aula 10_allegret, j. p.; dulbecco, p. (2003). the governance of international institutions - the imf...

8/13/2019 Aula 10_Allegret, J. P.; Dulbecco, P. (2003). the Governance of International Institutions - The IMF and the Evolutio…

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aula-10allegret-j-p-dulbecco-p-2003-the-governance-of-international 1/27

1

The Governance of International Institutions- The IMF and the Evolution of the New International Financial Architecture -

J.P. Allegret Associate Professor of Economics

at the University Lumière Lyon 2GATE - 93 chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France

[email protected]

P. DulbeccoProfessor of Economics

at the University of MetzCERDI – 65 boulevard François Mitterrand, 63000 Clermont Ferrand, France

[email protected]

Economics for the future - CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF CAMBRIDGE ECONOMICS Cambridge (UK) 17-19 September 2003

Preliminary Draft – Please do not quote without authors’ permission

1 Introduction

Governance refers to “the process and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and

restrain the collective activities of a group” (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 12). The main aspects of

governance are the production of information, control and coordination mechanisms. The

financial globalisation process has been accompanied by a wave of financial crises which has

led to a renewal of the debate on so-called “global governance”. Indeed, globalisation

implies the emergence of public goods, which modifies the traditional international

cooperation system and the question of governance in international affairs. In this new

context, international financial stability is not only based on “external” monetary

considerations, but also on domestic issues (Kaul, Grunberg, Stern, 1999). This increases the

contradiction between the economic system, which becomes more and more integrated, and

the political systems, which remain segmented.

Global governance means that interactions between domestic and international institutions

are now particularly strong. International institutions are seen to exert a decisive influence

on domestic governance. Nevertheless international institutions have recently been severely

criticised for their lack of both transparency and democracy (Metzler, 2000). They are also

often viewed as costly and over-centralised. In other words, international institutions

themselves seem to exhibit a rather poor governance which questions both their political and

economic legitimacy (Rodrik, 1997).

This paper focuses on the case of the IMF which appears to exhibit most of such criticisms.

More precisely, the aim is to propose an analytical framework to evaluate the IMFgovernance issue It is not only the design of the new international financial architecture



2

which is addressed by our analysis, but also the question of both the emergence and the

evolution of an international institution. Our analysis thus raises the question of the

consistency between domestic objectives and global objectives for international institutions

such as the IMF.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the nature of

international institutions. Section 3 highlights the governance issue of any international

institution. Section 4 makes use of our analytical framework in order to evaluate several

critical issues related to the IMF governance. Section 5 focuses on the efficiency of the IMF,

joining the debate on the evolution of the IMF. Section 6 concludes.

2 The Nature of International Institutions

Following the seminal book by North (1990), it is now largely recognized that institutions

play a crucial role in explaining the economic performances of different countries. Both

domestic and international institutions exert an influence of the speed and form of economic

growth. The question of the specificity of international institutions is, however, still open.

Institution, Markets, and Economic Performance: a Renewed Debate

Institution may be defined as “a regularity in social behaviour that is agreed to by all

members of society, specifies behaviour in specific recurrent situations and is either self-

policed or policed by some external authority” (Schotter, 1981: 11). This definition requires

consideration not only of the legal framework, but also of behavioural regularities associated

to a set of rules, norms and routines (Nelson, Winter, 1982). These two elements may

determine both the emergence and evolution of institutions.

As institutions are based on the idea of behavioural rules (Langlois, 1993: 166) they represent

a means by which agents, who ignore each other's actions and expectations, obtain the

information that enables them to co-ordinate. In other words they allow economies to be

made with respect to knowledge and information (Lachmann, 1970). They represent“orientation points”, which have the authority to render both actions and individual

expectations compatible (ibid.).

The point is that institutions consequently represent an essential element, a necessary

condition, for the harmonious functioning of the markets. This idea has been largely

developed by the Austrian theory of market processes. Time and uncertainty, which in an

Austrian perspective characterize all market processes, encourage agents to follow common

rules. The latter lead to the emergence and development of institutions, which then reduce

the uncertainty prevailing in markets by supplying stable models of interaction (O'Driscoll,



3

Rizzo, 1996). This argumentation naturally rests on the idea that the knowledge

disseminated by institutions is of a stabilizing nature – in that it reaffirms the stability of the

social structure at regular intervals – unlike that disseminated by the price system, which is

of a dynamic nature –in that it leads individuals to revise their plans continuously (Hayek,

1945)1.

Although international institutions fulfil these different functions - for example, by

producing information in the direction of private markets, the IMF facilitates the functioning

of the market - they nevertheless have specific characteristics.

Specificity of International Institutions

• Definition and Roles

An international institution is defined as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which

states should cooperate and compete with one another. [International institutions] prescribe

acceptable forms of state behaviour, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behaviour”2. One

recognizes here the behavioural rule function of institution previously underlined. But why

do international institutions exist? Considering a demand-side perspective, functionalist

theory explains that international institutions result from the fact that in the international

economy, transaction costs are high and property rights not perfectly defined. In this

perspective, states – as rational and homogenous agents - turn to international institutions in

order to minimize the negative consequences of these market failures. More precisely,

international institutions become the main instrument which allows states to cooperate with

each other. It is the so-called collaboration problem: how to incite states to cooperate in order

to achieve the Pareto efficient frontier? Institutions perform this function by providing

information about others states’ preferences, intentions and motivations, and by limiting the

potential behaviour of governments.

Functionalist theory assumes that states remain the key actors in world politics. International

institutions do not modify states’ interests and motivations. They simply allow them tochoose the most efficient solution in a non-cooperative game. In fact, by providing

information and defining certain standards of behaviour, international institutions matter.

More precisely, they change two basic features of the non-cooperative game between

governments: their strategies and beliefs. States’ strategies are affected by the rules of the

game determined by institutions. Some actions are prohibited or very costly and others

costless or promoted by institutions. States’ beliefs change because the production of

information by institutions modify the informational environment of states. This first feature



4

of the international institution is essential in order to understand the necessity of a

governance action.

Although institutions play an essential role in facilitating international cooperation,

problems of collaboration are not the only difficulties which impede such cooperation.

Indeed, it is necessary to take into account conflicts over where on the Pareto frontier states

will be situated. This is the so-called distributional problem. For numerous international

problems necessitating collective action, there are many possible sustainable agreements or

multiple equilibria. For example, states may agree on the reduction of current account

imbalances, but disagree on what current account balance is and on the adjustment sharing 3.

The traditional answer to this problem rests on the realist approach of international relations:

it is the exercise of state power (Krasner, 1991). The most powerful states have the most

bargaining power and so can impose a particular solution on the Pareto frontier.

