ayesha s. chaudhry

[CIS 2.2 (2006) 157–170] Comparative Islamic Studies (print) ISSN 1740-7125 doi: 10.558/CISv2i2.157 Comparative Islamic Studies (online) ISSN 1743-1638

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2008, Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW.

The Problems of Conscience and Hermeneutics: A Few Contemporary Approaches* AYESHA S. CHAUDHRY New York University This paper surveys contemporary approaches to the problems of conscience raised by Chapter 4, Verse 34 of the Qur’an, exploring modes of resolving the issues that arise when believing Muslims approach the verse and find its apparent meaning to violate their pre-existing notions of justice, notions which are partly informed the by the Qur’anic text itself. It argues that the prescrip-tion of “hitting” one’s wife, as the last of three mitigating directives when dealing with a woman who embodies the quality of nushūz, creates a moment of interruption in the relationship between the believer and text. Contemporary scholars engage both text and historical precedent in the present context when (re)interpreting Qur’an 4:34 and this paper shows that the relative weight given to text and precedent determines the conclusions of individual arguments. Introduction In March of 2007 the New York Times1 printed the story of a German judge who denied an expedited divorce to a German-Moroccan woman who was physically abused by her husband, arguing that the Qur’an granted the husband the prerogative to physically discipline his wife, stating that “The Koran sanctions such physical abuse.”2 The reporter, Mark Lander, clarified for his readers that “While the verse cited by Judge Datz-Winter does say husbands may beat their wives for disobedience—an interpretation embraced by Wahhabi and other fundamentalist Islamic groups—most mainstream Muslims have long rejected wife-beating as a relic of the medieval age.”3 This story highlights the importance of Q 4:34 in the investigation of the (in)equality of genders in the Qur’an and is directly connected to the question of divine sanction or justification for domestic violence. The verse declares that men are qawwamūn over women and further prescribes three steps that men may undertake if they fear nushūz from their wives. Both qawwamūn and nushūz are difficult words to translate due to the multiple meanings they contain, but qawwamūn is usually understood to mean “guardians” and nushūz to mean, in this context, “disloyalty,” “rebellion,” or “recalcitrance.” According to conventional readings of this verse, the three steps that husbands may under-take if they fear nushūz from their women are: to admonish them [fa‘iΩūhunna],

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158 Ayesha S. Chaudhry

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2008.

shun them in bed [wa’hjurūhunna fi’l-ma āji‘], and/then strike or beat them [wa’ ribūhunna]. Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates the verse as follows:

(Husbands) are the protectors and maintainers of their (wives) because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next) refuse to share their beds, (and last) spank them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance): For Allah is most High, Great (above you all). (Q 4:34)

Ali displays his discomfort with the prescription of wife-beating in this verse by taking two steps. First, he interprets the three prescriptions of verbal admon-ishment, shunning in bed, and beating to be sequential rather than simultane-ous. Second, he qualifies the unqualified Qur’anic prescription of beating by adding “lightly” in parentheses. Ali’s hermeneutic move is an example of how the explicit textual command to beat women who commit nushūz violates notions of justice and gender egalitarianism that many contemporary scholars bring to the text. These conscientious objections arise in part because they perceive this verse to stand in counter-distinction to other verses in the Qur’an that promote reciprocity, mutual love and respect in marriage, and encourage the establishment of justice.4 This paper explores the methods employed by contemporary believing schol-ars who seek to reconcile the notions of justice and gender egalitarianism that they bring to the text with their belief that the Qur’an is the literal word of God. Their attempts at reconciling the tensions raised by the prescription of wife-beating in turn lead to a conversation regarding the interrelated issues of (a) the relative privileging of Qur’an and Sunnah,5 (b) the relationship between text and community, and (c) the role of historical precedent in contemporary inter-pretations. While not all believing scholars struggle with Q 4:34 in their published work, this paper focuses on the work of contemporary scholars who do wrestle with conscientious objections to the prescription of wife-beating. Within current scholarship, I identify three trends which I refer to as traditionalist, idealist, and reformist.6 In the traditionalist approach, the Sunnah plays a significant role in explain-ing the Qur’anic text, and the community relinquishes—at least nominally—its autonomy in its interaction with the Qur’anic text, thus making the text “sovereign.” In this case, the tradition, which had previously played a part in interpreting the verse, functions as a binding authority when considering new interpretations.7 In the idealist model the Sunnah continues to be significant, and while the Qur’anic text remains sovereign, the community receiving this divine text

