background - bc forensic league web viewthe word “should ... white house raises . refugee ......

Bauschard Debate 10/2/15 5:22:37 PM

Background.....................................................................................................................................6Definitions..................................................................................................................................7

“Refugees” Defined................................................................................................................8Should Limit the Definition to Persecution/Fleeing War.......................................................14Related – Definition of “Persecution”...................................................................................20“Humanitarian Needs”..........................................................................................................21Prioritize...............................................................................................................................24Government..........................................................................................................................25National Interest...................................................................................................................27- No Agreed Upon Meaning..................................................................................................28- Neoconservatives Define it to include National Greatness and Promotion of Values........29- Realist Interpretation Bad...................................................................................................31- “National Greatness”/Neoconservative Interpretation Bad...............................................32Should...................................................................................................................................34-- Should -- Obligation...........................................................................................................35-- Should -- Mandatory..........................................................................................................36-- Should -- Likely..................................................................................................................37-- Should – Past Tense...........................................................................................................38-- Should -- Future.................................................................................................................39-- Should -- Future.................................................................................................................40-- Should -- Ought.................................................................................................................41-- Should – Recommended Course of Action........................................................................42-- Should – Implies Desirability.............................................................................................43-- Should – Not Mandatory...................................................................................................44-- Should -- Duty....................................................................................................................45

Current.....................................................................................................................................46Current Means the Present Time..........................................................................................47“Current Crisis” W/10 Refugees............................................................................................48

History of Refugee Law & Obligations......................................................................................86History of Refugee Law.........................................................................................................87Humanitarian Law vs. Human Rights Law.............................................................................91Sources of International Legal Protection for Refugees........................................................92International Law Supports Humanitarian Objectives..........................................................93International Humanitarian Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance...................................94Grounding for International Human Rights Law...................................................................99International Refugee Law Applies to All States.................................................................100International Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance........................................................101Customary International Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance......................................102What is Customary International Law?...............................................................................103

Extent of the Problem.............................................................................................................10460 Million Refugees (Global)...............................................................................................105Afghanistan Refugees.........................................................................................................108Existing Resettlement Fails.................................................................................................109Massive Crisis -- Europe......................................................................................................110Reasons People Flee...........................................................................................................113

Actions by Specific Countries..................................................................................................115Germany Intake..................................................................................................................116Syrian Refugees Will Increase.............................................................................................118


Status Quo Distribution Plan...............................................................................................119Hungary’s Anti-Immigrant Response..................................................................................120Mediterranean Border Crossing.........................................................................................121Greece................................................................................................................................123Status Quo US Action..........................................................................................................124European Border Controls..................................................................................................125Italy Route..........................................................................................................................126

Justice.....................................................................................................................................127Pro..............................................................................................................................................128

Morality – Crisis Specific Cards...............................................................................................129Morality – General – Current Crisis Specific Cards..............................................................130Morality – Walzer...............................................................................................................135Morality – Right to Asylum.................................................................................................136Morality – Golden Rule.......................................................................................................138Morality – General – Empathy............................................................................................139Morality – Syrians HAVE to Leave Syria..............................................................................141Morality -- Responsibility....................................................................................................142Morality – Responsibility (US).............................................................................................143Morality – Responsibility (US) – A2: Nothing US Could Have Done....................................145

Morality – General – Theoretical Evidence.............................................................................146Should Include Refugees.....................................................................................................147Supporting Basic Needs Protects Human Rights.................................................................149Need to Protect the Human Rights of the Stateless............................................................150Children..............................................................................................................................151Hospitality...........................................................................................................................154Should Provide Aid..............................................................................................................161Should Support “The Other”...............................................................................................162Should Act on Ethics...........................................................................................................170

A2: Con Arguments (Morality Related)...................................................................................177A2: Humanitarian Claims Bad.............................................................................................178A2: States Have the Right to Exclude..................................................................................179A2: Right to Exclude -- Wellman.........................................................................................183A2: Allow States to Refuse Refugee Resettlement..............................................................185A2: Should Act on a “Realist” Interpretation of the National Interest................................186A2: Other Governments Will Protect..................................................................................187A2: Bostrum........................................................................................................................192

Right to Receive Membership.................................................................................................193General Right to Receive Membership...............................................................................194

Humanitarian Needs of Refugees...........................................................................................196Smuggling Advantage.........................................................................................................197Death..................................................................................................................................198Sea-Crossing Death.............................................................................................................199Forgetting...........................................................................................................................201Migrant Detention Centers Bad..........................................................................................202Starvation...........................................................................................................................203Poverty/Abuse....................................................................................................................204Health Risks........................................................................................................................205

Human Rights.........................................................................................................................206


Refugees Human Rights Must Be Protected.......................................................................207Human Rights Protection Outweighs National Interest......................................................219A2: Human Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Refugees...............................................................221A2: No Foundation for Human Rights.................................................................................222Europe Obligated Under International Law........................................................................223

International Law....................................................................................................................224Can’t Send Refugees Back...................................................................................................225Need to Uphold International Law......................................................................................230

Other Advantages – Economies of Intake Countries...............................................................231Economy.............................................................................................................................232Germany/France Economy Advantage...............................................................................234

Other Advantages -- Geopolitical............................................................................................235Croatia Advantage..............................................................................................................236EE/Balkan Conflict...............................................................................................................238EU Leadership/Growth.......................................................................................................240

A2: Con Arguments (General).................................................................................................242A2: Too Many People to Absorb.........................................................................................243A2: Most are Migrants, Not Refugees.................................................................................244A2: Refugees Hurt the Economy.........................................................................................245A2: Too Expensive...............................................................................................................247A2: Refugees Could be Terrorists........................................................................................248A2: Military Action Better...................................................................................................253A2: Benefits Cause People to Flee Their Homeland............................................................254A2: Jordan Resopnse Plan Solves......................................................................................................255A2: Refugee Camps Solve...................................................................................................256A2: Racist Backlash.............................................................................................................265A2: Aid Solves.....................................................................................................................266A2: Sovereignty Good DA....................................................................................................267A2: Criticisms of International Law.....................................................................................271

