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“Dictators are dictators because they cannot win competitive elections…” (Gandhi &

Przeworski; 2007, 1281)

Political-patronage can be defined as the practice of using state resources to provide jobs

and services for political clienteles. While Huntington (1968) has observed that the active

use of patronage has “contributed directly to the building of some of the most effective

political parties and most stable political systems” the extent to which Authoritarian states

make use of it, makes one ask question what patronage is trying to replace? (Huntington;

1968, 70) If “rulers are driven by calculations of personal political survival” and

democracies survive because it gives power to the people, then dictators must contend that

patronage politics is the most secure way for their regime to survive. (Bratton & Van De

Walle; 1997, 461) The aim of this essay is to show that the prevalence of patronage politics

in Authoritarian regimes comes from the requirement of direct citizen-politician linkage in

the absence of functioning democratic accountability. It remains durable and prevalent

because it creates a dependency between constituents and politicians and because it acts as a

relatively peaceful alternative to dividing and eliminating the competition. The formation of

this essay shall follow by firstly, showing that a dictator’s ability to punish and reward

constituents acts as a kind of ‘perverse accountability’ ensuring to a large extent the

regime’s durability. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 7) (Stokes; 2005, 315) Secondly, it shall

weigh up the costs and benefits of using patronage to dissuade or neutralise opponents,

showing that it is the most efficient, mutually-beneficial and peaceful mechanism in

defeating threats. Finally, the essay will show that in the absence of democratic

representation, patronage has been the best way to forge institutional alliances between

different ethnic communities by looking at post-colonial Africa. This will highlight that the

institutionalization of local control over municipal-level patronage has played a key part in

its prevalence. (Kenny; 2013, 39) For the purposes of this essay patronage and clientelism

are terms used interchangeably.

Stokes (2005) describes the politician-citizen relationship in authoritarian regimes as

‘perverse accountability’. (Stokes; 2005, 315) Put simply, in authoritarian regimes it is the

party that punishes or rewards the constituents based on their allegiance in elections, an

ironic reversal of the democratic norm of accountability. This ironic reversal ensures a

return to pro-regime legislatures and leadership, explaining patronages prevalence in

autocratic regimes. For ‘perverse accountability’ to take place it requires; ‘contingent direct

exchange’, ‘predictability’ and ‘monitoring’. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 9)

Firstly, as a result of contingent direct exchange, that is the principal-agent relationship that

forms when individuals or small groups give an incumbent electoral support in return for

monetary or material ‘goods’, many of these constituents become dependent on these

selective goods and therefore view running politicians as service providers. (Kitschelt &

Wilkinson; 2007, 10) This creates an incentive structure that reduces the demand for change

in societies. This becomes particularly relevant in states where there are high levels of

poverty and income inequality as voters value the private rewards offered by the state higher

than the party itself (Stokes; 2005, 322) Patrons offer resources to their clients in exchange

for their loyalty, and clients support their patrons to access rewards that cannot readily be

attained in a formally weak economy. (Arriola; 2009, 1344) Due to a constituents need for

resources that in some cases impacts on an individual’s ability to survive, an incumbent can

use this as a predictability factor. That is, the ability to expect the repeated compliance again

and again in future elections for those specific services. While many tend to assume that

democracy is the only truly redistributive system, the party-state fusion of authoritarian

regimes are redistributive as well, but in a more selective manner. (Busse; 2008, 639) In

areas where there are weak resources, the person who ‘delivers’ can also indulge in “credit

claiming” that can serve his popularity and the regimes. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 23)

Moreover the authoritarian method of redistribution can be relatively cheaper in ensuring

regime stability than a nation-wide policy concession that may lend itself in helping the

competition or may require institutional restructure.

Secondly, the clientelistic exchange leaves citizens in a prisoner’s dilemma as groups may

be punished or left empty handed if they do not vote in favour of the hegemonic party.

Therefore this makes the compliance of individuals as much a local community concern as a

state concern. For example, Communist parties developed dense organizational networks

that reached right down to the level of local governments, workplaces, and residential units

in the Soviet Union (Ackerman; 1999, 107). From a citizen’s perspective, a pro-regime vote

is necessary for their own individual security under conditions of being monitored. In India,

for example, parties designate polling agents to observe the progress of voting and the

polling agents are normally local men who can identify each voter, enabling them to report

on who turns up. (Chandra; 2004, 139) As Stokes contends, “A voter whose support will

only be rewarded if the machine wins anticipates that the game in effect ends each time the

machine loses”. (Stokes; 2005, 319) In many cases, the machine is kept well-greased

because it functions on a bottom-heavy, decentralized army of grass roots civilians who

want to maintain their share of spoils. (Stokes; 2005, 317) By inserting these monitors

deeply into voter’s social networks an efficient system is created whereby patronage breeds

patronage. Moreover in countries that have formally weak state institutions, strong networks

based on trust and reputation can become invaluable and can substitute itself in place of

these institutions. (Ackerman; 1999, 107)

Finally, even when monitoring and enforcement may be less prevalent or absent altogether,

there is the high predictability that groups will comply based on the specific targeted

benefits offered. The offer of such an exchange creates a reasonably high level of certainty

and contractual enforcement. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 23) Patronage works because

while it is mutually beneficial, it is asymmetrical at the same time. For many constituents,

the benefits of co-operating often overshadow ideological preferences, this helps in

preventing reneging individuals.

