autonomy global macro fund investor letter 201212

Autonomy Global Macro Fund

December 2012

Confidential – Not for Re-Distribution of 13

The Autonomy Global Macro Fund performance was +1.68%* for December, bringing performance for the year to +19.67%.

Since inception in November 2003, the cumulative performance (net of fees and expenses) for the offshore feeder fund is

+269.58% versus the S&P 500’s performance of +63.83%. At the end of December 2012, the AUM of the Autonomy Global

Macro Strategy was approximately $2.1 billion**, and total Firm AUM managed by Autonomy Capital was approximately $3.3

billion.

Assets

Month

(%)

YTD

(%)

Annualized

Rolling 36

months (%)

Annualized

Rolling 60

months (%)

Annualized

Since

Inception (%)

Cumulative

Since

Inception (%)

Autonomy Global Macro Fund Limited $1,300 M +1.68 +19.67 +19.68 +10.28 +15.33 +269.58

Autonomy Global Macro Fund L.P. $541 M +1.68 +19.66 +19.69 +10.29 +15.70 +276.06

The results shown are net of all fees and expenses and include the reinvestment of all earnings, dividends and capital gains. Past performance

is no guarantee of future results. Inherent in any investment is the potential for loss.

Portfolio Comment

The Fund returned +1.68% in December led by gains in credit and foreign exchange. Equity and interest rate positions were

also meaningful contributors. In credit, notable gains were registered in Icelandic, Argentine, Spanish, Greek and African

sovereign positions. Small losses occurred in European credit spread positions as well as Egyptian sovereign positions.

Foreign exchange gains were driven by Asian FX longs against various funding currencies, notably against the Japanese Yen

(in particular JPY/KRW). The equity portion of the portfolio benefited from longs in U.S. financials, European indices and

Japanese indices. These gains were partially offset by losses in U.S. indices. Interest rates were up modestly, driven by gains

in Brazil, while losses were registered in Europe.

2012 Review

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Italy 10yr Govt Bonds

Japan Nikkei 225

MSCI Asia ex Japan

ML Global High Yield Bonds

MSCI Emerging Equities

JPM EMBI Emerging Debt

MSCI Developed Equities

Nasdaq Composite

Yen per US Dollar

ML Global Corporate Bonds

Silver

German 10yr Bund

Gold

US 10yr Treasury

Copper

HFR Global Hedge Fund Index

Brent Crude Oil

Dollar Index

Euro per US Dollar

Iron Ore

CRB Commodities Index

GSCI Soft Commodities

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, January 2013.

Asset Returns in 2012 (% return since 12/30/11)


December 2012


In our 2011 year-end letter we wrote: “2012 is beginning on a slightly different note. We believe some of the market’s

complacency toward kick-the-can policy solutions is coming to a head (specifically in Europe): the bar has been set lower for

growth expectations; many assets have cheapened; and, the post 2007 deleveraging hangover is another year older.

Furthermore, monetary policy makers globally have shown their bias of concern for weaker growth as opposed to price

inflation.”

With this as a starting point, we entered 2012 with a more constructive portfolio bias intending to buy European assets if

market volatility or idiosyncratic events created opportunistic value. We also believed central banks continued loose

monetary policy would buoy asset prices in general and that some European asset price volatility and existential issues were

likely to come to a head.

We believe considerable progress toward macroeconomic rebalancing has been made in particular European countries such as

Spain (see chart: Spanish Current Account Balances below) and prices have begun to reflect this improvement (see first chart

on the next page regarding Euro Area sovereign bond yield spreads). Challenges at the national level remain (in France in

particular) and more needs to be achieved on pan-European integration (a banking union) in order to insure the long-term

survival of the European Union as we know it (see second chart on the next page providing some context for the situation in

France). Although we have been able to look past the existential fears and volatility in a variety of European markets over the

past year, we are conscious that asset prices no longer present the same distressed opportunity, and slow growth remains an

important headwind for European markets. The need for a more growth-focused agenda and the challenges posed by

possibly tighter financial conditions (emanating from a stronger currency and higher core country interest rates) will be key

dynamics to monitor in 2013.