The Problems of Conscience and Hermeneutics 159


assumes greater interpretive authority than it does in the traditionalist model. Scholars in this category have an ideal view of the Qur’an and also hold pre-cious specific ideals, to which they would like to see the Qur’an conform. Previous interpretations play a conflicted role in this interpretive framework. On the one hand, the pre-modern exegetical heritage is entirely suspect after being labeled patriarchal and misogynistic, and on the other hand, it is drawn on in an ad hoc and selective manner in order to bolster specific interpretations of the Qur’an. Within the reformist method, Sunnah plays only a supplementary role in comprehending Q 4:34. Furthermore, the community assumes an even greater interpretive role in this framework, such that it may reject the literal interpreta-tion of specific texts in the Qur’an. The text of the Qur’an is not sovereign in this approach, but can only be understood in its interactions with the interpre-tive community. Concerning tradition, reformists emphasize the significance of engaging critically with and learning from the interpretive heritage, all the while clarifying that this heritage is not binding. I propose that while the traditionalist and idealist trends are crucial steps in current scholarship, as they recognize the tension between notions of gender justice and the text of the Qur’an, their methods do not ultimately resolve these tensions. The reformist approach builds on the traditionalist and idealist approaches and moves beyond them both, although it is still in its formative stage. The salient difference between the reformist approach and the traditional-ist and idealist approaches is that the reformists are willing to admit that the Qur’anic text itself might be patriarchal and/or androcentric, or perhaps even unjust. The Traditionalist Approach The traditionalist method absolves the text of the Qur’an, deemed to be the literal word of God, of all blame for any perceived injustice. Rather, it places the entirety of the blame for tensions raised by Q 4:34 on human understanding. Egyptian-Canadian professor Jamal Badawi8 and Pakistani-Canadian professor Ahmed Shafaat9 represent the range of positions found within the traditionalist method. They approach Q 4:34 differently, but both believe that if the tradition (Sunnah and pre-modern interpretations) were presented in the correct light, it would resolve any tensions that Q 4:34 might raise. Both argue that Islam espouses ideas of justice and gender egalitarianism, and that men do not have superiority over women except by God consciousness [taqwā].10 They argue that any apparent tension is resolved by considering a restricted definition of nushūz as well as by stressing the necessity of following the three prescribed steps of admonishment, separating beds, and beating sequentially, thereby avoiding the latter whenever possible.11 Although both Badawi and Shafaat



