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AUTHENTICITY IN ORGANIZATIONS?

Paper for the Conference:Critical Management StudiesOrganization Studies Stream

July 14-16, 1999, Manchester, UK

Draft: please do not cite without permission from the authorApril 1999

Birgit Brouns (Ph.D.-student)Nijmegen Business SchoolFaculty of Policy SciencesUniversity of NijmegenP.O. Box 9108NL-6500 HK NijmegenThe NetherlandsPhone int. + 31 24 361 1908Fax int.: + 31 24 361 1933E-mail: B.Brouns@BW.KUN.NL

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AbstractThis paper illustrates how critique serves both as an act to express discontent and as apotential to stimulate our thoughts and sensibility to look for alternatives. Within the field oforganization studies, these functions will be illustrated by exploring the relationshipbetween the notion of hegemony and the notion of authenticity. The results of threeethnographic studies in team based work structures are used to explain the hegemonicpower processes by which consent is achieved and relations of domination are reproduced.Reflecting on the key problem of power in organizations from a hegemonic perspectivemade me conclude that these power processes lead to a loss of authenticity. The pressure onemployees to conform to a desired attitude and to accept dominant organizational practicesnot to be excluded, is so strong that a loss of contact with the inner self is manifested.However, as soon as this contact is resought, it might imply a shift from the politics ofmeaning and identity construction (Deetz, 1992) to a reflexive dialogue giving leeway toauthenticity. Relations of power and strategies of control will not be absent, but transparant.It will be argued that the continuity of organizations can not be adequately understood frominstrumental and technical perspectives, which lead to nihilism. In the wake of apostmodern morality (Kunneman, 1998), we can recognize the contours of employeesseeking intrinsic meaning to (organizational) actions, that facilitates a dialogue on issues asfor example customer relations and responsibility and therefore actually expressing theimportance of essential needs like creativity, unity and intersubjectivity. Finally, the paperconceptualizes an organization as a reflexive social entity (a non-system) instead of a systemof domination. Passionately believing in our ‘inner voice’, makes it possible to conceivealternatives for reality and connects us to our potential to express our ideals moreadequately.

1 Introduction

What functions do critique serve in organization studies? This question will be addressedthroughout this paper. Within the field of organization studies, the production of writings incritical management studies is relatively low compared to the bulk of writings in so-called‘management fashions’ (see Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 1997). The essence of managementfashions is rhetoric in which the messages and metaphors of ‘progress’ are wrapped up: ‘(...)management fashions are started with rhetoric (...) and they are transmitted via rhetoric.Management fashions are “methods for constructing realities” (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993:105) or schemes for “sensemaking” (Weick, 1995)’ (Kieser, 1999). In many contemporaryorganizations, these methods and schemes produce ‘regimes of truth’ (Smart, 1986) thatfoster ‘normal’ organizational behaviour and excellent performances. Today, well-knownorganizational programmes, such as, for example, Total Quality Management (TQM),Human Resources Management (HRM), but also organizational redesigns as promoted byBusiness Process Reengineering (BPR), Lean Production (LP) and Modern Sociotechnology(MST), convey attractive concepts, including, for example, empowerment, entrepreneurship,open communication and employee involvement. To what degree, however are theseemingly humanistic assumptions laid down in these mere strategies to legitimizeeconomic justifications? And to what extent are explicit promises met, such as for example,to provide space for autonomy and participation? Which implicit conceptions of reality are‘organized in’ and what other possible conceptions of reality are ‘organized out’ (Mumby

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and Stohl, 1991: 314) or marginalized? Most of the answers to these questions can beprovided by management studies that take a critical stance to these ‘regimes of truth’.

In the first section after this introduction the functions of critique for organization studieswill be addressed. Then the issue of power in organizations, from a hegemonic perspective,will be questioned, by specifically focusing on hegemonic power processes in team basedwork structures. Analyzing these processes from a critical point of view (as explained in thesecond section), leads me to the concept of authenticity, since hegemonic control threatens aperson’s pursuit of authentic conduct. I shall endeavour to bridge the ‘gap’ between theseconcepts in an ‘intermezzo’ of the paper and throughout the rest of the exercise inunderstanding the role of critique. Then it is argued that an alternative to hegemonic controllies in enhancing authenticity. This was also exactly what Gramsci strived for when he wasstudying the mechanisms of hegemonic control. Hence, “the hegemonic project for Gramsciis the continuous effort in stimulating the human subjects to critically question, examine andintellectually overthrow the effects of ideas that have generated those distorted and falsereligions, political ideas and philosophies” (Kiros, 1985: 102).

The notion of authenticity will be explored in detail in the fourth section of the paper.Authenticity is a dynamic quality of an individual that lies in the ‘inner voice’ and theultimate indeterminacy of the sovereignty of a human being, potentially guiding him or herto enhance the meaning of his or her unique ‘life project’. A genuine dialogue is essential tomoral development and trying to define better what our ideals consists of (Taylor, 1991). Byexpressing our ideals more adequately and passionately, we (as humanity) might improveour relationships with others and our environment. This alternative to the suppression ofour discontent and passive subordination to a dominant ‘ethic’ might be applied toorganizations, since it will be argued that the continuity of organizations can not beadequately understood from instrumental and technical perspectives, so dominantthroughout modernity. The final section reconceptualises an organization as a reflexivesocial entity as opposed to a system of domination (Leflaive, 1996). An important conditionfor the realization of the former, is to strive for an ongoing dialogue on organizing amongvarious participants involved in and around organizations, one that explicitly discusses andreflects on issues that often have been neutralised or marginalised, as for example(corporate) responsibility, power relations, significant and legitimate action, wider socio-economic dilemmas, and so on. Critical management studies might contribute to thestimulation of a genuine dialogue.

2 Making sense of critique

In 1937, the members of the ‘Frankfurter Schule’ started to term all their theorizing as‘Critical Theory’. Consider the context in which critical theory was born: their was not onlythe dangers of fascism and the inability of people to consciously resist its propaganda butalso, the facts of the labour parties having fallen into decay (through dogmatism and

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opportunism). These, all gave rise to a complete disbelief in the possibility of theoreticalinsights and practice(s) being connected, in such a way, therefore, as to be able potentially tocreate a harmonious and just society. In these circumstances, ‘truth’ as a correspondencebetween thought and reality, ultimately became problematic. So what role did critiqueinitially play? Since for the Frankfurt School there was no positive force in society toaddress, it was impossible to present a positive theory about society. Only the negative couldbe pointed out. It would make no sense to hint at positive aspects since it would not be inaccordance with reality. In other words, critique emerged from an absence of positiveelements in society to base theory-building on (probably even a lack of faith in reaching atrue society). The only contribution social scientists could make to society was to criticize it:to reveal reality. Therefore, only in this way could an adequate analysis of societal life befostered by Critical Theory.

