdolf Hitler and his Nazis, who

rode to power in 1933 on a tide of nationalresentment that they had channeled totheir purpose. The territorial losses, eco-nomic hardships and affronts to Germanpride embodied in the Treaty of Versail-les virtually guaranteed the conflict thatescalated into World War II. As MarshalFoch had prophesied when the treaty wasforced upon a prostrate Germany: 'This isnot Peace. It is an Armistice for twentyyears.'

Hitler's stormy career seemed to reachits zenith when he seized control of theGerman Government in March of 1933.In fact, it was only beginning. Hitler im-

plemented a military buildup in defiance

of the Versailles Treaty, which had li-mited German arm ed forces to an army of100,000 and a small navy without armoror air force support. G roundwork was laidfor a much larger army to be built up byconscription upon a highly trained pro-fessional base organized by GeneralHans von Seeckt. The prohibited tanksand planes were developed secretly,many in the Soviet Union, and futurepilots were trained. Meanwhile, theNazis continued to scapegoat the Jewsand other minorities for the nation'sproblems; they established the first con-centration camp at Dachau in the sameyear they came to power.

Germany withdrew from the League of


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Previous page: German blitzkrieg(lightning war) tactics were expertlyexecuted by their highly trained troops.Below left: Germany's expansion byAugust 1939.Bottom left: De tail showing the recentlyannexed Rhineland and Sudetenland.Below: The Nuremberg Rally in 1934,with Adolf Hitler (center).

Nations, and by 1935 Hitler couldannounce repudiation of the Treaty ofVersailles. He told the world that theGerman Air Force had been re-created,

and that the army would be strengthenedto 300,000 through compulsory militaryservice. The Western democracies,France and Britain, failed to make anymeaningful protest, a weakness that en-couraged Hitler's ambition to restoreGermany to her 'rightful place' asEurope's most powerful nation.

Nazi Germany's first overt movebeyond her borders was into the Rhine-land, which was reoccupied in 1936. Thiscoup was achieved more through bravadothan by superior force. Hitler's generalshad counseled against it on account of therelative size of France's army, but the

reoccupation was uncontested. The next

step was to brin g all Germans liv ing out-side the Reich into the 'Greater Ger-many.' Austria was annexed in March1938, with only token protests from Bri-

tain and France. Even more ominous wasHitler's demand that Czechoslovakiaturn over its western border - the Su-detenland on ground tha t its three mil-lion German-speaking inhabitants wereoppressed. The Nazis orchestrated a de-mand for annexation among the SudetenGermans, and the Czechoslovakian Gov-ernment prepared to muster its strongarmed forces for resistance. Then BritishPrime Minister Neville Chamberlainflew to Munich to confer with Hitler.

Chamberlain rationalized that theproblem was one affecting CentralEurope alone, and expressed reluctance

to risk war on behalf of 'a far-off country

of which we know little.' France had tostand by its alliance w ith Britain, and theCzechoslovakian democracy was isolatedin a rising sea of German expansionism.

The Sudetenland, with its vital frontierdefenses, was handed over. Far fromsecuring 'peace in our time,' as NevilleCham ber l a in had p rom ised a f t e rMun ich , this concession opened the doorto Nazi occupation of all Czechoslovak iain March 1939'.

Only at this point did the Westerndemocracies grasp the true scope of Hit-ler's ambitions. Belatedly , they began torearm after years of war-weary stasis. Bynow Hitler's forces were more than equalto theirs, and the Fhrer was lookingeastward, where Poland's Danzig Corri-dor stood between him and East Prussia,

the birthplace of German militarism.


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The Partition ofPoland

France and Britain tried to forestall

the Nazi assault on Poland byissuing a joint guarantee to thethreatened nation. This was supposed toprovide leverage whereby the democra-cies could persuade the Poles to makeconcessions similar to those made by theCzechs. But Hitler's aggressiveness grewmore apparent throughout the springand summer of 1939. In April he revokedboth the German-Polish Non-AggressionPact and the Anglo-German NavalAgreement of 1935. Then he sent emis-saries to the Soviet Union, whereJoachim von Ribbentrop concluded bothan economic agreement and a Non-

Aggression Pact with Josef Stalin. By 1September 1939, the Germans wereready to invade Poland on two fronts intheir first demonstration of blitzkrieg -lightning war - a strategy that combinedsurprise, speed and terror. It took Ger-man forces just 18 days to conquer Po-land , which had no chance to complete itsmobi lization. The Poles had a bare dozencavalry brigades and a few light tanks tosend against nine armored divisions. Atotal of five German armies took part inthe assault, and German superiority inartillery and infantry was at least threeto one. The Polish Air Force was almostentirely destroyed on the ground by theLuftwaffe offensive supporting ArmyGroups North and South.

Above right: The Nazi thrust into Poland,early September.

Right: Russia counterattacks, mid to lateSeptember.

Below: The partition of Polan d as agreedby Germany and R ussia.


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Below: German troops enter Warsaw. Thecity finally surrendered on 27 Septemberafter 56 hours of resistance a gainst airand a rtillery attack.

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Thinly spread Polish troops staggered

back from their border, and Germanforces were approaching Warsaw a weeklater. The Poles made a last-ditch effortalong the Bzura River to halt the Germanadvance against their capital, but theycould not withstand the forces pittedagainst them. The Polish Governmentfled to Rumania, and on 27 SeptemberWarsaw finally capitulated.

Meanwhile, Britain and France haddeclared war on Germany 48 hours after

the invasion of Poland. Australia, New

Zealand and South Africa soon joinedthem. Since the Western Allies had failedin their diplomatic efforts to enlist Sovietsupport, they faced a united totalitarianfront of Hitler's Germany and Stalin'sRussia (which could be counted upon totake full advantage of Poland's impo-tence). Stalin had made it clear that hewanted a free hand in Eastern Europewhen he cast his lot with Germany. Be-fore the month of September was out, it

became obvious that Russia and Ger-

many had reached a secret agreement onthe partition of Poland during the sum-mer months. On 17 September Soviettroops crossed the eastern fron tier to takeVilnyas; a German-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship was announced two dayslater. On 28 September, after Warsaw'ssurrend er, Russia annexed 77,000 squaremiles of eastern Poland. The o ther 73,000square miles, bordering on Germany,were declared a Reich protectorate.


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Blitzkrieg - North

Hitler counted on Allied reluctanceto assume an active role in thewar, and he was not disappointed.

The six-month hiatus known as thePhony War lasted from September 1939until April 1940, when Germany invadedNorway and Denmark. In the interim,Britain and France made plans thatcould only fail, because they were basedon a negative concept: avoidance of thecostly direct attacks that had character-ized World War I. New Anglo-French

strategy focused on naval blockade andencirclement - indirect methods thatwere no match for the new blitzkrieg tac-tics of Nazi Germany.

Early in 1940 Hitler turned his atten-tion to Scandinavia, where he had avested interest in Swedish iron ore im-ports that reached Germany via theNorwegian port of Narv ik. Norway had asmall Nazi Party, headed by VidkunQuisling, that could be counted upon forfifth-column support. February broughtevidence that the Allies would resist aGerman incursion into Norway when the

Altmark, carrying British prisoners, was

boarded in Norwegian waters by a Brit-ish party . Both sides began to make plansfor a Northern confrontation.

On 9 Apri l the Germans launched theirinvasion of Norway and Denmark, basedon a bold strategy that called for navallandings at six points in Norway, sup-ported by waves of paratroops. The navalescort for the Narvik landing sufferedheavy losses, and the defenders of Oslosank the cruiser Blcher and damagedthe pocket battleship Liitzow. Even so,the Germans seized vital airfields, whichallowed them to reinforce their assaultunits and deploy their warplanes against

the Royal Navy ships along the coast.


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Denmark had already been overrun andposed no threat to German designs.

Norwegian defense forces were weak,and the Germans captured numerousarms depots at the outset, leav ing hastilymobi l ized reservis t s wi thout anyweapons. Allied planning proved whollyinadequate to German professionalismand air superiority. Kristiansand, Sta-vanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvikwere all lost to the Germans, along withthe country's capital, Oslo. Few Alliedtroops were trained for landing, andthose who did get ashore were poorly sup-plied.

In May, British, French and Polishforces attempted to recapture two impor-tant cities, but their brief success at Nar-vik was of fset by the bungled ef for t a tTrondheim to the south. Troops in thatarea had to be evacuated within twoweeks, and soon after Narvik was aban-doned to the Germans when events in

France drew off Allied troops.

Norway and Denmark would remainunder German occupation throughoutthe war , and it seemed that Hitler's Scan-dinavian triumph was complete. Howev-er, German naval losses there wouldhamper plans for the invasion of Britain,and the occupation would tie up numer-ous German troops for the dura tion. TheAllies were not much consoled by these

reflections at the time. The Northernblitzk rieg had been a heavy blow to theirmorale, and the Germans had gainedvaluable Atlantic bases for subsequentoperations.

