avoiding intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement
DESCRIPTION
AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENTJEREMY J. SIEMINSKIA Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCEDEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA JUNE 2011DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIAAVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst CollegTRANSCRIPT
AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA JUNE 2011
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
Submitted by:
JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI
Certificate of Approval: ________________________________
David J. Grabelski Assistant Professor Department of Intelligence Studies ________________________________
Timothy Lauger Assistant Professor Department of Criminal Justice ________________________________
Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs
June 2011
iii
Copyright © 2011 by Jeremy J. Sieminski All rights reserved.
iv
DEDICATION
This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my fiancée, Brandi, who has always supported and believed
in me.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank David Grabelski, my thesis advisor and primary reader, for his
assistance in the development of this study.
I would like to thank Dr. Tim Lauger, my secondary reader, for his continued analytical guidance
and encouragement throughout the course of this work.
I owe thanks to Lieutenant John Denk, Dallas Police Department - North Texas HIDTA RISC
Co-Program Manager, for the idea that inspired the direction of this thesis.
Lastly, I would like to thank Lance Sumpter, North Texas HIDTA Director, for his vital
assistance in the data collection phase of this study.
vi
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Avoiding Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement
A Critical Examination
By
Jeremy Sieminski
Master of Science in Applied Intelligence
Mercyhurst College, 2011
Assistant Professor David J. Grabelski, Chair
The purpose of this study was to determine the level to which intelligence irrelevance has
translated from military and national security settings to law enforcement. Furthermore,
determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permitted the development of prescriptive
framework to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished through contextually-
focused survey analysis of HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker populations directly addressing
intelligence-policy relations, intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of
intelligence irrelevance. The results of this study demonstrate that general or estimative
intelligence is modestly irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers primarily due to low levels
of intelligence marketing, low quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, a high
level of cognitive bias, and likely high organizational inertia (strong indicators of high inertia).
Additionally, study results suggest one of two conclusions regarding the relevance of strategic
intelligence in law enforcement policymaking: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement
intelligence irrelevance is unknown because of disparity between this study’s concept of strategic
intelligence and the law enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the
vii
former in law enforcement, or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement
policymakers because of a demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not
strategic (by the definition accepted for this study). The latter conclusion appears more
reasonable than the former.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………… viii
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………….. xi
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………..... xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………......... xiv
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………. 1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………….. 6
Key Terms…………………………..…………………………………... 7
Intelligence Irrelevance…………………………………………………. 10
Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System… 13
Intelligence as a Causal Locus…………………………………………. 20
Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus….…………………………….. 25
Policymakers as a Causal Locus………………………………………... 31
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY……………………………………………… 38
Survey Sample...………………………………………………………... 42
Demographics...………………………………………………………… 43
Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials ……………… 44
Measures……...…………………………………………………….…... 44
Data Analysis...…………………………………..……………………... 50
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS……………………………………………………..… 53
Intelligence Irrelevance………………………………………………... 53
ix
Cognitive Bias…..………………………………………………………. 56
Cognitive Dissonance….……………………………………………….. 58
Security………………………………………………............................. 60
Filtering………………………………………………............................. 62
Organizational Inertia………………………………………………....... 64
Marketing………………………………………………......................... 66
Volition………………………………………………............................. 68
Communication………………………………………………................. 69
Time……………………………………………….................................. 71
Confidence………………………………………………........................ 74
Summary………………………………………………........................... 76
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………... 83
Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement…………………………... 83
Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement……………….. 85
Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence
Irrelevance……………………………………………………………….
87
Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence
Irrelevance……………………………………………………………….
89
Limitations and Future Research……………………………………….. 91
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………...... 95
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………...... 103
Appendix A……………………………………………………………... 103
Appendix B………………………………………………....................... 106
x
Appendix C……………………………………………………………...
Appendix D……………………………………………………………...
115
124
Appendix E……..………………………………………………………. 127
Appendix F………….….……………………………………………….. 129
Appendix G..…………………………………………............................. 130
Appendix H..…………………………………………............................. 134
Appendix I…………..………………………………………………....... 135
Appendix J...……………………………………………......................... 143
Appendix K..…………………………………………............................. 147
Appendix L…..………………………………………………................. 157
Appendix M……………………………………….................................. 159
Appendix N...……………………………………………........................ 173
Appendix O……………………………………………........................... 177
xi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1 Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations 25
Table 2.2 Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source 35
Table 3.1 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix:
Negative Correlations
51
Table 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix:
Positive Correlations
52
Table 4.1 Cognitive Bias Results 58
Table 4.2 Cognitive Dissonance Results 59
Table 4.3 Security Results 62
Table 4.4 Filtering Results 64
Table 4.5 Organizational Inertia Results 66
Table 4.6 Marketing Results 68
Table 4.7 Volition Results 69
Table 4.8 Communication Results 71
Table 4.9 Time Results 74
Table 4.10 Confidence Results 76
Table 4. 11 Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:
Negative Correlations
79
Table 4.12 Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:
Positive Correlations
80
xii
Table 4.13 SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:
Negative Correlations
81
Table 4.14 SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations:
Positive Correlations
82
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 2.1 Bifurcated Intelligence-Policy Relations 10
Figure 2.2 Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces 16
Figure 3.1 HIDTA Program Counties 2010 40
Figure 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process 42
xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACH – Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
A-SR/I – Analyst reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
COMINT – Communications Intelligence
DCI – Director of Central Intelligence
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
FinCEN – Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
HIDTA – High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
HUMINT – Human Intelligence
IA – Intelligence Analyst
LEI – Law Enforcement Intelligence
MCIIS – Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies
NDIC – National Drug Intelligence Center
ONDCP – Office of National Drug Control Policy
PM – Policymaker
P-SR/I – Policymaker reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant
SI – Strategic Intelligence
US – United States
1
INTRODUCTION
The post-9/11 environment and global war on terror have provided a fresh focus for
foreign policy as well as justification for considerable expansion of intelligence programs. A
recent outgrowth of traditional military and national security intelligence efforts has been the
introduction of intelligence-led policing. While crime prevention and deterrence is a relatively
new application for the ancient craft of intelligence, the effective implementation of this effort is
likely to confront many of the same obstacles as those confronted by traditional applications.
This thesis aims to assist law enforcement intelligence and policy professionals avoid one such
obstacle, intelligence irrelevance.
Intelligence is a craft essentially as old as man. Historians and scholars recognize, “the
desire for advance information is no doubt rooted in the instinct for survival” (Dulles, 1985, p.9).
Intelligence sources have transformed over millennia from prophets, seers, oracles, soothsayers
and astrologers of Greek mythology to the postal workers and families of the Roman, Persian,
Byzantine and Mongol Empires to the secret police of the 18th and 19th centuries to modern spies
and professional agents (Dulles, 1985, p.9-28). Thus, the craft of intelligence transformed from a
superstitious and supernatural institution to one that is human and secular. Sun Tzu is credited as
creating the first organized intelligence service in the fifth century BC. He prescribed the use of
five categories of spies to obtain foreknowledge, rather than through the elicitation of spirits,
inductively or analogously through experience, or deductively through calculation (Tzu,
Connors, & Giles, 2009). Although his analysis continues to be widely embraced, modern
intelligence and policy often operate inductively and deductively as well.
Yet just as the employment of intelligence is a timeless phenomenon, so is incident of its
disregard. At its best, intelligence provides policymakers with the greatest amount of relevant
2
reality that can be achieved by filling gaps in knowledge and expertise crucial to tactical and
strategic success. At its worst, intelligence is ignored and becomes irrelevant to policy
considerations. Troy ignored Cassandra’s warning regarding their fall and the Trojan Horse
(Dulles, 1985). Xerxes ignored his advisor’s intelligence estimate stating King Leonidas and his
three-hundred men were preparing for war prior to the Battle at Thermopylae, ultimately losing
large numbers from his force (Dulles, 1985). Stalin ignored as many as eighty-seven separate and
credible warning of a German invasion prior to Operation Barbarossa (Steury, 2005). And, more
recently, President Nixon largely ignored the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the point
where he stopped reading his daily intelligence summary and rarely met with the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) (Rovner, 2011). Intelligence irrelevance is an issue arising with the
first efforts towards foreknowledge and which pervades numerous areas in which intelligence
operates. This thesis aims to determine if it pervades one of the latest applications of intelligence,
law enforcement intelligence.
Law enforcement intelligence (LEI) is recently constructed intelligence architecture. An
outgrowth of military and national security intelligence, LEI applies traditional communications
intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) methodologies to the law
enforcement context to exploit telephone records and confidential informants or sources
(Peterson, 2005). Advocacy for intelligence-led policing processes originated from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States (US) Department of Justice
(Peterson, 2005). LEI functions began to be instituted in the 1970’s with little success. Many
were shut down voluntarily, by court order, or from political pressure due to the lack of
governance over their practices (Peterson, 2005). LEI failed to gain real traction until after
September 11, 2001. September 11th, considered a focusing event, reinforced the need to enhance
3
intelligence operations. This reinforced LEI initiatives such as the National Drug Intelligence
Center (NDIC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. Thus, currently, instituting efficacious LEI initiatives
is a top priority (U.S. Department of, 2003).
Yet effectively integrating intelligence into the investigative and enforcement culture
continues to be a struggle. Law enforcement professionals continue to misuse the words
intelligence, analysis, tactical, operational, and strategic and confuse intelligence missions and
values (Peterson, 2005). A recent study conducted on the HIDTA program found that they
erroneously considered some of their reports as strategic intelligence documents when, in fact,
they performed little to no strategic intelligence analysis, suggesting intelligence irrelevance is
already occurring to some level (“Assessment of HIDTA,” 2009). Also, as there is no common
definition of intelligence in military and national security spheres, there is no common definition
for intelligence-led policing within the law enforcement community (McGarrell, Freihlich, and
Chermak, 2007). Federal law enforcement agencies define LEI differently than State, Local, and
Tribal law enforcement agencies because of difference is sources and missions (Carter, 2004).
Nor is there agreement on its practical implications for police agencies’ mission, structure or
processes (McGarrell, Freihlich, and Chermak, 2007). Regardless of definition, however,
intelligence must be embraced across the entirety of an organization to be effective, rather than
viewed as the responsibility of an intelligence unit. But before a law enforcement agency can
become intelligence-led, it must first understand what intelligence is, how it functions at
different levels, and how it is advantageous to law enforcement efforts. Thus far this appears to
be more natural for tactical and operational intelligence than for strategic intelligence.
4
Irrelevance to policy considerations is a significant fear of intelligence analysts and yet
also a pathology of intelligence-policy relations that is not well understood. Among causes of
failed intelligence-policy relations, politicization has drawn the most attention (Rovner, 2011).
Politicization involves the corruption of objective intelligence processes and products through
manipulation by policymakers, politically biased analysts, or both. Politicization of intelligence
occurs, however, because that intelligence is considered important by policymakers (Rovner,
2011). Intelligence irrelevance, ignoring that which is intended to objectively improve the
soundness of policy logic, can be just as or more damaging for intelligence stakeholders who
have a vested interest in the success of their policies. Thus, in order to prevent intelligence
irrelevance in the law enforcement intelligence setting one must understand the nature of the
developing law enforcement intelligence-policy relationship and relate this dynamic to likely
causes of intelligence irrelevance outlined in previous scholarship. In employing this strategy,
this thesis will seek to illuminate and outline a preemptive plan intended to avoid strategic
intelligence irrelevance in the law enforcement context. Survey analysis of High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area (HIDTA) employees, both on the analysis side and the policymaking side, will
be conducted through a set of questionnaires that will gauge the intelligence-policy relationship
and the relevance of intelligence at HIDTA at the strategic level. The questions in each
questionnaire will gauge the major variables discussed in the literature review. These include:
intelligence irrelevance, level of volition (act of willing), inertia (preference or not to modifying
strategy), level of confidence in intelligence (strategic), current level of or potential for cognitive
dissonance and bias, level of security, level of filtering, level of intelligence marketing, quality
and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, and available time to devote to strategic
intelligence. After exploring the relationship and strategic intelligence dynamics, a plan can be
5
developed that mitigates or, more favorably, prevents the potential causes of intelligence
irrelevance for HIDTA’s.
Unfortunately, there are a couple limitations to this study. This study focuses on the
relationships between intelligence, strategic analysts, and intelligence consumers rather than the
bureaucratic environments in which intelligence operates. Although study analysis will be
inclusive of organizational forces such as inertia, security and filtering, we assume that the most
significant causes of irrelevance as well as the greatest potential for their displacement arise from
intelligence-policy relations rather than bureaucratic idiosyncrasies. Further research is needed to
validate this assumption. Additionally, study representativeness and generalizability were
directly dependent upon survey participation and the level of response that was elicited. The
study sampling plan aimed to gain maximum participation as all relevant members of the study
organization could have been potentially sampled. These limitations, though, need not undermine
the development of a preemptive framework to mitigate or avoid intelligence irrelevance.
The nature and order of this study will be as such: First, the researcher will review the
current body of relevant scholarly literature including those works addressing the nonuse of
intelligence, largely supported by works addressing the issue of strategic surprise, to identify the
key causes of intelligence irrelevance. Next, the researcher will explain the research
methodology and subsequent results. Finally, the researcher will objectively interpret the study
results and deduce their implications for avoiding future incidents of intelligence irrelevance in
law enforcement.
6
LITERATURE REVIEW
As mentioned above, this study aims to facilitate the preemption of strategic intelligence
irrelevance in law enforcement by investigating the current and developing relationship between
law enforcement intelligence analysts and their decision-making counterparts. To achieve this
objective, however, it is necessary to review the concepts and debates relevant to the phenomena
of intelligence irrelevance. While resolving the debate by illuminating some sort of perfect
functioning intelligence-policy machine is outside the scope of this study, augmenting the debate
by introducing a new application for scholarly findings related to intelligence-policy relations
and intelligence irrelevance is not. Intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement setting
are currently developing parallel to the progression of intelligence-led policing efforts. It is here
we find a new and particularly useful application for scholarly findings from a particularly
mature debate.
This chapter will begin by defining and discussing key terms to be employed throughout
the study including: information, intelligence, strategic intelligence, strategic intelligence
irrelevance and intelligence-policy relations. Next, the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance
will be discussed generally as well as in the context in the loosely coupled system in which it
occurs. This section will largely be supported by contributions from the debate between two key
schools of thought, the orthodox and revisionist schools. Next, this chapter will discuss the likely
causal sources of intelligence irrelevance: intelligence work itself, imperfect analysis, and
imperfect policymaking. The result of all this investigation and debate leaves the reader without
denouement, but rather with this study’s hypotheses.
7
Key Terms
This study employs key terms that are conceptually complex in nature. The context of
their application, however, typically dictates the specific meaning intended to be expressed. With
this understanding, definitions for these key terms are delineated here in the context and for the
purposes of this study, namely, understanding the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance through
intelligence-policy relations.
The concept of information is both elusive and central to debate in numerous fields of
study. It is elusive precisely because it is broad enough to apply to so many fields of study.1 The
standard, and intuitive, definition of information described as “data that has been processed into
a form that is meaningful to the recipient” and “data….that is processed and refined” will be
used for this study (Davis & Olson, 1985, p.200; Silver & Silver, 1989, p.6). Opting for this
definition not only avoids unnecessary obstacles but also allows the study to focus on the
research questions outlined below.
Just as the practice of processing and refining is central to the creation of information, so
is it central to the creation of intelligence. While the ingredients in the recipe for information are
data and meaning, the ingredients in the intelligence recipe are information and meaning, created
through analysis. Lowenthal (2006) describes intelligence trichotomically as a process, product
and organization. He asserts intelligence can be thought of as “the means by which certain types
of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated”, “the product
of these processes”, and “as the units that carry out its various functions” (2006, p.9).While
highly accurate, Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence is missing a central aspect, reducing
uncertainty. Clark notes this (reducing uncertainty) as the central aspect in his definition of
1 See Floridi (2005) for various definitions of information, some that include elements that only complicate its understanding in the context of intelligence.
8
intelligence and explains intelligence reduces uncertainty by collecting and exploiting
information that the opponent prefers to (2007). The Mercyhurst College Institute for
Intelligence Studies (MCIIS) introduces two additional aspects to the concept of intelligence: a
process that is focused externally and that considers information derived from all sources (Chido
& Seward, 2006). This study will employ a concept of intelligence that incorporates all these
attributes. For this study intelligence will be described as the process of acquiring, processing,
analyzing and disseminating externally focused information that reduces uncertainty for decision
makers, as the final product of that process, and as the organizations that engage in that process.
This definition integrates all aspects of intelligence that have been acknowledged by scholars and
intelligence professionals.
Moving forward, strategic intelligence then exemplifies a certain classification of
intelligence. Clark describes strategic intelligence similarly for both government and business
sectors as dealing with long-range issues such as strategy and policy for senior leadership with
greater complexity due to the longer predictive time frame (2007). Strategic intelligence has
elsewhere been described as “the aggregation of all other types of intelligentsia to provide value-
added information and knowledge toward making organizational strategic decisions” (Liebowitz,
2006, p.22). Both Clark and Liebowitz describe the central tenet of strategic intelligence as
intelligence produced to support strategy. Although strategy is often associated with long-term
measures, its intelligence support need not furnish long-term prediction. Intelligence may be both
current and have significant strategic implications; however, most or all current intelligence is
not strategic. The Pentagon defines strategic intelligence as “intelligence required for the
formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels” (“Joint publication 1-
02:,” 2001, p.456). To effectively support strategy, strategic intelligence must be actionable and
9
multi-disciplinary (Heidenrich, 2007). This sort of support allows for maximum comprehensive
advantage. Strategic intelligence thus provides a framework for lower decision levels, is time and
resource intensive, far reaching in nature, infrequently produced, and often includes too many
variables for the strategist to understand and anticipate alone (Fleisher & Bensoussan, 2007;
Heidenrich, 2007). Cumulatively, then, strategic intelligence is both the intelligence process
creating strategic intelligence and ultimate product of that process that provides multi-
disciplinary, actionable and forward-looking support for an organizational or national strategy.
