august 1997 alerts - federal aviation administration · aircraft owners, operators, maintenance...

General AviationAirworthinessAlerts

AC No. 43-16

ALERT NO. 229AUGUST 1997

Improve Reliability-Interchange ServiceExperience

A LER TS

August 1997 FAA AC 43-16

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FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICEMike Monroney Aeronautical Center

The General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts provide acommon communication channel through which the aviationcommunity can economically interchange service experienceand thereby cooperate in the improvement of aeronauticalproduct durability, reliability, and safety. This publication isprepared from information submitted by those of you whooperate and maintain civil aeronautical products. Thecontents include items that have been reported as significant,but which have not been evaluated fully by the time thematerial went to press. As additional facts such as cause andcorrective action are identified, the data will be published insubsequent issues of the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts’readers prompt notice of conditions reported via Malfunctionor Defect Reports. Your comments and suggestions forimprovement are always welcome. Send to: FAA;ATTN: Designee Standardization Branch (AFS-640);P.O. Box 25082; Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20590

GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS ALERTS

UNAPPROVED PARTSNOTIFICATIONS

The following “Unapproved PartsNotifications” were issued by the FAA as“official notice” to everyone of the existence ofthese parts. Everyone is urged to comply withthe recommendations included in each ofthese “Unapproved Parts Notifications.”(The following “Unapproved PartsNotifications” are printed exactly as they werereceived.)

UNAPPROVED PARTS NOTIFICATIONNO. 97-030May 5, 1997

AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: Installed on, butnot limited to, Robinson R-22 Helicopters.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this notification is to advise allowners, operators, and maintenance entities ofRobinson R-22 helicopters that certain rotorblades were improperly repaired.

During the course of an accident investigationinvolving two fatalities, it was revealed thetail rotor blade assembly, part number A029-1,for the Robinson R-22 helicopter had beenimproperly repaired by Cherry Air Specialties,also known as CAS International, previouslylocated in Torrance, CA and presently inBuckeye, AZ. The investigation determinedthat there was strong reason to believe thatCherry Air Specialties/CAS Internationalimproperly repaired at least three sets of tailrotor blades. Those blades may have beenidentified as tail rotor assemblies, partnumber A008-2. No serial numbers areavailable for the blade or rotor assemblies. Thewhereabouts of these parts is unknown.

FAA AC 43-16 August 1997

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A subsequent suspected unapproved partsinvestigation by the Federal AviationAdministration, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, and the Department ofTransportation Office of Inspector Generalindicated that Cherry Air Specialties/CASInternational may also have altered the totaltime-since-new information in the componentlife historical records and serviceable tags ofthe above tail rotor blade assembly and othermain rotor blade assemblies along with theirassociated drive components.

It is important to note that examination ofother documents, as well as a signedstatement from the individual underinvestigation, have revealed possible evidenceof additional improper maintenance practiceson other helicopter makes and models.

RECOMMENDATION:

Regulations require that type certificatedproducts conform to their type design.

Robinson R-22 helicopter owners, operatorsand maintenance entities should inspect allin-stock and installed main rotor blades, tailrotor blades and associated drive componentsto determine if any were received from CherryAir Specialties or CAS International. If so,those items should be checked for evidence ofunapproved repairs or alterations and shouldinclude a review of the component’s lifehistorical record to substantiate itsauthenticity. If irregularities are indicated,appropriate action should be taken.

Other helicopter makes and models havingmain rotor blades, tail rotor blades, andcomponents overhauled or repaired by CherryAir Specialties or CAS International should beinspected for compliance with FAA approveddata.

FURTHER INFORMATION:

Further information may be obtained from theFlight Standards District Office (FSDO)referenced below. The FAA would appreciateany information concerning the discovery ofthe above referenced unapproved parts fromany source, the means used to identify the

source, and the actions taken to remove themfrom aircraft and/or stock.

This notice originated from the Long BeachFSDO, 5001 Airport Plaza Drive, Suite 100,Long Beach, CA 90815, telephone(562) 420-1755, fax (562) 420-6765, and waspublished through the Suspected UnapprovedParts Program Office, AVR-20, phone(703) 661-0581, fax (703) 661-0113.


AFFECTED AIRCRAFT:

Teledyne Continental Motors and AvcoLycoming Engines overhauled or repaired byStandard Aircraft, Inc. or Quality Engines, Inc.

PURPOSE:

This Unapproved Parts Notification containsinformation regarding investigation of QualityEngines, Inc., John’s Island, South Carolina,and Standard Aircraft, Inc., Belmont,North Carolina.

NOTE: Standard Aero, Inc., is notaffiliated with Standard Aircraft, Inc.

This notice is to advise all owners, operators,and maintenance entities of investigations ofnoncertificated engine overhaul facilities. Theinvestigation was based on numerouscustomer complaints of poor workmanship,failure to meet standards, and prematurefailures on overhauled engines and engineaccessories. These companies have been, orare now, owned and operated by eitherZackery Scott Stroupe orAnthony Mark Stroupe. Over the years, theseindividuals did business and/or were involvedin the following companies:

Standard Aircraft, Inc., Service Performance,Inc., Quality Engines, Inc., Air Palmetto, Inc.,Coastal Air Engines, Inc., Air Engines, Inc.,Veterans Airmotive, Inc., Aero TechEngineering, Inc., Gastonia AircraftEngines, Inc., Aviation Products Int’l, Inc.,


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Gastonia Air Engines, Inc., PerformanceAir, Inc.

BACKGROUND:

During this investigation, it was determinedthat the above named companies may havebeen involved in aircraft engine overhaulsthat were contrary to Title 14 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (14 CFR). Discrepanciesin engine and accessory overhaul recordsindicated work accomplished by StandardAircraft, Inc. and Quality Engines, Inc. wasnot performed in accordance with acceptedindustry standards and the performancerequirements of 14 CFR Part 43.

The nature of the noncompliance is as follows:

a. Current manufacturers’ overhaulmanuals and illustrated parts catalogs werenot available or being used during theoverhaul of Teledyne Continental Motors andLycoming reciprocating engines andaccessories.

b. The use of used/replacement parts thatdid not meet the engine manufacturersminimum service limits requirements.

c. Accessories were overhauled or repairedby noncertificated repair facilities(i.e., repairs performed by automotive electricshops that did not have current aircraftoverhaul manuals). Some of thenondestructive testing (NDT) work was doneby a non-certificated facility and componentswere approved for return to service by amechanic who had no formal training in NDTprocedures.

d. Engines were returned to servicewithout the proper documentation of workaccomplished, service instructions, bulletincompliance, and AD compliance.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Aircraft owners, operators, maintenanceentities, parts distributors, suppliers, andmanufacturers should determine if any workwas accomplished on the referenced engine by

the above named companies. If work wasaccomplished, the following should be done:

a. The part or component should beinspected and checked for serviceability andconformity.

b. Particular attention should be given tothe engine log book entries, maintenancerelease tags, invoices, and any otherdocumentation concerning parts in theengines/accessories that were overhauled orrepaired. Those items should be reviewed forauthenticity and to substantiate thecomponent’s historical record.

c. If an engine experienced major problemssuch as complete engine failure, prematureaccessory failure, low cylinder compression,burnt valves, piston failure, metal in the oilscreen, engine overheating indications andother indications of improperly performedwork, it should be reported to the local FlightStandards District Office (FSDO) bytelephone, fax, or by a Malfunction and DefectReport.