present their methodologies as solidly “traditional” it is clear that their reason-ing differs from the heterogeneous scholarship referred to as “tradition” because they are explicitly wrestling with this prescription in the context of promoting the idea that Islam espouses justice and gender egalitarianism as ideals. Although the text is fundamental for both, they differ as to whether the Qur’an or Sunnah is primary. Badawi argues that it is significant that the reported Sunnah of the Prophet is that he never beat his wives and his only reported comments on Q 4:34 qualified the prescription of beating by limiting or stigmatizing the husband’s physical chastisement of his wife. This renders the prescription more “symbolic” than “punitive” in nature12 and should serve to discourage husbands from ever beating their wives. In contrast, Shafaat claims that rendering beating only symbolic apologizes for the prescription of wife-beating in the Qur’an, which being the word of God, requires no apology. Although the beating should not “seriously” injure the wife, he argues that it should nonetheless be an “energetic demonstration of the anger, frustration and love of the husband.”13 In this regard, he treats Sunnah as secondary to the specific Qur’anic text itself, since the prophetic model functions as “excep-tional” rather than “exemplary” in this instance.14 The Idealist Approach The idealist paradigm locates most if not all blame for tensions surrounding Q 4:34 in the received tradition, with exegetical works rather than jurisprudence constituting the main body of work examined. Idealists argue that the Qur’anic text itself is not patriarchal and/or misogynist, but rather that misogyny and patriarchy were read into the Qur’an by exegetes.15 Once these exegetical works are properly historicized, this argument claims that contemporary scholars will no longer be bound by previous interpretations. Instead, they will be fully within their rights to re-interpret verses like Q 4:34 to have more egalitarian meanings, which are in line with the spirit of justice and gender egalitarianism found within the Qur’an.16 To this end, many feminist scholars attempt to re-translate -r-b17 in Q 4:34.18 In re-translating -r-b, they attempt to reconcile this particular Qur’anic text with the rest of their reading of the Qur’an and thus hold the text itself partially “responsible” for its own interpretation,19 by rec-ognizing that there may be a problem with the text of the Qur’an itself. Hence, although the interpretive community receiving and interacting with the text assumes greater interpretive authority than in the traditionalist framework, the Qur’anic text still remains sovereign for idealist scholars. The tension between Qur’an and Sunnah remains relevant here, though idealists across the board privilege the Sunnah over the Qur’an with respect to wife-beating, arguing that the Sunnah helps believers to understand that the prescription in Q 4:34 was not meant to advocate marital violence. This privileged treatment of hadith reports



over the Qur’an is unique in the idealist approach, which often dismisses/ disregards patriarchal hadith reports in favor of more egalitarian verses of the Qur’an. In this particular case though the roles seem to be reversed since the hadith reports are more accommodating than the literal verse itself.20 Scholars who fall into the idealist paradigm include Asma Barlas, Hadia Mubarak, and Sa‘diyya Shaikh. Amina Wadud takes a unique place in this tradition. Wadud addresses the problem of -r-b in Q 4:34 in her work Qur’an and Woman21 in a largely idealist way, with the exception that Sunnah does not play a role in her interpretation of -r-b.22 In the decade and a half between Qur’an and Woman and her 2006 book Inside the Gender Jihad, her methodol-ogy has developed and now fits the reformist paradigm. I will discuss her approach in greater depth below. Barlas and Mubarak hold that patriarchal exegetes misinterpret Q 4:34 to sanction violence against women.23 Absolving the Qur’anic text of any respon-sibility for prescribing marital violence, Barlas argues that it is “exegesis that reads sexual inequality and husband privilege into the Qur’an.”24 Echoing Barlas, Mubarak writes that “any reading of the Qur’an that promotes or sanctions domestic abuse would violate the Qur’anic paradigm of marital relations.”25 Both she and Barlas argue that “it was secondary religious texts that enabled the textualization of misogyny in Islam.”26 Further, they argue that it is “the interpretive process, both imprecise and incomplete, that is open to critique and historicization, not revelation itself.”27 In theory, then, Barlas and Mubarak absolve the Qur’anic text from any responsibility. In practice, however, they hold it at least partially responsible for its own interpretation28 by their attempts to use re-translation as a central method of reinterpretation of the command wa’ ribūhunna, “and beat them.” Based on notions of God’s justice and the multivalent nature of the Qur’an, Barlas says that Riffat Hassan’s translation of -r-b as “to hold in confine-ment”29 is the “best construction”30 of this verse. Mubarak suggests that wa’ ribūhunna means “to create an effect upon her” by “employing the means ordained for conflict resolution: counseling and then sexual abandonment.”31 Mubarak, then, understands wa’ ribūhunna to be a restatement of the first two prescriptions. She feels that this translation “accurately”32 reflects notions of God’s absolute justice and the values of mercy and tranquility in marriage promoted in the Qur’an.33 Both Barlas and Mubarak display scholarly integrity when they consider that their own proposed translations of -r-b in Q 4:34 may be incorrect, when they reflect on the ramifications of translating -r-b to mean “beating.”34 In this event, they put forth essentially the same arguments cited by traditionalists when trying to explain away any tensions that translating -r-b as “beating” may raise for contemporary sensibilities. These arguments include the claim that traditional commentaries of Q 4:34 make it clear that -r-b was meant to be