Solution -- Should Increase Aid...............................................................................................277Should Increase Aid............................................................................................................278Need to Increase Aid...........................................................................................................279

Solution -- Need Massive Resettlement..................................................................................280Status Quo Plan Fails...........................................................................................................281Need a Comprehensive Resettlement Plan.........................................................................282Resettling Large Numbers Practically Possible....................................................................284

Should Allow Asylum Claims Outside of Europe.....................................................................285Solution -- Resettlement – Tradable Quota System................................................................286

The System.........................................................................................................................287A2: Tradeable Quotas Undermine Refugee Preference......................................................289A2: Preference Key to Meet Basic Needs............................................................................290A2: Other Important Reasons for Preference.....................................................................291A2: Tradable Quotas Threaten the Dignity of Refugees......................................................292A2: Bad to Commodify Refugees........................................................................................294A2: Countries Might Discriminate Based on Type of Refugee.............................................296A2: Poorer Countries Will be Exploited...............................................................................298Solution -- Canada...............................................................................................................301Solution -- Aid to Refugee Camps.......................................................................................303


Solution -- Have Some Countries Absorb Most...................................................................304Solution -- Multilateral Action.............................................................................................305

Con.............................................................................................................................................306Morality/Should Prioritize National Interest & Realism..........................................................307

Should Prioritize National Interest......................................................................................308A2: Walzer..........................................................................................................................310A2: Rights............................................................................................................................312Turn - Responsibility...........................................................................................................313Turn -- Utopianism..............................................................................................................315Turn -- Intervention............................................................................................................318Turn – Social Contract.........................................................................................................322Ethical Pragmatism Necessary to Prevent War...................................................................326Ethics Of Prudence..............................................................................................................328Policy Relevance Turn.........................................................................................................331Policy Relevance Turn.........................................................................................................3331NC Lead By Example Turn.................................................................................................3351NC Lead By Example Turn.................................................................................................337Moralizing Terrible..............................................................................................................338Moralizing Is Immoral.........................................................................................................341Ethics Of Consequences Prevents War...............................................................................343Avoid the Worst..................................................................................................................345Absolute Virtue Bad............................................................................................................346Morality Answers Frontline -- Defense...............................................................................347Answers to: “Must Aid the Stranger”..................................................................................351Rawls Answers....................................................................................................................353Levinas/Infinite Responsiblity Answers – Util.....................................................................355Levinas Answer – Quantification.........................................................................................358Levinas Answer – Nazism....................................................................................................360Answers to: “Be for the Other”...........................................................................................362Liberalism Causes War........................................................................................................366Liberalism Leads to Foreign Policy Failure..........................................................................367Liberalism Undermines Foreign Policy................................................................................369Liberalism Supports Intervention........................................................................................371Liberalism Undermines U.S. Power.....................................................................................374Liberalism Promotes Isolationism.......................................................................................376Liberalism Supports Imperialism.........................................................................................378Liberalism Supports Imperialism.........................................................................................380Answers to: “Liberalism Peaceful”.....................................................................................382Answers to: “Liberalism Peaceful”.....................................................................................384Answers to: “Liberalism Peaceful”.....................................................................................386Answers to: “Liberalism Peaceful”.....................................................................................388Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................390Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................392Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................394Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................396Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................398Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................400Liberalism Theoretically Flawed..........................................................................................402


Realism Theoretically Superior toe Liberalism....................................................................404Morality/Responsiblity...........................................................................................................406

A2: US Responsible -- US Could Have Intervened in Syria...................................................407A2: Responsibility to Refugees............................................................................................410A2: Infinite Ethical Responsibility to the Other...................................................................411Not Just Europe’s Responsibility.........................................................................................415States Have a Right to Exclude............................................................................................416

A2: Other Advantages.............................................................................................................425A2: International Humanitarian Law...................................................................................426

Forced Resettlement Bad........................................................................................................431Redistributing Refugees Across Europe Fails......................................................................432Can’t Force Resettlement...................................................................................................433No Support for Increased Redistribution............................................................................437European Action Generally Fails.........................................................................................438

Disadvantages.........................................................................................................................440Social Services Good...........................................................................................................441Backlash..............................................................................................................................442Terrorism............................................................................................................................445European Politics Links.......................................................................................................446Czech Politics Links.............................................................................................................448Sovereignty.........................................................................................................................450


Background


Definitions


“Refugees” Defined

“Refugees’ vs. “migrant”

Jeanne Park, September 23, 2015, Council on Foreign Relations, Europe’s Migration Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874 DOA: 9-25-15

Distinguishing migrants from asylum seekers and refugees is not always a clear-cut process, yet it is a crucial designation because these groups are entitled to different levels of assistance and protection under international law.

An asylum seeker is defined as a person fleeing persecution or conflict, and therefore seeking international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees; a refugee is an asylum seeker whose claim has been approved. However, the UN considers migrants fleeing war or persecution to be refugees, even before they officially receive asylum. (Syrian and Eritrean nationals, for example, enjoy prima facie refugee status.) An economic migrant, by contrast, is person whose primary motivation for leaving his or her home country is economic gain. The term "migrant" is seen as an umbrella term for all three groups. (Said another way: all refugees are migrants, but not all migrants are refugees.)

Europe is currently witnessing a mixed-migration phenomenon, in which economic migrants and asylum seekers travel together. In reality, these groups can and do overlap, and this gray area is frequently exacerbated by the inconsistent methods with which asylum applications are often processed across the EU's twenty-eight member states.

