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Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and SocietyOccasional Paper Series No: 2

Never Stand Still Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society (ACSACS)

Nobility Down Under: How the Duchess became an Australian

Professor Tom Frame

ImagesAll images of Duchess © Department of Defence

ACSACS Occasional Papers Series

No: 1 ‘Soldiers, Squadrons and Strategists’: Building an Ethical Backbone for the Armies of the Twenty-First Century – An Anglo-Australian Practitioner’s View. Major Tom McDermott DSO MA

No: 2 Nobility Down Under: How the Duchess became an Australian. Professor Tom Frame

Published on 22/11/2016


Occasional Paper Series No: 2 | 1

Occasional Papers Series

The ACSACS on-line publication series embodies UNSW Canberra’s commitment to engaging in public discussion and, where possible, the development of public policy. This series was created in response to requests from Centre Fellows and Adjunct Lecturers for a vehicle to gain an audience for research and writing that relates to specialist topics that are not addressed in standard scholarly publications. Three broad categories of work are ‘published’ in the Series – Position Papers, Working Papers and Occasional Papers – each reflecting the length and purpose of the manuscript rather than its academic discipline.

Position Papers are 2,000-4000 words in length and seek to shape debate, direct discussion or outline a position on some aspect of policy. The emphasis is on highly topical work embodying the opinion and judgements of the contributor on matters of contemporary concern. Working Papers are 3,000-5,000 words and are intended to be ‘work-in-progress’. Papers in this category are offered for comment from other scholars working in the area. These papers are ‘first drafts’ of more substantial pieces of writing and present interim conclusions. Occasional Papers exceed 5,000 words and constitute completed work. Papers in this category include high quality descriptive and analytical work that might be too specialised or too topical for a scholarly journal. There is no upper word limit for papers in this category.

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Researchers interested in having their work appear in the series are encouraged to contact the Director of ACSACS in the first instance. Prospective contributors need to decide whether their submissions are to be assessed as Position, Working or Occasional Papers. Copies of the UNSW Press Author Pack containing guidelines on style and format are available from the Centre Manager.

A footnoted copy of this paper can be requested from the author at [email protected].

About the author

Tom Frame is Director of the Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society at UNSW Canberra. He joined the RAN College, HMAS Creswell, as a 16-year old junior entry cadet midshipman in January 1979. He served at sea and ashore, including a posting as Research Officer to the Chief of Naval Staff, and completed a PhD at UNSW Canberra. He resigned from the RAN to train for the Anglican ministry in 1993. After parish work in Australia and England he was Bishop to the Australian Defence Force (2001-2007) and then Director of St Mark’s

National Theological Centre (2007-14). He has been a Visiting Fellow in the School of Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Australian National University (2000-2003); Patron of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia (2002-06), a member of the Council of the Australian War Memorial (2004-07) and judged the inaugural Prime Minister’s Prize for Australian History (2007). Tom Frame is the author or editor of 26 books including Where Fate Calls: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy; HMAS Sydney: Loss and Controversy; Living by the Sword: the Ethics of Armed Intervention; The Life and Death of Harold Holt, Losing My Religion: Unbelief in Australia and The Shores of Gallipoli: Naval Aspects of the Anzac Campaign.

Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society (ACSACS)

2 | Occasional Paper Series No: 2

There seems to have been almost immediate consideration in Whitehall as to how Britain might assist the RAN following the loss of Voyager. On 13 February the head of the British Defence Liaison Staff in Canberra received an ‘Operational Immediate’ signal from the Admiralty. It read:

If put to UK Government now whilst tragedy is still strong in ministers minds, loan of a Daring [class destroyer] might well be agreed and we would be more than ready to help. We should not, however, want to embarrass RAN by suggesting this if it is not what they want nor should we wish to make firm offer until it had been put to our ministers.

[The] First Sea Lord would like you to show this signal to Admiral Harrington [the Australian Chief of Naval Staff] in case he wishes to further the matter. We should fully understand if he does not want to pursue the suggestion. If he does, we will give him details of two alternative ships, and their pros and cons. The First Sea Lord thinks that we would have to work out terms in detail but we would expect them to include:

a) no charge for ship herself b) RAN to accept responsibility for running costs, stores and any refits and c) no extra cost to Royal Navy.