This is the definition that will be employed for this study.
The concept that is most important to clarify as well as central to this study is that of
strategic intelligence irrelevance. Strategic intelligence irrelevance will be understood as the
tragic phenomena of intelligence that does not perceivably satisfy the requirements necessary for
efficacy, the prerequisites of which are timely, actionable, multi-disciplinary, and value-added
properties. Reflecting the tendency for policymakers to ignore intelligence, Walter Laqueur
(1993) states:
[A]fter much research and discussion with the leading consumers of intelligence, I
have concluded that, far from being an invisible government, far from wielding
great influence in the councils of state, intelligence has frequently been
disregarded or ignored by decision makers. No one claims that intelligence has
been of major importance in the conduct of affairs of state. (p.3)
Handel, a well-respected intelligence scholar, parallels Laqueur’s sentiments in stating, “Let this,
then, be the first axiom; fighting commanders, technical experts, and politicians are liable to
ignore, despise, or undernote intelligence” (1987, p.24). These scholarly perspectives support
Rovner’s argument that policymakers ignore intelligence for psychological and political reasons
and that the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of ana
work is disregarded (2011). Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevanc
occurs when strategic intelligence is requested, produced and disseminated to relevant policy
parties, but is not incorporated into policy discussions
Intelligence-policy relations will provide the context
within which this study will examine the phenomena of
intelligence irrelevance. For the purposes of this study,
intelligence-policy relations are understood as bifurcated
where the intelligence node may signify eith
products or intelligence analysts
graphic display of this relationship)
previous scholastic contribution to intelligence
irrelevance will highlight how each node, policy, intelligence analysts
potentially possess the ability to cause intelligence irrelevance
Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers
If it fails to complete this basic, but interminable, mission then it fails altogether
great deal of collection, processing and analysis effort wasted, but the failure also amounts to
fiscal waste in terms of billions of dollars
throughout history, especially so in supporting military operations
the military operations support arena, however, serve consumers that are more jaundiced to
intelligence products. This includes
the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of ana
Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevanc
occurs when strategic intelligence is requested, produced and disseminated to relevant policy
parties, but is not incorporated into policy discussions or policy formation.
relations will provide the context
within which this study will examine the phenomena of
For the purposes of this study,
policy relations are understood as bifurcated,
where the intelligence node may signify either intelligence
(See Figure 2.1 for a
graphic display of this relationship). The discussion of
previous scholastic contribution to intelligence
irrelevance will highlight how each node, policy, intelligence analysts, and intelligence products,
potentially possess the ability to cause intelligence irrelevance, particularly at their nexus.
Intelligence Irrelevance
Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers
If it fails to complete this basic, but interminable, mission then it fails altogether.
great deal of collection, processing and analysis effort wasted, but the failure also amounts to
fiscal waste in terms of billions of dollars. Intelligence has clearly demonstrated value
especially so in supporting military operations. Intelligence efforts outside
the military operations support arena, however, serve consumers that are more jaundiced to
des intelligence efforts to: support American diplomacy, support
Figure 2.1: Bifurcated IntelligencePolicy Relations
10
the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of analysts whose
Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevance
occurs when strategic intelligence is requested, produced and disseminated to relevant policy
ntelligence products,
particularly at their nexus.
Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers.
. Not only is a
great deal of collection, processing and analysis effort wasted, but the failure also amounts to
ce has clearly demonstrated value
Intelligence efforts outside
the military operations support arena, however, serve consumers that are more jaundiced to
intelligence efforts to: support American diplomacy, support
Bifurcated Intelligence-
11
monitoring of treaties and other agreements, support defense planning, economic intelligence,
counter activities abroad that threaten U.S. interests, support criminal justice and regulatory
agencies, environmental intelligence, and to support world health problems (“Preparing for the,”
1996). Maintaining relevance in support of these intelligence missions requires a great deal of
careful thought and constant effort (Davis, 2002).
Much of the difficulty in maintaining intelligence relevance relates to the quality of
intelligence products. Conscious of this issue, numerous scholars have promoting standards by
which to make intelligence useful to policy. Kovacs describes the ingredients of usability for
intelligence as, “timeliness, suitable level of detail and aggregation, mode of presentation and in
particular the perceived reliability and accuracy of the information” (1997, p.147). Lowenthal
puts forth a somewhat parallel recipe for acceptable, useful intelligence: timely, tailored,
digestible and clear regarding what is known and unknown (2006). Both of these recipes
highlight the significance of policymaker preferences and likely perceptions. Analysts, therefore,
must become just as knowledgeable about their policymaking consumers as they are of their
intelligence subject matter. Yet, intelligence that meets these standards is not guaranteed to be
used in the policymaking process, not guaranteed to be relevant. To maintain its usefulness and
acceptance into policymaking, then, intelligence must strive toward greater standards.
Policymakers are quick to point out additional shortcomings of intelligence products.
Politicians and senior executives, acclimated to and informed of political environments and
discussions, naturally notice when intelligence products fail to introduce anything new and
valuable to the policy table. Intelligence may simply regurgitate what is already known by
policymakers through their own arsenal of resources. This was the case for intelligence prior to
the Iranian revolution (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004). Intelligence became irrelevant in this case
12
because it “did not truly question basic assumptions upon which U.S. policy rested, at least until,
many agreed, it was too late” (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004, p.12). In essence, then, intelligence
must become a vehicle for detailed consideration of policy options (Best, 2007; Davis, 1996).
This type of intelligence has been referred to as opportunity analysis, value-added analysis, and
targeted tactical analysis (Davis, 1995). One policymaker suggests analysts “give them
something they will really miss if they do not get it” (Davis, 1995, p.11). This concept of value-
adding intelligence has been clearly described in scholarly debate and has gained traction in
recent years. Yet, even value-adding intelligence efforts can fall between the policymaking
cracks if policymakers are not aware of them.
To maintain relevance, then, intelligence analysts are required to also increase the quality
of intelligence processes. More specifically, policymakers and scholars suggest intelligence
professionals significantly increase their efforts to market their products. One policymaker goes
as far as to suggest analysts should spend a third of their time assuring they impact the
policymaking process or enough time establishing and maintaining an effective intelligence-
policy relationship that they begin to feel guilty about not having enough time for their other
duties (Davis, 1995). Another suggests a rule of thumb he dubs the “Riedel Rule”, after Bruce
Riedel, a CIA analyst, whom felt he was not doing his job of marketing his analyses unless he
got at least two parking tickets a month outside policymakers’ offices (Haass, 2007). Haass
insists that intelligence analysts:
Understand that to devote 99 percent of their effort to conducting and writing a
study and only 1 percent to marketing it is both foolish and a disservice to
policymakers. To produce results, they have to market their work relentlessly. If
13
analysts have something to say, they should not only say it, but press to say it
directly to the policymakers most involved in the issue. (p.13)
Time, however, is a limited commodity. A significant increase in effort on the part of
intelligence analysts to market their products detracts from their ability to increase the quality of
those products. Thus analysts are faced with a tradeoff between increasing the quality of
intelligence products and increasing the quality of intelligence processes, a tradeoff that appears
to essentially ensure intelligence irrelevance to some level.
Aside from highlighting the difficulty of avoiding intelligence irrelevance these
discussions highlight the significance of the relationship between intelligence analysts and their
policymaking consumers to the phenomena. To avoid intelligence irrelevance analysts must meet
or exceed the expectations their jaundiced customers have for their products. Additionally,
analysts must force policymakers to digest intelligence appraisals: seemingly against their will.
Quality intelligence products and processes thus require a synergy between the two parties. We
are beginning to see intelligence-policy synergy does not occur naturally.
Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System
Since the first employment of intelligence-type faculties, their relations with their
customers have been riddled with gaps and tensions. It seems intelligence consumers have
always been skeptical of its utility, opting to use it selectively. Sun Tzu noted in the fifth century
BC that although intelligence officers are often of critical importance to an army’s ability to
move and achieve success, they are also potential threats to those same ends and thus must be
managed with a certain intuitive sagacity (Tzu, Connors, & Giles, 2009). This practice involved
controlling the flow of information to intelligence, rewarding intelligence efforts liberally as a
means of preventing treason, and harsh punishment for any intelligence behavior that
14
undermined or threatened policy or strategy. For better or worse, intelligence had become a crux
between success and defeat. This double-edged sword conceptualization of intelligence has been
maintained through today as intelligence consumers continue to engage intelligence producers
skeptically, and interestingly also use their products as both tools and weapons. That skepticism
is reciprocated by analysts who guard their analytical integrity against potential political
pollution.
The relationship between modern intelligence and policy is noteworthy precisely because
of its significant influence on and consequence for both policy and strategy. Policymakers note
that “successful policy depends upon bridging the intellectual gap between imperatives of the
present and the potential of the future. In turn, this often depends on bridging the gap between
policymakers and the Intelligence Community” (Haass, 2002, p.1). In other words, if intelligence
is a crux between strategic success and defeat then deductively it is politically advantageous to
maintain close relations with intelligence professionals, or at least when success or defeat
depends on it. As intelligence analysts learned, policy can exist and function without support
from the intelligence community (if only temporarily), but the opposite is not true (Lowenthal,
2006). This policymaker stance forces the weight of the relationship nearly exclusively on the
analyst’s shoulders. After all, this crucial relationship for both policymakers and analysts does
not fall naturally in place, but requires careful thought to set right and constant efforts to keep
effective (Davis, 2002). The discovery that intelligence is not always a strategic necessity or
threat allowed policymakers to take the driver’s seat, however, both policymakers and
intelligence analysts are active participants in the relationship. Thus both parties are responsible
for and highly influence not only the success or demise of policy and strategy but the efficacy of
the relationship.
15
Yet a central challenge for analysts to maintain effective ties has been a historical,
conscious, artificial separation between intelligence and policy parties. This separation has been
motivated by analysts’ efforts to balance the seemingly intrinsic and endured trade-off between
analytical integrity and policy relevance - separation despite advice from both analysts and
policymakers to not merely produce literature, but strategic and politically relevant results
(Haass, 2002; Davis, 2002; Davis, 1995; Kent, 1949; Goldman, 2006). To produce results,
analysts are required to close the gap between themselves and their policymaking counterparts,
which is an uncomfortable proposition for many. Historically analysts have avoided the politics
of policymaking by consciously positioning themselves in positions of limited utility to policy as
prescribed by the “red line”, or a demarcation between intelligence and policy prohibiting
intelligence officers from advocating policy options (Steiner, 2003). This school of thought,
attributed to Sherman Kent, warns of the danger of intimate intelligence-policy relations as
having the strong potential to fall prey to aggressive policymakers who may wish to slant or
distort intelligence work in their political favor. Policymakers and scholars can and have applied
the same logic, however, to suggest analysts are wishfully biased in perceiving the
appropriateness, reliability, relevance and accuracy of their own work and project these biases to
intelligence consumers (Davis, 1995; Levite, 1987; Betts, 2004; Kam, 2004). As Crocker notes,
“American leaders, it should be acknowledged, are by no means the only ones susceptible to
linear thinking about world affairs. Nor are they alone in imagining that their own norms and
benchmarks have universal validity” (Crocker). In this sense, analysts pollute their own analyses
by distancing themselves from the politics of policymaking. In fact, analysts who distanced
themselves from the policymaking process learned to their sorrow that their policymaking
counterparts judged their intelligence products as less or not useful for policymaking (Davis,
2002). Thus analysts continue to be challenged to find the appropr
hazards as neither objectivity without relevance nor relevance without objectivity satisfies the
mission of intelligence (Davis, 2002; Goldman, 2006).
Thus the operating environment for intelligence
that is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence
close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2
Figure 2.2) In this sense not only do gaps and tensions within intelligence
to dysfunction, but the lack of gaps and tension
also lead to dysfunction. The excessive
harmony pathology embodies instances of
complacent tunnel vision shared by both
intelligence and policy in which both sides fail
to challenge basic assumptions —
tension creates ineffective relations (Rovner, 20
rationalizations for policymaker decisions in which policymakers employ intelligence to support,
rather than shape, pre-fabricated policy and political strategy (Rovner, 20
occur in numerous ways including: direct
assumptions, intelligence subverts policy, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism,
partisan intelligence and intelligence as a scapegoat
is politicized because it is considered
perceivably important intelligence
intelligence-policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has beco
analyst’s duty to achieve such a calibration.
Thus analysts continue to be challenged to find the appropriate balance between both
hazards as neither objectivity without relevance nor relevance without objectivity satisfies the
mission of intelligence (Davis, 2002; Goldman, 2006).
environment for intelligence is one of opposing threats
is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence
close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2
) In this sense not only do gaps and tensions within intelligence-policy relations lead
to dysfunction, but the lack of gaps and tension
The excessive
harmony pathology embodies instances of
complacent tunnel vision shared by both
intelligence and policy in which both sides fail
— the lack of
tension creates ineffective relations (Rovner, 2011). Politicization involves post hoc
rationalizations for policymaker decisions in which policymakers employ intelligence to support,
fabricated policy and political strategy (Rovner, 2011). Politicization can
occur in numerous ways including: direct manipulation, indirect manipulation, embedded
assumptions, intelligence subverts policy, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism,
partisan intelligence and intelligence as a scapegoat. As Rovner points out, though, “intelligence
d because it is considered important” (2011). Analysts thus struggle to produce
perceivably important intelligence that avoids threats of political pollution. Effective
policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has beco
achieve such a calibration.
Too close:
Politicization
Excessive Harmony
To great a distance:
Irrelevance
Figure 2.2: Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces
16
iate balance between both
hazards as neither objectivity without relevance nor relevance without objectivity satisfies the
is one of opposing threats. Intelligence
is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence that is too
close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2011). (See
policy relations lead
n involves post hoc
rationalizations for policymaker decisions in which policymakers employ intelligence to support,
Politicization can
manipulation, indirect manipulation, embedded
assumptions, intelligence subverts policy, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism,
As Rovner points out, though, “intelligence
Analysts thus struggle to produce
Effective
policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has become the
To great a distance:
Irrelevance
Intelligence Environment
17
Despite recent assertions that the red line has either faded or disappeared, metaphorically
lifting all or some of the weight off the analysts’ shoulders, this separation continues to be
concept-driven. During a 2004 Roundtable, intelligence and policy discussants expressed
frustration with regard to artificially imposing a red line and agreed communication failures
between parties was a more significant threat than violations of the red line concept
(“Intelligence and policy:,” 2004). In fact, these sentiments parallel Kent’s argument that too
great a distance was the more harmful hazard to the analyst and national security (Kent, 1949).
Others have recently found the line, at minimum, to be blurred (Steiner, 2003). This is
motivating considering, as Paul Wolfowitz has pointed out, “both the policy and intelligence
sides suffer, as does the national interest, whenever principals or practices are allowed to
interfere with close professional cooperation” (Davis, 1996, p.35). Red line, gray line or no line,
however, the true foundation for integrity is not an intelligence-policy separation, but “a high
level of professionalism, combined with high standards of intellectual integrity generated by
education, and nurtured by the ambient culture of the organization” (Kovacs, 1997, p.406). The
fact that irrelevance still plagues intelligence-policy relations illustrates that such concepts do not
saturate intelligence and policy cultures.
Organizational cultures, in fact, significantly contribute to gaps and tensions in
intelligence-policy relations. Tensions plague intelligence-policy relations originating from
differences in their organizational, or “tribal”, mindsets (Lowenthal, 1992). One example arises
from their professional attitudes toward odds. Analysts naturally focus their efforts on
phenomena judged to be likely, highly likely or all but certain, and hopefully also high-impact
low-probability phenomena, while policymakers focus their efforts on what is optimistically
18
possible, a much lower standard (Davis, 2003). This disparity would seem to facilitate, if not
promote, analysts to ignore numerous hot-button issues for policymakers.
Additionally, what issues analysts address that are on policymakers’ substantive schedule
are not likely to be communicated effectively. While analysts are inclined towards words and
complexities, their decision making clientele tend to prefer short, short-term, simplified, value-
adding reports inclusive of raw data (Westerfield, 1995; Rovner, 2011). These preferences
effectively devalue intelligence’s core competency. In fact, many, if not most, policymakers
view themselves as top-level analysts with a wider point of view than intelligence producers.
They view themselves as more than capable of developing not only their own conclusions, but
superior ones at that (Betts, 1978; Best, 2007). With this view, then, what policymakers desire
from intelligence is customized, current support providing explanation rather than prediction,
evidence rather than opinion, and reduction of uncertainty rather than ambivalent, although
reflective, interpretation (Davis, 1996, p.1; Davis, 1995). Former Director of Central
Intelligence Robert Gates suggests analysts:
[Provide] a frank, evenhanded discussion on the issues. If [analysts] know that a
policymaker holds a certain viewpoint on an issue that is different from [their]
analysis, [they] ought not lightly dismiss that view but rather address its strengths
and weaknesses and then provide the evidence and reasoning behind [their] own
judgment. (Goldman, 2006, p.174)
These preferences remain even if the message to be delivered is negative (Davis, 1995).