A refugee is anyone outside his or her own country who cannot return due to fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership in a particular group

Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, August 2014, Professor Guy S. Goodwin Gill was formerly Professor of Asylum Law at the University of Amsterdam, served as a Legal Adviser in the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 1976-1988, and was President of the Media Appeals Board of Kosovo from 2000-2003. He is the Founding Editor of the International Journal of Refugee Law and has written extensively on refugees, migration, international organizations, elections, democratization, and child soldiers. Recent publications include The Limits of Transnational Law, (CUP 2010), with Hélène Lambert, eds., The Refugee in International Law, (OUP, 2007), 3rd edn. with Jane McAdam; Free and Fair Elections, (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2nd edn., 2006); Brownlie’s Documents on Human Rights, (OUP, 2010), 6th edn., with the late Sir Ian Brownlie, QC, eds; and introductory notes to various treaties and instruments on refugees, statelessness and asylum for the ‘Historic Archives’ section of the UN Audio-Visual Library of International Law. He practises as a Barrister from Blackstone Chambers, London, The International Handbook of Refugee Protectionhttp://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021 DOA: 9-25-15

http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021


http://www.un.org/law/avl/


http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874


Article 1A(1) of the 1951 Convention applies the term ‘refugee’, first, to any person considered a refugee under earlier international arrangements. Then, Article 1A(2), read now together with the 1967 Protocol and without time or geographical limits, offers a general definition of the refugee as including any person who is outside their country or origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group (an additional ground not found in the UNHCR Statute), or political opinion. Stateless persons may also be refugees in this sense, where country of origin (citizenship) is understood as ‘country of former habitual residence’.

The refugee must be ‘outside’ his or her country of origin, and having crossed an international frontier is an intrinsic part of the quality of refugee, understood in the international legal sense. However, it is not necessary to have fled by reason of fear of persecution, or even actually to have been persecuted. The fear of persecution looks to the future, and can emerge during an individual’s absence from their home country, for example, as a result of intervening political change.

“Refugee” does not cover those who have committed war crimes


The Convention does require that the persecution feared be for reasons of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion’. This language, which recalls the language of non-discrimination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments, gives an insight into the characteristics of individuals and groups which are considered relevant to refugee protection. These reasons in turn show that the groups or individuals are identified by reference to a classification which ought to be irrelevant to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, while persecution implies a violation of human rights of particular gravity; it may be the result of cumulative events or systemic mistreatment, but equally it could comprise a single act of torture (Hathaway 2005; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007).

“Refugee” definition

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Dieter Kugelmann, lawyer and professor, March 2010, Refugees, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e866 DOA: 9-25-15

3 Art. 1 (1) Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons ([adopted 28 September 1954, entered into force 6 June 1960] 360 UNTS 117) defines the term ‘stateless person’ as a person who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law (Nationality). It further prescribes the standards of treatment to be accorded to stateless persons. The Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen of 23 November 1957 grants specific protection to a special group of refugees. The non-binding Declaration on Territorial Asylum, United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967, lays down a series of fundamental principles in regard to territorial asylum (Asylum, Territorial) stating that the granting of territorial asylum ‘is a peaceful and humanitarian act and that, as such, it cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other State’ (at para. 4).

4 Under international law, Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention defines the notion ‘refugee’ as a person who,

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

By Agreement, the Refugee Protocol extends the definition of a “refugee” to those impacted by war


The Refugee Protocol extended the application of the Refugee Convention to the situation of ‘new refugees’, ie persons who, while meeting the Refugee Convention definition, had become refugees as a result of events that took place after 1 January 1951. This definition requires that the fear of persecution was the reason for fleeing the State and it requires that the person crosses a border. Persons fleeing from natural disasters, civil wars (Armed Conflict, Non-International), or economic crisis do not fall into the scope of the Refugee Convention. However, the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for [UNHCR]) was extended, ratione personae, by unanimous consent of the Member States to displaced persons in refugee-like situations. This includes persons who are compelled to leave their home because of man-made disasters, eg armed conflicts or other political and social upheavals.

“Refugee Convention” definition is accepted world-wide


http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e866





















Although the legal definition of refugees given in the Refugee Convention is a definition solely for the purposes of the Convention, it is in practice recognized for the purpose of humanitarian assistance on a worldwide basis. It can be seen as the core of a minimum standard definition for the status of a person as refugee. The law of the European Union contains a definition which is based on the Refugee Convention. According to Art. 2 lit. c Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, the term refugee means a third country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of [his] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or [it refers to] a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.

SARPA definition of “refugee”


Within the Organization of American States (OAS), two legal instruments of 28 March 1954 relate to refugees: the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (Asylum, Diplomatic) and the Convention on Territorial Asylum (so-called Caracas Convention). The notion of refugee used in these conventions is close to the notion used in the Refugee Convention. A broader notion of refugee is endorsed by the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (‘SARPA Convention’). Taking into account the definition of the Refugee Convention, Art. 1 (2) SARPA Convention defines a refugee as a ‘person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence’. Refugee protection is not centred on the reason for persecution but on the individual need of the refugee to be protected. This notion, however, does not correspond with an enlargement of the rights of the refugee.

There are political, social, and legal definitions of a “refugee,” but all include the idea of someone who flees his or her existing living arrangement


The notion ‘refugee’ can be understood from a sociological, political, or legal point of view. In a broader sense, a refugee is a person who flees his habitual place of residence and seeks refuge elsewhere. Persons may leave their homes because of natural disasters or because of man-made situations, especially out of fear of persecution, war, or other circumstances, menacing their individual sphere of interest. After a certain period of time they may return to their home countries or may stay in the destination country for an unlimited time. However, this description















does not yet entail concrete legal consequences, because there is no consent on a general legal definition of the term refugee at the level of customary international law.