The Naval Board responded immediately by sending a signal to the Admiralty. It was headed, ‘Personal for VCNS from CNS’.

I am deeply appreciative of the offer and would be most grateful if I might have the details of the two alternative ships and their pros and cons. Knowledge of the offer is being kept within Navy Office until consideration can be given to pros and cons ... Our Darings are AC [power configured] ships and ... compatibility would be desired.

The Admiralty replied the next day that the two ships in mind were HMS Defender or HMS Duchess. Launched in 1950, Defender, which was DC powered and without air-conditioning, was undergoing a major refit and would not be ready until July 1964 when she could be taken over and sailed to Australia by an RAN ships company. By contrast, Duchess was badly in need of a major refit.

The loss of HMAS Voyager after a collision with HMAS Melbourne off Jervis Bay on 10 February 1964 left 82 men dead and created a serious operational problem for

the RAN. On completing her work-up, Voyager was due to return to South East Asia with HMAS Vampire for service in the Strategic Reserve. With the loss of HMAS Voyager, it seemed the best solution was to order Vendetta to accompany Vampire to the Strategic Reserve in May. HMAS Quiberon, which was to pay off, would remain in commission. She would be refitted in early June at Williamstown Naval Dockyard and relieve Vendetta at the end of the year. This action was subsequently agreed by the Naval Board. Yet, the RAN was still one destroyer short of what it needed to fulfill extant strategic demands and long-standing operational commitments. A crisis was looming.



Although Darings were usually refitted every two years, Duchess had not been refitted since 1960 and was scheduled to start a four month docking at Singapore in June 1964. Despite the absence of some of the more modern equipment fitted to Defender, Duchess was launched two years after Defender, was AC powered and was partially air-conditioned. She had been built at a cost of £A2.5 million.

Whatever ship was selected, the offer was for her to be operated by the RAN on permanent loan with the RAN to pay for the operating and maintenance costs. The only condition was that the RAN would have to return the ship in the very unlikely contingency of the Royal Navy becoming ‘involved in a protracted war which did not include the RAN’. As this general contingency was thought to be unlikely, the offer was effectively for the ship to be given as a gift.

Duchess was preferred for two main reasons. She was slightly newer than Defender and was AC powered. The Australian Darings were AC powered as this was becoming the standard configuration for all RAN ships. After being laid down in July 1948 at Southampton, Duchess was launched on 9 April 1951 and completed on 23 October 1952. She served in several British commands, including the Far East Fleet where she was deployed in 1964 as part of the British contribution to the Strategic Reserve.

With a refit imminent, the Royal Navy suggested that she could be refitted in Australia to the RAN’s standards and specifications. It was, in some ways, ironic that Duchess should be selected as the replacement. The previous ship to bear that name, a D Class destroyer built before World War II, was lost in a collision with the battleship Barham. More than 120 of Duchess’ 145-man complement were lost, including her captain, Lieutenant Commander R.C.M. White.

This was a very generous offer and a product of the Royal Navy’s close association with the RAN. It had enthusiastic political backing as well. The matter of loaning a ship to the RAN was to be raised in the House of Commons on 18 February 1964. The Admiralty advised the Naval Board that:

An MP is asking in Parliament tomorrow what request we have received from the Australian Government for assistance in the replacement of Voyager. Reply will be that no such request has been received at present. Ministers are, however, aware of general contents of my [signal of 13 February] and may wish in view of this parliamentary question to make a government to government offer very soon. I hope this would not embarrass you.

HMAS Duchess in Sydney Harbour.



The offer of a replacement for Voyager from the Royal Navy was considered from the outset to be a temporary measure while the Naval Board wanted to consider every option before committing itself. This was the central argument in a paper prepared by the Naval Staff for the Defence Department on 13 February.

The loss of Voyager has made it difficult, but not impossible to meet our Strategic Reserve commitments in 1964 and 1965 … While the keeping in commission of Quiberon does help to meet our Strategic Reserve and SEATO Exercise requirements, it does not in the short term provide an adequate replacement nor does it in the long term help us to obtain the minimum number of fleet escorts required.

