attack the network – defeat th e device – train the force
TRANSCRIPT
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
JIEDDO Overviewpresented to the
United States Naval AcademyAlumni Association, San Diego Chapter
April 21, 2011
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OfiL USE ONLY
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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Era of Persistent Conflict
• Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations
• Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism… produce a very complex environment
• Globalization
• Demographics
• Resources
• Proliferation
• Urbanization
• Environment
• Failed States
• Technology Advances
• Closed States Threatened
• Criminal Environments
• Resource Wars
• WMD/E Attacks
• Terrorist Recruitment
• Dissatisfied Populations
• Humanitarian Crises
Persistent
Conflict
The world will be in persistent conflict for generations and the IED will be the weapon of choice for decades
The world will be in persistent conflict for generations and the IED will be the weapon of choice for decades
Global Trends
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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IEDs are Weapons with…UNCLASSIFIED
Tactical Effect Operational Effect
Strategic Effect• Influence national will• Create perception of “lost
cause”• Use insecurity to
delegitimize host nation
• Isolate population• Disrupt freedom of
movement• Create perception
of insecurity
• Inflict casualties• Isolate population
from contact with friendly forces
Main Charge
Initiating System
Casing
Explosive Filler
Switch
InitiatorPower Sources
Containers
IED
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Afghanistan IED TrendsUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
• IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO
• IED severity has decreased
• IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11
Effective IEDAttacks
IneffectiveIED Attacks
# o
f IE
D E
ven
ts
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces- Effective host nation security force- Political reconciliation- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables
Iraq IED Trends
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11
Effective IEDAttacks
Ineffective IEDAttacks#
of
IED
Eve
nts
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Global IED Threat
Source: Triton Report
UNCLASSIFIED
*actual IED attacks or devices found and cleared
Nov 2008 – Nov 2010
IED Incidents*
All Others
The average number of monthly IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan was 245 for the last 6 months.
State & non-state actors
train, practice, &
employ IEDs worldwide
Monthly Global Terrorist Incidents (minus Iraq & Afghanistan)
0100200300400500600700800900
1000
Nov Dec Ja
n
Feb
Mar Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov Dec Ja
n
Feb
Mar Apr
May
Jun Ju
l
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
UNCLASSIFIED (COIC/703-995-6930/10 Jan 11)
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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Global IED Threat Highlights
IEDs remain an on-going and persistent threat worldwide.Source: Open Source Press Reports
UNCLASSIFIED/
(J2/ 27Jan11)
Philippines: 21 Oct, RCIED attack on bus
kills 10 civilians, injures 40
Pakistan: 5 Nov, 79 killed in PBIED attack on mosque
outside Peshawar
Guatemala: 13 Sep, 1st reported use of
VBIED; device defused
Somalia: 9 Sep, al-Shabaab attacks Mogadishu
International Airport with SVBIED and PBIEDs; 9 killed
Turkey: 31 Oct, PBIED detonates in Istanbul wounding 32; Kurdistan
Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed responsibility
UNCLASSIFIED
India: 8 Nov, 2 Military Police killed by Maoist
emplaced IEDArgentina: 16 Sep, IED detonated in front of
American Airlines and Alitalia offices. Chilean
anarchist group claimed responsibility.
Colombia: 4 Nov, Colombian Army
recovers 26 FARC gas cylinder bombs
Mexico: 10 Sep, Drug cartel use
‘luring’ tactic with VBIED
U.S.: 27 Oct, Pakistani-American
arrested for planning attacks against DC Metro
Chechnya: 19 Oct, Militants wearing PBIEDs attack Chechen parliament building in Grozny; Three civilians
killed,17 wounded
Algeria: Sep, AQIM conducts SVBIED against security force
convoy in Zemmouri
Moscow: 24 Jan, PBIED attack Domodedovo Airport; 35 killed,
130 wounded
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DoD Response
In February 2006, Department of Defense stood up the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to support Combatant Commands by leading efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations: The organization, integration and synchronization of capabilities that enable offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations across all phases of campaigns in order to defeat IEDs as operational and strategic weapons of influence.
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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What Makes JIEDDO Unique?