Cartagena definition includes those fleeing war

Hugo Story, Upper Tribunal Judge (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (UTIAC) (formerly Senior Immigration Judge of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal) in the United Kingdom (UK); formerly a law academic, and later an Honorary Research Fellow, at the University of Leeds; and a founding member of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ). The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of UTIAC or the IARLJ. draft, 2012, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Armed Conflict in the Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw,” http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/2/1.full DOA: 9-25-15

The Cartagena Declaration’s drafters were even more concerned to ensure their regional definition of refugee embraced those fleeing armed conflict and generalised violence, stating that: The definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.2

Those fleeing war are covered by broader and or subsidiary definitions of “refugee”


Significantly, within Europe, starting with various non-binding resolutions between EU Member States, 27 progressing to the Temporary Protection Directive 28 and culminating in the Qualification Directive, reform to ensure international protection for persons fleeing armed conflict was effected, not by including any specific criteria relating to them in the definition of persecution, but by dealing with them in the context of extra-1951 Convention “subsidiary protection”. Thus Article 15(c) of the QD provides that one of the three categories of serious harm concerns: “(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”.

Article 15 of the EU QD was drafted against the backdrop that within the wider framework of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its predecessor Commission, had been dealing with many cases involving persons fleeing from armed conflict who had been denied refugee status but claimed they should succeed under Articles 2 and 3 of the European

http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/2/1.full#fn-28


http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/2/1.full





Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 29 At that time the Court’s response was as given in Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom , 30 which concerned an asylum-seeker from Sri Lanka, that a person could not succeed on such a basis unless they could show a risk personal to him – again, some kind of exceptionality approach.

So when it comes to persons fleeing armed conflict there has been in various ways a visible displacement of refugee decision-making away from dealing with them under the Article 1A(2) refugee definition and towards catering for them either under broader, supplementary definitions of refugee (as in the OAU Convention) or under forms of subsidiary protection.

Four reasons those fleeing armed conflict should be protected as refugees


Before seeking to clarify the implications of the above analysis for refugee law, it is salient to remind ourselves of the major reasons why armed conflict cases need to be looked under the Refugee Convention. Firstly, because we know that Article 1A(2) was not supposed to exclude those fleeing armed conflict from consideration; secondly because we know that the Refugee Convention has primacy (it must have primacy on an international law level because, leaving aside the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture, it is the only refugee-specific treaty with a global application); thirdly, because we also know that all the regional treaties accord it primacy; and, finally, because otherwise we fail to combat the error of displacement – using other systems of refugee protection at a regional or state level as a substitute for application of Refugee Convention protection.





Should Limit the Definition to Persecution/Fleeing War

The definition of a “refugee” should be limited to persons fleeing persecution

Max Cherem, September 29, 2015, assistant professor of philosophy, has been appointed as the Marlene Crandell Francis Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Refugee Rights: Against Expanding the Definition of a “Refugee” and Unilateral Protection Elsewhere, p. 1-23 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12071

(1) It threatens state sovereignty

I reject a humanitarian definition where someone is a refugee simply if their basic needs are insufficiently protected at home. The Refugee Convention is roughly correct: a refugee is “any person who: owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”30 This definition yields a tripartite distinction between refugees who, after status recognition, have entitlements to non-refoulement and new membership, versus both immigrants and refugee-like outsiders who, while poorly off, do not.

The philosophical literature has coalesced around an expanded humanitarian definition pioneered by Andrew Shacknove.31 He compared definitions used by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations, endorsing a definition similar to that of the OAU.32 He claimed the UN definition went awry because it took persecution and alienage (crossing an international border)33 as capturing the distinctiveness of refugees. For Shacknove, these were manifestations of two more fundamental criteria—the absence of state protection and access by the international community. He proposed a wider definition: “a refugee is, in essence, a person whose government fails to protect his basic needs, who has no remaining recourse than to seek international restitution of these needs, and who is so situated that international assistance is possible. Thus it is not a matter of entitlements that distinguishes refugees from all other persons whose basic needs are unmet by their home government but a matter of dissimilar objective conditions.”34 This definition was attractive when proposed. The 1970s and 1980s saw humanitarian tragedies that seemed to call out for the remedies of refugee law.35 Nevertheless, despite wide acceptance, these definitional replacements have problems.

[31-35] Shacknove, Andrew. 1985. Who is a refugee? Ethics, 95, 274–284.

First, the anodyne phrase “so situated that international assistance is possible” means “either the willingness of the home state to allow [persons] access to international assistance or its inability to prevent such aid from being administered.” 36 This is worrisome for those who (even instrumentally) value state sovereignty.37 The new criterion is also at odds with subsequent legal developments. In the eighties the international community was only dimly aware of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Awareness eventually culminated in the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement . Yet Shacknove's criterion would redraw the line between IDPs and refugees: it assumes many IDPs should be called refugees. Lastly, replacing alienage with being “so situated that international assistance is possible” yields the “counter-intuitive result that those threatened by weak states would be refugees while those threatened by strong states would not be.” 38 So, while issues exist with the current definition's reliance on the apparently morally arbitrary criterion of location, 39 it is not clear that access by an apparently benevolent international community fares better.

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[38- Lister, Matthew. 2013. Who are refugees? Law and Philosophy, 32, 645–671.]

Second, replacing persecution with generalized need also raises problems. These are harder to see given the current definition's counterintuitive conclusions: it covers businessmen fleeing persecution yet excludes peasants fleeing drought. Focusing on persecution over needs arising from other sources seems unjustified. Shacknove's definition looks attractive as it includes both cases. Moreover, while the persecution criterion yields a clumsy tripartite distinction between refugees, refugee-like outsiders, and immigrants, his generalized need criterion yields two simple groups: immigrants (who, falling above the need threshold, have no entitlement to non-refoulement and new membership) and refugees/refugee-like outsiders (who, falling below the threshold, do). This accords better with our moral intuitions. I nevertheless defend the tripartite distinction, as it captures the distinctiveness of refugees.

We can start with the difference between refugees and immigrants. Refugees are fleeing persecution rooted in the five aforementioned grounds. By contrast, immigrants paradigmatically seek expanded (economic, educational, associational) opportunities. They may suffer severe hardship—some are so poorly off that their situation can in many ways be worse than refugees—but not the kind of persecution in the Convention.

