Written by Ajax Trueblood, see more at stormquellers.wordpress.com © ATAG International, 2018 1

ATTACK ON CAMP GANNON 11 APRIL 2005The storm clouds broke violently over India Company just after changeover on April 11th. Out in the towers along Camp Gannon’s perimeter and on the fortified rooftops of the nearby ING compound, Marines stood watch over a waking city. Some had just come off post and were hitting their racks. Others were already asleep after returning from a night mission.

The first mortar rounds exploded in quick succession at about 0815. LCpl Roy Mitros, Sergeant of the Guard that day, noticed how closely they were grouped. At the time, Gannon was getting hit by mortars almost every morning, but typically they were inaccurate. “This was definitely out of the norm”, Mitros later recalled. “[They hit] within five or ten meters of each other”. Then, as if on cue, the guard posts were hit with a wave of incoming small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) from the south and east. Clearly, this wasn’t a normal hit-and-run attack.

AQI’s deadly plan

During the previous months, the hardcore jihadists of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) had been planning this assault. Zarqawi’s network of fanatical fighters saw the presence of the Marines at Gannon as a significant obstacle. The Camp stood athwart their designs to dominate the city of Husaybah and control the border themselves. And as their capacity for violence grew in early 2005, AQI employed new methods to conduct orchestrated, highly-coordinated attacks.

The first of these so-called “complex attacks” was launched on April 2nd, against the notorious Abu Ghraib prison complex outside Baghdad. An estimated 100-150 insurgents operating in multiple teams employed automatic weapons, RPGs, mortars, rockets and suicide vehicle bombs to attack the prison, with simultaneous attacks against other

nearby installations. The attack lasted for several hours, wounding several Marines guarding the facility, but failed to breach the perimeter. The Coalition took note of the new tactics, and braced for more. ………….………... Against Gannon, AQI intended to use similar tactics. Zarqawi and his sub-commanders wanted to create a huge symbolic victory, demonstrate AQI’s power to all Iraqis, and weaken America’s resolve.

They looked for a base where they could make a political statement. This was their objective, to gain political support, nationally and globally. If they could take over a base--especially a Marine base--it would reverberate all the way back to Washington DC and across the United States. -- Capt Frank Diorio, Commander, India Co. Interview at Virginia Military Institute (VMI)

Video crews would capture the attack, then publish the footage on the web. The centerpiece of the enemy’s attack plan was a large diesel fire engine, up-armored and packed with as much explosives as possible vehicle. Rumors about this vehicle had been circulating for months among Iraqis.

Steven MacKenzie, a Squad Leader in 2nd Platoon, remembers that even before leaving Camp Lejeune, leaders in 3/2 had been briefed about it. “We were specifically told there was a large fire truck VBIED in our area of operations”, recalls McKenzie. “We were making jokes about it before we deployed”.

On the morning of April 11th, the rumors became all too real and nobody was joking anymore.

WORKING DRAFT v2.4

= Active link to video= Active link to web

ABOVE Stars & Stripes over Gannon in 2005, next to the Combat Ops Center (COC). Syria was just over the HESCO barriers. (Dali Markovic photo)

OVERVIEW OF THE APRIL 11th ATTACK

ECP

Training Area

Husaybah

ING compound

P8

P1

P2

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Wes

tend

Roa

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Gate

COC

ABOVE Annotated satellite imagery of Camp Gannon and the ING compound, showing key locations and where the VBIEDs detonated. “ING” stands for Iraqi National Guard, although no Iraqis were there at the time. .

The so-called training area (shown with the blue dotted line) was a collection of inspection sheds, warehouses and Iraqi Customs buildings.

The camp had recently been expanded before 3/2’s arrival, and India Company still improving the posts, barriers and firing positions on Apr 11th.

Camp Gannon

Syria

Note: This image is from 2 Jan 2005, about 3 months before the attack. Some structures may have changed by April.

Written by Ajax Trueblood, see more at stormquellers.wordpress.com © ATAG International, 2017 2

First Strike

Minutes after the opening salvo, an SUV-type vehicle sped into view traveling north on Westend Road. Instead of pressing directly towards Camp Gannon, it turned right into the neighborhood just south of the ING compound. This may have been an effort at misdirection, to draw attention away from the main attack. The driver made one more turn north and accelerated along a narrow dirt street towards the compound, with only a coil of concertina wire in his way.