highly qualified and more “symbolic” than “punitive” in nature.35 Consequently, while they break from the traditionalist mold by historicizing classical exegeti-cal interpretations and actually re-translate -r-b in Q 4:34, they also draw on the tradition for authority to argue that -r-b was not meant to condone vio-lence against women. The problem of husband privilege and the androcentric nature of the Qur’anic text itself, as it speaks “to men about women”36 is not interrogated in the idealist framework. In her earlier work Sa‘diyya Shaikh37 focuses her critique exclusively on the exegetical interpretations of Q 4:34 arguing that classical exegetes interpreted Q 4:34 to legitimate physical violence against wives. In doing so, she assumes that Q 4:34 does not sanction violence against women. She writes that reading the verse to sanction violence against women “reflects a decontextualized and simplistic interpretation of the text.”38 Though she critiques exegetes exten-sively, Shaikh does not consider that the nature of the Qur’anic text itself may be problematic and that it may be responsible for its own exegesis.39 The text remains sovereign in her approach and she does not mention the Sunnah or attempt to retranslate -r-b. Instead she argues that the imperative to “beat” wives if they are feared to be guilty of nushūz is descriptive of its seventh-century context rather than prescriptive.40 In her more recent work, Shaikh introduces the idea of a “tafsīr of praxis”41 or “embodied tafsīr,”42 where the community engaging with the Qur’anic text—specifically abused women—plays a central role in interpreting Q 4:34. Hence, she proposes that Qur’anic hermeneutics ought to “consciously reflect…real life experiences of Muslim women.”43 The idea that she proposes of hermeneutics reflecting the lived experience of Muslim women is one that many contemporary idealist and reformist scholars share. This approach provides an important opening for increased community responsibility for the interpretation of the Qur’anic text. The Reformist Approach Like Shaikh’s work, Wadud’s work on Q 4:34 has also developed a great deal. While Wadud addresses the problem of -r-b in Q 4:34 in a idealist way in her book Qur’an and Woman,44 she develops her methodology in her most recent book Inside the Gender Jihad45 so that her work moves from the idealist para-digm to the reformist framework. Wadud writes plainly that she simply “cannot condone permission for a man to ‘scourge’46 or apply any kind of strike to a woman.”47 For this reason, she has come to say “no” to a literal application of this verse.48 While this “no” may appear to be a break from the “tradition,” Wadud makes the case that it is rather a continuation of the process of tradi-tional exegesis of reading text through context.49 The only difference, accord-ing to Wadud, is that she explicitly acknowledges and accepts responsibility for her own intervention with the text while tradition does not do so overtly.50