International institutions do not play a significant role in the realist approach. Martin (1997)

identifies two other solutions to the distributional problems in which international

institutions matter. On the one hand, international institutions can act as “constructed” focal

points4. In this situation, they solve distributional problems by constructing regularities in

players’ behaviour. On the other hand, by promoting intense interactions between players in

a context of international cooperation, institutions favour the constitution of a common

culture which facilitates the choice of a particular outcome along the Pareto frontier.

• Autonomy of International Institutions

The governance of international institutions is a relevant question only if institutions can

gain autonomy relative to states. Autonomy has two inter-related meanings. On the one

hand, it refers to the ability of institutions to evolve independently from the wishes of states.

As we will see in section 3, IMF conditionality is such an example. On the other hand, an

institution has a degree of autonomy if it can impose new rules and/or norms on states and

other international players. In general, autonomy is a situation in which internationalinstitutions exert a specific influence on international affairs, influence which does not only

result from the states’ power.

The realist approach denies any autonomy to international institutions. In fact, the evolution

of international institutions demonstrates that they can obtain a degree of autonomy relative

to domestic government. They reflect more than states’ preferences in international affairs.

This point is particularly clear in the study by Barnett and Finnemore (1999). Using a socio-

economic approach, the authors identify two sources of institutions’ power. First, “the

legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody” (p.707). This source is intrinsically



5

linked to the nature of any institution. Indeed, institutions produce norms and rules which

create regular behaviour among participants in international affairs. Such regularities are a

strong source of “technical” legitimacy5. Second, institutions are autonomous players

because they exert a “control over technical expertise and information” (p.707). Again, IMF

conditionality is a good example of such autonomy.

• Legitimacy, Accountability and Democracy

The globalisation process has led to the end of what Keohane and Nye (2002) call “the club

model”. It designates a system of governance founded on a high degree of specialisation of

institutions responsible for international affairs. Opacity and lack of transparency are the

main characteristics of this system. More precisely, international governance is structured in

specific-issue areas which are without explicit links to the rest of the international system.

For example, the IMF is responsible for exchange rate arrangements and macroeconomic

policies while the Basle Committee is responsible for banking and financial areas. Until the

creation of the Financial Stability Forum in 1999, no explicit coordination between the two

institutions had existed. This specific-issue area implies that interactions with domestic

political systems are weak. The process of negotiations is conducted in secret, only the

outcomes being reported to publics and domestic legislatures6.

Globalisation modifies the structure of the world economy. First, new major participants

appear: developing countries as a whole, but more particularly new regional powers such as

China, India or Brazil which are marginal in the club model. These countries ask for greater

participation in the policy-making and decision-making processes. Second, one of the main

lessons of financial crises in 90’s is the strong links between monetary and financial factors.

Manifold empirical studies for emerging economies have demonstrated that banking crises

lead to balance-of-payments crises. The club model is not adapted to this new situation.

Third, increasing integration – both real and financial - makes the public more sensitive to

international concerns, such as the destabilising role of pension funds and hedge funds,company delocalisation and environmental problems. Finally, globalisation has led to the

proliferation of non-governmental organisations which represent the civil society. The

strategy of these NGOs is to contribute to, not to exit from, the new international syste m.

The end of the club model raises new questions for international governance. More precisely,

three main challenges concerning the governance of international institutions need to be

analysed in new terms: legitimacy, accountability and democracy. Each of these results from

the deep difference between domestic and international institutions. The former are

embedded in a coherent political sphere where citizens belong to the same political identity.



6

The latter are embedded in international relations based on unequal partners. As a result, the

game rules are asymmetric, not only in terms of construction, but also in terms of

implementation and modification. The most powerful states exert a decisive influence in this

area. The IMF is particularly concerned by this observation: there are no rules for surplus

countries and, to a lesser extent, very few for deficit countries, in the industrialized world

while developing countries have to apply strict rules when they borrow from multilateral

financial institutions. The main point is that the IMF is evolving in a paradoxical manner. On

the one hand, since the collapse of socialist bloc, it has become a universal institution. On the

other hand, as a consequence of the expansion of international capital markets, the IMF has

now a marginal influence on industrialized countries. This asymmetry in the evolution of the

IMF is one of the main problems justifying the debates on its legitimacy.

It is important to stress that the inequality between states which characterizes international

relations implies that a strict application of democratic rules – largely founded on the

principle of “one citizen, one voice”- is inapplicable. Indeed, it should be contrary to a

democratic principle to consider that a large country – Brazil for example - could have the

same voting power as smaller countries such as Panama. Again, this remark shows the

striking difference between the domestic and international spheres.

The three dimensions of global governance are inter-connected.

There is a close link between accountability and democracy. Indeed, accountability refers to

the ability of people to exercise control on governments or institutions. The latter is given a

mandate to fulfil missions in the interest of the former. In a democratic system, a government

is accountable to the majority of the citizens in a specific jurisdiction. For example, the

government presents its program to the Parliament which is the democratic representation of

citizens. The main pillar of this electoral accountability is the existence of a political

community whose citizens are members. In the international sphere, there is no comparable

political identity because there is no world government and no world identity. Even in theEuropean Union, where the integration process is particularly advanced, many observers

consider that European institutions display a democratic deficit. For instance, the ability of

the European Parliament to control the European Central Bank is limited. As a result,

electoral accountability at a global level cannot become a realist system for controlling

international institutions. Is the absence of a political community an absolute barrier for

accountable and democratic international institutions? On the one hand, electoral

accountability in international relations can be strengthened by various mechanisms

(Keohane and Nye, 2002). First, in order to reinforce state control and people’s judgement,



7

the transparency of the missions carried out by international institutions must be improved.

Targets must be clear and easily observable by both governments and the people. In

addition, a strict correspondence must exist between the mandates of international

institutions and their goals and actions. As we will see below, this question is essential for

the evolution of the IMF. Second, mechanisms of domestic accountability can be used.

Procedures could be implemented to encourage governments to inform parliamentarians

about their international strategy7. Finally, it is possible to increase legislative control over

international institutions at the supranational level. Such a mechanism exists in the European

Union. In the rest of the world, the lower degree of political integration undermines such a

possibility. Despite this barrier, a possible answer is to strengthen the political dimension of

international institutions (see below section 5).

On the other hand, non-electoral dimensions of democracy at the global level can be

identified. The public can exert an influence on the conduct of international affairs through

the NGOs. “A public space is an identifiable set of issues within a communicative

environment in which people can speak to one another in comprehensible ways. The public

is the group of people who communicate and agitate over their shared externalities in that

space […]. In this sense of shared externalities, and a degree of shared understanding, there

may be some global publics even if there is no global community” (Keohane and Nye, 2002:

15-16).