India’s 3rd Platoon was posted at the compound that day, under command of 2Lt Wagner. A member of the platoon, David Pinkham, has vivid memories of the attack:

I had just come off post that morning, and decided sleep was more important than food. I heard/felt mortar rounds land close to our building, but started to drift off again. Then, BOOOM! I was thrown from my cot into the wall… A VBIED had exploded right outside… One of my squad mates screamed “WE’RE HIT!!” All I could see was dust and my ears were ringing. I grabbed boots, flak, helmet and rifle and started running to the roof. My ears started to pick up lots of gunfire. --LCpl David Pinkham, India Co, 3rd Plt

For whatever reason, the driver had touched off his lethal payload prematurely in a trash-strewn lot just south of Pinkham’s position. He may have become disoriented, or the concertina wire entangled the vehicle, but fortunately he had not come close enough to cause casualties or major damage.

Gannon gets rocked

The attack was just getting started, however. Moments after the 1st suicide bomber hit, Marines standing post along Camp Gannon’s perimeter sighted a white dump-truck barreling up Westend Road. Instead of following the same route into the neighborhood, though, this vehicle pressed all the way north towards an unfortified, arched gateway structure that led into the training area outside Gannon.

Access to the training area was impeded by several wrecked vehicles that were arrayed across the road. Marines from 3rd Platoon could see that approach from rooftop positions within the ING compound. And as the truck came within view, LCpl Charles Young was able to fire two 40mm grenade rounds from his M-203. But there was no apparent effect, and as the massive dumptruck hit the wrecked vehicles, it easily brushed them aside. The driver turned left into the training area, and accelerated towards the Entry Control Point (ECP) at the northeast corner of Gannon.

Concrete barriers were arranged in a typical “serpentine” pattern in front of the ECP to slow vehicles down and confuse any incoming attacker. The two-story P2 tower overlooked the ECP, manned that morning by a single Marine, 21 year-old Colorado native, Josh Butler.

The story of LCpl Butler will probably never be told fully. It involves headstrong and proud personalities and time-honored disciplinary practices. Suffice it to say that Butler had been deep in the proverbial doghouse with his Squad Leader and other NCOs. For weeks before the attack, he’d been the focus of intense “remedial counseling”.

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ABOVE Stills from the AQI propaganda video, capturing the blasts at the entrance to Camp Gannon. The video edited deceptively. Visit the website to see the video and a detailed analysis.

Butler hardly describes himself as a model Marine. “I was never a guy you’d put on a recruiting poster”, he says. “I’m a combat Marine, that’s all.”

And that morning he proved it. As the massive truck-bomb accelerated straight at his position, Butler stood in the open-air parapet of the concrete tower. He braced the stock of his Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) against his shoulder and began firing:

(Josh Butler photo)

But as soon as the first rounds hit, almost simultaneously with the first strikes, Marines were grabbing gear, ammo and weapons and rushing to reinforce. Many of them credit their training, their leaders and a well-prepared defense plan for their ability to react so quickly and effectively.

It was scary, but then your training takes over. I got blown out of my rack when the attack started. Mortars landed on top of us. I had that moment of intense fear before running out, but you have a bigger fear of letting your brothers down.

Two guys were in P7 when I got there. I brought extra ammo. We were receiving heavy small arms, rocket and mortar fire from the south and east. I could see muzzle flashes and men on the rooftops. We started engaging them and reporting what we saw. We were aggressive but professional, if that makes sense. --Ron Jackson, interview with author

Butler’s Last Stand

Butler came to on the floor of P2 tower, the air around him filled with choking dust from the dump truck blast. Over the handheld radio clipped to his gear, a garble of urgent transmissions were stepping on each other. Then, through the radio chatter and the ringing in his ears, he heard another diesel engine whining. Instantly he knew what it was.

I was knocked out for a second, but it was like everything just clicked right back on. When I heard it, I knew right away it was that damn fire truck, and was like ‘You gotta be shitting me! Again?’ I jumped up, and it was coming right through the smoke. Just like a scene from ‘Lethal Weapon’ or something. Smoke was swirling around it as it came through.--Interview with author

The cyclic rate-of-fire for the M249 is between 650 and 800 rounds per minute. Which means if you hold the trigger down without letting up, it will fire about 13 bullets every second and chew through a 200-round belt in under 20 seconds. However, firing cyclic will quickly overheat the barrel and jam or even destroy the weapon. A good gunner knows to fire in short, disciplined bursts of 4 to 10 rounds.

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It wasn’t my weapon, and wouldn’t ya know, the damn thing jams right off. I go into my immediate action to clear it, and I can hear the diesel whining as it gets closer. But I got the weapon cleared, and start lighting him up. I probably used about a quarter of my ammo in three bursts. I knew I had to conserve, since I just had that one can. It was just like we did in dryfire drills, “butter-butter-jam, butter-butter-jam, butter-butter-butter-jam”. I was aiming right at the windshield, and it was pretty well spidered. I’m pretty sure I killed him in the seat. --Josh Butler, Interview with author

Butler’s bursts of 5.56mm rounds probably started impacting the dump-truck when it was about 100 meters from the tower. As they started piercing the windshield, the driver was either killed outright, wounded or disoriented and the truck veered left insteading of continuing straight towards P2.