Opposite top left: The Reich expands to thenorth and east.Opposite: German forces forge through

Denmark and make six simultaneouslandings in Norway.

A hove: A Norwegian port burns as theGermans follow through their surpriseattack.


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Blitzkrieg - West

The German assault on the West was

launched on 10 May 1940, whenaerial bombardments and para-troop landings rained down on the LowCountries at daylight. Dutch airfieldsand bridges were captured, and Germantroops poured into Holland and Belgium.Both countries called for help fromFrance and Britain, as the Dutch retre-ated from their borders, flooding theirlands and demolishing strategic objec-tives in an attempt to halt the invasion.Their demoralization was completed by asavage air attack on Rotterdam (14 May),after which Dutch forces surrendered.Queen Wilhelmina and her government

were evacuated to England.

The French Seventh Army had tried tointervene in Holland, but it was repulsed.In Belgium, the German capture of EbenEmael, a key fortress, and the accom-plishment of Manstein's plan to traversethe Ardennes with his Panzer divisions,gave access to the Meuse. Three bridge-heads were secured by 14 May, and theAllied line had been breached fro m Sedanto Dinant. The Panzer divisions thenmade for the sea, forcing back the BritishExpeditionary Force and two Frencharmies in Belgium. Allied forces weresplit, and their attempt to link up nearArras (21 May) was a failure. German


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Opposite below: German forces pour intothe Low Countries.

Left: M otorized Dutch soldiers arepictured traversing a dyke.

Below: The Panzer thrust to the Meuse.

tanks had already reached the sea atNoyelles and were turning north towardthe Channel ports.

Only the unwarranted caution of Ger-man commanders prevented wholesaledestruction of Allied forces in Belgium.On 23 May orders to halt came down fromHitler and Field Marshal Gerd von Rund-stedt. The German advance did not re-sume until 26 May, and the beleagueredAllies were able to fall back aroundDunkirk.


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Dunkirk and the Fallof France

Adetermined defense at Calais, and

German failure to capitalize onthe chance of seizing the Channel

ports, enabled the Royal Navy to beginevacuating British troops from Dunkirk.Between 27 May, when Allied resistanceat Calais ended, and 4 June, 338,226 menof the British Expeditionary Force leftDunkirk along with 120,000 French sol-diers. The Germans tried to prevent therescue operation with attacks by theLuftwaffe, but the Royal Air Force dis-tinguished itself in safeguarding the ex-odus. With the loss of only 29 planes, RAFpilots accounted for 179 German aircraftin the four-day period beginning 27 May.

Royal Navy losses totaled six destroyerssunk and 19 badly damaged, plus manysmaller craft. The toll in lives and matr-iel would have been much higher hadchance not favored the Allies in the formof Germany's inexplicable pause atNoyelles.

To the south, General MaximeWeygand tried to rally remaining Frenchforces for defense of the Somme Line. TheGermans began to attack south on 5June, and the line gave way despitecourageous fighting by many French un-its. By 10 June the Germans had crossed

the Seine, and Mussolini took advantage

of the situation by declaring war onFrance. Italian troops moved in and en-countered stiff resistance, but overallFrench morale and confidence were at alow ebb. The government removed toBordeaux and rejected Prime MinisterWinston Churchill's offer of a union be-tween Britain and France. By 16 JunePremier Reynaud was resigning in favorof Marshal Henri Ptain, who announcedthe next day that France was seeking anarmistice.

The conquered nation was divided intooccupied and unoccupied zones. ThePtain Government would rule the un-

occupied zone from Vichy and collaborateclosely with the Germans, to the revul-sion of most Frenchmen. The 'FreeFrench,' led by Charles de Gaulle, ayoung army officer and politician, repudi-ated the Vichy rgime and departed forEngland, where de Gaulle announcedthat France would ultimately throw offthe German oppressors.

Above: Germany expands westwards tothe Channel coast.

Below: The Allied front line contracts asFrance andBelgium are overrun.


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Farleft: The Allies prepare to evacuate as

the Germans advance.Left: France divided under Nazi andVichy rule.

Below: The occ upying forces move intoParis in June.


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Left: German vacillation and the spiriteddefense of Calais gave the A llies time toevacuate from Dunkirk.

Below: A British soldier is hit by strafin g Luftwaffe aircraft on theDunkirk beach.Bottom: T he British Expeditionary Forceand their French allies await departure.

Right: The aftermath of evacuation.Below right: The German sweepsouthwards through France that resultedin th e 22 June armistice. Note Italian

incursions from the southeast.


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The Attack onBritain

Right: The stage is set for the Battle ofBritain, 1940.Below: London's dockland burns after oneof the first major bombing raids on thecapital, 7September 1940.

The Battle of Britain was fought in

the air to prevent a seaborneinvasion of the British Isles. The

German invasion plan, code-named Op-eration Sealion, took shape when Britainfailed to sue for peace, as Hitler had ex-pected, after the fall of France. On 16July 1940, German Armed Forces wereadvised that the Luftwaffe must defeatthe RAF, so that Royal Navy ships wouldbe unprotected if they tried to prevent across-Channel invasion. It was an ambi-tious project for the relatively small Ger-man Navy , but success would hinge uponair power, not sea power.

There were only some 25 divisions on

British home ground, widely scatteredand ill supplied with equipment andtransport. The RAF alone could gain thetime necessary for the army to re-equipafter Dunkirk, and hold off the Germansuntil stormy fall weather made it im-possible to launch Operation Sealion.The air arm was well led by Air ChiefMarshal Hugh Dowding, who made themost of his relatively small but skillfulforce. The RAF had the advantage of agood radar system, which the Germansunwisely neglected to destroy, and pro-fited also from the German High Com-

mand's decision to concentrate on the

cities rather than airfields.All-out Luftwaffe attacks did not begin

until 13 A ugust, which gave Britain timeto make good some of the losses incurredat Dunkirk and to train additional pilots.On 7 September London became the mainGerman target, relieving pressure onBritish airfields which had suffered inearlier bombings. RAF pilots who wereshot down unwounded could, and oftendid, return to combat on the same day,while German pilots were captured. Theshort-range Messerschmitt Bf 109 couldstay over England only briefly if it were


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Bottom: Two Luftwaffe Dornier Do 17bombers over the R iver Thames,September 1940.

Right: Aftermath of heavy nightbombing in the Midlands city of Coventrytwo months later.

to return to its base in France, which

helped cancel out the German superiorityin numbers of planes and pilots.

The Battle of Britain raged in the skiesfor almost two months, while a Germanfleet of barges and steamers awaited thesignal to depart the Channel ports for theBritish coast. By mid September, the in-vasion date had already been put offthree times, and Hitler had to concedethat the Luftwaffe had failed in its mis-sion. Sporadic German bombing wouldcontinue until well into 1941, but Opera-tion Sealion was 'postponed' indefinitely.


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The Invasion ofYugoslavia

On 6 April 1941, the Germans

moved to extend their influence inthe Balkans by an attack onYugoslavia, whose Regent, Prince Paul,had been coerced into signing the Tripar-tite Pact on 25 March. As a result, he wasdeposed by a Serbian coalition thatplaced King Peter on the throne in a gov-ernment that would last only a matter ofdays. Hitler ordered 33 divisions intoYugoslavia, and heavy air raids struckBelgrade in a new display of blitzkrieg.At the same time, the Yugoslav Air Forcewas knocked out before it could come tothe nation's defense.

The German plan called for an incur-

sion from Bulgaria by the Twelfth Army,which would aim south toward Skopjeand Monastir to prevent Greek assist-ance to the Yugoslavs. Thence theywould move into Greece itself, for the in-vasion that had been planned since theprevious year. Two days later, GeneralPaul von Kleist would lead his First Pan-zer Group toward Nis and Belgrade,

where it would be joined by the Second

Army and other units that includedItalians, Hungarians and Germans.The plan worked smoothly, and there

was little resistance to any of the attacksmounted between 6 and 17 April, whenan armistice was agreed after King Peterleft the country. Internal dissensionamong the various Yugoslavian stateswas a help to the Germans, who lost fewerthan 200 men in the entire campaign.Another factor in their favor was the de-fenders' use of an ineffectua l cordon de-ployment that was no match for thestrength and numbers thrown againstthem. German air superiority completed

the case against Yugoslavian autonom y.

Below: Yugoslavia falls in the face of

pressure from Germany, Hungary and

Italy, April 1941.

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The Battle forGreece

Below: Italian attacks and Greekcounteroffensives, winter 1940-41.

Right: TheBritish evacuate the Greekmainland as Axis forces thrustsouthwards.

The overthrow of Yugoslavia's Re-

gency Government on 27 March1941 changed Hitler's scenario for

southeastern Europe. Prior to that, hehad planned to assist his Italian allies intheir ill-starred Greek campaign by per-suading Bulgaria and Yugoslavia toallow his troops free passage into Greece.Now he would have to invade both Yugo-slavia and Greece, where the Britishwere landing over 50,000 men in anattempt to enforce their 1939 guaranteeof Greek independence.

