Australia’s Submarine Research Strategy – Supporting the Needs of Australia’s Future Naval Submarine Program

Aidan Depetro, BMT Design & Technology, adepetro@bmtdt.com.au

The success of a naval submarine is driven by its ability to maintain its capability edge. The shift in the present day battlespace to manage not only the traditional range of blue water military roles but also key operations in the littoral such as counter insurgency, has brought significant implications on the design of future submarines and their ability to achieve the principal objective; to fight and win. The strategic role of the modern conventional submarine in this emerging battlespace is apparent through the proliferation of the types of assets in the Asia Pacific region. As the capability edge is founded on the implementation and adaptation of advanced technology, there is a need to establish a structured program of research and rapid development aligned to Australia’s submarine capability aspirations and acquisition programs that maintain and continually push the nation’s strategic advantage. BMT propose the development of a comprehensive Australian submarine research, design and engineering program under the direction of the Commonwealth and in partnership with industry and academia. The principal aim of the program is to identify capability priorities and provide a long term technology development framework to achieve this objective. This rolling program, with a 10 year time horizon, will continue to develop the key design evaluation tools, methodologies and technologies inline with the submarine program’s requirements and schedule. It is assumed that the optimum acquisition model to align with this proposal would consist of flights of submarines (in batches of 3 or 4) through which technologies and new capability requirements can be evolved. This evolutionary process is principally supported by the rolling design, technology and engineering program.

INTRODUCTION

As the Commonwealth embarks on the acquisition of its next generation of naval submarines it will be faced with many critical decisions that will establish the technological landscape for Australian industry and Naval capability for decades to come. These decisions will be driven by, among others, capability and technology requirements, budgetary constraints and through life operation and support strategy. It is evident that the Commonwealth will benefit from technical assistance provided by an indigenous, knowledgeable and skilled science and technology support network. The objectives of the network should be to expand Australia’s in-country expertise both in the short and long term, assist the delivery of the required capability on time and to budget and support the future evolution of the submarine capability.

Australia’s Future Submarine In the 2009 Defence White Paper “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century”, the Commonwealth presented its roadmap for meeting its strategic defence objectives. This strategy includes the development of a unified defence force that can operate throughout Australia’s northern maritime and littoral approaches, react decisively to maintain sea superiority and support the nation’s international strategic obligations. One key element to support these objectives is the Commonwealth’s plan to acquire 12 new conventionally powered submarines. Compared to its predecessor, the current Collins Class, the Future Submarine will be required to have an increased range, increased endurance, and host a range of enhanced and flexible capabilities. As an inherent function of its intended operational roles the Future Submarine will also be equipped with advanced and complex communications systems and mission payloads. The required roles of the future submarine will be numerous and include: “anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare, strategic strike, mine detection and mine- laying, intelligence collection, supporting

special forces and gathering battlespace data in support of operations”. All of this is required to be suitably accommodated while maintaining low signatures across all spectrums, including at high transit speeds. The Defence White Paper commitment to acquire a new class of conventional submarines confirms the perception that Australia would not make the step to acquire a nuclear powered submarine force. The advantage of the nuclear powered submarine being the extended periods of time they can remain submerged and high transit speeds compared with conventional diesel electric boats such as the Collins class. Such a capability would be advantageous to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) due to the long transits required to reach patrol areas and other unique operational requirements of the Australian Area of Operations. However, stealth is the greatest asset of the submarine and the conventional submarines produce less noise and are in general stealthier than their nuclear counterparts; an advantage the government would be reluctant to forfeit. In fact the unique and expansive operating requirements of RAN submarines are such that any conventional class submarine acquired to replace the Collins class will drive the requirement for an entirely new class and design; there being no equivalent in-service or projected class of submarine design that will be compliant. This situation is not new for Australia and was the genesis for the Collins program and to its reputation as the most advanced and capable conventionally powered submarine in operation today. Returning to the nuclear powered submarine debate, it is apparent that countries that operate nuclear powered submarines have long established civil nuclear programs (power generation) and hence the regulatory framework that ensures the safe operation of this highly controversial and potentially lethal power source. The existence of a strong and functional nuclear regulatory framework is seen as an essential precursor to expansion to any military nuclear capability. Additionally, the size, cost and manning requirements for nuclear submarines would require significant additional investment from the Australian Government into the future submarine program. The defence White Paper outlines a definite preference for a Commercial and Military off the Shelf (COTS/MOTS) strategy when it comes to defence acquisitions. It would be normal practice to investigate several off the shelf solutions in the initial stages of the project. However, as previously stated, it is likely there is no prescribed solution that fully