Democracy and legitimacy are closely linked. If the IMF is now challenged, it is in part

because its decision-making procedure has a low democratic level. Since 1945, world

economic and political structures have changed considerably. Industrialized countries

nevertheless remain the main shareholders and hence the main initiators of reforms in the

Bretton Woods institution. The problem of legitimacy is as follows: minor shareholders, the

developing countries, have become the main “clients” of the IMF. When they borrow from

the IMF, they must apply corrective macroeconomic measures – and now more and moregovernance measures - which exert a decisive influence on the domestic structures of these

countries. For most developing countries, this influence appears to be non-legitimate because

they do not significantly participate in the decision-making procedure of the IMF. They

consider that corrective measures are imposed by the most powerful industrialized

countries. The increasing influence of the IMF in domestic affairs is clear if we consider the

distinction made by Gould (2001) between targets conditionality and procedures

conditionality. Targets refer to measures – like a fiscal deficit limit - that can be met by

borrowing countries whatever methods they choose. Procedures specify both ends and



8

means by requiring countries to implement a single one-time action – for example a change

in exchange rate regime and the adoption of new corporate governance principles. As a

result, “procedures more directly dictate borrowing country policies, constrain domestic

politicians and violate sovereignty” (Gould, 2001: 8). After 1982, we observe a steady

increase in procedures conditionality.

Legitimacy, accountability and democracy are at the centre of the debate on the governance

of international institutions, and more particularly of the IMF.

3 The Evolution of International Institutions: a Global Governance Issue

The issue of global governance results from the two basic functions of institutions in the

world economy: coordination and collective action.

Coordination

Numerous studies have demonstrated the interaction between international and domestic

institutions. Studying the question of institutional effects, Martin (1997) identifies two “ideal-

types” of such effects. First, institutions can act as substitutes for domestic mechanisms and

institutions. Then, institutional effects must lead to a convergence of outcomes among the

members of the international institutions. The European monetary union or human right

institutions belong to this ideal-type. Second, institutions can complement the effects of

domestic institutions. In this case, international institutions “exaggerate domestically

generated practices” (Martin, 1997:8). When international institutions act as substitutes

governments turn to them when they cannot achieve a desired outcome with only domestic

measures. In his study on IMF agreement, Vreeland (2002) shows that governments use IMF

leverage to favour unpopular policies. As a result, domestic institutions matter in explaining

the behaviour of international institutions. In a similar perspective, Edwards (2001)

demonstrated that the ability of governments to satisfy IMF conditionality depends on the

political system. More precisely, fractionalised legislative political organisation exhibitspoorer performances in satisfying IMF programmes.

But from the perspective adopted in this paper, it seems to us that the coordination function

is particularly important in achieving a complementarity between domestic and global

governances. Such a complementarity becomes more and more determinant in the context of

financial globalisation (Allegret, Dulbecco, 2002). As noticed by Kapur and Webb (2000),

both the IMF and the World Bank are introducing more and more governance-related

conditionalities in their programs. This new form of conditionality implies institutional

changes in countries under IMF programs or World Bank loans. Institutional changes



9

accompanying financial liberalization may thus lead to a deterioration compared to the

initial situation because “various institutions and social expectations change at different

speeds, particularly when there is a mix of exogenous and endogenous forces, as when

global markets interact with domestic policies [...].The central problem to be addressed […] is

variable institutional adaptation” (Jacobs, 1999: 8). It is thus necessary to render the idea of

institutional change – implied by the financial liberalization - compatible with that of the

institution, understood as a permanent orientation point. There is, indeed, an asymmetry

between abandoning - rapidly destroying - previous institutions, and adopting - slowly

constructing - new ones.

Furthermore, one must take into account the fact that the adoption - the transfer -, just like

the creation of new institutions, is subject to delays: delays of implementation in the first

case, and delays of construction in the second. Yet, the amount of economic change possible

per unit of time is always limited, because agents have limited training capacities.

Lachman (1970) distinguishes between legal norms or designed institutions, which are “the

products of legislation and other manifestations of the ‘social will’” (Lachman, 1970: 69) and

spontaneous or “non-designed institutions”, understood as “recurrent patterns of conduct”

(ibid: p.75). Thus, if it is always possible, both in theory and in practice, to imagine a

situation in which an economic or political authority decides to implement new institutions -

for example a new system of property rights - the benefits expected from this type of

measure are a controversial issue. Indeed, insofar as such a policy is, by definition, limited to

designed institutions, its success depends on the capacity of these new elements to meet the

demand for change in institutions not yet designed. The difficulty lies in the fact that,

although the transformation of designed institutions is, in general, both radical and fast, that

of non-designed institutions is of an incremental nature, and is necessarily subject to path

dependence constraints.

Finally, the question of institutional order, and of its unity, arises: if institutional order is theproduct of the complementarity of institutions, what are the integrating forces of institutions,

and under which circumstances do these forces cease to work? The analysis of the process of

financial globalisation requires us to specify the conditions for the coherence of institutional

order, because the system's components evolve at different speeds.

This is one way to highlight the governance issue of international institutions: international

institutions need governance control in order to articulate both the evolution of international

and domestic institutions (Allegret, Dulbecco, 2002).

Collective Action



10

Collective action problems result from the fact that each country can improve its welfare

when it can free-ride on the other countries which bear the costs of intervention. These

problems are particularly relevant in contemporary financial crises in which contagion

process is strong. With contagion, the question of burden sharing of financial interventions is

very important. In the case of the Asian crisis, using a game theoretical perspective, Hausken

and Plümper (2002) conclude that “intervention by the international organization as a first-

mover was a necessary and crucial condition of collective action in containing [the crisis]”

(p.228). Indeed, their intervention incites players (the United States, Japan and European

countries) to participate in resolving the crisis because their respective payoffs are

maximized. More precisely, Japan and the United States – the two players most involved in

Asia - are in a defection game if no other players intervene. From a collective point of view, it

is clearly a sub-optimal strategy when we take into account interdependences between

countries.

The Asian crisis shows that international institutions can influence the decisions of states.

Similarly, states can influence the actions of institutions. If stronger states exert an influence

on international institutions, to what extent do they take politics into account when making

decisions? In principle, political factors do not influence IMF or World Bank decisions. In

order to explain why countries receive financial assistance from the IMF, (Barro and Lee

2002) find that political connections to the IMF are a significant explanatory variable of the

probability and size of IMF loans. The determinants of the political connections are the

following: country quota, national participation in the IMF staff, and member country’s

political and economic proximity to the IMF’s major shareholding countries. Each of these

determinants exerts a positive influence on IMF loans. Thacker (1999) studies the underlying

causes of the IMF’s behaviour concerning lending decisions and sanctions if borrower

compliance with IMF conditionality is weak. Decisions to lend are analysed over the period

1985-1994 for 87 developing countries. The main result is that politics matter in the IMF. Thegovernance of international institutions becomes a major preoccupation once we take into

account the influence of political factors. Indeed, it appears necessary to control that the

decisions of international institutions result from general interest and not from the strategy

of powerful states in the world economy.