The RAN firmly believed it needed 20 escorts as the minimum requirement for the convoy protection of military shipping alone. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) had previously endorsed a figure of 16 and asked the Naval Board to justify the increased number. Thus, the loss of Voyager presented the Navy with an opportunity to lobby the Cabinet again for additional frigates and destroyers.

The Navy also stated that plans existed for Voyager to undergo a major half-life refit in 1966 and so a replacement ship would have to encompass these additional capabilities. The new equipment included the fitting of the Tartar missile system in place of one 4.5 inch gun turret, the addition of a medium-range sonar, such as SQS 23, and the installation of a new fire control system, possibly the Dutch MRS III system, for the remaining two gun turrets.

The cost of fully converting a British Daring Class destroyer as a permanent replacement for Voyager, which had originally cost A£6.75 million to build, was estimated at £4-5 million. It was an unattractive option which presented several drawbacks.

There are significant differences in equipment standards between the Royal Navy and RAN Darings which on close examination do not make this proposal attractive ... The advantage of obtaining a Daring from the Royal Navy [on loan] is that it would restore the status quo more quickly, and would be the cheapest course to take in the short term.

The bridge of HMAS Duchess looking forward towards the ships bow.



Admiral Harrington was concerned from the beginning that the costs of a short-term and expedient measure might preclude the adoption of the wisest permanent solution. It was his determination to make good the loss of Voyager that ensured the Naval Board was not satisfied with anything less than it felt it needed to fulfill its strategic responsibilities.

In the longer-term, there was the possibility of adding a further two Type 12 frigates to the existing construction program at Williamstown to replace Voyager, or the ordering of an additional Charles F Adams Class (DDG-2) Guided Missile Destroyer from America, where three were already being built. There was also the thought of buying a single American destroyer escort, probably a Brooke Class (FFG-1) or even a Garcia Class (FF-1040).

The Navy, wanting to make the most of the opportunity presented by the loss of Voyager for further strengthening the Fleet, argued the best alternative was the construction of a further two Type 12 destroyer escorts at Williamstown. As it was felt the Type 12 was inferior to the Daring Class, two Type 12s would mean the Navy would not be depleted by the disaster. In fact, it would actually emerge stronger.

The two ships would cost around £9 or 10 million and be scheduled for completion in 1968. If this was not a practicable solution then the purchase of a fourth DDG was proposed at an estimated cost of £20 million. The acquisition of an American destroyer escort, either a Brooke or a Garcia class ship, would run to £15 million.

Having been reasonably assured that accepting the loan of Duchess as a short-term replacement would not prejudice the Navy’s proposal to build two Type 12 frigates as permanent replacements, the RAN started to consider in detail the costs of converting Duchess for Australian service on 17 February 1964. This was just one week after Voyager had been lost. After having Duchess inspected by RAN staff in Singapore, a general comparison was made between the operational capability of the two ships. The Director of Staff and Training Requirements (DSTR) in Navy Office stated that:

Broadly speaking, HMS Duchess has a slightly superior gunnery capability to HMAS Voyager and an inferior anti-submarine capability. The former’s suitability for operating in RAN areas of operation is markedly inferior because of her lack of air-conditioning but this would not prevent her being operated.

Without having examined Duchess closely, the Naval Staff could not make any conclusion on whether she should be modernised in line with the two remaining RAN Darings or whether she should be maintained so as to make her life exceed the four year loan period. On 18 February, the offer of Duchess was made formally made to the Australian Government.

A later group photograph of part of the complement of HMAS Duchess.

HMAS Duchess with an Australian colour scheme and side number.