Mussolini's forces had crossed theGreek frontier into Albania on 28 Octo-ber 1940, but their fortunes had beengoing downhill since November. TheGreeks mobilized rapidly and pushed theItalians back until half of Albania wasrecovered, with British assistance, byMarch of 1941. The prospect of his ally'sdefeat, coupled with British proximity tothe oil fields of Rumania, motivated Hit-ler to send three full army corps, with astrong armor component, into Greece.The attack was launched on 6 April,simultaneously with the invasion ofYugoslavia.

Allied forces in Greece included sevenGreek divisions - none of them strong -less than two divisions from Australiaand New Zealand, and a British armoredbrigade, as well as the forces deployed inAlbania. British leaders wanted to basetheir defense on the Aliakmon Line,where topography favored them, withsufficient forces to close the MonastirGap. But the Greek Commander in Chiefheld out for a futile attempt to protectGreek Macedonia, which drew off much-needed troops to the less-defensibleMetaxas Line. The Germans seized theirchance to destroy this line in directattacks and push other troops throughthe Monastir Gap to outflank the Allied

defense lines.By 10 April the German offensive wasin high gear and rolling over the Aliak-mon Line, which had to be evacuated. Aweek later, General Archibald Wavelldeclined to send any more British rein-forcements from Egypt - a sure sign thatthe fight for Greece was being aban-doned. Some 43,000 men were evacuatedto Crete before the Germans closed thelast Peloponnesian port at Kalamata;11,000 others were left behind.

Right: German mountain infantry marchthrough the township of La mia in April

1941.


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Battle of the Atlantic1939-42

The memory of German submarine

success in World War I led the Brit-ish to introduce a convoy system assoon as hostilities began. The immediatethreat was less than British leaders im-agined, because submarine constructionhad not been given high priority in theGerman rearmament program, and Hit-ler was reluctant to antagonize neutralnations by unrestricted submarine war-fare. This was fortunate for the British inthe early months of the war, because theylacked sufficient escort vessels. Manyships sailed independently, and otherswere convoyed only partway on theirvoyages.

In June 1940 the U-boat threat becamemore pressing. The fa ll of France entailedthe loss of support from the French Fleeteven as British naval responsibility in-creased with Italian participation in thewar. Germany's position was streng-thened by the acquisition of bases inwestern France and Norway for theirlong-range reconnaissance support planes


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Previous pages: A surfaced German U-boat immediately prior to its sinking byUS Navy bombers southwest of Ascensionsland, No vember 1943.

Opposite and below right: Earlydevelopments in the Battle o f the Atlantic.Below. USS Spencer closes on a U-boatoff the east coast of America.

and U-boats. And German submarines,

f relatively few in number, had severalechnical advantages. Their intelli-gence was superior to tha t of the Britishdue to effective code-breaking by theGerman signals service. British Asdicequipment could detect only submergedubmarines; those on the surface were

easily overlooked at night or until theyapproached with in striking distance of aconvoy. Radar was not sophisticated, andBritish patrol aircr aft were in very shortsupply.

As a result, the Battle of the Atlanticwas not one of ships alone. It involvedechnology, tactics, intelligence, air pow-

er and industrial competition. The Ger-mans made f ull use of their advantages inhe second half of 1940 (known to Ger-

man submariners as 'the happy time').U-boat 'wolf-packs' made concertedattacks on convoys to swamp theirescorts, and numerous com manders wonrenown for the speed and success of theirmissions.

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By March 1941 this picture was chang-

ing. Many U-boats had been destroyed,and replacement construction was notkeeping pace. The British provided stron-ger escorts and made use of rapidly de-veloping radar capabilities to frustrateGerman plans. Three of the best GermanU-boat commanders were killed thatMarch, and Churchill formed the effec-tive Battle of the Atlantic Committee toco-ordinate British efforts in everysphere of the struggle. The remainder of1941 proved that a balance had beenstruck: German U-boats tripled in num-ber between March and November, butshipping losses in November were the

lowest of the war to that date. US assist-ance in both convoy duty and supplieshelped improve the British position, asdid intelligence breakthroughs.

When the United States formally en-


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Opposite and below right: T he Battle ofthe Atlantic continues , with Allied aircover now apparent.Below: US troops disembark in Iceland.Air cover from Reykjavik drasticallyreduced U-boat strikes in the area from1941 onwards.

tered the war at the end of 1941, the

situation changed again. The US Navywas preoccupied with the Japanesethreat in the Pacific, and the East Coastwas left vulnerable to German sub-marine operations. For the first half of1942, the US ships sailed with out escorts,showed lights at night and communi-cated without codes - afflicted by thesame peacetime mentality that hadproved so disastrous at Pearl Harbor.Sparse anti-submarine patrols along theEast Coast were easily evaded by the ex-perienced Germans. It was months beforean effective convoy system was estab-lished and extended as far south as the

Caribbean. But by late summer of 1942the US coastline was no longer a happyhunting ground, and the U-boats turnedtheir attention back to the main NorthAtlantic routes.


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The Sea RoadsSecured, 1943-45

By mid 1942 the Battle of the Atlan-

tic had shifted away from the USEast Coast to more distant areas,where German U-boats continued tomake successful raids on Allied shipping.Many oil tankers and other vessels werelost south of the Caribbean, off the Brazi-lian coast and around the Cape of GoodHope. Before the year was out, the Allieshad augmented the convoy system byspecially trained Support Groups - escortvessels that would help endangered con-voys or seek out U-boats in areas wherethey had been detected. These groupsusually included a small aircraft carrierand an escort carrier; along with surface

forces. They were free of normal escortduties and could therefore hunt theU-boats to destruction.

A cryptographic breakthrough at theend of 1942 increased Allied intel ligenceon German deployments, and changes inthe code system (June 1943) made it moredifficult for the Germans to anticipateAllied movements. Even so, late 1942and early 1943 brought great difficulties.Allied commitments were increased bythe invasion of North Africa, which drewoff North Atlantic escort forces, with


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heDesertWarand the


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Rommel's FirstOffensive

The first German troops began land-

ing in North Africa on February1941, under command of GeneralErwin Rommel, who would earn the nick-name 'Desert Fox.' His leadership abili-ties were acknowledged by comrades andenemies alike. Rommel soon saw thatBritish forces in Africa were weak, andthat no reinforcements would be forth-coming. On 24 March German forces tookEl Agheila easily, and the 5 Light Divi-sion went on to attack the British 2Armored Division at Mersa Brega. Therethey encountered stiff resistance, but theBritish failed to counterattack and losttheir advantage.

Instead of choosing among threealternative courses of attack, Rommelmoved boldly on all three fronts : north toBenghazi, northeast to Msus and M echiliand east to Tengeder, to threaten Britishsupply lines. Field Marshal ArchibaldWavell, in overall command of Britishforces, lacked the men to counter thismultiple attack, launched on 5 April. Hissingle armored division fell back and wasreduced to a remnant by mechanica l fail-ure. The defense at Mechili, 3 Indian Bri-gade, was soon overwhelmed, with whatremained of the 2 Armored Division. The8 Australian Division retreated from

Benghazi to Derna, thence toward Tob-ruk, which was being reinforced with the7 Australian Division.

On 14 April the German 5 Light Divi-

sion penetrated the Tobruk perimeter a

short distance, but was driven back. Ita-lian troops were now coming up to replacethe German units making ready to crossthe Egyptian frontier. The British garri-son at Tobruk was isolated in the midst ofAxis forces, and on 25 April the Germans

Previous pages: The German retreat fromEl Alamein,November 1942.Right: T he Germans press eastwardsthrough Libya into Egypt.

Below: Rommel e nters Egypt.Bottom le f t : Rommel and his of f icersinspect a ca ptured British tank.

Bottom: The Allies isolatedat Tobruk.Below right: Rommel directs operations.

broke through the Halfaya Pass into

Egypt. Rommel was dissatisfied with thefailure to capture Tobruk, and anotherfull-scale attack struck the British thereon 30 April. Axis troops pushed a salientinto the western sector, but it was con-tained after four days of fighting.


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The German Driveon Gazala

Rommel's German units, the Deut-

sches Afrika Korps (DAK), andtheir allies suffered a setback inthe Crusader Battles with the BritishEighth Army late in 1941. Tobruk wasrelieved, and Rommel had to pull back toEl Agheila, having suffered 38,000 Axiscasualties as against 18,000 for the Brit-ish. His men were exhausted, supplieswere running out and 300 German tankshad been destroyed in the Libyan desert.

British forces pursued Rommel to ElAgheila, believing that his shattered un-its would be unable to react. However,successful air raids on Malta had restoredthe German supply line across the

Mediterranean, and Rommel's forceswere quickly rebuilt to fighting strength.On 21 January 1942 they made an unex-pected advance that pushed Eighth Army


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back toward Agedabia. In a matter ofdays the British faced encirclement atBenghazi and were forced to retreat tothe defensive position at Gazala. The linethere consisted of minefields runningsouth to Bir Hacheim and a series of for-tified keeps that were manned by XIIICorps brigades.