Another factor justifying the critical role of governance is the ability of international

institutions to become autonomous and powerful actors in global politics. International

institutions develop specific knowledge about the functioning of the global economy. This

expertise – both technical and informational - gives autonomy to international institutions.



11

Over time, international institutions can exert an unexpected influence, not intentionally

planned by their creators. An illustration of this process is the evolution of conditionality

within the IMF. As noticed by Martin (2002), “the development of the principle of

conditionality went hand-in-hand with a shift in responsibility from the executive board to

the staff” (p.20).

Conditionality specifies policies, performance criteria and standards which borrowing

countries must meet to receive resources from the Fund. Although conditionality was

initially a vague notion in the Bretton Woods Agreements, it developed during the 50’s with

the expansion of IMF lending activities. Conditionality is a source of autonomy for the IMF

staff for two main reasons. First, during the 80s and 90s, the IMF was confronted by more

and more complex problems such as debt crisis of developing countries and the transition of

socialist countries to a market economy. As a consequence, binding conditions attached to

IMF agreements become more and more sophisticated and numerous. “The mean value of

the average number of binding conditions for arrangements initiated between 1952 and 1973

was 4.23; between 1974 and 1982 was 7.13; between 1983 and 1990 was 12.07 and between

1991 and 1995/2000 was 12.42” (Gould, 2001: 6). The mission of the staff is to prepare

agreements between the Fund and the borrowing countries. Thus the staff directly negotiates

the binding conditions with them. In a principal-agent relationship, when we take into

account the increasing complexity of these conditions, it appears more and more difficult for

the Executive Directors (the principal) to exercise strong control over the staff (the agent).

This technical advantage allows the staff to influence the content of programs. The staff also

has a significant agenda-setting power based on the extension of IMF lending activities8.

Second, because of the political nature of the Executive Directors, domestic authorities are

reluctant to communicate strategic information to the IMF when they negotiate a loan.

Indeed, they are afraid that this information be used for political motivations. Information is

an essential element of conditionality. In order to incite domestic authorities from borrowingcountries to provide such information to the staff, the Executive Directors have guaranteed

their confidentiality. It is a classical situation of asymmetric information between the

principal and the agent. The staff knows information on the countries’ economic situation

not transmitted to the Executive Directors. It is a powerful source of autonomy for the staff.

International institutions need governance because of the issue of collective action: as

international institutions are implemented in order to serve the collective interest, it is

important to control the way the decision-making process evolves through time.



12

4 The Governance of the IMF: Controversial Issues

One of the main lessons of past financial crises is that institutions matter. From the point of

view of international financial institutions (IFIs), this means that it is necessary to go beyond

the Washington Consensus. Indeed, since the Mexican and Asian crises, IFIs have modified

their approach to financial liberalization in order to integrate the role played by institutional

factors. The Bretton Woods institutions nowadays promote the so-called sequential approach

to financial liberalization: financial liberalization must be part of a program of

macroeconomic and microeconomic structural reforms. The so-called “second generation

reforms” are another way to insist on the role played by institutional factors. The idea is that,

since macroeconomic reforms are not sufficient to promote high-quality growth,

“ownership” reforms by domestic authorities and the civil society become central to

successful liberalization. The architecture of the new international financial system reflects

these challenges.

With this new international financial architecture, the IMF becomes a market institution,

although this raises some controversial issues about its governance.

The IMF as a Market Institution

Negative externalities engendered by private markets might be internalised by public

institutions when they produce information about states’ situations and the evolutions of

private markets. This role nowadays played by international institutions implies that they

have become market institutions. In this last case, their intervention represents a pre-

condition in order to obtain mature markets where asymmetric information is limited. This

aim is moreover clearly confirmed by the IMF: production of information and international

standards hold “the promise of better informed lending and investment decisions, increased

accountability of policy makers and better policy making…” (IMF, 1999: 2).

Production of information, transparency and accountability constitute the main elements of

the new architecture. Although their function is to promote market discipline, IFIs alwaysrely on market operators to elaborate the guidelines for information production. A double

interaction between institutions and the market seems to exist: the first, in which institutions

promote market discipline; and the second, in which market operators own the standards

and guidelines. By managing the production information process, the IFIs contributed

decisively to the reduction of uncertainty and consequently provided solutions to the

formation and revision of individual plans.

However, despite this progress, IFIs have to cope with two connected impediments to

establish the preceding pillars.



13

A first limit is related to the credibility of IMF surveillance of countries’ policies. This

surveillance is exerted in accordance with article IV by means of annual consultations

between the Fund staff and representatives of each member country. However, the content

of the article IV discussions is not systematically made public. One argument is to consider

that systematic publication of reports would corrupt the quality and the frankness of the

discussion. In addition, publication could have adverse consequences, possibly causing

foreign investors to lose confidence. Although it may be based on relevant arguments, this

solution reduces the effectiveness of the surveillance. The power of the Fund to put pressure

on member countries and the efficiency of its surveillance activity are thus curtailed when

the markets are not informed about the difficulties experienced by each individual economy.

Second, we have some doubts concerning the incentives to divulge information by states or

private institutions. In both cases, IFIs and supervisors use market discipline to incite states

and private institutions to respect minimum standards and guidelines. For instance, in the

SDDS design, the IMF can eject a participating member if that member does not meet its

obligations. This sanction should discipline the domestic authorities because, when the

market observes its exclusion, its spread on international capital markets should rise.

However, such a threat does not seem credible since the IMF’s member countries are also its

shareholders. The incentive to participate is consequently undermined and the signals sent to

markets are not very easy to interpret.

IMF Governance

A major topic initiated by the debate on the new international financial architecture is IMF

governance. On the one hand, the Asian crisis has demonstrated the limited efficacy of the

IMF to restrain international contagion. On the contrary, IMF remedies in Asia – based on

restrictive monetary and fiscal policies – have seemed to worsen the situation. In fact, the

IMF has been the victim of “bureaucratic universalism”: applying universal remedies

without taking into account local specificities9

. On the other hand, the severity of the crisishas raised important doubts about the economic rationality of financial liberalisation. It

appears less and less evident that capital accounts convertibility on a worldwide scale leads

to a greater level of growth and development. How can the IMF’s behaviour before, during

and after the Asian crisis be explained? How can its unquestionable support of international

financial liberalisation be justified?

We interpret it in terms of governance. From this perspective, Stiglitz (2002) stresses that the

IMF “has pursued the collective interests of a subset of the international community, rather

than serving the broader collective interests for which it was originally created” (p.243).



14

More precisely, the main interlocutors of the IMF are financial ministries and central banks.

