BSc (Aviation): Directed Study Report

ATTITUDES TOWARD FLIGHT SAFETY AT REGIONAL GLIDING SCHOOL (ATLANTIC).

‘A directed study presented in fulfillment of AVIA314 course requirements’ Author: John W. Dutcher Supervisor: Ms. Kirstie Carrick Co-Supervisor: Dr. Steven M. Smith (St. Mary’s University, Canada) Date: November 2001

i

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to the open-minded persons of Regional Gliding School

(Atlantic) – RGS (A) who participated in this study, the Commanding Officer of RGS

(A) Maj. E.N. Berntson and the Deputy Commanding Officer Capt. John MacLellan.

Special thanks also to Capt. Dom Campbell and Ms. Gale Bull of Directorate of Flight

Safety at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Canada. I also wish to

acknowledge:

Maj. J.L. Allard

Canadian Department of National Defence – 405 Squadron at 14 Wing Greenwood

MWO Gordon Davies

Canadian Department of National Defence – 12 Wing Shearwater Flight Safety

Mr. Mike Doiron

Transport Canada – Aviation - System Safety

Capt. Warren Duffy

Canadian Department of National Defence – 12 Wing Shearwater Flight Safety

Maj. Tony Roeding

Canadian Department of National Defence – 12 Wing Shearwater Flight Safety

Mr. Sandy Sanford

Air Cadet League of Nova Scotia

The Air Cadet League of Canada

Professor John A. Wilhelm

The University of Texas at Austin - Department of Psychology

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Thanks to the Department of Psychology at St. Mary’s University (SMU) in

Halifax, Canada for funding the preparation of questionnaire materials and the initial

postage. Thanks to Mr. John Walker and the Air Cadet League of Nova Scotia for

donating funds for return postage for the questionnaires. Much thanks to Mr. Miles

Bore of the University of Newcastle (Australia) - School of Behavioural Sciences -

Psychology, who (amongst other things), helped me make sense of all the numbers, and

to Ms. Kirstie Carrick of The University of Newcastle (Australia) – School of

Behavioural Sciences – Aviation for her many patient hours of discussion and debate.

Lastly, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Steven M. Smith of the

Department of Psychology at SMU. Though he was not an instructor of AVIA314 or

even affiliated with The University of Newcastle (Australia), he volunteered his valuable

time and expertise. I am greatly indebted to him for his support, encouragement, and

guidance, which were critical in making this proactive research project possible!

iii

Abstract

This research examined attitudes toward flight safety in the Royal Canadian Air Cadet

Gliding Program (RCACGP). Regional Gliding School (Atlantic) – RGS (A), was

selected as the host RCACGP school for this research. Attitudes were measured using a

questionnaire customised to RGS (A) based on existing mainstay questionnaires used for

research in this area. 375 questionnaires were posted to present and former cadets and

officers at RGS (A), 69 useable questionnaires were returned. The statistical results

along with participant comments suggest the possibility of hazardous attitudes toward

flight safety present at RGS (A); possible contributing factors to the development and

maintenance of such attitudes are discussed. This research suggests there are no

attitudinal differences existing between officers and cadets and between males and

females. Data suggests that flight time does not change attitudes. Statistical data and

participant comments suggest the need for the development and implementation of a

more effective Human Factors training program at RGS (A). Results suggest that the

achievement of various civilian pilot licences influence the perception of Human Factors

training relevancy. Data suggests that involvement in incidents and accidents

concerning human error have a positive effect on flight safety attitudes. Future research

implications and considerations are discussed in terms of the development and

evaluation of Human Factors training strategies in the RCACGP and elsewhere.

1

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………….. 6

Royal Canadian Air Cadet Program……………………………………………. 6

Human Factors Training…………………………………………………………7

Attitudes…………………………………………………………………………. 9

Aeronautical Decision Making………………………………………………….. 9

Research Questions……………………………………………………………..10

METHOD …………………………………………………………………………….. 12

Participants……………………………………………………………………..13

Materials………………………………………………………………………...12

Procedure……………………………………………………………………….16

RESULTS …………………………………………………………………………….. 18

Reliability……………………………………………………………………….19

Correlations……………………………………………………………………. 22

Level of Agreement…………………………………………………………….. 24

Factor Analysis………………………………………………………………… 29

2

DISCUSSION ………………………………………………………………………… 32

Attitudes at RGS (A)…………………………………………………………… 32

Culture at RGS (A)…………………………………………………………….. 33

Is this just a RGS (A) problem?………………………………………………... 34

Operational Environment……………………………………………………… 36

Organisational and Political Pressures…………………………………….…. 36

Line Management and Peer Pressure to fly at RGS (A)…………………….…. 37

Human Factors Training………………………………………………………. 38

Involvement in Aircraft Occurrences…………………………………….….… 40

Limitations of Current Research………………………………………………. 41

Conclusion………………………………………………………………...…… 43

Implications for Future Research………………………………………..…….. 44

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List of Appendices

Appendix 1 Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Officer Flightcrew Staff Appendix 2 Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Cadets (Present & Former) Appendix 3 Flight Safety Attitudes Questions per Sub-total groups

4

List of Figures

Figure 1 Distribution of the Mean Human Factors Total Score………………… 18

Figure 2 Stress: The Professional Pilot and Me……………………………….… 24 Figure 3 Stressors and the Pilot………………………………………………..... 25 Figure 4 Human Factors and Flight Emergencies…………………………..…… 26 Figure 5 Human Factors Training Usefulness……………………………...…… 27 Figure 6 Type of Licence and Human Factors Training Relevancy…………….. 28

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List of Tables

Table 1 Sub-total Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges & Medians………...…. 19 Table 2 Sub-total Alpha Reliabilities………………………………………..…. 21 Table 3 Sub-total Pearson Correlations…………………………………..…….. 22 Table 4 Sub-total Pearson Correlations with Total Powered Aircraft

Flight Time………………………………………………………..…… 29 Table 5 Rotated Component Matrix………………………………………...….. 30

Table 6 Total Variance Explained……………………………………………… 31

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INTRODUCTION

Royal Canadian Air Cadet Program

The Royal Canadian Air Cadet program was formed in 1941 to assist Canada in

meeting its World War II objectives [Royal Canadian Air Cadets (RCAC), 1998]. In

1995 the Royal Canadian Air Cadet Gliding Program (RCACGP) celebrated the launch

of its one-millionth glider flight since its beginning in Penhold, Alberta in 1965, which

was a result of the partnership between the Air Cadet League of Canada (ACLC) and the

Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) (Thurston, 1994). Currently, together

they operate a fleet of 58 gliders and 26 tow aircraft in an attempt to accomplish one of

the primary aims of the Air Cadet program: establishing an interest in aviation. For

administration and operational purposes the national program is decentralized into five

regional gliding schools - Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Prairie and Pacific. During the

North American spring and autumn, each region conducts familiarisation flights for

approximately 28,000 Air Cadets nationwide. During the months of July and August,

each regional gliding school conducts a six-week Gliding Scholarship Course funded by

the ACLC, the DND, and private donations. Nation-wide, up to 320 male and female

Air Cadets between the ages of 16 and 18 years old are provided with the opportunity to

obtain a Transport Canada glider pilot license on full scholarship (Airforce Magazine,

1993).

The RCACGP is clearly a driving force in Canadian aviation and is one of the

largest contributors of aviation professionals to Canada’s military and civilian industries.

During its history it has yielded many aviation professionals including Canadian

Astronaut Colonel Chris Hadfield (ACLC, 2001). In 1998 the National Air Cadet

Gliding program was awarded the System of Cooperation of the Air Forces of the

Americas – Prevention of Accidents (SICOFAA – PREVAC) award in recognition of its

outstanding safety record. Because many of Canada’s aviation professionals receive

their ab initio flight training through the RCACGP and because of its outstanding safety

record, the author felt that there were possible lessons to be learned from the RCACGP

7

which may improve safety in the other sectors including the General Aviation (GA)

industries of both Australia and Canada.

This research began in February 2001 whilst the author was at the Department of

Psychology at Saint Mary’s University (SMU) in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. The

Atlantic Regional Gliding School - RGS (A), was selected as the host RCACGP School

because its headquarters was based near SMU at Canadian Forces (CF) 12 Wing

Shearwater, Nova Scotia. The author was also a graduate of the Gliding Scholarship

Course in 1996 and the Flying Scholarship Course in 1997 from the RGS (A) and was

employed there in 1998. Combined with the author’s familiarity with RGS (A)’s

operations and its geographical closeness to SMU, it was presented and selected as the

best host school to provided the necessary resources and support for this study.

Human Factors Training

Human error has been implicated in 60-80% of aviation accidents (Shappell &

Wiegmann, 2001). However research into GA have shown that this may be as high as

90% (Nagel, 1988). Human errors are inevitable within productive systems, therefore it

is unreasonable and a fallacy to believe and expect error-free human performance.

Human Factors is a multidisciplinary field, comprised of psychology, engineering,

physiology, medicine, sociology and anthropometry, aimed at optimising human

performance and reducing human error [International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO), 1991]. It is through the development and application of Human Factors

training that human error can be managed, thus yielding a safe and efficient aviation

industry. Modules containing topics such as stress, fatigue, sensory illusions, body

rhythms, information processing and decision making have been included in Human

Performance and Limitations (HPL) training (Orr & Nendick, 2000). HPL training,

mainly physiological in nature and targeting the individual, became a mandatory

licencing requirement for ICAO member states in 1989 (ICAO, 1991). Crew Resource

Management (CRM) is “the effective use of all resources, including the aircraft and its

systems, printed materials and computer software, and people, to achieve the highest

8

level of safety possible” (Transport Canada, 1996a, p.68). CRM has traditionally been

directed towards the airline environment, focusing on effective crew co-ordination,

communication, leadership and the Human Factors involved in working with advanced

aircraft automation and other technologies. In the past 30 years, Human Factors

training, including HPL and CRM, has gained wide acceptance in the aviation industry

and is seen as a necessary and valuable tool.