• Laser-like focus on the IED threat
• Reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Funded through OverseasContingency Operations– 3-year uncolored funding
• Rapid Acquisition – 4-24 month response window– 75% solution in months
• An innovative, transparent organization that finds solutions to the complex challenges of the IED fight
DoDs ability to rapidly
respond to Warfighters
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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Lines of Operation (LOOs)
Train the Force: Actions and activities designed to enable Attack the Network and Defeat the Device through:
graduate level Combat Training Center events C-IED training at Home Stations and the Centers
of Excellence focused individual C-IED pre-deployment training Training in-theater to stay ahead of adaptive enemy
Attack the Network: Lethal and non-lethal actions and operations against networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) that:
capitalize on or create key vulnerabilities disrupts activities eliminates the enemy’s ability to function
Defeat the Device: Detection, mitigation, and neutralization of IEDs once it has been emplaced through:
route clearance device neutralization explosive detection disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance vehicle and personnel protection
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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JIEDDO’s Current COCOM EngagementsUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
USJFCOM• C-IED Doctrine• Battle Staff Training
USCENTCOM- Main Effort- Continuous Support- Federated Nodes (HQ
& SOCCENT)
USEUCOM• NATO C-IED COE - Spain• NATO EOD Center – Slovakia• Federated Nodes (DGS-4;
Future: HQ & SOCEUR)
USSOUTHCOM• Colombia C-IED Program
Development• Identify C-IED Planning
requirements• Federated Node (DGS-2)
USSOCOM• Ongoing support• Federated Nodes
(HQ, USASOC, and NSW)
USNORTHCOM• TUE plan & exercise
development• Federated Node (JTF-N)
USPACOM• USFK C-IED Plan Development• Key Resolve 2010• Asia-Pacific Fusion Center• Federated Nodes (USARPAC &
DGS-5; Future: SOCPAC)
Working with all COCOMs to:• Identify planning, training, and exercise events• Nest C-IED within OPLANS using the C-IED Planning Template• Build theater C-IED programs• Cultivate international C-IED capacity building
USAFRICOM• Responding to RFIs• Federated Nodes (HQ;
Future: SOCAF)
Goal is for Rest of the World to remain in Phase 0 C-IED operations
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Technology Challenges
Predict and Prevent
Detect
Neutralize
Mitigate
Social and Dynamic Network AnalysisTagging, Tracking, & LocatingDetect/Prevent Pre-Emplacement ActivityPersistent Surveillance TechnologiesSensor Enhancement and Data Exploitation
Command Wire DetectionBuried IED & Pressure Initiation DetectionStandoff Explosives Detection & ConfirmationExplosively Formed Projectile DetectionSensitive Radio Frequency Detection
Passive Infrared DefeatBlasting Cap DefeatCounter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare
Vehicle and Crew ProtectionPre-empt Use of New Technologies & TTPsMedical
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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C-IED Ops/Intel Integration
Weapons Intelligence Teams
Pattern Analysis
Home Made Explosive
Tactical Site Exploitation
Company Intel Supt Teams
Biometrics
ElectronicWarfareTargeting
Intel, SurveillanceRecon
Law EnforcementProgram
Counter IEDTargetingProcess
Human Terrain Team
Find Fix
AnalyzeFinish
Exploit
We need To Train Attack the Network
UNCLASSIFIED
Disseminate
Facilitates Training On AttackThe Network Using A Common JIEDDO Training Support Plan
Training
UNCLASSIFIED
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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UNCLASSIFIED
JIEDDO Capabilities to the Warfighter
As of 7 October 2010 UNCLASSIFIED TOTAL: $16.6B
FY 06: $3.6B(Appropriated)
FY 07: $3.3B(Obligated)
FY 08: $3.9B(Obligated)
FY 09: $3.1B(Obligated)
FY 10: $2.7B(Obligated)
Attack the Network
FY 06-10 Appropriated
$5.4 B
Defeat the Device
FY 06-10Appropriated
$9.4B
Train the ForceFY 06-10
Appropriated$2B
Constant Hawk
Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles
Jammers: Duke, Guardian, Hunter, Spirals, Chameleon
PIR DefeatEngineer Reconnaissance Vehicles
Robotics
Rhino & Rhino II
Warrior Alpha
Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC) Law Enforcement
Program
Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID)
Persistent Threat Detection System
Joint Center of Excellence
Electronic Warfare Training
Surrogate Training Devices
Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
Counter-IED Targeting Program