This difference is sometimes contested in relation to desperately poor immigrants. Thomas Pogge remarks, “I cannot see why the moral importance of admitting political refugees should be any greater than that of admitting so-called economic migrants. For one thing, the politically persecuted are not, in general, worse off than the desperately poor. Being imprisoned for one's beliefs is not, in general, worse than working 16-hour days while being permanently hungry.”40 While such sentiments have intuitive pull, this way of framing matters is mistaken. Insufficiently protected basic needs often involve human rights violations, but only certain kinds of violations (or credible fears) ground refugee status. This is appropriate because refugee status entitles one to a very specific durable remedy—membership in a new state—that may not be sensible for everyone with unfulfilled basic needs.41

Moreover, Pogge and others seem to assume the definition involves a distinction between “political refugees” and “economic immigrants.” Yet this is a creation of popular discourse rather than a principle of national or international law. While this false dichotomy has distorted public understanding of refugees, refugee law can cover persons who seem like economic immigrants. Many fleeing destitution have impeccable refugee claims, as persecution can be socio-economic.42 Indeed, claims based on socio-economic human rights have gained traction in the last decade.43 Those who flee because of socio-economic deprivation can count as refugees.

[40- Pogge, Thomas. 1997. Migration and poverty. Pp. 12–27 in V. Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion. Basingstoke: Macmillan.]

[42-3 Foster, Michelle. 2007a. International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press].

If refugees aren't misclassified as economic immigrants, the distinction makes sense. Immigrants can be helped at home, refugees cannot. 44 Refugees are persecuted and cannot stay. 45 This helps explain why leaving one's country is partly constitutive of refugee status. 46

[46- Wellman, Christopher H. 2008. Immigration and freedom of association. Ethics, 119, 109–141.; Wellman, Christopher H. 2008. Immigration and freedom of association. Ethics, 119, 109–141.]









The distinction between refugees and refugee-like outsiders is more frequently criticized. Many claim the definition should cover refugee-like outsiders: those fleeing indiscriminate violence, famine, natural disasters, persecution outside the convention, and many IDPs. Despite holding opposed views on immigration, Chandran Kukathas and David Miller agree here. Kukathas warns the Convention “adopts a very narrow definition of a refugee … people fleeing war, natural disaster or famine are, on this definition, not refugees.”47 Miller concurs, “there is clearly a good case for broadening the definition to include people who are being deprived of rights to subsistence, basic healthcare, etc.”48 Such agreement may seem like a consensus on expanding the definition by dissolving the line between refugees and refugee-like outsiders. Yet, this part of the tripartite distinction also makes sense.

[47- Kukathas, Chandran. 2005. The case for open immigration. Pp. 207–220 in A. Cohen and C. H. Wellman (eds), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.]

[48- Miller, David. 2007. National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.]

As with mistakenly labeled “economic immigrants,” many apparently “refugee-like” persons are refugees. If generalized violence stems from race or religion, those fleeing could be refugees.49 If famine is induced or exacerbated to target geographically concentrated groups like political parties, those fleeing could be refugees.50 But worries remain. Even if all cases were correctly classified, there would still be a difference between refugees and refugee-like outsiders. Those fleeing natural disasters or largely indiscriminate violence would likely not be refugees.

[49-50 Foster, Michelle. 2007a. International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]

As with immigrants, the needs of such persons can be met without granting new membership. Many fleeing generalized violence and vulnerabilities only desire temporary safe-haven. Moreover, their needs can often be addressed by complementary protection—a legal mechanism whose “chief function … is to provide an alternative basis for eligibility of protection”51 to the Refugee Convention. There are many “codified forms of complimentary protection, such as ‘subsidiary protection’ in the EU; Temporary Protected Status (TPS), ‘withholding of removal’ and ‘deferral of removal’ in the US; and ‘persons in need of protection’ in Canada.”52 Such statuses are available to refugee-like persons falling outside the definition.53

Nevertheless, one may worry about such legalese. Is there really a difference? Michael Walzer's classic discussion of membership is helpful. He divides very needy outsiders into “necessitous strangers” and refugees. Both are distinct from immigrants. Necessitous strangers are “destitute and hungry” 54 people fleeing generalized catastrophes. Their needs can be met “by yielding territory” or “exporting wealth” while withholding membership. Yet refugees are “victims of … persecution” whose “need is for membership itself, a non-exportable good.” 55

[Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.[

The focus on membership is key. The groups have different needs and possible remedies because they have suffered different harms.56 Refugee-like outsiders need (often temporary) safe-haven, or suffer a plight remediable by aid. But only new membership will do for refugees. This is because refugee claims arise from persecution and the resultant loss of national protection, not simply from need.

[56-Lister, Matthew. 2013. Who are refugees? Law and Philosophy, 32, 645–671.]












This point deserves emphasis. Refugee status has always been linked to the loss of national protection. As Jane McAdam notes, “it is this factor that distinguishes refugees from people simply in need of humanitarian assistance. [The United Nations High Commission for Refugees] UNHCR says that ‘[t]he protection that States extend to refugees is not, properly speaking, “international protection,” but [new] national protection extended in the performance of an international obligation’.” 57 Refugees are special because persecution is a special harm. Refugees “are targeted for harm in a manner that repudiates their claim to political membership”; their “rights go unprotected because they are unrecognized” 58 rather than for other reasons. Even Shacknove recognizes this by portraying refugees as created by a “severed bond” of membership. 59 Refugees are persecuted and, for this

reason , cannot be helped at home. Indeed, to blandly speak of the loss of national protection is not quite

accurate. Refugees are distinctive because their country of origin has effectively repudiated their membership and the protection it affords. The status on which almost all their other rights hinge is gone.60 The distinction between refugees and refugee-like outsiders makes sense, then, as it tracks morally salient differences beyond severity of need: the nature of need, possible remedies, and country of origin relations.

[57- McAdam, Jane. 2007. Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 58- Price, Matthew. 2009. Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 59- Shacknove, Andrew. 1985. Who is a refugee? Ethics, 95, 274–284.]