One does not have to search very far to gather evidence illustrating the benefits

and the need for CRM and HPL training. The most highly publicised example being the

United Airlines Flight 232 (UAL 232). On July 19th, 1989 whilst cruising en route from

Denver to Chicago at 37, 000’, UAL 232 suffered a catastrophic failure of the No. 2 (tail

mounted) engine resulting in the forceful discharge of some 70 pieces of shrapnel, from

the rotor, penetrating the horizontal stabilizer and severing the No.1, No. 2 and No. 3

hydraulic lines; equalling a total loss of all three hydraulics systems powering the flight

controls. Nearly 45 minutes later the crew brought the doomed aircraft to within feet of

the runway at Sioux City, Iowa in an emergency situation which had never been seen

before, in which emergency checklists and procedures were not even in existence. Of

the 298 souls on board 187 survived the crash landing [National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB), 1990]. The NTSB, in their accident report on UAL 232, stated that the

flight crew interactions were “indicative of the value of cockpit resource management

training” (1990, p.76). Captain Al Haynes himself publicly attributes his success in

landing the plane to United’s resource management training (Haynes, 1991; Kayten,

1993).

Despite the many success stories where Human Factors education has been cited

as a major factor in the successful management of flight emergencies, there are several

glaring examples were such training and concepts should have been employed (i.e.,

Eastern Airlines Flight 401 (NTSB, 1973), United Airlines Flight 173 (NTSB, 1979),

Air Florida Flight 90 (NTSB, 1982), Air Ontario Flight 1363 (Helmreich, 1992)). Such

examples “jumpstarted” much research into Human Factors education in the commercial

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aviation industry. Much has been conducted since the late 1970s but such research in

the GA industry has been slow to develop which is also true of the RCACGP.

Attitudes

Since flightcrew attitudes have been implicated as possible contributing factors

to many accidents such as the Air France Airbus 320 crash on an air show demonstration

flight in 1988 (Wilson, 1993), the British Midlands Flight 92 in 1989 [Air Accidents

Investigation Branch (AAIB), 1990; Wilson, 1993], and the Saudia Flight 163 in 1980

(Wilson, 1993). Most research conducted in this area is aimed at developing effective

training programs to change attitudes to reflect positive and realistic attitudes toward

flight safety, thus improved safety and effective performance. An attitude is a “general

and enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue” (Petty &

Cacioppo, 1996, p.7). Attitudes are said to consist of a cognitive component or an idea

about an object, an affective component or feelings towards the object, and a

behavioural component. There is a considerable amount of evidence existing illustrating

a strong link between attitudes and behaviour (Helmreich, Foushee, & Russini, 1986

cited in Helmreich, 1992; Helmreich, 1987; Sexton & Klinect, 2001) however the

relationship between them is not particularly clear. Do attitudes precede behaviours or

are they the product of a direct experience (i.e., involvement in an aircraft occurrence)?

There is evidence existing to support either view, but what remains is the strong

relationship between attitudes and behaviour and that “Attitudes regarding flightdeck

management have been validated as predictors of crew performance and were derived

from research implicating them as relevant in many accidents and incidents”

(Helmreich, Foushee, & Russini, 1986 cited in Helmreich, 1992, p. 329).

Aeronautical Decision Making

Decision making is a complex process of gathering and processing information

in the working memory and formulating and implementing a plan of action. This

process also requires both attention and access to information stored in the long and

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short term memories. Heuristics, cognitive biases, physical condition (i.e., stress,

fatigue, medication), and attitudes all influence the effectiveness of the decision making

process (Carrick, 2001). In a study on GA accidents in the US between 1970 and 1974,

Jensen and Benel (1977) cited decisional errors as the leading contributing factor of 52%

of fatal accidents. The study also concluded that decision making skills could be taught

and that if such training was provided it would aid in reducing accidents (Kaempf &

Klein, 1994). Berlin, Gruber, Holmes, Jensen, Lau, Mills, and O’Kane (1982)

investigated why pilots would choose a course of action that in hindsight was obviously

unsafe. Berlin et al. (1982) attributed many of the decisional errors to attitudes held by

the pilots involved, causing pilots to select inappropriate courses of action in light of

information, which should have convinced them to choose another. Berlin et al. (1982)

identified five hazardous attitudes: anti-authority, external control (resignation),

impulsivity, invulnerability, and macho (Kaempf & Klein, 1994). Findings in these

areas sparked the development of Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) or Pilot

Decision Making (PDM) training in Australia, Canada and the US during the 1980s.

This training is still conducted today and examines the attitude and behaviour link with

the assumption that exposure to such training will produce attitudinal changes leading

students to avoid unnecessary risks as pilots (Kaempf & Klein, 1994).

Research Questions

Though the RCACGP and the RGS (A) operates over such a vast and spread out

country like Canada, its regard and commitment to flight safety is both consistent and

apparent when examining its outstanding safety record. But is a “good” safety record a

true reflection of sound training, flight safety programs and practices or luck? Experts

such as Foushee (1987 cited in Diehl, 1991) argue that because accidents are relatively

infrequent, accident figures make poor scientific criterion for the effectiveness of

training programs. The comments of a participant echoed this, “I’m pleased to see

someone has taken the time to check up on the program! While it appears to be safe (as

no one has had a serious incident/accident) the potential is still there. This study is an

excellent way to find and improve a “good” situation. It hurts no one if we prevent bad

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things from happening.” Since attitudes are major determinates of behaviour and

performance, attitudinal measurement may be the best gauge for the evaluation of true

flight safety. This study was primarily undertaken to examine the state of attitudes

toward flight safety held in the RCACGP, in particular RGS (A), and to identify possible

advantageous practices which may be migrated to other sectors of the aviation industry

and/or correct safety deficiencies, which in turn would migrate to other sectors. Because

of the global scarcity of female pilots (Merritt, 1997) very little research has been done

in relation to their flight safety attitudes. Since many females are trained in the

RCACGP, this study was also undertaken to examine whether attitudinal differences

existed between female and male pilots. Since officers (instructors) tend to have more

flight experience and exposure to Human Factors training than cadets (trainees),

research was conducted to uncover whether they had “better” attitudes toward flight

safety than cadets. Research was also aimed at uncovering whether more Human

Factors training and flight time were necessarily better in changing attitudes toward

flight safety. Other research questions included whether the achievement of various

pilot licences influenced flight safety attitudes and what effect the involvement in an

aircraft incident or accident had on attitudes toward flight safety? �

�

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METHOD

Participants

Participants were selected from RGS (A), based at CF 12 Wing Shearwater in

Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Persons, who successfully completed the Gliding

Scholarship Course at RGS (A) between 1995 and 2000 and/or were employed as an

Officer in a flight capacity, were invited to participate in the research. Participants’

postal addresses were retrieved from yearbooks of the Gliding Scholarship Course at

RGS (A) held during the North American summer (July and August) between the years

of 1995 and 2000. Each participant was followed through each yearbook in order to

place them in the correct group (explained later) and to retrieve the most recent postal

address. Confirmation of postal addresses was attempted via Email.

There were two major groups of participants: cadets and officers. The Cadet

group was divided into subgroups: Present and Former Cadets. Participants that had

successfully completed the Gliding Scholarship Course at RGS (A) and were still

enrolled and active cadets were classified as Present Cadets, and were between 16 and

18 years of age. Participants that had successfully completed the Gliding Scholarship

Course at RGS (A) and were not enrolled and active cadets were classified as Former

Cadets. Participants who held officer ranks and were employed in a flight capacity

between 1995 and 2000 at RGS (A) were classified as Officer Flightcrew Staff, and

were at least 18 years of age.

70 participants (20 officers and 50 cadets) responded to the questionnaire,

however only 69 presented useable data and the one officer was deleted from this study.

Age (N= 68) ranged from 16 to 65 years old, with a mean of 21.76 years and a Standard

Deviation (SD) of 8.62 years. 51 males (73.9%), 17 (24.6%) females, and 1 unreported

(1.4%) participated in the study. 56 (82.4%) of the respondents reported their primary

language as English, 11 (15.9%) reported French and 1 (1.4%) reported being Bi-lingual

(French-English).

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Materials

Materials utilised in this study were:

I. Questionnaires

Persons that were classified as Officer Flightcrew Staff were posted the

questionnaire entitled “Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Officer Flightcrew

Staff.” Persons that were classified as Cadets – Present and Former were posted

the questionnaire entitled “Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Cadets (Present

& Former).”

Each questionnaire contained three parts:

Part 1 - Flight Safety Attitudes

This section was identical for both groups and contained 30 statements of opinion.

Personnel were asked to respond using a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1

(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) to statements such as “The successful

management of a critical situation is due solely to operational experience.” “I can

always deal with my stress.” and “Successful aviation professionals take risks

when the situation calls for it.” (see Appendix 1 and 2). 19 of the 30 statements

were adapted from the 25-item questionnaire developed by Simpson and Wiggins

(1999) used to examine attitudes toward unsafe acts in a sample of Australian GA

pilots, the rest were adapted from the Cockpit Management Attitudes

Questionnaire (CMAQ) (Helmreich, Wilhelm, & Gregorich, 1984) and the Flight

Management Attitudes Questionnaire 2.0 (International) (FMAQ) (Helmreich,

Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich, & Wiener, 1996). The CMAQ and the FMAQ, on

which Simpson and Wiggins (1999) also based their questions, are the widely

14

accepted mainstays for research into CRM in the multi-crew airline environment

(Simpson & Wiggins, 1999).

Part 2 - Satisfaction and General Perceptions of Safety at Regional Gliding

School (Atlantic)

This study only utilised Section C, which was identical for both groups and was

based on the FMAQ 2.0 (Helmreich, et al., 1996). This section contained 3 open-

ended questions (i.e., “Please comment on your perception of the effectiveness of

Human Factors Training and the Flight Safety Program at RGS (A).”) designed to

provide participants with the opportunity to consider the effectiveness of Human

Factors training at RGS (A), the role Human Factors training plays in flight

operations and ways in which the program could be improved (see Appendix 1 and

2).

Part 3- Background Information

This section of the questionnaire was identical for all participants and was based

on the FMAQ 2.0 (Helmreich, et al., 1996), and the Flight Attendant Safety

Questionnaire (FASQ) (Helmreich, Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich, & Wiener, 1998).