DAK forces under Cruewell swungaround Bir Hacheim on 26 May to out-flank the Gazala Line, but they were

attacked from both sides on Sidra Ridgeand stopped short with loss of a third oftheir armor. Their water and fuel wererunning out, and Rommel tried to push asupply l ine through the Brit ishminefields without success. He thenmoved all his remaining armor into 'theCauldron' to await the impending Britishcounterattack.

Cruewell's isolated forces were finallysupplied on 4 June, and Eighth Armyfailed to counterattack until 5/6 June,when it was beaten off with heavy losses.The defense at Bir Hacheim crumbledand DAK broke out of the Cauldron to

force the British back from the GazalaLine even beyond Tobruk. Axis forceshad surrounded the British garrisonthere by 18 June.

Opposite above: Rommel advanceseastwards, pushing the Eighth Armyback toward Gazala and Tobruk.

Opposite: The Allied stand on 26 May,with fortified keeps (shaded) scatteredalong the minefield (bold line).

Above left: Breakout from theCauldron.Below: An AfrikaKorps Panzer IIIadvances.


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TheFallofTobruk

Eighth Army was severely demoral-

ized by the German triumph atGazala, which contributed to thedistrust between infantry and tank unitsthat had surfaced during the CrusaderBattles. British leadership had failed tocapitalize on several advantages, includ-ing a numerical superiority in armor, theDAK containment in the Cauldron andthe well-prepared defense line at Gazala.

Rommel launched his drive on Tobrukfrom the southeastern sector on 20 June1942. Heavy dive-bomber attacks dis-played German air superiority to devas-tating effect, after which DAK pushedthrough the perimeter defenses. By mid-

morning German troops had reached theminefields, and the airfields were over-run soon after. At 1900 hours 21 PanzerDivision moved into Tobruk.

There was sporadic fighting within theperimeter through the night, but the Ger-mans had overcome almost all resistanceby the morning of 21 June. General Klop-per, the South African in command of thegarrison, surrendered, and the road toEgypt was open.

Right: T he perimeter defenses arebreached, and the fall of Tobruk is lessthan 12 hours away.

Below: British troops surrender to theirAxis adversaries. Rommel's victory,completed on21 June, cleared the way foran advance into Egypt.


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The Naval War in theMediterranean

49

The Royal N avy faced a difficult task

in the Mediterranean, where thewell-equipped and modern ItalianNavy enjoyed a position from which itcould strike at will. British forces weresplit between Gibraltar (Force H) andAlexandria, with Malta at the center - akey position, but highly vulnerable. Onlylight and submarine naval forces werebased on Malta, and Mediterran ean Fleetcommander Sir Andrew Cunninghamwas constantly seeking ways to enhancethe British position in the Mediterran eanthrough fl exible use of his surface ships,including a limited number of carriers.

Cunningham's forces scored several

successes against the Italian Navy inchance encou nters dur ing July 1940, andplans were laid to attack th e Italian fleetin harbor at Taranto. On the night of 11No v e m b e r , 2 1 Sw o r d f i s h t o r p e d o -bombers were launched from the carrierIllustrious: all but two returned, havingsu nk the new battleship Littorio and twomodernized battleships and inflictedheavy damage on other craft. It was amajor coup for the British, and soon fol-lowed by another successful strike atCape Matapan, Greece.

Italian naval forces moved toward

Greece in late March 1941, to interdictconvoys carrying B ritish troops to assistthe Greeks during the Axis invasion ofthe Balkans, then imminent. On 27

Marc h, RAF scouts reported three Ital iancruisers heading east, and Adm iral C un-ningham put to sea from Alexandria.Three battleships , an a ircraft carrier anddestroyer escorts comprised his force,which was to rendezvous south of Cretewith Vice-Admiral IID Pridham-Wippellcomm andin g a force of four cruisers andfour destroyers.

The principal target among the Italianforce converging south of Crete was thebattleship Vittorio Veneto, the pride ofMussolini's fleet. Air strikes were laun-

ched against her, but only one torpedofound its mark. Then the Italian cruiserPola was heavily damaged, and theheavy cruisers Zara and Flume were sent

back to help; all three were destroyed.The remain der of the Italian force fled

back to its bases, including the VittorioVeneto, which found safe harbor atTaran to to the d i sappoin tment o f Adm iral Cunning ham and his men.

Above: The su ccessful night attack on theItalian fleet in T aranto on 11 No vember1940 moun ted by 21 Swordfish torpedo-bombers from HMS Illustrious.

Below: A second blow was dea lt to Italiannaval might at Cape Matapan on 28

March 1941.Following pages: H MS Barham, abattleship of the Allied Me diterranean

fleet, at Gibraltar.


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The Malta Convoys

The British island fortress of Malta

was in serious straits by mid 1942.Its location astride Axis supply

lines made it the target of incessant airattack, and its own supply lines were in-creasingly tenuous. Convoys to Maltahad to be suspended in July due to theirheavy losses. It was clear that Maltacould not hold out against both the Luft-waffe and the Italian Regia Aeronauticawithout food or fuel, and OperationPedestal was mounted as a desperateeffort to convoy supplies from England.

Twenty warships under command ofVice-Admiral E N Syfret left the Clyde on3 August with 14 merchantmen, 32 des-

troyers and various smaller craft. Theaircraft carrier Furious accompanied thegroup with a cargo of fighter planes forMalta's RAF squadron. On 10 Septem-ber, when the convoy passed through theStrait of Gibraltar in fog, a dummy con-voy was dispatched from Port Said to-ward Malta as a diversion. Next day itreturned to port, having failed to distractAxis leaders from the main operation,which was shadowed by reconnaissanceaircraft from the morning of 11 Septem-ber. That afternoon Furious flew her

planes off to Malta and turned back, and

the Axis made its first overt move in theform of a U-boat attack on the carrier

Eagle, which was sunk.The next day brought heavy Allied los-

ses to Axis planes and submarines. Thefreighter Deucalion went down, the des-troyer Foresightwas so badly damagedthat she had to be sunk and the Indomit-able's flight deck was bombed out of op-eration. At this point Syfret turned backaccording to plan, leaving Rear AdmiralH M Burrough to escort the convoy therest of the way with four cruisers and fourdestroyers. Two of the cruisers were dis-abled in the next few hours, Cairo so bad-

ly that she had to be sunk. At dusk, two ofthe merchantmen were destroyed andone damaged. The American tanker Ohiowas hit but stayed with the convoy, as didthe damaged cruiser Kenya.

Early on the morning of 13 September,five more merchantmen and the cruiserManchesterwere lost to torpedoes, andrenewed air attacks sank Wairanamaand did additional damage to Ohio, withits irreplaceable fuel cargo. By the timelight forces from Malta met the convoy,all but five of the merchantmen had been

sunk, along with one aircraft carrier, twocruisers and a destroyer. But the fuel andother supplies that got through enabledMalta to hold on.

Above: The hazardous passage toMalta.Below: The damaged tanker HMS Ohiolimps toward port with destroyer escort.

Right: General Eisenhower(lef t) onMalta with Viscount Gort, the island'sgovernor.


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gustattack

1215,12 AugustDeucalion damaged,sunk later

1600,12 August

U-boat sunk

1840,12 August

Foresight sunk,

carrier Indomitable

damaged. Maincovering force {'X')withdraws as planned

2000,12 August

Cairo, Clan Ferguson& Empire Hope sunk.

Nigeria, BrisbaneStar, Kenya & Ohiodamaged

Night, 12/13 August

Santa Eliza, Wairangi,Almeria, Lykes&

Glenorchy sunk.Manchester damaged,sunk later. Rochester

Castle damaged

0800,13 AugustWaimarama

sunk, Ohiodamaged

1125,13 AugustRochester Castle

& Ohio damaged.Dorset damaged,sunk later

1900,13 AugustMerchant ship

straggler sunk byGerman aircraft


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El Alamein: TheFirst Battle

Below: The German tanks advance, withItalian support.Right: The first Battle of El Alamein.Below right: General Grant tanks of the A Uied22ndArmoredBrigade advancesouth of El Alamein.

After the fall of Tobruk, Rommel

was promoted to Field Marshal, astatus that strengthened his argu-ment for advancing to Egypt at once. (Theoriginal Axis plan called for a halt whilenaval and air forces massed to invadeMalta.) Using the supplies newly cap-tured at Tobruk, Rommel crossed theEgyptian frontier and attacked the Brit-ish at Mersa Matruh (26-27 June), whereEighth Army was now under tacticalcommand of General Claude Auchinleck,Commander in Chief, Middle East. TheBritish could not contain the Germanadvance and retreated to the next de-fensible position - a line south from the

small rail station of El Alamein.Auchinleck had few reserve units with

which to prepare his position from ElAlamein, near the coast, to the QattaraDepression, an area of wilderness thatwas considered almost impassable. Hisdepleted forces took their positions alongthis line to bar the way to the Nile. Mean-while, Rommel's forces had also beenmuch reduced in recent battles to some2000 German infantry and 65 tanks -while fuel and other supplies were dwind-ling (these had consisted largely of bootycaptured at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh).