Although Wadud characterizes her “no” to the text of Q 4:34 as akin to Khaled Abou El Fadl’s “conscientious pause”51 I posit that it is qualitatively different. While a “conscientious pause” remains loaded with possibilities, including the possibility of accepting the text, a “no” is definitive in nature. It is not clear what saying “no” to texts such as Q 4:34 means precisely, nor is the relation-ship that these texts have with the community thereafter elucidated. It is clear, though, that Wadud no longer treats the text as sovereign, and in fact appears to be favoring the present context over the text in this instance of interpretation. Reformists, then, advocate an entirely new approach to difficult verses like Q 4:34 by granting an increasingly large interpretive role to each particularized context that interacts with the text. By doing this, they attempt to move away from what Ebrahim Moosa refers to as “text fundamentalism”52 wherein a text that is sovereign marginalizes its own community, to a text that is “performa-tive,”53 interactive, and thereby relevant. Historical precedent remains pertinent in this framework, but as a helpful reference rather than a binding authority. The tension between the Qur’anic prescription of wife-beating and the prophetic Sunnah of never beating wives also remains relevant in this paradigm, but serves the function of validating the existence of ethical tensions raised by the text in the current context rather than resolving these tensions. Scholars such as Farid Esack, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Kecia Ali, Ebrahim Moosa, and Amina Wadud approach the text as reformists. These scholars directly confront the tensions raised by verses like Q 4:34 as text of the Qur’an itself. Esack and Ali note the primarily androcentric nature of the Qur’an and assert that scholars need to grapple with the problems this raises directly.54 Both argue that it is not enough to locate patriarchy in interpretations, but rather the patriarchy of the Qur’anic text itself must be acknowledged even if it does not necessarily lead to misogyny.55 As opposed to idealist scholars, Esack finds little value in the re-translations of -r-b as anything but “beating,” and instead addresses issues of text, com-munity, and interpretation.56 Anticipating the later Wadud, Esack gives prefer-ence to the value of gender justice over the prescription of Q 4:34, even if it is a value that is largely imposed on the text. He contends that believers must “consciously depart from the letter of the text”57 when confronting the prescrip-tion of wife-beating in Q 4:34. In fact, any text that does not serve the end of justice must be subjected to a host of hermeneutical devices, ranging from contextualization and re-interpretation to abrogation. In response to those who may argue that this constitutes violence against the text, Esack candidly writes that if it comes down to a choice between committing violence against divine text and legitimating violence against real people, he would rather “plead guilty to charges of violence against the text.”58 Nonetheless, Esack believes that the Qur’an contains “sufficient seeds” within it to validate the efforts of those who are committed to gender justice and wish to “live in fidelity with its underlying



ethos.”59 Moosa and Ali warn that it is important to recognize that contempo-rary concerns of gender justice may not be the concern of the Qur’an.60 Like the idealists, Esack and Wadud claim that the relationship between context and text is infinitely significant, especially since context always has and must continue to influence interpretation.61 However, they differ from the ideal-ists in two significant ways: First, they contend that the use of the verb -r-b in Q 4:34 literally means “to hit/beat.” Second, Esack and Wadud unambiguously privilege current context over text and historical precedent when they argue that based on twenty-first century notions of gender justice, a literal application of Q 4:34 is unacceptable.62 Though historical precedent remains germane to reformist scholars it plays a different role. While both idealists and reformists historicize “tradition” and argue for new interpretative models, idealists tend to draw on precedent in a manner that seeks authority from it63 while reformists evoke it rather as a helpful reference. Abou El Fadl argues that the role of historical precedent is “to guide and not blind.”64 The example of traditional scholars is used to make the case that they did not consider themselves irrevo-cably tied to their own predecessors but also that they did not disregard them out of hand.65 Moosa illustrates the way that reformist scholars draw on historical prece-dent to justify their own methods. He points to the example of classical jurists who considered beating legitimate grounds for women to seek divorce despite the fact that the Qur’an permitted it. He argues that privileging a particularized context has been an acceptable scholarly practice, notwithstanding its apparent contradiction to the explicit text of the Qur’an.66 In this regard, he encourages the study of the multiple interpretive methodologies employed by scholars in the past, as part of the exploration and development of new interpretive methods.67 Ultimately, then, reformist scholars seem be to advocating a complex rela-tionship with history that neither binds us to it nor rejects it completely. While historical precedent is valued, it is historicized so it no longer carries the authority that is sometimes drawn from it by traditionalist and idealist scholars. This attempt to consider historical precedent when developing new methodolo-gies, even as historical precedent is declared non-binding and the “perpetually retrospective”68 manner of many contemporary scholars is criticized, may appear to be disingenuous. However, I venture that they seek to maintain a connection with historical precedent in order to use it to avoid both text fun-damentalism—an interpretative framework that grants sovereignty to the text— and its logical opposite, context fundamentalism—a hermeneutic framework that would grant sovereignty to context alone. Rather than granting ultimate sovereignty to previously held interpretations or rejecting those interpretations outright, this approach seeks a “middle path” in which historical methods and interpretations are understood through the lens of the present context.