The latter have close connections to the financial community. Consequently, it seems natural

that IMF remedies tend to reflect the interests of that community. These close connections

between the IMF and the finance ministry exert a decisive influence on the conduct of IMF

programme negotiations.

In his critical analysis of international financial liberalisation, Helleiner (2002) considers that

this agenda resulted from the disproportionate influence of stronger countries and private

interests. “The drive towards the universal liberalisation of capital accounts […] suited the

interests of the Northern banks and other financial institutions, and the governments that

represent them” (p.318).

It seems to us that these previous remarks refer to three critical issues concerning IMF

governance: (i) the IMF decision-making process; (ii) the weight of developing countries in a

changing world economy; and (iii) the ownership of reforms.

• The IMF decision-making process

Manifold reports dedicated to the new international financial architecture stress the lack of

transparency of the IMF decision-making process. The main obstacle to greater IMF

transparency relies on the Chairman’s Summing-up practice and to decision made by

consensus.

The Chairman’s Summing-up, also called “Chairman’s Concluding Remarks” fulfils three

roles related to the conduct of IMF Article IV surveillance (Van Houtven, 2000):

(i) to capture the progress of negotiations concerning a country’s IMF program;

(ii) to capture the main topics of the Board debate and to reflect the main differences

between the Board’s views and the opinions of the staff;

(iii) to indicate agreements and differences among Executive Directors.

The advantage of this procedure is to lead to the elaboration of common ground within the

Executive Board. However, it also leads to less transparency by underestimatingdisagreements within the Board. From an outsider’s perspective, the ongoing debate within

the Board and the manner in which final decisions are adopted appear largely non-

transparent, even secret.

Lack of transparency is reinforced by consensus decision-making within the Board. More

precisely, no formal vote within the Board concludes the adoption of a decision. Protection of

minor shareholders and minimisation of strong conflicts are the positive side of consensus.

The negative side is nevertheless important. On the one hand, the position of the staff is

strengthened. Indeed, consensus leads Executive Directors to adopt a “take it or leave it”



15

behaviour because any amendment to staff proposals could be very controversial and

contrary to the consensus spirit. On the other hand, the accountability of the Board seems

low. With decision making by consensus, it becomes impossible to identify who is effectively

responsible for a decision. Contrary to the main central banks, neither formal up-or-down

votes nor the release of results exist for the IMF.

From the institutional perspective adopted in this paper, it seems to us that the lack of

transparency of the IMF decision-making process is a significant drawback for its legitimacy.

By choosing not to render public disagreements within the Fund, the Bretton Woods

institution is unable to explain its decisions to the civil society.

• Weight of developing countries in the IMF structure of governance

Another point which decreases IMF legitimacy is the asymmetry between industrialized

countries and developing countries. In the IMF, as in numerous international institutions,

voting power is determined by taking into account economic strength and not repartition of

the world’s population. As a result, the majority of the world’s population is weakly

represented within the Fund. “Whereas developed countries […] accounted for only 17 per

cent of voting strength in the United Nations […], 24 per cent in the WTO, and 34 per cent in

the International Fund for Agricultural Development, they account for 61-62 per cent in the

World Bank and IMF” (Helleiner, 2002: 312). Such under representation of developing

countries – which are the Fund’s main clientele - has led more and more observers to

consider that the IMF is dominated by the richest countries and that its action is illegitimate.

A more democratic IMF implies an increase in the influence of developing countries in its

structure of governance. At the same time, it is essential to keep in mind the logic of

collective action: the higher the number of participants in a decision, the less effective the

decision will be. There is thus a trade-off between democracy and effectiveness. The Board is

composed of 24 members. In the report by the Group of Independent Experts (1999),

manifold Executive Directors stressed that its size “makes a free-flowing of well-focuseddiscussion very difficult” (p.33).

The IMF could become more democratic by using two non-mutually-exclusive mechanisms:

to review quota formula and to modify voting rules.

Developing countries claim a new quota formula which could lead them to obtain a better

situation within the IMF. More precisely, IMF quotas have four functions. First, it is equal to

the member country’s capital subscription to the Fund. Second, quotas determine the

maximum amount of credit that a member can obtain from the IMF. Third, the distribution

of quotas determines members’ voting power. From a governance perspective, this is the



16

most significant function. Each country has a voting power which is composed of two parts:

on the one hand, the basic votes equivalent to 250 votes; on the other hand, one additional

vote for each part of its quota equal to SDR 100,000. This latter part represents the main

determinant of each country’s voting power. The voting power is thus related to the size of

their quotas. Fourth, the country’s share in total quotas determines its relative share of SDRs

following a general allocation. General quota reviews occur on a five-yearly basis. It is

important to distinguish here between “equiproportional” increase and selective increase:

- equiproportional increase means that rises are such that pre-existing quota

distribution is unchanged. The increase is expressed as a uniform percentage of the

pre-existing quotas;

- selective increase occurs when quota increases vary across countries expressed in

terms of existing quotas or when the increases benefit only a subgroup of members.

The choice between this two modalities of quota increases is a matter of judgement by the

Executive Board. On average, equiproportional increases have represented 70% of total

increases while selective increases have represented 30%10. As a consequence, members’

quota shares evolve very slowly over time. This slow adjustment is in contradiction with the

rapid transformation of the world economy. There is now a large gap between the structure

of the world economy and the distribution of quotas between member countries.

In terms of governance, but also in terms of new financing needs for IMF members, quota

formula review is a major stake for the Bretton Woods institution. In 1999, the Managing

Director requested that a group of external experts publish a report (Cooper, 2000). The

Board’s mandate was clear: reviewing the quota formula with respect to “their adequacy to

help determine members’ calculated quotas […] in a manner that reasonably reflects

members’ relative position in the world economy as well as their relative need for and

contributions to the IMF’s financial resources, taking into account changes in the functioning

of the world economy and the international financial system and in light of the increaseglobalisation of markets” (Cooper, 2000: 3). The review group has proposed a simplification

of the current system based on one formula containing two variables, one representing a

country’s ability to contribute to the IMF’s resources11 and the other its external

vulnerability12. Such a formula is not applicable because it would exacerbate the decline of

developing countries quota share. A quota formula respecting economic criteria – such as the

capacity of contribution to IMF’s resources - thus seems contradictory to a political formula

implying a new distribution of quota shares in favour of developing countries. It is



17

important to stress the fact that this new distribution does not respond exclusively to

economic reasons, but to political factors linked to IMF governance.