Seconds later, as it neared a large red-roofed inspection shed, it exploded in a massive fireball. In an instant, the shock wave radiated from the blast, mangling metal and masonry, filling the air with deadly shards, and slamming Butler violently against the back wall of the concrete guard tower, knocking him unconscious.

About 200 meters away, behind the double-stacked HESCO wall and inside the hardened Combat Ops Center (COC) Capt. Diorio also experienced the effects of the blast:

The next thing I know the roof lifts up... It was a cement-poured roof. It lifts up and you can see daylight between the roof and the top of the walls. The doors get blown off and everyone gets knocked off their feet. --Interview with VMI

Running to the Sound of Gunfire

During the night, insurgents had moved into buildings with good fields of fire towards Marine positions. In some cases, they had pushed families out of homes, threatening them to keep quiet. Now small teams of fighters were firing from windows and rooftops along Westend Road, and from the apartment blocks of the “440” sector, south of Gannon.

ABOVE The P2 tower where Butler was posted when during the morning of April 11th.

ABOVE LCpl Ron Jackson, India Co, 1st Platoon(Ron Jackson photo)

Butler was a good gunner that morning. Knocked down by the first explosion and now back up and watching the fearsome firetruck accelerating towards him, he displayed poise and fire discipline. Again, he aimed to kill or disable the driver, firing in controlled bursts at the windshield.

I could see into the cab, and there were two guys with black ski masks. They were wearing helmets and old-style flak vests I aimed bursts right at the windshield, and saw my rounds impact, kind of fogging the glass. Later we found out they had a ‘bullet-proof’ windshield installed. I don’t know if I penetrated it, but I don’t think they could see much after that. The driver just basically followed where the first truck went.--Josh Butler, Interview with author

Just like the dump truck, the fire truck veered left under Butler’s onslaught and detonated in almost the exact same spot as the previous blast, about 80 meters from P2 and 40 meters from the serpentine barriers.

This explosion was even larger, again knocking many Marines down, tearing off plywood doors inside Camp Gannon, shredding several sheds and buildings in the training area and filling the air with chunks of metal, engine parts and deadly splinters. The explosion was clearly heard and felt thirteen miles away at Camp Al-Qaim, and a dark, ominous mushroom cloud rose several hundred feet over Husaybah.

The concrete structure of P2 tower was cracked and chunks had been taken out, but it was still standing. As was Lance Corporal Butler. He was battered and bruised, with multiple pieces of metal embedded in his kevlar body armor, but still had ammo for his SAW and was ready to take on whatever came next.

A large bit of shrapnel had struck the aluminum NVG mount bolted to the front of his helmet. Just an inch higher or lower, and it would have pierced his skull or his face.

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ABOVE Post-blast photo taken from P2. The red arrow shows the path of both the dump truck and the fire truck. Both exploded in the same location marked by the starburst. The green line on the diagonal row of HESCOs provides orientation with the image below. (Dali Markovic photo)

ABOVE Zoomed in to the seat of the blast. Note that part of the single-stack HESCO wall was completely destroyed.

ABOVE Dotted red lines show likely paths the fire truck would have taken, had the dump truck detonated closer to the single-stack HESCO wall and eliminated that barrier. If the fire truck had pushed through and exploded against the main double-stack HESCO wall,

the blast would have been far more lethal. Marines bunked in the structures directly below P2 would have been killed or seriously injured. Even more sobering,

If the fire truck had penetrated through the Entry Control Point, it could have easily reached the COC, with catastrophic results. It was a very close call.

Extended Firefight

Rocked by the explosions, Capt Diorio and his battle staff inside the COC struggled to figure out what was happening and get a handle on the situation:

I didn’t know whether my Marines on the perimeter were alive. We can’t see anything because it’s just dust everywhere. You can’t see in front of your face. I go back to the radio and [report to Battalion] “We just got hit with a fire truck.” He said, “What are your casualties?” I said “We have no way of knowing right now.” Apart from all this...we got RPGs and small arms fire coming in… dust everywhere, you can’t see what’s going on and can’t hear anything because Marines are firing back… I thought part of the base had been taken over. As the smoke clears, I can see where the fire truck hit, and my heart sank. --VMI interview

Meanwhile, the firefight along the perimeters of Gannon and the ING compound continued to rage. The post known as P8, a sandbagged position on the southeast corner of Gannon, was at the center of the action. With its M-240 machine-gun and a dominant field of fire, it was critical to the base’s defense, and both the Marines and AQI fighters knew it.