Up until today, a fundamental role of critique has been to uncover reality, especially to shedlight on the negative elements in society. In particular, to take a critical stance is toilluminate the contradictions of life itself and that of society as a whole and to confront itwith our self-image and our understanding of (phenomena in) society. The latter inevitablyleads to introspection, since it encourages us to reflect. To stimulate the act of reflection, is, Ibelief, another important role of critique. To express discontent with actual situations is onlyan important step towards adequately analysing and conceptualising reality. But tostimulate reflection, and thus introspection (although often set aside when a weak attempttowards change is undertaken), renders it possible to achieve alternative modes of livingand to create a more ‘appropriate’ societal constitution for living together in ourenvironment.

Related to the ‘reflexive’ role that critique may serve, there is another, more ‘natural’function of critique, namely that it counterbalances thoughts and actions. Human beings areable to think, for example, in terms of ‘ideals and nightmares’ or to reason the ‘pros andcons’. We are able to think in dualities and to act in contradictory ways. To be critical is anatural way of awakening our awareness or consciousness of existential matters, since itexpresses the ‘cons’ or the restrictive elements of life etcetera. It serves more or less as awarning signal. ‘The way things are’ or are perceived to be, is a stagnating mode of being ormeaning, that constantly needs to be legitimated by questioning ‘why’. If there were onlycommon sense and acceptance of actual situations, humanity would not ‘grow’ oremancipate or enhance any kind of progress. We would passively live up to an ethicalstandard and never change our ways of living. Since we are dynamic living creatures,seeking meaning in life, it makes sense to challenge constantly the ways we relate to eachother and the world. Therefore, critique also forms an integral part of shaping our lives. Forexample, it orientates us to our sense of what is right and wrong. This normative function,however, also bears a negative connotation of the notion of ‘critique’. Used or expressed inan extreme way, critique can contain an implicit (or explicit) claim of ‘what is right orwrong’ in a negative way; that is, restricting alternatives for living and limiting options foraction. Today, with regard to morality, it would not be wrong to consciously point to (the

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consequences of) an existing ethical standard or the ethos of a given society, for example.But it would be moralistic only to raise our finger and, as a moral police officer, point at all‘the wrongs’ (the black list) or even to proclaim what, in contrast to the actual situation,would be ‘the ideal’ (utopia or blueprint). If the criticism does seek a deeper explanation ofthe actual situation and is not willing to look at the dilemmas that life itself contains, then,as critique, it would make no sense. It would miss any reasonable ground related to realityitself.

To take a critical stance within organization studies, often means to remove the veil ofmystification or to unwrap that which is covered, as in many management fashions. Or, asAlvesson and Willmott argue, critical management studies face marginalised problems andreflects on

issues concerning management that are now increasingly acknowledged to beproblematical for human well-being - such as the mindless equation of scientificdevelopment with social progress, the destructive effects of consumerism andcommercialization, and the tendency of the modern state to equate policies (e.g.deregulation) intended to enhance and/or legitimize capitalist accumulation with thedevelopment of a more civilized, caring and just society (1996: 2).

However, the act of unwrapping and highlighting dominant conceptions of reality or ofmarginalized practices, would imply a reflection that is always ex-post, providing only for areactive response. I think there is another important function, already indicated above as themore ‘natural’ function of critique, one that enables it to serve a more ‘active’ role. It cancounterbalance our thoughts and actions in a manner that is ex-ante, when it is integrated inour way of shaping our life. As I will argue in the course of this paper, the concept ofauthenticity exactly contains this capacity. Within organization studies, this notion isimportant, since people are capable of articulating sense and converting to authenticity. Ifthis capacity is denied or marginalized, organizations risk being threatened by alegitimation crisis. By connecting the notions of hegemony and authenticity applied toorganizations, I will now illustrate the importance of integrating these functions of critiquein daily operations and decisions. In the future, this integration might be essential to anorganizations’ license to operate!

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3 A hegemonic perspective on power in organizations

Members of organizations have to function collectively to attain organizational goals. Thisimportant element of organizing, pre-eminently has become a primarily managerial task1.Throughout the history of managerial activity, a variety of strategies, tactics and means havedeveloped in order to have employees ‘give their best’, while their focus is on primaryorganizational interests. In other words, organized action is shaped by management,designing a control structure that enhances organizational performance. The outlook of thecontrol structure has been preconditioned by several external factors, such as, for example,market demands (e.g. massive production) and societal developments (e.g.democratisation).

In contemporary organizations, mechanisms of power and modes of control, increasinglyhave an unobtrusive rather than a ‘visible’ character. For example, it can be argued thatFriedman’s well-known two (ultimate) strategies of managerial control, increasingly showsthat the managerial strategy of ‘Direct Control’ has been substituted for a strategy of‘Responsible Autonomy’ (Friedman, 1977). In the past few decades, there is a shift fromdirect supervision to forms of control that are internalized by organization members,pervasively persuaded by promising organizational (change) concepts. Seemingly morehumanistic, however, new forms of control ‘are more insidious’ (Jermier, 1998: 253) andtheir potential oppressive elements are underexposed (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998). Ahegemonic perspective on power in organizations can help to understand those processesby which employees are seduced, rather than coerced, to maintain a very effective controlstructure that substitutes “self-discipline for the discipline of an external manager” (Hardyand Clegg, 1996: 624). Especially in team-based work structures, control is effectedhegemonically. It is an unobtrusive but infiltrating form of power, in short “the politics todetermine meaning” (Hall, 1991), capable of (re)producing relations of domination. Beforeanalyzing its subtle elements as revealed in practice, let us first have a closer look at thenotion of hegemony.

The concept of hegemony…‘Hegemony’ was a very important concept in the work of Antonio Gramsci, whoseconception of hegemony grew out of an engagement with Marx’s views of ideology. Marx’views on ideology implied that it hides reality. Therefore, we have a false consciousness thatalienates us from ourselves. However, Gramsci (1971), did not consider ideology asepiphenomenal, because ideology might demystify reality. Ideological forms are not false,but crystalisations of the contradictions of life itself and therefore inadequate expressions of theideals of men and women given the stage of their human consciousness. Until today,scholars have not exactly agreed on the meaning of hegemony. Given its rich ambiguity, ithas generated a rich proliferation of perspectives2. In most interpretations and descriptions

1 Now increasingly known under the popular term ‘people management’.2 This is probably due to the development of Gramsci’s thought on hegemony (for an excellentreconstruction see Clegg, 1979)

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of the concept, however, we find that lived hegemony is always a(n active) process: arealised complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changingpressures and limits. An example is given in the following two views. According to GwynWilliams (in: Dirks et al, 1994: 587) hegemony points at:

an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which oneconcept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and privatemanifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious andpolitical principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moralconnotation.

