authoritarianism essay 1 (1)
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“Dictators are dictators because they cannot win competitive elections…” (Gandhi &
Przeworski; 2007, 1281)
Political-patronage can be defined as the practice of using state resources to provide jobs
and services for political clienteles. While Huntington (1968) has observed that the active
use of patronage has “contributed directly to the building of some of the most effective
political parties and most stable political systems” the extent to which Authoritarian states
make use of it, makes one ask question what patronage is trying to replace? (Huntington;
1968, 70) If “rulers are driven by calculations of personal political survival” and
democracies survive because it gives power to the people, then dictators must contend that
patronage politics is the most secure way for their regime to survive. (Bratton & Van De
Walle; 1997, 461) The aim of this essay is to show that the prevalence of patronage politics
in Authoritarian regimes comes from the requirement of direct citizen-politician linkage in
the absence of functioning democratic accountability. It remains durable and prevalent
because it creates a dependency between constituents and politicians and because it acts as a
relatively peaceful alternative to dividing and eliminating the competition. The formation of
this essay shall follow by firstly, showing that a dictator’s ability to punish and reward
constituents acts as a kind of ‘perverse accountability’ ensuring to a large extent the
regime’s durability. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 7) (Stokes; 2005, 315) Secondly, it shall
weigh up the costs and benefits of using patronage to dissuade or neutralise opponents,
showing that it is the most efficient, mutually-beneficial and peaceful mechanism in
defeating threats. Finally, the essay will show that in the absence of democratic
representation, patronage has been the best way to forge institutional alliances between
different ethnic communities by looking at post-colonial Africa. This will highlight that the
institutionalization of local control over municipal-level patronage has played a key part in
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its prevalence. (Kenny; 2013, 39) For the purposes of this essay patronage and clientelism
are terms used interchangeably.
Stokes (2005) describes the politician-citizen relationship in authoritarian regimes as
‘perverse accountability’. (Stokes; 2005, 315) Put simply, in authoritarian regimes it is the
party that punishes or rewards the constituents based on their allegiance in elections, an
ironic reversal of the democratic norm of accountability. This ironic reversal ensures a
return to pro-regime legislatures and leadership, explaining patronages prevalence in
autocratic regimes. For ‘perverse accountability’ to take place it requires; ‘contingent direct
exchange’, ‘predictability’ and ‘monitoring’. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 9)
Firstly, as a result of contingent direct exchange, that is the principal-agent relationship that
forms when individuals or small groups give an incumbent electoral support in return for
monetary or material ‘goods’, many of these constituents become dependent on these
selective goods and therefore view running politicians as service providers. (Kitschelt &
Wilkinson; 2007, 10) This creates an incentive structure that reduces the demand for change
in societies. This becomes particularly relevant in states where there are high levels of
poverty and income inequality as voters value the private rewards offered by the state higher
than the party itself (Stokes; 2005, 322) Patrons offer resources to their clients in exchange
for their loyalty, and clients support their patrons to access rewards that cannot readily be
attained in a formally weak economy. (Arriola; 2009, 1344) Due to a constituents need for
resources that in some cases impacts on an individual’s ability to survive, an incumbent can
use this as a predictability factor. That is, the ability to expect the repeated compliance again
and again in future elections for those specific services. While many tend to assume that
democracy is the only truly redistributive system, the party-state fusion of authoritarian
regimes are redistributive as well, but in a more selective manner. (Busse; 2008, 639) In
areas where there are weak resources, the person who ‘delivers’ can also indulge in “credit
claiming” that can serve his popularity and the regimes. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 23)
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Moreover the authoritarian method of redistribution can be relatively cheaper in ensuring
regime stability than a nation-wide policy concession that may lend itself in helping the
competition or may require institutional restructure.
Secondly, the clientelistic exchange leaves citizens in a prisoner’s dilemma as groups may
be punished or left empty handed if they do not vote in favour of the hegemonic party.
Therefore this makes the compliance of individuals as much a local community concern as a
state concern. For example, Communist parties developed dense organizational networks
that reached right down to the level of local governments, workplaces, and residential units
in the Soviet Union (Ackerman; 1999, 107). From a citizen’s perspective, a pro-regime vote
is necessary for their own individual security under conditions of being monitored. In India,
for example, parties designate polling agents to observe the progress of voting and the
polling agents are normally local men who can identify each voter, enabling them to report
on who turns up. (Chandra; 2004, 139) As Stokes contends, “A voter whose support will
only be rewarded if the machine wins anticipates that the game in effect ends each time the
machine loses”. (Stokes; 2005, 319) In many cases, the machine is kept well-greased
because it functions on a bottom-heavy, decentralized army of grass roots civilians who
want to maintain their share of spoils. (Stokes; 2005, 317) By inserting these monitors
deeply into voter’s social networks an efficient system is created whereby patronage breeds
patronage. Moreover in countries that have formally weak state institutions, strong networks
based on trust and reputation can become invaluable and can substitute itself in place of
these institutions. (Ackerman; 1999, 107)
Finally, even when monitoring and enforcement may be less prevalent or absent altogether,
there is the high predictability that groups will comply based on the specific targeted
benefits offered. The offer of such an exchange creates a reasonably high level of certainty
and contractual enforcement. (Kitschelt & Wilkinson; 2007, 23) Patronage works because
while it is mutually beneficial, it is asymmetrical at the same time. For many constituents,
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the benefits of co-operating often overshadow ideological preferences, this helps in
preventing reneging individuals.