It contained demographic questions seeking information on participants’ age, sex,

primary language (English or French), year they completed the Gliding

Scholarship Course, total flight experience, attendance at formal Human Factors

courses, involvement in aircraft accidents or incidents concerning human error and

positions held at RGS (A) (see Appendix 1 and 2).

Participants were also asked what aviation licences they held. Licences were

ranked (from lowest to highest): Glider, Private Pilot Licence (PPL), Commercial

Pilot Licence (CPL), and Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL). Only the

highest licence obtained was recorded. Because the CF does not issue civilian

licences, anyone with CF pilot wings were coded as military being their highest

15

“licence.” Participants reported their highest licence obtained as follows: Glider -

24 (34.8%); PPL - 29 (42.0%); CPL - 11 (15.9%); ATPL - 2 (2.9%); Military - 1

(1.4%); Unspecified - 2 (2.9%). 62 participants reported logging Glider flight

time. Total Glider flight time ranged from 9 to 700 hours, with a mean of 61.79

hours (SD=111.52 hours) and a median of 18.50 hours. 45 participants reported

logging Powered Aircraft flight time. Total Powered Aircraft flight time ranged

from 1 to 29000 hours, with a mean of 929.82 hours (SD=4310.74 hours) and a

median of 70.00 hours.

II. Human Factors Training Programs

In order to establish the origin of attitudes toward Human Factors training, the

DND programs in place between 1995 and 2000 were obtained from RGS (A).

Essentially the same program was conducted since 1995 and was mainly

physiological in nature. The Human Factors training program from Transport

Canada (TC) was obtained from Aviation System Safety – Atlantic Headquarters

in Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada. TC commenced presenting their program in

1997; essentially the same program was in place between 1997 and 2000. The

program was mainly psychologically based and comprised of PDM material but

did include some physiology.

III. Flight Safety Program

The CF Flight Safety Program is aimed at preventing the accidental loss of

aviation resources through the use of education programs, continuous monitoring

of hazards, and the investigation and analysis of all aviation safety occurrences,

whilst recruiting the full commitment of every person involved with aviation

operations (DND, 1999). DND’s Flight Safety program manual, Flight safety for

the Canadian Forces (A-GA-135-001/AA-001) (1999) was obtained from the

Standards Officer at 405 Squadron (SQN) at CF 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova

Scotia, Canada under authority of the Directorate of Flight Safety (DFS) in

16

National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The Flight

Safety directives for the Air Cadet Gliding Program are contained in Chapter 12 of

Flight safety for the Canadian Forces (A-GA-135-001/AA-001) (1999) and were

stated by DFS to have been essentially the same over the years 1995 to 2000.

IV. Air Cadet Aircraft Occurrence Reports

In order to gain a more in-depth knowledge of the type of incidents and accidents

occurring in the RCACGP, access to occurrence data via the Flight Safety

Information System (FSIS) for trend analysis was sought and approved by DFS

at NDHQ. RGS (A) and DFS arranged for access to the nearest FSIS station at

the CF 12 Wing Flight Safety office in Shearwater, Nova Scotia. All occurrence

reports for RGS (A) from 1995-2000 were printed, and any reports from other

regions the author felt possessed useful flight safety data.

Procedure

A total of 375 questionnaires, with free-post return envelopes, were posted to all

those who qualified. 285 persons were posted the Cadet questionnaire and 90 persons

were posted the Officer questionnaire. Participants completed the questionnaire at their

leisure, and were advised that the questionnaire was completely voluntary and

anonymous. Of the 375 participants, 40 participants (20 officers and 20 cadets) were

posted two identical questionnaires and requested to complete and return them a week

apart. This data was used for test-retest data, which is used to attempt to establish

reliability.

A total of 70 questionnaires were returned representing an approximate overall

response rate of 19%. A total of 50 (18%) Cadet questionnaires and 20 (22%) Officer

questionnaires were returned. 39 (10%) questionnaires were returned by Canada Post

with incorrect addresses (this was not factored into the calculatation of the overall return

17

rate). 2 officers (10%) and 3 cadets (15%) responded to the request for test-retest data,

representing an approximate overall responses rate of 13%.

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RESULTS

After reversing negatively worded items, an overall Human Factors score was

obtained for each participant based on their responses to the 30 items contained in Part 1

- Flight Safety Attitudes of the Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire. Items were

reversed to allow high scores to indicate an ideal and realistic “Human Factors attitude”

and low scores an unrealistic “Human Factors attitude” or disagreement with Human

Factors and CRM concepts. The mean item score was 3.59 out of a maximum of 5.00

(SD = 0.25). This represented a reasonably “good” attitude toward Human Factors but

is not particularly high. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Overall Human Factors

score at RGS (A), which ranged from 2.93 to 4.27 with a median of 3.57

4.254.13

4.003.88

3.753.63

3.503.38

3.253.13

3.002.88

20

10

0

Std. Dev = .25

Mean = 3.59

N = 69.00

Figure 1. Distribution of the Mean Human Factors Total Score

From face value, similar content questions were grouped into 6 sub-totals to

allow for categorisation. Questions (see Appendix 3) were placed in the sub-totals:

“Flight Emergency Management Attitudes,” “Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue

Effects on Flight Performance,” “Accident Susceptibility,” “Perception of Human

Factors Training Relevancy,” “Pilot Selection,” and “Risks and Violations.” Similar

19

categories were presented in “The Structure of Cockpit Management Attitudes”

(Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990), which examined results of a study using the

CMAQ (Helmreich, et al., 1984). Through the use of sub-totals further and more in-

depth analysis of questions and scores could be carried out. The mean score, SD, range

and median was calculated and is shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Sub-total Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges & Medians

Item Mean SD Range Median

HF in the Mngt. of Flt. Emerg. 3.57 0.37 2.88 –

4.50

3.50

Rec. of the effects of Stress & Fatigue on Flt. Perf. 3.14 0.37 2.14 –

3.86

3.14

Accident Susceptibility 3.70 0.51 2.33 –

5.00

3.67

HF Trg. Relevancy 4.01 0.51 2.67 –

4.67

4.00

Pilot Selection 4.08 0.43 2.83 –

5.00

4.00

Risk & Violations 3.21 0.92 1.00 –

5.00

3.33

Reliability

Reliability refers to the concept of consistency in measurement. One type of

reliability is internal consistency, which is often indicated by performing the Cronbach's

Alpha test. A Cronbach's Alpha test was completed on this study, producing a reliability

20

coefficient of α= 0.55. Ideally an Alpha coefficient of 0.8 or greater is considered

reliable, however, alphas of .6 or lower are sometimes considered adequate (Orr &

Nendick, 2000; Aron & Aron, 1999). Despite the low Alpha coefficient for this study it

is consistent with results of other research in this area (Orr, 2000; Orr & Nendick, 2000;

Gregorich, et al., 1990). Orr (2000) obtained results from research using the FMAQ

version 2.1 (USA/Anglo) (Helmreich, Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich & Wiener, 1993) at

The University of Texas, showing Alpha coefficients ranging from α= 0.55 to α= 0.79

on seven sub-totals; an overall alpha was not reported. It should also be noted that to

date no reliability or validity information had been found during literature reviewed to

suggest that the FMAQ is a valid and reliable instrument (Orr, 2000).

Part 1, Flight Safety Attitudes, of the questionnaire contained 30 questions, 19 of

which were contained in the 25-question Simpson and Wiggins (1999) questionnaire.

All the questions contained in the sub-totals of “Flight Emergency Management

Attitudes,” “Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects on Flight Performance,” and

“Accident Susceptibility” were from the Simpson and Wiggins (1999) questionnaire.

Since most of the questions used in this study were from Simpson and Wiggins (1999)

and a reliability coefficient of α= 0.83 was reported, a Cronbach's Alpha test was

performed on the 19 Simpson & Wiggins (1999) questions as a measure of comparison.

The Cronbach's Alpha test was performed and produced a reliability coefficient of α=

0.13.

Item analysis, conducted for each of the 30 questions, examining the Alpha

reliability coefficient produced when each item, in turn, was removed from calculation

revealed no significant change in the Alpha coefficient. This indicated that, firstly, the

items were correctly reversed scored and, secondly, suggests that the questionnaire

measured more than one factor, which supported the concept of sub-totals.

A Cronbach's Alpha test was completed on the questions that composed each

sub-total and is presented in Table 2. It was revealed that the Alpha reliability

coefficients were low, however again consistent with other studies already cited. These

results further supported the concept of sub-totals and once again that the questionnaire

21

was measuring more then one factor. The “Risk and Violations” sub-total showed a

relatively good Alpha reliability coefficient, lending to its importance. Despite the

extremely low Alpha reliability coefficients in the sub-totals of “Flight Emergency

Management Attitudes,” “Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects on Flight

Performance,” and “Accident Susceptibility,” the “Flight Emergency Management”

Alpha was over two times higher than the total observed when the Cronbach's Alpha test

was performed on the 19 Simpson and Wiggins (1999) questions combined.

Table 2

Sub-total Alpha Reliabilities

Item Alpha

HF in the Mngt. of Flt. Emerg. .29

Rec. of the effects of Stress & Fatigue on Flt. Perf. -.12

Accident Susceptibility -.09

HF Trg. Relevancy .40

Pilot Selection .49

Risk & Violations .67

The most straightforward method for determining the reliability of test scores is

to administer the identical test twice to the same individuals. The correlation between

the two testings is another type of reliability known as test-retest reliability. Upon

examining the test-retest data provided by five participants (n=5), a correlation was

performed between the first Overall Human Factors score and the second revealing a

correlation coefficient (r) of r = 0.56. However, since n=5 it was not viewed as an

accurate representation of test-retest reliability.

22

Correlations

Correlations between each sub-total were preformed (see Table 3). Consistent

with other research (Orr, 2000; Orr & Nendick, 2000), the correlations showed only

weak relationships, however several showed significance at both the p<0.01 and p<0.05

levels.

Table 3

Sub-total Pearson Correlations

HF in the

Mngt. of Flt.

Emerg.

Rec. of the

effects of

Stress &

Fatigue on

Flt. Perf.

Accident

Susceptibility

HF Trg.

Relevancy

Pilot

Selection

Rec. of the

effects of

Stress &

Fatigue on

Flt. Perf.