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Spanish Current Account Balances

Current Acct

Goods Bal

% GDP

Source: Bank of Spain and Autonomy Capital, November 2012.

(Dots denote estimate of the balances as % GDP over past 3 months)


December 2012


Interest Rates

For the third year in a row interest rates were the best performing asset class for the Fund. Entering 2012 Autonomy

maintained its view that global economic growth would remain anemic at best. This view was guided by our belief of

continued debt deleveraging and fiscal austerity in much of the highly indebted western world. As such, monetary policy

would remain a key component of continued growth, however sluggish (see chart on left below). The interest rates “lower for

longer” theme was (again) key to our portfolio construction and investment success throughout 2012.

In the U.S., the Fund profited from forward starting steepeners that were supported by generally buoyant markets and

continued accommodation from the Federal Reserve. The chart below on the right shows the two-year interest rate, two years

forward in Australia, Brazil and South Africa – some of the Fund’s top performing interest rate themes in 20121.

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Euro Area 10yr Sov Bond Yield Spread

Average of (Ita & Spa) - (Ger & Fra)% pt

Source: Reuters, Bloomberg and Autonomy Capital, December 2012.

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Real GDP, % y/y

PMI Composite [RHS]

Latest PMI [RHS]

French Real GDP Growth and Composite PMI

Source: Markit, Eurostat and Autonomy Capital, January 2013.


December 2012


Credit

Credit positions posted significant gains for the Fund in 2012. The largest single contributor was the Fund’s long position in

Icelandic Króna (ISK) sovereign debt. The appreciation of the offshore ISK against the Euro and interest paid on the bonds

drove this position’s profit during the year. We continue to see improvement in Iceland that we believe will continue to

support solid performance in 2013. Notable returns were also generated from long positions in the sovereign credit of select

African countries. We continue to build our focus on Africa and anticipate an attractive set of opportunities in Africa in the

years to come.

Longs in European sovereign credit (most notably Spain and Greece) also contributed meaningfully to the Fund’s profits in

the second half of the year, driven by pan-European policy (i.e. work on having a single supervisory mechanism, European

Stability Mechanism), Spanish banking support, the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)2 and

idiosyncratic national level structural reform. Detracting from gains in credit were a number of European credit spread

positions, which served as portfolio hedges in the event that European markets experienced a significant “risk off” crisis.

Foreign Exchange

Foreign exchange was the third largest contributor to profits in 2012. As discussed in the 2011 letter, we believed many

emerging market currencies began 2012 at notably attractive levels. The Fund’s largest individual contributor in foreign

exchange was a long position in the Mexican Peso. Mexico’s change in leadership, improving policy mix/reform agenda,

valuation, and interest rate differential provided significant support for the Peso. Asian FX longs funded in various currencies

(most notably against the Japanese Yen) were also a notable driver of foreign exchange performance in 2012. In addition, the

Fund profited from longs in the Hungarian Forint and Polish Zloty (see the first and second charts on the next page).

A short position in the Brazilian Real benefited from the Real’s reversion from overvaluation and government intervention

(see third chart below). Short hedges in the Euro and the Australian Dollar detracted from performance.

1,600

1,800

2,000

2,200

2,400

2,600

2,800

3,000

3,200

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

2009 2010 2011 2012

S&P 500 Price Index

Fed Balance Sheet, US$ bn [RHS]

Source: Standard & Poor's and Federal Reserve, December 2012.

S&P 500 Price Index and Federal

Reserve Balance SheetIndex $ bn

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

105

Jan 12 Mar 12 May 12 Jul 12 Sep 12 Nov 12

Australia

Brazil

S Africa

Source: Bloomberg and Autonomy Capital, December 2012.

2012 Most Profitable Interest Rate Markets:

2yr,2yr Forward Swaps03/01/2012=100


December 2012


88

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104


Hungary

Poland

Mexico

(Jan 2nd 2012=100). Upwards denotes appreciation

Source: Reuters and Autonomy Capital, December 2012.