Raymond Williams (in: Dirks et al., 1994: 597) conceptualizes hegemony as:a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses andassignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is alived system of meanings and values - constitutive and constituting - which as theyare experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It is, that is to say, inthe strongest sense a "culture", but a culture which has also to be seen as the liveddominance and subordination of particular classes.

These views also illustrate that the internal structures of hegemony are highly complex anddynamic: hegemony has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified(Dirks et al, 1994: 598). In this respect, Clegg (1989: 179) notes the conclusions reached byLaclau and Mouffe (1985: 112):

politics is about the articulation of meanings in forms which are only ever partiallyfixed. It is this which constitutes hegemony. Meaning can never be finally fixed,according to post-structuralist emphases on the relational quality of meaning,because meaning is relational and so it can never be wholly stabilized. Inconsequence, the impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that therehave to be partial fixations; otherwise, the very flow of differences would beimpossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning.

In its typically Gramscian formulation, power is “the ability to articulate various conceptionsof reality in such a way that possible antagonism is neutralized" (Dirks et al, 1994: 321-322).Hegemonic control then, is aiming at reconciling opposing and clashing interests.Hegemony is perceived as the “political, intellectual, and moral leadership over alliedgroups” (Mouffe, 1979: 10). It reveals itself as seduction rather than threat; it is “a particulartype of leadership that is not based on the use of violence or coercion, but on the systematicspread of the world view of the ‘ruling class’3” (Kiros, 1985: 10). The concept of hegemonyexpresses the casualness with which many people in many circumstances of daily life wieldpower or are subject to it, without being always fully aware of the fact: “[I]t is the sheertaken-for-grantedness of hegemony that yields its full effects – the ‘naturalness’ of a way ofthinking about social, economic, political and ethical issues” (Hamilton in: Bocock, 1986).

… applied to organizationsIn the field of organization studies, a hegemonic perspective on power has been wellelaborated, for example by Clegg (see Clegg, 1979; Clegg, 1989). The hegemonic

3 Although Clegg (1979: 89) remarked: “The concept of hegemony is (… ) not necessarily tied to class,as was the strictly Marxist concept of ideology (… ). The formal domination of a world-viewexpressed in and through the concept of hegemony could act in ways that cut across class lines.”

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interpretation of power “emphasizes the strategic role of existing ideological and socialstructures in constituting, and thus selectively limiting, the interests and values – and henceaction – available to social actors in any particular decision area” (Reed, 1996: 41). Studiesfrom a hegemonic perspective on power in organizations, have in common that they moreor less focus on the production of ‘consent’, or how consent is orchestrated (see for exampleBurawoy, 1979; 1985; Fröhlich, 1983; Doorewaard, 1988; Mumby and Stohl, 1991; Kunda,1992; Barker, 1993; Vallas, 1993; Willmott, 1993; Deetz, 1995; Brouns and Doorewaard, 1997;Benschop and Doorewaard, 1998; Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998; Doorewaard and Brouns,1999).

I have found in my fieldwork distinct ways of producing consent, effecting managerialcontrol hegemonically (government via consent). On the basis of literature on hegemonyand the three ethnographic studies that I have conducted, I conceptualise the constitution ofhegemonic control in organizations as resulting from processes that consist of concealedmeaning and identity formation. Meaning formation is exposed in inter-woven (non)verbalexpressions (like common sense utterances and references to consensual social relations). Atthe same time meaning is moulded by the actor’s habitus and expressed in manifestations ofidentification processes. Thus, in an ongoing and rather implicit way, ever changingmeaning structures and identities in organizations are temporarily ‘fixed’, channeling theway subjects submit to enhance organizational interests. As a result, both meaning andidentity formation processes encourage consent with the dominant organizational view andthe acceptance of organizational practices, despite possible disadvantages of these practicesfor some involved. Meaning and identity formation imply that certain conceptions of realityand types of identity are ‘organized in’ while other possible perspectives and identities areexcluded.

Before elaborating further on the above conceptualisation, I will briefly discuss somemethodological implications of the fieldwork that was conducted. Three ethnographicstudies in team based work structures were undertaken to explain the hegemonic powerprocesses by which consent is achieved and relations of domination are reproduced. Thesestudies were carried out in a team of nurses at the Children’s Ward of a local hospital(October 1996 - January 1997), a staff team at the headquarters of a huge bank (September1997 – December 1997), and a team that picked up orders and packed up parcels for amultimedia distribution company (January 1999 – April 1999). In each organization, Iparticipated passively in a team (see Spradley, 1980), during a period of three months, whilegathering data via observations, interviews and from documents. The main advantage of theethnographic research approach (Van Maanen, 1995), is to study culture, interactions andpower processes in situ: in people’s own natural environment. In the course of participantobservation, the researcher “listens and interprets carefully as their informants speak forthemselves” (Jermier, 1998: 240). Analyzing hegemonic power processes focuses specificallyon discursive practices: both explicitly, verbal as well as nonverbal expressions, symbolizingdominant meaning structures in organizations, as in body language, dress codes, the waypeople decorate their work environment and the architecture of an office or a plant, and so

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on. The role of language, symbols and meaning is analysed in “(the) presumed relationshipbetween socially constructed accounts of ‘reality’ and the intersubjective meaning andexperience of those ‘realities’” (Keenoy et al, 1997: 148). The research method used what hasbeen termed the ‘controlled comparison’ case study design (Wester, 1991), one that is mostsuitable to apply to the approach of ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Straussand Corbin, 1990), where sensitising concepts and empirical data continuously confronteach other.

Let me further elaborate on hegemonic power processes, using the conceptualisation givenearlier. To illuminate how power processes include and exclude certain conceptions ofreality in such a way that possible antagonism is neutralised, I focused successively onprocesses of (a) meaning and (b) identity formation, (c) producing consent and acceptance,while (d) analysing the possible disadvantages that were entailed for some members as aresult of marginalizing alternative meaning and identity. After this concise elaboration, Iwill give a short illustration of how these power processes operate in practice (see for in-depth analyses Doorewaard and Brouns (1999)), by giving one example of how a team dealtwith an organizational dilemma and treated it as if it was their own problem. Specialattention will be given to how an initial discontent converted into consent. Then, I will reflect onthe consequences of such processes in teams, arguing that team based work structuresimply an intensified pressure to commit to collective entrepreneurial standards and,therefore, often threaten people’s authenticity. Following this, I shall explore the notion ofauthenticity in greater detail.