Regulations require that type certificatedproducts conform to their type design.In instances where an unauthorizedprocedure and/or repair has beenaccomplished, appropriate action should betaken.


The FSDO listed below would appreciate anyinformation regarding the discovery of theabove problems from any source, the meansused to identify the source, and the actionstaken to remove them from aircraft and/orstock.

This notice originated from the Charlotte,North Carolina FSDO, 4700 Yorkmont Road,Rm. 203, Charlotte, NC 28208, telephone(704) 344-6488, fax (704) 344-6485, and waspublished through the Suspected UnapprovedParts Program Office, AVR-20, telephone(703) 661-0581, fax (703) 661-0113.


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AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: Fokker F-27.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this notification is to advise allowners, operators, and maintenance entities ofan unapproved procedure that wasaccomplished on certain parts of the nosewheel steering assemblies of F-27 aircraft.

BACKGROUND:

During an FAA suspected unapproved partssafety investigation, it was revealed thatcertain nosewheel steering assembliesindicated a staking procedure was used to aidin retention of the planetary gear pins and thedowel pins contained in the housing assembly.It appeared that this staking procedure wasutilized during the repair or overhaul of thehousing assemblies. The housing assembly iscontained within the nosewheel steeringassembly. This is an unauthorized procedureand contributed to a nosegear-up landing by aforeign operator. The component overhaulmanual calls for oversizing the holes andinstalling larger pins, not this stakingprocedure.

The steering assemblies that could incorporatethis procedure are identified by part numbers893477 and 893477-01, and the housingassemblies are identified by part numbers891808 and 893970-01. There are indicationsthat more than one company utilized thisunauthorized procedure.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Aircraft owners, operators, maintenanceentities, parts distributors, suppliers, andmanufacturers should determine if they havereceived or installed the above housingassemblies. If stake marks are apparentaround the gear pin and dowel pin holes,further inspection or review of themaintenance records is recommended toascertain that the approved oversizing

procedure had been accomplished subsequentto the unapproved staking procedure.

Regulations require that type certificatedproducts conform to their type design. Ininstances where this unauthorized procedurehas been utilized, appropriate action should betaken.


The FAA Flight Standards District Office(FSDO), listed below, would appreciate anyinformation that you could provide concerningthe discovery of these assemblies from anysource, the means used to identify the source,and the actions taken to remove them fromaircraft and/or stock.

This notice originated from the St. LouisFSDO, 10801 Pear Tree Lane, Suite 200,St. Ann, MO 63074, telephone (314) 429-0209,fax (314) 429-6367, and was published throughthe Suspected Unapproved Parts ProgramOffice, AVR-20, telephone (703) 661-0581, fax(703) 661-0113.

UNAPPROVED PARTS NOTIFICATIONNO. 96-186June 18, 1997

AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: Boeing, Lockheed,and McDonnell Douglas aircraft, as well ascertain corporate aircraft.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this Unapproved PartsNotification is to advise all aircraft owners,operators and maintenance organizations thata large number of nickel cadmium battery cellsused in Saft, Marathon, and othermanufacturers’ batteries, have beenimproperly repaired and/or altered.

BACKGROUND:

During the course of a suspected unapprovedparts investigation, it was revealed that manynickel cadmium battery cells had beenimproperly repaired and/or altered by D&CAirparts Corporation, Repair Station


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MJ4R364M, 485 West 27th Street,Hialeah, Florida 33010. The repairs and/oralterations did not return the cells to theiroriginal or properly altered condition, and, infact, caused leaking battery cells, internalplate trimming, high internal cell resistance,and low cell capacity. These conditions maylead to uncontrollable thermal runaway ofa battery. D&C Airparts also approved forreturn to service emergency light battery packassemblies. No authority was ever granted toD&C Airparts to perform maintenance onthose assemblies.

RECOMMENDATION:

Regulations require that type certificatedproducts conform to their type design. Aircraftowners, operators, maintenance organizations,manufacturers, and parts suppliers shouldinspect their aircraft and/or aircraft partsinventory for battery cells or completebatteries or emergency light battery packassemblies repaired and/or altered by D&CAirparts Corporation. If these items areinstalled in an aircraft, it is recommended thatthey be removed until such time as they can beinspected for conformity and/or approved forreturn to service appropriately. If found inexisting aircraft parts stock, it isrecommended they be quarantined to preventinstallation in aircraft.


Further information may be obtained from theFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) FlightStandards District Office (FSDO) shownbelow. The FAA would appreciate anyinformation concerning the discovery of theabove referenced unapproved parts from anysource, the means used to identify the sourceand the action taken to remove them fromaircraft or stock.

This notice originated from the Miami FSDO,P.O. Box 592015, Miami, FL 33159, telephone(305) 526-2568, fax (305) 526-2698 and waspublished through the Suspected UnapprovedParts Program Office, AVR-20, telephone(703) 661-0581, fax (703) 661-0113.

AIRPLANES

BEECH

Beech Nose Landing GearModel C-23 FailureSundowner 3222

The pilot reported that the nose landing gearcollapsed during landing.

An evaluation disclosed that the lower noselanding gear strut housing (P/N 169-810011-27)had broken. The structure failed at the upperfastener holes. This is the point where thenose gear steering collar was attached. Thesubmitter did not offer a cause for this failure;however, this area should be given closeattention during scheduled inspections andmaintenance.

Part total time-4,079 h

Beech Nose Landing GearModel C24R FailureSierra 3222

During a landing approach, the nose landinggear would not extend. All attempts to extendthe nose gear failed and a “nose gear up”landing was made.

An inspection disclosed the nose landing gearwas jammed in the nose gear well. The tirewas hitting the end of the wheel wellpreventing the nose gear from extending.Further inspection revealed the roll pin(P/N MS9048-180) installed in the compressorassembly (P/N 169-380003-7) had sheared.(Refer to the following illustration.) This rollpin holds the rod (P/N 169-810000-111) in thecompressor assembly. Installation of theseparts, along with the shock absorber pads, inthe nose gear housing results in a compressionload on the pads and a shear load on the rollpin. Failure of the shear pin allows the pads toexpand and the nose gear fork and tire toextend.


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When correctly installed the roll pin is notvisible. Should the roll pin be visible in thecompressor assembly, it may indicate that thenose gear strut is incorrectly adjusted or theroll pin has failed. The only requiredmaintenance check in the manufacturer’smaintenance manual is related to “hardlanding inspections.” The submitterrecommended the requirements of the “hardlanding inspection” related to the nose strutcompressor assembly be accomplished each100 hours of operation.