Nominal Trade-Weighted Exchange Rates

88

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104


S Korea

Malaysia

China

(Jan 2nd 2012=100). Upwards denotes appreciation

Source: Reuters and Autonomy Capital, December 2012.

Asian Nominal Trade-Weighted Exchange Rates

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2.40

2.60

2.80

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: Reuters, December 2012.

USDBRL Spot Rate, Inverted Axis


December 2012


Equities

Equities were slightly profitable for the Fund in 2012. Notable gains were registered in long European equities against U.S.

equities. As we have discussed in many of our prior letters and communications, the valuation divergence between European

and U.S. equity indices may have hit notable levels in 2012 (see chart below). Japanese equity longs were a noteworthy

contributor to equity profits in 2012.

Profit and Loss Attribution for the Month

PnL Attribution - MTD Credit Equity Rates FX Commodity TOTAL

Region % % % % % %

Developed Asia (ex Japan) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.57

Developed Europe 0.21 0.12 -0.09 -0.19 0.00 0.05

EMG Asia 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.16

EMG Europe 0.27 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.36

Japan -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03

Latin America 0.28 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.75

MEA 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12

North America 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05

Not Applicable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Total 0.90 0.23 0.12 0.44 0.00 1.68

The categories reflected in the attribution tables are, by their nature, general and imprecise; not all portfolio positions are easily categorized

and some positions could be categorized in more than one way. Totals in each column and row may not total precisely due to rounding.

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

2.00

2.25

2.50

Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12

S&P 500 Nikkei 225 Euro STOXX 50

Source: Bloomberg, December 2012.

Key Price to Book Value Ratios


December 2012


Profit and Loss Attribution for Year to Date

PnL Attribution - YTD Credit Equity Rates FX Commodity TOTAL

Region % % % % % %

Developed Asia (ex Japan) 0.00 0.00 2.61 1.76 0.00 4.36

Developed Europe 1.20 1.26 0.18 -0.25 0.00 2.39

EMG Asia 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.39

EMG Europe 1.74 0.30 -0.24 1.52 0.00 3.31

Japan -0.04 0.38 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.42

Latin America 0.98 0.01 2.91 2.47 0.00 6.37

MEA 1.93 0.00 0.83 -0.06 0.00 2.71

North America -0.10 -0.90 0.70 0.00 0.00 -0.30

Not Applicable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03

Total 5.97 1.09 6.99 5.60 0.03 19.67

The categories reflected in the attribution tables are, by their nature, general and imprecise; not all portfolio positions are easily categorized

and some positions could be categorized in more than one way. Totals in each column and row may not total precisely due to rounding.

Looking Forward

The financial markets’ conventional wisdom, for the most part, seems to believe once again that all is well in China. Last year,

policy makers in China went back to the well expanding credit for infrastructure and command economy projects, thus

propping up growth into the leadership transition (see chart below on left). So, of the two probable outcomes for China’s

economy we’ve discussed in past letters: either “no landing” or “hard landing,” thus far we have had “no landing.” What are

the consequences? Credit has continued to expand faster than GDP particularly through dubious shadow banking activities.

Over the past five years China has added more than 50 percentage points of credit to GDP, with that ratio now reaching 175%

of GDP inclusive of social financing.3 We believe the growth in shadow banking via Wealth Management Products and Trust

Products could eventually become acutely problematic (see chart below on right). These two areas now total approximately

15 trillion RMB, and are generally extremely opaque in terms of the assets that back their projected returns. We expect many

of these products will fail to meet their expected return targets as they come due in 2014. We are concerned that

underperformance and a deceleration of fundraising for these products may prove difficult to offset smoothly via other credit

measures, which will have a negative knock-on impact on the banking sector and future credit growth. We expect

considerable investor disappointment from these products and continue to make the point that China, to date, has failed to

transition to a sustainable growth model. We will be increasingly focused on this issue as the year progresses. Frankly the

failure of some of these shadow banking products could create quite a mess in our opinion.