Conclusion This brief survey of some of the contemporary approaches to Q 4:34 explores the question of how much text matters as opposed to context or vice versa, and who has the authority to decide how much of each plays a role in the interpreta-tion of difficult verses. Although I outlined three specific categories in this essay for the purpose of organization, they are better represented by a spectrum and a varying level of each approach can be found in almost all scholarly works of interpretation engaged in this essay. As contemporary scholars struggle with Q 4:34, they have argued for engag-ing both the text and historical precedent in the present context. Yet current approaches raise more questions than they answer. How can scholars engage with a divine text so that they may ultimately say “no” to it as part of a herme-neutic that is at the same time consistent and comprehensive? How can scholars engage with history in a constructive and beneficial way to derive such a herme-neutic? Can new methodologies of interpretation avoid both text and context fundamentalism? Verses such as Q 4:34 contain an immediacy that requires scholars to articulate a just and egalitarian reading of the text. This may lead them into novel methods of hermeneutics but these readings must be conscious of the myriad tensions any new interpretive methodology creates. Notes * I would like to acknowledge Professor Kecia Ali for her persistent guidance in

the writing and re-writing of this article. Her insights were invaluable to this project.

1. The New York Times also printed another article in the same month regarding Q 4:34. The second article was about Laleh Bakhtiar’s “new translation” of -r-b in Q 4:34 as “to go away.” Actually this translation has been put forth by several scholars previously, including Dr. Abdul-Hamid Abu Sulayman, Tariq Suweidan and others. See Neil MacFarquhar, “New Translation Prompts Debate on Islamic Verse”, The New York Times, March 25, 2007.

2. Mark Lander, “Germany Cites Koran in Rejecting Divorce,” The New York Times, March 22, 2007.

3. Lander, “Germany Cites Koran in Rejecting Divorce.” 4. E.g. Q 4:1; 9:71–72; 16:72; 20:21; 33:35; 48:5–6; 49:13. Kecia Ali discusses

these and other similar verses in Chapter 7 of her book Sexual Ethics and Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).

5. Sunnah or the way of the prophet Muhammad, includes both hadith reports (reports of sayings of the Prophet) and sira (historical writings about the Prophet).

6. I am not proposing these to be hard and fast categories, but rather as tentative structures that will help us sort through contemporary works on the topic.



7. The vocabulary that I use regarding the “sovereignty” of the text and of the

community interacting with the text is drawn from my understanding of Ebrahim Moosa’s article “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” in Progressive Muslims: On Gender, Justice and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 111–27.

8. Jamal A. Badawi, Gender Equity in Islam: Basic Principles (1995), www.iad.org/pdf/gei.pdf.

9. Ahmed Shafaat, “A Commentary on the Qur’an 4:34,” http://www. themodernreligion.com/women/dv–4–34-shafaat.html.

10. Shafaat, “A Commentary on the Qur’an 4:34.” Taqwā is a Qur’anic concept which connotes “God consciousness” and refers to the state that believers struggle to attain through faith and good deeds.

11. Badawi discusses Q 4:34 only in the footnotes of his Gender Equity in Islam. Shafaat discusses this in the main text of his “A Commentary on the Qur’an 4:34”.

12. The earliest comparative use of “symbolic” vs. “punitive” that I can find was in Badawi’s 1995 treatise on Gender Equity in Islam. I found it used many times thereafter, by scholars including Barlas and Mubarak. See Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 188, and Hadia Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” Hawwa 2 no. 3 (2005): 276, 286.