Part total time not

reported.

Beech Landing GearModel C24R MalfunctionSierra 3230

The pilot reported that after landing, theaircraft was parked on the ramp, and theengine was shut down. The aircraft masterswitch was still in the “on” position. As thepilot was preparing to exit the aircraft, hiscoat inadvertently caught on the landing gearcontrol switch moving it to the “up” position.The landing gear immediately collapsed.

An investigation revealed the differentialpressure switch (P/N 90-380010-11) had notdisengaged when the airspeed was reduced.Further examination disclosed the pressureswitch bellows were defective. The submitterspeculated this allowed the landing gear toretract with the aircraft on the ground.

The submitter recommended the manufacturerauthorize the use of a “squat” switch in placeof the pressure switch.

Part total time 3,153 hours.

Beech Vacuum SystemHeatModel F33A DamageBonanza 3710

The submitter of this report stated thatnormal routing of the auxiliary instrumentvacuum system plumbing subjects it to heatdamage.

At one point especially, the plumbing passesvery close to the exhaust stack on the left sideof the engine. A vacuum system filter isinstalled at this location to which a plastichose (P/N 131823H12A0030) is used to attachthe filter to a ridged line. The hose does nottolerate the heat it is exposed to at thislocation. The submitter recommended that“a high quality, high temperature silicone hosebe installed in place of the cheaper factoryhose.”

Part total time-1,055 hours.


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Beech Nose Landing GearModel 58P Door MalfunctionBaron 3231

The pilot reported hearing an abnormal noisewhen the landing gear was retracted and againwhen the gear was extended. A safe landingwas made and maintenance technicians weresummoned.

An investigation disclosed that a section of theshaft assembly (P/N 002-410038-1), whichcloses the nose gear doors, had broken. Thisallowed the doors to rotate freely on theirhinges. The submitter speculated the doorswere held closed by the slipstream, and theabnormal noise was generated when the nosegear forced the doors to open during extensionof the gear.

Part total time not reported.

Beech Defective OxygenModel B100 Cylinder SecurityKing Air 3500

During a scheduled inspection, an oxygencylinder support bracket was found cracked.

Both the left and right support brackets(P/N 178000-1) for the oxygen cylinder locatedin the aft section of the aircraft were crackedat the “cutout” used to accommodate theclamping band. Oxygen cylinder securityshould not be taken lightly. Even small defectshave the potential to result in personalinjuries and aircraft damage.


CESSNA

Cessna Worn WingModel 150M Attachment AreaCommuter 5740

This aircraft was being disassembled forrefurbishment when this defect wasdiscovered.

The right wing main spar attachment fittingwas found “eroded” in the area just outboard of

an attachment hole. (Refer to the followingillustration.) Additional evidence of similardamage was found at the lower end of theright lift strut. All of the wear found wasindicative of a limited fore-and-aft “swing” ofthe entire wing structure. All of the wingattachment bolts were properly torqued, andthere was no fastener hole elongation at thefittings. The submitter could not determinethe cause of this defect. It is recommendedthat this area be given close attention duringinspections and maintenance.


Cessna Passenger SeatModel 172K FailureSkyhawk 2510

The front passenger seat fore-and-aftadjustment handle (P/N 1200504-1) broke atthe pivot point, allowing the arm to separatefrom the pivot point, and the seat locking pinwould not engage the seat rail. The passengerseat was then free in a fore-and-aft direction.This allowed the seat to move freely accordingto the combination of engine powerapplications and flight attitudes.


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The submitter suggested that both front seatsbe closely inspected for wear andserviceability during scheduled inspections.


Cessna Excessive Seat RailModel 172 WearSkyhawk 2510

All of the seat rails (P/N 0511243-5) and rollerswere replaced. After 529 hours of operation,the fourth adjustment hole from the forwardend was found worn beyond limits.

The seat rails were originally replaced inaccordance with Airworthiness Directive(AD) 87-20-03R2 which establishes the wearlimits. In accordance with this AD, the firstinspection after replacement of the seat railsis due after 1,000 hours of operation.

The submitter recommended the FAA reviseAD 87-20-03R2 to require inspection of theseat rails after 500 hours of operation afterreplacement. Air taxi operators who makefrequent stops may experience an acceleratedwear rate on the seat rails and are cautionedto have the seat rails inspected as frequentlyas possible.

This report has been sent to the responsibleFAA aircraft certification office forappropriate action.

Part total time as stated above.

Cessna Horizontal StabilizerModel R182 CrackSkylane RG 5512

During an annual inspection, the lefthorizontal stabilizer (P/N 1232600-31) wasfound cracked.

The crack was located in a reinforcement(P/N 0732101-4). This reinforcement was usedfor attachment of the horizontal stabilizer tothe empennage. The submitter did notmention the length, extent, or cause of thecrack. No other details could be obtained;however, it would be wise to thoroughly

inspect this area during maintenance andscheduled inspections.


Cessna Defective NoseModel P210 Landing Gear DoorCenturion Linkage

3231

During a scheduled inspection, the noselanding gear door linkage was found damaged.

The left nose landing gear door rod-end stud(P/N S2321L3) was found partially separatedfrom the rod-end. (Refer to the followingillustration.) The rod-end and stud assemblyexhibited evidence of severe wear. Completeseparation of the linkage at this point wouldallow the door to jam during operation of thenose gear or swing freely in the airstream.


Cessna Nose Landing GearModel T210 Actuator DefectCenturion 3230

During an annual inspection, a crack wasfound in the nose landing gear actuator.

The crack was located at the “bearing end” ofthe downlock actuator (P/N 1280514-7).It appeared the crack originated at thedownlock pin location and extended forwardand longitudinally around the casting. CessnaService Bulletin (SEB) 95-20, which requiresa check of “free play” on the downlock pin, hadrecently been accomplished with no “play”reported. The submitter stated this conditionpresented the possibility of a nose landinggear failure in the near future.


Cessna Defective NoseModel 404 Section StructureTitan 5320

The pilot reported experiencing severenosewheel shimmy during landing.

The aircraft was taken into a hangar and


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jacked for inspection. The inspection revealedthe nosewheel shimmy was caused by both theleft and right “tee” extrusions(P/N’s 5213040-11 left and 5213040-12 right)being broken. (Refer to the followingillustration.) These extrusion “tee” angles arepart of the primary structural support for thenose landing gear trunnion. The submitterfound another like aircraft with sheared rivetsin the same area. This is a critical area anddeserves your full attention during inspectionsand maintenance.


attached to the wing spar web just aft of theengine. When the ground lug was removed,evidence of electrical arcing was discovered.The lug attachment hole in the wing spar webwas originally .375 inch diameter and had beenburned to an approximate diameter of 1 inch.