meets the unique requirements of the Future Submarine. As will be discussed, even a modified version of an off the shelf design would bring with it significant technical risks and capability deficiencies as well as resulting in the derivation of what would be, effectively, a unique platform due to the level of extrapolation from the base design. This creates problems when trying to leverage through life support and technology upgrade of the capability for the entirety of its life, at this stage, past 2050.

The Future Submarine Programme The Future Submarine programme is forecast to be Australia’s largest single defence project (described as a nation building activity) and is expected to evolve over at least the next 30 years. The projected life of the current Collins Class submarines will see the introduction of its replacement around 2025. Although in its early stages, the program is expected to go through first pass approval in the fiscal year 2012. In the meantime, an acquisition strategy is under development to support the decision between various acquisition options including an ab initio design either by an overseas design house or through the establishment of an indigenous Australian design capability. The realities of a submarine design and production program is such that the current program will require periods of accelerated activity to define, order and deliver the necessary long lead and short term schedule milestones. At each step of the way the Commonwealth will be engaging with international and Australian stakeholders from both Government and industry.

Realising the Capability Gap Despite an inglorious start (not unexpected for such an ambitious program), the Collins class has proven to be an exceptional platform and has been widely acknowledged as the most advanced conventional powered submarine in the world. It is unmatched in its ability to deploy to areas undetected by opposition forces. That said, it cannot be expected that this capability advantage will continue into the future as countries in the region expand economically and seek to exert their influence; including the final arm of diplomacy, military capability. It is apparent from recent acquisition programs in the region that the military balance is changing, enhanced capability is being fielded and advanced technology is being implemented as a matter of course. To maintain a capability edge, Australia must strive to maintain pace with these changes such that it can retain sufficient control over its sea approaches and sea lanes vital to its national interests. To meet the threat of emerging powers in its region, Australia cannot be satisfied with a platform that cannot be adapted and evolved throughout its life. Instead, Australia’s future submarine capability must be designed to embrace evolution through continual evaluation of future threats and assessment of the relevant technologies required to combat them. As stated previously a model that consists of flights of submarines (in batches of 3 or 4) with each successive flight representing a design evolution of the previous and incorporating the technology upgrade, new capability requirements and lessons learned from the previous flight would achieve such an objective.

This objective also requires the integration of a research/technology insertion program with the acquisition and major upgrade activities through life, thus providing the future submarine with the capability to fight and win against any short or long term threat emerging in the region. The ability to support this Nation building vision unfortunately highlights a gap between where Australian industry is now and where it will need to be to develop and support the future submarine fleet. Australia, by its size, is restricted in that it often does not have the population or economic and industrial strength to design, build and support major complex platforms on tight budgets and within short time frames. The enormity of the task to design, build, support and evolve a major platform such as the future submarine over the life of 40 years should not be underestimated. These types of activities require large lead times to ensure that the platform remains at the fore front of technology in order to fulfil its operational requirements throughout its entire life. This does not imply that this type of project is beyond the capacity of Australian industry, however, it would require unprecedented industry cooperation and reach back to allied European and US expertise as no one industry partner has the capability or technical expertise to design, produce, support and maintain the multitude of advanced systems that will be required to fulfil the capability for the future submarine project. It is imperative to such an approach that the acquisition model should not proceed down a single partner solution. The “winner takes all” approach will, through experience, exclude all other organisations capable of supporting the program through the usual commercial realities of the corporate world. Australia has had success in the past with the Collins project at building and supporting a complex fleet of boats, however, to become the capability leader in a project will require a marked increase in technology, skills and infrastructure which does not currently exist in-country. Although the Collins was built in country, the experience that has been gained in its design and construction has unfortunately withered over the years. Since the construction of the final Collins class, Australia’s focus has been on sustainment, and much of the workforce that held the technical “know how” gained through the construction of the Collins has moved on. Now substantial resources will have to be invested to train a younger workforce in these skills. Also, Australia is currently building the AWD, and while some construction techniques will flow through from one platform to the other, there are major differences between building a ship and building a submarine. With that said, the infrastructure required is already in place, something that will be a key driver in reducing costs. Even with a skilled workforce and all the required infrastructure, significant collaboration with allied countries, most significantly the US and those in Europe, will be required to ensure the technologies and systems on board are state of the art and will continue to give Australia the capability edge over regional neighbours in the years to come.