13. Shafaat, “A Commentary on the Qur’an 4:34.” 14. The issue of the Prophet’s example being treated as “exemplary” or “excep-

tional” within contemporary discourse is discussed in depth in Kecia Ali’s article “ ‘A Beautiful Example’: The Prophet Muhammad as a Model for Muslim Husbands,” Islamic Studies 43, no. 2 (2004): 273–91. Shafaat treats the specific example of the Prophet not beating his wives as “exceptional” whereas Badawi considers it as “exemplary.”

15. See Sa‘diyya Shaikh, “Exegetical Violence: Nushuz in Qur’anic Gender Ideol-ogy,” Journal for Islamic Studies 17 (1997): 49–73; Shaikh, “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South African Muslim Community,” in Violence Against Women: Roots and Cures in World Religions, ed. Sa’diyyah Shaikh and Dan Maguire (Ohio: Pilgrim, forthcoming); Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 189; and Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” 266, 275.

16. Many feminist scholars refer to the notion of the “spirit” or underlying ethos of the Qur’an as one that promotes justice and egalitarianism differently in different social and historical contexts. These works draw heavily on Fazlur Rahman’s work where he promotes this idea. See Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 39; Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9; Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 23.

http://www.iad.org/pdf/gei.pdf

http://www.themodernreligion.com/women/dv%E2%80%934%E2%80%9334-shafaat.html



17. -r-b is the trilateral root of the imperative form ‘i ribūhunna used in Q 4:34.

The translation of this word is very controversial, although in its most basic sense it is translated by Hans Wehr in A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Beirut: Librarire du Liban, 1980), 629–31, as “to beat, to strike, to hit.”

18. Some of these re-translations will be discussed below. For a more comprehen-sive list of contemporary re-translations, see Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” 261–89.

19. I borrow the general idea of a text being “responsible” for its own interpretation from Asma Barlas. See Barlas’ work in “Believing Women” in Islam, 27–28, 206–7.

20. Kecia Ali discusses the Qur’an-centered nature of much feminist scholarship in her book Sexual Ethics and Islam, xx–xxi.

21. Wadud, Qur’an and Woman. 22. Kecia Ali discusses this in her article “ ‘A Beautiful Example’: The Prophet

Muhammad as a Model for Muslim Husbands,” where she explores the tension raised by the fact that Wadud does quote the Prophet on being the best to his family and her decision to avoid Sunnah when dealing with this verse.

23. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam; Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34.”

24. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 189. 25. Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse

4:34,” 275. 26. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 9. See also Mubarak, “Breaking the

Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” 262. 27. Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 34. 28. The idea of a text being “responsible for its own (mis)reading” is one that I draw

on from Asma Barlas’ work in “Believing Women” in Islam, 27–28, 206–7. Ali critiques Barlas’ take on the notion that that the Qur’an may be “responsible for its own misreading” (205) in her book Sexual Ethics in Islam, 132, where she argues that Barlas’ approach renders any claim that patriarchy may be present in the Qur’anic text itself as a “misreading” of that text.

29. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 188–89; Riffat Hassan, “An Islamic Per-spective,” in Sexuality: A Reader, ed. Karen Lebacqz (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1999), 355–56. Hassan makes the case, based partly on Urdu words (like the Urdu word salahiyat meaning “capacity” vs. the Arabic word āli āt meaning “righteous”) that Q 4:34 is suggesting that if all women decide to rebel against their roles as child-bearers then the community has an obligation to discipline them.

30. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 189. 31. Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse

4:34,” 284–85. 32. Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse

4:34,” 264.



33. Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse

4:34,” 275. 34. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 188 and Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpre-

tive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” 285–86. 35. Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 188 and Mubarak, “Breaking the Interpre-

tive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” 286. See n. 12 above for discussion on “punitive” and “symbolic.”

36. Farid Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia,” in What Men Owe to Women: Men’s Voices from World Religions, ed. J. C. Raines and D. C. Maguire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 195, and Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam, 112.

37. Shaikh, “Exegetical Violence: Nushuz in Qur’anic Gender Ideology,” and “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South African Muslim Community.”