Security of electrical connections is veryimportant and deserves your full attentionduring inspections and maintenance.


Cessna Fuel Line DamageModel 441 2820Conquest II

During a scheduled inspection, the main fuelline from the boost pump “tee” to the fuelcrossfeed shutoff valve was found chafedbeyond limits.

The fuel line (P/N 5700113-3) was chafing ona wing rib (P/N 5722215-33) in the right wingat center wing station (CWS) 88.0. Since thishigh pressure fuel line is located adjacent toengine bleed air ducting, complete failure ofthe line would almost certainly producecatastrophic results. The submitterrecommended the fuel line be reformed toprovide adequate clearance from the wing riband other structures as well as chafeprotection where needed. The submitterstated finding this defect several times in thepast.


Cessna Rudder Skin CrackModel 560 5542Citation

During a scheduled inspection, a crack wasfound in the rudder skin.

The crack was located on the right lowerrudder skin (P/N 5533000-54). This was thesecond time a crack was found at this locationon the same rudder. The first crack wasdiscovered after 718 hours of operation.In both cases, the rudder skin was replaced.The submitter stated this was the ninthoccurrence of this defect in their fleet of like

Cessna Wing Spar DamageModel 425 5711Conquest

It was reported that during flight, the rightengine generator dropped “off line.” Thegenerator was reset several times, and eachtime it would stay on for a while then drop offagain.

During troubleshooting, the generatorelectrical ground was found to be defective.The ground lug was loose where it was


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PIPER

ALTERNATIVE LEVELING MEANS ANDRIGGING OF WING WASHOUT FOR PIPERPA-12, PA-12S, PA-14, PA-18 SERIES, AND

PA-19 AIRPLANES

The information contained in the followingarticle was submitted by Mr. Gordon Mandell,who is an aeronautical engineer with the FAAAircraft Certification Office, ACE-115N,located in Anchorage, Alaska.

This document has been approved by the FAAAircraft Certification Office, ACE-117A,located in Atlanta, Georgia. ACE-117A isresponsible for the Type Certificate DataSheet for the airplanes listed. Piper will issueservice information in the near futureauthorizing the use of this information.

This information is printed as it was approvedby ACE-117A.

This document may be used to supplement theinformation contained in Piper AircraftCorporation Service Memos No. 8, No. 9, andNo. 19 concerning leveling and setting thewing washout of Piper Aircraft Corporation(now The New Piper Aircraft, Inc.) ModelsPA-12, PA-12S, PA-14, PA-18 Series, and PA-19airplanes. This document is intended for usein cases where the airplane’s original levelingmarks cannot be found. It also containsinformation about setting the wing washoutthat is not found in the original ServiceMemos. For information concerning all otherprocedures for rigging the subject airplanesconsult the original Service Memos.

aircraft. It was speculated that an engineeringand/or a production problem led to this type ofdefect. This is an excellent area for your fullattention during scheduled inspections. Thisreport has been sent to the responsible FAAaircraft certification office for appropriateaction.


LUSCOMBE

Luscombe Landing Gear FailureModel LL-8-E 3213

Information for the following article wasfurnished by Mr. Darren Brown, who is anaviation safety inspector (airworthiness) withthe FAA Flight Standards District Officelocated in Richmond, Virginia.

The pilot stated that during the afterlandingrollout, the left main landing gear collapsed.

An examination disclosed that the left maingear lower leg (P/N 58383) had broken. Therewas evidence of severe corrosion inside thebore of the lower gear leg at the point where itattached to the axle. (Refer to the followingillustration.) It was speculated thatapproximately 70 percent of gear leg structurehad been consumed by the effects of corrosionat the point of failure. It was believed thecorrosion was caused by moisture and possibleother contaminates entering the inner core ofthe gear leg through the landing gear fairingattachment bolt holes. This area is difficult toproperly inspect due to the position of thegear fairing and the tie rod clevis. It wasrecommended this area be stripped of paintand inspected using dye penetrant to detectany cracks or pitting. It was also suggestedthat the strut be filled with linseed oil,allowed to soak for a time, and then drained. Itwould be wise to seal the landing gear fairingsat the strut attachment holes.



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Piper Models PA-12, PA-12S, and PA-14

1. If the original leveling marks cannot befound, the airplane can be leveled by deviatingfrom Step 1 of Piper Aircraft CorporationService Memo No. 8 for the PA-12 and PA-12S,or from Step 1 of Piper Aircraft CorporationService Memo No. 9 for the PA-14, as follows:

Level the airplane laterally by placing an18 inch spirit level on top of the member thatsupports the front edge of the rear seat andadjusting the heights of the jacks under themain landing gear axles to bring the bubble tocenter. Level the airplane longitudinally byplacing an 18 inch spirit level on the cabinfloor between the front and rear main landinggear attachment points. Position the leveloutboard of the front seat(s) on one side of thecabin, so that it is facing directly fore and aft,and place a 33/64 inch block under its rear end.Raise or lower the tail to bring the bubble tocenter. Repeat the procedure with the levelpositioned outboard of the front seat(s) on theother side of the cabin. If any difference in thetail height required to bring the bubble tocenter exists between the two sides, adjust thetail height so as to divide the differenceevenly.

An 18 inch digital level may be substitutedfor the spirit level. If a digital level is used,level the airplane laterally by placing the levelon top of the member that supports the frontedge of the rear seat and adjusting the heightsof the jacks under the main landing gear axlesuntil the level reads zero. Level the airplanelongitudinally by placing the level on the cabinfloor between the front and rear main landinggear attachment points. Position the leveloutboard of the front seat(s) on one side of thecabin, so that it is facing directly fore and aft,and place it flat against the floor. Raise orlower the tail until the level reads not lessthan +1.6 degrees nor more than +1.7 degrees(front end of level higher than rear end). Thenposition the level outboard of the front seat(s)on the other side of the cabin, so that it isfacing directly fore and aft, and place it flatagainst the floor. Observe the readingdisplayed by the level. If it is less than +1.6

degrees or more than +1.7 degrees, adjust thetail height until the average of the readingstaken on the left and right sides of the cabin isbetween +1.6 degrees and +1.7 degrees (theactual value, expressed to the nearestthousandth of a degree, is +1.665 degrees, butmost digital levels read to the nearest tenth ofa degree).

2. Step 3 of Piper Service Memo No. 8 for thePA-12 and PA-12S, and Step 3 of Piper ServiceMemo No. 9 for the PA-14, both instruct therigger (or two-person rigging crew) to set thewing washout after the airplane has beenleveled, as follows:

Place a 1 3/8 inch block under one wing atthe rear spar location at the outboard aileronrib. Place a 30 inch spirit level chordwiseacross this block with the front end of the levelat the front spar location. Adjust the rear liftstrut fork in or out to bring the bubble tocenter. When the bubble is centered the wingwill have the proper 2 1/2 degree washout.Repeat the procedure for the other wing.