A second way to improve the position of developing countries in the IMF structure is to

modify voting majorities. Decisions within the Fund are adopted on the basis of weighted

voting power of the members. Ordinarily, a simple majority rule is required. However, for

sensitive decisions – as a new SDR allocation - special majorities are needed. Currently, there

are two special majority rules: 70% and 85%. It is important to stress that the second rule

allows the United States to exert a decisive influence on major IMF decisions. Indeed, it can

exert its veto power with its 17.5% voting share. In addition, industrialized countries –

through the Group of Eight- have a powerful position within the Fund. It is more difficult for

developing countries to exercise veto power because of their limited capacity to coordinate

among themselves. The evolution of decisions requiring special majorities exhibits a striking

trend. Originally, the Articles of Agreement included only 9 categories of decisions. At

present more than 50 categories of decisions require special majority rules. There is thus a

strong relationship between the increasing role of special majority votes and the expanded

responsibilities of the IMF. Not only has this latter trend led the staff to become more

autonomous relative to the Executive Board, it has also created inequalities within the Board

and more widely within the IMF governance structure. An increasing part of major IMF

decisions – those relating to the IMF governance structure - are under the control of major

countries. Such a development undermines the legitimacy of the IMF. As suggested by the

Overseas Development Council (2000), a solution to strengthen the IMF’s legitimacy is to set

special majorities below the voting share of its Board’s main shareholder.

• Ownership of reforms

In his study on adjustment programs, Killick (1995) identifies two major trends. On the one

hand, programs exhibit high mortality or interruption rates. From 1991 to 1993, 61% of IMF

programs were stopped before the end of their intended life. On the other hand, theconnection between structural adjustment programs and the implementation of policy

reforms is weak, more particularly for institutional reforms. These weak results can be

explained by the lack of ownership of reforms initiated by the IMF. Following a study by the

World Bank (1992), we define ownership as a multidimensional concept. First, ownership

refers to the extent to which the initiative for reforms planned in programs is local or

external. Second, intellectual conviction in the appropriateness of measures matters. Finally,

the degree of support from the top political leadership is a determinant of ownership. Lack



18

of ownership rests on two main factors: the circumstances under which countries use IMF

resources and IMF conditionality.

Traditionally, member countries borrow from the IMF in crisis circumstances. The

negotiating mission ordinarily lasts two or three weeks. Under these circumstances,

structural adjustment programs raise two major problems. First, in a context of imperfect

knowledge about local particularities, the IMF cannot render compatible what we called

domestic and global governance. The IMF does not take the time to invest in institutional

knowledge. Second, the adoption of IMF programs does not result from consensus building.

Not only does the IMF staff not devote enough time to ensuring that the government is fully

involved in reforms, but also the government rarely consults the civil society. The letter of

intent – in which the borrowing country formally presents the policies it will undertake to

meet program objectives and conditions - is drafted in Washington. From this point of view,

IMF conditionality appears coercive and thus undermines ownership.

In general, lack of ownership, like the decision-making process and the low weight of

developing countries in the IMF governance structure, undermine the legitimacy of the

Bretton Woods institution.

5 What Institutional Change for the IMF?

Broadly speaking, institutional change has two main characteristics (North, 1990b). First,

high transactions costs resulting from the re-design of institutions imply that changes are

gradual, incremental. Second, there is a significant path dependency associated to

institutional change: history matters. A corollary question of institutional change is the

efficiency of such process. We refer here to both a problem of institutional efficiency and a

problem of political markets efficiency.

In the second section of this paper, we stressed that institutions are a main pillar of the

market process in a context of decentralized individual decisions and uncertainty. At thesame time, problems encountered by agents change over time implying institutional

adaptations. When institutions evolve in such a manner to allow agents to solve these new

problems, there is adaptive efficiency. It is a dynamic perspective of institutional changes.

For the IMF, adaptive efficiency is its capacity to respond to new concerns encountered by

the globalisation of markets, mainly the compatibility between domestic and global

governance. When institutions have a strong political signification, like the IMF, institutional

change also raises the problem of political markets efficiency. Agents evolve in a context of

uncertainty. They therefore only have an imperfect knowledge and understanding of the



19

consequences of their political choices. More precisely, agents use subjective models to

choose between different political organisations (North, 1990b). The IMF suffers from both a

problem of adaptive efficiency – in that the dramatic increase in its missions undermines its

capacity to improve the market process - and a problem of political efficiency – based on its

lack of legitimacy in the absence of significant amendments which would take into account

changes in its missions. We focus our analysis of IMF institutional change by considering

two basic properties owned by any institution: legalization and political legitimacy.

Financial instability partly arises from the fact that the private sector seizes the opportunity

of the limited power of national and international authorities to implement new worldwide

rules of the game. Thus, globalisation raises the need for global governance. This latest

problem requires two kinds of responses linked to legalization and political legitimacy. The

first is related to the adequate kinds of rules to devise. The second is related to the

underlying institutional arrangements which might make these rules effective.

• What rules in a global governance perspective?

As it reinforces the interdependences at a worldwide scale, financial globalisation places

international institutions and governments in a dilemma. On the one hand, the increasing

world integration calls for the establishment of certain substantive rules, which precisely

define the standards of behaviour of each state as it interacts with other states. On the other

hand, the increase in capital mobility reduces the power of the authorities. It also limits the

ability of the countries to apply these rules and the capacity of international organizations to

enforce them. As repeated crises of exchange rate regimes demonstrate, substantive rules are

excessively rigid and difficult to apply. That is why any attempt to return to the Bretton

Woods order or a similar one, based only on a set of such rules, would be unworkable. That

is also the reason why substantive rules tend to be replaced by procedural rules 13 which -

unlike the former - do not define a priori behavioural standards, but continuously develop a

process of negotiation between states.Whereas most of the Bretton Woods substantive rules collapsed in the early 70’s, the

historical evolution of the 80’s and 90’s highlights the difficulty encountered by the

international institutions in creating new ones. For example, the negotiations aimed at

establishing a single set of world accounting standards come up against national specificities,

while capital moves freely throughout the world. So, the efforts to define new principles of

monetary organization seem to evolve necessarily to the implementation of procedural rules

designed to bring governments and the private sector together and to strengthen the

compatibility of their behaviours. At the same time, it seems to us that global governance



20

needs a higher degree of legalization than today. Legalization is “a particular form of

institutionalisation characterised by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation”

(Abbott and others, 2000: 401). Obligation means that the behaviour of the states and other

international players is bound by rules and commitments. With behaviours becoming more

foreseeable, obligation is thus an essential element to support collective action. Precision

means that behaviours in international affairs are unambiguously defined by rules which

define what is required, authorised and proscribed. Finally, delegation refers to the extent of

the implementation, the interpretation and the application of rules which is under the

responsibility of a third party, such as the IMF.

From this point of view, orderly globalisation requires a higher degree of legalization with

the definition of an internationally accepted framework concerning the pace and sequencing

for opening domestic financial systems to world markets. Two main factors justify such a

higher degree of legalization.