Eighth Army's artillery units were in-strumental in repelling the first Germanand Italian attacks on 2-4 July; their co-ordination was much better than it hadbeen under General N M Ritchie fromwhom Auchinleck had assumed com-mand. The British Commander in Chiefwas now in a position to essay somelimited counterattacks, whose targetswere Italian rather than German divi-sions. This choice was deliberate, as itcompelled Rommel to waste fuel in wide-spread efforts to assist his Italian cohorts.

The Sabratha unit fell to the 9 AustralianDivision on 10-11 July, and the Britishrecovered Tell el Eisa as a result.

Larger Allied efforts were mounted inthe Ruweisat Ridge area, where opposingforces grappled to an exhausted stand-still. Both sides were simply worn out,

and Auchinleck's refusal to continue theattacks known collectively as the FirstBattle of El Alamein was to cost him hiscommand.

Below: The Allied retreat along theMediterranean coast to El Alamein.


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The Battle of AlamHaifa

In August 1942 Churchill arrived in

the Middle East to make changes.General Harold Alexander replacedAuchin leck as Commander in Chief, andGeneral Bernard Montgomery tookcharge of Eighth Army. Less than threeweeks later, he would face Rommel's lastattempt to break through the position atEl Alamein.

Montgomery's defensive plan was

based loosely upon Auchinleck's: to hold

the Alam Haifa Ridge and counter a Ger-man threat in the South with 7 ArmoredDivision. Rommel used the tactic thisplan had anticipated when, on 30 August,his main attacks swung south of the Brit-ish positions with the object of turningnorth again beyond Alam Haifa to sur-round Eighth Army. The presence of 7Armored Division on the right flank

forced him to turn north earlier than he

had intended, with the result that DAKfailed to break through the Alam Haifaposition. Harassing air attacks and ashortage of fuel compounded Rommel'sdifficulties. His 15 Panzer Division triedto outflank 22 Armored Brigade on 1September, but this effort was stymied byan improved British antitank system.Axis forces pulled back to prepare a deep


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Below: A Vickersgun noses over thebarricades.Right: The Axis attack on A lam Hal fafailed to achieve its objectives.Below right: Rommel's staff confer as theAllied defense turns into counterattack.

defensive position between the Qattara

Depression and the sea.Rommel had to hold the new line ofdefense or be overwhelmed he lackedboth the vehicles and the fuel for a mobilebattle. By the same token he could notretreat. On 6 September, Axis forces wereback where they had started, committedto an immediate counterattack for everyfoot of disputed ground.


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El Alamein: TheSecond Battle

In his new command, General Mont-

gomery lived up to his reputation as acareful planner who emphasized bothtraining and morale. Eighth Army hadsuffered many changes of fortune andcommand in the North African Theater,and morale had eroded to a serious de-gree. Failures of co-operation and con-fidence had resulted in faul ty operations,and Montgomery addressed himself to re-building Eighth Army into an optimumfighting unit. At the same time, he wasamassing a force superior to the Ger-mans' in every respect: troops, tanks,guns and aircraft.

The Germans were well dug in along a

line between the sea and the Qattara De-pression, and Montgomery's plan was toattack north of the Miteirya Ridge. Theinfantry of XXX Corps was to push for-ward to the Oxalic Line and open corri-dors through the minefields for passage ofthe X Corps' Sherman tanks, which werefinally proving a match for the GermanMark IV. Axis forward defenses weremanned largely by Italian troops, andRommel was hospitalized in Germany; hedid not arrive until 25 October, when thebattle was underway. General Stummecommanded in his absence.

The British infantry made a good start

toward its objectives on 24 October, but itproved impossible to move the tanks for-ward as planned. The German 21st Pan-zer Division was kept out of the mainbattle for several days by diversionaryefforts from XIII Corps, and the Germandefense suffered as a result of GeneralStumme's death from a heart attack dur-ing the first day of fighting. The Axis fuelshortage had become critical with thesinking of two tankers in Tobruk Harbor.

When Rommel returned to North Afri-ca, he launched a series of unsuccessfulcounterattacks that ended on 3 Novem-ber, when the British armor began to

break through into open ground. Hitlerat first forbade a withdrawal, but by 4November Axis losses had made it inevit-able. Rommel and his remaining forcesmade good their retreat.

A bove right: The attack plan for corridorsto be driven through Axis minefields to

provide safe passage for Allied tanks.Right: General Montgomery directsoperations at El Alamein. On his right isGeneral Sir Brian H or rocks.


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Above: Italian infan trymen in the field atElAlamein.Right: The second battle saw the EighthArmy repel Axis attacks.


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Operation Torch

On 8 November 1942, four days af-

ter Rommel began to retreat fromEl Alamein, American and Brit-ish forces made a series of landings inFrench North Africa. This operation,code-named Torch, was the first realAllied effort of the war. It was hoped thatthe numerous Vichy French forces inNorth Africa would not resist the land-ings, and the US had undertaken diplo-matic missions to local French leaderswith this object in view. (Anglo-Frenchrelations were still embittered by theevents of 1940.) Despite these efforts,sporadic French opposition delayed plan-ned Allied attacks on Casablanca and

Mehdia, and two destroyers were lost offAlgiers. However, the weakest point ofthe Allied plan was its failure to occupyTunisia in the first landings. Germantroops began to arrive there on 9 Novem -ber to cover Rommel's retreat and formeda defensive perimeter.

The Allied capture of Vichy leaderAdmiral Darlan at Algiers helped dimin-ish resistance from French forces; fewerthan 2000 casualties were incurred in thethree main landing areas. The largestdifficulty was pushing the considerableAllied force the 400 miles to Tunis beforethe Germans could pour in troops andaircraft from Sicily. This they did withgreat speed, on instructions from Hitlerand Commander in Chief Mediterranean

Field Marshal Kesselring. Allied forces

under General Dwight D Eisenhower,American Commander in Chief of theTorch operation, were stopped short inTunisia by early December.

Below: US troops ma rch on Algiers

Maison Blanche airfield.Bottom: The Operation Torch landings. Right: TheAlliedpush into Tunisia.Below right: The Germans reinforce.


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The Winter War:Finland, 1939-40

On 30 November 1939, the Soviet

Union invaded Fin land, after fail-ing to obtain territorial conces-sions demanded in early October. Fivedifferent Soviet armies crossed theRusso-Finnish frontier on four majorfronts, but the conquest of this smallneighboring nation proved much moredifficult than had been foreseen. Deepsnow and heavy forest forced Russiantanks and transports to stay on the roads,where they were easy targets for themobile, well-trained Finnish ski troops.Russian convoys were shot up and sepa-rated, and formations were isolated anddefeated in detail. The Finns never had

more than nine divisions in the field, withfew guns and almost no tanks. But theirconfidence was high, and they had theadvantage of fighting on familiar groundwith tactics suited to the terrain.

By 31 January 1940, the Russians hadmade deep penetrations in the north bydint of superior numbers, but the Man-nerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus,was holding on. The Seventh and Thir-teenth Soviet Armies assaulted this linefrom 1 through 13 February with forcesthat included six tank brigades and 21infantry divisions. A massive bombard-ment preceded these attacks, which

achieved a breakthrough in mid-February. The Finns were forced to sur-render, and to cede the Karelian Isthmus

and considerable territory in the north.

They would seek to make good these los-ses the follow ing year in an alliance withNazi Germany.

The Finnish fight was solitary and ulti-mately hopeless, because the British andFrench Governments feared to arouseSoviet hostility by involv ing themselves.Nevertheless, the Russo-Finnish Warhad far-reaching consequences in the in-ternational community. As a result of it,the French Government fell due to dis-sension about helping the Finns, and theLeague of Nations was thoroughly dis-credited. Hitler formed a false impressionof Soviet inefficiency that probably influ-

enced his decision to turn on his Russianally. And the Red Army was awakened todeep-seated internal problems that be-came subject to reform in the months thatfollowed.

Previous pages: The Wehrmacht advancewith difficulty along a muddy Russianroad, 1941.

Below: The Russians breach Finland's

Mannerheim Line in February. Right: Soviet soldiers dismantle Finnishanti-tank obstacles.


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Above: Earlier Soviet penetration in thenorth and east from November 1939 hadmet effective Finnish resistance.


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(W

Military Balance onthe Eastern Front

The German High Command spent

almost a year planning the inva-sion of Russia, code-named Opera-tion Barbarossa. Three different planswere devised, of which the one givingpriority to the capture of Leningrad waschosen. German leaders estimated RedArmy strength along the frontier at some155 divisions (in fact, there were 170within operational distance.) The frontwas divided in half by the Pripet Mar-shes. In the north, von Leeb's ArmyGroup North was to aim itself againstLeningrad, where it faced an almostequal number of Russian divisions.However, these were deployed so far for-

ward that they were vulnerable to beingpushed back against the coast. VonBock's Army Group Centre, with twoPanzer armies, was the strongest Ger-man force in the field; facing it was thecomparatively weak Red Army WestFront. Most Soviet troops were south ofthe Pripet Marshes, positioned to defendthe agricultural and industrial wealth ofthe Ukraine. Von Rundstedt's ArmyGroup South was to thrust southeastagainst these forces.