-.068

Accident

Susceptibility

-.050 .123

HF Trg.

Relevancy

.387** -.003 .112

Pilot

Selection

.275* .165 .165 .188

Risk &

Violations

.319** -.270* -.024 .470** .309**

** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05

23

Many of the significant correlations presented in Table 3 were expected. The

fact that correlations such as the one between “Human Factors Training Relevancy” and

“Flight Emergency Management Attitudes” (r=.387, p<0.01), which suggested that a

pilot who had a low perception of the relevancy of Human Factors training felt that

Human Factors and CRM concepts did not play a role in managing in-flight emergencies

were both logical and expected results.

There was a significant negative correlation (r= -.27, p<0.05) between the

“Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects” and “Risks and Violations” observed

suggesting that pilots, who are more apt to take risks and commit violations, have a

greater recognition of the effects of stress and fatigue on flight performance. This was

an unexpected result, which prompted further investigation by the author.

Analysis of questions within the Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects sub-

total was completed. A significant positive correlation (r= 0.45, p<0.01) between Flight

Safety Attitudes Questions number 3 and 5 was observed. This suggested that pilots

who agreed with Question 3, “Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems

behind when in the operational environment” also agreed with Question 5, “I can always

deal with my stress.”

A significant positive correlation (r= 0.30, p<0.05) between Flight Safety

Attitudes Questions number 3 and 12 was observed. This suggested that pilots who

agreed with Question 3, “Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems

behind when in the operational environment” also agreed with Question 12, “I would

easily be able to tell if I were suffering from a physical problem that may affect my

performance.”

A significant positive correlation (r= 0.50, p<0.01) between Flight Safety

Attitudes Questions number 7 and 22 was also observed. This suggested that pilots who

agreed with Question 7, “In a critical situation, most people forget Human Factors

training and revert back to old, well-practiced ways” also agreed with Question 22, “In

24

critical situations, I would probably forget Human Factors training and revert back to my

old, well-practiced ways.”

Level of Agreement

An analysis of the level of agreement to Flight Safety Attitudes Questions

number 3 and 5 was examined and is presented in Figure 2. Question 3, “Effective

aviation personnel can leave personal problems behind when in the operational

environment” asked participants to consider the ideal standard for handling stress. It can

be seen that a majority (59.4%) of participants believed that the professional standard,

the standard to aspire to, was one of invulnerability to stress. Merritt and Helmreich

(1996) and Orr and Nendick (2000) cited similar findings for researching using the same

question from the FMAQ. A majority (47.8%) of participants agreed with Questions 5

“I can always deal with my stress” which supported the possible existence of an

invulnerability attitude towards stress at RGS (A).

47.8%

7.2%

27.5%

59.4%

24.6%

33.3%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

Q3 Q5

Agree Neutral Disagree�

Figure 2. Stress: The Professional Pilot and Me�

The level of agreement to Flight Safety Attitudes Question 12 was examined and

is presented in Figure 3. The majority of participants (52.2%) agreed with Question 12,

“I would easily be able to tell if I were suffering from a physical problem that may affect

25

my performance.” It has been established that humans are not reliable and effective

evaluators of their own stress and fatigue levels (Transport Canada, 1996b; Transport

Canada, 2000; Wilson, 1993). The high level of agreement with Question 12 again

supported the possible existence of an unrealistic and invulnerability attitude towards

stress and fatigue at RGS (A).

52.2%

18.8%

29.0%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

Q12

Agree Neutral Disagree�

Figure 3. Stressors and the Pilot

An analysis of the level of agreement to Flight Safety Attitudes Question 7 and

Question 22 was examined (see Figure 4) to uncover how pilots view themselves in

relation to other pilots. It was observed that 43.4 % of participants agreed with Question

7, “In a critical situation, most people forget Human Factors training and revert back to

old, well-practiced ways” however only 29% agreed with Question 22, “In critical

situations, I would probably forget Human Factors training and revert back to my old,

well-practiced ways.” Despite the high level of neutrality in responses to both questions

the results suggest that some participants held that most people would forget Human

Factors training and revert back to old, well-practiced ways but that they would not.

The significant positive correlation (r= 0.50, p<0.01) between Question 7 and 22 lends

support to this. These findings suggested a possible overconfident or macho attitude is

present at RGS (A).

26

29.0%

42.0%37.7%

43.4%

33.3%

14.5%

0.00%5.00%

10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%30.00%35.00%40.00%45.00%50.00%

Q7 Q22

Agree Neutral Disagree�

Figure 4. Human Factors and Flight Emergencies

�

An analysis of the level of agreement to Flight Safety Attitudes Question 23

“Overall, I feel that Human Factor training is useful” was examined (see Figure 5), and

showed an overwhelming 91% (approx.) of participants agreed. However,

approximately 72% of participants agreed with Question 13, “Human Factors are more

important to the Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) and officers in senior management

positions than it is to people at the operational level.” Though a high regard for the

usefulness of Human Factors training was observed, there was a feeling that Human

Factors were more important to the management, suggesting that there may again be a

macho, overconfident attitude present at RGS (A).

27

91.3%

7.2%

1.4%0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Q23

AgreeNeutralDisagree

�

Figure 5. Human Factors Training Usefulness

A t-test was performed on the Overall Human Factors Attitudes score and the six

sub-totals to identify differences between officers and cadets. This analysis revealed no

significant difference at the p<0.05 level in any of the items. The two groups were then

treated as being one for the remaining analysis. A t-test was performed on the Overall

Human Factors Attitudes score and the six sub-totals to identify differences between

males and females. This analysis revealed no significant difference at the p<0.05 level

in any of the items. A t-test was also performed on the Overall Human Factors Attitudes

score and the six sub-totals to identify differences between persons who reported

involvement in an incident or accident concerning human error. It was observed that

there was a significant difference in the Overall Human Factors Attitudes score (t (66) =

-2.35, p = 0.022), persons who responded that they had been involved in an incident or

accident concerning human error (n=26) had a higher mean score (3.69) than those who

reported no to the question (n=42) (mean score = 3.55). A significant difference was

also observed in the “Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects on Flight

Performance” score (t (66) = -2.61, p = 0.011), persons who responded that they had

been involved in an incident or accident concerning human error had a higher mean

score (3.28) than those who reported no to the question (mean score = 3.05). In all other

sub-totals no significant difference was observed.

28

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was undertaken to examine mean differences in

relation to the “highest” type of licence held by participants and the Overall Human

Factors Attitudes score and the six sub-totals. It was revealed that there was a

significant difference of p<0.009 only in the “Perception of Human Factors Training

Relevancy” score (see Figure 6).�

CPLPPLGlider

Mea

n of

HF

Trg.

Rel

evan

cy

4.3

4.2

4.1

4.0

3.9

3.8

3.7

�

Figure 6. Type of Licence and Human Factors Training Relevancy �

Correlations were performed between the Overall Human Factors Attitudes score

and the six sub-totals and the total Glider flight time and total Powered Aircraft flight

time. It was revealed that there was no significant relationship between any of the

attitude totals and total Glider flight time. This would suggest that there is no change in

attitudes with an increase in total Glider flight time. Table 4 presents the results of the

same correlation done in relation to total Powered Aircraft flight time. It was observed

that there were significant negative correlations at the p<0.01 level in relation to the

Overall Human Factors Total Score and the Perception of Human Factors Training

Relevancy. A significant negative correlation at the p<0.05 level in relation to “Pilot

Selection” was also observed. These significant correlations suggest that attitudes in

these areas become worse with an increase in Powered Aircraft flight time; in the other

29

groups no attitudinal change was observed. It should be noted that when an extreme

outlier (with regards to Total Powered Aircraft Flight time) was removed the Total

Powered Aircraft Flight time SD dropped to 523.52 hours. When the same correlations

were performed, no significant correlations were observed suggesting that attitudinal

change was not related to an increase in Total Powered Aircraft Flight time. The fact

that such as difference was made by the outlier’s extreme amount of flight hours could

be for several factors, such as culture and type of experience, however it would be pour

speculation with no evidence to base it on and is beyond the scope of this study. �

Table 4

Sub-total Pearson Correlations with Total Powered Aircraft Flight Time

Overall

Human

Factors

Total

Score

HF in the

Mngt. of

Flt. Emerg.

Rec. of

the effects

of Stress

& Fatigue

on Flt.

Perf.

Accident

Susceptibility

HF Trg.

Relevancy

Pilot

Selection

Risk &

Violations

Powered

Aircraft

flight

time.

-.382** -.270 .037 -.102 -.466** -.314* -.207

** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05

Factor Analysis

As a final analysis of the questionnaire, a Principle Components Factor Analysis

with a Varimax Rotation was performed extracting 6 Factors to verify the 6 sub-totals

the author determined based on item face value (see Table 5). The six-factor solution

was found to account for 49% of the variance (see Table 6).

30

Table 5

Rotated Component Matrix

Component

1 2 3 4 5 6

fsa20 .740

fsa23 .697

fsa19 .647 .331

fsa24 .560

fsa22 .551 -.341 .335 -.349

fsa07 .537 -.353

fsa29 .441

fsa15 -.395 .306

fsa16 .362

fsa12 .742

fsa08 .710

fsa03 .640

fsa05 .558

fsa02 .417 -.524

fsa06 .402

fsa13 .603 -.316

fsa04 .602

fsa25 .584 .324

fsa09 .453

fsa21 .347

fsa10 .725

fsa26 .318 .659

fsa01 .646

fsa28 .421 .473 .341

31

fsa17 .624

fsa11 -.561

fsa18 .547

fsa14 .373 -.520

fsa27 .798

fsa30 .704

Table 6

Total Variance Explained

Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings

Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %

1 3.466 11.554 11.554

2 2.658 8.860 20.414

3 2.373 7.910 28.324

4 2.354 7.848 36.172

5 2.040 6.799 42.971

6 1.827 6.089 49.060

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The Factor Analysis revealed more than one factor was measured using this

questionnaire, which would aid in explaining the low Alpha score. However, the sub-

totals uncovered in the Factor Analysis did not match sub-totals proposed by the author.