First, international financial integration engenders centripetal forces which can destabilize

the international financial system. Indeed, if emerging economies believe that the benefits of

integration are greater than the costs - without distinguishing between short- and long-term

horizons - then they will prefer a rapid integration in order to attract a share of world

savings. This strategy could imply negative externalities on the international financial system

if their financial infrastructure is insufficiently developed.

Second, capital controls a priori contradict the so-called “Wall Street paradigm” according to

which the globalisation of financial markets induces only benefits via the optimal allocation

of resources. As a result, the imposition of capital controls could consequently be interpreted

by the markets as a negative signal and the cost of international loans (credit as well as

bonds) can increase. So, centripetal forces and negative signal do not incite the authorities of

emerging economies to adopt a prudential strategy of liberalization.

In this context, the IMF should develop a precise and mandatory code of good practicesconcerning capital movements, in order to avoid such heavy and sudden destabilizing

inflows and outflows. The opening of the capital account must be carried out under the

surveillance of the international institutions which provide a common framework to the

international community and, at the same time, respect the variable institution adaptation in

each country. At the Hong Kong annual meeting in September 1997, a first step in this

direction was proposed by the IMF.

The Board of Governors published a communiqué entitled “Statement of the Interim

Committee on the liberalization of capital movements under an amendment of the articles”.



21

In this statement, the Board affirmed the necessity “to add a new chapter to the Bretton

Woods agreement” and, in order to promote an orderly financial liberalization, to adapt the

capital account liberalization to “the circumstances of individual countries, thereby

maximizing the chances of success, not only for each country but also for the international

monetary system”.

In order to reduce the negative effects coming from these controls, the IMF should propose a

broad set of principles and guidelines concerning their uses. Principles and guidelines

should be negotiated multilaterally, but each member-country should be free to use them

after consultation with the IMF. The negative signal linked to the imposition of capital

controls should be minimized if the IMF integrates them in a liberalization strategy. The

intervention of the IMF would serve as a guarantor of the credibility of the strategy adopted

by domestic authorities. Capital controls would become a positive signal for markets, i.e. the

illustration of the prudent strategy adopted by authorities in emerging economies, but under

the surveillance of the IMF.

The main implication of this proposition is that capital controls – and more broadly capital

account convertibility - must be under the jurisdiction on the IMF. More precisely, in the

same way that article VIII of the Bretton Woods agreement establishes current account

convertibility and article XIV specifies the transitional measures towards a total

convertibility, a new article to be written relating to capital account convertibility, would

institutionalise the appropriate sequencing of the financial opening of the member countries

and the game rules concerning capital controls, thus favouring a sustainable integration in

the world economy. This new article should specify to what extent the IMF has the

responsibility of monitoring progress towards capital account convertibility.

This new responsibility may be interpreted as an implicit way of forcing national authorities

to liberalize their economy. We propose here another interpretation. Instituting a code of

good practices indeed offers the advantage of stabilizing the relationship between thevarious agents in the financial markets, since internationally recognized standards model

their behaviour. As a result, far from promoting a global capital market that escapes any

control, enhanced surveillance and careful Fund management of capital account

convertibility would help ensure a gradual and successful integration of each country in the

global financial community. That also means that the IMF must develop its analysis of the

use of different types of capital controls by member countries.

• Strengthening IMF political legitimacy



22

The credibility of this strategy, however, requires institutional changes aimed at

strengthening the effective power of the Bretton Woods institutions.

From this point of view, it seems necessary to enhance the legitimacy of the IMF so as to take

up the challenge of financial globalisation. Actually, the mastery of global interdependence

calls for the creation of international institutions endowed with a real capacity to promote an

evolution of government behaviour as well as the functioning of financial markets towards a

greater stability of the world economy. The monetary crises, which have been on the increase

since 1997, have re-launched the discussions about strengthening the IMF’s role and power.

There is a need for more effective political oversight on the part of the IMF. At present, the

IMF as a political body is weak both in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimacy is

undermined by frequent political pressure from the governments of the major industrial

countries within the Executive Board. IMF lending to Russia is a striking illustration of such

pressures. Effectiveness is undermined by a fragile balance within the Fund between its

shareholders and its management. On the one hand, governors of the IMF – who are already

ministers in their country with full agendas – do not devote enough time to controlling IMF

activities effectively. They tend to delegate their functions to lower level staff in their

ministries or to the Executive Board. On the other hand, Executive Directors rarely spend

more than three years in the Board. Unlike the staff, they cannot develop their expertise

while there is a growing complexity and diversity of the IMF’s agenda. In general, contrary

to the principle of good IMF governance, there is neither effective political leadership nor a

strong Executive Board.

To reach these two objectives, it seems necessary to us to promote both a more political body

within the IMF and at the same time a less political decision-making process in the Board.

One way is to transform the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) (the

former Interim Committee) into a body possessing real decision-making power. At present,

this committee, which stems from the Committee of the Twenty of the early 70’s, iscomposed of 24 members: IMF governors, ministers or officials of similar rank. The IMFC

meets only twice a year. Notwithstanding its ministerial level and thus its political character,

the IMFC has no formal decision-making power, being merely consultative. In addition, the

frequency of its meetings is too low to permit it to exert a real impact on the managing of the

world economy. The former Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, proposed to

transform the IMCF into a decision-making council. In order to strengthen the effective

support of member countries at a political level, he also proposed that the IMCF meet

periodically at the level of heads of state or government. There is strong opposition among



23

IMF shareholders. Developing countries are afraid that such measures might destroy the

consensus building and lead major countries to decide by up-or-down votes. Many members

do not want to be invested with more political responsibility when emerging markets crises

put the IMF under stress.

An additional method could be to constitute the IMF’s Executive Board at ministerial level 14.

The Executive Board is the IMF’s true, permanent, decision-making authority. However, as

presently constituted, the Executive Board does not have the political power that would

enable it to discuss with member states at the same level of political competence and

responsibility. Such a transformation of the Executive Board into a ministerial decision-

making body, called “Council”, was provided for in the second amendment of the Bretton

Woods Agreement (in 1978). In order to avoid a problem of excessive politicisation of the

Board, it is important to strengthen its legitimacy by two measures (De Gregorio,

Eichengreen, Ito and Wyplosz, 1999). First, with respect to central banks, the independence

of the Executive Board should allow it to take decisions without political influence from its

main shareholders. Taking into account the strong influence of the Board on the agendas of

national governments, this is a crucial measure. So, its decisions should be better accepted by

members. Second, the Executive Board must be accountable for its actions to a political body

which represents the international community. Under the condition that the IMFC becomes

the effective political body of the IMF, the Executive Board could regularly present its results

and projections to the IMFC.