(a) Meaning formation processes In many organizations a so called ‘management of meaning’ is wielded, aiming at the(re)construction of a common script via a process of spotting and breaking down oldinterpretations in order to reshape new common interpretations and alternative meanings oforganizational reality (Weick, 1979). Meaning formation processes are temporary, slowlychanging ‘fixities of meaning’ (Clegg, 1989), in which dominant basic assumptions, normsand values rule. The concept of fixity of meaning comes close to Foucault’s notion of‘regimes of truth’ (see Smart, 1986). In these regimes, certain temporary conceptions of truthdominate, while other possible interpretations are neglected or considered to be of minorimportance. In all three studies, I observed that the teams emphasised prevailinginterpretations of organizational reality, therefore neglecting or underestimating otherpossible interpretations. Especially during team meetings, when issues concerning work canbe discussed collectively, often there was an initial protest, for example, against anorganizational measure. After registering this protest the teams started to search for anopening, a new meaning perspective that helps them to break through the impasse and togo on (taking decisions, solving conflicting issues, and so on). Once the teams have foundopenings, they express, consolidate and anchor the new perspective in practice.

I came across three mechanisms that fixed the new perspective: utterances of commonsense, reaching consensus, and legitimising rationalities. Common sense notions function as

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important vehicles in portraying dominant organizational norms and values as indisputablenotions of truth (Hall, 1985). They are spread out through the organization as a complex setof opinions and moral statements about what is right or wrong in the day-to-day world.These opinions are self-evident, truisms that go without saying. Common sense utterancesfunction to interpret daily practices to make sense of the new team perspective. In teambased work structures it is important to reach (social) consensus in daily practices (Mumby,1994), often induced by group dynamic processes (see for example Forsyth, 1990) as forinstance ‘group think’ (Robbins, 1996). For example, the (re)confirmation of the feeling that‘we are a solid group’, that ‘I belong to this strong group’ as well as the (un)conscious fearof becoming an outcast, reinforce consensus about the (implicit) norms and values of thegroup. To reach consensus is crucial, since team members need mutual support to faceorganizational dilemmas by crystallising new perspectives. A third group of expressionshelping the team to ‘organize in’ the requested new perspective consists of legitimisingrationalities. Certain ‘modes of rationality’ (Clegg, 1989), vocabularies which invoke therhetorics of organizational reality (for example, efficiency, effectiveness and competition),aim at the construction of an overall acceptance of the regimes of truth in organizations.They have a strong legitimising function, pretending to be ‘good’ arguments that justify theway things are – or have to be - perceived in organizations. Legitimising rationalities belongto the ‘art of reasoning’: an accepted and elegant way of legitimising organizational truth.To call upon these lines of argumentation represents sophisticated organizational behaviour.In summary, common sense notions, the search for reaching consensus and legitimisingrationalities are three vehicles for meaning formation through which the teams express,consolidate and anchor the perspective they need in order to find their way out of theorganizational dilemma they are confronted with.

(b) Identity formation processesParallel to processes of meaning formation, processes of identity formation are stimulatedby the quest for an organizational solution. Analogue to meaning structures, identities aredetermined only temporarily. Identities are open and subject to change: “Identity is alwaysin process, always subject to reproduction or transformation through discursive practicesthat secure or refuse particular posited identities” (Clegg, 1998: 29). Identity formation isinextricably bound up with the social world in which individuals participate. ‘Id’entity(persons own ‘eidos’) is developed in relation to other entities (other persons, practices andprocesses). Identity formation takes place in numerous (un)pleasant, (un)expected and(un)intentional encounters of individuals and the ‘generalised other’ (cfr. Mead in Clark etal, 1994). Groups or teams function as such a ‘generalised other’ in so far as the team “entersinto the experience of any one of the individual members of it. (… ) only in so far as he [theindividual, author] takes the attitudes of the organized activity or set of such activities inwhich that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self… ” (Clark et al, 1994:100). Referring to Bourdieu, there is a distinction between an individual and a grouphabitus. A habitus is a set of dispositions inclining agents to act and react in certain ways.Dispositions generate regular practices, perceptions and attitudes of a particular field (forexample, the organizational practice). People internalize and therefore reproduce the norms

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and discourses of this field and, in so doing, they develop both an individual and a grouphabitus. “… the individual habitus in so far as it expresses or reflects the class (or group),could be regarded as a subjective but non-individual system of internalized structures,common schemes of perception, conception and action, which are the precondition of allobjectification and apperception;” (Thompson in Bourdieu, 1990: 60). Thus, in searching forsolutions for organizational difficulties, team members develop a commonly shared grouphabitus, attuning their individual norms and values in order to reach consensus. In otherwords, of all possible sets of attitudes, norms and values, team members tend to select thatparticular set that is commonly shared by the team, in which the preference or dominance ofcertain identities and the marginalisation of others is effected. Similar to processes ofmeaning formation, in identity formation processes we recognize an ongoing process of‘organizing in’ relevant or requested identities and ‘organizing out’ or marginalisingirrelevant or unrequested identities.

In all three studies I observed the selection, development and adoption of an entrepreneurialidentity, initially steered by management but later induced by the team membersthemselves. Members of self-managing teams regulate their activities based on theinternalised attitude of the ‘archetype’ of an entrepreneur: someone who takes care of his orher activities according to his or her own standards of what is good or bad for the business.In order to find a way out of the organizational dilemma, team members reinforce thisentrepreneurial identity. As part of a hegemonic power process, identity formation does notonly result from explicit and intentional strategies. In all three studies, three characteristicsof identity formation processes were found, constituting and anchoring the requiredentrepreneurial identity: the awareness of autonomous self-regulation, the amalgamation ofcompany policies and day-to-day practices, and what Bourdieu refers to as the affirmativecorporeal hexis of team members, a term that I shall explain below. The entrepreneurialidentity is based on the undisputed awareness of employee autonomy and self-determination andyet, it forms the basis of team regulation, since it limits the selection of group norms andvalues to those corresponding organizational aims. That makes regulation, or even power,and freedom two sides of a same coin in identity formation. Foucault’s well knownstatement on power and freedom (“Power is exercised only over free subjects, and onlyinsofar as they are free” (Foucault, 1982: 221)) can be applied to identity formationprocesses. On the one hand, identity formation is restrictive; it implies the limited andregulatory selection of both individual and team norms and values. On the other hand,individual subjects will only select and internalise these norms and values when they feelfree to do so. Thus, identities are both constrained and enabled by power processes: “Theindividualising formative processes that penetrate ever broader social strata are bothregulatory and also constitutive of reflexive and autonomous modes of identity” (McNay,1994: 105). In all cases, team members show an eagerness to identify ‘their selves’ with thearchetype of the entrepreneur: nobody explicitly forced them to do so. Secondly, theformation of the entrepreneurial identity is smoothened by a mixture of company policies andday-to-day practices. On the one hand, the new entrepreneurial attitude is communicatedthroughout the organization explicitly by training schedules, vision statements and policy