December 2012


Until recently, policymakers in Japan had shown little resolve to counteract the deflation it has endured for several decades.

Capital inflows due to risk aversion and rising real rate differentials with the rest of the world had pushed the Yen to arguably

unsustainable levels, severely impacting Japan’s competitiveness, while deflation has continued to depress domestic demand.

We believe the recent LDP election victory has the potential to mark a sea-change in macroeconomic management. The

government is likely to change the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) leadership so as to create a framework for the BoJ to monetize

sovereign debt and other assets until nominal growth rises substantially (the LDP’s official target for nominal growth is +3%,

compared to +0.1% at the latest print). We believe Japan has embarked upon a new monetary framework.

Higher inflation and BoJ bond purchases will likely reduce real yields thereby potentially forcing Japanese savers into higher-

returning foreign and domestic assets. The resulting JPY depreciation could become self-sustaining as a weaker currency

drives higher inflation and further declines in real rates. This dynamic, combined with the large deterioration in Japan’s

current account, may mark the beginning of a substantial JPY depreciation. The chart on the left below shows the Yen plotted

against the ratio of the BoJ/Fed balance sheets - this ratio appears likely to rise based on larger BoJ asset purchases. The chart

on the right shows the Yen plotted against the current account balance, where the latter is consistent with a weaker currency.

6

8

10

12

14

16

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Autonomy Capital, 4Q12.

Chinese Real GDP Growth % y/y

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Domestic Bank Loans Equity Issuance by NFCsCorporate Bonds Bank AcceptancesTrust & Entrusted Loans Foreign Loans

Source: PBOC and Autonomy Capital, December 2012.

Chinese Total Social Financing% GDP

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

USDJPY vs. BoJ/Fed BS Ratio

BoJ/Fed Advanced 20 Months

BoJ/Fed BS

USDJPY [RHS]

Source: Bloomberg, January 2013.

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

11000

1200060

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013

USDJPY

Japan Curr Acct Bal (¥bn) - 6 Mths Rolling Sum [inv, RHS]

Source: Bloomberg, January 2013.

USDJPY & Japan BOP Current Account Balance

Current Account Advanced 25 Months


December 2012


We believe that as this new policy seeps into the domestic investor psyche, the extent of Japanese domestic investment

misallocation will become clear (see chart below comparing household financial asset allocation in various developed

markets). Specifically, after years of deflation, Japanese domestic investors are hugely overweight cash and bonds, and

underweight equities. In a world where monetary policy has deliberately and decidedly changed to reflation, such an

allocation will likely change.

Allocation of household financial assets to different asset classes in 2010 (%)

ECB president Mario Draghi has told us that the Euro is irreversible. Of course, the Euro is only irreversible if everyone is

better off within it rather than outside the currency structure. Is that true? So far, we’d say NO. In the debate on austerity

between Paul Krugman and everyone else, it looks like Krugman is winning. Yet the requisite program in Europe has been

fiscal austerity, mainly as a German idea essentially minimizing Germany’s contingent liability. Meanwhile, what is the

responsibility of the ECB? What was the cause of the European crisis? Was it that profligate sovereign country borrowing

caused the crisis as the story goes, as indeed was the case in Greece? Or, was it the former ECB President Jean-Claude

Trichet’s initial refusal to act as lender of last resort in a liquidity crisis for the European System? Certainly whatever the

cause, the issue is being more and more defined as a lack of growth.

What is needed in Italy is a complete remake of the judicial system and the labor market system that allows individuals to

utilize their skills. Is this easy? We think not. Does fiscal austerity help here? No. What about France? Is the economy closer

to being deregulated? No. Is the labor market sufficiently reformed? No. Will austerity help here? No.