This explanation is roughly right.61 Both groups flee peril of a different nature. Refugees flee the persecutory peril of repudiated membership, which can often only be durably solved by new membership. The non-persecutory peril of refugee-like outsiders (and immigrants) can be addressed at home or in other ways.62

At this point, the definition's tripartite distinction appears plausible. Many reservations have to do with misapplication. If so, the definition conceptually survives because neither poor legal interpretation nor improper implementation undermines its justification. Other reservations stem from failing to appreciate the distinctive harm of persecution and supplemental legal tools. But, even if the tripartite distinction avoids common worries, what is gained from it? We gain clarity about allocating scarce resources, displaced costs, and the justice of saying “no” to people who could be helped otherwise.63

People suffering humanitarian catastrophes have different needs than refugees


By citing scarce resources I'm not appealing to the traditional “political will” argument—that we should devote our efforts to combatting global poverty instead of to increasing admissions because the former can aid more needy people and there is limited political will. That argument has some merit but is incomplete.64 Instead I claim that, under current conditions, implementing a humanitarian definition would be problematically over-inclusive. By casting duties to refugees in terms of need alone, the justice standard underlying status determinations (and subsequent entitlements) is transformed from a target into a threshold. While the new definition covers more needy people, what gets obscured is that the nature of these needs is different. Many covered by a threshold criterion have more general entitlements and could have their needs otherwise met.










[Martin, David. 1991. The refugee concept: on definitions, politics, and the careful use of a scarce resource. Pp. 30–51 in H. Adelman (ed.), Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States. Toronto: York Lanes Press Ltd.]

Referencing refugees as extremely needy strips refugees of their agency and distracts from their international legal claims. If refugees are portrayed as supplicants we do not see them as claimants with real legal rights


Responses to refugees rely on both traditions, but humanitarianism pervades the public imagination and academic literature. The term “refugee” connotes people fleeing war, famine, and failed states. They are portrayed as victims waiting in camps until they can return or be resettled. These are the “neediest” of the needy such that “a refugee's plight appears morally tantamount to that of a baby who has been left on one's doorstep in the dead of winter.”13

Characterizations like this represent what has been called a “humanitarian” conception of refugees where a “foreigner's need for protection —regardless of whether that need results from persecution, civil war, famine, extreme poverty, or some other cause—grounds a claim for asylum. The more serious and urgent is the need for protection, the stronger is that claim.”14 Need, vulnerability, and passivity are highlighted. The agency of refugees, the source of their plight, the precise grounds for their claim, and the adjudication of that claim are absent. By casting refugees as simply very needy, we tend to ignore their agency and see them as passive, “client-ized” aid recipients.15 But, theoretically speaking, the damage of a humanitarian view stems from what it erases. Refugee law is squarely in the human rights tradition. Since its inception, the Refugee Convention has been interpreted in light of human rights. 16 A humanitarian definition obscures this by transforming refugees into simply a group with insecure basic needs. This leads theorists to overlook the uniqueness of refugee claims and claiming practices.

[15 -- Price, Matthew. 2009. Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ]

Indeed, there is “convergence in open and closed border arguments around the principle of assistance for those most in need” and this group is often called “refugees.” As such, “even though in several ways the legal category ‘refugee’ may not correspond with neediness, need is the logic that underlies the category and the debate about it.”17 A need-based humanitarian view is problematic because “humanitarianism is not a standard of obligation, as justice would be, but rather of charity … It defines a morality of beneficence and bestowal rather than equality and justice.”18 Portraying refugees in humanitarian terms transforms them from claimants into supplicants. We see them as “in the unequal position of any seeker of mercy or grace … As they are asking for a gift in a realm with no justice standard, they cannot assert a right.” 19

[17-19 Dauvergne, Catherine. 1999. Amorality and humanitarianism in immigration law. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 37, 597–623]

Joel Feinberg famously argued that rights are a combination of “claims to” and “claims against.” He criticized rights theories based on moral entitlements alone that “identify needs, or at least basic needs, with … ‘human rights’.”22 Such theories don't distinguish rights from other strong moral claims. For Feinberg, a right consists in its being a valid claim, where “validity” amounts to


http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1523&context=ohlj









“justification of a peculiar and narrow kind, namely justification within a system of rules” such that “to have a right is to have a claim against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing rules or moral principles. To have a claim in turn is to have a case meriting consideration, that is, to have reasons or grounds that put one in a position to engage in performative and propositional claiming.”23 When people exercise this claim and assert their rights, this helps secure dignity and self-respect.24

[22-4 Feinberg, Joel. 1970. The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Inquiry, 4, 243–260.]




Related – Definition of “Persecution”

Persecution includes the threat of death


Although central to the refugee definition, ‘persecution’ itself is not defined in the 1951 Convention. Articles 31 and 33 refer to threats to life or freedom, so clearly it includes the threat of death, or the threat of torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. A comprehensive analysis requires the general notion to be related to developments within the broad field of human rights,6 and the recognition that fear of persecution and lack of protection are themselves interrelated elements. The persecuted do not enjoy the protection of their country of origin, while evidence of the lack of protection on either the internal or external level may create a presumption as to the (p. 39) likelihood of persecution and to the well-foundedness of any fear. However, there is no necessary linkage between persecution and government authority. A Convention refugee, by definition, must be unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of the state or government, and the notion of inability to secure the protection of the state is broad enough to include a situation where the authorities cannot or will not provide protection, for example, against persecution by non-state actors.