32

DISCUSSION

Attitudes at RGS (A)

The low sub-total SD results suggest that attitudes held at RGS (A) are relatively

consistent. Overall attitudes appear to be reasonably “good,” however through in-depth

analysis of the sub-totals and participant comments it can be seen that there may be

examples present of attitudes counter-productive to flight safety. Data suggesting the

presence of an unrealistic and invulnerability attitude towards the effects of stress and

fatigue on operational performance is presented several times. Firstly, the majority of

participants (59.4%) (see Figure 2) believed that the professional standard, the ‘right

stuff’ standard to aspire to, was one of invulnerability to stress. Secondly, the majority

(47.8%) (see Figure 2) of participants agreed that they could always deal with their

stress. Thirdly, the majority (52.2%) (see Figure 3) of participants felt they were

effective evaluators of their own stress and fatigue levels. Lastly, this is supported by

the comment of a participant, “I can honestly say though, that when I fly I can put

everything aside. I can’t tell you specifically how, but I and many other people probably

do it too.”

Perhaps the most shocking comment towards the state of attitudes are RGS (A)

was, “The attitudes of pilots at RGS (A) are at [a] point where people are going to start

having accidents because they don’t realize how real the danger is. The “fighter jock”

attitude in the civilian world does exist but only in a very small group of people. That

attitude has been long since gone and is looked badly upon by employers and fellow

pilots. RGS (A) is stuck in that rut because of a group of senior officers that keep

promoting a dangerous attitude.” This comment along with the findings that some

participants (see Figure 4) held that most people would forget Human Factors training

and revert back to old, well-practiced ways in an emergency but that they would not, and

that Human Factors were a greater concern for management lent support to the

possibility of macho attitudes existing at RGS (A). The negative and significant

correlation (r= -.27, p<0.05) between the “Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects

33

on Flight Performance” and “Risks and Violations,” suggests that pilots who were more

apt to take risks and commit violations had a greater recognition of the effects of stress

and fatigue on flight performance. This correlation suggest that these individuals may

hold that while most people’s performance is affected by stress and fatigue, their’s is

not. This lends further support to the possible existence of a macho and invulnerability

attitude present at RGS (A).

Participant comments suggested that there might also be an anti-authority

attitude present at RGS (A). When asked to name recommendations to improve flight

operations and training at RGS (A) a participant responded, “Ban pilots who won’t

follow the rules of the air (i.e., doing loops at 1000 ft or stalls at 500 ft).” This suggests

that there may be violations of applicable Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) and

RCACGP Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). One (only) participant commented

about the use of alcohol, “The mess [officer bar located in the officer’s residence] should

close by midnight to help ensure the 8 hours alcohol rule is followed.” This suggests the

possibility that alcohol consumption, by officers, may take place in a period less than the

Transport Canada (1996c) mandatory requirement of 8 hours before the commencement

of flight.

Culture at RGS (A)

The Dutch engineer and social scientist Geert Hofstede (1980 cited in Johnston,

1993), defined culture as a “collective programming of the mind.” The influence of

culture and society predominates in shaping social behaviour. Social influences impact

the manner in which we all come to accept uncritically various actions, attitudes,

practices, values, social arrangements, and definitions of “reality” as being normal and

beyond challenge (Johnston, 1993). Cross-cultural research has suggested that culture

pervades everything we do (Helmreich & Merritt, 1996).

Comments suggest that the manner in which Human Factors and the CF Flight

Safety program are viewed may be a component of the organisational culture of RGS

34

(A). One participant commented, “My view is that most people don’t directly recognize

the advantage of participating in HFT [Human Factors training]. HFT is perceived as a

“waste of time” by the membership…” Another participant commented that “The course

is more effective towards cadets; some instructors do not feel it applies to them.” Again,

this suggests that there appears to be an invulnerability, macho and anti-authority

attitude present at RGS (A).

If many of the officers perceive Human Factors and Flight Safety as a “waste of

time” and something that does not apply to them, than that is the professional standard

and the standard to ‘aspire’ to presented to cadets and others. Officers serve as role

models to their cadets and in most cases they are the only “mental model” of a

professional and successful aviator available to them. One participant commented that

“The staff should not participate in “do as I say, not as I do” in front of the glider

cadets.” This would suggest that there are possible unsafe acts and/or violations

committed by officers at RGS (A). This again lends support to the possibility of an anti-

authority attitude existing. The fact that results of the t-test to identify differences

between officers and cadets revealed no significant difference at the p<0.05 level in any

of the items suggests that these attitudes are being replicated by the cadets. Also, the

fact that there were no changes in attitudes with an increase in total Glider flight time

suggests that this may also be a product of the RGS (A) culture. The data suggests that

RGS (A) has a strong culture with components of macho, invulnerability, and anti-

authority attitudes.

Is this just a RGS (A) problem?

There is evidence to suggest that the attitudes observed at RGS (A) are not

necessarily unique to RGS (A) and are in fact inherent to the RCACGP, to varying

degrees in the aviation industry in general, and the culture of the ‘western world.’ The

selection process to become a candidate for the flying courses offered by the RCAC

program is very rigorous, requiring high performance in academics, interpersonal skills,

citizenship, and a demonstration of self-confidence, and determination. This process, in

35

its self, requires competitiveness. The course is very taxing, physiologically,

psychologically and emotionally, and again requires a high level of competitiveness,

flight performance and academics. Upon graduation there is a possible sense of an “I’m

the best of the best” in other words a macho attitude. When returning to home squadron,

graduates are often seen as the “heroic person with the ‘right stuff,’” which may serve to

breed and perpetuate these attitudes.

The “Top Gun,” “Fighter Jock” image is possibility inherent to the military

structure, the flight suit uniform and wings. The graduates of this very selective and

intense program have every right to wear their wings and uniform with pride, after all

they have well and truly earned them, but it is possible that some of the symbols of the

heroically self reliant, ‘white scarf blowing in the wind’ stereotyped pilot from days past

(Merritt, 1993) are indeed part of the culture of the RCACGP and the military

environment (to varying degrees) and not unique to RGS (A).

The analysis of one particular RCACGP accident on 14 October 1996 at North

Battleford, Saskatchewan, supports the possibility that these attitudes are not RGS (A)

specific. The glider sustained accident category damage when the Aircraft Commander,

also the Pilot Flying (PF), crashed whilst conducting an illegal ‘penetration type landing

approach’ (DND, 1996; DND, 1997). Data stemming from the investigation (DND,

1996; DND, 1997) suggests that an impulsive attitude was presented when the PF

recognised the aircraft was too high on approach for landing and decided to conduct a

‘penetration approach’ to expedite descent. A possible macho attitude was presented

when despite concerns raised by the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) that the approach was

unusual the PF continued and ignored the concerns. The fact that the PF knowingly and

wilfully violated published applicable CARs and RCACGP SOPs by performing the

‘penetration approach,’ (DND, 1997) suggests that there was an anti-authority attitude

present.

Hofstede’s (1980, cited in Johnston, 1993; Merritt, 1997) cross-cultural study

produced an Individualism-Collectivism (IND) dimension which defined the extent by

36

which individual’s behaviours were influenced and defined by groups. In ‘western’

countries (i.e., Australia, Britain, Canada, USA) individuals seem to prefer self-

sufficiency (high IND) and in ‘eastern’ countries (i.e., China, India, Japan, Korea)

individuals seem to recognise their interdependent roles and obligations to the group

(low IND). A recent cross-cultural study (Merritt, 1997) has revealed elevated

individualist scores present in pilots around the world even in the traditionally ‘eastern’

cultures, suggesting that a macho attitude, to varying degrees, is inherent to the piloting

profession. This further supports that attitudes observed at RGS (A) as not necessarily

unique the school.

Operational Environment

Comments by participants suggest that RGS (A) operates in a highly stressful

and very demanding environment. A participant commented, “The student pilots crew

in very warm Wx [weather] and get very tired (long term also) and we are expected to

give Max potential. The human body isn’t made to sprint behind a glider for an hour

and then fly.” The stressful operating environment at RGS (A) may be a contributing

factor to attitudes observed. Stress can be physiological or psychological and is by

definition a dynamic state within an organism in response to a demand for adaptation

(Hodgson, 2001). Personnel at RGS (A) may cope with the stresses of the operating

environment by adopting invulnerability and macho attitudes towards stress and fatigue.

Since this environment is inherent to the RCACGP similar attitudes to those observed at

RGS (A) may exist throughout the program.

Organisational and Political Pressures

Organisational pressures and fallible decisions made at the organisational level

well before an accident occurred have been cited by many accident investigations as

possible contributing factors to accidents (Helmreich, 1992; Harle, 1994; ICAO, 1993).

Views on organisational pressures at RGS (A) varied widely. One participant

commented, “In general (in my experience) compared to civilian flying Ops [operations]

37

I’ve been involved in, RGS (A) and military style Ops are the ideal from a safety and

“pressures” view point. As the goal is not to get out and make money. Any safety

concern I ever had gliding pale in comparison to what I have seen in regular commercial

flying.” However there were many more participants who stated that the system was too

pressed. Participants called for “Less pressure to finish the required number of flights in

a summer. The system is too ‘stressed’ and flying is pressed, just to finish on time.”

Besides suggestions of organisational pressures present at RGS (A) one

participant suggests that these organisational pressures may stem for political pressures

of a higher level than RGS (A) (i.e., the ACLC and/or the DND), “I think the biggest

factor that upper management of RGS (A) as well as any other flying organisation

should get from this questionnaire is when to recognize fatigue and when the system is

pressed and pressured to finish a set # [number] of missions that is dictated by political

rather than operational factors. Too many flights to complete means resources are

stretched to the limit both operationally, and personally. Reduce the numbers [of cadets

on the Gliding Scholarship Course] and the “passing”.” This comment also suggests

that political pressures may be present to ensure the successful graduation of cadets from

the Gliding Scholarship Course in the allotted six weeks even though they may not meet

the licencing requirements for a Glider Pilot Licence dictated by Transport Canada.