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documents. On the other hand, anticipation of the required attitude takes place implicitly indiscursive practices, as for example team meetings and spontaneous dialogues amongorganization and team members. Finally, articulations of entrepreneurial identity formationare not only expressed in ‘linguistic’ or verbal terms, but also in the so-called corporeal ‘hexis’(Bourdieu, 1977; 1991). The corporeal or bodily hexis consists of diverse non-verbal mannersand styles “in which actors ‘carry themselves’” (Jenkins, 1992: 75), like gestures, faceexpressions and attitudes. “It is in bodily hexis that the idiosyncratic (the personal)combines with the systematic (the social)” (Jenkins, 1992: 75). In summary, the awareness ofautonomous self-regulation, the amalgamation of company policies and day-to-daypractices, and an affirmative corporeal hexis of team members, are important media for thetemporarily determinacy of the required entrepreneurial identity the teams develop in orderto deal with the organizational dilemma.

(c) Consent and acceptanceIn all studies processes of meaning and identity result in consent or compliance with thedominant organizational perception and in the acceptance of actual organizational practices.A certain conception of reality gains the status of ‘true’ or ‘natural’ and is accepted by themajority of the team that adopts it. A taken-for-granted order appears as a collective will ofthe team, bringing about a common flow of individual and organizational interests.Meaning and identity formation processes produce a harmony between the perception ofindividual or team interests and the implicit and explicit ‘codes of conduct’, reflectingdominant organizational meanings and values. In a seemingly natural way, a relativelystable and harmonised order is (re)established.

(d) Despite possible disadvantagesHowever, the discursive practices, that tend to push the teams towards the selection andadoption of the new meaning perspective and the reinforcement of the entrepreneurialidentity, prevent alternative perceptions of reality and other identities prevailing. In all theethnographic studies, it appeared that in the search for a solution for organizationalproblems or dilemmas that had to be faced an awareness of possible disadvantages for theteam members was overruled. While (re)producing the entrepreneurial identity, all theteams marginalised other identities. In particular their ‘worker identity’, often prominentlypresent at the start of a debate on organizational dilemmas, is gradually disappearing fromthe scene. While incorporating the new perspective, team members rule out the threateningperspective of not being able to reduce the workload by excluding the norms, values andhabits that belong to their position as employees. By internalising an entrepreneurialattitude, they reinstall their own regulation as a matter of course. This is ‘entrepreneurialgovernance’ (du Gay, 1996) par excellence. Let me give a short illustration.

Understaffing at the Children’s WardAn issue (expressing an organizational dilemma) that was dealt with by one of the twonursing teams at the Children’s Ward of a local hospital that lingered on for some timeconcerned understaffing (due to cuts). In particular, this situation occurred during the night

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shifts, when only one nurse was available to take care of all the patients, including cases ofintensive and medium care. During a team meeting, Ida (a very experienced nurse) reporteda difficult situation she had to face the night before, from an emotionally involvedperspective. Another nurse reported similar examples of situations that reflect a dangeroussituation and people started to express their feelings of discontent:

Mary: “You can’t guarantee quality of care in this way”.Ida: “Several times, Henry [the manager] promised he would provide for extra staff. So

far he didn’t do it”.Mary: “That’s making a fool out of us”.Lisa: “I agree with Ida. We are so supple, we already accept so much: to work for other

departments when it is quiet here… to take imposed holidays. When it is busy, theorganization has to be there for us too!”

Berna: “Does this flexibility always has to come from us?”Ida: “No, you can’t get blood out of a stone”.

How did the team respond to this (organizational) dilemma? Meaning and identityformation processes activated ‘self-managing’ mechanisms that were powerful enough toforce a U-turn in feelings, converting the expressed discontent into consent, serving ahegemonic (instead of a ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘autocratic’) way out. Namely, the team started tosearch for a new meaning perspective that helped them to break through the impasse andenable them to go on. Common sense notions were uttered such as the fact that: “cuts arealways made at the expense either of us or of the patients; that is a law you can’t escape”(Mary). These reinforced their consensual social relations and expressed legitimisingrationalities, all focusing on quality of care, flexibility and cost effectiveness, as for example:

Mary: “We need to be flexible in order to cope with turbulences”.Nicole: “Probably, they will have a good reason for economising, we can’t judge that

properly”.

Simultaneously, identification with a required entrepreneurial attitude increasingly poppedup at the surface, for example expressed in their corporeal hexis. At the beginning of themeeting the nurses exposed an attitude of disappointment and helpless wrath. They satwith their bodies back, indolently. However, when the team leader leaned forwards,decisively placing her hand palms one the table, while looking at her agenda, thusexpressing her eagerness to go on, and simultaneously saying “let’s find a solution for thisproblem”, the team members responded to her. They straightened up and moved theirchairs towards the table… . Their faces expressed enthusiasm and relief. They started tospeak louder, interrupting each other. At the end of the meeting the team membersthemselves found two solutions to deal with the problem of understaffing. If necessary, theywould (1) put the beds of two sections of the department together, having two nurses, or (2)phone a co-worker when the work cannot be finished, to warn him or her to start workearlier. Thus, they accepted the organizational policy not to hire extra nursing staff.However, the solutions were not viable, they neither solved problems of understaffing, norreduced the workload. Moreover, after the meeting feelings of frustration mirrored a senseof unsafety and of fear and uncertainty of being held responsible for failures in care taking,involving dramatic consequences. What are the consequences of these power processes, orput differently: what critical notes can be made while reflecting on the above research?