Patronage helps incumbents stay in power by its ability to neutralise opponents. Although
authoritarian politicians have the option to ban, incarcerate or in extreme cases eliminate the
competition, Authoritarian regimes prefer to use the powers of patronage to co-opt or buy
off the opposition. One may reasonably ask why Authoritarian regimes have elections in the
first place as it can create space for competition to breed. According to Geddes, dictators
have elections to help “solve intra-regime conflicts that might otherwise end their own rule
and possibly also destabilize the regime as well”. (Geddes; 2005, 3) Multi-party elections in
Authoritarian regimes combined with patronage gives the incumbent a number of tools that
helps to ensure the regime’s stability. These can be explained in three points.
Firstly, constituents more often than not will only support candidates who have shown
themselves as willing to cooperate with the incumbent elite. (Lust; 2009, 126) Busse makes
the point that “it is not simply the case that ‘clientelism thrives when government institutions
are weak’”, rather specific institutions are built to serve the extractive goals of rulers and
these becomes viewed as a norm throughout society. (Busse; 2008, 639) Therefore when
elites win overwhelmingly at the polls, this demonstrates to potential rivals that they have
little hope of defeating the incumbent as citizens want candidates who cooperate and can
deliver. The clientelistic relationship between state and citizen provides a signal to
challengers about the extremities of the resource imbalance, which for the most part is off-
putting. (Geddes; 2005, 5) This encourages potential challengers to cooperate with the
dictator’s game. (Magaloni; 2008, 724)
Secondly, the powers of patronage enable the ruling elite to solicit the cooperation of
opponents. In the case of rebellion, the ruling elite is able to deter the risk either by bribing
the opponent through direct private transfers of goods or through the incorporation of
opposition forces into partisan legislatures. This invests them with a stake in the ruler’s
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survival and broadens the base of the ruler’s support which encourages a longer tenure in
power. (Gandhi & Przeworski; 2007, 1280) Autocrats may certainly use force to impose
cooperation but banning existing parties that are already organised within pre-existing
structures is an extremely difficult task, moreover the costs of repressive and non-
competitive rule can become unsustainable. By sharing spoils for the sake of cooperation,
rulers can more effectively control groups peacefully which helps in preventing counter
insurgency or the creation of martyrs by banning or eliminating parties. Although in one
sense, co-optation and co-operation can be considered costly as a result of the spoils that
must be distributed; by affiliating with the opposition they are able to maintain the status
quo which can in turn prevent future opposition parties. By co-operating this helps to
‘encapsulate’ and contain the threat of being overturned, it mobilizes contrasting ideological
preferences in support of the incumbent, which in turn helps to ensure the regime’s stability.
(O’Donnell (1973) cited in Gandhi & Przeworski; 2007, 1281)
Thirdly and finally, in cases of extreme risk, ruling elites may expand the cabinet or engage
in what Magaloni describes as power sharing arrangements. (Magaloni; 2008, 715)
Magaloni contends that by “giving up his absolute powers to select members of the ruling
clique into government positions, the dictator can more credibly guarantee a share of
power...over the long run”. (Magaloni; 2008, 716) This may be a critical exchange of power
to ensure a dictator’s survival in office. This method ensures that the dictator still remains
on the top of the pyramid, the potential rival will be forced to compromise his policy agenda
and the dictator still gets to decide what spoils get distributed amongst members of the
ruling coalition. This transfer gives enough power to the opponent to ensure loyalty that
significantly helps in reducing rebellion.
When post-colonial states were initially formed, patronage was used as a mechanism of state
building. Van De Walle (2007) submits that the two central characteristics of the new states
that emerged from colonialism lacked national integration and had a low level of economic
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development; both of these factors play another important part in explaining patronages
prevalence today. (Van De Walle; 2007, 52)
The central problem for post-colonial leaders was finding a method to integrate and align
different ethnic communities. Tribal chiefs often enjoyed more legitimacy than state leaders
and in an attempt to create national unity and buttress their own legitimacy new state leaders
engaged in clientelistic relations in order to seek the support of these local elites. (Van De
Walle; 2007, 52-53) As a result of low economic development, less mobility has taken place
in many of the African states which means that managing the diverse interests of these
national elites is still a problem today. For example, more than a third of Jordanian voters
cast their ballots for a candidate who was a member of their tribe or family according to a
2007 survey made by the centre for strategic studies at the University of Jordan. (Lust; 2009,
129) As a result of this decentralised state structure, there is more focus on clientelistic
networks than the party in power. The deep penetration of patronage into African politics is
a result of the “[initial] state building that took place in the face of strong centrifugal and
disintegrative pressures” in which local elites were sought after for central stability.(Kenny;
2013, 24) In order to cater for the differing interests of the co-ethnics, leaders will recruit
more ministers into the cabinet to create an “effective coup-inhibiting strategy” so that the
whole cabinet looks, more than acts, as an all-encompassing representative. (Arriola; 2009,
1355) In some extreme cases this has even led to institutional provincial power, for example
the Nigerian Federation increased from four states to thirty-six states in the year 2000 to
maximise the regime’s ability to please the different ethnic elites. (Van De Walle; 2007, 55)
This provides good evidence as to why patronage remains so prevalent. In cases where
power is less central, reform if so desired, can be more difficult to implement. (Kenny;
2013, 40)
To conclude, a political monopoly that is held by an extended patronage network is
extremely difficult to shift and if a state is born from patronage then the chances are that
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patronage will remain to some extent. While many authoritarian states have democratic
institutions in theory, in practice these are weak and abused. Therefore in the absence of real
democratic accountability, the extended use of patronage is necessary to control the voters,
opposition and the elite in authoritarian regimes. While a dictator could use mechanisms of
force and coercion to control its people, this is costly, dangerous and unsustainable. By
being selective in who benefits from patronage, a dictator effectively controls his citizens,
which contributes to the longevity and durability of a government. The dependency
relationship created between ruler and citizen therefore explains why patronage is so
prevalent in authoritarian regimes.