Line Management and Peer Pressure to fly at RGS (A)

Besides the participant suggestions of political and upper management pressures

to fly at RGS (A), there are comments suggesting a wide variance in pressures from

instructors and fellow cadets to fly. One participant commented, “…I was always asked

if I was okay to fly (in case I was tired, sick, etc.), before told to get in a glider. I think

it’s important the pilot feels comfortable flying, and RGS (A) seemed to understand

that.” Despite this good example of instructor assessment of their student’s fitness to

fly, there are some disturbing comments of the contrary. One participant commented,

“…I know I have flown when I probably shouldn’t have, mostly because of what an

instructor would’ve said, or what other cadets would have said.” Another participant

commented that it was important that “… it’s okay to say “I can’t fly now,” as some

38

instructors/cadets roll their eyes, and treat it as an inconvenience. They [RGS (A)] need

to realize that it’s easier for instructors to re-make the flying order than to pull a

smashed glider out of a tree.” These comments also suggest that macho and

invulnerability attitudes towards stress are a cultural norm at RGS (A).

Human Factors Training

Participant comments and statical data suggest that the Human Factors training at

RGS (A) conducted by both TC and DND may be a contributing factor to attitudes at

RGS (A). Though there were some positive and realistic comments that Human Factors

training was useful, there were some who viewed it as ‘common sense:’ “As a friend of

mine once said, “they take a little bit of common sense and stretch it into a briefing”.”

Another stated, “Sometimes seems that flying is not that important but CRM more

important than flying. Common sense would help. Working as a Caddy in the old days

was as good as the CRM course.” One must point out that if ‘common sense’ was so

common, then it could be quantified, also what is ‘common sense’ to one person may

not be to another, thus ‘common sense’ is not always common.

The adequacy of the Human Factors training programs at RGS (A) must be

questioned. One participant enthusiastically commented, “The [Human Factors] training

at RGS (A) is very adequate in that we took a whole day off to just sit through a very

informative flight safety briefing.” Another commented, “The program was far too

condensed. Too short! It was just a movie and a lecture. More testing is required.”

These comments suggest that the Human Factors training program is a “one-off deal.” If

participants see this training as such then the attitude of “it’s just something you have to

do to satisfy TC and DND” will continue and the effectiveness of the program will

continue to be questionable. It is interesting to note the call for a Human Factors testing

program. The topic of a pass/fail Human Factors and CRM proficiency system has been

a very controversial one in the airline industry for years, and will continue to be,

however the calls for such a program coming from pilots of this relatively low flight

time level is encouraging.

39

The method of delivery of the Human Factors training program came under fire

by several participants. One participant commented, “I feel that the program is not

effective. While the Human Factors training is LONG and thorough I do not feel that it

applies to the gliding program, it’s more of a PPL or CPL type program (some of it

DOES apply, [however] it requires sorting through the rest to try and find it).” Another

participant commented, “They teach a good course in the theory but they should teach in

a way you can apply it out in the field, then you can better recognise and deal with HF

[Human Factors].” These comments may serve to explain why there was no change in

attitudes with an increase in glider and powered flight time. If participants cannot

conceptualise how to utilise the information presented in lectures on the line, than

transfer to the line of these concepts will be minimal.

Many participants commented on the applicability of some of the content used in

the Human Factors training program, “The PDM [Pilot Decision Making] seminars

would be more effective if tied specifically to glider flying problem scenarios and

situations.” This may aid in explaining why there were no attitudinal changes with flight

time but there was with the achievement of various licences. The ANOVA tests in

relation to type of licences held, revealed that participants whose “highest” licence was a

PPL had a better perception of the relevancy of Human Factors training then participants

with only a Glider licence (see Figure 6). Besides possible cultural influences at RGS

(A), the fact that the PPL Human Factors training syllabus utilises more relevant aircraft

and situational examples suggest that this approach is more effective. This also suggests

that this is vital in the understanding and transference of Human Factors and CRM

concepts to the line. The fact that there are no significant differences between the PPL

and CPL Human Factors syllabuses (Doiron, 2001) may serve to explain why there was

no difference observed between PPL and CPL.

The content of the Human Factors training program may serve to explain the

homogeneousness of attitudes between officers and cadets. One participant commented,

“…I feel the cadets have a more positive attitude towards it [Human Factors training]

40

than the officers. The officers see the same videos and presentations from Transport

Canada each year. It being repetitious causes the officers to loose interest in the

seminars. It being fresh and new to the cadets they will tend to listen more.” If the

training program is causing the officers to loose interest, then they are not advancing

their understanding of Human Factors concepts. Furthermore, if others, including

cadets, see that officers are not interested in such training it may transfer to the cadets,

which seems to be the case.

There are comments that suggest that the possible organisational and political

pressures present at RGS (A) may affect the delivery, application and thus line

transference of Human Factors concepts. One participant commented, “All the training

was very rushed and more emphasis was placed on finishing ASAP. Not enough was

placed on Human Factors Training.” Another participant commented, “Human Factors

plays the biggest role, in the classroom when we take that course. It’s not the biggest

priority in flight operations.” This comment also suggest the possible existence of the

‘Honeymoon’ phenomenon described by Taylor and Robertson (1994) where

participants in Human Factors and CRM training seem, to the presenter, to accept and

embrace the concepts but fail to transfer them to the line because they feel they are not

important.

Involvement in Aircraft Occurrences

A t-test indicated significant attitudinal differences between persons who

reported involvement in an occurrence concerning human error and those who did not.

The t-test revealed that those who reported involvement in an occurrence had a better

Overall Human Factors attitude and a better recognition of the effects of stress and

fatigue on performance. Similar findings were revealed in the Simpson and Wiggins

(1999) study on which this questionnaire is based. These findings suggest that exposure

to hazardous or unsafe experiences through such platforms as high-fidelity flight

simulators like those used in Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) may be as beneficial

41

in improving attitudes in GA and ab initio flight training as in the commercial airline

industry.

Limitations of Current Research

Overall the reliability of the questionnaire appeared to be low. However, this

illustrates that it is measuring more than one factor. The Factor Analysis results and the

concept of subgroups proposed by Gregorich et al. (1990) also support this. The CMAQ

and the FMAQ have a wide range of reliability scores (Orr, 2000, Orr & Nendick, 2000,

Bevitt, 2000), which suggests that the questionnaires are unstable warranting further

research into them.

“Validity of a test is the extent to which it measures what it claims to measure”

(Gregory, 2000, p.96). Validity is also applied to entire studies, when it refers to the

appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of conclusions drawn from the results

(Aron & Aron, 1999; Gregory, 2000). Psychometricians argue that if a measure is not

reliable it cannot be valid. However, despite the low reliability score obtained in this

study, the questionnaire does possess components of validity. The questions appearing

on the questionnaire appear to be valid, thus the questionnaire possesses face validity. A

recent study at The University of Texas (Sexton & Klinect, 2001) concluded that results

obtained on the FMAQ were valid predictors of cockpit performance, thus suggesting

the FMAQ possesses predictive validity. Since the questionnaire used in this study is

based on the FMAQ it suggests that it may possess predictive validity as well. Recently,

several psychometricians have introduced the controversial concept that a test is valid if

it serves a purpose (i.e., identifying areas in which remedial training is required)

(Gregory, 2000). This questionnaire was designed to establish possible areas in which

training could be improved, thus based on this controversial concept of test validity; this

questionnaire would indeed be valid. Although this questionnaire does posses attributes

of validity, research into the development of a highly reliable and valid questionnaire to

be used as the mainstay of research in this area is required.

42

The value of a questionnaire can only be as good as the design of the questions

(Hawkins, 1993). A participant commented, “I doubt that a survey like this will be able

to accurately portray Flight Safety Attitudes. Pilots are smarter than they seem and will

answer questions based on their attitude…” This questionnaire was designed with the

anticipation that participants would respond based on their attitude and numerous

research papers using similar questionnaires suggest this is the case (Sexton & Klinect,

2001; Orr, 2000; Orr & Nendick, 2000; Gregorich et al., 1990; Merritt & Helmreich,

1996; Simpson & Wiggins, 1999). However, some possible limitations of the

questionnaire may lie in the wording of some items and the rating scale used. Question

3, “Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems behind when in the

operational environment” asked participants to consider the ideal standard for handling

stress. This question may be perceived as being ambiguous. One would hope that a

professional pilot would only fly if personal problems were not affecting their

performance, however it is impossible to escape the pressures and problems of everyday

life. This study used the 5–point Likert-type rating scale, ranging from 1 (strongly

agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) with 3 being neutral. A particular problem with providing

a neutral or middle option is that it gives the participant the possibility to take the easy or

middle way out when they have an opinion but prefer not to express it. Or it may be a

true expression of a middle or no opinion (Hawkins, 1993). Another common bias with

this type of scale is that people are often reluctant to select extremes and tend towards

the middle (the error of central tendency) (Hawkins, 1993).

Other possible limitations in this study may be the small sample size and low

response rate, which may restrict the statistical significance and validity of the findings,

which may also limit the appropriateness, and validity of some of the generalisations

made to other schools within the RCACGP. Furthermore the sample may not be a true

representation of the domain population.

43

Conclusion

This study was primarily undertaken to examine the state of attitudes toward

flight safety held in the RCACGP, in particular RGS (A). There is ample evidence to

support the existence of several hazardous attitudes counter-productive to flight safety at

RGS (A) and to suggest their existence throughout the RCACGP. This study has also

shown that there may be several contributing factors to the development and

maintenance of such attitudes, such as national, organisational and professional culture,

operational environment, organisational and political pressure and the content and

delivery of Human Factors training programs. Because of the global scarcity of female

pilots (Merritt, 1997) very little research has been done in relation to their flight safety

attitudes, this study also attempted to identify attitudinal differences between male and

female pilots. No significant difference at the p<0.05 level in any of the attitudinal

scores were revealed between males and females, suggesting that flight safety attitudes

are consistent across both sexes. Results indicted no significant differences in attitudes

between officers and cadets either. This would suggest that the frequency of exposure to

the same Human Factors training does not necessarily change attitudes for the “better.”

Also this study suggests that more flight experience does not necessarily produce a

“better” ‘Human Factors pilot.’ The results obtained in this study also suggest that the

achievement of various pilot licences does influence the perception of the relevancy of

Human Factors training. However, this may be traced directly to the content of the

Human Factors training programs. Finally, consistent with results obtained by Simpson

and Wiggins (1999), the involvement in an aircraft incident or accident seems to affect

attitudes toward flight safety.