The German plan called for swiftpenetration deep into Russia in June, todestroy the Red Army long before winte r.A massive German buildup began, butStalin and his advisors were so deter-mined not to give Hitler any excuse to

attack that they ignored all the warning

signs. In fact, the Red Arm y was still on apeacetime footing when the invasion be-gan on 22 June. Most units were widelyscattered for summer training; otherswere too close to the western frontier. Thereforms that followed upon the Russo-

Finnish War were far from complete, and

there was almost no Russian reserve todeal with deep incursions. The Germanshad good reason to be optimistic aboutthe invasion of Russia.


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The Finnish Front

Below left: With German assistan ce, theFinns established a front line to the eas t oftheir 1939 border.

Below: Finnish infantry adopt defensivepositions on the Mannerhe im Line asRussian pressure increased.

The 1941 alliance with Germany

brought significant improvementsin Finland's forces. Mobilizationand training systems were revamped, asthe Finns prepared to regain the territorylost to Russia the previous year by ex-pediting the German assault in the

north. Marshal Carl von Mannerheim,

hero of the Russo-Finnish War, wouldlead first the army and then the state forthe balance of World War II.

Joint German-Finnish attacks beganon 19 June 1941, with early successesaround Lake Ladoga. The Russians were

outflanked there and began to withdraw

by water, until the Finns had pursued toa point near their former frontier (1September). On the Karelian Isthmus,another attack reached Vuosalmi on 16Augus t, but was stopped short of Lenin-grad by a second Russian retreat. At thispoint Mannerheim called a halt: havingregained the territory lost in the previousyear, he was reluctant to become moredeeply involved in the attack on Russia.

Offensives did not resume until severaldays later, when attacks north of LakeLadoga and against the Murmansk rail-way achieved their objectives. Then theRussian resistance grew increasingly

stronger, and by early December theFinns were on the defensive. The frontline stabilized along an axis east of the1939 Russo-Finnish boundary.


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The Attack onLeningrad

7,3

German Army Group North, com-

manded by General Wilhelm vonLeeb, arrived near Leningrad on 1September 1941. The Germans had de-cided not to storm the city, bu t to isolate itand starve out its defenders. Artillerybombardments began immediately, andwithin two weeks Leningrad had beencut off entirely from overland com-munication with the rest of Russia.

The city had only a month's supply offood - heavily rationed - and starvationset in by October. The following month,11,000 died of hunger. Meager suppliescontinued to come in by barge acrossLake Ladoga in the early fall, but on 9

November the Germans took Tikhvin,the point of origin, and ice on the lakemade navigation impossible. Four weekslater, the Russians opened a new 'Life-

line' road from Zaborie to Lednevo, butwinter weather and difficult terrainslowed supply trucks to a crawl.

Thousands more had succumbed tostarvation in Leningrad by early Decem-ber, when the Red Army's counteroffen-sive began to make itself felt. Tikhvinwas recaptured, and the Germans were

pushed back to the Volkhov River. TheRussians repaired the railroad andopened an ice road across the lake, whichwas now frozen solid ly enough to bear the

weight of trucks. By Christmas Day, itwas possible to increase the bread rationin Lening rad. B ut relief came too late formany: on that same day, almost 4000died of starvation.

Above: Supply routes to the besiegedcityofLeningrad.

Below: Finnish members ofthe Waffen-SS in action.


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Moscow - Strike andCounterstrike

Below: The Ge rman Army Group Southpushes to capture the Ukraine , but isforced to withdraw to the MiusRiver.Bottom: Muscovites dig defense linesaround the capital, 1941.

Right: T he German assault on Mo scow.

After capturing Kiev, the Germans

redeployed their forces for theassault on Moscow. They had a su-periority of two to one in men and tanks,three to one in the air. Fourteen Panzerdivisions were involved in the attacksthat converged on Russia's capital begin-ning 30 September.

By 7 October large pockets of Soviettroops had been cut off around Vyazmaand Bryansk. They were systematicallydestroyed in the next two weeks, afterwhich heav y rains put a serious check onGerman mob ility. The Mozhaisk defenseline offere d increasing resistance, and by30 October German forces had bogged

down miles from M oscow. Many men andtanks were lost in the frustrating ad-vance through a sea of mud.

When the w eather changed, it did littleto help the German cause. The freeze thatset in hardened the roads, but Germansoldiers found it difficult to adapt to theextreme cold, which also created newproblems with their vehicles. By 27November, units of the Third Panzer


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Group finally reached the Volga Canal,19 miles from Moscow center, but theylacked the support for a frontal assault onthe city. Elements of the Second PanzerArmy had gotten as far as Kashira, butthey had to fall back for the same reason.

By 5 December the Germans realizedthat they could go no farther for the timebeing. Valuable time has been lost in thecapture of Smolensk, whose courageousdefenders had helped delay the Germanadvance on Moscow until the dreadedonset of winter. Now the capital could notbe completely encircled, and heavy bomb-ing did not offset the failure to close Mos-cow's window on the east. Fresh Soviettroops began to arrive from Siberia even

as the Germans faced temperatures thatplummeted to 40 degrees below zero.

On 8 December Hitler announced asuspension of operatio ns outside Moscow,but the Soviet High Command was notlistening. Employing the reserves it hadgathered in previous weeks, the RedArmy launched a great counteroffensivethat recalled the winter of 1812, whenNapoleon's forces came to grief on thesame ground. Avoiding German strong-points, the Soviets advanced by infiltra-tion passing over fields instead of roads,making skillful use of Cossack cavalry,ski troops and guerrilla forces. The Ger-mans were harried from flank and rear,forced from one position after another.

Tanks and planes became inoperable inthe extreme cold, and supply lines weretenuous or nonexistent.

With the recapture of Kalinin andTula, the Russians removed the immedi-ate threat to Moscow. Their offensivedrove on into late February, and Germantroops took refuge in strongly fortifieddefensive positions (called hedgehogs) inhope of holding out until fresh troopscould arrive. Hitler had ordered 'No re-treat,' and airborne supplies kept manyenclaves going through the winter. ButOperation Barbarossa had foundered inthe snowfields of Russia. The Sovietswere regaining ground from Leningradto the Crimea.


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The Red ArmyFights Back

During the fall of 1941, the Rus-

sians were able to evacuate muchof their factory equipment andmany key workers to the east, where theybegan to rebui ld the i r indus t r ia lmachine. Railroad equipment was alsoevacuated, giving the Soviets an edge inthe number of locomotives and freightcars per mile of track. The transportationbreakdown foreseen by Hitler did notmaterialize, and Russian troop reserveswere built up in Siberia to replace thegreat losses incurred on the EasternFront. At the same time, war matrielfrom the West began to reach Russia viaArchangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok and

Persia.Since Operation Barbarossa had been

designed to achieve a quick victory dur-ing the summer months, German troopshad never been equipped for winter war-fare. Soviet troops by contrast, wereroutinely equipped with clothing andvehicles appropriate to the theater of op-erations. The Soviet Supreme Command

(Stavka) had rallied from the shock of

invasion to make effective use of the hugearmy that had been so wastefully de-ployed in June of 1941.

The Russian counteroffensive that be-gan on 5-6 December saw immediate anddramatic gains on many front s. The siegeof Moscow was broken by the Kalinin,West and South-West Fronts (armygroups). Supplies began to reach Lenin-grad in time to avert universal starvationin the besieged city. In the south, theKerch Isthmus was retaken and theCrimea re-entered with help from theRed Navy . The Russians had gone all theway back to Velikiye Luki and Mozha isk

before they had to rest and regroup in lateFebruary 1942.

Opposite: TheRedArmy launches itscounteroffensive.

R ight: R ussian territory regained by theend of April 1942.

Below: A political meeting of the R ussianTwentieth Army near Smolensk.


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The Treaty ofVersailles: Blueprintfor Hostilities

Germany had had no part in the

negotiations that resulted in theTreaty of Versailles; it was entire-ly the work of the 32 nations that hadbeen leagued against her in World War I.The 80,000-word draft of the proposedpeace treaty was approved by the AlliedPeace Congress on 6 May 1919, and Ger-man representatives did not even see thedocument until the following day. Theyprotested bitterly against its terms, and

there were demonstrations all over Ger-

many and a change of government beforeit was signed.By the treaty's terms, Germany ceded

Alsace-Lorraine to France, the towns ofEupeh and Malm dy to Belgium, the cityof Memel to L ithuania, and the provinceof Posen and a 'corridor' through WestPrussia to Poland. German Austria, Po-land and Czechoslovakia were declaredindep enden t. The port city of Danzig was

internationalized as a 'free city,' and the

valuable coal region of the Saar passedunder League of Nations administrationand the economic control of France.