Analysts are forced to continue to risk being ignored, however, in recognition of the alternative
risks associated with oversimplifying reality and desensitizing policymakers to the ambiguities
and forecast motility — the greater the ambiguity the greater the impact of preconceptions and
19
wishfulness (Jervis, 1970, p.132). Latent cognitive, behavioral and communicative tensions
between decisive, aggressive and confident policymakers and reflective, introspective and
cautious analysts seemingly naturally inhibit efficacious relations by frustrating professionally
and personally disparate parties.
Mutual ignorance about the each party’s role and capabilities, induced by artificial
separation and communicative failures, also undercut effective relations. Gates (1989) has noted
that:
[I]ntelligence collection and assessment are black arts for most presidents and
their key advisors, neither adequately understood nor adequately exploited. For
intelligence officers, presidents and senior level views of the intelligence they
receive and how they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar. (p.36)
This gap depreciates intelligence as it provokes mutual mistrust between the intelligence and
policy factions. Tensions are further frustrated when the void creates unrealistic expectations.
Intelligence practitioners expect their products to be consumed and appreciated regardless of
whether their endeavors were at the direction of policymakers. Conversely, policymakers expect
intelligence to serve their substantive policy needs in a timely and calibrated fashion regardless
of whether they posed appropriate questions to proper intelligence capabilities. Treverton speaks
to this gap when observing that “questions that go unasked by policy are not likely to be
answered by intelligence. If intelligence does provide the answers without being asked, those
answers are not likely to be heard by policy” (2001, p.192). Unfortunately, however,
intelligence staffs do little to replace unrealistic expectations of their policymaking consumers
whom serve a public so attentive to the performance of the Intelligence Community (Kovacs,
20
1997; “Intelligence and Policy:,” 2004). Policymakers, on the other hand, continue to fail to
effectively engage intelligence capabilities too often.
This intelligence operating environment, a loosely coupled intelligence-policy system,
significantly influences the utility of intelligence products, processes and organizations and sets
the tone for intelligence-policy success or failure. Intelligence and intelligence-policy relations
are only effective when calibrated correctly. Thus the relevance of intelligence depends on such
a calibration. Intelligence analysts must actively manage both the quality of their products and
the quality of their strained relationship with policymakers to avoid irrelevance. Mismanagement
of either will breed irrelevance.
Intelligence as a Causal Locus
Yet there are real and concrete limitations to what intelligence can provide. These will be
discussed below in terms of their severity within two categories: intelligence difficulties and
intrinsic limitations. Intelligence difficulties are problematic properties of intelligence that
exacerbate the process of serving policy. Intrinsic limitations, on the other hand, are realities of
human interaction that are inherently impossible for intelligence to unveil. The combination of
these two properties of intelligence work contributes to numerous instances of intelligence
irrelevance.
Most difficulties inherent in intelligence work relate to the operating environment that is
rampant with uncertainty, nonlinearity and complexity. These properties also translate into the
nature of intelligence information. Generally, intelligence collects ambiguous and inconsistent
data. Stein notes that information collected by intelligence is often open to several plausible and
conflicting interpretations (1982). These chaotic dynamics are not conducive to intelligence
forecasting or probabilistic reasoning as distinguishing a priori between signals and misleading
21
noise is exceedingly difficult (Wohlstetter, 1965). In fact, it has been argued that patterns arising
in such complex systems only show retrospective coherence — they can be identified ex-post,
but not predicted (Fruhling, 2007). It has been asserted that “paradoxical logic” also pervades
such systems, compounding the friction, by opposing ordinary, linear logic in favor of choices
that are aimed at deceiving an enemy (Luttwak, 2001). As Luttwak notes, “surprise in war…is…
not merely one advantage among many… but rather the suspension, if only brief, if only partial,
of an entire predicament of strategy (Luttwak, 2001, p.4). If true, such a configuration,
paralleling Clausewitz’s concept of general friction, would not lend itself to pattern- and trend-
based forecasting.
Yet logic for strategic reversals and historical discontinuities exists. As do political
opportunities to stabilize beneficial patterns and destabilize those that are antithetical to preferred
futures (Fruhling, 2007). This is precisely because strategy-context paradoxical propositions,
although intellectually appealing, suffocate under rigorous logical analysis — what appears a
paradox is truly irony (Echevarria II, 2010). It is “ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the
competent general must both protect his soldiery and endanger them by use, and that he cannot
do one without forgoing the other,’ similarly, it ‘is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the
individual soldier cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk” (Echevarria II, 2010, p.vii)
Thus, the logic of war is precisely linear and intelligence possesses the ability, and hopefully the
resources, to inform policy of strategically constructive opportunities to manipulate political
levers, despite extreme difficulty. Central to the identification of these opportunities is a crucial
distinction between uncertainty and risk where, “conditions of risk are those that prevail in
casinos or the stock market, where future outcomes are unknown, but probabilities can be
estimated. Conditions of uncertainty, by contrast, are those where there is no basis even for
22
estimating probabilities” (Fitzsimmons, 2006, p.5-6). Within the first environment intelligence
enjoys the freedom to act. While in the latter, it cannot do so usefully. Jervis asserts that
intelligence, given these conditions, ought only offer estimated probabilities of several plausible
scenarios to policymakers (1986, p.29). Such a halt in efforts, however, is not likely to be praised
by intelligence consumers who demand more than calculated risk (Lowenthal, 2008).
Intelligence analysts tread into dangerous waters, however, when advancing their analyses with
ironic logic to meet these policymaker demands in an effort to ensure their products are relevant
to political and strategic discussion.
Several tools and mechanisms are at intelligence analysts’ disposal, however, to assist
them both in differentiating between signals and noise and managing uncertainty and risk.
Richards Heuer is arguably at the forefront of this school of thought insisting that analysts
develop the capability to extract relevant data patterns through their training and experience
(1999). To assist in diagnosing an issue, managing a large amount of information, and
recognizing pattern analysts also naturally develop schemas, a collection of stored knowledge
associated with a concept (Honig, 2007). Yet developing schemas creates another difficulty,
consciously managing the interplay between top-down (schema driven) and bottom-up (data-
driven) information processing and analysis (Khong, 1992). Quality analysts, critical of their
analyses, will alter schemas in the face of new and strongly incongruent information to maintain
analytical relevance to political reality. Others may fall prey to uncertainty and ambiguity. Thus
the quality of the analyst is central to successful prediction in recognition that intelligence
involves subjective judgment and knowing how to utilize one’s experience (Honig, 2008).
Relating this to the medical field, Honig notes that “diagnosing a rare disease requires both the
appearance of unique symptoms as well as the availability of excellent doctors” (2008, p.4).
23
Ultimately, however, analysts’ tools for achieving methodological professionalism are wrought
with paradoxes and barriers to analytical accuracy — or, in other words, difficulties. Skills and
common sense gained through experience, rather than marginal reforms, remain pivotal to
successful intelligence appraisal, and therefore to the relevance of intelligence that is produced
(Betts, 1978).
Additionally, there are two less attractive but equally pervasive difficulties inherent in the
intelligence process — security and filtering. Security and intelligence, in fact, go hand in hand
so much that secrecy is viewed as one of the most notable characteristics of intelligence
(Shulsky, 2002; Warner, 2007). Security impedes useful intelligence in numerous way including:
limiting use due to the need to protect sources, limiting use by requiring the use of data links that
reduce timeliness and availability, security considerations limiting connectivity between
information systems, encouraging group-think and inertia by limiting availability to a select few,
providing shelter to mediocrity, hindering accountability, and finally, limiting the visibility of
capabilities to decision makers (Kovacs, 1997). Security is but one example, though, of a more
comprehensive difficulty facing analysts, filtering. Filtering is inherent in the intelligence
process and is a more subtle means of limiting availability and impeding intelligence relevance.
Filters color information that reaches the decision-maker and often affect its timeliness (Kovacs,
1997). Beyond security, additional filters include: the mere act of processing raw information
into intelligence, privatizing intelligence as a means of furthering an organizations own interest,
the narrowing of the policy and intelligence vision by focusing on perceived areas of strategic
interest (which creates blind-spots), the reluctance to accept or bear bad news, and the “cry-wolf”
syndrome (Kovacs, 1997). Unfortunately, stress and time pressures, often present in intelligence,
24
escalate the negative effects of these difficulties exponentially, significantly increasing chances
of intelligence irrelevance and strategic surprise.
If the scene is not daunting enough, intelligence also suffers from intrinsic limitations.
While intelligence difficulties arise from epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge),
intelligence’s intrinsic limitations arise from the combination of aleatory uncertainty, also known
as randomness, and uncertainty arising from the enemy (or human subject) (Fruhling, 2007).(See
Figure 3) In essence, the intelligence community is expected to function as society’s soothsayer,
or, to be able to foretell and predict future events regardless of the commonsensical impossibility
of this feat (Kovacs, 1997). As Lowenthal notes, “We ask intelligence analysts to describe the
actions of people who are geographically distant and culturally remote. Worse yet, they are
people. They react to emotions, to stress, to miscalculation and they sometimes make
profoundly bad decisions” (2008, p.313). These unrealistic expectations have been likened to
expecting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to stop bank robberies before they occur
(“Intelligence and policy,” 2004). In truth, the intelligence community is on par cognitively with
their policymaking consumers, the media, and the general public. Cognitive skills necessary for
successful careers are not innate to intelligence work, but are developed and employed better and
worse in all professional contexts. If we accept that not every patient will survive admission into
the emergency room then we must accept the fallibility of intelligence. To expect any more of
intelligence professionals would submit them to unnecessary abuse.
Ultimately, some obstacles of intelligence work are insurmountable and cause
intelligence irrelevance, the intrinsic limitations of intelligence work. As Lowenthal argues, “we
will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is
difficult” (2008, p.315). We must therefore focus our efforts on those causes of intelligence
25
irrelevance that are rectifiable, those attributed to intelligence analysts and policymakers and the
degree to which they effectively manage the quality of intelligence products and intelligence-
policy relations.
Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus
The fundamental function of the intelligence analyst, again, is to reduce uncertainty for
decision makers. They must actualize this function within an environment in which intrinsic
limitations prevent complete success and intelligence difficulties further antagonize efforts to
meet professional expectations. Intelligence analysts thus become causal loci for intelligence
irrelevance when they fail to overcome intelligence difficulties due to avoidable mistakes, most
often due to psychological or professional pathologies. These occurrences were likely
maintained by the fact that intelligence had traditionally been understood and described as more
an art than a science (Marrin, 2005). Progress in professionalizing intelligence, however, began
with efforts of Sherman Kent to create an analytic code, the CIA’s intelligence journal and the
CIA Center for Study of Intelligence (Marrin, 2005). More recently, a CIA study found that
although intelligence operations may be appropriately conceptualized as tradecraft, intelligence
Table 2.1: Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations
26
analysis is and should be part of a scientific process (Johnston, 2005). Increasing the quality and
efficacy of intelligence thus requires that it be reconstructed in the context of some scientific
method, alloyed with intelligence’s traditional arts (Kerbel, 2008). Intelligence analysts ought to
be conscious of this transition on two planes in particular: information-processing skills and
maintenance of professional norms. Both scholars and their customers surely are.
Information-processing Skills
Information-processing skills are needed to generate comprehensive assessments based
on voluminous, specific, reliable and factual information (Honig, 2007). Limitations in human
intuitive cognition, however, undercut analysts’ ability to process such large quantities of
information into concise, coherent and comprehensive intelligence products. While speed and
efficiency are strengths of intuitive human cognition, inherent limitations in human cognition
provoke bias in intelligence analysis (Brasfield, 2009). Cognitive mindsets have been identified
as a major cause of intelligence and policy failures for decades (Feder, 2002). Humans have a
limited mental capacity. The complexity of the world, however, requires us to adopt and employ
a simplified mental model of reality within which to work. We behave rationally within the
constructs of our model; however, the models we construct are not always adapted to the
requirements of the real world (Heuer, 1999; Simon, 1957). When disparate from reality,
analyst’s falls prey to cognitive dissonance. As mentioned above, quality analysts alter their
mindsets in the face in strongly incongruent evidence. Under these circumstances, however,
analysts are required to employ cognitive shortcuts to cope with the volume of information,
shortcuts that inevitably lead to mistakes in judgment (Wohlstetter, 1962).
These shortcuts also produce a number of cognitive biases that include, but are not
limited to, the following:
27
1. tendencies to allow perceptions to be influenced by expectations,
2. tendencies to maintain initial perceptions despite strongly incongruent information,
3. tendencies to allow available evidence, memory or imaginable scenarios to drive an
analyst’s estimate of probabilities,
4. tendencies to establish cognitive anchors and then adjust estimated probabilities from that
initial anchor point as new evidence is collected,
5. tendencies to achieve more confidence in a small body of consistent data than a large
body of inconsistent data,
6. tendencies to process less-than-perfectly-reliable evidence as if it were wholly reliable,
7. tendencies to ignore the absence of evidence in judgments,
8. tendencies to favor causality over randomness, accident or error explanations, and
9. tendencies to fall prey to deceptive tactics (Heuer, 1981).
Intelligence analysis ought to be a neutral process that does not slant the raw information.
Analysts who are not mindful of these cognitive pitfalls are likely to have their analyses ignored
as they filter information into intelligence.
The value of information processing skills really surfaces when the analyst needs to
decipher and differentiate vital incoming information from superfluous noise, which can be
exceedingly complicated (Wohlstetter, 1962). Analysts that have developed sufficient and
realistically accurate mindsets, however, can employ them to recognize patterns in voluminous
data without being distracted by contradictory noise (Heuer, 1999). Such mindsets are developed
through training and experience so that one should expect a positive relationship between the
seniority of intelligence professionals and pattern recognition skills. This, of course, assumes that
such accretionary mindsets adapt to transformations within an enemy or target. As Betts notes,
28
experience can cause greater error than ignorance when the enemy does not follow the patterns
of past behavior (2007). Analysts therefore must remain aware of scenarios and hypotheses that
have proven historically inconsistent with their schemas as changes within a target may cause
them to become more likely. These considerations increase the time needed to produce
intelligence and, therefore, potentially eliminate the usefulness of the product.
To analysts’ and policy’s detriment, however, biases pervade additional elements of
intelligence work as well. Not only do analysts have the daunting task of assessing the reliability
and relevance of information that has been collected, but they also must assess the reliability of
human sources behind information. HUMINT sources are masked from intelligence analysts as a
means of preserving the extremely fragile relationship between case officer and agent
(Lowenthal, 2006). While reports supplied to analysts may include information on the access of
the source or the past reliability of the source, the ultimate lack of details regarding the human
source of the information is likely to bias the interpretation of the information (Lowenthal,
2006). For example, information consistent with previous perceptions or expectations will tend
to be valued more than information that discredits previous perceptions or expectations. These
security measures ultimately deny the analyst the opportunity to compare and contrast reliability
between human and other sources of intelligence information. This causes them to intuitively
apply some analytical rubric based on skill and common sense to their collection of evidence
(Honig, 2008). The cautious and critical analyst cannot assume perfect reliability; however,
analysts must ensure the same attributes prevent them from miscalculating the value of
HUMINT.
The final critical element of the analysts’ information-process skill is temporal. In order
for intelligence to do any good it needs to be in the right hands at the right time. Intelligence
29
analysis, production and dissemination, therefore, ought to conclude at a point when the product
is still relevant to policy considerations — remember, timeliness is a prerequisite to usable
intelligence. Rapidly shifting and changing situations, such as war, decrease this window of
opportunity. Ultimately, analysts must ensure the appropriate consumers of intelligence have
access and availability to their products before their perishable date.
Thus, again, the quality of the analyst becomes central to the ability of intelligence to
process information. Quality analysts, mindful and self-critical of potential perceptual
distortions, employ evidence in judgment based on its balanced and fair diagnostic value in a
timely manner. Newly developed scientific methods for intelligence analysis, such as Analysis of
Competing Hypotheses (ACH), are assisting this effort (Brasfield, 2009). Additionally, quality
analysts have developed cognitive tools (schemas) through their training and experience that are
representative of the real world, flexible enough to adapt to evolution within targets, and that
allow analysts to accurately detect significant patterns within volumes of information. These
skills thus become central to producing intelligence that is useful and relevant to policy.
Maintaining Professional Norms
In addition to the methodological quality, analytical integrity becomes central to the
maintenance of intelligence relevance. To maintain analytical integrity, intelligence analysts
need to insulate themselves from society’s prejudices and resist tendencies toward common
perceptions and toward parochialism. Doing so improves estimation in that it avoids
unnecessary, additional distortion.
Analysts can avoid these negative cultural and organizational influences through
independence of mind, nonconformity, and curiosity. Although, as Nesbitt and Ross point out,
there is a natural tendency to form images upon first impressions and on the basis of relatively
30
little information, analysts cognizant of such pressures can significantly reduce their effects
(1980, p.172). They can also make parallel efforts to combat pressures to conform to
organizational cultures by adopting common assumptions and to unnecessarily restrict
intelligence to protect their unit. Analysts ought not to submit to pressures to conform or rivalry
encouraged by specialization of intelligence units. As Bar-Joseph suggests, curiosity within
responsible, professional analysts will lead them to look for the bigger picture in order to fully
understand a research subject (2001). Analysts should strive for the courage to challenge
organizational and societal pressures in the name of truth. Efforts to do so are efforts that avoid
the pitfall of cognitive dissonance.
The ultimate assessment of quality information processing and maintenance of analytical
integrity should come from the intelligence consumer. The intelligence must justifiably motivate
a perception of accuracy and relevance in the policymaker that instills a level of confidence
sufficient to base political action. Communicating the intelligence appraisal appropriately,
including its underlying facts and assumptions, is critical to inspiring such confidence. A product
that withstands an intelligence-policy dialogue is much more likely to be employed. Ultimately,
to create confidence the intelligence ought to ease policymaker fears of ambiguity and deception,
thus reducing uncertainty.