At the very beginning of the attack, P8 was hit by an RPG round. The impact blew apart the outer layer of sandbags and threw Cpl Anthony Fink, LCpl Joe Lampe and LCpl Roger Leyton to the floor of the post. They quickly recovered and returned fire with the M240 and 40mm rounds from an M203 grenade launcher. Heavy incoming was coming from the houses across Westend Road.

Recognizing that P8 needed support, India’s 1st Sergeant, Donnie Brazeal, rushed from the COC across an exposed area to the point of danger. “Fink told me it was coming from beyond a wall 300 meters from the post, so we reset the gun to suppress that.” Brazeal and Fink then deployed AT-4 unguided rockets, standing on a firing platform outside the protection of the sandbagged fighting position. Both rockets hit the wall, killing several attackers.

Meanwhile at the ING compound, 3rd Platoon was engaging insurgents at even closer range, only 100-150 meters away. David Pinkham had scrambled onto the rooftop of his building, gun in hand.

We had two posts facing south into the city. The houses closest to us had been taken by attackers. As best I could assess there were 15-20 enemy there. We took to the wall of the rooftop for cover and began to gain fire superiority. I remember concrete being chipped off the wall from bullet impacts, and hitting us. In that split second, time morphed into an eternity. Adrenaline is a strange rush. --LCpl David Pinkham, chat with author

Fire Superiority

As the dust settled, India’s leadership worked to get headcounts, ammo status and casualty reports. After such massive blasts, they assumed there were multiple serious casualties and several dead Marines. Radio calls for MEDEVAC had already gone out to Battalion, and rotors had started turning on the birds at Camp Al-Qaim.

Frank Diorio recalls, “I started getting reports in. Lt. Brummond, my 1st platoon commander, calls in, ‘Sir, I’m all accounted for.’ Lt. Albert, “Sir, I’m all accounted for.” Third platoon, Lt. Hess, “Sir, I’m all accounted for.” Lt. Hackler, “Sir, all accounted for.” --VMI interview

Written by Ajax Trueblood, see more at stormquellers.wordpress.com © ATAG International, 2018 6

RIGHT Post 8 (P8) on the southeast corner of Gannon

had commanding fields of fire and was a priority

target for the attackers.

ABOVE LCpl David Pinkham, India Co, 3rd Platoon. (D.Pinkham photo)

ABOVE Red circle shows house where Pinkham was posted. Arrows show fire from enemy-occupied houses to the south.

N

ABOVE Looking south from a post on top of the ING compound. Note bullet strikes on the armored glass and M-249 SAW at the ready. (David Pinkham photo)

N

Ammo distribution became a priority, as Marines in the posts were still dealing with heavy incoming. They were pouring out suppressive fire, dealing with multiple clusters of attackers, and several posts ran low on ammunition. Squad leaders and NCOs exposed themselves to enemy fire to run ammo cans out to the towers and sandbagged positions.

Within about 15 minutes after the attack began, a Cobra attack helicopter arrived from Camp Al-Qaim, adding its firepower to the fray. The mortars on Gannon also engaged the enemy as best they could. The firefight continued for about 45 minutes, but started to slack off as insurgents were suppressed, killed or withdrew back into the city.

At one point, the men in P1 tower actually spotted the insurgent media team. Through binoculars, they saw a cameraman on a rooftop about 800 meters southeast of Gannon. “We considered them hostile due to their activity at the time of the attack and the fact that we were receiving fire from that direction,” remembers Dali Markovic. “We called for mortar fire on the location, but it was declined due to the helicopter being too close.”

Basically, while AQI’s media team were shooting their propaganda video, the Marines of India Company had their position dialed in and were trying to kill them.

Doing What Marines Do

While some men’s actions stood out that day, based on being at a crucial point at a crucial time, in truth it was the concerted action of the whole company that was remarkable.

When veterans of India Co. recall that incredible experience, they speak with pride about their brothers reacting calmly and professionally under fire, engaging the enemy as a team. As 1st Sgt Brazeal told a reporter after the fight: “This whole company is full of Marines who do the right thing at the right time in the right way, and [April 11th] is proof of that.”

Frank Diorio has similar feelings: “The Marines did what Marines do. They knew their fields of fire. They reinforced, they resupplied, they went into harm’s way... Proud doesn’t really say it… I truly am humbled to be amongst them… It was inspiring. They were calm against a raging storm.” --VMI interview

And those Marines are equally grateful for the officers and NCOs who trained them, prepared them and led them in the heat of the fight.