Australian Submarine Technology As mentioned earlier, there is a significant gap in where manufacturing technology and support systems are and where they need to be to realise the future submarine capability. Significant technology and know how in relation to submarine design and support currently exist in country with the continued Collins sustainment activity. Apart from the

major prime contractor, ASC, there exists a plethora of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) who were instrumental in the design and initial acquisition of the Collins as well as its continued sustainment over the past decade. This capability will need to be maintained and enhanced into the future for both the Collins and future submarine project. These companies and those that have established and proven complimentary expertise will be heavily relied upon to deliver the future submarine project. It is expected that they will utilise many of the lessons learned from the Collins project and apply them to the future submarine. Additionally, these SMEs will be expected to build on their established knowledge base and develop new capabilities that will be both of great need to the project and commercially attractive to the companies. DSTO, as the Government’s primary defence scientific research organisation, has shouldered much of the responsibility to ensure that as military platforms age, the capability, availability and safety of the platforms continue to meet Defence requirements. During the development of the Collins class, DSTO was responsible for developing new materials, to increase strength and improve stealth, and also worked on reducing noise from the propeller after the initial introduction into service. In the case of the future submarine project, this contribution will continue especially during the initial stages of the project when significant input and leadership will be required by DSTO and other subject matter experts to develop capabilities and bridge knowledge gaps currently limiting Australian industry’s ability to perform submarine design, manufacture and support tasks. The White Paper commitment to continue upgrades to Collins through the remainder of its life will continue to keep Australian industry active and assist in reducing the skills gap in order to build the future submarine. This may also contribute to a smoother transition from Collins to the future submarine program. DSTO, in addition to the aforementioned SMEs, would provide the initial knowledge base for the in country design/manufacture and or support for any future submarine program regardless of whether the boat is designed in Australia, or an extrapolated MOTS solution is sought. Consolidation of these skills in addition to input from other allied countries would form the basis of an in country science and technology base focused on delivering the new submarine capability via a collaborative research roadmap.

The Need for In-country Supportability

Australia will continue to take existing military hardware and modify it for its specific roles and requirements. This has led to numerous problems in major platform acquisitions where there has not been an adequate knowledge base to help in the resolution of these issues. The risk of knowledge gaps and lack of expertise in areas concerning Australia’s operational roles and requirements reveals the need for a dedicated science and technology group for a program as high risk and technologically complex as the future submarine. If Australia pursues the option where it takes responsibility for the design, manufacture and support of the future submarine in country, it additionally accepts an elevated level of project risk. While this is essential to developing a more capable and effective platform system, it is in conflict with the defence strategy as discussed in the White Paper of reducing risk by way of procuring off the shelf products to ensure projects are delivered on time, to budget and provide value for money. If Australia is to continue down the path of

developing in-country design, it must look for ways to mitigate risks and reduce project delays and budget overruns whilst still delivering the necessary capability. An example of recent defence programs that have led to delays and cost overruns include the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft which was to be delivered in late 2006 and is currently still delayed with no sign of a delivery date in sight; and the Army Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) which has only recently been put back on schedule after a intensive program to deal with numerous issues within the project. In both cases, an aircraft was derived from an existing platform and modified to suit Australian specific operational roles and environments. This unique tailoring led to Australia being isolated when problems arose in the projects. In the case of the Wedgetail, the available technical expertise is yet to find solutions to these issues. Another example of this is the Australian fleet of Blackhawk helicopters. The original US Army design baseline has been changed to customise the platform for Australia’s use in an attempt to gain operational and functional advantages. Australia had the option to tap into the US Blackhawk program but chose not to as, at the time, the upgrades were deemed too costly and were not necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Australian Army. From that time on there has been a divergence in design baseline that has stifled the continual upgrade and evolution of the fleet. Due to on going difficulties, the Australian government attempted to utilise the US Army Blackhawk helicopter upgrade program to remedy its problems. However, due to changes made to the baseline configuration earlier in the program, the fleet was unable to undergo the same program. Australia’s fleet became in such desperate need of upgrade that a new platform was sought in the form of the MRH-90. In contrast, the US fleet of Blackhawks are still in service and will continue to operate long into the future thanks to the upgrade program. The cost associated with implementing the US lead upgrade program is minimal in comparison to the $2bn needed to replace the Australian Blackhawk fleet. This is a prime example of how a reliable, experienced, knowledgeable and skilled in-country support network, established over years, has saved millions in tax payer’s money and sustained the capability edge necessary to maintain effectiveness in military operations. The Australian government would do well to establish a similar program for its future submarine. The Research Strategy outlined in this paper will be vital in building the foundation for a much needed Australian submarine engineering and design evaluation capability. While the Collins class has been a highly effective platform, there were a number of costly delays and capability shortfalls that required immediate correction. Arguably these issues were caused by a lack of knowledge, experience and IP control, problems that can be addressed by the collaborative group described in this paper. As discussed, risk can be minimised by entering into a partnership between Government, academia and industry to drive strategic research in areas identified as vital to the success of the future submarine program and or areas lacking expertise in Australian industry. The partnership needs to focus on strengthening ties between the Commonwealth and all participants by harbouring a culture of “best for project” thinking and sharing responsibilities to reduce adversarial relationships between stakeholders. Although sharing

responsibilities, the Commonwealth will still maintain key controls over the program and will link expenditure to real progress to ensure value for money. An added benefit of the collaborative research model is that all SMEs are responsible for the success or otherwise of the project. This has the potential to bring a significant improvement in the success of the overall program.

Collaborative Partnering and Value for Money

A similar yet more targeted and specialized program is that of Collaborative Research Centres (CRC) and a number of these are well established and have yielded benefits for all stakeholders. CRCs are targeted at a specialised area of expertise such as the CRC for Advanced Composite Structures (CRC-ACS) and the automotive industry (Auto-CRC). Both of these research centres have been very successful in developing new technologies and processes within their areas of expertise and have also been able to provide technological skills and expertise to other industries. Value for money within CRC programs is demonstrated very well by the successful bidding of Hawker de Havilland (HdH) to build all rear moving surfaces on the new Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft, a project that commenced in 2006. The $4bn contract was successful in no small part thanks to the work with the CRC-ACS to develop manufacturing methods for lightweight structures such as liquid moulding and vacuum bag resin infusion. The research HdH had done with CRC-ACS allowed them to manufacture structures faster, lighter and cheaper, delivering significant cost savings to the 787 program. This resulted in a healthy return for HdH who has invested $17m into the CRC-ACS since 1991. The investment required to build on existing infrastructure and establish a true engineering design and evaluation capability for the future submarine program will make positive returns over the life of the new platform and beyond. Due to Australia’s geography and need to defend and control vast coastal areas and seas, submarines will likely form an integral part of the country’s national security interests for generations to come. In light of this, an investment of this nature for Australia’s next generation submarine will yield long lasting rewards far beyond the life of platform that replaces the Collins class. Additionally, new found capabilities in ship/submarine design have potential to significantly bolster the Australian maritime and ship building industry both immediately and in the long term.

THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY

Meeting the Capability Development Needs

The task to design and construct a major platform such as the future submarine relies on a number of technologies and skills that must be established before the project commences. This not only includes design and manufacturing capabilities and methodologies but through life support and maintenance practices and policies, future upgrade and design evolution programs and eventual disposal plans. Any program to design, build and support the future submarine project would also have to rely heavily on the lessons learnt from the Collins program both due to the similarity of the platforms and also due to Australia’s success, and in some cases failures, with the previous submarine platforms.

As the future submarine will be a new design of boat, the White Paper also predicts Australia’s reliance on its allied partners, in particular the US and Europe. The US Navy (USN) and RAN have an established relationship in terms of submarine warfare, specifically in the area of combat systems, and the utilisation of this relationship will continue to be of great benefit to both parties. Already many of the systems on board USN boats are replicated on Collins class and it would be expected that this type of common configuration would be continued with the future submarine effectively forming a large element of the MOTS component of an acquisition program. This cooperative approach could see reductions in cost burdens in the development of new technologies and systems, something both parties would be eager for. This would also make the challenge of interoperability much easier, by assisting training and live operations alike. While it would be possible for Australia to rely on pre-existing alliances with allied nations to fill the gaps in its knowledge and skills base for the future submarine project, over-dependence on other nations or private companies would result in loss of control and sever restrictions in access to the intellectual property (IP) of the design. This restriction has been the main criticism of the Collins project. This may seem like a small problem when focusing solely on the acquisition phase of the project, as significant cost savings and risk reductions can be achieved by building an existing design. However, issues such as IP access and control can cause significant problems when upgrades/modifications or even evolutions of the baseline design are required. Having suffered the consequences and inefficiencies of this reality it would be reprehensible to ignore such a major issue. IP ownership and unfettered access is imperative to the through life support and technology insertion that is essential to maintaining Australia’s capability edge. It should also be noted that the future submarine project will deliver the first platform by 2025, a period of 17 years from commencement. To commence with an existing (if extrapolated) design which has similarly taken 17 years from genesis results in fielding a platform design that was initiated 34 years prior. This reality does not align with attaining a capability edge.

The Australian Submarine Technology Group

As the evolution of an overseas design exposes problematic issues in the support and design evolution of the future submarine, BMT contends that an indigenous design solution should be sought and which the Commonwealth would have full control over the IP allowing future flights to be evolved, block upgrades, configuration baseline changes and design evolution to ensure the future submarine delivers a capability superior to that of any other in the region. As previously discussed, Australia does not currently have the capability to develop an in-country design nor does any one company possess the resources or expertise to deliver what is required. To bridge this gap, a research partnership would need to be established and would comprise a consortium of Government, industry and academia with the task of developing the new technologies and processes required to make such a complex project a reality. This would need to be under the management and direction of the Commonwealth and aligned to the acquisition program. This would not be restricted to design and manufacturing techniques but also sustainment and through life support of highly complex equipment and sophisticated systems. Research on such a large scale and with such advanced technology cannot be handled by just one organisation and each partner would need to bring their own expertise in specific areas and in many cases develop new technologies and practices that they currently do not possess.

Government initiatives to train defence industry participants are not a new concept. Where shortfalls in technical areas were identified they have been targeted in a strategic measure to ensure skills in these areas are adequate and that there are enough trained staff to fulfil the needs of defence in the years ahead. The group (Australian Submarine Technology Group) would ensure a strategic approach is made in developing the necessary technologies. The ASTG would take direction from the Commonwealth Submarine Community (Submarine FEG/DMO/DSTO) as to the appropriate technology streams, priorities, expectations and scheduling. Within the ASTG, individual partners would focus on delivering specific milestones within a structured technology stream research program all working towards the same end goal. Without this structure and the tailoring of a collaborative partnership, the task of up-skilling and developing new processes and new thinking to make the future submarine a reality would be far too reactive. This would lead to possible delays in development and capability gaps resulting in operational availability shortfalls. Figure 1 shows the proposed structure of the group. An advantage of this approach from an IP perspective is that if one partner decides to withdraw from the project this does not mean that they take their own IP with them as the IP remains the property of the group. This also contributes to a significant reduction in risk throughout the project. To ensure that Australia maintains the capability edge in the region, the baseline technology can be continuously developed by use of collaborative programs and the utilisation of emerging technologies. To do this, a capability growth path would need to be defined early in the program that would set out the relevant upgrades expected to be completed on the platform throughout its life. In addition to this, the continual assessment of the platform’s ability to fulfil its role and not just the serviceability of the equipment is essential. A rolling program, producing 3 or 4 submarines at a time, with a 10 year time horizon will continue to develop the key design evaluation tools, methodologies and technologies inline with the submarine program’s requirements and schedule for each technology stream. While best practice dictates that technology that will emerge throughout the life of the program be identified (in some cases looking 20-30 years ahead) and incorporate them into the initial design, being prepared to adapt to operational environments or threats that could not be foreseen at the time of the initial capability definition is also imperative. As such, a continual program of evolution and upgrade needs to be developed to ensure the platform’s operational effectiveness until its final disposal some time after 2050. The new ASTG would adhere well to the requirements set out in the White Paper which, when discussing the development for technologies to assist the design and support of the new submarine, called for “self-reliant defence research” and “collaborative programs with scientifically and technologically capable partners” focusing on “new and advanced technologies and their exploitation and application”. This centre for excellence or research collaborative with expertise in advanced technologies (primarily focused on submarine applications) would also have the capability to design technologies that could also flow through to other maritime platforms and combat systems across the ADF.

Figure 1 - ASTG Stakeholders and Outputs

The ASTG would ensure a sustained level of activity for the duration of the future submarine project with continual research, evaluation, design and development of the platform. All IP generated from future submarine program activities would be retained by the ASTG which would provide a smooth transition into the program for the proceeding generation of submarine. By providing a constant stream of activity, the ASTG provides industry and Government constituents with an economical and lucrative business opportunity. The ASTG concept will provide a continuous flow of work for stakeholders during all phases of the future submarine project. This increases financial viability and avoids periods of inactivity that can deteriorate the knowledge and experience of the in-country work force, as is what happened with Collins. Figure 2 illustrates the ability of the ASTG to generate a steady stream of work tying into the continual development of the future submarine platform and the delivery of successive flights of submarines. The development cycle will be continuous at all stages. For example, during the fabrication of the first flight of submarines the research, design and development of the second flight will begin. Similarly, while test and trials of the first flight of submarines is underway, planning and preparation for the fabrication of the second flight will begin. The time to act on this partnership is now. Due to the long lead times associated with major acquisitions, action needs to be taken now to ensure these essential milestones are achieved to support the delivery of the first boat by 2025.

Figure 2 - Comparison of activity levels of the Future Submarine Program (with

ASTG support) and Collins Class Submarine Program

Life-Cycle Research and Develop Approach

A major responsibility of any collaborative research group would be ensure that the technologies and systems involved not only operate as required, but continue to deliver the required capability in the face of expanding threats within the region. This is particularly important in an era when technological evolution occurs at unprecedented speeds. Considering the next generation submarine will operate over a period of 30 years, there will be a need to continually upgrade, re-fit and modify the platform. To achieve this, a specialised research plan will be required to ensure these systems continue to be superior to those of other potential adversaries in the region, especially now when the availability of sophisticated and complex technology is more prominent. The research plan should start with core research projects and build into practical applications that can be integrated into the acquisition, evaluation and design of the next generation submarine. The experience gained through implementing ideas and outcomes from well planned and executed research projects will provide the basis for the in country capability that is required. As knowledge is developed, research will evolve ahead of the submarine in its life-cycle, allowing the evolution of the platform including integration of new technologies, improvements in performance, efficiency, maintainability and reliability, not to mention an increase in Australian industry’s capacity to support the future submarine program. The research strategy would typically be devised in conjunction with all relevant stakeholders. An example of the research program for three such technology streams being pursued by BMT and the associated milestones required for the development of a strong engineering design and evaluation capability ahead of the future submarine acquisition is shown in Table 1.

REF. Description

Milestone 1 The completion of projects 1 and 17 will support the comprehensive evaluation of the submarine’s total resistance characteristics during deep diving and near surface operation. Further study and the completion of projects 2 and 3 will complement Milestone 1 and support the assessment of the submarine’s propulsive and manoeuvring performance.