It was at this point that the United States became involved. During a discussion between a staff member from the Australian Embassy in Washington, Alan Renouf, and the Special Assistant to Averill Harriman, Renouf was told that if the Australian Government wanted a prompt replacement for Voyager he was certain that ‘the United States would be happy to loan Australia one of the many American destroyers that were in mothballs. The only cost to Australia would be that of de-mothballing’. The Australian Ambassador, Sir Howard Beale, then spoke with the Secretary for Defense, Robert McNamara, about the US Navy ships in reserve. McNamara indicated that they fell into two categories. Those best described as ‘junk’, and those vessels which were reasonably up-to-date and operable. Although these were part of US war plans, McNamara indicated that if the RAN wanted an immediate replacement for Voyager, and an application were received from the Australian Government, he would give the possibility of a ship on loan ‘very sympathetic consideration’. News of this offer was received on 16 February, the day before the RAN submitted its views on Duchess.

The following day Beale raised the matter with the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who replied:

‘Why don’t we offer you one straight away instead of you asking for one. It would sound better and be a good demonstration of our solidarity as well as our sympathy’. Rather than offering a mothballed destroyer, Rusk said his idea would be to dispatch a destroyer presently on duty and to replace it if necessary with one from reserve. The Australian Government replied by suggesting the Navy suspected, or rather hoped, the ship offered would be a Gearing or Sumner Class destroyer, although it added the offer of a DDG ‘like those we are acquiring would be attractive’. If the ship offered were an Adams Class DDG, the RAN would need to pay off one of the two remaining Darings immediately in order to train the requisite ships company. The Navy was pushing its luck and its resources to the limit but this seemed justified given the enthusiasm of Rusk to help the grief-stricken RAN.

The Australian Ambassador was also asked to ascertain the details of the loan arrangement including the likely duration of the loan and logistic support arrangements.

Harrington had earlier said that there ‘could be no question of paying off another Daring since the intention is to restore the situation to what it was before the loss of HMAS Voyager’. He outlined the likely Australian reaction in a memorandum prepared for the Australian Embassy in Washington.

If a DDG were offered to us it would be so attractive that it would be hard to refuse it and I would like more time to review the situation. Any other ships I consider from a naval aspect would be overall a worse bargain than say a loan Daring from the Royal Navy. I suggest unless there are political reasons which override the naval reasons that any ships other than a DDG be refused. If it be must be accepted than at least six months will be necessary before a trained crew can be provided.

The American response was disappointing and almost demeaning. Rusk indicated that a Gearing or a Sumner Class destroyer was absolutely out of the question because he was compelled to act through the US Ship Loan Act, which was about to pass through Congress. It contained a clause limiting loans to vessels which would be going out of service in a few years time. Subsequent to the passing of the Act, the United States would offer the Australian Government a Fletcher Class destroyer for a five year loan. Despite its disappointment, the Naval Board agreed to consider the proposal, more for appearance sake than anything else.

While it was dealing with the Americans, the Australian Government and the Naval Board had hoped the Admiralty would not learn that the RAN was holding out for a better offer from across the Atlantic. In a cablegram sent to London, Menzies informed the High Commissioner:



For your information the Americans have also made an offer which requires study. We will make every effort to reach a quick decision and will keep you informed. It is important at this stage, that there should be no mention to the British of the American offer.

That hope was ended by a cablegram received from London on 21 February: ‘Commodore Ramsey informs me that American offer is already known to Royal Navy’.

The ship nominated by Rusk was the Fletcher class destroyer USS Twining which was built in 1943. USS The Sullivans was also considered by the US Navy and then rejected. Twining was at that time fully operational and was available to the RAN on the west coast of the United States from May 1964. Detailed estimations were made of the cost of converting the ship to RAN standards and supporting her operation. The anticipated commitment from Australia for stores, spare parts and ammunition would be $US1.5 to 2 million, thus making it far more expensive to bring into RAN service than Duchess. The Naval Board argued that Twining was, in fact, ‘the least acceptable short term replacement for HMAS Voyager’.

After making detailed comparisons of the two offers, the Naval Board advised the Cabinet on 22 February that:

from logistic, manpower and financial aspects, the choice between the two ships offering clearly points to the RN Daring Class destroyer HMS Duchess. The Naval Board therefore strongly recommends acceptance of the British Government’s offer of this ship as the immediate replacement for HMAS Voyager.

The Navy was again adamant that Duchess should be considered an interim replacement for Voyager, and argued before Cabinet that she be lent for four years only, and replaced by ‘modern construction escorts’. It was recommended that the Admiralty be informed of the RAN’s desire to acquire Duchess on loan, and that she be accepted in June 1964 before her refitting and modification in Australia. The cost of refitting Duchess and converting her for immediate RAN service was estimated at £295-305,000.

The Minister for the Navy, Fred Chaney, presented the Navy’s recommendation with his concurrence for Cabinet consideration on 24 February. The British offer was accepted on the same day and the British High Commissioner was advised by Prime Minister Robert Menzies of the decision on 25 February. Menzies announced publicly Australia’s intention to accept the British offer to loan HMS Duchess in reply to a question from Peter Howson in Parliament on 25 February. He said that:

naval studies showed that the Daring class destroyer was more compatible in all respects with the RAN and would present lesser problems in regard to training of personnel, availability spares and stores and dockyard maintenance than any other replacement likely to be available.

The RAN had acquired a replacement for Voyager just two weeks after the ill-fated destroyer had been lost. Harrington sent a short personal signal to the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty: ‘I am very happy that the Government has accepted your kind offer of Duchess. Thank you’. A personal note was received by Harrington from the British Chief of the Defence Staff. It read:

I was an enthusiastic backer of the idea of making a replacement for the Voyager available to you and was absolutely delighted when you accepted and the choice fell on the Duchess. The Duchess was launched by my wife who always took a great personal interest in her and visited her on numerous occasions, often with me. So I have a very special interest in the new addition to the Royal Australian Navy and hope that she will prove entirely successful.

The letter was signed ‘Mountbatten of Burma’.

At the same time, Harrington was mindful that there might be some stalling of the need for a permanent replacement and advised COSC that: ‘He would not like it to be assumed ... that a decision on a permanent replacement for HMAS Voyager is a matter which does not need immediate resolution’. The Naval Staff prepared a staff paper for the next COSC meeting on the long-term replacement for Voyager which concluded:



a) The effective period for HMS Duchess as a temporary replacement for Voyager is about four years.

b) The best replacement for Voyager in the long term would be two Type 12 frigates which could be built in Australia in approximately the same period.

Once the decision was made to acquire Duchess on loan, the RAN attempted on 17 March to have the delivery date brought forward to April with the hope of refitting the ship and working her up to replace Vendetta in the Strategic Reserve before the end of 1964. The Admiralty realised a delay in handing over Duchess would cause serious manning problems for the RAN and acceded to the request. Plans for Duchess’ June 1964 refit in Singapore were cancelled and preparations were hastily made for the ship to leave Singapore on 6 April for transfer to the RAN. Harrington impressed upon the Naval Staff that an absolute minimum should be spent on Duchess given that she was going to serve for at ‘least four years but probably no more than six’. The Admiralty stated that the ship had to be ‘returned at the end of the expiration of the loan in as good a condition as when lent, fair wear and tear excepted’ to Singapore or a mutually agreed port. Given the poor state of Duchess when accepted by the RAN, there was little chance of the Royal Navy being disappointed.

An advance party of RAN personnel was sent to Singapore on 19 March. The ship’s passage through Indonesian waters by the Sunda Strait (later altered to the Lombok Strait) to Melbourne was controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Fleet (CINCFEF). At that time the Indonesian Government was challenging the right of vessels to transit the archipelagic straits as a precursor to its ‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia after October 1964. For the same reason, full ammunition stocks and the existing Royal Navy weapons crews were retained onboard. The ships company for Duchess would be drawn primarily from Quiberon which would pay off in June 1964. Of concern to the Royal Navy was the fate of ‘unofficial’ Chinese laundry crew embarked in Duchess.

These crews were considered an institution in naval ships operating in South East Asia. The Department of Immigration decided to allow the six Chinese entry into Australia on the condition that they returned to Singapore on the first Royal Navy or RAN ship bound for that port. Three of these Hong Kong nationals had previously ‘served’ in RAN ships as laundry staff during Strategic Reserve deployments.