The following additional information pertainsto this procedure:

a. The outboard aileron rib is the wing ribat the outboard end of the aileron bay. It islocated 169 11/16 inches outboard of the buttrib.

b. A spirit level up to 48 inches long maybe substituted for the 30 inch spirit level whensetting the washout using the original methoddescribed in the Service Memos. The front endof the level must be placed at the front sparlocation regardless of the length of the levelused. Excess length will extend aft past the 13/8 inch block.

c. A digital level 30 inches to 48 incheslong may be substituted for the spirit level. If adigital level is used, place it chordwise underone wing at the outboard aileron rib, with therear end of the level at the rear spar location.Excess length will extend forward past thefront spar location. Adjust the rear lift strutfork in or out until the level reads -2.6 degrees


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(front end of level lower than rear end). Whenthe level reads -2.6 degrees (the actual value,expressed to the nearest thousandth of adegree, is -2.627 degrees, but most digitallevels read to the nearest tenth of a degree)the wing will have the proper 2 1/2 degreewashout. Repeat the procedure for the otherwing.

d. Whether the washout is set by using aspirit level according to the original methoddescribed in the Service Memos or by using adigital level, the tolerance in the angle ofincidence of the outboard aileron rib is +/- 1/4of 1 degree. This is approximately equivalentto +/- 1/8 inch in the height of the 1 3/8 inchblock used with the spirit level in the originalmethod, or to +/- 0.2 degree in the reading ofthe digital level.

Piper PA-18 Model Series and PA-19

1. If the original leveling marks cannot befound, the airplane can be leveled by deviatingfrom the “LEVELING” step of Piper AircraftCorporation Service Memo No. 19 as follows:

Level the airplane laterally by placing an18 inch spirit level on top of the member thatsupports the front edge of the rear seat andadjusting the heights of the jacks under themain landing gear axles to bring the bubble tocenter. Level the airplane longitudinally byplacing an 18 inch spirit level on top of thebottom member of the door frame on the rightside of the cabin, or by placing a spirit level upto 30 inches long along the lower windowframe channel on the left side of the cabin.Raise or lower the tail to bring the bubble tocenter.

A digital level may be substituted for thespirit level. If a digital level is used, level theairplane laterally by placing the level on top ofthe member that supports the front edge of therear seat and adjusting the heights of the jacksunder the main landing gear axles until thelevel reads zero. Level the airplanelongitudinally by placing an 18 inch digitallevel on top of the bottom member of the doorframe on the right side of the cabin, or byplacing a digital level up to 30 inches long

along the lower window frame channel on theleft side of the cabin. Raise or lower the tailuntil the level reads zero.

2. The “WASH OUT” step of Piper ServiceMemo No.19 instructs the rigger (or two-person rigging crew) to set the wing washoutafter the airplane has been leveled, as follows:

Place a 3/8 inch spacer block on top of oneend of a 30 inch spirit level. Place the levelfore and aft along the bottom of the ribadjacent to the outer end of the aileron on onewing, with the spacer block at the rear of thelevel and the front end of the level at the frontspar location. Adjust the rear lift strut fork inor out to bring the bubble to center. Thecorrect washout will exist when the bubble iscentered. Repeat the procedure for the otherwing.

The following additional informationpertains to this procedure:

a. The rib adjacent to the outer end of theaileron is also called the outboard aileron ribor the wing rib at the outboard end of theaileron bay. It is located 166 3/4 inchesoutboard of the butt rib.

b. A spirit level up to 48 inches long maybe substituted for the 30 inch spirit level whensetting the washout using the original methoddescribed in the Service Memo. The front endof the level must be placed at the front sparlocation regardless of the length of the levelused. Excess length will extend aft past the3/8 inch block.

c. A digital level 30 inches to 48 inches longmay be substituted for the spirit level. If adigital level is used, place it fore and aft alongthe bottom of the rib adjacent to the outer endof the aileron on one wing, with the rear end ofthe level at the rear spar location. Adjust therear lift strut fork in or out until the levelreads -0.7 degree (front end of level lower thanrear end). When the level reads -0.7 degree(the actual value, expressed to the nearestthousandth of a degree, is -0.717 degree, butmost digital levels read to the nearest tenth ofa degree) the wing will have the correct


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washout. Repeat the procedure for the otherwing.

d. Whether the washout is set by using aspirit level according to the original methoddescribed in the Service Memo or by using adigital level, the tolerance in the angle ofincidence of the outboard aileron rib is +/- 1/4of 1 degree. This is approximately equivalentto +/- 1/8 inch in the height of the 3/8 inchblock used with the spirit level in the originalmethod, or to +/- 0.2 degree in the reading ofthe digital level.

e. The correct wing washout of the PiperPA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes is2 1/2 degrees, the same as that of the PiperPA-12, PA-12S, and PA-14 airplanes. ThePA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes,however, have a wing angle of incidence of+1.843 degrees at the wing root (inboard end;i.e., the centerlines of the wing butt hingebolts), while the PA-12, PA-12S, and PA-14airplanes have a wing root angle of incidenceof -0.060 degree. The negative angle ofincidence at which the outboard aileron ribs ofPA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes mustbe set in order to produce 2 1/2 degrees ofwashout is therefore much smaller than thenegative angle of incidence at which theoutboard aileron ribs of PA-12, PA-12S, andPA-14 airplanes must be set in order toproduce that same 2 1/2 degrees of washout.The wing span of PA-12, PA-12S, and PA-14airplanes is also 3 inches greater than that ofPA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes, andthe outboard aileron ribs of PA-12, PA-12S,and PA-14 airplanes are 4 9/16 inches fartherfrom the center of the fuselage than those ofPA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes.These differences in aircraft configurationaccount for the differences between theinstructions for setting the wing washout ofPA-18 model series and PA-19 airplanes at2 1/2 degrees and the instructions for settingthe wing washout of PA-12, PA-12S, and PA-14airplanes at 2 1/2 degrees.

Piper Technical DataModel PA 23-250 DiscrepancyAztec 2721

A maintenance technician discovered adiscrepancy between the Piper Aztec ServiceManual (P/N F753564) and the aircraft. Thediscrepancy concerned the rudder trim tabtravel limits.

After a discussion with a Piper representative,it was determined that the service manual isin error. The Piper representative confirmedthat a revision will be issued to correct thisproblem. Until the service manual revision isissued, the correct rudder trim tab travellimits should be obtained from TypeCertificate Data Sheet (TCDS) 1A10.

Piper Defective EngineModel PA 24-250 Compartment HosesComanche 2820, 2900, 3610, and

7920

During a scheduled inspection, all the flexiblehoses in the engine compartment were foundto be severely deteriorated.

This aircraft was manufactured in 1959, and itappeared that these hoses had been installedas original equipment. Flexible hoses are notdesigned or intended to last 38 years! Thesubmitter stated these hoses were “fossilizedand brittle.” This subject has been discussedmany times in this publication and otheraviation maintenance publications; however,we continue to receive this type of report.Even if this aircraft had been stored in aclimate-controlled hangar for this amount oftime, the hoses would not be serviceable.Maintenance personnel are cautioned toinspect and replace all “aircraft installed”hoses as necessary.