Patronage helps incumbents stay in power by its ability to neutralise opponents. Although

authoritarian politicians have the option to ban, incarcerate or in extreme cases eliminate the

competition, Authoritarian regimes prefer to use the powers of patronage to co-opt or buy

off the opposition. One may reasonably ask why Authoritarian regimes have elections in the

first place as it can create space for competition to breed. According to Geddes, dictators

have elections to help “solve intra-regime conflicts that might otherwise end their own rule

and possibly also destabilize the regime as well”. (Geddes; 2005, 3) Multi-party elections in

Authoritarian regimes combined with patronage gives the incumbent a number of tools that

helps to ensure the regime’s stability. These can be explained in three points.

Firstly, constituents more often than not will only support candidates who have shown

themselves as willing to cooperate with the incumbent elite. (Lust; 2009, 126) Busse makes

the point that “it is not simply the case that ‘clientelism thrives when government institutions

are weak’”, rather specific institutions are built to serve the extractive goals of rulers and

these becomes viewed as a norm throughout society. (Busse; 2008, 639) Therefore when

elites win overwhelmingly at the polls, this demonstrates to potential rivals that they have

little hope of defeating the incumbent as citizens want candidates who cooperate and can

deliver. The clientelistic relationship between state and citizen provides a signal to

challengers about the extremities of the resource imbalance, which for the most part is off-

putting. (Geddes; 2005, 5) This encourages potential challengers to cooperate with the

dictator’s game. (Magaloni; 2008, 724)

Secondly, the powers of patronage enable the ruling elite to solicit the cooperation of

opponents. In the case of rebellion, the ruling elite is able to deter the risk either by bribing

the opponent through direct private transfers of goods or through the incorporation of

opposition forces into partisan legislatures. This invests them with a stake in the ruler’s

survival and broadens the base of the ruler’s support which encourages a longer tenure in

power. (Gandhi & Przeworski; 2007, 1280) Autocrats may certainly use force to impose

cooperation but banning existing parties that are already organised within pre-existing

structures is an extremely difficult task, moreover the costs of repressive and non-

competitive rule can become unsustainable. By sharing spoils for the sake of cooperation,

rulers can more effectively control groups peacefully which helps in preventing counter

insurgency or the creation of martyrs by banning or eliminating parties. Although in one

sense, co-optation and co-operation can be considered costly as a result of the spoils that

must be distributed; by affiliating with the opposition they are able to maintain the status

quo which can in turn prevent future opposition parties. By co-operating this helps to

‘encapsulate’ and contain the threat of being overturned, it mobilizes contrasting ideological

preferences in support of the incumbent, which in turn helps to ensure the regime’s stability.

(O’Donnell (1973) cited in Gandhi & Przeworski; 2007, 1281)

Thirdly and finally, in cases of extreme risk, ruling elites may expand the cabinet or engage

in what Magaloni describes as power sharing arrangements. (Magaloni; 2008, 715)

Magaloni contends that by “giving up his absolute powers to select members of the ruling

clique into government positions, the dictator can more credibly guarantee a share of

power...over the long run”. (Magaloni; 2008, 716) This may be a critical exchange of power

to ensure a dictator’s survival in office. This method ensures that the dictator still remains

on the top of the pyramid, the potential rival will be forced to compromise his policy agenda

and the dictator still gets to decide what spoils get distributed amongst members of the

ruling coalition. This transfer gives enough power to the opponent to ensure loyalty that

significantly helps in reducing rebellion.

When post-colonial states were initially formed, patronage was used as a mechanism of state

building. Van De Walle (2007) submits that the two central characteristics of the new states

that emerged from colonialism lacked national integration and had a low level of economic

development; both of these factors play another important part in explaining patronages

prevalence today. (Van De Walle; 2007, 52)

The central problem for post-colonial leaders was finding a method to integrate and align

different ethnic communities. Tribal chiefs often enjoyed more legitimacy than state leaders

and in an attempt to create national unity and buttress their own legitimacy new state leaders

engaged in clientelistic relations in order to seek the support of these local elites. (Van De

Walle; 2007, 52-53) As a result of low economic development, less mobility has taken place

in many of the African states which means that managing the diverse interests of these

national elites is still a problem today. For example, more than a third of Jordanian voters

cast their ballots for a candidate who was a member of their tribe or family according to a

2007 survey made by the centre for strategic studies at the University of Jordan. (Lust; 2009,

129) As a result of this decentralised state structure, there is more focus on clientelistic

networks than the party in power. The deep penetration of patronage into African politics is

a result of the “[initial] state building that took place in the face of strong centrifugal and

disintegrative pressures” in which local elites were sought after for central stability.(Kenny;

2013, 24)  In order to cater for the differing interests of the co-ethnics, leaders will recruit

more ministers into the cabinet to create an “effective coup-inhibiting strategy” so that the

whole cabinet looks, more than acts, as an all-encompassing representative. (Arriola; 2009,

1355) In some extreme cases this has even led to institutional provincial power, for example

the Nigerian Federation increased from four states to thirty-six states in the year 2000 to

maximise the regime’s ability to please the different ethnic elites. (Van De Walle; 2007, 55)

This provides good evidence as to why patronage remains so prevalent. In cases where

power is less central, reform if so desired, can be more difficult to implement. (Kenny;

2013, 40)  

To conclude, a political monopoly that is held by an extended patronage network is

extremely difficult to shift and if a state is born from patronage then the chances are that

patronage will remain to some extent. While many authoritarian states have democratic

institutions in theory, in practice these are weak and abused. Therefore in the absence of real

democratic accountability, the extended use of patronage is necessary to control the voters,

opposition and the elite in authoritarian regimes. While a dictator could use mechanisms of

force and coercion to control its people, this is costly, dangerous and unsustainable. By

being selective in who benefits from patronage, a dictator effectively controls his citizens,

which contributes to the longevity and durability of a government. The dependency

relationship created between ruler and citizen therefore explains why patronage is so

prevalent in authoritarian regimes.