The results of this study suggest that RGS (A) is deficient in some aspects of

operation, however this may be common across organisations. The vast majority of

RGS (A)’s operational performance is adequate or better, as illustrated in the low

occurrence rate. It is encouraging to see that the CF Flight Safety program is embraced

and ‘sold’ from the top down, recruiting the full commitment of anyone involved with

aircraft operations (DND, 1999; Baril, 1999). This is imperative in creating and

44

sustaining a positive safety culture. This may explain why the RCACGP and RGS (A)

have such a good safety record. This example should be migrated to other sectors of the

aviation industry. However since the DND, and thus the RGS (A), Flight Safety

program (DND, 1999; Baril, 1999) is built primarily on the basis of vigilance in all of its

personnel, it creates and presents a possible problem. A level of vigilance is required to

aid in maintaining the effectiveness and safety of operations, however personnel cannot

be vigilant whilst over-stressed, fatigued and pressured (United States Navy, 1991;

Transport Canada, 1996b; Transport Canada, 2000; Wilson, 1993). Furthermore, error

cannot be eliminated if personnel are sufficiently vigilant, and conscientious, the truth is

that vigilant and conscientious personnel make mistakes even in tasks in which they are

highly skilled (Dismukes & Tullo, 2000). If RGS (A) and DND are serious about

improving safety it must recognise that personnel errors and attitudes are symptoms, and

that symptoms can only be ameliorated by treating the underlying causes.

The Commanding Officer, the Deputy Commanding Officer, and members of

RGS (A) and DFS should be commended and viewed with the upmost respect for their

openness and enthusiastic support of this study. It is highly unusual for an organisation,

particularly the military, to provide full and unrestricted assess, to the material discussed

in this report, to an ‘outside’ organisation. Despite some disturbing findings it is

abundantly clear that they are willing to improve their operations, which is a major and

fundamental step in the right direction. DFS and RGS (A) should however be cautioned

that more Human Factors training is not necessarily more effective in changing flight

safety attitudes for the better and thus improving flight safety. The vehicle and method

in which this training is conducted is vital in its understanding and line transference.

Implications for Future Research

The results associated with this analysis echo the need for research and

development of Human Factors and CRM training in all areas of the aviation industry.

Such research and development should be directed at integrating Human Factors and

CRM concepts into all aspects of flight training, possibly whilst taking advantage of

45

such platforms as LOFT. This study also illustrates that ‘off-the-shelf’ training

programs may not be effective and that training programs should be tailored to the

organisation, its aircraft, its operations, and its members. However, this can only be

done through in-depth and unbiased analysis of the organisation’s needs, by utilising a

valid and reliable instrument to gauge such information. This study stresses the need to

question existing mainstays (i.e., the CMAQ and the FMAQ) and establish and develop

a more valid and reliable instrument.

Because the entire RCACGP utilises essentially the same Human Factors

training program, SOPs, flight safety program, training for the same licencing standard,

operates the same aircraft in similar environments and utilises the same selection

process, there is a high possibility that attitudes observed at RGS (A) are present at some

level throughout the RCACGP. Future research could be aimed at establishing the state

of attitudes in each RGS, identifying possible contributing factors to attitudes found and

prescribing and implementing appropriate remedial training. Further studies may also

transfer this to other sectors of the aviation industry including military and civilian.

46

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Appendix 1

Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire –

Officer Flightcrew Staff

1

Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Officer Flightcrew Staff Part 1: Flight Safety Attitudes For each of the following questions, please circle the response that best reflects your personal attitudes. 1. There is no time for human factors when split-second decisions need to be made.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 2. I have never let physical problems influence my performance in the operational environment.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 3. Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems behind when in the operational environment.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 4. The successful management of a critical situation is due solely to operational experience.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

5. I can always deal with my stress.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 6. In critical situations, I find it easy to come up with options and choose between them.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 7. In a critical situation, most people forget human factors training and revert back to old, well-practiced

ways. 1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 8. In an unfamiliar situation, I would not hesitate to ask for help.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 9. Most aviation personnel get into trouble because they don't know their own limits.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

2

10. I have no time for human factors in critical situations.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 11. Accidents generally occur because people do not follow the rules.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 12. I would easily be able to tell if I were suffering from a physical problem that may affect my performance.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 13. Human Factors are more important to the Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) and officers in senior management positions than it is to people at the operational level.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 14. There have been times when I have made serious mistakes that have affected my operational performance.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 15. Most people do not know how to monitor their physical responses.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 16. High quality pilots have a natural talent that cannot be instilled through training.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 17. Most people think accidents will never happen to them.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 18. Professionals in the aviation industry should be able to deal effectively with critical situations.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 19. Standard Operational Procedures are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply

to them and the situation.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

3

20. Federal Regulations are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply to them and the situation.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 21. Most people can't manage their stress or fatigue levels effectively.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 22. In critical situations, I would probably forget human factors and revert back to my old, well-practiced ways.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 23. Overall, I feel that Human Factor training is useful.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

24. Most people overall, feel that Human Factor training is useful.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 25. Pilot selection should be based solely on technical knowledge.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 26. Pilot selection should be based solely on skill.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 27. Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge and skill.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 28. Pilot selection should be based solely on interpersonal skills.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 29. Successful aviation professionals take risks when the situation calls for it.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 30. Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge, skill and interpersonal skills.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

4

Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Officer Flightcrew Staff Part 2: Satisfaction and General Perceptions of Safety at RGS (A) Section A: Satisfaction at RGS (A) Please answer the following by writing a number from the corresponding rating scale in the space provided next to each item.

1

2 3 4 5

Very High

High Adequate Low Very Low

Please rate your LEVEL OF SATISFACTION with: ___ 1. Ground School ___ 2. Flight line relevance of training material ___ 3. Instructor skill ___ 4. Flight Training overall ___ 5. Availability of Operations Manuals ___ 6. Quality of Checklists ___ 7. Quality of Operations Manuals ___ 8. Availability of Checklists ___ 9. Disciplinary policy and enforcement ___ 10. Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) availability ___ 11. Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) availability Please rate the QUALITY OF TEAMWORK with: ___ 1. Instructors ___ 2. Launch Control Officer (LCO) ___ 3. Maintenance ___ 4. Tow Pilots ___ 5. UFSO ___ 6. CFI ___ 7. Standards ___ 8. Senior management at RGS (A) Section B: General Perceptions of Safety at RGS (A) Please refer to the rating scale below when answering the next set of items.

1

2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree

Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

___ 1. The officers in Flight Operations listen to us and care about our concerns. ___ 2. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding safety procedures and practices. ___ 3. Check Airmen (ie: Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) and Standards Officer) are respected in RGS (A). ___ 4. I feel comfortable going to the CFI’s office to discuss problems or operational issues. ___ 5. I feel comfortable going to the UFSO’s office to discuss problems or operational issues. ___ 6. My last flight check was a positive learning experience.

5

___ 7. I am encouraged by my supervisors and fellow officers to report any unsafe conditions I may observe. ___ 8. RGS (A) practices the highest maintenance standards. ___ 9. Flight Operations staff constructively deal with problem pilots. ___ 10. Check Airmen hold all pilots to the same standard. ___ 11. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to management. ___ 12. Our Instructors have a good understanding of flight line operations. ___ 13. Senior management at RGS (A) are doing a good job. ___ 14. All personnel (including Tow Pilots, etc.) should be included in crew briefings at the start of the duty day. ___ 15. Personnel that I fly with comply with RGS (A)’s Standard Operational Procedures (SOP’s). ___ 16. Personnel that I fly with comply with Federal Regulations. ___ 17. RGS (A) has a positive safety culture. ___ 18. I am proud to work for RGS (A). ___ 19. I intend to work again at RGS (A). ___ 20. I like my job. ___ 21. Our training has prepared us to work together as a well-coordinated team. Section C: 1. Please comments on your perception of the effectiveness of Human Factors Training and the Flight

Safety Program at RGS (A). 2. Please comment on your perception of the role Human Factors training plays in flight operations. 3. Please name your top three recommendations to improve flight operations and training at RGS (A).

6

Part 3- Background Information Basic Information: Age ______ Gender (M or F) ______ Years at RGS (A)_______ Glider Year: ______ Primary Language (English or French) ___________ Flight Experience: Years in Aviation________ Have you ever been involved in an accident or incident concerning human error? _________ Glider or Powered A/C: ________________ Types of Licence(s) Held _____________________________________________________ Types of Rating(s) Held _______________________________________________________ Present Flight Status: Is your present flight status active (Yes/No): ______ If No, Why (ie; Expired/ Unable to “hold” a Medical, $$, etc.): ___________________________ If Yes: Military (Regular/Reserve): ____ Cadet: ___ Civilian ___

Current Position: _________________ Flight Time (approx): Approx. Glider Flight Time: Total ______ PIC ______ Dual ______ Instructor _____

Number of Flights: _____________ Type(s) flown: ____________________________________ Approx. “Powered” A/C Flight Time:

Total ______ PIC ______ Dual ______ Multi _____ IFR ______ Cadet Glider Tow______ Number of Flights: _________ Type(s) flown: _________________________________________ Positions held at RGS (A): (Check Yes/No to all that apply) Have you worked at a Spring/Fall Famil Site in the Atlantic Region? (Yes/No) ________ If Yes, Where and When: ___________________________ Have you ever been a Famil Pilot at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? __________ If Yes, Where and When: ________________ Have you ever been a Glider Instructor at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? ________ If Yes, When: ____________

7

Have you ever been a Tow Pilot at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? _________ If Yes, When: ____________ Have you ever been a Launch Control Officer at RGS (A) (Yes/No) ______

If Yes, Where and When: ______________ Have you ever been a Flight Commander at RGS (A) (Yes/No) _______ Have you ever been a Deputy Flight Commander at RGS (A) (Yes/No) ________ Have you ever been a Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) at RGS (A) (Yes/No) _____________ Human Factors Training • Please answer the following regarding Human Factors training with Yes or No and elaborate where

requested. 1) Have you completed Human Factors Training as part of the Glider/PPL/CPL/ATPL syllabus?