While analysts have long strived for political objectiveness in their assessments,
analytical objectivity has only recently spawned great attention. Maintaining analytical
objectivity through quality information processing and maintenance of analytical integrity
requires as much careful attention and constant effort as required to maintain effective
intelligence-policy relations. The product of such efforts is the elimination of intelligence
31
analysts as a causal locus of intelligence irrelevance. Anything less than careful attention and
constant effort begs intelligence consumers to ignore intelligence products.
Policymakers as a Causal Locus
Intelligence consumers, however, have the ultimate say in the employment or rejection of
intelligence. As Amos Kovacs noted, it is in the mental steps of the decision-making process
where “the die is cast – to use or not to use” (1997, p.394). This decision may arise for various
reasons, some proper, some improper and rectifiable. The latter causes will be discussed here.
Policymakers may not employ intelligence due to inertia. Often, there is a distinct flow
within political organizations, militaries and governments. As Kovacs points out, “As a rule,
people and organizations prefer not to act rather than to act. And they prefer to act according to
previously decided plans rather than modify them” (1997, p.398). Intelligence can embody all
the prerequisites of usability and easily build confidence in decision-makers (if read) and still be
ignored. Andrew S. Grove (1999) notes that:
Senior managers got to where they are by having been good at what they do. And
over time they have learned to lead with their strengths. So it’s not surprising that
they will keep implementing the same strategic and tactical moves that work for
them during the course of their careers – especially [at critical moments]. I call
this phenomenon the inertia of success. It is extremely dangerous and can
reinforce denial. (p.127)
Kirkpatrick (1969) notes parallels in the military sphere. He asserts that military decision-
makers ignore intelligence for many reasons, including because “they simply do not care what
the enemy is doing or can do. They have decided on an objective and are determined to
accomplish it, regardless of what others might do” (1969, p.15). This phenomenon is
32
synonymous with incidents in which intelligence analysts cognitively block newly acquired
information in maintenance of initial perceptions. Both phenomena are the effects of perceptual
biases and both are potentially highly consequential. Deductively, therefore, a will to act, is a
prerequisite for intelligence use. Also deductively, though, the act of willing is also a prerequisite
for intelligence use. Policymakers must have already decided that action is necessary and that
inaction is unacceptable. Only then does intelligence have a decision to support — of which
action to take.
More personally, inertia within a policymaker’s mind may cause intelligence irrelevance.
Intelligence may be ignored simply because it is not congruent with a policymaker’s
preconceptions, dogmas or ideologies (Kovacs, 1999, p.400). Perceptions and appraisals of
reality that are incongruent with their ideology are naturally denied as “objective analysis [takes]
a second seat to personal and emotional reactions” (Grove, 1999, p.124). We have come to know
this phenomenon as cognitive or strategic dissonance. A clear example is Stalin’s ignorance of a
yearlong military buildup in Eastern Europe and eighty-seven separate, credible intelligence
warnings prior to Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June
1941. The fundamental reason those warnings were ignored was because of Stalin
preconceptions (Steury, 2006). Grove asserts that dissonance is an automatic reaction to strategic
inflection (1999). If so, policymakers fail both intelligence and national, or organizational,
security at the most pivotal moments - perceivably counterfactual strategic shifts. Indeed, as Bar-
Joseph and Kruglanski (2003) point out, regarding the lead up to the Yom Kippur war, key
figures with strong needs for cognitive closure:
(1) placed an unusually high premium on clarity and coherence of their
assessments (2) exhibited a high self-assured manner and an autocratic style of
33
decision-making, and (3) tended to suppress, ignore, and reinterpret information
inconsistent with their preconception until the very last hours before the outbreak
of the war… [which accounted] for…the general adherence… to the tragically
mistaken notion that war with Egypt and with Syria was unlikely. (p.92)
Thus analysts who develop the courage to speak truthfully to powerful decision-makers do so at
their own peril. As Johnson notes, “speaking truth to power is notoriously difficult, because
power often refuses to listen” (2003, p.12). These phenomena are synonymous with incidents in
which intelligence analysts allow the aggregation of evidence, memories and reasonable
scenarios correlated with their long-held, but mal-adjusted, mindsets drive their estimate of
probabilities, despite Betts’ warning. As discussed before, many decision-makers see themselves
as their best intelligence analysts; however, they must recognize that they too are susceptible to
the same cognitive and perceptual biases.
Cognitive dissonance, though, is but one form of a larger issue, filtering. There are
several forms of filtering sourced to the intelligence consumer. Intelligence that challenges
inertia, mentioned above, is often filtered precisely because it bears bad news. Policymakers
dislike hearing bad news as much or more than intelligence analysts dislike sharing it (Davis,
1995). Kovacs notes that narrowing one’s field of vision and concentrating on those events
perceived to be the most crucial is yet another self-imposed filter (1997). Yet the imperatives of
daily decision-making, which limit the time available to read and digest intelligence, requires a
consolidation of effort (Betts, 1978). Rationed vision, however, creates blind spots in policy,
and, therefore, in intelligence, which compounds uncertainty. Lastly, some scholars assert that
policymakers filter out intelligence analyses that are antithetical to their policy preferences.
These scholars assert policymakers purposely select intelligence analyses that provide support
34
for their preferences (Rovner, 2011; Lowenthal, 2008; Betts, 1978). In these cases,
policymaker’s do not use intelligence as a tool to serve policy, but as a weapon to defend their
standpoint and attack their political counterpart. Regardless, each form of filtering prematurely
limits policy options and responses on the table.
Of course, though, filters exist because of some inherent utility. They function similarly
to mindsets and relate to temporal concerns and constraints. Policymakers often assert that they
simply do not have sufficient time to read the volumes of intelligence reports that flood their
desks (Davis, 1995; Davis, 1996; Haass, 2007). As one policymaker bluntly stated:
I could not afford to read intelligence papers because this or that intelligence
agency was entitled to produce them. It did not matter to me how much work the
Agency had put into its products, or how polished they were in scholarly terms. In
fact, I could not afford the time to read intelligence papers written by personal
friends and colleagues. I could only read intelligence products tailored to help me
get through my substantive schedule. There was no other rational choice. (Davis,
1995, p.5)
Another recommended that analytical products not extend beyond two pages as he only had five
minutes each day to dedicate to intelligence (Johnson, 2002, p.193-194).For policymakers,
anything other than concise, tailored intelligence instinctively fails their needs. Intelligence
should suit policymakers’ preferred format, however, it would be tragic if the US needlessly
suffered a surprise attack because a policymaker simply could not make time to read a three-page
report. Arrogance and inflexibility can be just as dangerous and cognitive biases.
35
Moving Forward by Managing Intelligence Difficulties
The above literature demonstrates that effective intelligence-policy relations and, by
default, the relevance of intelligence are dependent upon an unnatural synergy between disparate
parties. Although the nature of intelligence work ensures and reinforces the natural tensions
inherent in intelligence-policy relations, often both analysts and policymakers needlessly
aggravate those tensions by failing to overcome cognitive intelligence difficulties. (See Table
2.2) Such failures are highly consequential not only for national or organizational security, but
also consequential for future intelligence-policy interaction. Thus the quality of intelligence
analysts and policymakers highly influences the development of such a synergy. Additionally,
calibrating relations early is likely to increase odds of efficacy for the long term, assuming
continued careful thought and constant effort.
Table 2.2: Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source
36
Although there are significant structural and functional disparities between the
intelligence and policy tribes, relations between the two do not need to be tense and intelligence
does not ever need to be irrelevant. The key to accomplishing these goals has already been
recognized by the scholarship, careful thought and constant effort. Within law enforcement, such
thought and effort may already be in place. Thus, we must understand the current state of the
relationship to be able to recommend any methods for improvement. Towards this aim, this study
will investigate the status of current intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement context.
The data collected will be used to deduce appropriate actions to improve relations and reduce
intelligence irrelevance. Given these goals, this exploratory and explanatory study investigates
the following research questions:
1. Are law enforcement intelligence-policy relations frustrated by tribal disparities?
2. Do law enforcement policymakers ignore law enforcement strategic intelligence?
3. How can law enforcement intelligence-policy relations be improved to reduce incidence
of intelligence irrelevance?
Assumption of frustrated relations and a higher-than-negligible incidence of intelligence
irrelevance, along with the concepts and assertions highlighted in this chapter, lead to the
following hypotheses:
1. The prevalence of cognitive biases or dissonance in analysts or policymakers, as well as
the level of security, filtering and inertia in the organization are all positively correlated
to intelligence irrelevance (as they increase, intelligence irrelevance increases).
2. The level of intelligence marketing by analysts, level of policymaker volition, level of
communication between analysts and policymakers, the amount of time available to
devote to strategic intelligence and the level of confidence in strategic intelligence by
37
analysts and policymakers are all negatively correlated to intelligence irrelevance (as they
increase, intelligence irrelevance decreases).
3. Incidence of intelligence irrelevance can be reduced and intelligence-policy relations
improved most effectively in the law enforcement context by focusing efforts on
measurably reducing the variables positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance and
measurably increasing those variables negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.
I anticipate support not only for the above hypotheses, but also for the data to support the
appropriateness of the independent variables summarized by the literature.
38
METHODOLOGY
In order to address the research questions and test the stated hypotheses, I conducted
survey research that examines intelligence-policy relations at HIDTA programs both from the
perspective of HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts as well as from HIDTA policymakers. This
survey research will determine if, in fact, intelligence and policy are disconnected in law
enforcement and if that disconnection causes frustration for either party. Data was also collected
to determine the relevance of strategic intelligence within HIDTA. The survey research will also
determine the level of synergy that currently exists between HIDTA intelligence analysts and
their policymakers. This will be accomplished by evaluating the quantitative and qualitative
survey data that directly reflect the level of intelligence marketing present, the level of analyst
and policymaker submission to intelligence difficulties including cognitive biases, cognitive
dissonance, security, filtering, time constraints, and the level of organizational inertia present in
HIDTA programs. We can then deduce from the details of the present synergy, or lack thereof,
appropriate measures that can reduce incidents of strategic intelligence irrelevance in law
enforcement. The following methodology section will provide the details of this research.
Survey Setting
As stated above, the survey research conducted for this study was completed at HIDTA
programs, programs key to counter-narcotic efforts. These programs are ideal for measuring law
enforcement intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance as the national HIDTA
program provides thirty-two individually managed HIDTA offices that assist federal, state, local
and tribal law enforcement partners. Each HIDTA is responsible for producing its own strategy
and its policymakers and analysts are employed by and representative of federal, state, local and
tribal law enforcement levels. No other single population source is likely to be as generalizable
39
as the HIDTA population. The generalizability of the study to the larger law enforcement
community is also supported by the fact that the study’s approach is not dependent upon the
HIDTA mission or strategy. Rather, sampling the HIDTA program provides thirty-two potential
case studies to verify whether intelligence irrelevance has translated over from the national
security sector. The verification, then, highlights the high likelihood that law enforcement
agencies and organizations other than the HIDTA program are afflicted by unnatural
intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance.
The HIDTA program functions to consolidate drug enforcement personnel and resources to
more effectively combat drug trafficking in areas of the country considered to be major drug
distribution channels. The first offices were opened in 1990, when the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) established five HIDTA’s in New York City, Los Angeles, South
Florida, Houston, and the Southwest Border. Today, thirty-two HIDTAs with representation
from fifteen percent of US counties, covering fifty-eight percent of the US population, as well as
all major federal, state, local and tribal drug enforcement organizations continue this mission in
thirty-two targeted areas. (See Figure 3 for a map of HIDTA counties nation-wide) They fulfill
this mission through 670 current initiatives throughout the country including:
• Enforcement initiatives comprising multi-agency investigative, interdiction, and
prosecution activities;
• Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives;
• Support for programs that provide assistance beyond the core enforcement and
intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; and
40
• Drug use prevention and drug treatment initiatives (“High intensity drug,” 2010)
The HIDTA intelligence initiatives specifically assist participating agencies develop a
coordinated HIDTA strategy, identify new target and trends, develop threat assessments and drug
market analyses, de-conflict targets and events, and manage cases.
As described above, one of the four core missions of the national program is to enhance
“law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies” (“High intensity drug,” 2010). Towards this end, HIDTAs develop intelligence-driven
initiatives to combat local drug threats (“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). Common initiatives
include those directed towards identified drug trafficking corridors or areas, drug trafficking
conveyances, drug finance methodologies, and drug-related crime (generally violent) threats.
Figure 3.1: HIDTA Program Counties 2010
41
Tactical HIDTA intelligence analysts support multi-agency criminal investigators and task force
officers within these initiatives with intelligence that directly supports areas of uncertainty within
their investigations, particular attention given to investigative direction and focus (“HIDTA
program policy,” 2009). Strategic HIDTA intelligence analysts work drug threats that are not
investigation-specific, including intelligence “related to the structure and movement of organized
criminal elements, pattern of criminal activity, activity of criminal elements, projection of
criminal trends, or projective planning” (“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). Within many
HIDTAs there is a large degree of cross-over between the roles of tactical and strategic analysts.
It is not clear from the program policy, however, if the intelligence functions within the HIDTA
program address the basic assumptions of counter-narcotic and HIDTA strategies, a role
traditionally and commonly associated with strategic intelligence analysis. Rather, HIDTA
program policy suggests intelligence analysts do not produce intelligence or strategic intelligence
(“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). According to program policy, the drug threat assessment is
the strategic intelligence product of each HIDTA; HIDTAs develop their strategy annually based
on their annual drug threat assessment. Developing a strategy that “can respond quickly” to the
current drug threat, though, is not an intelligence function. Intelligence functions to permit
policymakers to preempt what will be, not to respond to what is. Thus, HIDTA threat
assessments are overwhelmingly retrospective and operationally-focused.
Nonetheless, HIDTA initiatives reside at the nexus of HIDTA strategic intelligence and
HIDTA policymaking. (See Figure 4 for the intelligence-policy process) Each HIDTA possesses
an executive board comprised of representatives from all federal, state, and local law
enforcement participants. Initiatives are created and proposed for ONDCP approval through each
HIDTA’s executive board, their policymaking component. The Director of the ONDCP also
receives advice directly from the participating f
the executive decision to fund a new HIDTA initiative
specific or HIDTA-wide initiative
of strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking, is the setting for thi
be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both
intelligence analysts and HIDTA executive board members.
The sampling procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling
research questions further dictate a sampling focus on HIDTA
their policymakers. Thus sampling will be restricted to professionals with those
HIDTA programs. Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;
however, participation will be limited to those HIDTA analysts
production of strategic intelligence
Policymaking functions are execute
generally include representation from
•HIDTA Strategic
Intelligence
Identify strategic
threats and
intelligence gaps
•HIDTA Executive
Board
Propose
initatives for
funding to
address threats
and gaps
Figure 3.2
irectly from the participating federal law enforcement agencies before making
ecutive decision to fund a new HIDTA initiative (strategic element), whether a HIDTA
wide initiative. Activity between the first two links in this process, the nexus
of strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking, is the setting for this study. The survey will
be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both
intelligence analysts and HIDTA executive board members.
Survey Sample
procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling
research questions further dictate a sampling focus on HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and
Thus sampling will be restricted to professionals with those roles
Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;
however, participation will be limited to those HIDTA analysts that are involved in the
production of strategic intelligence. HIDTA policymakers, by contrast, hold numerous titles
Policymaking functions are executed within HIDTA executive boards. HIDTA executive boards
generally include representation from all federal, state, local and tribal participants of that
HIDTA Executive
Board
Propose
initatives for
funding to
address threats
and gaps
•Federal Law
Enforcement
Agency
Representatives
Advise on which
initiatives to
fund
•Director of the
Office of
National Drug
Control Policy
Grants funding
for HIDTA
initiatives
3.2: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process
42
ederal law enforcement agencies before making
whether a HIDTA-
Activity between the first two links in this process, the nexus
The survey will
be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both HIDTA strategic
procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling. The
intelligence analysts and
roles within
Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles;
are involved in the
, hold numerous titles.
d within HIDTA executive boards. HIDTA executive boards
all federal, state, local and tribal participants of that
New HIDTA
Initiative
43
HIDTA. Members of HIDTA executive boards, therefore, will be invited to participate in the
policymaking sample. All members of both survey samples can potentially be sampled.
Demographics
The data collection phase of this study yielded 72 total responses, 40 policymaker
responses and 32 strategic intelligence analyst responses. Of the 72 respondents who started the
survey, 46 completed it, yielding a 63.9% completion rate. The 40 policymaker responses are
estimated to represent 6.25% of the HIDTA policymaker population. The 32 strategic
intelligence analyst responses are significantly more representative of the HIDTA strategic
intelligence analyst population at an estimated 50%. Although the rate of questionnaire
participation is not a variable of this study, it nonetheless is the first indicator of intelligence-
policy relations at HIDTA.
The initial questions posed by the study questionnaires aimed to confirm respondents’
role at their HIDTA as well as collect demographic data reflecting the respondent’s HIDTA and
level of law enforcement representation. Aggregate study data represents 21 of the 32 HIDTAs
— 5 HIDTAs fall under the Southwest Border HIDTA but are individually managed (See
Appendix D for Study Demographics Figures). Of the twenty-one HIDTAs represented, ten
include representation in both the policymaker and strategic intelligence analyst population. As
expected, both the policymaker and analyst study participants represent several levels of law
enforcement including federal, state, and local law enforcement. Such inclusion, coupled with
the response rates, permit study findings to be suggestive of intelligence-policy relations at
HIDTA as well as in law enforcement in general, but not generalizable.
