G.R. No. 86250 February 26, 1990ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON, ROMEO F. LACSON and ZENA F. VELASCO,petitioners,vs.HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 22, and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and EPHRAIM J. SERQUINA,respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin. His petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of the respondent court, entitled "In Re Testate Estate of Carmelita S. Farlin, Ephraim J. Serquina, Petitioner." He also petitioned the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as executor under the will.The petition was not opposed and hence, on November 17, 1987, the respondent court issued a "certificate of allowance,"1the dispositive part of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the Court hereby renders certification that subject will and testament is accordingly allowed in accordance with Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.2On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's fees"3against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were a complaint against said heirs"4directing them to answer the motion.Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered judgment and disposed as follows:In the light of the foregoing, considering the extent of the legal services rendered to the clients, the value of the properties gained by the clients out of said services, the petition for attorney's fees is granted. Judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent heirs to pay their lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and reasonable attorney's fees which shall be a lien on the subject properties. Cost against the respondent.SO ORDERED.5On October 21, 1988, eleven days after the heirs received a copy of the decision,6the latter filed a notice of appeal.On November 7, 1988, the respondent court issued an order directing the heirs to amend their notice of appeal.7On October 27, 1988, the respondent court issued an order "noting" the notice on appeal "appellants [the heirs] having failed to correct or complete the same within the reglementary period to effect an appeal."8On November 24, 1988, the respondent court issued yet another order denying the notice of appeal for failure of the heirs to file a record on appeal.9Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution.On December 5, 1988, the respondent court issued an order granting execution.10The petitioners submit that the decision, dated October 26, 1988, and the orders, dated October 27, 1988, November 24, 1988, and December 5, 1988, respectively, are nun and void for the following reasons: (1) the respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over the "motion for attorney's fees" for failure on the part of the movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay docket fees; (2) the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their failure to file a record on appeal; and (3) the respondent court also gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.Atty. Serquina now defends the challenged acts of the respondent court: (1) his motion was a mere incident to the main proceedings; (2) the respondent court rightly denied the notice of appeal in question for failure of the heirs to submit a record on appeal; and (3) in collecting attorney's fees, he was not acting as executor of Carmelita Farlin's last will and testament because no letters testamentary had in fact been issued.We take these upseriatim.I.Anent docket fees, it has been held11that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.Although the rule has since been tempered,12that is, there must be a clear showing that the party had intended to evade payment and to cheat the courts, it does not excuse him from paying docket fees as soon as it becomes apparent that docket fees are indeed payable.In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his clients for attorney's fees. The very decision of the court states:This case is an out-growth from Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of same Court which was long decided (sic). It resulted from the filing of a petition for attorney's fees by the lawyer of the petitioner's heirs in the case against the latter.Upon the filing of the petition for attorney's fees, the heir- respondents (sic) were accordingly summoned to answer the petition as if it were a complaint against said heirs who retained the petitioner as their lawyer in the said case.13In that event, the parties should have known, the respondent court in particular, that docket fees should have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on the case, and decide it.It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the payment of docket fees is mandatory.Assuming, therefore,ex gratia argumenti,that Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the fees in question before the respondent court could validly try his "motion".II.With respect to the second issue, it has been held that in appeals arising from an incident in a special proceeding, a record on appeal is necessary, otherwise, the appeal faces a dismissal.14It has likewise been held, however, that in the interest of justice, an appeal, brought without a record on appeal, may be reinstated under exceptional circumstances. Thus:xxx xxx xxxIt is noted, however, that the question presented in this case is one of first impression; that the petitioner acted in honest, if mistaken, interpretation of the applicable law; that the probate court itself believed that the record on appeal was unnecessary; and that the private respondent herself apparently thought so, too, for she did not move to dismiss the appeal and instead impliedly recognized its validity by filing the appellee's brief.In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court.15In the instant case, the Court notes the apparent impression by the parties at the outset, that a record on appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by: (1) the very holding of the respondent court that "[i]t is now easy to appeal as there is no more need for a record on appeal . . . [b]y merely filing a notice of appeal, the appellant can already institute his appeal . . . ;"16(2) in its order to amend notice of appeal, it did not require the appellants to submit a record on appeal; and (3) Atty. Serquina interposed no objection to the appeal on that ground.In any event, since we are annulling the decision appealed from, the matter is a dead issue.III.As we have indicated, we are grantingcertiorariand are annulling the decision appealed from, but there seems to be no reason why we can not dispose of the heirs' appeal in a single proceeding.It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from the estate. The Rule is specifically as follows:SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. An executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or devisees, of twoper centumof the first five thousand pesos of such value, oneper centumof so much of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-halfper centumof so much of such value as exceeds thirty thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos, and one-quarterper centumof so much of such value as exceeds one hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be reexamined on appeal.If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by them respectively.When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the will.17The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. In one case,18we held that "a greater sum [other than that established by the rule] may be allowed 'in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator.'"19It is also left to the sound discretion of the court.20With respect to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen, disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject properties,"21the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquired jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said Mr. Serquina's "motion for attorney's fees").The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his client.22Mutatis mutandis,where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved.23They are also subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the services rendered; and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.24In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word of the parties.25And always, they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.The records show that Atty. Ephraim Serquina, as counsel for the heirs, performed the following:xxx xxx xxx5. That after the order of allowance for probate of the will, the undersigned counsel assisted the heirs to transfer immediately the above-mentioned real estate in their respective names, from (sic) the payment of estate taxes in the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of the titles, in order for the heirs to sell the foregoing real estate of 10,683 sq. cm (which was also the subject of sale prior to the death of the testator) to settle testator's obligations and day-to-day subsistence being (sic) that the heirs, except Zena F. Velasco, are not employed neither doing any business;26The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty. Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by him (P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court (P65,000.00). The Court observes that these are acts performed routinely since they form part of what any lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The will was furthermore not contested. They are not, so Justice Pedro Tuason wrote, "a case [where] the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense to the estate,"27to entitle him to a bigger compensation. He did not exactly achieve anything out of the ordinary.The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been paid the sum of P6,000.00.28It is our considered opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his efforts on aquantum meruitbasis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) GRANTING the petition and making the temporary restraining order issued on January 16, 1989 PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING the petitioners to PAY the private respondent, Atty. Ephraim Serquina, attorney's fees in the sum of P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be recovered from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al.,petitionersvs.INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.BIDIN,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the joint decision*promulgated on December 22, 1986, by the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01063 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth, Inc. and Domingo M. Guevara, defendants-appellants" and in CA-G.R. No. 01064 entitled "International Corporate Bank, plaintiff-appellee vs. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., Radiowealth, Inc. and D.M.G., Inc., defendants-appellants," the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmedin toto, with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, p. 101).The basic facts appear undisputed and they are as follows:Sometime in 1978, petitioners Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (RFC) applied for and obtained credit facilities from private respondent International Corporate Bank (Interbank). Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara, for short) and D.M.G., Inc., acted as sureties to the obligations contracted by RWI and RFC. The obligations of petitioners were accordingly covered and evidenced by promissory notes, trust receipts and agreements.A common stipulation in the covering promissory notes, trust receipts, and continuing surety agreements between the borrowing petitioners and the lending private respondent provided, to wit:In the event of the bringing of any action or suit by you or any default of the undersigned hereunder I/We shall on demand pay you reasonable attorney's fees and other fees and costs of collection, which shall in no cases be less than ten percentum (10 %) of the value of the property and the amount involved by the action or suit. (Rollo, p. 211).From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on time with Interbank due to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses. Petitioners thus asked Interbank for a restructuring of their outstanding loans, but the parties were not able to arrive at a mutually acceptable proposition.On December 28, 1979, Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel Norberto J. Quisumbing and Associates, lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Manila its first complaint, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 128744, for collection of sum of money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against RWI and Guevara covering the principal sum of P1,585,933.61 plus penalties, service charges, interests, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 31-38).This was followed by another complaint filed on January 9, 1980 before the same trial court against RFC, RWI and D.M.G., Inc., also with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. 128897, for the collection of the principal sum of P2,113,444.58, plus interests, penalties, service charges, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 39-47).Petitioners, however, opted to amicably settle their obligations promptly. They, therefore, did not file any answer nor any responsive pleading to the complaints, and instead entered into a compromise agreement with Interbank shortly about four (4) months later. Said compromise agreement between the parties was embodied in two Motions for Judgment Based on Compromise dated March 21, 1980 (Rollo, pp. 48-55) corresponding to the separate claims in the said two complaints which were accordingly submitted to the court a quo for approval. These motions did not however, cover the payment by the petitioners of Interbank's claims for attorney's fees, costs of collection and expenses of litigation which were left open by the parties for further negotiations.In its decision in Civil Case No. 128744, dated March 28, 1980, the trial court approved the parties' corresponding compromise agreement thereto, with the reservation that "(T)his decision does not terminate this case because matters respecting payment of attorney's fees, costs and collection."Similarly, the trial court, in its decision in Civil Case No. 128897 of even date, also approved the parties' corresponding compromise agreement thereto with the Identical reservation as aforequoted (Rollo, pp. 60-61).Thereafter, further proceedings were conducted by the trial court particularly on the issue of the alleged unreasonableness and unconscionableness of the attorney's fees. It appears from the records of the cases, however, that Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, counsel for Interbank, was able to adduce his evidence in support for the attorney's fees due to his said client, while Attys. Reyes and Guevara, counsel for petitioners in the trial court, were not given their request for further hearing against the claimed attorney's fees despite some supervening events as alleged in their motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 82-84) which was denied in the Order of January 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 85).At any rate, the trial court, in its Order dated January 2, 1981, had already reduced Interbank's claim for attorney's fees, from the stipulated 10 % to 8 %, pertinent portions thereof are hereunder quoted, thus:(T)he 'ten per cent' in the foregoing quoted provisions includes attorney's fees, other fees and cost of collection. In paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 128744 under which the defendants therein acknowledge their indebtedness of Pl,585,933.61 as of December 28, 1979, it is provided that in paying the same there shall be added to it 16 % per annum as interest, 2 % per annum as service charge, 2 % per month or any fraction thereof as penalty from January 31, 1980. A similar provision is contained in paragraph No. 2 of the compromise agreement filed in Civil Case No.. 128897 under which the defendants therein admitted their indebtedness of P2,113,444.58, payment of which was to commence on or before January 31, 1980. The service charge of 2 % should be deducted from the 10 % already mentioned above, to give the rate of attorney's fees which is 8% in accordance with the provisions already aforequoted. Eight percent (8 %) of l,585,833.61, or P126,824.68 is the attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 128897 sums which ... are not excessive and perhaps acceptable to plaintiff which was willing to have its claim reduced to P73,987.57 had defendants acceded to its offer to compromise attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants in Civil Case No. 128744 to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally P126,824.68 and the defendants in Civil Case No. 128897 to pay the plaintiff, also jointly and severally, P169,075.56 with interest at 12 % per annum from this date until the same is paid.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 80-81).Not satisfied with said trial court's order, petitioners appealed the same before the respondent appellate court raising therewith the following assigned errors:A. The lower court erred in not giving the defendants the opportunity to be heard in a hearing set for the purpose of determining the amount of attorney's fees;B. The lower court erred in insisting that the amount of attorney's fees should be governed by the contract signed by the parties;C. The lower court erred in not substantially reducing the amount of attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 242-243).The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed order of the trial court.Hence, the instant petition.Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:I. Whether or not the reasonableness of attorney's fees in the case at bar is a question of law;II. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in the case at bar is reasonable;III. Whether or not a contracted stipulation regarding attorney's fees may be disregarded by this Honorable Court;IV. whether or not attorney's fees require proof (Rollo, p. 243).Deducible from the contentions of the parties, is the sole issue of whether or not the amount equivalent to 8 % of the recovery or sums of money due from the two civil complaints adjudged as attorney's fees by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is fair and reasonable under the peculiar facts and circumstances herein. Corollarily, whether or not the court has discretion to modify the attorney's fees previously agreed upon by the parties under a valid contractual stipulation.Petitioners assert that the sums of P126,824.68 in Civil Case No. 128744 and P169,075.56 in Civil Case No. 128897 or 8 % of the amount involved in the respective suits, adjudged as attorney's fees due to Norberto J. Quisumbing and Associates, counsel of record of the judgment creditor the herein private respondent Interbank, per the order of the trial court, is unreasonable, exhorbitant and unconscionable under the premises considering the following undisputed facts: that said cases were immediately settled with the execution of a compromise agreement after the complaints with prayer for preliminary attachment had been filed by the private respondent against the petitioners in the lower court, and no answer was filed by petitioners; that pursuant to the Compromise Agreement between the parties, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc. has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128744 the total amount of P2,867,802.64, while petitioner Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. (RFC) has fully paid to Interbank in Civil Case No. 128897 the total amount of P3,018,192.52; that of the amounts paid to Interbank, petitioner Radiowealth, Inc., has fully paid the total sum of P118,075.84 as service charge and penalties, while petitioner Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., had paid the total amount of P135,526.40 as penalties and service charges, all in addition to the interests paid by petitioners to Interbank.Interbank, on the other hand, avers that petitioners have omitted to state certain facts and circumstances, as follows: that the collection suits filed against petitioners involve charges of violation of the trust receipts law for disposing of the goods they had received from Interbank on trust receipts and failing to surrender the proceeds thereof; that Atty. Quisumbing had successfully obtained attachment against their properties; that Atty. Quisumbing succeeded in forcing petitioners to agree in the joint motions for judgment based on compromise to such stipulation which made them fear a default in the payment of the amortizations or installments of the compromise amount; that the principal amount collected from petitioners totalled P3,699,378.19, not counting the interests; that petitioners' obligations to Interbank were not evidenced by one but many letters of credit and trust receipts; that the records were destroyed by fire and had to be reconstituted; that Interbank had already given petitioners very substantial discounts on penalty charges; and, despite clear contractual stipulations, the lower court had already reduced the 10 % stipulated attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to 8 %.As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify or change even an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding attorney's fees is conceded. The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts (Panay Electric Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos vs. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409 [1972]; Rolando vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. vs. Eastern Scott Paper Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe vs. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425 [1959]; Turner vs. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. vs. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986 [1929]). For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable (Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Green, 48 Phil. 466).There is no mistake, however, that the reasonableness of attorney's fees, though seemingly a matter of fact which takes into account the peculiar circumstances of the case, is a question of law where the facts are not disputed at all. For a question of law does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties (Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]), and where the issue is the construction or interpretation to be placed by the appellate court upon documentary evidence, or when a case is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts or where all the facts are stated in the judgment, the question is one of law where the issue is the correctness of the conclusion drawn therefrom (Cunanan vs. Lazatin, 74 Phil. 719 [1944]; Ng Young vs. Villa, 93 Phil. 21 [1953]). In the case at bar, the issues do not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence because the ultimate facts are admitted by the parties and all the basic facts are stated in the judgment.Nevertheless, a careful review of the records shows that the modified attorney's fees fixed by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court, appears reasonable and fair under the admitted circumstances of the case. As aptly reasoned out by the said court:We find nothing wrong in the aforegoing disquisition of the lower court.It is to be remembered that attorney's fees provided in contracts as recoverable against the other party and damages are not, strictly speaking, the attorney's fees recoverable as between attorneys and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulations therefor is aptly called a penal clause, So long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the defendant (Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187 [1969]). However:"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. For this reason, we do not really have to strictly view the reasonableness of the attorney's fees in the light of such facts as the amount and character of the service rendered, the nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional character and the social standing of the attorney. We do concede, however that these factors may be an aid in the determination of the inequity or unconscionableness of attorney's fees as liquidated damages. (Supra)May the attorney's fees granted by the court be tagged as iniquitous or unconscionable? We give the answer in the negative. The high standing of plaintiffs counsel has not been challenged.In the motion for judgment based on compromise agreement, defendants acknowledged and admitted their default or failure to pay their joint and several obligations or indebtedness arising from the credit facilities which plaintiff extended to defendants and availed of by the latter, the punctual payment of which having been guaranteed and warranted by the other defendants. Having admitted such default in the payment of their obligations, the filing of the action in court and, consequently, the legal services of counsel became imperative and thereby, set into operation the contract clause on the payment of attorney's fees.The complaints are not simple actions for collection. They are accompanied with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and charge defendants with violation of the trust receipts law and they involve several letters of credit and trust receipts. The fact that the compromise agreements were entered into after the complaints were filed against appellants indubitably proves that the legal action taken by counsel for the plaintiff against the defendants contributed in no measure to the early settlement of defendants' obligation.Considering further that, apart from the reduction and waiver of penalty charges due to the plaintiff to the extent of P79, 191.72, the service charge of 2 % was further deducted by the lower court thereby, reducing the attorney's fees to 8 % the court is of the considered opinion and so holds that given the prestige of plaintiff's counsel, the nature of the action and quality of legal services rendered, the award of attorney's fees in a sum equivalent to 8 % of the judgment which is below the stipulated fees of 10 % could hardly be suggested as iniquitous and unconscionable. On the contrary, it easily falls within the rule of conscionable and reasonable. (Rollo, pp. 100-101).The foregoing disquisition merits our assent.Moreover, even if the so-called supervening event which ought to have been heard in the trial court as alleged in petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated January 29, 1981, i.e., "that supervening events happened from the time the trust receipt agreements were signed in which the defendants agreed to pay 10 % of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs of collection up to the actual filing of the complaint and these events were the payments of interest in the amount of P285,341.27, as interest, P41,507.37 as service charges and P76,568.47 as penalty by Radiowealth, Inc.; that Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. has paid the amount of P281,940.12 as interest, P38,721.83 as service charges and P96,804.57 as penalty (Rollo, pp. 137-138), were to be considered, they would still be insufficient to justify a further substantial reduction in the adjudged attorney's fees. At any rate, it would be noted that petitioners have not even prayed for a specific reduction as to amount or percentage of the attorney's fees except for their sweeping allegations of unreasonableness, exhorbitance and unconscionableness.WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the respondent appellate court is Affirmed, with costsde officio.