Spain, we believe, is in an improved situation in some respects due to its labor market reforms. But, here too, austerity looks

to be causing social issues beyond the tolerance of many. What is necessary? For a start, a central bank that provides a clear

and unambiguous backstop to the system is essential. Politically this may ultimately only be possible in a Federal Europe,

Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) notwithstanding, that feeds through to common bank regulation and resolution, bank

spreads, lending spreads and the like. We have seen prolonged delays in issues like common bank resolution and regulation

in the current non-federal structure. These changes become easier with some federal control over sovereign budgets,

something France has studiously avoided putting on the table. Do we need a further crisis to trigger change? If we do, French

banks would be a good place to start.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

US

France

Germany

Korea

UK

Australia

Japan

Equities Cash & Deposits Bonds Loans Insurance Other

Source: OECD, December 2012.


December 2012


It remains to be seen whether austerity will continue to be backed politically – we would doubt it. As an aside, in the U.K., we

would not be surprised if George Osborne were, politically speaking, thrown under a bus sometime soon. But of all the

potential longer term outcomes, we’d at least want to entertain the idea that the flawed nature of the Euro system will

potentially act as a catalyst for structural change in Europe, as austerity is increasingly sidelined. Could we hear more about

judicial and labor market reform in the upcoming months and years? Certainly if lack of growth is identified as the problem,

then this would be a logical route for the Euro countries to follow. Time will tell. It’s a contentious idea, and one that is only

speculative to date. But if true, the entire market will be wrong-footed, again. Why? Because the very flaws the market

identifies as being a weakness to be discounted, turn out to be the catalyst for change to more competitive social structures

within the economy of Europe. It is a longer term idea, but we mention it here just to illustrate the varied nature of

possibilities within the Eurozone.

In the immediate future we have an ECB that is likely to be called upon to do more and more to support growth in a situation

where growth is not forthcoming due to lack of comprehensive policy. Discussions over the future of Europe are definitively

not over, and the cost of a gradualist approach to a solution mount with domestic political frustrations. European markets

and politics are likely to be volatile and tricky. At the end of the day, we favor the idea that Europe will head to a construct

where Spain has the same ECB backstop as Germany. If this is the case, some “distressed” and discounted European assets,

such as Spanish real estate, present attractive risk/reward opportunities.

In the previous paragraphs, we mentioned Paul Krugman, and how he has been on the right side of the fiscal austerity

argument so far. That said, there is an entitlement problem in the United States we’d better review. Expanding social benefits

without a corresponding increase in revenue and a shift in demographics are conspiring to stress the solvency of the

entitlements system. Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require significant adjustments over a

number of years - increased government revenue and reductions in certain entitlement expectations. The picture, as displayed

in the chart below, is clear and stark - the clock is ticking.

U.S. Extended Scenarios; Outlays and Receipts, % GDP

Source: CBO Long Term Budget Report, June 2011.

Currently, the U.S. Congress and President seem to want to ignore the situation. How this issue is addressed will have a

meaningful impact on our investment decisions over the longer-term. As 2013 progresses we will watch the entitlements

debate closely. It may be the case that the United States’ deteriorating debt situation could impact financial markets before the

politicians can come to an agreement on a sustainable plan.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080

Other Noninterest Spending

Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP and Exchange Subsidies

Social Security

Net Interest

Revenues


December 2012


Firm Update

After nine great years with Autonomy, Joe Rooney, Strategist, retired as of the end of December 2012. Joe has been and

remains a valued colleague and friend. We recognize this occasion with a mixture of great happiness for Joe and his family as

well as some sadness having enjoyed his many valuable contributions to our team.

Ben Berkowitz, after consulting with Autonomy during 2012, has joined Autonomy as General Counsel and Head of Tax. Ben

will also serve as interim Chief Compliance Officer. Prior to joining Autonomy, Ben was General Counsel, Chief Compliance

Officer and Chief Financial Officer at Chalkstream Capital Group, L.P., a private investment firm that manages alternative

investment vehicles. Prior to joining Chalkstream Capital in 2005, Ben was a senior tax attorney at Schulte Roth and Zabel,

LLP, from 2002 to 2005. He started his professional career at Roth & Co. LLP, an accounting firm where he obtained his CPA

certification, from 1996 to 1999. Ben holds a JD from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a BS in accounting summa cum

laude from Touro College. Irshad Karim, formerly General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer departed Autonomy at

year-end. A Chief Compliance Officer will be hired in the next few months to head Autonomy’s compliance team.