I attribute our survival to a being a bunch of professional warfighters, ready and willing to do what it took. And an incredibly astute CO, who had the foresight to change up our ECP just before the attack. If we hadn't, I feel absolutely certain the VBIED would have gotten through, and would have demolished the COC... I really can't say enough about the leadership we had. Capt Diorio and 1st Sgt Brazeal made sure we had what we needed. --Cpl Kevin Morris, Wpns Plt, India Co.

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RIGHT Inside P8, just two days before the attack.

Note the range card on the sandbags, showing fields

of fire and pre-designated targets, evidence of a

well-prepared defense. (Jon Dupont photo)

ABOVE LCpl Dali Markovic, Fire Team

Leader in India Co, 2nd Platoon, spotted the

enemy cameraman who was taping the attack.

(Dali Markovic photo)

The Media Battleground

Well before the first explosion, Zarqawi’s media arm had prepped the battlespace. With a camera team in place, video editors standing by, and jihadist websites ready to receive and upload, AQI was poised to make headlines around the world. The speed of their information ops (IO) was impressive. RCT2’s Commander, Col Steven Davis, recalls:

Their stringers in Husaybah were already primed... When that second one went off, they had a report out there about the insurgent attack on Gannon. That’s how well connected they were... That’s how fast their flash-to-bang IO was. (The Awakening, Vol III, IDA)

According to Davis, even as the firetruck was barrelling towards the ECP, a story popped up on the Wall Street Journal’s web feed reporting a massive suicide bombing. Just a short time later, the edited attack video appeared on extremist websites, with narration saying many Americans were killed and claiming a great victory against the infidels.

But AQI’s attempt to seize the media narrative quickly unravelled. As India Co. reported up the chain that they’d only suffered minor injuries, and their perimeter was secure, Marine and Coalition press officers released that information. The story started to change, as it was picked up widely by western reporters and the truth came out.

Locals vs. Foreign Fighters

As dramatic as the April 11th attack was, a more subtle effect became more important in the long run. AQI’s initial announcement of a great victory turned out to work against them, as the truth became known. Frank Diorio explained:

The locals actually started making fun of the people who did it, [saying to AQI] “No one died, you guys failed, you’re all talk” I started to see this kind of schism.

The glaring gap between the foreign fighters’ propaganda and their obvious failure to inflict real damage, accelerated a growing split between AQI and the locals, including key

tribal leaders. Over the next several weeks, the Marines observed so-called “red-on-red” firefights occurring at night in the streets and back alleys of Husaybah. Through local contacts, anonymous sources and delicate negotiations, Diorio and India Co. began to implement a strategy for exploiting the split:

Foreign fighters started heavy-handing the locals. I learned this through multiple intelligence sources. I would say about a month after [April 11th] we started seeing some locals starting to call on us with information.

Operational Impact

India Company had come through the attack essentially unscathed. Just three Marines had been injured, and all returned to duty. But they also realized that the margin between survival and disaster had been alarmingly slim. The day was a violent reminder that they faced a resourceful, fanatical foe that would kill them if ever given the chance.

April 11th also starkly underlined that reinforcements, even air assets, could not arrive in time if a determined enemy assault penetrated Gannon. India Co. had to be constantly ready to blunt an attack, relying on their own weapons, resources and competence. They couldn’t count on the “cavalry” to rescue them.

Operationally, this meant that for the rest of the deployment, India Company concentrated its efforts on defending Camp Gannon and the ING compound. They made limited forays into Husaybah city and the 440 neighborhood, mostly during targeted nighttime raids. For the big clearing operations in May and June, LtCol Mundy would have to rely on Kilo and Weapons Companies as his organic maneuver forces.

In spite of this tactically defensive stance, the attack had the effect of prompting India Co. to adopt an innovative, non-traditional approach towards engaging the local population. Soon after the attack, Frank Diorio and his leadership team began to capitalize on the growing divide between local Iraqi power brokers and the AQI-led foreign fighters that were trying to dominate Husaybah.

Written by Ajax Trueblood, see more at stormquellers.wordpress.com © ATAG International, 2018 8

ABOVE The border sign survived but bore scars for the rest of the tour, giving an ironic twist to its words. (Patrick Glynn photo)

ABOVE The fire truck’s twisted chassis lay in the training area for weeks after the attack. (USMC photo) .

ABOVE Donald Brazeal, Roy Mitros, Anthony Fink, Paul Mathis, Jessie Beddia, (l-r, standing), Charles Young, Joshua Butler (l-r, kneeling) (USMC photo)