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC)
CREW-Mounted 2.1
Route Clearance Blowers
Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS)
Victim Operated IED (VOIED) Roller Systems
Rapid Deployable Integrated Surv. System (RDISS)
CREW Training
Home Station Training
Federated Nodes
Identity InstaCheck
Palantir
Data Tracker
Forensic Exploitation Team (FOX)
Weapons Technical Intelligence
External Information Programs
Base Expeditionary Target & Surv. System (BETSS-C)
Ahura
Vehicle Optics Sensor System (VOSS)
JCREW-Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer
MARCBot/XBot
Home Station Training I & II
Insurgents on the Battlefield
C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams (C-MATT)
JCAST
Desert Owl
Copperhead
Night Eagle
IED Rollers
CREW-Dismounted 3.1 & SOCOM EGON
Counter Bomber
BeachComber
Entry Control Point Solutions in a Box
Afghan Surge:
C-IED Live Fire
IED Battle Drill
Virtual Medical Training
Afghan Surge:
Keyhole
Route Clearance Optics Suite (RCOS)
Wolfhound II
JCAST
Exploitation Labs
Devil Pup
CREW-Fixed Site CVRJ
Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer
Tactical Site Exploitation
Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) Toolkits
ORSA
Knowledge &Information Fusion Exchange
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Summary
• We must contain the spread of IEDs as a global weapon of choice for violent extremists
• The ENEMY adapts quickly – “we can’t armor our way out of IEDs”
• We need to institutionally integrate what we have learned
• We must continue to strive to make IEDs too costly to produce and too risky to employ by:– Attacking networks that emplace IEDs– Training our forces to protect themselves
• We must seek technologies and train warfighters to protect themselves and defeat the devices
• IEDs are not just a tactical problem
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
Mr. Craig S. McDonaldDeputy OIC, JIEDDO USMC Detachment
(760) [email protected]
www.jieddo.dod.mil
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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Afghanistan IED TrendsUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
• IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO
• IED severity has decreased
• IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant
Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force
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• No significant change in number of IED events since July; % of effective attacks trending downward• Coalition Force IED casualties continue to trend down, with only 2 CF IED WIA in December• Host Nation IED casualties trends continue to vary month to month
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces- Effective host nation security force- Political reconciliation- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables
Iraq IED Trends
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Joint Center of Excellence, Ft. Irwin, CA
• Resource Training for the IED Defeat Fight
• Direction, Guidance, & Coordination
Afghanistan Field Team (Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Salerno, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Orgun-E, Sharona, Tarin Kowt & Abad)
• Embed with deployed units• Advising Units• TTP development and dissemination• CREW training• ISAF transition• TF Phoenix Support
Iraq Field Team (Baghdad, Tikrit & Ramadi)
• Embed with deployed units• Advising Units• TTP development and dissemination• CREW training• Transition Team Support
Joint IED Defeat Organization, Crystal City, VA• Resourcing the IED Defeat Fight• Direction, Guidance, & Coordination• Technology Integration• DS Support from Rapid Equipping Force (REF)
JIEDDO’s Reach
UNCLASSIFIED
Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, VA
UNCLASSIFIED
JIEDDO Knowledge & Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE), Newport News, VA
• Global TTP, Best Practice, Lesson Learned repository• Collaboration & Information Sharing Portals• Knowledge Management• Joint Training Support
Joint Training COIC, Newport News, VA
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Joint IED Defeat Organization Mission
Mission Areas
• Operations & Information Fusion• Training & Operations Support
• Rapid Acquisition• Strategic Planning
JIEDDO Lines of Operation
Attack the Network
Defeat the Device
Train the Force
Deputy Secretaryof Defense
Director, Joint IED Defeat Organization
JIEDDO leads DoD actions to rapidly provide Counter Improvised Explosive Device capabilities in support of the Combatant Commanders and to enable the defeat of the
IED as a weapon of strategic influence
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED