authenticity in art

of 26 Authenticity in Art

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The Oxford Handbook of AestheticsJerrold Levinson

Print publication date: Sep 2009Print ISBN-13: 9780199279456Published to Oxford Handbooks Online: Sep-09Subject: Philosophy, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art, Moral PhilosophyDOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001

Authenticity in Art

Denis Dutton

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.003.0014

Abstract and Keywords

Many of the most often-discussed issues of authenticity have centred aroundart forgery and plagiarism. A forgery is defined as a work of art whosehistory of production is misrepresented by someone (not necessarily theartist) to an audience (possibly to a potential buyer of the work), normallyfor financial gain. A forging artist paints or sculpts a work in the style of afamous artist in order to market the result as having been created by thefamous artist. Exact copies of existing works are seldom forged, as theywill be difficult to sell to knowledgeable buyers. The concept of forgerynecessarily involves deceptive intentions on the part of the forger or theseller of the work: this distinguishes forgeries from innocent copies or merelyerroneous attributions.

authenticity, art forgery, plagiarism, innocent copies, deceptive intentions, expressiveauthenticity

1. Introduction

‘Authentic’, like its near-relations, ‘real’, ‘genuine’, and ‘true’, is what J. L.Austin called a ‘dimension word’, a term whose meaning remains uncertainuntil we know what dimension of its referent is being talked about. A forgedpainting, for example, will not be inauthentic in every respect: a Han vanMeegeren forgery of a Vermeer is at one and the same time both a fakeVermeer and an authentic van Meegeren, just as a counterfeit bill may beboth a fraudulent token of legal tender but at the same time a genuine

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piece of paper. The way the authentic/inauthentic distinction sorts outis thus context-dependent to a high degree. Mozart played on a moderngrand piano might be termed inauthentic, as opposed to being playedon an eighteenth-century forte-piano, even though the notes played areauthentically Mozart's. A performance of Shakespeare that is at pains torecreate Elizabethan production practices, values, and accents would beto that extent authentic, but may still be inauthentic with respect to thefact that it uses actresses for the female parts instead of boys, as wouldhave been the case on Shakespeare's stage. Authenticity of presentationis relevant not only to performing arts. Modern museums, for example,have been criticized for presenting old master paintings in strong lightingconditions which reveal detail, but at the same time give an overall effectthat is at odds with how works would have been enjoyed in domestic spacesby their original audiences; cleaning, revarnishing, andstrong illumination arguably amount to inauthentic presentation. Religioussculptures created for altars have been said to be inauthentically displayedwhen presented in a bare space of a modern art gallery (see Feagin 1995).

Whenever the term ‘authentic’ is used in aesthetics, a good first question toask is, Authentic as opposed to what? Despite the widely different contextsin which the authentic/inauthentic is applied in aesthetics, the distinctionnevertheless tends to form around two broad categories of sense. First,works of art can possess what we may call nominal authenticity, definedsimply as the correct identification of the origins, authorship, or provenanceof an object, ensuring, as the term implies, that an object of aestheticexperience is properly named. However, the concept of authenticity oftenconnotes something else, having to do with an object's character as a trueexpression of an individual's or a society's values and beliefs. This secondsense of authenticity can be called expressive authenticity. The followingdiscussion will summarize some of the problems surrounding nominalauthenticity and will conclude with a general examination of expressiveauthenticity.

2. Nominal Authenticity

2.1 Forgery and Plagiarism

Many of the most often-discussed issues of authenticity have centred aroundart forgery and plagiarism. A forgery is defined as a work of art whosehistory of production is misrepresented by someone (not necessarily theartist) to an audience (possibly to a potential buyer of the work), normally




for financial gain. A forging artist paints or sculpts a work in the style of afamous artist in order to market the result as having been created by thefamous artist. Exact copies of existing works are seldom forged, as theywill be difficult to sell to knowledgeable buyers. The concept of forgerynecessarily involves deceptive intentions on the part of the forger or theseller of the work: this distinguishes forgeries from innocent copies or merelyerroneous attributions. Common parlance also allows that an honest copycan later be used as a forgery, even though it was not originally intendedas such, and can come to be called a ‘forgery’. In such cases a defraudingseller acts on an unknowing buyer by misrepresenting the provenance of awork, perhaps even with the additions of a false signature or certificate ofauthenticity. The line between innocent copy and overt forgery can be, as weshall see, difficult to discern.

Plagiarism is a related but logically distinct kind of fraud. It involves thepassing off as one's own of the words or ideas of another. The most obviouscases of plagiarism have an author publishing in his own name a text thatwas written by someone else.If the original has already been published, the plagiarist is at risk ofbeing discovered, although plagiarism may be impossible to prove if theoriginal work, or all copies of it, is hidden or destroyed. Since publication ofplagiarized work invites wide scrutiny, plagiarism is, unlike forgery, a difficultfraud to accomplish as a public act without detection. In fact, the mostcommon acts of plagiarism occur not in public, but in the private sphere ofwork that students submit to their teachers.

2.2 Honest Misidentification

Authenticity is contrasted with ‘falsity’ or ‘fakery’ in ordinary discourse,but, as noted, falsity need not imply fraud at every stage of the productionof a fake. Blatant forgery and the intentional misrepresentation of artobjects has probably been around as long as there has been an art market—it was rife even in ancient Rome. However, many works of art that arecalled ‘inauthentic’ are merely misidentified. There is nothing fraudulentabout wrongly guessing the origins of an apparently old New Guineamask or an apparently eighteenth-century Italian painting. Fraudulence isapproached only when what is merely an optimistic guess is presented aswell-established knowledge, or when the person making the guess usesposition or authority to give it a weight exceeding what it deserves. The line,however, that divides unwarranted optimism from fraudulence is hazy atbest. (Any worldly person who has ever heard from an antique dealer the




phrase ‘It's probably a hundred and fifty years old’ will understand this point:it's probably not that old, and perhaps not even the dealer himself could besure if he's merely being hopeful or playing fast and loose with the truth.)

Authenticity, therefore, is a much broader issue than one of simplyspotting and rooting out fakery in the arts. The will to establish the nominalauthenticity of a work of art, identifying its maker and provenance—in aphrase, determining how the work came to be—comes from a general desireto understand a work of art according to its original canon of criticism: whatdid it mean to its creator? How was it related to the cultural context of itscreation? To what established genre did it belong? What could its originalaudience have been expected to make of it? What would they have foundengaging or important about it? These questions are often framed in terms ofartists' intentions, which will in part determine and constitute the identity ofa work; and intentions can arise and be understood only in a social contextand at a historical time. External context and artistic intention are thusintrinsically related. We should resist, however, the temptation to imaginethat ascertaining nominal authenticity will inevitably favour some ‘old’ or‘original’ object over a later artefact. There may be Roman sculptures, copiesof older Greek originals, which are in some respects aesthetically better thantheir older prototypes, as there may be copies by Rembrandt of other Dutchartists that are aesthetically more pleasing than the originals. But in all suchcases, value and meaning can be rightly assessed only against a backgroundof correctly determined nominalauthenticity (for further discussion see Dutton 1983; Goodman 1976; Currie1989; Levinson 1990).

2.3 Han van Meegeren

One of the most famous episodes of misidentification and fraudulence inthe last century involves the van Meegeren Vermeer forgeries. The Dutchartist Han van Meegeren (1889–1947) was born in Deventer and studied inDelft, which was the home of the great seventeenth-century Dutch artistJohannes Vermeer. As his career declined in the years following the FirstWorld War, van Meegeren became increasingly resentful of dealers, critics,and academics. In part to wreak silent revenge on his enemies (‘woman-haters and negro-lovers’, he called them), but also simply to make money,van Meegeren tried his hand at forgery, producing in 1923 a LaughingCavalier, ostensibly by Franz Hals. Later he turned to the much scarcerand more valuable paintings of Vermeer. (Fewer than forty Vermeers havesurvived into the twentieth century.) His most ambitious plan, hatched in the




mid-1930s, was to forge a large Vermeer on a religious subject. This wouldhave been an unusual find for an undiscovered Vermeer, and therefore anunlikely choice for a forger; but in fact van Meegeren was cleverly confirmingpublished scholarly speculation that Vermeer had visited Italy and paintedon religious themes in his youth, and that such paintings in a large, Italianstyle might yet be found. This forgery, Christ and the Disciples at Emmaus,was completed in 1937. To produce it, van Meegeren studied seventeenth-century pigment formulas, incorporated volatile flower oils in his pigmentsto create hardness, and used badger-hair brushes (a single modern bristleembedded in the paint would give him away) on canvas recycled from anunimportant seventeenth-century painting. He conceived a way to produce acraquelure, the fine web of surface cracking characteristics of old paintings,and concocted a plausible provenance for the work, claiming that it hadcome into his hands from an old Italian family that had fallen on hard timesand wanted to dispose of the painting under strict confidentiality (Godley1967; Dutton 1983). The work was ultimately purchased by the BoymansMuseum in Rotterdam for a price of approximately 2.5 million US dollars(2002 value), two-thirds of which van Meegeren pocketed.

When the Emmaus was unveiled at the museum, van Meegeren had thesatisfaction of standing at the edge of a crowd that heard the paintingextolled by the eminent Vermeer scholar Abraham Bredius as perhaps lthemasterpiece’ of Vermeer (Bredius 1937). Van Meegeren went on to forge sixmore Vermeers, one of which ended up in the private collection of the NaziReichsmarschall Hermann G&ring. Because van Meegeren was known tohave dealt with this work, he was arrested by Dutch police a few days afterthe end of the war for having sold a Dutch national treasure to the enemy.Only then did he confess that he had actually created this painting and theothers, going on to paint a last Vermeer in jail as a demonstration while heawaited trial. The trial itself was a media event, and the worldwide coveragemade him a folkhero. Van Meegeren was given a prison sentence of only one year; he died ofa heart attack shortly after beginning his sentence (Dutton 1983).

The van Meegeren episode is justifiably notorious as a case of recognizedexperts being hoodwinked by a clever, artistically gifted fraudster. As such,it calls into question both the validity of official expertise and the existenceof ascertainable aesthetic values that should ideally enable art professionalsto identify ‘masterpieces’ and distinguish them from inferior fakes. Afterall, if even renowned experts cannot tell the difference between a Vermeerand a van Meegeren, and if the van Meegeren has the power to delight




museum visitors, as the Emmaus clearly did, then why should anyone carevery much whether or not the painting is a Vermeer? Why should such awork be consigned to the basement? The discovery that it is forged doesnot, it seems, alter its perceived aesthetic characteristics. Arthur Koestlerhas argued that in such situations there can be no justification for rejectinga copy or forgery. If the forgery is indiscernible from an original (in the caseof an identical copy), or if it fits perfectly into the body of work left by anartist, and produces aesthetic pleasure of the same kind as other works bythe original artist, then there can be no warrant to exclude it from a museum(Koestler 1964).

In his influential discussion of forgery, Nelson Goodman has advancedarguments calling into question the idea that there can be no aestheticdifference between an original and an indiscernible forgery. In the first place,Goodman would have us ask, ‘Indiscernible to whom?’ Differences betweenthe Mona Lisa and a so-called exact copy of it may be indiscernible to achild, but obvious to an experienced museum curator. Even if the curatorcannot tell the difference between the one and the other, that does not meanthat a difference will not emerge, and later on appear glaring not only tothe curator, but to more innocent eyes as well. This process of change inperception, actually a sharpening of perception, is nicely illustrated by thevan Meegeren episode. In the first place, it should be noted that, even atthe time of the unveiling of the Emmaus, there was a divergence of opinionas to its authenticity. The local agent for the New York dealer Duveen Bros,attended the event and wired back to his employer that the painting wasa ‘rotten fake’. Moreover, the Emmaus in retrospect looks strangely unlikeany extant Vermeers. There is a photographic quality to the faces that lessresembles seventeenth-century portraiture than it does black and whitemovie stills; one of the faces, in fact, displays a striking resemblance toGreta Garbo. This overall ‘modern’ feel of the painting gave it a subtle appealto its initial audience, but for the same reason it reveals to our eyes thepainting's dated origin, as much as any 1930s movie betrays its originswith its hairstyles, make-up, gestures, and language. It seems that theagent for Duveen had a more sharply perceptive view than most of hiscontemporaries.

Goodman also pointed out another feature of forgery episodes that isespecially relevant in the van Meegeren case. Any supposed new discoveryof a work by an old artist will be assessed and authenticated in part by theextent to which its features conform to the artist's known œuvre. But onceincorporated into the artist's œuvre,




a new work, even if a forgery, becomes part of what Goodman calls the‘precedent class’ of works against which further new discoveries will beassessed. In the case of van Meegeren, Emmauswas stylistically the closestof all his forgeries to the precedent class of authentic Vermeers. Once itwas authenticated by Bredius and hung on the wall of the authoritativeBoymans Museum, its stylistic features—heavy, drooping eyes with walnut-shell lids, for instance—became an accepted aspect of the Vermeer style.Van Meegeren's next forgery could therefore move farther from the originalprecedent class of Vermeers, the next one farther still, and so on, as theunderstanding of the Vermeer style became more and more distorted. VanMeegeren was also aided by the fact that most of his activity was carried outduring the Second World War, with actual Vermeers in protective storage andunavailable for comparison. In the end, all of his forgeries were enough aliketo each other, and different stylistically from authentic Vermeers, that it iscertain their status would eventually have been revealed even without vanMeegeren's confession (Dutton 1983).

Goodman suggests that, in general, knowledge that a work is a forgery, oreven the suspicion that it is, conditions our viewing of the object, assigningit ‘a role as training toward perceptual discrimination’ It is by trying toperceive as yet invisible differences between originals and forgeries thatwe actually do learn to detect them. Leonard Meyer is another theorist whohas argued that cultural ideas about differences between an original anda forgery are indelibly part our perceptions of art. Our understanding ofany human product, Meyer claims, requires ‘understanding how it cameto be and what it is and,… if it is an event in the past, by being awareof its implications as realized in history’ (Meyer 1967). We can no morerid ourselves of these presuppositions of perception than, as he puts it,we can breathe in a vacuum. A related point is made by Denis Dutton,who argues that much of what we call achievement in art is implicit inour idea of the origins of a work of art. The excitement a virtuoso pianistgenerates by producing a glittering shower of notes in Liszt's Gnomenreigenis intrinsically connected with what we conceive to be an achievementof human hands playing at a keyboard. An aurally identical experienceelectronically synthesized fails to excite us: sound synthesizers can play asfast as you please, while pianists cannot. In the same way, however pleasantand skilful a modern forgery of a sixteenth-century master drawing may be,it can never be a sixteenth-century achievement, and therefore can never beadmired in quite the same way (Dutton 1983).




2.4 The Igorot of Luzon

Forgery episodes such as van Meegeren's Vermeers are unproblematic interms of nominal authenticity: there is a perfectly clear divide betweenthe authentic Vermeers and the van Meegeren fakes. But there are areaswhere determining nominal authenticity can be extremely fraught. Considerthe complexities of the following example. The Igorot of northern Luzontraditionally carved a rice granary guardian figure,a bulul, which is ceremonially treated with blood, producing over years adeep red patina which is partially covered with a black deposit of greasefrom food offerings. These objects were already being made for tourists andfor sale at international exhibitions in the 1920s, and one famous virtuosoIgorot carver, Tagiling, was by then producing figures on commission bylocal families and at the same time for the tourist trade. Bululs are still intraditional use, but specialized production of them ceased after the SecondWorld War. Today, if a local wants a bulul, it is purchased from a souvenirstand and then rendered sacred by subjecting it to the appropriate ceremony.‘The result’, Alaine Schoffel has explained, ‘is that in the rice granaries onenow finds shoddy sculptures slowly becoming covered with a coating ofsacrificial blood. They are authentic because they are used in the traditionalfashion, but this renders them no less devoid of aesthetic value.’ We donot necessarily have to agree with Schoffel's aesthetic verdict on ‘shoddy’souvenirs to recognize that he is legitimately invoking one of the manypossible senses of ‘authenticity’: the authentically traditional. The contrastto the authentically traditional carving in this context is a tourist piece, orone not made to take part in or express any recognizable tradition. On theother hand, a tourist piece that is bought by a local person and employedfor a traditional purpose is just as authentic, but in a different sense: it hasbeen given an authentically traditional use in an indigenous spiritual context.The fraudulent converse to authenticity in this sense would be a piece thatis intentionally misrepresented as fulfilling a traditional function, but whichdoes not, for example a piece that has been carefully given a fake patina andsigns of use or wear by a dealer or later owner of a carving (Schoffel 1989).

2.5 Authenticity in Music

Arguments over the use and presentation of art are nowhere more prominentthan in music performance. This is owing to the general structure of Western,notated music, in which the creation of the work of art is a two-stageprocess, unlike painting and other plastic arts. Stand in front of Leonardo'sGinevra de' Bend in the National Gallery in Washington, and you have before




you Leonardo's own handiwork. However much the paint may have beenaltered by time and the degenerative chemistry of pigments, howeverdifferent the surroundings of the museum are from the painting's originallyintended place of presentation, at least, beneath the shatter-proof, non-reflective glass you gaze at the very artefact itself, in its faded, singularglory. No such direct encounter is available with a performance of an oldmusical work. The original work is specified by a score, essentially a setof instructions, which are realized aurally by performers, normally for thepleasure of audiences. Because a score underdetermines the exact sound ofany particular realization, correct performances may differ markedly (Davies1987).

With a painting, therefore, there normally exists an original, nominallyauthentic object that can be identified as ‘the’ original; nothing correspondsto this inmusic. Even a composer's own performance of an instrumental score—say,Rachmaninoff playing his piano concertos, or Stravinsky conducting The Riteof Spring—cannot fully constrain the interpretive choices of other performersor define forever ‘the’ authentic performance. (In any event, composer/performers interpret their music differently on different occasions.) StephenDavies argues that a striving towards authenticity in musical performancedoes not entail that there is one authentic ideal of performance, still less thatthis would be a work's first performance or whatever a composer might haveheard in his head while composing the piece. The very idea of a performanceart permits performers a degree of interpretive freedom consistent withconventions that govern what counts as properly following the score (Davies2001; see also Godlovitch 1998; Thorn 1993).

Nevertheless, the twentieth century witnessed the development of an activemovement to try to understand better the original sounds especially ofseventeenthand eighteenth-century European music. This has encouragedattempts to perform such music on instruments characteristic of the time,in line with reconstructions of the past conventions that governed musicalnotation and performance (Taruskin 1995). This concern with authenticity canbe justified by the general, though not inviolable, principle which holds that‘a commitment to authenticity is integral to the enterprise that takes deliveryof the composer's work as its goal. If we are interested in performancesas of the works they are of, then authenticity must be valued for its ownsake’ (Davies 2001). This interest can take many forms—playing Scarlattisonatas on harpsichords of a kind Scarlatti would have played, instead ofthe modern piano; using a Baroque bow over the flatter bridge of a Baroque




violin to achieve more easily the double-stopping required of the Bach soloviolin works; performing Haydn symphonies with orchestras cut down fromthe late Romantic, 100-player ensembles used by Brahms or Mahler. Thesepractices are justified by taking us back in time to an earlier performingtradition and, in theory, closer to the work itself.

In this way of thinking, the purpose of reconstructing an historically authenticperformance is to create an occasion in which it sounds roughly as it wouldhave sounded to the composer, had the composer had expert, well equippedmusicians at his disposal. Enthusiasm for this idea has led some exponentsof the early music movement to imagine that they have a kind of moral orintellectual monopoly on the correct way to play music of the past. In onefamous put-down, the harpsichordist Wanda Landowska is said to have tolda pianist, ‘You play Bach your way, I'll play him his way.’ The question foraesthetic theory remains: What is Bach's way? If the question is framed aspurely about instrumentation, then the answer is trivially easy: the Bachkeyboard Partitas are authentically played in public only on a harpsichord ofa kind Bach might have used. But there are other ways in which the musicof Bach can be authentically rendered. For instance, Bach's keyboard writingincludes interweaved musical voices which, under the hands of a skilledpianist such as Glenn Gould, can often be revealed more clearly on a modernconcertgrand than on a harpsichord (Payzant 1978; Bazzana 1997). In general,the dynamic range and gradation of the piano are an advantage for allmusic performed on it, in contrast with the harpsichord, though the olderinstrument displays some exquisite qualities in which Bach too can soundglorious. (Its lack of sustaining power, for example, required harpsichordcomposers to introduce trills and ornamentation which became part of theBaroque style.)

However, if an authentic performance of a piece of music is understoodas one in which the aesthetic potential of the score is most fully realized,historic authenticity may not be the best way to achieve it. We would notgo back to productions of Shakespeare plays with boys taking the femaleroles simply because that was the way it was done in Shakespeare's time. Weregard the dramatic potential of those roles as ideally requiring the maturetalents of actresses, and write off the Elizabethan practice of boy actors asan historic accident of the moral climate of Shakespeare's age. We assume,in other words, that Shakespeare would have chosen women to play theseparts had he had the option. Similarly, the Beethoven piano sonatas werewritten for the biggest, loudest pianos Beethoven could find; there is little




doubt that he would have favoured the modern concert grand, if he had hada choice. (Davies points out, however, that the appeal and point of someof Beethoven's piano writing, for instance with the Appassionata Sonata,is that it pushes to the limit, and beyond, the capabilities of Beethoven'sinstruments: on a modern grand, the sense of instrumental challenge inthe power Appassionata is lost, or in any event reduced.) The best attitudetowards authenticity in music performance is that in which careful attentionis paid to the historic conventions and limitations of a composer's age, butwhere one also tries to determine the larger artistic potential of a musicalwork, including implicit meanings that go beyond the understanding that thecomposer's age might have derived from it. In this respect, understandingmusic historically is not in principle different from an historically informedcritical understanding of other arts, such as literature or painting.

3. Expressive Authenticity

In contrast to nominal authenticity, there is another fundamental senseof the concept indicated by two definitions of ‘authenticity’ mentioned inthe Oxford English Dictionary: ‘possessing original or inherent authority’,and, connected to this, ‘acting of itself, self-originated’ This is the meaningof ‘authenticity’ as the word shows up in existential philosophy, wherean authentic life is one lived with critical and independent sovereigntyover one's choices and values; the word is often used in a similar sense inaesthetic and critical discourse. In his discussion of authenticity of musicalperformance, Peter Kivy points out that, while the term usually refers tohistoricalauthenticity, there is another current sense of the term: performanceauthenticity as ‘faithfulness to the performer's own self, original, notderivative or aping of someone else's way of playing’ (Kivy 1995). Hereauthenticity is seen as committed, personal expression, being true musicallyto one's artistic self, rather than true to an historical tradition. From nominalauthenticity, which refers to the empirical facts concerning the origins ofan art object—what is usually referred to as provenance—we come now toanother sense of the concept, which refers less to cut-and-dried fact andmore to an emergent value possessed by works of art. I refer to this second,problematic sense of authenticity as expressive authenticity.

The nominal authenticity of a work of art of any culture may be impossible inmany cases to know, but where it is possible, it is a plain empirical discovery.To identify expressive authenticity, on the other hand, is a much morecontentious matter, involving any number of disputable judgements. Anthony




Shelton's account of the art and culture of the Huichol of north-west Mexicoillustrates ambiguities of expressive authenticity (Coote and Shelton 1992).Huichol traditional art is intimately bound up with the rituals that embody theHuichol cosmology and value system, combining aesthetic with local ethicalnotions. This art involves exchange relations, not only between humanand supernatural beings, but also between wife-givers and wife-takers intraditional marriages. While Shelton repeatedly stresses how semioticallydistant Huichol art is from Western models—for example in fusing thesignifier with the signified—he nevertheless allows that it may have a‘counterpart’ in the ‘art and ideas of beauty developed in scholasticism inmedieval Europe’. This is certainly true; the notion that a work of art—astatute of the Madonna, for instance—may on occasion actually incarnate,rather than merely represent, is hardly unknown in the European tradition.

Shelton describes the recent rise of Huichol commercial craft—specifically,constructions called ‘yarn paintings’, wooden tableaux (tablas) thatdepict episodes from traditional mythology. The yarn is brightly colouredcommercial material, embedded in beeswax on a plywood base. Whiledeeply sympathetic to Huichol culture, Shelton regards the development of acommercial market for Huichol work as having given birth to a meretriciousform of art, something that is not an authentic Huichol cultural expression.The producers of these colourful, even gaudy, pieces, on the other hand,avow their authenticity as significant products of their culture. So who isShelton, or any outsider, to dispute the indigenous opinion and the valuesthat guide it?

The two most significant aspects of Shelton's critique of Huichol art involveissues of continuity and audience. While Shelton says there has been atendency for outsiders and dealers to regard the yarn tablas as ‘either atraditional artform or as having evolved from a traditional form’, he rejectsthem as part of a continuous tradition. The Huichol do have a traditionof embedding beads and other materials in beeswax and in this mannerdecorating votive bowls and flat, wooden rectangles. But Shelton says that,with regard to the yarn constructions, he has been unable to trace anyorganic principle of evolution suggesting any kind of direct development fromolder forms. Shelton lists ways in which the tablas must be set apart fromtraditional Huichol art. The tablets' brightly dyed commercial yarns onplywood or fibreboard, dense with elaborate colour depictions, presentsomething quite unlike sparingly decorated traditional votive objects.Furthermore, the context of production for the modern objects is not thesierra—they are made by Huichol people living in Guadalajara or Mexico




City—and such objects, while illustrative of traditional mythologies, have noindigenous religious use.

Shelton therefore regards Huichol yarn tablas as indicative of the crumblingof traditional Huichol society. ‘Commercial arts and crafts are antipatheticto traditional Huichol values’, he says, because they serve ‘none of theintegrative purposes of traditional art’. As craft items made for sale toforeigners, the tablas are produced to appeal to a culture whose wholetheory of knowledge is, on Shelton's account, radically different fromHuichol tradition. The very translation of oral narratives into single pictorialrepresentation takes from them the causal element intrinsic to their culturalcharacter. Shelton notes that the flamboyance of the tablas makes them, inthe view of Huichol people, items of ‘conspicuous consumption’. In this way,the values they embody ‘are foreign to the Huichol themselves, and conflictwith their emphasis on humility and religious introspection’. Consequently,the tablas would never be purchased by traditional Huichols. The tablas havethe overall effect of alienating Huichol people from their own culture. It is inthese respects that it is legitimate to call Huichol tablas ‘inauthentic’.

Shelton criticizes Huichol yarn construction for its failure to be continuouslylinked to historic Huichol artforms by what he calls an ‘organic principle ofevolution’. Continuity here means persistent presence of external form, andthere is little doubt that this is an adequate criterion for authenticity in somecontexts. But concentration on perceptible form ignores the more importantissue at stake in assessing the expressive authenticity of art. Authenticityoften implies that the original indigenous audience for an art is still intact;inauthenticity that the original audience is gone, or has no interest in theart, and that the art is now being created for a different audience, perhapsfor foreign consumption. The authenticity question for Huichol yarn productsdoes not depend on whether beeswax and/or yarn, commercially dyed or not,has been used in the past. The issue is that the yarn constructions have nopart in the present religious economy or other aspects of traditional Huicholsociety, and therefore are not addressed to the people themselves, theirfears, dreams, loves, tastes, obsessions. Nor are they subjected to criticismin terms of the values of an indigenous audience: they do not expressanything about Huichol life to Huichol people. They are inauthentic in theserespects.




3.1 Authenticity and Audiences

Too often discussions of authenticity ignore the role of the audience inestablishing a context for creative or performing art. To throw light on theimportance of an audience in contributing to meaning in art, consider thefollowing thoughtexperiment. Imagine the complicated and interlockingtalents, abilities, stores ofknowledge, techniques, experience, habits, and traditions that make upthe art of opera—for example as it is presented, or embodied, by a greatopera company, such as La Scala. There is the music and its history, thedramatic stories, the staging traditions, the singers, from the chorus to theinternational stars, along with the distribution channels for productions—broadcasts, videos, and CDs. In addition, surrounding opera there is a wholeuniverse of criticism and scholarship: historical books are written, academicdepartments study the music and the art and technique of singing, reviewsfor new casts and productions appear in magazines and daily newspapers.When the lights go down for a La Scala performance, the curtain rises noton an isolated artistic spectacle, but on an occasion that brings togetherthe accrued work of countless lifetimes of talent, knowledge, tradition, andcreative genius.

Now imagine the following: one day La Scala entirely loses its natural,indigenous audience. Local Italians and other Europeans stop attending,and local newspapers cease to run reviews of performances. Nevertheless,La Scala remains a famous attraction for visitors, and manages to fill thehall every night with busloads of tourists. Further, imagine that, althoughthese nightly capacity crowds—consisting of people from as far away asSeoul, Durban, Yokohama, Perth, Quito, and Des Moines—are polite andseem to enjoy themselves, nevertheless, for nearly all of them their La Scalaexperience is the first and last opera they will ever see. They are not surewhen to applaud, and although they are impressed by the opulent costumes,dazzling stagesettings, massed chorus scenes, and sopranos who can singvery high, they cannot make the sophisticated artistic discriminations thatwe would associate with traditional La Scala audiences of the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.

If we picture such a scene, how would we expect it to affect the art of operaas currently practised at this imaginary La Scala? The problem here is notjust the loss of good singers or orchestral pit musicians: it is rather the lossof a living critical tradition that an indigenous audience supplies for anyvital artform. It is impossible to engage in this thought-experiment without




concluding that in the long term operatic art as practised at such a La Scalawould steeply decline. A Pacific Island dancer was once asked about hisnative culture. ‘Culture?’ he responded. ‘That's what we do for the tourists.’But if it is only for the tourists, who have neither the knowledge nor the timeto learn and apply a probing canon of criticism to an artform, there can beno reason to expect that the artform will develop the complex expressivepossibilities we observe in the great established art traditions of the world(Dutton 1993).

Why, then do critics and historians of art, music, and literature, privatecollectors, curators, and enthusiasts of every stripe invest so much time andeffort in trying to establish the provenance, origins, and proper identity—thenominal authenticity—of artistic objects? It is sometimes cynically suggestedthat the reason is nothing more than money, collectors' investment values—forms of fetishizing, commodification—that drives these interests. Suchcynicism is not justified by facts. The nominal authenticity of a purportedRembrandt or a supposedly old Easter Island carving may be keenlydefended by its owners (collectors, museum directors), but the vast majorityof articles and books that investigate theprovenance of art works are written by people with no personal stake in thegenuineness of individual objects. Moreover, when this comes into question,issues of nominal authenticity are as hotly debated for novels and musicalworks in the public domain as they are for physical art objects with a specificcommodity value.

Establishing nominal authenticity serves purposes more important thanmaintaining the market value of an art object: it enables us to understandthe practice and history of art as an intelligible history of the expression ofvalues, beliefs, and ideas, both for artists and their audiences—and hereinlies its link to expressive authenticity. Works of art, besides often beingformally attractive to us, are manifestations of both individual and collectivevalues, in virtually every conceivable relative weighting and combination.Clifford Geertz remarks that ‘to study an artform is to explore a sensibility’,and that ‘such a sensibility is essentially a collective formation’ whosefoundations ‘are as wide as social existence and as deep’ (Geertz 1983).Geertz is only partially right to claim that the sensibility expressed in anart object is in every case essentially social: even close-knit tribal culturesproduce idiosyncratic artists who pursue unexpectedly personal visionswithin a socially determined aesthetic language. Still, his broader descriptionof works of art, tribal or European, is generally apt, along with its corollary




that the study of art is largely a matter of marking and tracing relationshipsand influences.

This explains why aesthetic theories that hold that works of art are justaesthetically appealing objects—to be enjoyed without regard to any notionof their origins—are unsatisfactory. If works of art appealed only to ourformal or decorative aesthetic sense, there would indeed be little point inestablishing their human contexts by tracing their development, or evenin distinguishing them from similarly appealing natural objects—flowers orseashells. But works of art of all societies express and embody both culturalbeliefs general to a people and personal character and feeling specific to anindividual. Moreover, this fact accounts for a large part, though not all, of ourinterest in works of art. To deny this would be implicitly to endorse preciselythe concept of the eighteenth-century curiosity cabinet, in which Assyrianshards, tropical seashells, a piece of Olmec jade, geodes, netsuke, an Atticoil lamp, bird of paradise feathers, and a Maori patu might lay side by side inindifferent splendour. The propriety of the curiosity cabinet approach to arthas been rejected in contemporary thought in favour of a desire to establishprovenance and cultural meaning precisely because intra- and inter-culturalrelationships among artworks help to constitute their meaning and identity.

4. Conclusion

Leo Tolstoy's What Is Art?, which was published near the end of his life in1896, is the work of a genius nearly gone off the rails. It is famous for itsfulminations notonly against Beethoven, Shakespeare, and Wagner, but also even againstTolstoy's own great early novels (Tolstoy 1960). It continues, however, tobe read for its vivid elaboration of a thesis that has a permanent place inthe history of aesthetics: artistic value is achieved only when an artworkexpresses the authentic values of its maker, especially when those valuesare shared by the artist's immediate community. Tolstoy allowed that modernart was dazzling in its ability to amuse and give pleasure, but damned it asdevoid of the spiritual import that ultimately makes art significant to us. Notsurprisingly, he lavished praise on naive folk art, especially the Christianart of the Russian peasantry. It is easy to imagine that, had he lived one ortwo generations later, Tolstoy might have extolled the ‘primitive’ art of tribalsocieties, not out of a desire to support the modernist agendas of Picasso orRoger Fry, but to champion the notion that the honest art of noble savagesexpresses authentic spiritual values rejected by modern society.




Tolstoy claimed that cosmopolitan European art of his time had given uptrying to communicate anything meaningful to its audience in favour ofamusement and careerist manipulation. While he may have been wrong inso dismissing all the art of his age, the extent to which his bitter, cynicaldescriptions of the art world of his time apply to both popular and high art ofour own media-driven age is surprising. Where and how Tolstoy drew the linebetween art that is falsely sentimental and manipulative on the one hand,and sincerely expressive on the other, has been hotly disputed (Diffey 1985).But it is impossible that these categories could be entirely dispensed with, atleast in the critical and conceptual vocabulary we apply to Western art. It ismore than just formal quality that distinguishes the latest multimillion-dollarHollywood sex-and-violence blockbuster or manipulative tearjerker from thedark depths of the Beethoven Opus 131 String Quartet or the passionateintensity of The Brothers Karamazov. These latter are meant in a way thatmany examples of the former cannot possibly be: they embody an elementof personal commitment normally missing from much popular entertainmentart and virtually all commercial advertising.

Consider as a last example Dirk Smidt's account of the carvers ofKominimung, a group of about 330 people living in the middle Ramu Riverregion of Papua New Guinea. Kominimung carvers create masks and shieldswhose designs incorporate elaborate systems of colour-coding and visualsymbols for the clans of the group. The clan affinities of the shields, whichdisplay clan emblems, are accorded the greatest importance by the menwho bear them in skirmishes with their enemies in nearby villages. Theseemblems touch deep human feelings, Smidt explains, but they do more thanthat:

Warriors protecting themselves with shields are not just humanbeings holding a plank: they are protected by the ancestor oftheir clan depicted on the shield, with whom they identify….When holding the shield, they almost literally get under theskin of the ancestor via the unpainted part, resembling a teardrop, on the upper half of the back of the shield, which is thespot where the shield rests against the shoulder. (Smidt 1990)

The shield, Smidt claims, is a living being, the construction and painting ofwhich goes through steps symbolizing the bones, flesh, blood, and skin ofhumans.

As a life may depend on its powers of defence, the making of a shieldinvolves an intense devotion to getting the design and construction




right. However, this does not entail slavish submission to the traditionaldemands of genre. Smidt states that ‘much weight is given to individualexecution’. He records that it is often said by the Kominimung that oneshould follow one's own ideas and not copy from another person. ‘Whena carver temporarily puts away a shield he has been working on he mayturn it with its front towards the wall of the house, in order to prevent othercarvers from “stealing his ideas”.’ In other words, while Kominimung shieldsare expressive of the sensibility of a culture, they are also understood atthe same time to embody the sensibility of the individual carver. This is notmerely a matter of local copyright on ideas: it involves the emergence of thecarver's individual vision into the design of the shield or other carving. Asone Kominimung carver told Smidt, ‘A woodcarver must concentrate, thinkwell and be inspired. You must think hard which motif you want to cut intothe wood. And you must feel this inside, in your heart.’ For the Kominimung,good carving is a matter of technical mastery, of feeling, and of meaning it.

Smidt's description of artistic life in Papua New Guinea reminds us thatthe idea of expressive authenticity is not exclusively Western. Varieties offormalism in aesthetics have at various times attempted to discount itssignificance, but if it is possible for art ever to express anything whatsoever,then questions of sincerity, genuineness of expression, and moral passion,are in principle relevant to it. Expressive authenticity is a permanent part ofthe conceptual topography of our understanding of art.

See also: Expression in Art; Medium in Art; Value in Art; Ontology of Art;Comparative Aesthetics; Painting.

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http://sfx.metabib.ch/sfx_locater?sid=&genre=bookitem&atitle=&title=Aspects of Art Forgery&date=1962

http://worldcat.org/title/Aspects of Art Forgery

http://books.google.com/books?q=intitle:Aspects+intitle:of+intitle:Art+intitle:Forgery

http://sfx.metabib.ch/sfx_locater?sid=&genre=article&atitle=The Concept of Authentic Performance&title=British Journal of Aesthetics&date=1988&spage=228&volume=28&issue=

http://worldcat.org/title/The Concept of Authentic Performance



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http://books.google.com/books?q=The+Concept+of+Authentic+Performance

authenticity in art

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