The Convention does require that the persecution feared be for reasons of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion’. This language, which recalls the language of non-discrimination in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments, gives an insight into the characteristics of individuals and groups which are considered relevant to refugee protection. These reasons in turn show that the groups or individuals are identified by reference to a classification which ought to be irrelevant to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, while persecution implies a violation of human rights of particular gravity; it may be the result of cumulative events or systemic mistreatment, but equally it could comprise a single act of torture (Hathaway 2005; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007).




http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021#oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021-note-6






“Humanitarian Needs”

“Humanitarian needs” includes basic crisis assistance

Humanitarian Coalition, no date, “Humanitarian Needs,” http://humanitariancoalition.ca/info-portal/factsheets/humanitarian-needs

When a humanitarian disaster hits, affected communities frequently require essential,

appropriate and timely humanitarian assistance.

Relief Aid

Relief aid refers to the provision of such assistance to those affected by a disaster, based on an initial rapid assessment of needs, and designed to contribute effectively to their recovery. It consists of the delivery of a specific quantity and quality of goods to a group of beneficiaries, according to selection criteria that identify needs and target those that are least able to provide for themselves.

In response to any emergency humanitarian agencies need to pay close attention to the particular needs of communities affected and ensure that their work is coordinated so that a humanitarian response to a situation is the most efficient and helpful it could be. It is important to support local markets in meeting humanitarian needs, and agencies must avoid sending unnecessary goods that do not respond to specific humanitarian needs.

Relief aid responds to the humanitarian needs unique to any single emergency, and can be subdivided into the following categories:

Food:

It is essential in every crisis to first determine whether food supply is a correct response. If that kind of response is appropriate, a comprehensive survey should be conducted to define the composition of the food. In every instance, it is necessary to ensure that food donations are culturally and nutritionally appropriate for the affected population and that the costs of their purchase, transportation, storage and distribution are kept to a minimum.

Food assistance will not be needed where disasters have no major effect on food stocks or crops, where the effect is localized, or when people are able to draw on their own savings or food reserves. It is important to support local food markets whenever possible, and for agencies and donors to buy food closer to where it is needed. This would make it cheaper, faster and easier to find food people are used to eating.

Shelter:

Shelter is a critical determinant of survival in the initial stages of a disaster. Beyond survival, shelter is necessary for security and personal safety, protection from the elements and resistance to disease. Shelter assistance is provided to individual households for the repair or construction of dwellings or the settlement of displaced households within existing accommodation or communities. When it is not possible to provide individual shelter, collective shelter is provided in suitably large public buildings or structures, such as warehouses, halls or barracks, or in temporary planned or self-settled camps. For more information on shelter in emergencies, please refer to the fact sheet on shelter.

http://humanitariancoalition.ca/info-portal/factsheets/humanitarian-needs

http://humanitariancoalition.ca/info-portal/factsheets/humanitarian-needs


Non-food Items :

When people have lost everything in a disaster, they require basic and culturally appropriate goods and supplies to maintain their health, privacy and dignity, to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food and to achieve necessary levels of thermal comfort. These items might include clothing, blankets, bedding, stoves and kitchen sets, water containers and hygiene products.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion:

The lack of access to safe water and sanitation facilities is a major cause of death, disease and loss of dignity in most of the world’s poorer countries. Over 1.1 billion people do not have access to clean water and more than 2.6 billion people do not have access to basic sanitation. More than 2 million people, the majority of whom are children under 5, die every year due to a lack of improved water sources and basic sanitation.

The problems caused by a lack of access to safe water and sanitation are made much worse during disasters and crises, and are increasingly influenced by climate change, rapid unplanned urbanization, increasing epidemics and pandemics, population movement and conflict. Lack of safe water is the most common and preventable underlying cause of disease and death in the world today.

Emergencies have major consequences on the health of affected populations. Children and women are particularly vulnerable to malnutrition, disease and violence. In the past decade, an estimated 2 million children have died as a result of armed conflict alone. This is largely due to the interruption of existing health and social services. This is often compounded by population displacement, lack of access to food and other essential commodities, overcrowding, and poor water and sanitation facilities. Excess morbidity and mortality results from the indirect causes of conflict or natural disasters, such as malnutrition and communicable diseases.

Humanitarian aid is “ short-term”

Wikipedia, Humanitarian Aid, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+humanitarian+aid DOA: 10-2-15

Humanitarian aid is material and logistic assistance to people in need. It is usually short-term help until the long-term help by government and other institutions replaces it. Among the people in need belong homeless, refugees, victims of natural disasters, wars and famines.

It’s short-term

Global Humanitarian Assistance, no date, Defining humanitarian assistance, http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid DOA: 10-2-15

Humanitarian assistance is generally accepted to mean the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations (Source: Good Humanitarian Donorship). What marks it out from other forms of aid and foreign assistance is that it should be guided by the principles of:

http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid

http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+humanitarian+aid

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+humanitarian+aid


Prioritize

To say one thing is more important than the other

Google Definitions:, no date, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+prioritize DOA: 10-2-15

Designate or treat (something) as more important than other things."prioritize your credit card debt"

synonyms: emphasize, concentrate on, put first, focus on, fast-track, expedite, make a priority"we must prioritize pollution control"

determine the order for dealing with (a series of items or tasks) according to their relative importance.

"age affects the way people prioritize their goals"

synonyms: rank, order, hierarchize, triage; More

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+triage&sa=X&ved=0CCMQ_SowAGoVChMIw6rIwOCkyAIVhsuACh1iNQkr

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+order&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ_SowAGoVChMIw6rIwOCkyAIVhsuACh1iNQkr

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+rank&sa=X&ved=0CCEQ_SowAGoVChMIw6rIwOCkyAIVhsuACh1iNQkr

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+expedite&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q_SowAGoVChMIw6rIwOCkyAIVhsuACh1iNQkr

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+emphasize&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q_SowAGoVChMIw6rIwOCkyAIVhsuACh1iNQkr

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+prioritize


Government

Google Definitions, no date, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+government DOA: 10-2-15

Governing body

gov·ern·mentˈɡəvər(n)mənt/nounnoun: government; plural noun: governments

1. 1.

the governing body of a nation, state, or community.

"an agency of the federal government"

o the system by which a nation, state, or community is governed.