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Intermezzo: uncovering the ‘cover of autonomy’Taking into account its current widespread adoption in organizations, teamwork has provedto be a most favourite recipe for organizational redesign. The concept is surrounded by anaura of promises, associating organizational performance outcomes such as efficiency,productivity, quality and flexibility with autonomy, responsibility and job enrichment tomeet the aspirations of the workers. As Rose (1989) stated: “The new vocabulary ofteamwork, quality consciousness, flexibility and quality circles (… ) reconciles theautonomous aspirations of the employee with the collective entrepreneurialism of thecorporate culture”. Indeed, teamwork is often portrayed as a win-win situation (Ezzameland Willmott, 1998). What is underexposed, is the potential threat it conveys, especiallywith regard to people’s authenticity. The participative and autonomous elements that areoften celebrated by management cover up the rhetorical attempt of management to gainacceptance of the workers and to suppress discontent. I am not suggesting that cunningmanagers consciously pursue these attempts. Rather these attempts are a more (historically)systematic feature that automatically (without being constantly aware of it) render the actsof management as the most prevalent: that is, to act in accordance with organizational goals,in this case deploying a strategy of seduction or seeking compliance to support such acts.Hierarchical control structures, with a direct supervisory system in which an ‘iron fist’(Jermier, 1998) is deployed, are more and more substituted by team based work structureswhere a ‘velvet glove’ (Jermier, 1998) is characteristic. However, in teamwork, hegemonicpower processes infer an intensified pressure to commit to collective entrepreneurialstandards, therefore possibly neglecting typical worker interests. Workers are seduced toadapt their perception and attitude to the organizational interests and goals, possiblyneglecting their individual interests or even rigorously undermining their established‘rights’ (eg, the law on maximum working hours). Whereas important organizationalexpectations are met (eg, a higher productivity or flexibility), some (groups of) workers areburdened with (unintended) side effects (eg, an intensified work-load). One may wonderwhether this kind of exerting hegemonic control can be typified by the metaphor of ‘an ironfist in a velvet glove’! Moreover, in the next section, I will argue that there are threats toorganizations when this pressure on workers to (1) adhere to ‘role-playing’ (adapting anentrepreneurial identity), (2) to achieve social conformity (by peer pressure) and (3) whereneglect of their interests is persevered.

4 Authenticity in Organizations?

The birth of the notion of authenticityThe structural production of philosophical writings on the concept of authenticity can betraced back to the eighteenth century. An explanation for this ‘sudden’ rise of philosophiesof authenticity lies in the prevailing ethos of that era as “a target of scepticism [that] ceasedto function as an unchallenged authority. The birth of authenticity is rooted in revolution, orat least in the transfiguration of all prevailing social values and institutions” (Golomb, 1995:

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12). Most of these philosophical writings describe authenticity as a pathos4, a legitimateconstitutive element of the self, as opposed to a prevailing social ethos. For philosophers, asfor example Kant and Hegel, but also the later existentialists, and even to a lesser extent thecontemporaries Habermas and Rawls, the concept of authenticity “is a protest against theblind, mechanical acceptance of an externally imposed code of values” (Golomb, 1995: 11).These conceptions of authenticity come close to autonomy, or self-rule, that stresses moralreasoning. However, as Ferrara (1993) brings to the fore, there is another competing traditionthat stresses a moral emotional state of being, represented by Rousseau, Schiller,Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Also according to Taylor, the ethic of authenticityhas its starting point “in the eighteenth century notion that human beings are endowed witha moral sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and wrong. (… ) The notion was thatunderstanding right and wrong was not a matter of dry calculation, but was anchored inour feelings. Morality has, in a sense, a voice within” (1991: 25-26).

Taylor argues that Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the most important philosophical writerwho promoted this view and who was one of the first to articulate this ‘voice within’ or “lesentiment de l’existence” (1991: 27). Taylor, referring to Rousseau, closely relates this innervoice to what he calls a ‘self-determining freedom’ (1991: 27): “the idea that I am free when Idecide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences”. Here,Taylor moves close to the conception of authenticity held by the tradition that stressesautonomy.

It is a standard of freedom that obviously goes beyond what has been called negativeliberty, where I am free to do what I want without interference by others because thatis incompatible with my being shaped and influenced by society and its laws ofconformity. Self-determining freedom demands that I break the hold of all suchexternal impositions, and decide for myself alone (1991: 27).

Taylor goes on to explicate the ideal of authenticity, also based on an idea that Herder hasput forward, “that each of us has an original way of being human” (1991: 28). This idea,stemming from the late eighteenth century, is significantly new: “a powerful moral ideal thathas come down to us” (1991: 29) which Taylor formulates as follows: “There is a certain wayof being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not inimitation of anyone else’s. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I amnot, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me “ (1991: 28-29, originalemphasis). Thus, Taylor (1991) describes two ideas that were articulated in late modernity,where the notion of authenticity develops out of in modern culture: that of the inner voiceand that of each human being having his or her own original way of being human.

Exploring the concept of authenticity…When a dictionary is consulted, the word ‘authentic’ always refers to ‘genuine’ and‘original’ and oppositions that can be respectively given are ‘pretended’ and ‘copy’. Theconcept of authenticity that refers to a person’s identity also consists of these elements.Additionally, it also presupposes the notion, and the existence of a ‘self’, which denotes that 4 In the sense of inspiration or animation and not as grandiloquence.

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which one intrinsically is. Authenticity itself cannot be defined as it lacks any definition. It isa dynamic quality of an identity, “a pathos of incessant change, as opposed to a passivesubordination to one particular ethic” (Golomb, 1995: 12). From theories of social action itcan be derived that authentic conduct “has the quality of being somehow connected with,and expressive of, the core of the actor’s personality. It brings into play the actor’s uniquelypersonal, as opposed to culturally or socially shared, identity “ (Ferrara, 1998: 5). As withthe relation between authenticity and autonomy, Ferrara argues that authenticity presupposesintersubjectivity:

The idea of an “authentic identity” (… ) presupposes, among other things, that topossess an identity as a subject, any identity whatsoever, means to be able to seeoneself through the eyes of another” (1998: 14).

Referring to G.H. Mead, also when he concludes that:All identities arise from interaction, but authentic identities have a distinctive quality.In Greek “authentikos” derives from “eautón” and theto,” where “theto” isetymologically related to “thesis.” Thus “authentic” refers to individuals who “positthemselves” or, more freely, “set themselves as a thesis.” Such an act of “positingonseself,” however, must also be understood along intersubjective lines: namely, asthe capacity to express that uniqueness which has been socially constituted throughthe singularity and uniqueness of the formative contexts but which no formativesocial context as such can enjoin us to express. Such capacity is what distinguishesauthentic identities from other kinds of individual identities.

(Ferrara, 1998: 15)

In line with the above considerations, an explicit moral dimension is often added to theconcept of authenticity. For example, Leahy (1994: 447) describes authenticity as: “a personalattitude that aims toward taking responsibility for freedom and obligation; one’s choicesintegrate reason and emotion through dialogue, reciprocal recognition, intimacy, and caringto construct one’s self as a moral individual”. Also Taylor (1991: 31-35) reasons that agenuine dialogue is essential to moral development and that an identity is formed indialogue, arguing that we reason with others about what is right and wrong, trying todefine better what our ideals consists in. Ferrara agrees with Taylor that in developingauthenticity “intimacy is a fertile terrain” (1993: 90), implying honest communication andvulnerability, acceptance of others and reciprocity. Intimate relationships can result into“disclosure and expression of parts of the self which normally would be kept secret for fearof disrupting one’s social image” (Ferrara, 1993: 91).