44
Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials
Given the large geographic disparity between HIDTA locations, this study relied on
electronic surveys. A set of questionnaires were developed and distributed online utilizing the
services of web-based survey site surveymonkey.com. The HIDTA email domain served as the
primary distribution channel for data collection. Thus respondents were able to participate from
natural, non-manipulative settings of their choice — within the limits of locations in which they
had access to the Internet.
Two distinct surveys were developed and distributed separately to their corresponding
sample. The two distinct samples represent the two nodes in the relationship: strategic
intelligence analysts and intelligence customers/policymakers. The data collection process took
place over the period of four weeks. Reminder invitations for the survey were distributed to
increase respondent participation. Survey protocol was as follows:
• Day 1 – Invitation to online survey instrument sent by e-mail, data collection began
• Day 14 – Thank you/Reminder letter sent by e-mail
• Day 27 – Additional thank you/reminder letter sent by e-mail
• Day 28 – Data collection concluded
Measures
To determine if intelligence irrelevance is or is likely to become an obstacle for HIDTA
strategic intelligence the questionnaire sought responses to questions relating to the existence of
a relational disconnect and any resulting frustration, the relevance of intelligence to their
organization, and specific measures of the causes of intelligence irrelevance asserted by the
scholarship in the literature review. These variables were operationalized as follows:
45
Intelligence Irrelevance
To discern whether or not law enforcement intelligence-policy relations were plagued by
tribal tensions and gaps the questionnaires asked respondents whether or not they believed they
are connected to their intelligence-policy counterpart. If not, respondents were asked to report
whether that disconnect causes them frustration. Follow-up questions aimed to measure whether
or not law enforcement policymakers ignored strategic intelligence. Questions asked respondents
to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production with the frequency of policymaker
discussion of strategic intelligence products. Respondents were also asked directly to assess the
relevance of strategic intelligence to HIDTA success and how to improve the utilization of
strategic intelligence. The last question highlights the level to which participants are aware of the
causes of reported intelligence-policy disconnection. Any recommendations outside of the ten
independent variables included in this study provide opportunities for further research. These
questions aimed to determine the level of intelligence-policy disconnection, the level of strategic
intelligence irrelevance, and to validate the latter measure by asking indirect questions about
strategic intelligence production and consumption.
Cognitive Bias
Cognitive bias has been asserted to be a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as bias reduces
the policymaking value of intelligence products. Biased policymaking can undermine
intelligence just the same. Respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the
steps they take to remain objective in their strategic intelligence production or policymaking,
respectively, as a measure of their susceptibility to cognitive bias in their given tasks. Thirteen
potential steps were offered as well as an opportunity to list any other steps taken by the
46
respondent. This question aimed to measure HIDTA susceptibility to bias and to determine the
correlation between cognitive bias and intelligence irrelevance.
Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as it leads
policymakers to deny appraisals of reality (strategic intelligence assessments) that are
inconsistent with their ideology or schema in favor of preserving that ideology or schema. Both
study populations were asked to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production that is
inconsistent or conflicts with policymaker beliefs or attitudes, the frequency of policymaker
rejection or disbelief of those assessments, and the frequency of policymaker rationalization of
those assessments. These questions aimed to measure the presence of cognitive dissonance in
HIDTA policymakers and determine how they alleviate the resulting tension. Additionally, these
questions aimed to determine the correlation between cognitive dissonance and irrelevance.
Security. Security is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as security
considerations limit the availability and accessibility of strategic intelligence to potential users,
thus undermining the intelligence-policy process. Security measures can also limit the
availability and accessibility of critical sources necessary for the production of valuable strategic
intelligence. This undermines the intelligence process directly and the intelligence-policy process
indirectly. To determine the level to which security impacts intelligence-policy relations and is
correlated with intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA, analysts were asked to report the availability
of critical sources of strategic intelligence/information as well as the frequency that security
policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence sources, impede the production of
useful intelligence, and delay the production of useful intelligence. Policymakers were asked to
report the availability of strategic intelligence products as well as the frequency that security
47
policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence, impede their use of strategic
intelligence, and delay their use of strategic intelligence.
Filtering
Filtering is asserted as a cause for intelligence irrelevance, as filters color the information
that reaches a policymaker and often adversely impact its timeliness. In effort to determine the
level to which filters impact intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence
irrelevance, respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the number of
personnel/parties that must approve strategic intelligence products before they reach the
policymakers, report the frequency that these approvals/revisions delay the production of useful
strategic intelligence, and report how these measures affect the utility of the product.
Organizational Inertia
Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when
policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions
rather than alter them. The logic follows, policymakers simply may not care about what is going
on, but have decided on an objective and/or strategy and intend to achieve or implement it. To
determine the level to which organizational inertia impacts intelligence-policy relations and is
correlated with intelligence irrelevance the questionnaire asked respondents to describe their
strategy, to report the length of time their strategy has largely remained the same, the level of
success of their strategy, and to judge whether or not strategic intelligence can improve their
strategy.
Marketing
Insufficient marketing of intelligence is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as
policymakers are consumed by their substantive schedules and cannot innately know which
48
information and assessments are most deserving of their limited time. Policymakers often devote
their time to the people, issues, and information that most press for it. To measure the level to
which HIDTA marketing impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence
irrelevance respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the amount of
time spent marketing strategic intelligence products to policymakers.
Volition
Volition is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as policymakers must be
willing and have decided to act for intelligence to be relevant to its organization. If policymakers
have not decided to act then they are not likely to value intelligence assessments. To measure the
level to which volition impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with irrelevance
respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to judge the likelihood that their
Executive Board would be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans.
Respondents should have been asked whether or not they have decided policy or strategy change
(action) is necessary, however, the researcher misinterpreted the concept of volition.
Communication
Insufficient frequency or low quality communication between intelligence analysts and
policymakers is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance as low professional cooperation
intensifies natural gaps and tensions within intelligence-policy relations. To measure the level to
which communication impacts intelligence-policy and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance,
respondents were asked to report the frequency in which intelligence produced is easily
digestible (a measure of quality), the frequency in which intelligence produced includes
assessments of source reliability and analytical confidence, their general satisfaction with the
timeliness, format, content, communication, and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence, the
49
frequency in which policymakers and strategic intelligence analysts directly communicate, and
whether or not analysts normally attend their Executive Board meetings.
Time
Producing valuable strategic intelligence requires a significant investment of time, both in
terms of production and marketing. Employing strategic intelligence also generally requires a
significant temporal investment. Strategic intelligence is apt to become irrelevant if either side,
intelligence or policymakers, devote insufficient amounts of time to these efforts. To measure the
level to which temporal attributes impact HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and correlate with
intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the frequency in which they
produce/utilize strategic intelligence, the percentage of their time they devote to strategic
intelligence, to qualify their temporal investment, and to report their overall satisfaction with the
timeliness of strategic intelligence.
Confidence
For policymakers to base political action on intelligence, intelligence products must
overcome ambiguity, avert deception, and motivate a perception of accuracy and relevance in
policymakers that is sufficient to justify action. To this end, confidence must be achieved by both
analysts and policymakers in intelligence products as well as intelligence processes. To measure
the level to which confidence impacts HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with
intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the relevance of strategic intelligence to
their HIDTA, their level of belief that their strategy can be improved through strategic
intelligence, to general confidence in their strategic intelligence processes and products, and
whether or not analytical confidence was normally included in strategic products.
50
Data Analysis
As mentioned previously, the study collected quantitative and qualitative data to address
the research questions. Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted on collected quantitative
data. Quantitative and qualitative data representative of the dependent and ten independent
variables were analyzed for statistical significance in terms of central tendency and variance for
both aggregate data as well as data representative of intelligence irrelevance. Surveymonkey.com
automatically extracted quantitative data from the questionnaires for construction of that data
into a Microsoft Excel sheet for manipulation and analysis. Furthermore, a set of matrices were
constructed by the researcher to assist in data analysis. The matrices categorized responses
offered by each question into one of three options: low, moderate, or high (See Tables 3& 4).
Response options were assigned to matrix categories logically according to the researcher. The
subjective nature of the development of these tools need not undermine the study findings since
the statistical correlation between aggregate results and those representative of intelligence
irrelevance are the primary sources for this study’s findings and conclusions. The matrices only
serve to assist in data analysis and to graphically display summarized data results. Analyzing the
results in this manner permits the production of a prescriptive methodology for HIDTA’s to
mitigate, or more favorably, eliminate strategic intelligence irrelevance. All survey questions
were also analyzed thematically in context of the three research questions and hypotheses.
51
Marketing Volition Communication Time Confidence
← L
owe
r
Hig
her →
- % of time devoted is ≥ 20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s normally attend Executive Board meetings
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IA’s and PM’s -IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PM’s judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products
-% of time devoted is 10-20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)
- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Every 6 months or yearly -- IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart
- Analyst – 30-50% of time devoted - PM – 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI
- % of time devoted is <10%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy
- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s &PM’s: Less than Yearly - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PM’s reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IA’s normally do not attend Executive Board meetings
- Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst – 0-30% of time devoted - PM – 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products
Table 3.1: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations IA – Intelligence Analyst, PM – Policymaker, SI – Strategic Intelligence
52
Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia ←
Low
er
H
ighe
r →
-Average of 0-4 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IA’s - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PM’s - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years - Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources occasionally available to IA’s - SI occasionally available to PM’s - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- No incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IA’s - SI generally or readily available to PM’s - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough
- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
Table 3.2: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations IA – Intelligence Analyst, PM – Policymaker, SI – Strategic Intelligence
53
RESULTS
The study questionnaire posed a total of 36 questions. Demographic inquiries aside, each
question will be discussed as it relates to the 11 total variables measured in this thesis: 1
dependent variable (intelligence irrelevance) and 10 independent variables (causes of intelligence
irrelevance).
Intelligence Irrelevance
Study results suggest that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are moderately
plagued by tribal disparities and that law enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic
intelligence. The number of respondents reporting to believe they are disconnected from their
intelligence-policy counterpart was lower than expected, but still notable. Eleven of thirty
analysts, or 36.7%, report disconnection while seven of thirty-two policymakers, or 21.9%,
report the same in their intelligence-policy relations. Interestingly, ten of the twenty-one
HIDTAs represented, or 47.6%, report a disconnection by an analyst, policymaker or both. Out
of the ten HIDTA’s represented by the data on both the analyst and policymaker side only the
North Texas HIDTA had a respondent from both populations report disconnection. This result
demonstrates the level of inconsistency in intelligence-policy relations and thus emphasizes the
level of relational disconnection in HIDTA. Most respondents are not even aware that their
counterpart believes they are disconnected.
While these results confirm that natural gaps and tensions plague intelligence-policy
relations, the level of frustration caused by intelligence-policy disconnection was also less than
anticipated, but still notable. One of six policymakers, or 16.7%, and three of ten analysts, or
30%, reporting disconnection also reported frustration caused by that disconnection (See
Appendix E for Intelligence-Policy Disconnection Figures). Although the reasons for this result
54
are unclear, the greater level of frustration among analysts appears to support the assertion that
policymakers can succeed without intelligence analysts, but the opposite is not true. This result
suggests that even though analysts and policymakers are active participants in the relationship,
the weight of ensuring effective intelligence-policy relations rests nearly exclusively on the
HIDTA analysts’ shoulders. This can easily lead to ineffective relations as HIDTA analysts are
not in a position to compel their policymakers to pay attention to their estimates.
Study responses reflecting the frequencies of strategic intelligence production and
executive discussion of those products confirm this relational weakness. Over four-fifths of
analysts, or 82.2%, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly,
however, less than half report that it these products are discussed by executives as frequently.
Most are not sure how frequently their products are discussed by policymakers. Less than half of
policymakers, however, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or
quarterly. Most report it is produce yearly, however, discussed at board meetings quarterly.
Nearly one-fourth of policymakers, however, or 23.3%, do not know how often strategic
intelligence is produced at their HIDTA. The substantial level of relational opacity and
inconsistency demonstrated by these results not only confirms HIDTA intelligence-policy
disconnection, but suggests it was under-reported.
Ironically, when asked directly, an encouraging number of analysts and policymakers
report that strategic intelligence is relevant to their success. Specifically, 82.1% of HIDTA
analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report that strategic intelligence is relevant (See
Appendix F for Intelligence Irrelevance Figures). This result confirms that HIDTA analysts see
their work as more relevant to HIDTA success than their policymakers. Again, the disconnection
in these results supports the assertion that policymakers can succeed without intelligence
55
analysts. A third of policymakers (N=10) believe they can successfully fulfill their mission
without strategic intelligence. Half as many analysts feel the same way. Although no
respondent, analyst or policymaker, reported strategic intelligence as “irrelevant” to HIDTA
success, the number reporting the function as somewhat relevant or irrelevant suggests law
enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic intelligence. If it was never ignored, strategic
intelligence would be reported as relevant by all analysts and policymakers.
Furthermore, intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance are positively
correlated. HIDTA’s with at least one respondent reporting strategic intelligence as somewhat
relevant/irrelevant account for 83.3% of reports of intelligence-policy disconnection. Thus, less
than one-fifth of reported disconnection is associated with relevant intelligence. This high
correlation demonstrated between intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance
supports scholarly assertions that intelligence-policy relations are riddled with natural tensions
and gaps, and that they often lead to intelligence-irrelevance. This correlation also raises the
question as to whether HIDTA policymakers are managing intelligence professionals with an
intuitive sagacity, as Sun Tzu recommended so many years ago. The notable levels of
intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance would suggest that HIDTA
policymakers are doing so only if they sincerely view intelligence as more of a threat than an
asset to HIDTA strategy and policy. Regardless, it appears clear that the reciprocative skepticism
that has largely and historically characterized intelligence-policy relations has translated to the
law enforcement environment.
The last question posed to respondents regarding the relevance of intelligence asked how
to improve the use of strategic intelligence at HIDTA. Content Analysis (or text analysis) of the
responses suggests analysts and policymakers are most concerned with communication,
56
organizational inertia, time, and marketing. Of the responses collected, 45.5% related to issues in
communications, 18.2% related to organizational inertia, 15.2% related to time, 12.1% related to
marketing, 6.1% related to policymaker volition and security, 3.0% related to confidence.
Respondents did not answer that cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance or filtering were problems.
Recommendations outside of this study’s variables included the following: improving the
general quality of strategic intelligence products, increasing resources and analysts, expanding
the role of strategic intelligence analysts, increasing training, and prioritizing intelligence
projects. While policymaker recommendations focused heavily on improving communication
and the need for more analysts and marketing, analyst recommendations focused on
communication and organizational inertia. These responses demonstrate that both HIDTA
analysts and policymakers see significant opportunities to improve the relevance of strategic
intelligence. Analysis of responses measuring the independent variables of this study will
highlight if these recommendations are on target.
Cognitive Bias
As stated above, cognitive bias causes intelligence irrelevance by undermining its
objectivity, a central pillar of intelligence function. The aggregate results measuring the level of
cognitive bias indicate that there are significant opportunities for HIDTA analysts and
policymakers to decrease bias in their assignments. While analysts report a mean number of 7.2
steps taken to remain objective in their assessments, policymakers report a mean number of 4.9
steps taken to remain objective (See Appendix G for Cognitive Bias Figures). Analysts are most
likely to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (95.2%, N=20), and they frequently critically
assess the reliability of sources (81%, N=17). They are least likely to modify perceptions in the
face of incongruent evidence (28.6%, N=6), or employ efforts to detect deception (33.3%, N=7).
57
Policymaker responses suggest they are more biased than analysts. Policymakers are most likely
to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (87%, N=20), and resist tendencies toward
common perceptions (60.9%, N=14). They are least likely to consciously avoid cognitive
anchors (13%, N=3), or seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses (17.4%, N=4). These
results demonstrate that HIDTA policymakers are likely more biased in their decision-making
that HIDTA analysts are in producing strategic intelligence.
Cognitive bias increases, though, when filtering out those responses representative of
intelligence irrelevance. Analysts who report strategic intelligence as somewhat
relevant/irrelevant (A-SR/I’s) and policymakers who reported strategic intelligence as somewhat
relevant/irrelevant (P-SR/I’s) report they take fewer steps to avoid cognitive bias than the mean
analyst and policymaker respondent. A-SR/I’s report a mean number of 5.7 steps taken to remain
objective in producing intelligence. However, no A-SR/I’s report they consciously prohibit their
expectations from influencing their analyses, consciously avoid cognitive anchors, or insulate
themselves from societal prejudices. Furthermore, only a third (N=1) report they seek to
disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses; equally consider causality, randomness, accident
and error; employ efforts to detect deception; or modify perceptions in face of incongruent
evidence. P-SR/I’s report a mean number of 3.75 steps taken to remain objective in
policymaking, suggesting they are the most biased population sampled. No P-SR/I’s report they
seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses or employ efforts to detect deception.
Furthermore, only 12.5% (N=1) report they consciously avoid cognitive anchors; equally
consider causality, randomness, accident and error; modify perceptions in the face of incongruent
evidence; use words of estimative probability; or insulate themselves from societal prejudices.
These results demonstrate an unnerving level of bias in HIDTA intelligence and policymaking
58
processes and products. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that cognitive bias is positively
correlated with intelligence, as hypothesized.