In addition, Germany lost all of itsoverseas empire, most of its armed forcesand control of the Rhineland which wasto be occupied at Germany's expense un-til the Treaty of Versailles was fully ex-ecuted. A clause that even some of thevictors disputed forced Germany to claim


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full responsibility for the war and to

promise finan cial repa ration Tor all dam-age done to the civilian population of theAllies and their property.' The initialpayment was set at five billion dollars;subsequent reparations were limitedonly by 'the utmost of [Germany's] abil-ity' to pay. Disarmed, dishonored andheavily mortgaged, the conquered nationembarked upon years of distress and re-sentment that would culminate in theconflict that was to eclipse even the GreatWar itself.

Previous page: USS Arizona explodes atPearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

Opposite: Admiral Chester WNimitzpoints the way to Tokyo. Seated (left toright) are General MacArthur, President

Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy. Left: European boundaries before andafter Versailles.

Below: The Allied premiers convene inParis for the Peace Conference in 1919.


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German Expansion,1939-40

The German Army that went to war

in 1939 was armed and organizedmuch like that of 1918, but therehad been important developments in theinterwar years. The Stuka dive bombernow served as a form of mobile artilleryat need. Submachine guns offered anadvantage in portability over the Vickersand Bren machine guns used by the Brit-ish. Allied forces had more tanks, but theGermans were much better at using themtactically. German generals knew how tofight the war of movement, while theFrench were still fixated on their Magi-not Line - a static and incomplete systemthat anticipated a second Verdun. The

Germans had no intention of fightinganother such action.The new blitzkrieg style of German

warfare rolled over Poland, Norway,Denmark and France in a matter ofmonths. The British Army was shatteredby the French campaign, but the evacua-tion from Dunkirk and the crucial weeksbought by the Battle of Britain staved offinvasion of the British Isles. Mussolinitook advantage of Allied defeats to enterthe war on the German side, but Italian


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armies in both Greece and North Africawere struggling before the end of 1940.By that time, German U-boats were tak-

ing a heavy toll of Allied shipp ing on theconvoy routes.

Above left: Saluting the Swastika.Left: Axis expansion in the late 1930s.Above: German and Italian territorialgains in 1939 and 1940.Right: The dreaded Ju 87 Stuka divebomber, whose success in Europe becamelegendary.


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German Conquest atIts Height

Below: 1942 saw the high tidemark ofGerman expansion. Allied landings in

North Africa combined with the Sovietcounteroffensive on theEasternFrontwere to turn the tide and sound the death-knell for Hitler's territorial aspirations.

Having been balked in his plan to

invade the British Isles, Hitlerdirected his attention to the east,

where he gained control of the Balkans inthe spring of 1941. He shored up thetenuous Italian position in North Africa,then ordered the implementation of Op-eration Barbarossa the invasion of theSoviet Union. Operations beginning 22June 1941 inflicted great losses on the

Red Army, but the expected quick and

easy victory was not forthcoming. Ger-man confidence and supplies began toerode with the onset of an early winterthat found troops unequipped for freezingconditions. The Russian Bear shook offits tormentors in a counteroffensive thatprevented the capture of Moscow, thenStalingrad, in 1942. Russian civiliansproved able defenders of their embattled

homeland, and the Germans went onto

the defensive in Russia. An ill-adviseddeclaration of war on the United Statesafter Pearl Harbor guaranteed open andactive American involvement, with allthe industrial and military strength thatthis implied. Hitler's Germany had over-reached itself.


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The PropagandaWar

Below: Two examples of war propaganda from German (left) and Soviet artists;their respective messages are clear.

Right: Anti-Semitic feelings foundexpression in such German posters as 'The

EternalJew'.

85

Propaganda was used by all of the

belligerents in World War II toincite patriotism and inflame

popular feeling against 'the enemy,' bothoutside and within the country. Luridlyillustrated Soviet posters trumpeted 'Killthe German Beasts!' and 'Destroy theHitlerite Army - It can and must bedone!' Soviet leaders did not feel fullyconfident of their peoples' loyalty in everyphase of the war, in which they lost moresoldiers and civilians than any othersingle belligerent.

Germany produced comparable war artf rom 1943 on, af ter the of f ice of Natio nalSocialist Leadership was created.Psychological warfare played a majorrole in the German war effort, with theproduction of films, posters, magazines

and other media that fostered unques-

tioning loyalty and hatred of minorities,who were accused of subverting the wareffort. During World War I, propagandahad been so falsified by all parties in-volved that genuine atrocities like 'TheFinal Solution to the Jewish Problem'were widely disbelieved - until Allied li-beration of concentration camp survivorsin 1945 revealed the incredible truth.

The US propaganda effort was less ob-vious, but not necessarily less effective.Marine recruitment posters bore thelegend: 'We're looking for a few goodmen,' emphasizing the Marines' reputa-tion as an lite force. 'War Bonds' and'Victory Gardens' abounded to fosterwholehearted co-operation on the homefront. 'Remember Pearl Harbor' was

taken up as a powerful rallying cry in thewar against Japan. Thus dictatorshipsand democracies alike waged the prop-aganda war with deep intensity and un-shakeable conviction of the Tightness oftheir cause.


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Below: Japan's sphere of influence andactivity, December 1941.

Below right: Soldiers return to Japanfrom Manchuria to a hero's welcome.


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Below right: Japan's surprise attack atPearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December1941 (below) raised the curtain on ninemonths of feverish expansion in thePacific-yet the scale of this empire-building was destined to sap her strength.


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The Japanese Sweepthe Pacific

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Below: Japan's empire-building wasfinally curtailed as a two-pronged Alliedoffensive from the east and southwest

forced a retreat.Below right: U S and British combinedchiefs ofstaffdiscuss A Hied strategy.


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The Allies StrikeBack at Japan

As US forces gained experience inthe challenging Pacific Theater,their leaders saw the necessity for

mounting two major lines of advanceagainst Japan. US Navy carrier forceswere strengthened for their essentialrole, amphibious assault capability wasincreased and a fleet train was created tosupply the fighting ships hundreds ofmiles from their bases. These units wereto advance toward Japan via the centralPacific islands.Test case for the 'island-

hopping' strategy was Tarawa, where USforces fought one of the costliest battles intheir history in proportion to the num-bers engaged in November 1943. Threethousand US Marines were casualties,and only 17 of the 4000 Japanese defen-

ders were captured. An intensive study ofthis campaign helped the Americans toavoid their mistakes on Tarawa in subse-quent operations. They accepted the factthat the Japanese would have to beflushed out of their caves and bunkersone by one, using grenades, flamethrow-ers and anyth ing else that came to hand.

The other half of the Allied offens ivewas in the southwest Pacific, whereAmerican and Australian forces underGeneral Douglas M acArthur made slow

but certain progress with massive sup-port from land-based aircraft. Australianforces had a strong vested interest in de-feating the Japanese, who were sure toattack their homeland if they could iso-late it from American support.


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The Defeat of NaziGermany

Germany's long retreat began in

1943; the Battle of Kursk in Julyof that year was the death knellfor hopes of victory in the east. Twomonths before, Italy had been knockedout of the war, and it was on ly a matter oftime before the A llies would try to breakinto Fortress Europe. The German threatto the Atlantic supply routes was effec-tively nullified , and before the year was

out, US and British bombers were attack-

ing both industrial targets and popula-tion centers within the Reich.By the midd le of 1944, after successful

massive Allied landings in Normandyand breakthroughs aimed at the Rhine,the combined might of US and Soviet in-dustry and armies had become over-whelming. Br i t i sh r esources werestrained, bu t not to the breaking point. In

fact, Allied organization and equipment

were at their peak. The Germans, by con-trast, were drained in every area: men,money, armaments and leadership. Bythe time Allied forces converged on theElbe to link up with the Russians (Ap ril-May 1945), most German units were pre-pared to show the white flag. Town aftertown surrende red eagerly to the Allies inpreference to the feared Russians.


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9,'j

Below left: The contraction and (below)

inal defeat of Hitler's Germany.Right: Berlin lies in ruins, the target of

ound-the-clock raids by British and USbomber aircraft.


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Below: The reversal of Japanesesupremacy in the Pacific was confirmed bythe Allies' recapture of the Philippine s inearly 1945. De feat was then only a matterof months away.

Below right: A postwar view of thebusiness district of Kobe, showing thedamage caused by incendiary attack.


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Dissolution of theJapanese Empire

The first real check to the Japanesecame with the Battle of the CoralSea, six months after Pearl Harbor.

There US carriers commanded by RearAdmiral Frank 'Black-Jack' Fletcherdashed Japanese hopes of capturing PortMoresby, the key to New Guinea. Thebattle made history as the first naval en-gagement in which opposing ships neversighted each other - all fighting was doneby carrier-based planes. Both sides madeserious errors in this new form of war-fare, but many of these were corrected byUS forces in the subsequent Battle ofMidway.