Furthermore, in most literature on authenticity, the concept is clarified by either describingfor what it is not or, more positively, by giving examples of what authentic behaviour wouldbe. Inauthentic behaviour for example is to adhere to role-playing within society as the basisof one’s identity (Leahy, 1994: 451), but also social conformity, imitation, pretended actions,fashionable ways of expressing oneself, etcetera are all examples of inauthenticity. Or asFerrara puts it (1998: 16): “Nothing is more inauthentic than an identity constructed with aview to recognition”. On the other hand, it is often illustrated in literature what authenticbehaviour would be, by using heroïc figures or literary characters that explain the mostappropriate conduct, for example Kierkegaard’s biblical or mythological figure of Abraham.A general message that can be obtained from these heroes (or sometimes anti-heroes), is that

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to strive for authenticity is like a test of being true to yourself, expressed in actions, tobecome what one truly is, since it is:

essential for the individual to encounter and experiment with the various life-styles,patterns and belief-systems that arise in human society, history and ethics. Thus notonly is there no theoretical incompatibility between the notions of authenticity andsociety, the social context is an indispensable condition of authenticity.

(Golomb, 1995: 201, 202)

What about the subjective nature of authenticity? Conventional methodology would arguethat there is no objective ground to enhance this value. However, as Ferrara (1998)convincingly argues, a normative notion of authenticity can be methodologically claimed,therefore avoiding ambiguity and giving it a universalist outlook. He defends the alternativeof a non-generalizing universalism, phronesis5 that can be best understood as ‘exemplary’universalism (not relativistic and compatible with “the fact of pluralism”).

And, is it not problematic to strive for its ‘implementation’ in society? Fortunately, there isan openess that characterises the ideal of authenticity. As mentioned before, it is a personalpathos that is contrary to any attempt of narrowing it down to a universal ethic. But for anyperson to embrace authenticity would not be ‘wrong’, since it makes us human. As Golombputs it:

The very wish to live genuinely, the very attempt to become authentic, expressescourageous determination not to despair or to yield to the powerful processes oflevelling, objectification and depersonalization. To be human is to search for one’strue self and to yearn for authentic relations with others. While it is hard, almostimpossible, to attain public authenticity within the prevailing social ethic, with itsinstrumental personal and economic relations, it is certainly feasible to attempt to doso - to take responsibility for one’s actions and to foster true concern for others.

(Golomb, 1995: 204)

Above all, there are emancipatory aspects to authenticity, as it calls upon a universalstruggle involving the indeterminacy of identity, the self-determining freedom. Althoughformed by socializing practices, it is not its only constitutive element, as we are capable offorming ‘talks’ with ourselves (Kunneman, 1998) through our inner voice, from which welearn a lot as it forms our consciousness. Equally important and related to it, to my opinion,are the sovereign aspects that the notion of authenticity conveys. By shaping your ‘ownauthority’, instead of being solely shaped by ‘external authorities’ we can resist and provoke‘the powers that be’. In the end, there is an ultimate indeterminacy of the sovereignty of ahuman being.

… applied to organizations

5Phronesis as wisdom, prudence, judgement and taste. In relation to authenticity, Ferrara describes itas: “the judgement that guides us in selecting the combination of values on the various dimensionsthat best suits who we, individually or collectively, are” (1998: 12). ‘Best suits’ is in the sense of ‘bestfits’, not at this moment, but as the property bringing the concerned identity “(...) closer to the uniquecombination of the dimensions of self-realization which realizes the highest aggregate value whilealso being the least dispersed” (1998: 12).

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As we have seen in the introduction, being true to oneself is exactly what Gramsci meant asa means to oppose the effects of hegemonic control. In a writing on Taylorism and Fordism(in: Kiros, 1985: 110-115), he problematises the reduction of the worker into an unthinkingbut efficient appendage to the machine. However, Gramsci believed that Taylorism onlyseemed to succeed in transforming labour into a commodity, since in reality thought stillremained a human privilege and not only one of the managers. Human beings remain whatthey potentially are: thinkers and philosophers. Gramsci argued (in: Kiros, 1985: 114):

They have understood that ‘trained gorilla’ is just a phrase, that ‘unfortunately’ theworker remains a man and even that during his work he thinks more, or at least hasgreater opportunities for thinking, once he has overcome the crisis of adaptationwithout being eliminated: and not only does the worker think, but the fact that hegets no immediate satisfaction from his work and realizes that they are trying toreduce him to a trained gorilla, can lead him into a train of thought that is far fromconformist.

Here, we can trace Gramsci’s conviction that, in the terms used here, employees (workers ormanagers) as human beings, have authentic dimensions such as sovereignty, veracityetcetera, capable of giving meaning to one’s actions and to decide for themselves whom theywant to be(come). However, in a world where hypes and fashions, buzzwords and rhetoricrule, the meaning of authenticity appears to be an outsider to the vocabularies constitutewith organizational ‘reality’. Even when referred to a personal identity or attitude,authenticity seems to have little place in organizational life. I would like to argue that itwould be interesting for practitioners related to organizations, as well as for academicsrelated to organization studies, to take a closer look at the implications for reflecting on sucha concept, at the very least they would break through barriers of dogmas (for example strictprograms of organizational change but also more general ‘regimes of truth’) and domination(for example as manifested in the classical dichotomy of management - workers). Amongother reasons, one formulated by Golomb (1995: 3) is as follows:

The quest for authenticity becomes especially pronounced in extreme situations.These include not only personal and external crises, but also significant social andhistorical crises such as that arising from the decline of the powerful and long-enduring ethos of objectivity, rationality and enlightenment. Using Nietzsche’s terms,this era of the ‘twilight of the idols’ and the ‘death of God’ reopens the issues ofpersonal identity and meaning frequently referred to as central dilemmas of thepostmodern world.

In contemporary organizational and Western societal life, I believe there are traits of asignificant crisis (see also Taylor, 1991). Especially since the eighties, the corporate ethossuffered from massive downsizing, numerous restructuring or reengineering operations anda constant drive for continuous improvement often lead to what Hamel and Prahalad referto as ‘corporate anorexia’ (1994: 11). The ‘psychological contract’ between an employer andan employee has been put under considerable strain in terms of, for example, loyalty,flexibility and work stress. In terms of coping with ‘permanent change’, organizationsseemingly have learned to give quick responses to constantly changing demands related to(global) competition, quality, (information) technology, innovation, etcetera. Only sharp-witted organizations have a good chance to survive: it has become a license to operate.However, many wonder whether this option is viable for the future, which paradoxically

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indicates the crisis Western organizations and societies are suffering from (see for exampleVan Diest, 1997; Verstraeten, 1997).