Indicator
Aggregate Central
Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
# Steps Mean 6.00 Std Dev 4.65 Mean 4.20 Std Dev 1.61
Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance causes intelligence irrelevance when policymakers relieve the
tension caused by incongruence or confliction between objective reality and their cognitive
schema by rejecting analyses reflective of objective reality, or in other words, they ignore
intelligence. Measures of cognitive dissonance were overwhelmingly unfamiliar to both analyst
and policymaker respondents, however, both populations reported these phenomena occur (See
Appendix H for Cognitive Dissonance Figures). Most analysts (73%) report they do not know
the frequency of: strategic intelligence being inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker
beliefs or attitudes, policymakers rejecting or disbelieving inconsistent strategic intelligence, or
policymakers rationalizing inconsistent strategic intelligence as agreeable with their beliefs or
attitudes. Additionally, most policymakers (58.7%) report they do not know the frequency of
these phenomena. Analysts reporting otherwise, however, report that policymakers rationalize
strategic intelligence findings as agreeable with their beliefs or attitudes more frequently than
they report them to be inconsistent with their beliefs and attitudes. Policymaker responses report
the same results. Policymakers also report they reject or disbelieve strategic intelligence findings
when they are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs or attitudes nearly as frequently as they
are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs and attitudes. These results suggest cognitive
Table 4.1: Cognitive Bias Results
59
dissonance is likely an issue in HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and that it likely causes
some level of intelligence irrelevance. However, more data is necessary to confirm these
assertions.
Reporting from P-SR/I’s and A-SR/I’s closely parallels these results, thus preventing a
confident deduction of correlation between cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. A-
SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s report that rejection, disbelief and rationalization occur, but occur slightly
less frequently than incidence of intelligence inconsistency with policy schemas. A “none” or
“never” answer was not offered. Respondents wishing to communicate that answer may explain
the large number of “I don’t know” responses. These results demonstrate that further research is
needed to confirm the level of cognitive dissonance present in law enforcement and its
correlation to intelligence irrelevance. Nonetheless, the data available suggests that cognitive
dissonance occurs within HIDTA, both when intelligence is relevant and when it is less than
relevant.
Indicator
Aggregate Central
Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
Incidence of Inconsistency v.
Incidence of Rejection/Disbe
lief
Mode I Don't Know
Range
Quarterly-Less than
Yearly
Mode I Don't Know
Range
Quarterly-Less than
Yearly
Incidence of Inconsistency v.
Incidence of Rejection/Disbe
lief
Mode I Don't Know
Range
Quarterly-Less than
Yearly
Mode I Don't Know
Range
Quarterly-Less than
Yearly
Table 4.2: Cognitive Dissonance Results
60
Security
Security is an aspect central to understanding intelligence irrelevance. Security can
undermine intelligence-policy relations and processes by limiting the availability and
accessibility of intelligence and its sources. The aggregate results collected measuring security
demonstrates that HIDTA security measures do not substantially impact intelligence-policy
relations. Policymakers and analysts report that strategic intelligence and its critical sources are
generally available (See Appendix I for Security Figures). Most policymakers (72%, N=18)
report security measures never or rarely restrict their access to strategic intelligence. Most
policymakers also report security measures never or rarely impede or delay their use of strategic
intelligence, 84% (N=21) and 80% (N=20) respectively. Analysts, however, report security
measures impacting intelligence-policy relations to a greater degree. Many analysts (42.9%,
N=9) report security measures occasionally restrict their access to critical sources of strategic
intelligence. Two thirds of analysts (N=14), however, report security measures never or rarely
impede or delay their production of strategic intelligence. Thus, security measures in HIDTA are
unlikely to significantly and adversely impact intelligence-policy relations as they do not
substantially impact the availability or accessibility of strategic intelligence or its critical sources.
A-SR/I and P-SR/I results suggest that security measures may be related to intelligence
irrelevance, though further exploration is needed. A-SR/I reporting, particularly, demonstrates a
notable association between security measures and intelligence irrelevance. Two of three A-
SR/I’s report that critical sources of strategic information/intelligence are generally unavailable.
Additionally, one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely restrict access to critical
strategic intelligence sources and one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely
delaying the production of useful intelligence. Furthermore, two of three A-SR/I’s report that
61
security policies occasionally impede the production of useful strategic intelligence. Of P-SR/I
responses, one of eight reports security measures routinely impacting intelligence-policy
relations. One P-SR/I also reports security measures routinely impeding the use of strategic
intelligence. Most P-SR/I’s (75%, N=6) report security measures rarely or never restrict their
access to strategic intelligence. Additionally, most P-SR/I’s (87.5%, N=7) report security
measures rarely or never impede or delay their use of strategic intelligence. Nonetheless, SR/I
responses demonstrate an increase in adverse impacts of security measures. Cumulatively, these
results demonstrate that security, particularly measuring adversely impacting the availability and
accessibility of resources analysts need, is likely positively correlated with intelligence
irrelevance, as hypothesized.
62
Indicator
Aggregate Central Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
Availability of SI
Sources Mode
Generally
Available
Range
Generally
Unavailable-
Readily Available; I Don't
Know
Mode
Generally
Unavailable
Range
Generally
Unavailable-
Occasionally
Available
Availability of SI
Mode
Multimodal:
Occasionally,
Generally,
Readily Availabl
e
Range
Generally
Unavailable-
Readily Available; I Don't
Know
Mode
Occasionally
Available
Range
Generally
Unavailable-
Readily Availabl
e; I Don't Know
Frequency of
Restricting Access
Mode Rarely Range
Never-Routinely; I Don't
Know
Mode Never Range Never-
Routinely
Frequency of
Impeding Production/
Use
Mode Rarely Range
Never-Routinely; I Don't
Know
Mode Rarely Range Never-
Routinely
Frequency of Delaying Production/
Use
Mode Rarely Range
Never-Routinely; I Don't
Know
Mode Rarely Range Never-
Routinely
Filtering
Filters impact the relevance of intelligence by coloring the information that reaches
intelligence producers and consumers, thus undermining the comprehensive objectivity of
intelligence. The results of aggregate data collected relating to the impact of filtering
demonstrates that filters have little impact on HIDTA intelligence-policy relations. Twenty-one
analyst responses report a total of sixty-four revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 3.05, mode
of 3, and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA
Table 4.3: Security Results
63
policymakers (See Appendix J for Filtering Figures). The analyst-reported numbers possess a
standard deviation of 1.69. Additionally, most analysts report these measures rarely delay the
production of useful strategic intelligence and are about right to make the product useful.
Policymaker responses generally parallel those of provided by HIDTA analysts. Twenty-two
policymaker responses report a total of forty-six revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.09,
mode of 3, and median of 2 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach
HIDTA policymakers. The policymaker-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 1.54.
Additionally, policymakers report these measures rarely delay the production of useful strategic
intelligence and are about right to make the product useful. These results demonstrate that
HIDTA filters do not substantially impact intelligence-policy relations.
SR/I reporting demonstrates, however, that filters are positively correlated with
intelligence irrelevance. A-SR/I’s report a total of thirteen revisions/approvals yielding a mean of
4.33 and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA
policymakers. A-SR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 3.21. Two of three A-
SR/I’s report these measures take away from the utility of their product. A-SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s
both report that these measures occasionally delay the use of strategic intelligence. P-SR/I’s
report a total of twenty revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.86, mode of 2 and median of 3
revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA policymakers. The P-
SR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 0.90. P-SR/I reporting concurs with
aggregate policymaker and aggregate analyst reporting that these measures are about right to
make the products useful. Cumulatively, though, these results demonstrate that filters are
positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.
64
Indicator
Aggregate Central
Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
# Revisions/ Approvals
Mean 2.56 Std Dev 1.67 Mean 3.3 Std Dev 1.83
Delay of Production/Us
e Caused Mode Rarely Range
Never-Routinel
y; I Don't Know;
NA
Mode Occasio
nally Range
Never-Routinel
y
Judgment of Revisions/ Approvals
Mode About Right
Range
Takes Away-
Not Enough
Mode About Right
Range
Takes Away-
Not Enough
Organizational Inertia
Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when
policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions
rather than alter them. Study responses suggest HIDTAs likely suffer from substantial
organizational inertia. The key elements of the HIDTA strategy include: enforcement,
prosecution, intelligence, information technology (IT), training, de-confliction, information
sharing, administration (management and coordination), and prevention. Analysts and
policymakers nearly across the board confuse their strategy with their mission, and their
descriptions of their strategy largely ignore all the elements listed above aside from enforcement
(See Appendix K for Organizational Inertia Figures and Tables). Content analysis of study
responses demonstrates analysts conveyed an average (mean) knowledge of 16% of their
strategy. Policymakers conveyed a mean knowledge of 18.3% of their strategy. These results
suggest analysts and policymakers are either overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their HIDTA
strategy or that the stated strategy, although conceptually appropriate, is institutionally an
Table 4.4: Filtering Results
65
illusion. If analysts and policymakers are overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their strategy this is a
strong indicator that HIDTAs prefer to act in accordance with the current inertia of their
enforcement activity, regardless of the stated strategy or current objective reality. An illusory
HIDTA strategy would result from the same cognitive process. The following results measuring
organizational inertia must then be taken with a grain of salt. Both analysts and policymakers
report their strategy has been largely the same for more than 5 years. Both analysts and
policymakers also judge their strategy as successful in achieving the HIDTA mission. Ironically,
though, both analysts and policymakers believe their strategy can be improved through strategic
intelligence. Thus, although analysts and policymakers are substantially unfamiliar with their
largely unchanged and reportedly successful strategy, they think it can be improved through
strategic intelligence. It is unclear how much they believe the strategy can be improved;
however, the results suggest they do not believe it can be improved substantially.
Nonetheless, even discounting the inherent difference in views of the relevance of
strategic intelligence, SR/I reporting still demonstrates that organizational inertia is positively
correlated with intelligence irrelevance. Most SR/I responses match aggregate reporting that their
strategy has remained largely the same for more than five years, but responses are less variable.
SR/I respondents are even less familiar with their strategy, though, demonstrating a mean
knowledge of 12.95%. Obviously, SR/I respondents view strategic intelligence as less than
relevant — somewhat relevant/irrelevant. Most SR/I respondents see their strategy as somewhat
successful; however, they believe it can be improved through strategic intelligence.
Cumulatively, these results demonstrate that organizational inertia is positively correlated with
intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.
66
Indicator Aggregate
Central Tendency Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Years
Strategy Largely
Unchanged
Mode More than 5 Years
Range < 1 Year
- > 5 Years
Mode More than 5 Years
Range 1-2
Years - > 5 Years
Familiarity with
Strategy Mean 17.10% Std Dev 26.60% Mean 12.95% Std Dev 7.97%
Level of Belief SI
Can Improve Strategy
Mode Yes Range No-Yes Mode Yes Range Yes
Relevance of SI
Mode Relevant Range
Somewhat
Irrelevant-
Relevant
Mode Somewh
at Relevant
Range
Somewhat
Irrelevant-
Somewhat
Relevant
Judgment of Strategy
Success Mode
Successful
Range
Somewhat
Unsuccessful-
Successful; I Don't Know
Mode
Somewhat
Successful
Range
Somewhat
Unsuccessful-
Successful
Marketing
Not all politically useful intelligence is naturally employed. Intelligence often requires
marketing effort to achieve relevance. The aggregate results demonstrate sparse marketing by
HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts. Twenty-four analyst responses yielded a mean of 4.8,
mode of 0, and median 4 percent of their time devoted to marketing their products. Analyst
responses demonstrated a standard deviation of 5.36. Twenty-two policymaker responses yielded
a mean of 5.8%, mode of 0, and median of 3 percent of their strategic intelligence analyst’s time
is devoted to marketing to them. Policymaker responses demonstrated a standard deviation of
Table 4.5: Organizational Inertia Results
67
8.15. These results demonstrate that HIDTA analysts spend nowhere near a third of their time
marketing their products, as recommended by policymakers in Chapter 2. Those policymakers
would consider the level of HIDTA strategic intelligence marketing foolish and a disservice to
HIDTA policymakers. Undoubtedly, these results suggest marketing is a significant opportunity
to improve intelligence-policy relations.
The marketing results are worse when filtering for responses representative of
irrelevance. While analysts that report their products are less than relevant to their HIDTA also
report they spend more time marketing their products, policymakers reporting that strategic
intelligence is less than relevant to their HIDTA report their analysts spend nearly no time
marketing their products. The five A-SR/I responses yielded a mean of 8.20, mode of 5, and
median 5 percent of their time devoted marketing their products. A-SR/I reported yielded a
standard deviation of 7.3 percent. A-SR/I results were skewed by one analysts reporting they
spend 20% of their time marketing their products, the most reported by any analyst participating
in the study. Conversely, the seven P-SR/I responses yielded a mean 2.14, mode of 0, and
median 0 percent of their strategic intelligence analyst’s time devoted to marketing analytical
products to them. P-SR/I reporting yielded a standard deviation of 3.9 percent. Five of the seven
P-SR/I respondents reported their analysts devote 0 percent of their time marketing their
products. Combined, aggregate analyst and policymaker reporting, however, yields a mean of
5.26 percent of time devote to marketing while combined SR/I reporting yields a mean 4.67
percent of time devote to marketing. Intelligence marketing, thus, is demonstrably negatively
correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.
68
Indicator
Aggregate Central
Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
% of Time Spent
Mean 5.26% Std Dev 6.77% Mean 4.67% Std Dev 6.14%
Volition
For intelligence to be relevant to any policymaker he or she must be willing and have
decided to act where the subsequent decision on which action to take requires intelligence
support. The collected data do not directly measure HIDTA policymaker volition due to a
misinterpretation by the researcher. The collected data do, however, form a foundation for
significant HIDTA policymaker volition (See Appendix L for Volition Figures). Analyst
responses demonstrate that 80% (N=20) of HIDTA analysts believe their Executive Board is
likely or highly likely to be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans.
Policymaker responses demonstrate that 92% (N=23) of HIDTA policymakers feel the same
way. These results are encouraging as a policymaker will to act is a prerequisite of a decision to
act, and therefore of intelligence relevance. Only one policymaker communicated an overt
action to support strategic policymaking – the hiring of a strategic intelligence analyst. This
highlights the difference between the willingness to act and the act of willing action, of deciding
action is necessary. Further data is needed to assess policymaker volition in HIDTA and the law
enforcement context.
Nonetheless, reporting representative of intelligence irrelevance demonstrate a decrease
in policymaker willingness to act. Most A-SR/I’s, 60% (N=3), report they believe their executive
board is less than likely to modify its strategy and plans — 40% reporting chances are even and
Table 4.6: Marketing Results
69
20% reporting such change is highly unlikely. While most P-SR/I’s, 75% (N=6) report their
boards are likely or highly likely to be willing to modify its strategy or plans, 25% (N=2), report
those chances are even, more than reported in aggregate policymakers report. These results
suggest volition may be negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.
Indicator
Aggregate Central
Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure PM
Proclamation of
Willingness to Modify Strategy
Mode Likely Range
Chances are
Even-Highly Likely
Mode
Multimodal: Likely, Highly Likely
Range
Chances are
Even-Highly Likely
IA Judgment of PM
Willingness to Modify Strategy
Mode Likely Range
Highly Unlikely-Highly Likely
Mode
Multimodal: Chances are
Even, Likely
Range Highly
Unlikely-Likely
Disparity Between the
Two None Minimal Moderate Moderate
Communication
As stated above, suboptimal communication, in terms of frequency or quality, intensifies
the natural gaps and tension in intelligence-policy relations, thereby causing intelligence
irrelevance. Aggregate results demonstrate that the frequency of intelligence-policy
communication is a significant area to improve relations. Most analysts and policymakers, or
44.9%, report that many strategic intelligence products are easily digestible (See Appendix M for
Communication Figures). Most analysts and policymakers, or 58.4%, also confirm that source
reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence products.
Most analysts, however, 54.2% (N=13), report they directly communicate with their executive
Table 4.7: Volition Results
70
board less than yearly. Policymaker responses are multimodal with 32% reporting they directly
communicate with their strategic intelligence analysts weekly and 32% claiming to do so less
than yearly. Additionally, only 25% of analysts and 24% of policymakers report they/their
strategic intelligence analysts normally attend Executive Board meetings. Analyst and
policymakers report they are satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the timeliness, format, content,
communication and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence analysts, though. These results
demonstrate that the quality of HIDTA intelligence-policy communication is generally good;
however, the quantity of direct communication can be substantially improved.
Both the quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication decrease, though,
when evaluating SR/I reporting. Most SR/I respondents, or 55%, report few strategic intelligence
products are easily digestible. Most SR/I respondents, or 42.5%, also report that direct
intelligence-policy communication occurs less than yearly (P-SR/I results are multimodal). SR/I
satisfaction ratings skewed right (towards dissatisfaction). Most A-SR/I’s report they are
somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence products.
Aggregate SR/I reporting, however, demonstrates that these respondents are somewhat satisfied
with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence. A mean 66.7% of A-SR/I’s do
not know how often strategic intelligence products are inconsistent with policymaker beliefs or
attitudes, or how often policymakers reject/disbelieve or rationalize strategic intelligence. A
slightly larger percentage of SR/I respondents, or 76.9%, report strategic intelligence analysts do
not normally attend their HIDTA Executive Board meetings. A lower percentage of SR/I
responses, or 53.8%, confirm the inclusion of analytical confidence and source reliability in
strategic intelligence. Cumulatively, SR/I reporting demonstrates a notable decrease in the
71
quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication. These results confirm that
communication is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.