6 Conclusion

This paper has studied the role of international institutions from the point of view of global

governance. Our approach focused on the two basic functions of an international institution -

coordination and collective action - which raise the question of governance. In a dynamic

perspective, coordination underlines the necessary complementarity between domestic and

global governances. Collective action stresses the fact that not only the most powerful states

can influence strategies and decisions of institution, but also that international institutions

can obtain autonomy from governments.

Our analysis of institutional changes leads us to propose an intermediate approach between

an independent and specialized IMF on the one hand, and the constitution of a political IMF

with a large but imprecise mandate on the other. Legitimacy and a high degree of

legalisation are the cornerstone of IMF governance in a global perspective.



25

References

Abbott K.W., Keohane R.O., Moravcsik A., Slaughter A.M., Snidal D. (2000), “The Concept ofLegalization”, International Organization, 54, 3, Summer, pp.401-449.

Allegret J.P., Courbis B., Dulbecco Ph. (2003), “Financial Liberalisation and Stability of the

Financial System in Emerging Markets: the Institutional Dimension of Financial Crises”,Review of International and Political Economy, 10, 1, February, pp.73-92.

Allegret J.P., Dulbecco Ph. (2002), “Global Governance Versus Domestic Governance: WhatRole for International Institutions?”, The European Journal of Development Research, 14, 2,December, pp.173-182.

Barnett M.N., Finnemore M. (1999), “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations”, International Organization, 53, 4, Autumn, pp.699-732.

Barro R.J., Lee J.W (2002), “IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are The Effects?”,NBER Working Paper Series, May.

Cooper R.N. (chairman) (2000), Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula ReviewGroup, April, IMF, Washington DC.

Council on Foreign Relations (1999), Safeguarding Prosperity in A Global Financial System : TheFuture International Financial Architecture, Institute for International Economics, WashingtonDC.

De Gregorio J., Eichengreen B., Ito T., Wyplosz C. (1999), “An Independent and AccountableIMF”, International Center For Monetary and Banking Studies, CEPR, Geneva Reports on the WorldEconomy, n°1, Oxford University Press.

Eatwell J., Taylor L. (2000), Global Finance at Risk, the Case for International Regulation, TheNew York Press, New York.

Edwards M.S. (2001), “Sticking with Yes: Domestic Institutions and IMF Compliance”, Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September.

Global Governance (1995), Our Global Neighbourhood, The Report of the Commission onGlobal Governance, oxford University Press, Oxford.

Gould E.R. (2001), “Money Talks: The Role of External Financiers in Influencing IMFConditionality”, Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco,September.

Hausken K., Plümper T. (2002), “Containing Contagious Financial Crises: The PoliticalEconomy Of Joint Intervention Into The Asian Crisis”, Public Choice, 111, 3, April, pp.209-236.

Hayek F. (1945), “The use of knowledge in society”, in Hayek (1949), Individualism andeconomic order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Helleiner G.K. (2002), “Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance andNegotiation Processes”, in D. Nayyar (ed), Governing Globalisation, Issues and Institutions,Oxford University Press, pp.308-333.

International Monetary Fund (1999), International Standards And Fund Surveillance – ProgressAnd Issues, Washington DC, August.

Jacobs S. (1999), “The Second Generation of Regulatory Reforms”, Communication to TheConference on Second Generation Reforms, IMF, November 8-9.



26

Kahler M. (1995), International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration, TheBrookings Institution, Washington DC.

Kapur D., Webb R. (2000), “Governance-related Conditionalities of the InternationalFinancial Institutions”, Group of 24 Discussion Paper Series , n°6, August.

Kaul I., Grunberg I., Stern M.A. (eds) (1999), Global Public Goods, International Cooperation inthe 21st Century, Oxford University Press.

Keohane R.O., Nye J.S. Jr. (2000), “Introduction”, in J.S. Jr Nye and J.D. Donahue (eds),Governance in a Globalizing World, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D, pp.1-44.

Keohane R.O., Nye J.S. Jr. (2002), “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and theWorld Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, The J.F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Visions of Governance in the 21st Century, Working Paper n°4.

Killick T. (1995), “Adjustment and Economic Growth”, in J.M. Boughton and K.S. Lateef(eds), Fifty Years After Bretton Woods, the Future of the IMF and the World Bank , IMF and WorldBank, Washington DC, pp.139-159.

Krasner S.D. (1991), “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the ParetoFrontier”, World Politics, 43, 3, April, pp.336-356.

Lachmann, L. (1970), The legacy of Max Weber, Heinemann, London.

Langlois R. (1993), “Orders and organizations: toward an Austrian theory of socialinstitutions”, in Caldwell B.J., Boehm St. (eds.), Austrian economics: tensions and new directions,Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Martin L.L. (1997), “An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies”,Conference on International Order in the 21 st Century, McGill University, May.

Martin L.L. (2002), “Distribution, Information, and Delegation to InternationalOrganizations: the Case of IMF Conditionality”, Cambridge Workshop on the Political Economyof International Finance and the BYU Conference on Delegation to International Organizations,September.

Metzler A.H. (chairman) (2000), “Report of the International Financial Institutions AdvisoryCommission”, Report to the US Congress, Washington D.C.

Nelson R., Winter S. (1982), An evolutionary theory of economic change, The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England.

North D.C. (1990a), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, CambridgeUniversity Press.

North (1990b), “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2, 4,pp.355-367.

O'Driscoll J., Rizzo M. (1996), The economics of time and ignorance , Basil Blackwell, London.

Overseas Development Council (2000), The Future of the IMF in Development, ODC Task ForceReport, Washington DC, April.

Rodrik D. (1997), Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?, Institute for International Economics,Washington D.C..

Schotter A. (1981), The economic theory of social institutions, Cambridge University Press, NewYork.



Stiglitz J.E. (2002), “Globalisation and the Logic of International Collective Action: Re-examining the Bretton Woods Institutions”, in D. Nayyar (ed), Governing Globalisation, Issuesand Institutions, Oxford University Press, pp.238-253.

Thacker S.C. (1999), “The High Politics of IMF Lending”, World Politics, 52, 1, pp.38-75.

Van Houtven L. (2002), “Governance of the IMF, Decision Making, Institutional Oversight,Transparency, and Accountability”, Pamphlet Series, n°53, August, IMF; Washington D.C..

Vreeland J.R. (2002), “Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements”, Mimeo, December.

Williamson J. and Henning C.R. (1994), “Managing The Monetary System”, in Managing TheWorld Economy - Fifty Years After Bretton Woods, P.B. Kenen (ed.), Institute for InternationalEconomics, Washington D.C., pp.83-111.

World Bank (1992), “World Bank Structural and Sectoral Adjustment Operations: the SecondOED Overview”, Operations Evaluation Department Report 10870, June, Washington DC.

aula 10_allegret, j. p.; dulbecco, p. (2003). the governance of international institutions - the imf...

Documents