Finally, Autonomy will be changing the format of the monthly letter we have published over recent years. Going forward, on

a monthly basis, we will update investors on returns, profit and loss attribution, portfolio positioning, and any significant

change to our outlook both from an economic and asset price standpoint, as well as sharing any firm updates as warranted.

On a quarterly basis, Autonomy will publish a “Strategy Research” piece that will be a thematic analysis sharing our latest

views on structural trends, our “frameworks” for how we are investing, and key themes driving the positioning of the Fund.

Contact Information Business Development Investor Relations

Scott M. Nelson Shira Gedanken

+1-212-796-1913 +1-212-796-1907

[email protected] [email protected]

End-notes:

* Please note that the year-to-date returns are indicative only and individual investor results may vary based on numerous factors including

but not limited to the Class or Series invested, on timing of subscriptions or redemptions and any applicable high water mark. Returns and

statistics cited for Autonomy Global Macro Fund are calculated based on the then currently offered Shares/Interests -- Class A (11/2003-

10/2005), Class B (11/2005-2/2010), and General Series beginning 3/2010. The results shown are net of all fees and expenses and include the

reinvestment of all earnings, dividends and capital gains. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Inherent in any investment is the

potential for loss.

** Autonomy Global Macro Strategy assets total $2.1 billion (inclusive of separate accounts, excluding the AB-SPV assets). Please note that

Autonomy Global Macro Fund Limited and L.P. AUM exclude $15 million of Designated Shares. The breakdown is $11 million in Autonomy

Global Macro Fund Limited and $4 million in Autonomy Global Macro Fund L.P.

1 These are not necessarily the Fund’s positions. 2 ECB: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html 3 Credit Suisse Economics Research, February 22, 2013. China: Shadow banking – Road to heightened risks.

DISCLOSURE

The content of this report is strictly confidential, is intended solely for the receiving party and may not be published, distributed or disclosed without the express

written consent of Autonomy Capital (Jersey) Limited (together with its affiliates, “Autonomy Capital”). These materials do not constitute an offer or solicitation

by Autonomy Capital for the purchase or sale of interests in any of the investment products or services described herein (collectively, the “Fund”) or in any other


December 2012


fund or investment product. Any such offer or solicitation may only be made by means of delivery of the applicable Confidential Private Placement

Memorandum, as amended from time to time (each, a “Memorandum”), and other documents associated with the investment, each of which should be reviewed

in its entirety prior to investment (including the sections “Certain Risk Factors” and “Potential Conflicts of Interest” contained in the applicable Memorandum).

This report is for informational purposes only and not to be relied upon as investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. A prospective investor should consult with

his or her independent professional advisors as to the legal, tax, financial or other matters relevant to the suitability of an investment in the Fund.

HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE INFORMATION DEPICTED HEREIN IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE OR INVESTMENT RETURNS, AND

ACTUAL EVENTS OR CONDITIONS MAY NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH, AND MAY DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM, THOSE DEPICTED. Any information

provided herein relating to the Fund’s performance has been provided by Autonomy Capital and is unaudited. Any such information has not been reviewed or

approved by either a fund’s auditor or administrator and is subject to change. Autonomy Capital makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy or

completeness of such estimated performance figures, and further no such estimated performance figures shall be relied upon as a promise by, or representation

by, Autonomy Capital whether as to past or future performance results. Further, there can be no assurance that any investment opportunity offered by Autonomy

Capital with an investment objective similar to the fund(s) and/or strategy (ies) being described herein will achieve its investment objective, generate positive

returns, or that any targeted returns, anticipated diversification or asset allocations will be met.

Any investments depicted in this material are not, and are not intended to be, a complete depiction of all investments made by any such funds or accounts, or to

be made by the Fund.