Indicator
Aggregate Central Tendency
Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Metho
d Measure Method Measure
Digestibility of SI
Products Mode Many Range None-All Mode Few Range None-All
Inclusion of Analytical Confidence and Source Reliability
Mode Yes Range No-Yes; I
Don't Know Mode Yes Range
No-Yes; I Don't Know
Frequency of Direct PM-IA
Com-munication
Mode Less than Yearly
Range Weekly-Less than Yearly
Mode Less than Yearly
Range Weekly-Less than Yearly
PM-IA Satisfaction
with Timeliness, Format and
Content of SI
Mode
Multi-modal: Very
Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied
Range
Very Dissatisfied-
Very Satisfied
Mode
Multi-modal:
Somewhat Satisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied
Range
Very Dissatisfie
d -Very Satisfied
Normal IA Executive
Board Attendance
Mode No Range No-Yes Mode No Range No-Yes
Time
Effectively producing and consuming strategic intelligence requires significant
investments of time by analysts and policymakers. If either party devote insufficient time to
these projects then intelligence is liable to become irrelevant. Aggregate results relating to
temporal attributes raise serious questions about what the study responses are measuring.
Nonetheless, these results demonstrate that analysts and policymakers do not devote a sufficient
amount of time to producing or employing non-investigation-specific intelligence. Most analyst
and policymaker responses report intelligence production and policymaker discussion at least
Table 4.8: Communication Results
72
yearly (See Appendix N for Time Figures). Most analyst respondents, or 96.4%, report at least
yearly strategic intelligence production. Most policymaker respondents, or 76.7%, report at least
yearly strategic intelligence production. Additionally, most policymaker respondents, or 93.3%,
report yearly or more frequent executive discussion of strategic intelligence. So far the results
seem promising. Discouragingly, however, most analyst respondents, or 62.5%, report thirty
percent or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Only 25% of analysts
report over fifty percent of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Additionally,
most analysts, or 50%, report their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough. These
results raise serious doubts about quality of strategic intelligence that is produced. These doubts
increase exponentially when we relate this time investment to the analyst and policymaker
reports that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or quarterly — 82.2% of analysts
and 46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence product with this frequency. It is all but
certain that the products they are referring to do not qualify as strategic intelligence. Moving on,
though, policymaker responses yield a mode 2-5% of their time is available to devote to strategic
intelligence. Most, or 52%, reporting their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough
time. Policymaker assessment of the timeliness of strategic intelligence is multimodal, 44% of
policymaker respondents are very satisfied and 44% are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness.
Most analysts, or 50%, are somewhat satisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. These
results suggest that many of the study respondents are not referring to strategic intelligence if
most believe it is being produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly by analysts spending thirty
percent or less of their time producing it. Strategic intelligence production, as stated in Chapter
2, is infrequently produced, resource and time intensive, multi-disciplinary, and far-reaching in
nature. Thus, these results confirm that HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts are highly
73
unlikely addressing the basic assumptions of their HIDTA’s strategy. Nonetheless, analysts and
policymakers still believe they do not invest enough time into these non-investigation-specific
tasks. Thus the quality of this intelligence production, likely general or estimative intelligence,
and resulting policymaking are substantial opportunities to improve relations and decrease
intelligence irrelevance. Simply stated, HIDTA analysts and policymakers spend less than a
sufficient amount of time producing and employing non-investigation-specific intelligence.
The amount of time devoted by HIDTA analysts and policymakers decreases, though,
when evaluating SR/I reporting. A lower percentage of SR/I responses, or 85%, report at least
yearly strategic intelligence production, the other 3 P-SR/I respondents do not know. Also fewer
SR/I responses, or 65%, report strategic intelligence discussion by policymakers at least yearly.
A larger percentage of A-SR/I’s, or 80%, reports that less than 30% of their time is available to
devote to strategic intelligence. A larger percentage of P-SR/I’s, or 75% (compared to 64% total
policymakers), reports that 5% or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence.
All SR/I respondents report their time available to strategic intelligence is not enough or not
nearly enough. Most A-SR/I’s (66.7% N=2) and more P-SR/I’s (25% N=2) than policymakers
are somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. Most P-SR/I’s, though, or
50%, are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness. These results suggest that analysts and
policymakers in HIDTAs where non-investigation-specific intelligence is irrelevant spend less
than an insufficient amount of time producing and employing those products. Furthermore, these
results confirm that time is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.
74
Indicator Aggregate Central
Tendency Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
Frequency of
Intelligence Production/
Use
Mode Quarterly Range
Weekly-Less than Yearly; I
Don't Know
Mode Quarterly Range
Weekly-Less than Yearly; I
Don't Know
IA % Time Investment
Mode 1-10% Range 0% - More than 50%
Mode 1-10% Range 0% - More than 50%
PM % Time Investment
Mode 2-5% Range 0-1% -
More than 20%
Mode 2-5% Range 2-5% - 10-
20%
IA-PM Judgment of
Time Investment
Mode About the
Right Amount
Range
Not Nearly Enough -
Much More than Enough
Mode Not
Enough Range
Not Nearly Enough -
Not Enough
IA-PM Satisfaction
with SI Timeliness
Mode Somewhat Satisfied
Range
Very Dissatisfied
-Very Satisfied
Mode Somewhat Satisfied
Range
Very Dissatisfied
-Very Satisfied
Confidence
Confidence in intelligence processes and products must be achieved by both analysts and
policymakers to justify intelligence influencing political action. Aggregate results relating to the
confidence HIDTA analysts and policymakers have in strategic intelligence demonstrates
substantial confidence by both populations. As reported above, analysts and policymakers agree
that source reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence
products. Inclusion of these measures only serves to increase policymaker confidence in the
product. Furthermore, most analysts, or 82.1%, report strategic intelligence is relevant to their
HIDTA (See Appendix O for Confidence Figures). Most policymakers, or 66.7%, report the
same. Nearly all respondents, or 98% of analysts and policymakers, believe their strategy can be
improved through strategic intelligence. One disconnected policymaker does not. Interestingly,
Table 4.9: Time Results
75
though, only 40% of analyst respondents claim to be confident in their HIDTAs intelligence
processes and products, while 56% claim to be somewhat confident/unconfident. Most
policymakers, or 52%, are confident in their strategic intelligence processes and products, while
48% are somewhat confident/unconfident. These results suggest there may be some disparity
between what intelligence processes and products should be and what they are. Almost all
respondents believe their strategy can be improved, far fewer are confident it will be.
Furthermore, these results demonstrate that strategic intelligence products likely only
occasionally motivate a sense of accuracy and relevance in HIDTA policymakers sufficient to
base political action.
Confidence in intelligence processes and products decreases, though, when evaluating
SR/I results. Inherently, all respondents report strategic intelligence is less than relevant,
somewhat relevant/irrelevant. No A-SR/I’s report they are confident in their strategic intelligence
processes and products. Rather, most, or 80%, report they are somewhat confident/unconfident.
Twenty percent report they are unconfident. Only 25% (N=2) of P-SR/I’s report they are
confident in their strategic intelligence processes or products. The other 75% report they are
somewhat confident/unconfident. A-SR/I’s and P-SR/I’s do, however, agree with aggregate
reporting that analytical confidence and source reliability are normally included in strategic
intelligence products and that their strategy/policy can be improved through strategic
intelligence. Nonetheless, these results demonstrate a marked decrease in confidence affirming
that confidence is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.
76
Indicator Aggregate Central
Tendency Aggregate Variability
SR/I Central Tendency
SR/I Variability
Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure Method Measure
Relevance of SI
Mode Relevant Range Somewhat Irrelevant-Relevant
Mode Somewhat Relevant
Range
Somewhat Irrelevant-Somewhat Relevant
Level of Belief SI
Can Improve Strategy
Mode Yes Range No-Yes Mode Yes Range Yes
IA Confidence
in SI Mode
Multi-modal:
Somewhat Confident, Confident
Range Unconfident-Confident
Mode
Multimodal: Somewhat
Unconfident, Somewhat Confident
Range Unconfident-Somewhat Confident
PM Confidence
in SI Mode Confident Range
Somewhat Unconfident-Confident
Mode Somewhat Confident
Range Somewhat
Unconfident-Confident
Inclusion of Analytical Confidence
in SI
Mode Yes Range No-Yes; I
Don't Know Mode Yes Range
No-Yes; I Don't Know
Summary
Analysis of the data yielded from the strategic intelligence analyst and executive board
(policymaker) questionnaires has revealed findings within the areas of the research questions.
Analyst and policymaker responses to the questionnaires were grouped to correspond to the
research questions and then categorized within the study’s independent variables to validate the
hypotheses. Here they will be discussed in summary.
The findings discussed in this chapter highlight the relevance of the study’s research
questions. The data reveal that HIDTA intelligence-policy relations are notably disconnected and
some frustrations arise as a result, as expected, primarily among analysts. The data further
Table 4.10: Confidence Results
77
confirm that intelligence irrelevance is an obstacle in law enforcement, that it is likely
underreported, and that there are a significant number of policy opportunities to increase the
relevance of law enforcement strategic intelligence. Two matrices below categorically
summarize study data pertaining to the third research question. The matrices graphically
illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypotheses one and two. Cognitive dissonance, security
and volition are exceptions to the previous statement as the data collected was not sufficient to
confidently correlate these variables with intelligence irrelevance. The matrices also graphically
illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypothesis three. Cognitive bias, filtering, organizational
inertia, marketing, communication, and time elements of HIDTA intelligence-policy relations
present significant opportunities for improvement in context of reducing intelligence irrelevance.
Confidence, not addressed in hypothesis three, is also highly relevant to any HIDTA effort to
decrease intelligence irrelevance. Among the proposed causes of intelligence irrelevance for
which this study collected data, only security measures presented distinctly fewer policy
opportunities for reducing intelligence irrelevance. The data, nonetheless, suggest a correlation
between security and volition and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized. The data also confirm
a correlation between all independent variables and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized,
apart from the two listed above and cognitive dissonance. Thus, these data and findings offer a
foundation for the development of a prescriptive policy to reduce intelligence irrelevance in law
enforcement.
Research questions and hypotheses aside, analysis of the study data suggests a strong
possibility strategic intelligence is politically irrelevant within HIDTA simply because it is not
produced. As stated in Chapter 1, strategic intelligence is distinct from other forms of
intelligence in that it must inherently be multi-disciplinary, comprehensive, and contextually
78
adapted to a grand (organizational or national) strategy. Thus, strategic intelligence is immensely
time and resource intensive. The number of study respondents reporting the production of
strategic intelligence on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis (82.2% of analysts and 46.7% of
policymakers) suggests a high likelihood that the products they refer to do not meet the
qualifications of strategic intelligence. Additionally, the number of respondents overwhelmingly
associating their day-to-day enforcement and intelligence efforts with their HIDTA strategy
solidifies this assertion as it demonstrates an analytical inability to address that which is
comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist beyond paper. Discussion in Chapter
1 reveals this would not be the first study to come to this conclusion. Rather, study data likely
more accurately measures general or estimative intelligence, and its irrelevance.
79
Marketing Volition Communication Time Confidence
← L
owe
r
Hig
her →
- % of time devoted is ≥ 20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition)
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s normally attend Executive Board meetings
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IA’s and PM’s -IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PM’s judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products
-% of time devoted is 10-20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)
- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Every 6 months or yearly -- IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart
- Analyst – 30-50% of time devoted - PM – 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI
- % of time devoted is <10%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy
- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s &PM’s: Less than Yearly - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PM’s reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IA’s normally do not attend Executive Board meetings
- Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst – 0-30% of time devoted - PM – 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products
Central Tendency →
Table 4.11: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance
80
Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia
← L
owe
r
Hig
her →
-Average of 0-4 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IA’s - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PM’s - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years - Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources occasionally available to IA’s - SI occasionally available to PM’s - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- No incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IA’s - SI generally or readily available to PM’s - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough
- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
Central Tendency →
Table 4.12: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance
81
Marketing Volition Communication Time Confidence
← L
owe
r
Hig
her →
- % of time devoted is ≥ 20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition)
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s normally attend Executive Board meetings
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IA’s and PM’s -IA’s/PM’s very satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PM’s judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products
-% of time devoted is 10-20%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)
- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IA’s & PM’s: Every 6 months or yearly -- IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart
- Analyst – 30-50% of time devoted - PM – 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI
- % of time devoted is <10%
- PM’s judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy
- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IA’s &PM’s: Less than Yearly - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IA’s do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PM’s reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IA’s normally do not attend Executive Board meetings
- Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst – 0-30% of time devoted - PM – 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IA’s and PM’s - IA’s/PM’s somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI
- SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IA’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PM’s judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products
Central Tendency →
Table 4.13: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance
82
Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance Security Filtering Inertia ←
Low
er
H
ighe
r →
-Average of 0-5 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IA’s - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PM’s - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years - Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- Incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI findings less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources occasionally available to IA’s - SI occasionally available to PM’s - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility
- Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IA’s and PM’s to reduce bias
- No incidence of PM’s rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PM’s rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes
- Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IA’s - SI generally or readily available to PM’s - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI
- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough
- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission
Central Tendency →
Table 4.14: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance
83
CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the purpose of this study was to determine the level to which
intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law
enforcement. Furthermore, determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permits the
development of prescriptive policy to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished
through contextually-focused survey analysis of the HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker
populations. The surveys directly and indirectly addressed intelligence-policy relations,
intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of intelligence irrelevance.
While aggregate respondent results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence
irrelevance, respondents reporting less than relevant intelligence demonstrate that seven of the
ten scholarly identified causes of irrelevance are correlated with intelligence irrelevance as
previously asserted — data collected was not sufficient to confidently draw a correlation
between cognitive dissonance, security, and volition; and intelligence irrelevance. Furthermore,
these ten irrelevance-correlated topics all present HIDTA with policy opportunities to improve
intelligence-policy relations and reduce incidents of intelligence irrelevance.
Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement
As stated above, study results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence irrelevance.
An encouraging 82.1% of HIDTA analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report strategic
intelligence is “relevant” to the success in the HIDTA mission. Conversely, however, 17.9% of
analysts and 33.3% of policymakers consider strategic intelligence less than relevant to the
success of their HIDTA, somewhat relevant/ irrelevant. These results demonstrate that
intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law
enforcement and that intelligence has failed to successfully integrate into the enforcement and
84
investigative culture. These conclusions are also supported by results demonstrating 36.7% of
analysts and 21.9% of policymakers feel disconnected from their intelligence-policy counterpart.
Additional results, however, likely more accurately demonstrate the level of strategic intelligence
irrelevance in law enforcement.
Study results emerging from measurement of the independent variables (causes of
irrelevance) provide valuable insight into HIDTA intelligence irrelevance. 82.2% of analysts and
46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence production on a weekly, monthly or quarterly
basis. Any products produced at these rates are all but certain not to qualify as strategic
intelligence given the depth of analysis, number of variables, time, and resource prerequisites of
strategic intelligence production. An additional 3.6% of analyst responses and 10% of
policymaker responses reporting strategic intelligence production every 6 months also unlikely
qualify. Furthermore, the results demonstrating a mean 16% analyst familiarity and 18.3%
policymaker familiarity with the HIDTA strategy suggests an analytical and policymaking
inability to address that which is comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist
beyond paper. These results permit two logical conclusions about law enforcement intelligence
irrelevance: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is unknown
because of disparity between this study’s concept of strategic intelligence and the law
enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the former in law enforcement,
or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers because of a
demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not strategic (by the definition
accepted for this study). Accepting the latter conclusion seems more reasonable than the
accepting the former. This conclusion, however, need not undermine study research and analysis
pertaining to research question three or any of the three study hypotheses. Rather, given these
85
conclusions regarding strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance, findings regarding the
causes of law enforcement intelligence irrelevance are all but certainly more accurately
interpreted as reflective of general or estimative intelligence-policy relations and causes of
general or estimative intelligence irrelevance. This interpretation is consistent with the role of
strategic analysts outlined in Chapter 3 as focusing on non-investigation-specific and projective
analyses.
Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement
Scholarship outlined in Chapter 2 presents ten elements of intelligence-policy relations
that are asserted to account for incidence of intelligence irrelevance. With the exception of
cognitive dissonance, security, and volition, this study finds a correlation between each element
and intelligence irrelevance consistent with scholarly-asserted correlations, positive and
negative. Specifically, this study confirm that marketing, communication, time and confidence
are all negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance — a decrease in any of these elements
correlates to, if not causes, an increase in intelligence irrelevance. Conversely, cognitive bias,
filtering, and organizational inertia are all positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance —
an increase in any of these elements corresponds to, if not causes, intelligence irrelevance. This
study affirms that volition is likely negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however,
the data collected was not sufficient to confirm this. Similarly, this study affirms that security is
likely positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however, the data collected was not
sufficient to confirm this. Nonetheless, increasing those variables negatively correlated (or likely
negatively correlated) with irrelevance as well as decreasing those variables positively correlated
(or likely positively correlated) with irrelevance should serve to improve HIDTA intelligence-
policy relations and decrease incidence of intelligence irrelevance.
86
Considering the HIDTA program, the study results offer the most likely causes of general
or estimative intelligence irrelevance (see the Results summary in Chapter 4). Analyst and
policymaker recommendations for improving communication, marketing, time, and
organizational inertia were on point. Lower levels of intelligence marketing, lower quality and
quantity of intelligence-policy communication, increases in cognitive bias, and higher
organizational inertia are the intelligence-policy attributes most likely causing intelligence
irrelevance in HIDTA. Additionally, lower levels of confidence in intelligence, lower levels of
time invested in intelligence, and higher levels of filtering and security likely moderately cause
intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA. Of all ten attributes, the levels of intelligence marketing,
cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, and organizational inertia were the most concerning. These
deficiencies in intelligence-policy relations, however, provide opportunities for improvement,
both for intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence. Before outlining a
prescriptive policy to improve intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence,
however, it is critical to address one additional likely cause of law enforcement intelligence
irrelevance.