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Piper Firewall DefectsModel PA 28R-201T 5412Turbo Arrow

While removing the aircraft engine, the“galvanized” portion of the firewall was foundseverely corroded and deteriorated.

The area of damage was approximately3 inches in diameter and was located directlybehind the turbocharger. The insulation coverswere in place when this defect was discovered.The submitter stated that the close proximityof the turbocharger and the excessive heatgenerated by it caused this damage to thefirewall. It was recommended that themanufacturer develop and make available aheat shield assembly constructed of stainlesssteel to further protect this area from heatdamage.


Piper Landing Gear FailureModel PA 28RT-201T 3230Turbo Arrow

The pilot reported the landing gear would notextend using the normal extension system.The emergency system was used to lower thelanding gear, and a safe landing was made.

An investigation disclosed the hydraulicpowerpack reservoir fluid level was very low.There were no apparent hydraulic systemleaks after servicing and pressurizing thehydraulic system. The aircraft was placed onjacks, the landing gear was cycled severaltimes, and still there were no signs of leakage.After a diligent search, a hydraulic leak wasfound when the right side cabin upholsterywas removed. The upholstery material andinsulation was soaked with hydraulic fluid.The leak source was found to be a pin hole in ahydraulic line (P/N 67700-181) going to thenose gear actuator. The submitter speculatedthe pin hole in the hydraulic line was causedby corrosion.


Piper Stabilator CorrosionModel PA 28-236 5551Dakota

During an annual inspection and compliancewith Piper Service Bulletin (SB) 856, corrosionwas found at the stabilator attachmentfittings.

Two of the four stabilator attachment bracketswere severely corroded. (Refer to thefollowing illustration.) The attachmentbrackets are made of steel and attach to thealuminum stabilator skin. The submitterbelieved these two metals being in contactwith each other caused the corrosion. Eightmonths prior to this discovery this area hadbeen inspected for corrosion in accordancewith SB 856, and no corrosion was present atthat time. Therefore, the submitter suggestedthe manufacturer revise the inspectionschedule of SB 856 to 6 months or more often.



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Piper Elevator Spar CracksModel PA 31-350 5521Chieftain

While complying with Piper Service Bulletin(SB) 998, the left elevator spar was foundcracked in two places.

The spar (P/N 40075-14) was cracked at theoutboard end and adjacent to the inboard sideof the outboard attachment point. Thesubmitter suggested the manufacturer developand make available a “kit” to strengthen theelevator spars at the failure points outlinedin SB 998. All operators of aircraft to whichthis SB 998 applies are strongly urged tocomply with its content. This is especiallyurgent for high time aircraft.


Piper EngineCompartmentModel PA 31-350 Fuel LeakChieftain 2822

During a scheduled inspection, a fuel leak wasfound coming from the right enginecompartment.

Further investigation revealed the enginedriven fuel pump (P/N RG 9080J4A) was thesource of the leak. It appeared the leakoriginated from the pump body flanges. Thesubmitter speculated the cause of this defectcould be that the flange fasteners were notproperly torqued, the flange gasket wasdefective, or the flange gasket was notproperly installed. On several occasions, thesubmitter discovered that the gasket was“pinched.”

Part total time-510 hours.

Piper Engine Fuel LeakModel PA 31-350 2820Chieftain

A fuel leak was discovered in the vicinity ofthe right engine cowling.

An investigation revealed a flexible fuel line(P/N 39997-10) was leaking. This line wasattached to the emergency fuel pump(P/N 42113-05) and a ridged metal fuel line.Both of the flexible fuel line fittings wereproperly torqued and neither was leaking.

The exterior of the line was covered withstainless steel braid which appeared to be inexcellent condition. However, interior of theline was covered with a “rubber and fabricmaterial” and was severely deteriorated.The leak was located in approximately themiddle of the flexible line. The submitterstated this aircraft was manufactured in 1982,and this was probably the “original part” thatwas installed 15 years ago.


Piper Nose Landing GearModel PA 32R-301 Trunnion DefectSaratoga 3222

After a flight, the pilot noticed that a springwas hanging from the nose landing gear.

An investigation revealed the springattachment “ear” on the upper right forwardpart of the nose gear trunnion (P/N 67054-08)had broken. This was a relatively new aircraft,and the submitter speculated the defectivetrunnion “ear” was caused during themanufacturing process.


AMERICAN EUROCOPTER


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HELICOPTERS

AMERICAN EUROCOPTER

American Eurocopter Defective HydraulicModel 105 CBS ControlTwinjet II

The Pilot stated that the helicopter hydraulicsystem switched to the number 2 systemduring flight. A landing was made and thenumber 1 hydraulic system was reset. Again,the hydraulic control system switched to thenumber 2 system.

An investigation disclosed that the guideassembly (P/N D133-1454.01E) switch (P/N10DB4) had shorted to ground. The helicopterhad been operating in high humidity, rain, andsnow conditions and there was a great deal ofmoisture present under the guide assemblycover. It was speculated that the moisturecontributed to this defect.


American Eurocopter Defective Fuel FlowControl

Model AS350B 7320Ecureuil

The pilot reported that during a landingapproach, the rotor RPM was higher thannormal after the collective was lowered tobegin a decent. The rotor RPM did not changewhen the collective was raised, in a effort torestore the rotor RPM to normal.

When the fuel flow control lever was used, inan effort to slow the rotor RPM, the RPMindication went well below normal. A safelanding was made and maintenance personnelinspected the aircraft.

They discovered that the fuel flow control(anticipator) cable (P/N 704A34-130-30) wasbinding adjacent to the point where it attached

to the fuel flow control. It was recommendedthis cable be inspected for operationalcondition at every opportunity.


AGUSTA

Agusta Tail rotor BearingFailure

Model 109 K2 6520

During a preflight inspection, the duplexbearing (P/N 109-0133-05-101) seal was founddetached from the bearing.

After disassembly, it was discovered that all ofthe lubricant had been lost. Several of the“bearing balls” were missing from the outerduplex bearing. The submitter did not offer acause for this defect. It was stated that theduplex bearing was severely deteriorated.


BELL/GARLIC

Bell/Garlic Tailboom Spar CapCrack

Model UH-1B 5302Huey

During a routine inspection, the tailboom sparcap was found cracked.

This area had been inspected prior to the lastflight and there was no damage to the spar capat that time. The previous flight was 1 hourlong and the submitter stated the crackdeveloped during that time. Also, the crackfracture surfaces and other available evidenceindicated an instantaneous failure. GarlicHelicopters Alert Service Bulletin (SB) UH1-96-04 had been complied with. This SBrequires removal of a rivet which may induce


17

stress at the defect location. This tailboom hadaccumulated a large number of operatinghours in external load logging operations.