The information presented herein is intended to be a summary only and Autonomy Capital makes no representation as to the accuracy of such information. This

presentation may contain targeted returns and forward-looking statements. “Forward-looking statements,” can be identified by the use of forward-looking

terminology such as “may”, “should”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “project”, “estimate”, “intend”, “continue” or “believe” or the negatives thereof, or variations

thereon, or other comparable terminology. Investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such returns and statements, as actual returns and results could

differ materially due to various risks and uncertainties. In considering any transactional history or prior performance information contained herein, investors

should bear in mind that transactional history or prior performance is not necessarily indicative of future results, and there can be no assurance that the Fund will

achieve comparable results. Such descriptions are provided for illustrative purposes only and there can be no assurance that Autonomy Capital will be able to

implement its investment strategies in a similar manner or pursue similar transactions or be able to avoid losses.

Any categorizations, estimates, quantifications, sensitivities and other information contained in this report are substantially based on estimated information,

which may be inaccurate or incomplete. As a result of these estimates, the information in this report is subject to material change. Further, any such

categorizations, estimates, quantifications, sensitivities and other information presented in this report are unaudited and do not reflect adjustments that might

result when closing the books for the period that includes the date of this report. The information in this document has been furnished by Autonomy Capital, is

subject to adjustments and has not been independently reviewed or audited by outside certified public accountants. All investments involve risk including the

loss of principal.

Statements in this report are made as of the date of hereof, unless stated otherwise herein, and the information contained herein may not be correct as of any time

subsequent to such date. Certain information contained herein has been obtained from published sources prepared by other parties and has not been

independently verified by Autonomy Capital, and Autonomy Capital makes no representation that such information is accurate or complete. Opinions expressed

herein are subject to change without notice and any investment views expressed herein represent Autonomy Capital’s views as of the date of preparation of this

presentation only and not as of any future date. None of Autonomy Capital, the Fund, and any personnel, principals, or agents of any of the foregoing shall be

liable for any errors (to the fullest extent permitted by law in the absence of wilful misconduct) in the production or contents of this presentation. As used in the

report, all reference to “dollars” or “$” refer in all cases to U.S. dollars. This report may be discontinued at any time.

Historical results, exposure, allocations, and trading are not indicative of future results, exposures, allocations, and trading, or for the full fiscal year. In addition,

no limitation on the current or future use of the net assets of the Fund or any other investment or investment vehicle is created or implied by the information in

this report.

The categorizations, estimates, quantifications, sensitivities and other information provided in this report may not reflect the criteria employed by Autonomy

Capital to evaluate exposure, risks, or trading strategies. No representation is made that the categorizations, estimates, quantifications, sensitivities and any other

information in this report are complete or adequate, or that they would be useful in successfully limiting exposure or risk, identifying and/or evaluating profitable

or risky trading strategies, or constructing a profitable or limited-risk portfolio. The presentation of the exposures or risks identified in this report is not intended

to be complete. There may be other exposures or risks, of which Autonomy Capital may or may not be aware, that would affect the performance or risks of the

Fund. In addition, trading strategies may involve, among other techniques, leverage, short selling and various derivatives, each of which entails separate and

distinct risks.

Returns and valuations of unrealized investments are inherently uncertain and should not be relied upon as a basis for transfer or related investment decisions.

All investments involve risk including the loss of principal.

There is no guarantee that the portfolio of the Fund will continue to contain any or all of the investments identified herein, that any such investments will actually

be available for purchase at such prices or be sold at such prices. Any reference to specific investments is not intended to be and must not be relied upon as

recommendations to purchase or sell such investments.


December 2012


Autonomy Capital (Jersey) Limited, in its capacity as general partner to Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission

for the conduct of Fund Services Business. Registered in Jersey, number 89144. Registered Office: Conway House, 2nd Floor, 7-9 Conway Street, St. Helier, Jersey

JE2 3NT. Autonomy Capital Research LLP is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. Registered in England, number OC303616. Registered

Office: 8-11 Denbigh Mews, London SW1V 2HQ, UK.

autonomy global macro fund investor letter 201212

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