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 91958 January 24, 1991WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees, is the principal issue.This petition for review oncertiorariassails:1) The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12, 1989 which dismissed the petitioners' appeal thereby upholding the reasonableness of the respondent lawyer's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his clients; and2) The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30, 1990 which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:The respondent Court, in upholding the entitlement of private respondent-attorney on the attorney's fees he claimed, decided the question in a manner not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal.The respondent Court, in refusing to review and determine the propriety, reasonableness and validity of the attorney's fees claimed by the private respondent-attorney, departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings.The respondent Court, in failing to declare the attorney's fees claimed by the private respondent-attorney as unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable, immoral and unethical, decided the question in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal. (Petition, pp. 12-13;Rollo, pp. 16-17)The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at bar:The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased petitioners' parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two related civil cases docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in connection with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases, the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients.On August 13,1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney's Lien with Notification to his Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in his favor which provided that:a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiff's share of the lot in question.b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of plaintiffs' share of the lot in question.c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for the undersigned counsel.(Annex "H" of the Petition,Rollo, p. 54)On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer's Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by petitioner Wilfredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. The said trial court's Order, being one of two Orders being essentially challenged in this petition, is reproduced below:Before the court for consideration is a Petition for Attorney's Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D. Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his attorney's fees be annotated as a lien at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, subject matter of this case.For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as well as his son to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio Licudan together with his son Wilfredo Licudan, who appears to be intelligent and in fact he speaks (the) English language well, appeared. Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they have freely and voluntarily signed the Contract for Professional Services, dated August 30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public Amado Garrovillas as Doc. No. 32, Page 8, Book No. XIX, Series of 1979.Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that they have entered freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional services, let the same be annotated at the back of TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon payment of the required legal fees. (CA Decision, pp. 7-8;Rollo, pp. 36-37)The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 differs from the earlier contractual provisions in that it entitled the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property or 90.5 square meters and provided for usufructuary rights over the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyer's son, Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex "J" of the Petition;Rollo, p. 59)On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motionex parteto amend the Order dated September 19, 1979 so as to conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square meters more of the lot for services rendered in Civil Case No. Q-28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 executed by Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer.On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in conformity with his attorney's fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him.On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the amendment of the Order dated September 19, 1979 to conform with the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 which was executed after the annotation of the original attorney's lien of 90.5 square meters.On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the respondent lawyer cannot collect attorney's fees for other cases in the action for partition.On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion for reconsideration of the Order dated September 6, 1985 explaining that what he sought to be included in the Order dated September 19, 1979 is the additional attorney's fees for handling the redemption case which was but a mere offshoot of the partition case and further manifesting that the additional 31 square meters as compensation for the redemption case must be merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition case to enable the said respondent lawyer to comply with the Order dated September 6,1985 which directed him to submit a subdivision plan as required.On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this petition. The said Order reads:Acting on the "Second Motion for Reconsideration" filed by Atty. Teodoro Domalanta and finding the same to be justified, let an attorney's lien be annotated in the title of the property for 31 square meters as attorney's fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition to the original 90.5 square meters. (CA Decision, p. 8;Rollo, p. 37)On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 had become final and executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the respondent lawyers' deceased clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the award of professional fees covering 121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and excessive.After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above petitioners' motion, the lower court, on August 29, 1986, finding that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs are not in full agreement with the respondent lawyer's claim for attorney's fees, set aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985.On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be disturbed or set aside because it has already been implemented and had since then become final. This motion was denied on October 3, 1986.On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to set aside the orders dated August 29, 1986 and October 3, 1986 reiterating his position that the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 have become final and are already implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for the modification of the October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32 square meters instead of 31 square meters only since the stipulation in the Additional Contract for Professional Services entitled him to 60.32 square meters.After the petitioners' Opposition to the said motion was filed, the trial court, on February 26, 1987, rendered an Order with the following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but to set aside its orders of 29 August 1986 and 3 October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19 September 1979 and 21 October 1985 irrevocably final and executory. (CA Decision, p. 5;Rollo, p. 34)On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the prayed for writ of preliminary injunction. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied', the petitioners filed the instant petition.The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients.The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration.It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's fees may be claimed in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. (seeCamacho v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989]; Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]).It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are notper seprohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case ofTanhueco v. De Dumo(172 SCRA 760 [1989]):. . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833 [1955]).In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorney's fees lien in the main action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the basis of a Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979. We find reversible error in the Court of Appeals' holding that:When the reasonableness of the appellee's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his clients awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned by the client, and the said orders had already become final and executory, the same could no longer be disturbed, not even by the court which rendered them (Taada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419). (CA Decision p. 7;Rollo, p. 36)On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985 cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which reads:13. Contingent Fees.A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but shouldalwaysbe subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. (Emphasis supplied).There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees claimed by the respondent lawyer are in the nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract for professional services even after the termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exceptionthat the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order (seePhilippine American Life Insurance Company v. Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 111 [1989]).Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.1wphi1In determining whether or not the lawyer fees are fair and reasonable, Rule 20-01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. They are as follows:a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;c) The importance of the subject matter;d) The skill demanded;e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; andj) The professional standing of the lawyer.A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states that:Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys;agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brother-in-law was a simple case of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshot of the partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal relationship between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests instead of protecting the legal interests of his clients. A careful perusal of the provisions of the contract for professional services in question readily shows that what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of the fact that despite the successful turnout of the partition case, they are now practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot won in the litigation. This is because aside from the 121.5 square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney's fees, the said contract for professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney's fees the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.The respondent lawyer's argument that it is not he but his son Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. who is claiming the usufructuary right over the remaining portion of the subject lot is inaccurate. The records show that the matter of usufruct is tied up with this case since the basis for the said usufructuary right is the contract for professional services the reasonableness of which is being questioned in this petition. We find the ten-year usufruct over the subject lot part and parcel of the attorney's fees being claimed by the respondent lawyer.In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney's fees, we uphold the time-honoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom an trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. We find the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979, unconscionable and unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, in lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent lawyer and the ten-year usufructuary right over the remaining portion of 150 square meters by the respondent lawyer's son, is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by Atty. Domalanta.WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-68838 March 11, 1991FLORENCIO FABILLO and JOSEFA TANA (substituted by their heirs Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, Cristeta F. Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo),petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Case Division) and ALFREDO MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita M. Murillo, Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol),respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:In the instant petition for review oncertiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the appellate court's decision interpreting in favor of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo the contract of services entered into between him and his clients, spouses Florencio Fabillo and Josefa Taa.In her last will and testament dated August 16, 1957, Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a house and lot in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte which was covered by tax declaration No. 19335, and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte.1After Justina's death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. On June 2, 1962, the probate court approved the project of partition "with the reservation that the ownership of the land declared under Tax Declaration No. 19335 and the house erected thereon be litigated and determined in a separate proceedings."2Two years later, Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in recovering the San Salvador property. Acquiescing to render his services, Murillo wrote Florencio the following handwritten letter:Dear Mr. Fabillo:I have instructed my stenographer to prepare the complaint and file the same on Wednesday if you are ready with the filing fee and sheriffs fee of not less than P86.00 including transportation expenses.Considering that Atty. Montilla lost this case and the present action is a revival of a lost case, I trust that you will gladly give me40% of the money value of the house and lotas a contigent (sic) fee in case of a success. When I come back I shall prepare the contract of services for your signature.Thank you.Cordially yours,(Sgd.) Alfredo M. MurilloAug. 9, 19643Thirteen days later, Florencio and Murillo entered into the following contract:

CONTRACT OF SERVICESKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:That I, FLORENCIO FABILLO, married to JOSEFA TANA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with residence and postal address at Palo, Leyte, was the Petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 843, entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the late Justina Fabillo, Florencio Fabillo, Petitioner" of the Court of First Instance of Leyte;That by reason of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte dated June 2, 1962, my claim for the house and lot mentioned in paragraph one (1) of the last will and testament of the late Justina Fabillo, was deniedalthothe will was probated and allowed by the Court;That acting upon the counsel of Atty. Alfredo M. Murillo, I have cause(d) the preparation and filing of another case, entitled "Florencio Fabillo vs. Gregorio D. Brioso," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3532 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte;That I have retained and engaged the services of Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO, married and of legal age, with residence and postal address at Santa Fe, Leyte to be my lawyer not only in Social Proceedings No. 843 but also in Civil Case No. 3532 under the following terms and conditions;That he will represent me and my heirs, in case of my demise in the two cases until their successful conclusion or until the case is settled to my entire satisfaction;That for and in consideration for his legal services, in the two cases, I hereby promise and bind myself to pay Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO, in case of success in any or both casesthe sum equivalent to FORTY PER CENTUM (40%) of whatever benefit I may derive from such casesto be implemented as follows:If the house and lot in question is finally awarded to me or a part of the same by virtue of an amicable settlement, and the same is sold, Atty. Murillo, is hereby constituted as Atty. in-fact to sell and convey the said house and lot and he shall be given as his compensation for his services as counsel and as attorney-in-fact the sum equivalent to fortyper centumof the purchase price of the house and lot;If the same house and lot is just mortgage(d) to any person, Atty. Murillo shall be given the sum equivalent to fortyper centum(40%) of the proceeds of the mortgage;If the house and lot is leased to any person, Atty. Murillo shall be entitled to receive an amount equivalent to 40% (FORTYPER CENTUM) of the rentals of the house and lot, or a part thereof;If the house and lot or a portion thereof is just occupied by the undersigned or his heirs, Atty. Murillo shall have the option of either occupying or leasing to any interested party FORTY PER CENT of the house and lot.Atty. Alfredo M. Murillo shall also be given as part of his compensation for legal services in the two cases FORTYPER CENTUMof whatever damages, which the undersigned can collect in either or both cases, provided, that in case I am awarded attorney's fees, the full amount of attorney's fees shall be given to the said Atty. ALFREDO M. MURILLO;That in the event the house and lot is (sic) not sold and the same is maintained by the undersigned or his heirs, the costs of repairs, maintenance, taxes and insurance premiums shall be for the account of myself or my heirs and Attorney Murillo, in proportion to our rights and interest thereunder that is forty per cent shall be for the account of Atty. Murillo and sixty per cent shall be for my account or my heirs.IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby set unto my signature below this 22nd day of August 1964 at Tacloban City.(Sgd.) FLORENCIO FABILLO(Sgd.) JOSEFA T. FABILLOWITH MY CONFORMITY:(Sgd.) ALFREDO M. MURILLO(Sgd.) ROMAN T. FABILLO(Witness)(Sgd.) CRISTETA F. MAGLINTE(Witness)4