Tailboom total time-2,500 hours.

BELL

Bell Inflight EngineFailure

Model 47G5 7160Engine Textron LycomingModel VO-435-B1A

The engine lost power during flight. Thisresulted in a safe auto-rotation landing.

An investigation revealed that the gasket,installed between the air filter housing andthe carburetor inlet was not properlyinstalled. One corner of the gasket (P/N 47-615-004-1) folded over allowing an opening tothe atmosphere. This opening allowed debristo enter the carburetor and block critical airpassages. The submitter believed the gaskethad been improperly installed previously. Itwould be a good idea to inspect the engine airinduction system at every opportunity.


Bell Defective CrossTube Bracket

Model 206 L-4 3210Long Ranger

During a daily inspection, a crack was found ina landing gear cross tube attachment bracket.

The cross tube attachment bracket (P/N 206-030-104-023) was installed at the forward leftposition. The crack appeared to haveoriginated at the middle of the bracket radiusfor the cross tube and extended to the left.(Refer to the following illustration.) Thesubmitter did not offer a cause for this defectand there was no mention of corrosion of thebracket or the cross tube.


AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT

GRUMMAN

Grumman Main Landing GearFailure

Model G164B 3211Ag Cat

When the pilot made a turn to line up fortakeoff, the left main landing gear collapsed.The aircraft had a full load of fertilizer whenthis incident occurred.

An examination revealed damage to thepropeller, a stud assembly (P/N A1518-111),and the landing gear beam bracket assembly(P/N A1322-001). The cause of the landing gearcollapse was determined to be failure of alanding gear attachment bolt (P/N MS20009-138). This bolt was installed at the rearattachment position. The bolt failed at thejunction of the bolt shank and the head. It isrecommended these bolts be examined by dyepenetrant inspection at least annually.



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AMATEUR, SPORT, ANDEXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT

Glasair Landing Gear FailureModel III 3200

The pilot reported that the landing gear failedto retract after takeoff. It was stated that the 3“green” indicator lights remained illuminatedthroughout the flight.

During a precautionary landing, all 3 landinggear collapsed. The left main gear collapsedfirst, followed by the right main gear andfinally the nose gear. The significance of theorder of failure was not given. The cause of thelanding gear failure had not been thoroughlyinvestigated or determined at the time of thisreport. If further information is received itwill be printed in a future edition of thispublication.


Revolution Helicopter Airframe VibrationModel Mini 500 1810Engine RotaxModel 582

The pilot reported that at 100 per cent engineRPM, a very high frequency vibration wasnoticed. The vibration seemed to originate inthe airframe. The engine RPM was loweredand the helicopter was landed immediately.

A test using a “Chadwick” instrument,disclosed a vibration level at the clutchassembly of 8.0 inches per second at 6500RPM. The clutch assembly was removed andsent to the manufacturer for rebalancing.When the clutch was reinstalled, anothervibration test revealed no change in thevibration level.

This is an exceptionally high vibration leveland can produce structural failure of theairframe in a short period of time. Thesubmitter of this report seemed to beconvinced that the clutch assembly was causeof vibrations. There was no mention of

investigating other vibration causes.Owners, operators, and maintenancetechnicians should consult thehelicopter manufacturer for acceptablevibration limits. These limits should bestrictly followed to prevent catastrophicairframe failure.


ACCESSORIES

CABIN INTERIOR LIGHTING

This report concerns the use offluorescent lighting in the cabin interiorof a Gulfstream, Model G-IV-SP aircraft.The dangerous condition presented bythis type of defect can, and has, occurredon many other make and model ofaircraft. For that reason, this article ispresented to inform all of the possibledangers.

The lower fluorescent lamp on the rightside of the aft cabin was found to beinoperative.

When the cover was removed thefluorescent tube (P/N BR9800-005) wasfound burned completely through andseparated. The area of damage wasapproximately .5 inch from one end ofthe tube. A small fire had occurred asevidenced by smoke, fire stains, and firedamage in the adjacent area. This lightfixture has been sent to themanufacturer for evaluation. If furtherinformation is obtained, it will beprinted in a future edition of thispublication.

Heat problems associated withfluorescent light fixtures are usuallycaused by the ballast. However, apossible hazardous situation may occurwhenever excessive heat is generated inan aircraft cabin.



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STROBE LIGHT SYSTEMS ARCING

All Aircraft Equipped with High Voltage StrobeLight Systems

Several service difficulty reports (SDRs)indicate that aircraft high voltage strobe lightsystems are susceptible to wire chafing,flashtube burnout, and arcing.

One report indicated a Beech Model 60outboard wing panel exploded during takeoffwhen leaking fuel fumes contacted a chafedand arcing strobe light wire. Another reportindicated that during a routine preflightwalkaround inspection a Cessna Model 310wingtip flashtube was found burned throughand arcing to the case. The pilot reported loudpopping noises. There are several reports ofwires chafing at flashtube housing assemblies,power supply locations, loose wire-to-housingconnections, and various structural locationswhere wires chafe due to aircraft structuralmotion on the ground and in flight.

Several reports indicate unsecured extra wirebundle length allowed chafing contact with thesurrounding structure. One report indicatesthat the wire bundle was too short, resultingin chafing and shorting at the strobe lighthousing.

It is recommend that operators of aircraftequipped with high voltage strobe lightsystems conduct daily walkaround inspectionswhile the strobe lights are operating.Specifically, pay attention to decreased strobelight bulb intensity or changes in flashsequence, and listen for popping or arcingsounds that may indicate internal shorts.At night look for evidence of arcing, externalto strobe light housings where screwheadsmay act as a high voltage path to ground, orother evidence of high voltage leakage.

Caution:

Strobe light systems are high voltagedevices. Wait ten (10) minutes afterremoving power before disconnecting thelight assembly or power supply.

Do not touch flashtubes with bare hands asresidue will cause tube failure/burnthrough within a short period of time.

During routine maintenance, inspect all highvoltage connections for security and tightness,and the switches for evidence of heat damageor other evidence of failure. Ensure that allwires are of correct length and properlysecured and routed according to approvedmaintenance practices. Inspect for looseflashtubes in sockets and signs of arcingwithin the light head. Wrap wire bundles withchafe-strip protection where needed,particularly near fuel tanks and otherstructural components. Check for evidence offuel leakage and vent line security andcondition.

Lastly, the FAA highly recommends thatoperators report all occurrences of highvoltage leakage incidents and othermaintenance problems in accordance with theService Difficulty Program (SDP) reportingsystem. This will allow the FAA to make thatinformation available to other operators whomay have the opportunity to inspect for andcorrect potentially unsafe conditions.

AIR NOTES

APPROVED PARTS SEMINARS

The Designee Standardization Branch,AFS-640, had previously presented anApproved Parts Seminar. However, the FAAconvened a task force to conduct a thoroughreview of the Suspected Unapproved Parts(SUP) issue, and the seminar was discontinueduntil the review was completed. As a result ofthe task force recommendations, a newnational SUP Program Office, AVR-20, wasestablished to standardize national policy.Now that standard policy is completed, theApproved Parts Seminar will again bepresented by AFS-640.