Milestone 2 The completion of the remaining hydrodynamics, hydro-acoustics and fluid mechanics projects will support the evaluation and analysis of key aspects of the submarine’s propulsive performance, acoustic signature and damage/recovery performance.

Milestone 3 It is expected that the completion of project 20 and 21 will permit a thorough assessment of the submarine’s fluid structure interaction (FSI) across a range of applications including: control surfaces and appendages, snort mast and antennae and propeller.

Milestone 4 The completion of projects 22, 23 and 24 are expected to support the existing research effort being conducted by key Commonwealth organisations.

Milestone 5 Projects 26 and 27 are targeted toward the assessment of the submarine’s internal environment and disaster management. Both internal environment and system cooling, and fire and explosion management are considered high risk areas that require evaluation and management during the design and operational stages.

Milestone 6 The outcomes of project 25 will support the following operational performance aspects: power generation and usage requirements, discretion rates, and mission planning, simulation and evaluation.

Table 1 - Program Milestones

The key areas identified by BMT for future research are:

a. Hydrodynamics, hydro-acoustics and fluid mechanics;

b. Vibration and structural mechanics; and

c. Thermal and mechanical systems.

Other technology streams that should be considered include, but are not limited to, communications, energy storage and signatures. A preliminary research program plan is presented in Table 2. These are examples of research that are proposed as part of a submarine design and evaluation capability sustainment/development program. It includes those objectives and outcomes identified as being of significant importance to the future submarine design evaluation process.

The knowledge and experience gained through completing projects in the areas suggested by Table 2 will lead to the outcomes and benefits identified at each of the milestones in Table 1. Continual development and evolution of the new submarine performed off the back of in-country research and design will support continuous customisation of the platform for Australia’s unique operational requirements. The in country engineering design and evaluation capability is paramount to sustaining supportability of the platform as its configuration moves further away from the original COTS/MOTS variant from which it was derived and closer to the Australian tailored design that is required.

Table 2 - Research Program Plan

Conclusion

The acquisition of the next generation of Australian naval submarines will be the largest acquisition project in Australia’s history and as such it is imperative that initial phases of the program are executed correctly. Australia’s unique operational requirements dictate that an entirely new class of boat is required to be designed to meet these needs. As such, Australia has an opportunity to take ownership of the development and ensure that the capability delivered is truly world class. Australian industry has not previously conducted an activity on such a large scale, a significant amount of research will be required over a broad range of technologies to establish expert industry know how and skills. Submarines will be an integral part of Australia’s defence force for generations to come and it is appreciated that the Commonwealth would wish to explore COTS/ MOTS solutions. It is also safe to assume any off the shelf solution will be modified considerably to suit the unique operational and functional requirements of the Australian Navy; and rightly so. However, experience has shown there is considerable risk in modifying off the shelf solutions when the in country engineering and design capability required to assure the continual supportability and evolution of the platform has not been established. The consequences are damaging, ranging from schedule and budget overruns to capability shortfalls and consequent vulnerabilities in national security. It is clear that these risks can be mitigated by having the necessary knowledge, experience and ingenuity to continually evaluate, evolve and support programs as complex and long running as the future submarine. To achieve this, a government and industry strategic collaborative research program should be formed. The ASTG encapsulates a group that will focus on developing and expanding existing skills in submarine design and manufacturing processes, maintenance and repair procedures, through life support and design baseline evolution to ensure that Australia’s security and strategic advantage is maintained towards the year 2050 and beyond. Due to the large lead times required for projects of this magnitude, it is imperative that this collaborative research initiative starts now to ensure that the skills gap in the industry is bridged, allowing an adequately skilled and experienced Australian workforce to design, manufacture and adequately support the largest acquisition project in the country’s history.

Acknowledgements

Edward Dawson (Naval Architect, BMT Design & Technology), Gordon MacDonald (Technical Director, BMT Design & Technology) and Tim Rafferty (Graduate Engineer, DMO).

References

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