38. Shaikh, “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South African Muslim Community,” 5.

39. Farid Esack makes a similar critique of Sa‘diyya Shaikh’s article in “What Do Men Owe to Women: Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/fewhatdomenowe.html. I use the website for some of these references, since the text of the presentation includes ideas that are not present in the printed version of this article in the edited volume.


41. Shaikh, “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South African Muslim Community,” 5, 12.



44. Wadud, Qur’an and Woman. 45. Amina Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford:

Oneworld, 2006). 46. The translation of wa’ ribuhhunna as “scourge” is Pickthal’s translation. 47. Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 200. 48. Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 200. 49. Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 204. 50. Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 204. 51. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and

Women (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 213, and Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 200.

52. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 123. 53. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 124–25.

http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/fewhatdomenowe.html



54. Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia,” 195–96, 202;

Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam. 55. Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam, 132. 56. Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia,” 202–5. 57. Esack, “What do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/

fewhatdomenowe. html. 58. Esack, “What do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/

fewhatdomenowe.html. 59. Esack, “What do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/

fewhatdomenowe.html. 60. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 121; Ali, Sexual Ethics and

Islam, 133. 61. Esack, “What Do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/

fewhatdomenowe.html; Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad, 203. 62. Esack, “What Do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/

fewhatdomenowe.html; Wadud in Inside the Gender Jihad, 203–4. 63. The obvious exception here is Sa‘diyya Shaikh, who does not draw on tradition

for authority in her work. Her approach does not fall squarely into the Idealist or Reformist categories.

64. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam (New York: University Press of America, 2001), 182.

65. Esack, “What do Men Owe Women?,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/ fewhatdomenowe.html; El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 144–45, 62–63; Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam, xxiv.

66. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 125–26. 67. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 125–26. 68. Moosa, “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam,” 122. References Ali, Kecia. Sexual Ethics and Islam. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Ali, Kecia. “ ‘A Beautiful Example’: The Prophet Muhammad as a Model for Muslim

Husbands.” Islamic Studies 43, no. 2 (2004): 273–91. Badawi, Jamal A. Gender Equity in Islam: Basic Principles. 1995. www.iad.org/pdf/gei.pdf. Barlas, Asma. “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the

Qur’an. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. Esack, Farid. “What Do Men Owe to Women: Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic

Apologia,” http://uk.geocities.com/faridesack/fewhatdomenowe.html. Esack, Farid. “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Aplogia.” In What Men Owe to

Women: Men’s Voices from World Religions, ed. J. C. Raines and D. C. Maguire, 187–210. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.

El Fadl, Khaled Abou. Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam. New York: University Press of America, 2001.

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El Fadl, Khaled Abou. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. Oxford:

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Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1999. Lander, Mark. “Germany Cites Koran in Rejecting Divorce.” The New York Times, March 22,

2007. MacFarquhar, Neil. “New Translation Prompts Debate on Islamic Verse.” The New York

Times, March 25, 2007. Moosa, Ebrahim. “The Debts and Burden of Critical Islam.” In Progressive Muslims: On

Gender, Justice and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi, 111–27. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003. Mubarak, Hadia. “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34.”

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Islamic Studies 17 (1997): 49–73. Shaikh, Sa’diyya. “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South

African Muslim Community.” In Violence Against Women: Roots and Cures in World Religions, ed. Sa’diyyah Shaikh and Dan Maguire. Ohio: Pilgrim, forthcoming.

Wadud, Amina. Qur’an and Woman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Wadud, Amina. Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Wehr, Hans. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. Beirut: Librarire du Liban, 1980.

http://www.themodernreligion.com/

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http://www.themodernreligion.com/women/dv%E2%80%934%E2%80%9334-shafaat.html

ayesha s. chaudhry

Documents

librarire du liban

modern written arabic

germany cites koran

translation prompts debate

book sexual ethics

unreading patriarchal interpretations

quranic gender ideology

kecia ali discusses