Chapter 1 demonstrates that intelligence is an ancient craft and one that is rooted in the
instinct for survival. This logic keeps with that which likely provoked early intelligence users to
do so within the realm of military campaigns. What does not seem apparent, though, is that law
enforcement policymakers are at all concerned with their survival within their executive
positions or with the survival of their organizations. It is also unclear that the performance of
rigorous strategy or policy analysis is a prerequisite of executive or institutional stability within
certain law enforcement missions. Rather, despite political and public frustration with counter-
narcotic enforcement efforts, funding for them represents the stable majority of the national drug
87
control budget (Executive Office of, 2010). It also seems to be that some law enforcement goals,
such as those to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, are
unlikely to require a strategy, rather than tactical and operational planning. Logic would seem to
dictate that a strategy only becomes relevant when paralleled by requirements for achieving
ambitious levels of efficiency and effectiveness, arguably peripheral law enforcement goals.
Thus, at least some law enforcement strategy is more likely abstract theory than sound logic.
This is highly likely the case in the HIDTA programs. Nonetheless, for the purposes of
improving the relevance of non-strategic law enforcement intelligence, a prescriptive framework
aimed at improving intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law
enforcement intelligence is offered. A framework aimed at making strategic intelligence relevant
is also offered.
Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence Irrelevance
Assessment of the ten independent variables of this study illuminates numerous
opportunities to stabilize or improve the relevance of HIDTA intelligence. First, there are several
indicators of positive intelligence-policy relations that ought to be reinforced and stabilized.
Security policies within HIDTA appear to successfully balance the competing interests of
enforcement operational integrity and efficiency. Security considerations also demonstrate a
lower level of access restriction, production delay or impediment, and consumption delay or
impediment. With regard to filters, most HIDTA members judge the level of intelligence
revision and approval about right to make to maximize the value of their products. Reinforcing
the substantial level of intelligence relevance and substantial level of analyst and policymaker
belief in intelligence is also beneficial to the stated aims. And lastly, analysts should be
encouraged to continue to include their analytical confidence and source reliability in
88
assessments. Such inclusion can only improve policymaker confidence in the product. These
efforts, in sum, ought to stabilize the elements of intelligence-policy relations already closely
calibrated for optimal intelligence-policy relations and intelligence relevance.
Conversely, however, there are several elements of intelligence-policy relations that can
be improved upon to increase the relevance of intelligence. Study results demonstrate a
substantial level of bias among SR/I reporting, worse than the already substantially biased
aggregate HIDTA intelligence and policy. HIDTA members can exploit advanced analytical
techniques to increase the rigor in their analysis and policymaking as well as decrease analytical
bias. HIDTAs ought also seek means to increase the availability of critical sources of estimative
intelligence to analysts and estimative intelligence to policymakers. Members would also benefit
from familiarizing themselves HIDTAs comprehensive strategy and ensuring its relevance to
current and developing drug threats. HIDTA analysts ought to significantly increase their efforts
to market their products, spending as much as a third of their time or enough to feel guilty about
avoiding other tasks, as policymakers recommend. Essentially, if they have something worth
saying they should ensure those who need to hear it actually do. Analysts ought to also consider
reformatting their products to increase their digestibility. If policymakers cannot easily withdraw
their conclusions and their logic then they are not likely to see value in their product.
Additionally, analysts and policymakers would both benefit from more frequent direct
communication. Intelligence ought to function at the direction of policymakers. Regular
attendance by analysts to executive board meetings is one method to improve intelligence-policy
communication. Increased direction from policymakers will also likely increase the time analysts
invest in general and estimative products as well as increase the timeliness of those products.
Increasing direction communication would also reinforce some of the variables mention here
89
including increasing marketing and ensuring the digestibility and relevance of intelligence
products and processes. And lastly, cognitive dissonance, from the little data that was provided
was substantial. Policymakers who accept that their conceptions of their operating environment
may need to be calibrated from time to time are likely to produce better policy and possess better
relations with their intelligence analysts. In sum, decreasing cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance,
and organizational inertia as well as increasing the availability of critical sources of intelligence
and policymaking, intelligence marketing, and the frequency and quality of intelligence-policy
communication are the primary elements of the framework to improve law enforcement
intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law enforcement
intelligence. Additional opportunistic recommendations at the institutional level are a significant
resource provided elsewhere (See: “The national criminal,” 2003; and Peterson, 2005).
In addition to the recommendations arising from measurement of the ten causes of
irrelevance, HIDTA analysts and policymakers recommend expanding the role of intelligence
analysts, providing training opportunities, and prioritizing intelligence projects. Analysts also
recommend HIDTAs perform tactical analysis (rather than research and information processing)
and extract strategic value which can be exploited. It is unclear whether these recommendations
are aimed at reducing strategic or estimative intelligence irrelevance. To improve either,
however, HIDTAs must shift away from intelligence research initiatives towards intelligence
analysis initiatives. HIDTAs are unlikely to achieve sound strategic logic by collecting data
exclusively in the context of individual investigations.
Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence Irrelevance
First, for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymakers it must be
requested and produced; or, in other words, it must be valued. This requires that both
90
policymakers and analysts understand what strategic intelligence is and how it can add value to
their program. Contrary to what ONDCP suggests, strategic intelligence is not “intelligence
related to the structure and movement of organized criminal elements, patterns of criminal
activity, activities of criminal elements, projections of criminal trends, or projective planning”
(“HIDTA program policy,” 2009). The association of strategic intelligence strictly with analysis
that is “big picture” and “long-term” is a legacy of Cold War-era thinking and highly inaccurate
(Heidenrich, 2007). Rather, it is all that ONDCP suggests and more combined and analyzed for
the strict purpose of impacting a HIDTA strategy. Strategic intelligence products, therefore,
must either: 1) analyze all variables necessary to reasonably optimize the soundness of the logic
employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal, or 2) analyze one or more
variables in relation to previous strategic intelligence analysis of all reasonable variables and
demonstrate how previous logic fails to reflect the current reality (or will likely fail to reflect
reality in the future) — as a means of calibrating the logic employed to achieve a grand (national
or organizational) goal, or 3) analyze all relevant information necessary to reasonably validate an
assumption within the logic employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal
(turning an assumption into a truth). Simply stated, strategic intelligence must comprehensively
support a strategy; a strategy is not a plan, and certainly not an operational plan, but the logic
driving a plan to achieve a grand goal. Additionally, strategic intelligence requires that analysts
not attempt to identify independent variables in the dynamic environment, but rather accept that
the environment is made up of innumerable dependent variables. In the case of HIDTA, this
means that drug trafficking simply cannot be managed strictly through enforcement activity.
Drug trafficking is a product of many other forces including social, economic, political, and
philosophical variables, among others. A strategy that ignores these is all but certain to fail. And
91
lastly, it is crucial that HIDTAs distinguish this process and these products from operational
intelligence and operational planning. Both operational and strategic intelligence are non-case-
specific.
Secondly, HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and policymakers must optimize their
relations for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymaking. This requires that they
calibrate the ten independent variables of this study within strategic processes. They need to
ensure high levels of strategic intelligence marketing, policymaker volition, strategic
intelligence-policy communication, time invested and confidence in strategic intelligence
products and processes. Additionally, they need to ensure low levels of cognitive bias, cognitive
dissonance, security, filtering, and organizational inertia. This is no different from the process
required for the relevance of intelligence at any level. And as asserted, it takes careful thought
and constant effort.
Limitations and Future Research
As with any research, there were inherent limitations within this study. Limited resources
forcing this study to employ survey research rather than interviews resulted in insufficient data to
correlate cognitive dissonance with intelligence irrelevance. This study was also limited by a
misinterpretation of the concept of volition. The data collected for the purposes of measuring this
variable did not in fact measure it. Additionally, data collected from HIDTA policymakers was
minimal, estimated to represent 6.25% of the population. Interviewing HIDTA members would
have possibly resulted in more collected data and more depth of data collection regarding analyst
and policymaker familiarity with their strategy. Although careful thought was employed in the
development of study questionnaires, face-to-face interviews permit the researcher to clarify the
questions posed to participants, thus increasing the accuracy of data collected. Additionally, in
92
order to improve the accuracy of data analysis, future researchers utilizing questionnaires ought
to benchmark the categorical assignment of measures (low, moderate, high) of the independent
variables. Categorical assignment of the independent variables, as provided in Chapter 4, is
vulnerable to contest. Future research can also draw more distinct correlations between
intelligence irrelevance and its asserted causes by comparing and contrasting data representative
of relevant intelligence with that of irrelevant intelligence – rather than aggregate with irrelevant.
Nonetheless, this study illuminates a couple opportunities for future research. First, this
study highlights the possibility that strategic objectivity is decreasingly or simply not valued. As
stated above, collected data was insufficient for statistically significant correlation between
cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. Study responses, nonetheless, reflect the
relevance of this attribute to understanding intelligence-policy relations and intelligence
irrelevance.
Truly strategic intelligence represents somewhat of a departure from traditionally
externally-focused intelligence towards an externally and internally-focused effort. While in the
former, the product focuses on the weaknesses of a them for the purposes of highlighting
opportunities to gain competitive advantage for us, in the latter the product focuses on
weaknesses of them and the potential weaknesses of us to calibrate our logic of achieving or
maintaining a competitive advantage. Simply stated, intelligence normally highlights
advantageous opportunity to leverage our current strengths whereas strategic intelligence
normally recommends a calibration of our logic; the result potentially causes internal reform or
change. Thus, strategic intelligence seems to inherently possess the potential for internal conflict
as it inherently opposes those within the organization who have a vested interest in the status
quo. This presents a unique opportunity for future research to isolate the roles of objectivity and
93
cognitive or organizational dissonance in strategic intelligence-policy relations. It would be
interesting to read analytical conclusions arising from research that leverages interviews with law
enforcement or national security policymakers aimed to address this topic in appropriate depth.
Secondly, this study posits that law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is likely caused
by the absences of any threat to executive and institutional survival — that causes of intelligence
irrelevance can lie outside the realm of information processing, quality analysis and assessment,
and maintenance of professional norms. Future research that investigates and clarifies the
presence or absence of measurable levels of accountability present in law enforcement, their
relation to intelligence irrelevance, and their implications for the necessity of strategy would be
particularly intellectually profitable in understanding law enforcement strategic intelligence-
policy relations. It can confirm that the adoption of the framework posed here will actually
permit law enforcement intelligence to be relevant. The hypothesis here is: intelligence is
doomed to irrelevance when it aims to support organizations/nations and policymakers whose
survival is not threatened. Secondly, this research would hypothesize that in these cases the ten
independent variables of this study no longer represent the causal factors of intelligence
irrelevance. Research confirming these hypotheses would have significant implications for
intelligence processes in many environments and of many organizations.
Lastly, the data collected highlight the strong possibility that irrelevance is not the only
pathology of intelligence-policy relations present in the law enforcement arena. The data
demonstrate notable support for the possibility that excessive harmony is the most prominent
pathology present in the HIDTA program. Again, excessive harmony occurs when intelligence
and policy officials share the same complacent tunnel vision – neither party seriously addresses
or challenges the assumptions inherent in the policy or strategy currently driving organizational
94
action. In these cases, it is the lack of tension between intelligence and policy parties that creates
ineffective relations. ONDCP’s definition of strategic intelligence sets the stage for
organizational logic to be ignored. The data collected on cognitive dissonance suggest that
HIDTA intelligence may rarely be inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker beliefs and
attitudes. Data collected on organizational inertia demonstrate that HIDTA analysts and
policymakers are generally unaware of their strategy and that intelligence products are highly
unlikely applicable to HIDTA strategy. And some of the most crucial efforts to avoid cognitive
biases that would permit excessive harmony, such as consciously avoiding cognitive anchors and
modifying perceptions in the face of incongruent evidence, were rarely taken. These findings
present a highly valuable opportunity for future research to explore and substantiate the level to
which law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are plagued by excessive harmony. The
likely absence of any risk to law enforcement organizational or executive survival would
logically seem to reinforce the high likelihood that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations
are plagued by substantial excessive harmony.
95
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Blank Copy of IRB Proposal Form
104
105
106
Appendix B: HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analyst Measurement Instrument
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
Appendix C: HIDTA Policymaker Measurement Instrument
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
Appendix D: Study Demographics Figures
: Study Demographics Figures
124
125
126
Appendix E: Intelligence-Policy Disconnection
Policy Disconnection Data Figures
127
128
Appendix F: Intelligence Irrelevance
Intelligence Irrelevance Figures
129
Appendix G: Cognitive Bias Figures
Figures
130
131
132
133
Appendix H: Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive Dissonance Figures
134
Appendix I: Security Figures
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
Appendix J: Filtering Figures
143
144
145
146
Appendix K: Organizational Inertia
Organizational Inertia Figures, Tables, and Lists
147
148
149
Enforcement Prosecution Intelligence IT Training Deconfliction Information Sharing Administration (Management and Coordination)
Prevention None
Number of Responses Eluding to
Topic
18 0 11 0 1 0 6 0 0 3
Percentage of Responses Eluding to
Topic
72.0% 0.0% 44.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 24.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.0%
Mean
Number of Responses Eluding to
Topic
17 2 8 1 1 1 0 0 3 3
Percentage of Responses Eluding to
Topic
85.0% 100.0% 40.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Mean
16.0%
18.30%
Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analysts
Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Executive Board Members
150
Please describe your current strategy at HIDTA.
Analyst Responses:
- Quarterly trends in trafficking - Our strategy uses a number of task forces to address the threats identified throughout the
year. Their focus is intelligence driven investigations. The task force concept allows agencies to leverage resources and be more effective.
- Proactive - It’s unclear - Monthly newsletters - Participating agencies incorporate intelligence with enforcement activities to address the
threat. - Intelligence led policing is key. - We have a HIDTA Intelligence Support System (ISS) made up of 3 intel centers - Dismantle DTOs - Dismantle DTOs through investigative means - TO DEVELOP NEW INTELLIGENCE PROTOCOLS THAT WILL IDENTIFY DRUG
IMPORTATION-TRANSPORTATION-DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND MONEY LAUNDERING INFRASTRUCTURES RESULTING IN ARRESTS OF HIGH-LEVEL TRAFFICKERS AND SEIZURES OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS AND MONEY AND DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO BORDER DRUG TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES
- More tactical. Assisting law enforcement agencies - To provide/share information and intelligence among all the agencies in this area and
beyond as necessary. - Identifying threats and addressing in efforts of mitigating it - To disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations. As far as Intel, we are here to
support HIDTA Initiatives and other State/Local Police agencies on ongoing criminal investigations. Should we see a developing trend, we produce strategic documents and disseminate them in our AOR.
- To pursue the drug traffickers and organizations - Participation by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies; the collocation and
commingling, at one central facility, of most investigative initiatives; targeting the most significant drug trafficking, money laundering, and drug-related violent crime organizations
- Identify drug threats as documented in the annual Threat Assessment then provide specific direction on threat elements to be addressed and deployment of resources thru the funding of initiatives.
- To combat the DTO’s and provide training to LE members to help in the fight against drugs
- Improving public safety, assist law enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies
151
- To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies
- Provide officer safety and analytical support to initiatives through intel gathering and dissemination
- To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies
- To assist Law Enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies
- Give money to task forces and let them incorporate that money into their existing programs however they see fit
Policymaker Responses:
- Identify Threat and develop enforcement strategies to deal with threat through unity of
effort - Interdiction, Investigation, and Prosecution of drug shipments smuggled and/or
transshipped into and through the State of NM - Evaluate past performance, determine the threat, align resources into task forces and
initiatives to counter the threat , evaluate success. - Detect, investigate and disrupt/dismantle DTO and MLO - Our current strategy is based on the Drug Market Analysis produced by NDIC. The
Strategy has not changed significantly over the past few years, but changes have been made to reflect the Executive Board and Directors view of the drug market and threat.
- A MIX OF INVESTIGATIVE/INTELLIGENCE/TRAINING/SUPPORT AND PREVENTION INITIATIVES
- To target large DTOs and MLOs. Disrupt flow of drugs to community. - Reduce availability of illicit drugs, effectively use Intel, detect-disrupt-dismantle DTOs
& MLOs - Reduce availability of illicit drugs; effectively use intelligence; detect, disrupt, dismantle
DTOs; reduce drug-related violence; support demand reduction efforts - I don’t think we have one for executives - Intelligence and enforcement - Based on our strategic intelligence we design our task forces to attack our specific threats - DTOs that traffic in Meth and Marijuana are our priorities along with cross border
trafficking - Task Force approach based on specialties - Develop operational objectives that reflect strategic threats as identified by the Threat
Assessment - The Lake County HIDTA will aggressively pursue drug and firearms trafficking
gangs/organizations in order to disrupt, dismantle, and reduce the supply of drugs and firearms to help meet the National Drug Control Strategy goals.
- Narcotics from the DR and the Caribbean, Money Laundering, parcel interdiction - See our Strategy and Threat Assessment Published annually
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- The Northwest HIDTA Executive Board has implemented and administered programs that meet the National Drug Control Strategy by forming partnerships and dedicating HIDTA resources to law enforcement, intelligence, prosecution, prevention, treatment, and education efforts. The Northwest HIDTA Executive Board’s strategy is to develop programs and initiatives that meet the ONDCP program requirements and that reduce the drug threat in this region.
- Through the successful investigation of violent drug trafficking organizations, reduce the trafficking of drugs and the occurrence of drug-related violent crime within the HIDTA region
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Appendix L: Volition Figures
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Appendix M: Communication Figures
Figures
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Appendix N: Time Figures
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Appendix O: Confidence Figures
Figures
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