(Yes/No) _______ If yes, what licence(s) _____________________________________________

2) Have you completed Human Factors Training with the Department of National Defence (DND)? (Yes/No) _________ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

3) Have you completed Human Factors Training with Transport Canada (TC)? (Yes/No) ________ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

4) Have you completed Human Factors Training with any other company or organisation? (Yes/No) _______ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

Please specify the company or organisation: __________________________________

5) How would you rate your Human Factors knowledge?

Basic _____ Intermediate _____ Advanced _____

8

• Detail any Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) courses/seminars attended

Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Your participation is appreciated! COMMENTS

Appendix 2 Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire –

Cadets (Present & Former)

1

Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Cadets (Present & Former) Part 1: Flight Safety Attitudes For each of the following questions, please circle the response that best reflects your personal attitudes. 1. There is no time for human factors when split-second decisions need to be made.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 2. I have never let physical problems influence my performance in the operational environment.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 3. Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems behind when in the operational environment.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 4. The successful management of a critical situation is due solely to operational experience.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

5. I can always deal with my stress.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 6. In critical situations, I find it easy to come up with options and choose between them.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 7. In a critical situation, most people forget human factors training and revert back to old, well-practiced

ways. 1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 8. In an unfamiliar situation, I would not hesitate to ask for help.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 9. Most aviation personnel get into trouble because they don't know their own limits.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

2

10. I have no time for human factors in critical situations.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 11. Accidents generally occur because people do not follow the rules.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 12. I would easily be able to tell if I were suffering from a physical problem that may affect my performance.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 13. Human Factors are more important to the Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) and officers in senior management positions than it is to people at the operational level.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 14. There have been times when I have made serious mistakes that have affected my operational performance.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 15. Most people do not know how to monitor their physical responses.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 16. High quality pilots have a natural talent that cannot be instilled through training.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 17. Most people think accidents will never happen to them.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 18. Professionals in the aviation industry should be able to deal effectively with critical situations.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 19. Standard Operational Procedures are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply

to them and the situation.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

3

20. Federal Regulations are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply to them and the situation.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 21. Most people can't manage their stress or fatigue levels effectively.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 22. In critical situations, I would probably forget human factors and revert back to my old, well-practiced ways.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 23. Overall, I feel that Human Factor training is useful.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

24. Most people overall, feel that Human Factor training is useful.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 25. Pilot selection should be based solely on technical knowledge.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 26. Pilot selection should be based solely on skill.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 27. Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge and skill.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 28. Pilot selection should be based solely on interpersonal skills.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 29. Successful aviation professionals take risks when the situation calls for it.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 30. Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge, skill and interpersonal skills.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

4

Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire – Cadet (Present &Former) Part 2: Satisfaction and General Perceptions of Safety at RGS (A) Section A: Satisfaction at RGS (A) Please answer the following by writing a number from the corresponding rating scale in the space provided next to each item.

1

2 3 4 5

Very High

High Adequate Low Very Low

Please rate your LEVEL OF SATISFACTION with: ___ 1. Ground School ___ 2. Flight line relevance of training material ___ 3. Instructor skill ___ 4. Flight Training overall ___ 5. Availability of Operations Manuals ___ 6. Quality of Checklists ___ 7. Quality of Operations Manuals ___ 8. Availability of Checklists ___ 9. Disciplinary policy and enforcement ___ 10. Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) availability ___ 11. Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) availability Section B: General Perceptions of Safety at RGS (A) Please refer to the rating scale below when answering the next set of items.

1

2 3 4 5

Strongly Agree

Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree

___ 1. The officers in Flight Operations listen to us and care about our concerns. ___ 2. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding safety procedures and practices. ___ 3. Check Airmen (ie: Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) and Standards Officer) are respected in RGS (A). ___ 4. I feel comfortable going to the CFI’s office to discuss problems or operational issues. ___ 5. I feel comfortable going to the UFSO’s office to discuss problems or operational issues. ___ 6. My last flight check was a positive learning experience. ___ 7. I am encouraged by my supervisors and fellow cadets to report any unsafe conditions I may observe. ___ 8. RGS (A) practices the highest maintenance standards. ___ 9. Flight Operations staff constructively deal with problem pilots. ___ 10. Check Airmen hold all pilots to the same standard. ___ 11. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to management. ___ 12. Our Instructors have a good understanding of flight line operations. ___ 13. Senior management at RGS (A) are doing a good job. ___ 14. All personnel (including Tow Pilots, etc.) should be included in crew briefings at the start of the duty day. ___ 15. Personnel that I fly with comply with RGS (A)’s Standard Operational Procedures (SOP’s).

5

___ 16. Personnel that I fly with comply with Federal Regulations. ___ 17. RGS (A) has a positive safety culture. ___ 18. I am proud to be a cadet of RGS (A). ___ 19. I intend to work at RGS (A). Section C: 1. Please comments on your perception of the effectiveness of Human Factors Training and the Flight

Safety Program at RGS (A). 2. Please comment on your perception of the role Human Factors training plays in flight operations. 3. Please name your top three recommendations to improve flight operations and training at RGS (A).

6

Part 3- Background Information Basic Information: Age ______ Gender (M or F) ______ Years at RGS (A)_______ Glider Year: ______ Primary Language (English or French) ___________ Flight Experience: Years in Aviation________ Have you ever been involved in an accident or incident concerning human error? _________ Glider or Powered A/C: ________________ Types of Licence(s) Held _____________________________________________________ Types of Rating(s) Held _______________________________________________________ Present Flight Status: Is your present flight status active (Yes/No): ______ If No, Why (ie; Expired/ Unable to “hold” a Medical, $$, etc.): ___________________________ If Yes: Military (Regular/Reserve): ____ Cadet: ___ Civilian ___

Current Position: _________________ Flight Time (approx): Approx. Glider Flight Time: Total ______ PIC ______ Dual ______ Instructor _____

Number of Flights: _____________ Type(s) flown: ____________________________________ Approx. “Powered” A/C Flight Time:

Total ______ PIC ______ Dual ______ Multi _____ IFR ______ Cadet Glider Tow______ Number of Flights: _________ Type(s) flown: _________________________________________ Positions held at RGS (A): (Check Yes/No to all that apply) Have you worked at a Spring/Fall Famil Site in the Atlantic Region? (Yes/No) ________ If Yes, Where and When: ___________________________ Have you ever been a Famil Pilot at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? __________ If Yes, Where and When: ________________ Have you ever been a Glider Instructor at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? ________ If Yes, When: ____________

7

Have you ever been a Tow Pilot at RGS (A) (Yes/No)? _________ If Yes, When: ____________ Have you ever been a Launch Control Officer at RGS (A) (Yes/No) ______

If Yes, Where and When: ______________ Have you ever been a Flight Commander at RGS (A) (Yes/No) _______ Have you ever been a Deputy Flight Commander at RGS (A) (Yes/No) ________ Have you ever been a Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) at RGS (A) (Yes/No) _____________

Human Factors Training • Please answer the following regarding Human Factors training with Yes or No and elaborate where

requested. 1) Have you completed Human Factors Training as part of the Glider/PPL/CPL/ATPL syllabus?

(Yes/No) _______ If yes, what licence(s) _____________________________________________

2) Have you completed Human Factors Training with the Department of National Defence (DND)? (Yes/No) _________ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

3) Have you completed Human Factors Training with Transport Canada (TC)? (Yes/No) ________ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

4) Have you completed Human Factors Training with any other company or organisation? (Yes/No) _______ If Yes, Where and When: _____________________________________

Please specify the company or organisation: __________________________________

5) How would you rate your Human Factors knowledge?

Basic _____ Intermediate _____ Advanced _____

8

• Detail any Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) courses/seminars attended

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your participation is appreciated! COMMENTS

Appendix 3

Flight Safety Attitudes Questions per

Sub-total groups

RGS(A) Flight Safety Attitudes Questionnaire Part 1: Flight Safety Attitudes Flight Emergency Management Attitudes Question Number

Question

1 There is no time for human factors when split-second decisions need to be made. 4 The successful management of a critical situation is due solely to operational experience. 6 -- R In critical situations, I find it easy to come up with options and choose between them. 7 In a critical situation, most people forget human factors training and revert back to old, well-

practiced ways. 8 -- R In an unfamiliar situation, I would not hesitate to ask for help. 10 I have no time for human factors in critical situations. 18 -- R Professionals in the aviation industry should be able to deal effectively with critical situations. 22 In critical situations, I would probably forget human factors and revert back to my old, well-

practiced ways. Recognition of Stressor and Fatigue Effects on Flight Performance Question Number

Question

2 I have never let physical problems influence my performance in the operational environment. 3 -- R Effective aviation personnel can leave personal problems behind when in the operational

environment. 5 -- R I can always deal with my stress. 12 -- R I would easily be able to tell if I were suffering from a physical problem that may affect my

performance. 14 -- R There have been times when I have made serious mistakes that have affected my operational

performance. 15 -- R Most people do not know how to monitor their physical responses. 21 -- R Most people can't manage their stress or fatigue levels effectively. Accident Susceptibility Question Number

Question

9 -- R Most aviation personnel get into trouble because they don't know their own limits. 11 -- R Accidents generally occur because people do not follow the rules. 17 -- R Most people think accidents will never happen to them.

Perception of Human Factors Relevancy Question Number

Question

13 Human Factors are more important to the Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) and officers in senior management positions than it is to people at the operational level.

23 -- R Overall, I feel that Human Factor training is useful. 24 -- R Most people overall, feel that Human Factor training is useful. Pilot Selection Question Number

Question

16 High quality pilots have a natural talent that cannot be instilled through training. 25 Pilot selection should be based solely on technical knowledge. 26 Pilot selection should be based solely on skill. 27 -- R Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge and skill. 28 Pilot selection should be based solely on interpersonal skills. 30 -- R Pilot selection should be based on a combination of technical knowledge, skill and

interpersonal skills. Risks and Violations Question Number

Question

19 Standard Operational Procedures are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply to them and the situation.

20 Federal Regulations are only a guide for pilots. Pilots must evaluate whether they apply to them and the situation.

29 Successful aviation professionals take risks when the situation calls for it.