But what impelling force made organizational activity nearly become ‘inauthentic’?Throughout this century organizations were predominantly perceived and shaped by aninstrumental and technical perspective on organizing6. The organization of production, thedecision making process and so on, are designed efficiently, for example to weigh the prosand cons in a way most beneficial to the firm, mostly in light of the profit motive. Thetechnical apparatus serves us to enhance ‘progress’ and ‘perfection’ in an ongoing process.But the question is to what end? In the end, I believe, this approach to organizing andorganizations leads to nihilism: nothing in itself has value, only the human subject decidesupon the meaning and worth of animals and other forms of life, objects and even humanbeings. That what is, is ‘ready for production’, is material for the ‘needs’ of the humansubject7. The order of ‘beings’ is decided by technique:8 in itself they are ‘worthless’. Thus,intrinsicality is lost because everything has become a means to an end. From thisperspective, human action, particularly organizational activity, is predominantly shaped byopportunistic motives. This is the result of the ‘project of modernity’ which has been led bythe ideal of the human being shaping and producing him or herself to his or her own imageand likeness9 and therefore, being able to control nature and to reshape it, together withsocietal life. In modernity, according to Weber’s thought, substantive rationality is more andmore replaced by formal or instrumental rationality. However, the crisis of modernityconsists in the result that this kind of rationality produces irrationality, since in striving forcontrol or domination, damage is being done to the environment, but eventually also tosociety and to other individuals. It also produces all kinds of inauthentic behaviour:overwhelming publicity stunts, products that are imitated, people copying each other’sexcessive need for materialism etcetera. Also in organizations inauthentic behaviour cametrickling in: the famous big smile to please customers, the polishing of the corporate image(to hide irresponsible actions), the exaggeration of ‘positive thinking’ (to inflate productivitystandards), legitimising rationalities that are fraught up with politics and rhetoric, etcetera.But, what ‘lesson(s)’ can be learned related to the notion of authenticity?

5 Reconceptualising organizations

In today’s organizations it is no longer adequate to ‘rule and divide the world in parts’ bydesigning structures, schemes and systems in order to obtain clarity, certainty andproductivity. Organizations founder on it (Morgan, 1986), since such action iscounterproductive (a vicious circle) and oppresses human aspects of creativity,

6 The underlying atomistic paradigm of these perspectives stems from the idea that human beings arerational and at the same time strive to realize their self-interests (inaugurated by Hobbes and Locke).7 A clear and smart example of this is represented in factory farming.8 As Heidegger would proclaim.9 This idea of ‘causa sui’ can make a human being act like Narcissus, who only had his own image asthe guideline of his beauty.

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intersubjectivity etcetera. Although themes like organizational culture, organizationalparticipation and democratisation seem to contribute to extending the horizon of rationality,and therefore ‘dissolve’ the reductionist tendency of instrumental reasoning, predominantlythey fail to do so by treating these elements as means to an end! Let me give an example ofthe theme ‘corporate culture’: “the means involved in managing culture demonstrate avalue system that is inherently technical and manipulative, the aims of which are ultimatelycommercial rather than humanistic” (Starkey, 1998: 127). Participation and other forms ofdemocratisation run the same risk. If it is not considered as an end in itself but merely as ameans to obtain commitment or flexibility or whatever goal, its manipulative character willstart to produce counterproductive effects (Heller et al, 1998). Self-disciplinary practices andincreasing forms of unobtrusive control in team based work structures function in a similarway. They aim aim at workers’ compliance and consent, obstruct the development of vitalhuman resources and, as a consequence, stifle organizations in finding a creative and moralflux to act collectively with a socially aware conscience in a rapidly changing environment.How to cut loose from this trap through which organizations proceed to be systems ofdomination? A possible alternative lies in enhancing a reflexive dialogue giving leeway toauthenticity, in reconceptualizing an organization as a reflexive social entity. Probably theonly condition to it (correct me if I am wrong), is to organize a genuine dialogue onorganizing and in organizations that explicitly discuss and reflect on (often perceived as‘delicate’) issues as responsibility, power relations, significant and legitimate action, widersocio-economic dilemmas and so on. Through a dialogue, people are able to expose theiropinions and frustrations, to express their feelings and thoughts and to reflect (together) onethical and other issues. Van Diest (1997: 8) argues that the intrinsic meaning of actions, asfor example unicity, creativity and intersubjectivity, might actually be expressed. These are‘needs’ that can not be satisfied in a technical or instrumental way. For example, therelationship with clients is intersubjective and as such a reciprocal and free activity,contradictory with any imposed norm or standard (Van Diest, 1997: 223). In a similar way,creativity in principle can not be controlled or programmed. In other words, today’sorganizational life is encountered by the limits of controllability, calculation andprogramming. Material scarcity is no longer the dominating primacy that conditionsorganizations but immaterial scarcity will be the basis of the continuity of organizations(Van Diest, 1997: 8). Van Diest argues that organizations characteristically are in atransitional phase: from an open system (adapting to the market) to a non-system; areflexive social entity in which meaning and sense-making is a dynamic (interactive) act.Complex relationships, as represented by a stakeholder-model, and organizationaldilemmas, are confronted with ‘difference’ and multiplicity: there is no uniform way to dealwith them. Although power in organizations, from a hegemonic perspective, is a politics ofmeaning and identity formation (see also Deetz, 1992), it should also be acknowledged thatthere is an indeterminant component to it. Taking into account the capacity of people toarticulate sense and to convert to authenticity means that there is an openness to conceivealternatives for shaping reality and to formulate answers to different and difficult questions.‘Freezing’ meaning and ‘constraining’ authentic behaviour would stifle organizations andreinforce fragmentation and routine, while expected to be flexible, responsive and

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innovative. Recognizing the virtuosity of the people employed might help organizations tofind this flux and fluidity, by facilitating a dialogue on important issues as for example‘customer value’, responsibility etcetera. Relations of power and strategies of control will notbe absent, but more transparent. ‘Regimes of truth’ or ‘truisms that go without saying’would be questioned as other conceptions of reality would pop up, searching for veracity.Values would not be ‘inculcated into the workforce’ and instrumentalised, but searched forfrom ‘within’ and respected as vital. Especially integrating the reflexive role of critique (seesection 2), and therefore to embrace authenticity, might be essential to an organizations’license to operate.

But also in the academic circle and within the arena of consultancy and other practitioners itis important to give leeway to a reflexive dialogue, and of course among them, for exampleto discuss and face marginalized problems. The intention and atmosphere of it should notbe restricted to pointing at negative aspects and solely express discontent. It would also beworthwhile to stimulate our thoughts and sensibility to look for alternatives that areessential for societal development and the emancipation of humanity as a whole. When wewould integrate the notion of authenticity in shaping our lives, I believe we are capable ofcreating a more just, caring and happy society. Passionately believing in our ‘inner voice’can learn us to express our ideals more adequately.

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