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Attendance at these seminars is open toeveryone in the aviation community; however,the material and content is mainly directed toRepresentatives of the Administrator, bothforeign and domestic; FAA inspectors; CivilAviation Authority (CAA) representatives;aircraft engine and propeller manufacturers;parts manufacturers; distributors; suppliers;air carriers; mechanics; and repair stations.It is expected that the seminars will beapproved to be used as an acceptable means ofrenewal for Inspection Authorization (IA). Theseminars can also be used as acceptabletraining in conjunction with the AviationMaintenance Technician Award.

The major areas which will be covered in these8-hour seminars are: type design, conformity,different methods to obtain approval on partsthat are eligible for installation on U.S.-typecertificated products, quality systems, andexamples of litigation as a result of theinstallation of fraudulent/unairworthy parts.

The seminars are tentatively scheduled tobegin after October 1997. You may contactAFS-640, your local Flight Standards DistrictOffice (FSDO), or your local ManufacturingInspection District Office (MIDO) for aschedule of seminar locations. The seminarschedules will also be available on theInternet. The Regulatory Support Division,AFS-600, has established a “HomePage” at thefollowing Internet address:

[email protected]

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (AD’S)

AD’S ISSUED IN JUNE 1997

AD **-**-** ****************************************************************.

ALERTS ONLINE

This publication is now available through theFedWorld Bulletin Board System (BBS), viathe Internet.

You may directly access the FedWorld BBS attelephone number (703) 321-3339. To accessAC 43-16, General Aviation AirworthinessAlerts, through the Internet, use the followingaddress: “http://www.fedworld.gov/ftp.htm”.This will open the “FedWorld File TransferProtocol Search And Retrieve Service” screen.Page down to the heading “Federal AviationAdministration” and select “FAA-ASI”. The filenames will begin with “ALT”, followed bythree characters for the month, followed bytwo digits for the year (e.g. “ALTJUN96.TXT”).The extension “TXT” indicates the file isviewable on the screen and also available fordownload.

In July 1996, we began using the AdobeAcrobat software program format to uploadthis monthly publication. Since that time, the“ALT” files now appear with a “PDF”extension, and it is necessary to download thefiles for viewing. This change was necessary toaccommodate inclusion of the illustrationsassociated with various articles. The AdobeAcrobat Viewer is available for download fromthe Internet (free of charge) and will allow thefiles to be read.

Also available at this location are the ServiceDifficulty Reports for the past 2 months, whichmay be of interest.

The Regulatory Support Division (AFS-600)has established a “HomePage” on the Internet,through which the same information isavailable. The Internet address for theAFS-600 “HomePage” is:“http://www.mmac.jccbi.gov/afs/afs600”. Also,this address has a large quantity of otherinformation available. There are “hot buttons”to take you to other locations and sites whereFAA Flight Standards Service information isavailable. If problems are encountered, youcan “E-mail” us at the address below.


21

If you wish to contact the staff of thispublication, you may do so by any of the meanslisted below.

Editor: Phil Lomax, AFS-640Telephone No.: (405) 954-6487FAX No.: (405) 954-4570 or (405) 954-4748

Internet E mail address: [email protected]

Mailing Address: FAA ATTN: AFS-640 ALERTS P.O. Box 25082 Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

We hope this will allow you to contact us bya means which will be convenient and savesome of your time. We welcome the submissionof aircraft maintenance information via anyform or format. This publication provides anopportunity for you to inform the generalaviation community of problems you haveencountered as well as bringing them to theattention of those who can resolve theproblems. The Service Difficulty Program(SDP) also brings the problems to theattention of those who are able to resolve theproblems, as well as, bringing them to theattention of those who can resolve theseproblems. Your participation in the SDP isvital to ensure accurate maintenanceinformation is available to the general aviationcommunity.

ELECTRONIC AVAILABILITY OFINFORMATION

In light of the previous article, we solicit yourinput and ideas for the future of thispublication. The electronic information mediahas made available a vast amount ofinformation in a more expedient and efficientmanner. We believe the expanded use of thismedia can bring about the conveyance of safety

information in a more efficient and timelymanner.

We are currently distributing approximately28,000 printed copies of this publication eachmonth, and the distribution number continuesto increase. The cost for publishing, printing,and mailing this publication has alsoincreased, and there has been a substantialnegative impact on our budget allotment.

In an effort to save tax dollars and make betteruse of the electronic media, we encourage allof our readers to cancel their printed copysubscription to this publication and use thecomputer to download the monthly issues.(The instructions for downloading the Alertswas given in the preceding article.) We will behappy to assist you if you require furtherassistance. Some of you may not yet have theequipment necessary to receive theinformation electronically, and you arewelcome to continue receiving it in the printedform.

There have been some efforts to charge anannual subscription fee for this publication. Sofar these efforts have not been given muchcredence, and we will make every effort tokeep this a free-of-charge publication.However, we need your input and ideas.Would you be willing to pay a nominalsubscription charge for this publication?

We appreciate your interest in this publicationand the opportunity to serve you. Please offerany comments, questions, or suggestions to usvia any of the means in the preceding article.

FAA FORM 8010-4, MALFUNCTION ORDEFECT REPORT

For your convenience, FAA Form 8010-4,Malfunction or Defect Report, will be printedin every issue of this publication.

You may complete the form, fold, staple, andreturn it to the address printed on the form.(No postage is required.)


22

SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORM

For your convenience, a Subscription RequestForm for AC 43-16, General AviationAirworthiness Alerts, is printed in everyissue.

If you wish to be placed on the distributionlist, complete the form, and return it, in astamped envelope, to the address shown onthe form.

Use this space for continuation of Block 8 (if required).

SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORMADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 43-16, GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS

ALERTS

Please use this request to subscribe to AC 43-16 or to change your address if you are presently on the mailinglist. Once your name has been entered, you will continue to receive this publication until you request your namebe removed or a copy is returned because of an incorrect address.

Because this mailing list is independent of other FAA mailing lists, it is necessary that you notify us when youraddress changes. (Our address is on the following subscription request.) If you are presently receiving thispublication it is NOT necessary to send another subscription request. The following subscription request may beduplicated, as necessary. TELEPHONE REQUESTS WILL ALSO BE ACCEPTED; THE TELEPHONENUMBER IS (405) 954-6487. THE FAX NUMBERS ARE: (405) 954-4748 and/or (405) 954-4570.

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PLEASE PRINT INFORMATION LEGIBLY,INCLUDE YOUR ZIP CODE, AND THE DATEOF YOUR REQUEST.

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If you require more than one copy of AC 43-16, it may be reproduced.

U.S.Departmentof Transportation

Federal AviationAdministration

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