Pursuant to said contract, Murillo filed for Florencio Fabillo Civil Case No. 3532 against Gregorio D. Brioso to recover the San Salvador property. The case was terminated on October 29, 1964 when the court, upon the parties' joint motion in the nature of a compromise agreement, declared Florencio Fabillo as the lawful owner not only of the San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land.Consequently, Murillo proceeded to implement the contract of services between him and Florencio Fabillo by taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said properties. He installed a tenant in the Pugahanay property.Sometime in 1966, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties and refused to give Murillo his share of their produce.5Inasmuch as his demands for his share of the produce of the Pugahanay property were unheeded, Murillo filed on March 23, 1970 in the then Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint captioned "ownership of a parcel of land, damages and appointment of a receiver" against Florencio Fabillo, his wife Josefa Taa, and their children Ramon (sic) Fabillo and Cristeta F. Maglinte.6Murillo prayed that he be declared the lawful owner of forty per cent of the two properties; that defendants be directed to pay him jointly and severally P900.00per annumfrom 1966 until he would be given his share of the produce of the land plus P5,000 as consequential damages and P1,000 as attorney's fees, and that defendants be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as the court might deem just and reasonable.In their answer, the defendants stated that the consent to the contract of services of the Fabillo spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into believing that Special Proceedings No. 843 on the probate of Justina's will was already terminated when actually it was still pending resolution; and that the contingent fee of 40% of the value of the San Salvador property was excessive, unfair and unconscionable considering the nature of the case, the length of time spent for it, the efforts exerted by Murillo, and his professional standing.They prayed that the contract of services be declared null and void; that Murillo's fee be fixed at 10% of the assessed value of P7,780 of the San Salvador property; that Murillo be ordered to account for the P1,000 rental of the San Salvador property which he withdrew from the court and for the produce of the Pugahanay property from 1965 to 1966; that Murillo be ordered to vacate the portion of the San Salvador property which he had occupied; that the Pugahanay property which was not the subject of either Special Proceedings No. 843 or Civil Case No. 3532 be declared as the exclusive property of Florencio Fabillo, and that Murillo be ordered to pay moral damages and the total amount of P1,000 representing expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.In its decision of December 2, 1975,7the lower court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the Fabillo spouses' consent to the contract was vitiated. It noted that the contract was witnessed by two of their children who appeared to be highly educated. The spouses themselves were old but literate and physically fit.In claiming jurisdiction over the case, the lower court ruled that the complaint being one "to recover real property from the defendant spouses and their heirs or to enforce a lien thereon," the case could be decided independent of the probate proceedings. Ruling that the contract of services did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code as said contract stipulated a contingent fee, the court upheld Murillo's claim for "contingent attorney's fees of 40% of the value of recoverable properties." However, the court declared Murillo to be the lawful owner of 40% of both the San Salvador and Pugahanay properties and the improvements thereon. It directed the defendants to pay jointly and severally to Murillo the amount of P1,200 representing 40% of the net produce of the Pugahanay property from 1967 to 1973; entitled Murillo to 40% of the 1974 and 1975 income of the Pugahanay property which was on deposit with a bank, and ordered defendants to pay the costs of the suit.Both parties filed motions for the reconsideration of said decision: Fabillo, insofar as the lower court awarded 40% of the properties to Murillo and the latter insofar as it granted only P1,200 for the produce of the properties from 1967 to 1973. On January 29, 1976, the lower court resolved the motions and modified its decision thus:ACCORDINGLY, the judgment heretofore rendered is modified to read as follows:(a) Declaring the plaintiff as entitled to and the true and lawful owner of forty percent (40%) of the parcels of land and improvements thereon covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 19335 and 6229 described in Paragraph 5 of the complaint;(b) Directing all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P2,450.00) representing 40% of the net produce of the Pugahanay property from 1967 to 1973;(c) Declaring the plaintiff entitled to 40% of the 1974 and 1975 income of said riceland now on deposit with the Prudential Bank, Tacloban City, deposited by Mr. Pedro Elona, designated receiver of the property;(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P 300.00) as attorney's fees; and(e) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.In view of the death of both Florencio and Justina Fabillo during the pendency of the case in the lower court, their children, who substituted them as parties to the case, appealed the decision of the lower court to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. On March 27, 1984, said appellate court affirmedin totothe decision of the lower court.8The instant petition for review oncertiorariwhich was interposed by the Fabillo children, was filed shortly after Murillo himself died. His heirs likewise substituted him in this case. The Fabillos herein question the appellate court's interpretation of the contract of services and contend that it is in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.The contract of services did not violate said provision of law. Article 1491 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 5 thereof, prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property.9Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.10As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.11Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo.12However, we disagree with the courts below that the contingent fee stipulated between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo is forty percent of the properties subject of the litigation for which Murillo appeared for the Fabillos. A careful scrutiny of the contract shows that the parties intended forty percent of thevalueof the properties as Murillo's contingent fee. This is borne out by the stipulation that "in case of success of any or both cases," Murillo shall be paid"the sum equivalent to forty per centum of whatever benefit"Fabillo would derive from favorable judgments. The same stipulation was earlier embodied by Murillo in his letter of August 9, 1964 aforequoted.Worth noting are the provisions of the contract which clearly states that in case the properties are sold, mortgaged, or leased, Murillo shall be entitled respectively to 40% of the "purchase price," "proceeds of the mortgage," or "rentals." The contract is vague, however, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold, mortgaged or leased because Murillo is allowed "to have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party forty per cent of the house and lot." Had the parties intended that Murillo should become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties, it would have been clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract considering that the Fabillos would part with actual portions of their properties and cede the same to Murillo.The ambiguity of said provision, however, should be resolved against Murillo as it was he himself who drafted the contract.13This is in consonance with the rule of interpretation that, in construing a contract of professional services between a lawyer and his client, such construction as would be more favorable to the client should be adopted even if it would work prejudice to the lawyer.14Rightly so because of the inequality in situation between an attorney who knows the technicalities of the law on the one hand and a client who usually is ignorant of the vagaries of the law on the other hand.15Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof, the length of time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is entitled to the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered in the case which ended on a compromise agreement. In so ruling, we uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy."16WHEREFORE, the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered (a) ordering the petitioners to pay Atty. Alfredo M. Murillo or his heirs the amount of P3,000.00 as his contingent fee with legal interest from October 29, 1964 when Civil Case No. 3532 was terminated until the amount is fully paid less any and all amounts which Murillo might have received out of the produce or rentals of the Pugahanay and San Salvador properties, and (b) ordering the receiver of said properties to render a complete report and accounting of his receivership to the court below within fifteen (15) days from the finality of this decision. Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT,petitionervs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE GENARO C. GINES, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, San Fernando, La Union, and BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC.,respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:pBefore the Court is Atty. Raymundo Armovit's claim for attorney's fees against the private respondent.It appears that Atty. Armovit was engaged as counsel for the private respondent in a complaint to have an extrajudicial foreclosure of certain properties by the Government Service Insurance System declared null and void; that the parties allegedly agreed that the private respondent shall pay P15,000.00 as initial compensation and twenty percent in contingent fees; that after trial, the defunct Court of First Instance rendered judgment annulling foreclosure and ordering the Government Service Insurance System to restructure the private respondent's loan; that thereafter, the System appealed; the on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of lower court; and that the Appellate Court's judgment has since attained finality.It also appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the courta quo, he was informed by Romualdo Bengson president of the respondent corporation, that the firm has retained the services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the company would pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later ignored his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the records of the case. The lower court allegedly refused to make the entry and on the contrary issued an order ordering the Philippine National Bank to "release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengzon and/or Atty Pacifico Yadao"1the sum of P2,760,000.00 (ordered by the Court of Appeals as rentals payable by the Government Service Insurance System).Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of hi motion to recognize attorney's lien, and thereafter, the trial court. issued an order in the tenor as follows:When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering that they are in the process of amicably settling their differences with the plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo Bengson and Brenda Bengson, who are present today.In view of this development, the petition to record attorney charging lien, the same being in order and not contrary to law, moral and public policy, as prayed for by Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby directed to co ply faithfully with their respective obligations.SO ORDERED.2However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of Romualdo Bengzon delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.0 twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengzon made assurances that he will be paid the balance.On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received a order emanating from the trial court in the tenor as follows:During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's charge lien on October 11, 1988, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorney's charging lien, which was duly approve petition to recordby the Court, after which the Court directed the parties to comp faithfully with their respective obligations.In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as compliance alleging that petition (Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the sum P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorney's fees With the receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its obligation.WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of the petition to record attorney's charging lien, on motion of the petitioner, is now final.SO ORDERED.3Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit went the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition.On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals4rendered judgment dismissing the petition. Reconsideration having been likewise denied by the Appellate Court, Atty. Armovit instituted the instant appeal.Shortly thereafter, we required the private respondent comment.The private respondent did not materially traverse Atty. Armorvit's chronicle of events but added: that the private respondent hired the petitioner after the Government Service Insurance System had answered and that it was Atty. Benjam Bernardino who prepared the complaint; that for his appearances, Atty. Armovit was paid a total of P108,000.00, not to mention "beach resort accommodations";5that Atty. Armovit did not inform the private respondent that the court had rendered judgment which they would have appealed; that they lost an appeal on account of Atty. Armovit's indiscretion; that the forthwith engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Yadao; and that it was the latter who prepared the brief in the Court Appeals (on GSIS's appeal).The private respondent also alleged that it opposed Atty. Armovit's effort to record his attorney's lien on grounds of allege nullity of the retainer agreement, Atty. Armovit's negligence and because of excessive fees demanded.The private respondent also insisted that the retainer agreement was signed by only one of seven directors, and it could no bind the corporation. Atty. Armovit, in any event, had also been allegedly more than sufficiently compensated.The private respondent alleged that Atty. Armovit had bee paid P300,000.00 an amount approved by the court, and an amount he accepted and for which he is allegedly estoppel from claiming a higher amount. The order of the court has the effect ofres judicata, the private respondent claimed, as well as a compromise agreement which is immediately executory.The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since the receipt evidencing payment to Atty. Armovit of the sum P300,000.00 "was without any qualification as 'advance' 'partial' or 'incomplete',"6the intention of the parties was that was full payment. The Appellate Court also noted Atty. Armorvit's withdrawal of his motion to record attorney's lien and figured that Atty. Armovit was satisfied with the payment P300,000,00.The only issue is whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000.00 more, in addition to the sum P300,000.00 already paid him by the private respondent.There is no question that the parties had agreed on a compensation as follows:a) P15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee, payable within five (5) days from date;b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered b favorable judgment in the cases; andc) the execution and signing of a final retainer agreement complete with all necessary details.7(While the parties' agreement speaks of "a final retain agreement"8to be executed later, it does not appear that the parties did enter into a "final" agreement thereafter.)The private respondent's version however is that while it may be true that the agreed compensation was twenty percent of all recoveries, the parties later agreed on a compromise sum approved allegedly by the trial court, per its Order of October 11, 1988.The Court is inclined to believe that Atty. Armovit never agreed on the compromise sum of P300,000.00. It is true that he did agree to withdraw his motion to annotate attorney's lien, but because the parties were "in the process of amicably settling their differences"9and not because Atty. Armovit had agreed to accept a lower amount as full payment. There is nothing, on top of that, Atty. Armovit's manifestation that would suggest that he was accepting the sum of P300,00.00 as agreed final payment, other than the fact that an agreement was supposedly certain. We quote:ATTY. ARMOVIT:Your Honor, we would like to manifest in Court that we served notice to the counsel of the plaintiff, Bengson Commercial Building, a copy of the petition to record attorney's charging lien, and together with the president of the corporation, Mr. Romualdo Bengson, and his wife, Mrs. Brenda Bengson, we have discussed the problem and we all agreed upon is an earnest one at this time, this representation is withdrawing his petition to record charging lien.ATTY. YADAO:No objection, Your Honor, because we have to agree with Atty. Armovit. I am in full accord with this.10There is nothing there that would indicate Atty. Armovit's willingness to accept, in fact, a lower figure in consideration of his withdrawal of his request to enter attorney's lien. What the Court takes his statement to mean is that he was withdrawing his request on the certainty that the private respondent would pay him the money, presumably, under more becoming circumstances.The Court does not therefore see how the private respondent can hold Atty. Armovit to have been in estoppel.The fact that Atty. Armovit did not, after all, accept the sum of P300,000.00 as final compensation is indeed indicated by the behavior of the private respondent, through Mrs. Romualdo Bengson, when she assured Atty. Armovit that the balance was forthcoming.11According to Mrs. Bengson, she wished the rest of the Bengsons to witness the final payment and when the occasion was present, wished for a postponement on account of "All Saints Day."12The parties never therefore amended their original agreement, and what appears to the Court is a clear effort on the part of a client, with the apparent approval of the trial court, to renege on a valid agreement with its lawyer.The Court believes that the trial court, in accepting the private respondent's "compliance" as a final payment of Atty. Armovit's fees, was guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. The private respondent had nothing with which to comply, and the parties, as manifested by Atty. Armovit, were "in the process [merely] of amicably settling their differences."13It is apparent furthermore that the trial judge himself was out to deny Atty. Armovit the agreed compensation. In his order of October 4, 1988, he commanded:The PNB is hereby ordered and directed to release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengson and /or Atty. Pacifico Yadao, counsel for the plaintiff, the sum of Two Million Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,760,000.00), Philippine Currency for the satisfaction of the rentals of the Bengson Building against the GSIS.14in spite of the fact that Atty. Armovit had remained the private respondent's counsel of record. It is fundamental that unless a lawyer has been validly discharged, his authority to act for his client continues and should be recognized by the court.15The fact that the receipt evidencing payment by the private respondent of the amount of P300,000.00 "was without any qualification as 'advance' or 'partial' or 'incomplete',"16as the Court of Appeals noted and the Court of Appeals took to mean "full payment", will not weaken Atty. Armovit's demand for the balance. There is nothing in the receipt that will suggest that will suggest that it was full payment either, and the fact that Atty. Armovit accepted it does not mean that he was satisfied that it was final payment. The fact of the matter is that the private respondent had assured him that the balance was forthcoming.The private respondent can not justifiably downplay Atty. Armovit as negligent (for failing to appeal) or his demand for fees excessive (that he had been paid enough). Atty. Armovit, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his client, an although his prayer for various damages were denied, he secceeded in obtaining a substantial award (P1,900,00.00 in unpaid rentals) for his client. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained his theory. It should be noted that the private respondent had in fact stood to lose substantial properties on foreclosure Atty. Armovit not only restored to the private respondent its foreclosured properties, he succeeded in having the private respondent's loans restructed and the Government Service Insurance System pay rentals. No client can ask a better result from a lawyer.Obviously, the private respondent's effort to downgrade Atty. Armovit's performance is a wild, if not cheap, shot of a client out to evade its obligations to its lawyer. The fact that Atty. Armovit may have been paid substantially (in initial fees) while the case was dragging is no justification for denying him the full amount under their agreement. It has been held that initial fees and fees paid in the progress of litigation are independent of the contingent fees.17That the retainer agreement was never approved by the board of the corporation is also a poor excuse because the fact of the matter is that the private respondent did deliver to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 in partial payment, and the private respondent can not now deny him the balance bay alleging lack of authority of the Bengson spouses.Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction.18It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable;19however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case ofAro v. Naawa,20decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.Several times, we have come down hard on erring practitioners. We will not however be slow either, in coming to the rescue of aggrieved brother-lawyers in protecting the integrity of the bar from unscrupulous litigants.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent.IT IS SO ORDERED.G.R. Nos. 89971-75 October 17, 1990CELIA B. CHUA, MARITES P. MARTINEZ and ARACELI A. ELARDO, For Themselves and in Their Capacity as Attorneys-In-Fact of 2,345, Former Daily-Paid Employees of Stanford microsystems. Inc., LUDIVINA L. SABALZA, ADELIZA E. CANTILLO and REMIGIO P. PESTAO, For Themselves and in Their Capacity As Attorneys-In-Fact of 3,244 Former Daily-Paid Employees of Stanford Microsystems, Inc., MARIO A. MENTIL, REMIGIO F. SANTOS and NOEL VILLENA, For Themselves and in Their Capacity As Attorneys-In-Fact of 599 Former Monthly-Paid Employees of Stanford Microsystems Inc., MAXIMO E. DAQUIL, GEORGE T. BARTOLOME and ERNESTO L. CONCEPCION, For Themselves and in Their Capacity As Attorneys-In-Fact of 300 Former Non-Unionized and Confidential Employees of Stanford Microsystems, Inc., and LIQUIDATION COMMITTEE OF STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC., Duly Appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION LABOR ARBITER DOMINADOR M. CRUZ, Public Respondents, and FERNANDO R.GUMABON, CARMELITA TOLENTINO, RICARTE CABASE, TERESITA ALORAN, ENCARNITA JULIANO, ANITA DAILEG, ERNESTO ALARCON, JOHNNY ARAGON, LEONCIO PIMENTEL, RODOLFO MERCADO, DANIEL ALMAZAN, ORLANDO DE LEON, EDITHA LIMA, MARILYN INES, LINDA ESTABA, NELIA DE BORJA, CECILIA CRUZ, FE RAYALA, ADELIZA MOYA, NATY LAMAN, JANET PONCE, ESTELA ALABASO, MILAGROS CERRA, JOSEPHINE BAYONETA and ANNABELLE SALABIT privaterespondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:The instant petition questions the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in issuing three (3) resolutions dated October 6, 1988, November 3, 1988 and January 3, 1990 in NLRC Injunction Case No. 1793. The October 6, 1988 resolution denied for lack of merit the petitioners' petition for writ of prohibition to stay further proceedings in the five (5) consolidated labor cases involving the former employees of Stanford Microsystems, Inc. pending with respondent Labor Arbiter Dominador M. Cruz. The November 3, 1988 resolution ordered petitioners' Liquidation Committee of Stanford Microsystems, Inc. to defer the payment of SIX MILLION PESOS (P6,000,000.00) to the former employees of Stanford Microsystems, Inc. The January 3, 1990 resolution, among others directed petitioner Liquidation Committee to deposit with the NLRC the deducted attorney's fees representing ten percent (10%) of the amount due and/or to be paid to the former employees of Stanford Microsystems Inc.In December, 1985, Stanford Microsystems, Inc. (Stanford) a service conductor corporation filed a petition for suspension of payments and appointment of rehabilitation receiver (Annex "A", Petition) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The petition was docketed as SEC Case No. 2930. At that time, Stanford had seven (7) secured creditor banks and more or less seven thousand one hundred twenty-four (7,124) employees.On February 5, 1986, the SEC declared Stanford to be in a state of suspension of payments. It issued an order (Annex "B", Petition) appointing Sycip Gorres & Velayo & Co. (SGV) as the rehabilitation receiver.In view of these developments, the former employees of Stanford filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) cases for money claims, to wit:(a) STANFORD TECHNICAL AND OFFICE STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (STOSEA)-FFW, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, NOEL VILLENA AND FOR AND IN BEHALF OF ITS EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY SUM (860) MEMBERS,Complainants, v. STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC. AND CRISTINO CONCEPCION, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, Respondents, NLRC-NCR CASE NOS. 1-106-86 AND 1-117-86, filed by herein Petitioners Mario A. Mentil, Noel Villena, and Remigio F. Santos, acting for themselves and as the duly appointed Attorneys-In-Fact of Five Hundred Ninety Nine (599) Monthly-Paid Employees for Stanford, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana--for illegal lockout and payment of thirteenth month pay, vacation leave and sick leave benefits and subsidiary seminar fund and recreational activities fund.Thiscase has been decided but execution was suspended upon motion of the complainants;(b) RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, ET AL., Petitioners, v. STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC., Respondent, NCR CASE NO. 1-294-86, filed by herein Petitioners Rodolfo Fernandez, for himself, Maximo E. Daquil George T. Bartolome and Ernesto L. Concepcion, acting for themselves and as the duly appointed Attorneys-In-Fact of Three Hundred (300) Confidential and Non-Unionized employees of Stanford, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela-which case have been archived at the instance of the complainants;(c) STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC. LABOR UNION-FFWPetitioners,v. STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC., Respondent, CASE NO. 1-039-86, filed by herein Petitioners Celia B. Chua, Araceli A. Elardo and Marites P. Martinez, acting for themselves and as the duly appointed Attorneys-In-Fact of Two Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five (2,345) Daily-Paid employees of Stanford, and formerly assigned to Labor Arbiter Benigno C. Villarente, now assigned to Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez which case has been decided but the execution of the decision and the case archived at the instance of the complainants;(d) LUDIVINA L. SABALZA, ADELIZA E. CANTILLO, REMIGIO P. PESTAO, ET AL., Complainantsv. STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC. ET AL.,Respondents, CASE NO. 12-4882-86, filed by herein Petitioners Ludivina L. Ssbalza, Adelina E. Cantillo, and Remegio P. Pestao, acting for themselves and as the duly appointed Attorneys-In-Fact of Three Thousand Two Hundred Forty Four (3,244) Daily-Paid employees of Stanford, and formerly assigned to Labor Arbiter EvangelineLubaton for payment of separation pay, back (strike duration) pay and thirteenth month pay for 1985, cash conversion of vacation leave and sick leave and other money claims.The petitioner Stanford Liquidation Committee has intervened in this case and moved to stay proceedings;(e) SMI LABOR UNION-FFW ET AL., Petitioners v.STANFORDMICROSYSTEMS, INC.Respondent, NCR-NS-3-124-85, CASE NO. 3-753-86, filed by herein Petitioners Ludivina L. Sabalza, Adelina E. Cantillo, and Remigio P. Pestao, acting for themselves and as the duly appointed Attorneys-In-Fact of Three Thousand Two Hundred Forty Four (3,244) Daily-Paid employees of Stanford, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Dominador M. Cruz for payment of separation pay, back (strike duration) pay and thirteenth month pay for 1985, cash