The arrival of HMS Duchess in Sydney on 19 April, under the command of Captain J. Bitmead RN, attracted substantial public and press attention. In addition to handing over the ship, Bitmead presented a cheque to the Lord Mayor of Sydney, Alderman Jensen, for £303 as a donation from Duchess’ ships company for the Voyager Dependents Relief Fund. Berthing at Circular Quay, the ship was met by the Honourable Les Bury, Minister for Housing, on behalf of the Commonwealth Government, with the British High Commissioner, Sir William Oliver, representing the British Government. After the enormous publicity attracted by her arrival in Sydney, her recommissioning as HMAS Duchess at Williamstown Naval Dockyard was brought forward to 8 May 1964. For the sake of convenience, the RAN decided to retain her side-number (D154), military call-sign, international call-sign and signal letters. The Naval Board sent a signal to the Admiralty expressing its appreciation on her safe arrival: ‘We look forward to having this ship in service with the fleet from whence she came’. The British ships company were relieved by Australian officers and sailors and transported to Sydney by train, and back to Britain by air.

Having obtained Duchess on loan, the RAN floated the idea of her being purchased outright at a later date. This suggestion was put to Cabinet at the same time that it was asked to consider a long-term replacement for Voyager. As expected, the Naval Board recommended in its submission to Cabinet of 24 April that it authorise the construction of a further two Type 12 frigates at a capital cost of £22 million. The ships would be built at Williamstown and commissioned in four years. Cabinet accepted the Navy’s recommendations at its meeting on 13 May 1964.



It also ‘approved the consequential additions to the financial allotments for capital and maintenance under the Naval Programme’. Cabinet also ‘noted the deficiencies in the present planning allotments to Navy for 1964/65 and subsequent years’. In plain language, this meant the Navy would receive an additional allocation of funds for the new ships while the Cabinet noted its case for wanting even more money over the next few years.

A Navy press release was issued on 23 June announcing that two new frigates would be built as permanent replacements for HMAS Voyager. The new ships were to be of the River Class design which was a large improvement on the Type 12. HMAS Swan was commissioned in 1970, and her sister, HMAS Torrens, the following year.

HMAS Duchess was refitted at Williamstown from May to September 1964. After trials in Port Phillip Bay, she sailed for Sydney in November under the command of Commander Ian Burnside RAN. It would appear that a factor in his selection to command Duchess was his previous service in that ship during the 1956 Suez Crisis. The refit took a little longer than expected with Duchess having only several weeks of work-up exercises before Christmas 1964 following her arrival in Sydney.

Duchess sailed from Sydney for her first deployment to the Strategic Reserve on 19 January 1965 relieving Vampire on station. After a short stay in the Far East, Duchess returned to Sydney. On arrival in Williamstown, Burnside was informed that his ship would be required to escort HMAS Sydney to South Vietnam. The converted troopship would convey the first Australian ground forces committed to the conflict although the Prime Minister had yet to make an announcement in Parliament to this effect. Over the next seven years, Duchess would make numerous trips to South Vietnam escorting Sydney in addition to periodic service in the Strategic Reserve.

There was never any serious consideration given to returning Duchess to the Royal Navy after the expiration of the initial four year loan. In September 1967, the British Ministry of Defence advised that the loan of Duchess had been extended to 29 April 1972. The ship then underwent a seven month refit. The logic was simple: the RAN needed the ship to enlarge the available number of escorts; the Royal Navy did not want Duchess or the non-standard equipment fitted by Australia back in its fleet. In August 1972, the RAN sought a new role for Duchess and offered to purchase her outright for £150,000. As the new owners, the RAN announced in January 1973 that Duchess would be converted for service as the fleet training ship. After spending twelve months being refitted and partly reconstructed, Duchess served in a training role before being paid off in October 1977. Had Voyager not been lost in 1964 and remained in service, it is very likely that she would have eventually paid off in 1977 or 1978. Her sister, Vendetta, paid off in 1979 while Vampire lingered in a training role until 1985.

The RAN obtained very good service from a ship for which it only ever paid a nominal amount. Duchess was also the last major British-built surface vessel to be commissioned into the RAN.

In terms of operational capacity, the RAN generally did very well out of the loss of Voyager. It was able to replace a tired and ageing destroyer with three ships - another Daring and two River Class frigates and a crisis had been avoided.

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