In this action, the island of Midwayserved as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'for Admiral Chester W Nimitz. BungledJapanese intelligence contributed to adisaster from which the Japanese Navywould not recover - the loss of every car-rier commanded by Admiral ChuichiNagumo. After Midway, the Japanesewould be inc apable of supporting the far-

flung conquests so rapidly made in pre-ceding months.

To preclude a second Japanese attempton Port Moresby, the Americans deter-mined to seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal inthe Solomon Islands. It was a six-monthstruggle in which US forces gained addi-tional skills from day to day despiteheavy losses, and it set the tone for theduration of the Pacific War - a campaignthat moved steadily toward Japan byavoiding heavily garrisoned enemystrongholds and seizing weaker positionsto use as a springboard to the next Amer-ican objective.

General Matsuichi Ino summarizedafter the war: 'The Americans attackedand seized, with minimum losses, arelatively weak area, constructed air-fields, and then proceeded to cut supplylines . . . Our strongpoints were gradu-ally starved out.' It was a brilliant im-provisation on the theme of the indirectapproach.


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The Japanese

Juggernaut


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Previous page: The battleship Yamatofitting out at Kure, Japan, in!941.Above: Japan's occupied territories.R ight and far right: The Pe arl Harborattacks in detail.

Above right: The magazine of the US

destroyerShaw explodes during the raids.


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Pearl Harbor

The Japanese strike force that

approached Pearl Harbor on 6 De-cember consisted of six fleet car-riers escorted by two battleships and twoheavy cruisers. Anchored in Pearl Har-bor were eight battleships of the USPacific Fleet, numerous destroyers andtenders, and submarines and minesweep-ers. The carriers Lexington and Saratogawere away on a supply mission to WakeIsland, which was fortunate for the fu-ture course of the war on the Allied side.

Rad io m oni to r ing o f i nc reased

Japanese radio traffi c in the several dayspreceding the attack made it clear thatan operation was underway. All Pacificforces had been alerted, but those atPearl Harbor remained on a peacetimefooting despite the danger. Aircraft onthe several Oahu airfields were undis-persed, and ships were anchored in linewith many members of their crewsashore. Reconnaissance flights had notbeen increased above the average.

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The Japanese launched the first waveof their two-part air attack at 6:00 AM on7 December. A radar station reported in-coming planes at 7:00 AM , but this reportwas unaccountably ignored. An hour la-ter, torpedo bombers came in to attackthe harbor as fighters began to strafe theairfields. Virtually all the US aircraftwere destroyed on the ground. In the har-bor, five of the eight battleships were hitimmediately; minutes later, West Virgi-

nia was in flames and sinking, Oklahomahad capsized and California was badlydamaged. Arizona had exploded and

Nevada had to beach herself as she madefor the harbor entrance under fire fromthe second wave of the Japanese attack.Dive bombers and high-level bombershad joined the first aircraft contingent tocreate additional devastation.

By the time the second wave struck, USforces had rallied from the ini tial shock tooffer a more ef fect ive defense. At 9:45 AM ,Vice-Admiral Nagumo's aircraft re-turned to their carriers with loss of ninefighters, fifteen dive bombers and fivetorpedo bombers.

Had Admiral Nagumo launched anadditional attack against the harbor, hemight have destroyed the port facilitiesentirely and accounted for the absent air-craf t carriers as well. Instead, he chose towithdraw the strike force, from which hedispatched several units to attack WakeIsland (8 December). US Marines garri-soned there sank two Japanese des-troyers and held the island againststeady air and sea bombardment for twoweeks, until they were overwhelmed by aJapanese landing.


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Malaya

L

ieutenant General TomoyukiY a m a s h i t a c o m m a n d e d t h e

Japanese Twenty-fifth Army in itswhirlwind invasion of M alaya. (December1941). In this campaign, which drove allhe way to Singapore and was described

by Winston Churchill as the worst disas-er in British military history, Yamashita

earned the nickname 'Tiger of Malaya.'His force consisted of three divisions sup-ported by 600 aircraft, as against Lieute-nant General A E Percival's two divisionswith some 150 aircraft.

Northern landings met little oppositionexcept at Kota Bharu, where TakumiForce, a regimental group, had to fight itsway ashore. Meanwhile, air attacks wiped

out all but some 50 British planes.A double advance south was led by the

Japanese 5 Division, which grappledwith 11 Indian Division around Jitra on11 December. The defenders were pushedback steadily, as the Japanese GuardsDivision mov ed down the coast and 5 and18 Divisions progressed inland. Within70 days, Yam ashita's troops had overrunall of Malaya through a combination ofsuper ior force, speed and surprise. Gener-al Percival was tricked by skill ful jungle-warfare tactics into believing that theJapanese force was vastly superior insize, and on 15 February 1942 he and hismen surrendered.

Above left: Aftermath of P earl Harbor,with USS Downes at left, USS Cassin atright and USS Pennsylvania at rear.Left: T he garrison flag flies as HichamField burns.Right: The Japanese conquest ofMalaya,completed in January 1942.Below right: Singapore falls in February.Below: General Yamashita (foreground)surveys newly-conquered territory.


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102

The Fall of HongKong

Simultaneous with the Japanese in-

vasion of the Malay Peninsula on 8December 1941 came the invasion

of Hong Kong, whose defenders werehopelessly outnumbered. Within 24hours they had been pushed back to theGindrinkers Line, which was breachedby the capture of Shing Mun Redoubt.The mainland then had to be evacuated,an operation which was completed on 13December. Five days later the Japanesecrossed Kowloon Bay on a wide front andcaptured more than half of Hong KongIsland. Fierce resistance continued untilseveral days before Christmas, but aftermost of the reservoirs were captured, the

garrison was forced to surrender on 25December.

A bove: British soldiers face captivity afterthe fall of Hong Kong.

Right: Hong Kong and the surroundingarea.

A bove: The Japanese take Hong Kong onChristmas Day 1941.Opposite top: The Japanese conquest of

Bataan, completed in April 1942.Opposite: The last US forces to hold out onCorregidor Island, south of Bataan, were

finally neutralized on the morning of6May.


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Victory in thePhilippines

In July 1941, when the Philippine

Army joined forces with the UnitedStates, General Douglas MacArthurwas made commander of US Forces in theFar East (USAFFE). His ten divisionsincluded some 19,000 American troopsand 160,000 Filipinos most of them illequipped and undertrained. There werealso 200 aircraft at his disposal. TheJapanese believed, with some justifica-tion, that their Fourteenth Army of twodivisions supported by 500 aircraft couldconquer the Philippine Islands.

Heavy air attacks struck US air baseson 8 December (the same day as PearlHarbor, but dated a day later by the In-

ternational Date Line). Word of the PearlHarbor disaster had impelled USAFFEto fly its bombers off Clark Field in themorning, but by the time of the middayattack, they were back on the groundwith their fighter escorts. Forty-eighthours of bombing against the airfieldsaccounted for the vast majority of USwarplanes and cleared the way forJapanese landings north of Luzon to seizethe bases at Vigan, Laoag and Tuguegar-ao. In the south, Legaspi was seized as abase from which to interdict seaborne USreinforcements.

The main Japanese landings were at

Lingayen Bay on 22 December, whencethe invaders broke out of their beachheadto advance against Manila. On 23 Decem-ber MacArthur announced his plan towithdraw to Bataan; five days later, hedeclared Manila an open city. By earlyJanuary, the Japanese were gainingground on the Bataan Peninsula, buttheir troops were overtaken by diseasethere and gained little ground for thenext two months.

On 12 March 1942, MacArthur wasflown out and replaced by LieutenantGeneral Jonathan Wainwright, whofrustrated several Japanese attempts toestablish beachheads behind US lines.Not until 3 April, after reinforcement bya fresh division, were the Japanese ableto launch their final offensive. Within aweek's time, they had penetrated so deep-ly that US forces were compelled to sur-render (7 April). The last Americantroops held out on Corregidor Island in asiege that ran from January until 5 May,when their artillery was almost entirelyknocked out by unceasing bombard-ments. On that day, Japanese troopslanded at Cavalry Point and establishedtheir beachhead. It was all over for the

time being in the Philippines.


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Left: Japanese landings on Luzon,December 1941.Above: Small Japanese field gun In actionduring theBataan campaign, April 1942.

Right: American prisoners of war under

guard by Japanese troops after thesurrender of Bataan.


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The Dutch E stIndies

The oil and other resources of theDutch East Indies made them aprime target for occupation by

Japan, which planned a three-part attackon the islands early in 1942. WesternForce, from Indochina and newly cap-tured Sarawak, would attack southernSumatra, Western Java, and North Bor-neo; Central Force would attack Borneofrom Davao; and Eastern Force would

jump off from the same point against theCelebes, Amboina, Timor, Bali and east-ern Java.

Defense of the islands was undertakenby a combined force of Allies in the South-west Pacific: American, British, Dutchand Australian (ABDA). General Archi-bald Wavell and his forces had more cour-age than support, which consisted largelyof a six-cruiser naval flotilla under DutchRear Admiral Karel Doorman. Theattacks beg

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