"a secular, pluralistic, democratic government"

o the action or manner of controlling or regulating a nation, organization, or people.

"rules for the government of the infirmary"

synonyms:rule, governing, running, leadership, control, administration, regulation, management, supervision"her job was the government of the district"

o the group of people in office at a particular time; administration.

"the election of the new government"

synonyms:

administration, executive, regime, authority, powers that be, directorate, council, leadership; Morecabinet, ministry;nanny state;informalfeds;Washington"the government announced further cuts"

o another term for political science.2. 2.

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+political+science&sa=X&ved=0CDIQgCswAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+nanny+state&sa=X&ved=0CDEQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+ministry&sa=X&ved=0CDAQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+cabinet&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+leadership&sa=X&ved=0CC0Q_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+council&sa=X&ved=0CCwQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+directorate&sa=X&ved=0CCsQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+authority&sa=X&ved=0CCoQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+regime&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+executive&sa=X&ved=0CCgQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+administration&sa=X&ved=0CCcQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+supervision&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+management&sa=X&ved=0CCQQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+regulation&sa=X&ved=0CCMQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+administration&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+control&sa=X&ved=0CCEQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+leadership&sa=X&ved=0CCAQ_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+running&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+rule&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q_SowAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+government


Grammar

the relation between a governed and a governing word.

Origin

Middle English: from Old French governement, from governer (see govern).

System by which people are controlled

Wikipedia, no date, Government, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government DOA: 10-2-15

A government is the system by which a state or community is controlled.[1] In the Commonwealth of Nations, the word government is also used more narrowly to refer to the collective group of people that exercises executive authority in a state.[2][3][4] This usage is analogous to what is called an "administration" in American English. Furthermore, especially in American English, the concepts of the state and the government may be used synonymously to refer to the person or group of people exercising authority over a politically organized territory.[5][6] Finally, government is also sometimes used in English as a synonym for governance.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governance

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synonym

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government#cite_note-6


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synonymous

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_English

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administration_(government)#United_States



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government#cite_note-hge-2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_(government)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_(collective_executive)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Nations


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_(polity)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government

https://www.google.com/search?biw=1250&bih=737&q=define+govern&sa=X&ved=0CDMQgCswAGoVChMI-8zZxuKkyAIVCXU-Ch2gXwiF


National Interest


- No Agreed Upon Meaning

Endless debates over the “national interest” among realists

Michael Williams, University of Wales, 2005, European Journal of International Relations, vol 11(3), What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory, p. 321

Neoconservatism’s critique of Realism emerges from this perspective, and develops along three reinforcing lines. First, the endless debates and indeterminacy within Realism over what the national interest is, reflected more than just the complexities of judgment, which neoconservatives readily acknowledge.


- Neoconservatives Define it to include National Greatness and Promotion of Values

Neoconservatives define the national interest as a promotion of US values, including democracy

Michael Williams, University of Wales, 2005, European Journal of International Relations, vol 11(3), What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory, p. 318-9

The idea of national greatness and its necessity is a key dimension of the neoconservative vision of the American national interest. The national interest of the United States is fundamentally related to the history, values and identity of the Republic itself, and ‘every profound foreign policy debate in America’s history’, Robert Kagan (2004) recently declared, ‘has ultimately been a debate about the nation’s identity and has posed for Americans the primal question “Who are we?”’. The answer lies in a vision of the American republic as in its essence a progressive force, a nation embodying universal values whose greatness resides precisely in the fact that its founding principles are not limited to the United States itself. In this way, the struggle is not to move back to the past — it is to return to the past in order to recover resources that will allow the United States to move resolutely forward into the future. Answering this question in line with the values of the Republic provides a foundation for knowing what the national interest is, a vision of a future world order in accordance with those values and interests, and a politically mobilizing vision through which it can be conveyed. The American national interest, properly understood, is — like the United States itself — exceptional. But it is not unique. It is part of an historic mission that can and should be shared by all peoples; and it would be, if only virtuous governments could rule. The culmination of this logic is, of course, the promotion of democracy as part of a ‘muscular patriotism’ based upon ‘freedom and greatness’ (W. Kristol, 2000: 36). Creating an international order of values is good for both America and the world. A policy of ‘benevolent hegemony’ makes sense precisely because ‘American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding hat its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony’ (Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 27; Bennett, 2000: 303).

The national interest from a neoconservative perspective includes a healthy protection of the social order


We are now in a better position to understand the significance of the national interest in neoconservative thinking, and the critique of Realism that it develops. For neoconservatives, the question of the national interest goes beyond the exigencies of contemporary foreign policy. As a question of political philosophy, it is linked to issues as old and fundamental as the nature of political modernity, the travails of liberalism, and the foundations of the American republic. As an issue of contemporary political practice, it transcends any absolute divide between domestic and foreign policy, incorporating issues as broad and contested as the prevailing social structures and moral standards of contemporary American life. In this vision, the national interest cannot be reduced to an analytic concept of foreign policy or a narrowly defined material interest. It is a political principle — a symbol and requirement of the political virtue needed for a healthy modern polity. A clear, commonly shared understanding and commitment to the national interest is the sign of a healthy social order domestically and a basis for strong and consistent action internationally.

Conversely, the lack of a clear, powerful, mobilizing understanding of the national interest is a sign of societal decadence. The nihilistic and fragmenting aspects of modern urban society and culture must be


countered by a reassertion of the values of the nation, and a restoration of the tradition of ‘republican virtue’. Strong, socially vibrant conceptions of both the public interest and the national interest are essential if a political community is to combat the corrosive acids of modernity. Attitudes toward the national interest are thus as much a concern of domestic political virtue as a dimension of foreign policy. Indeed the two are seen as inseparable. Correctly conceived, the national interest and public interest become elements in a politically virtuous circle.24 A strong, morally cohesive society with a clear sense of the public interest provides a basis for the national interest. A national interest constructed on these lines will support the creation and maintenance of such a public. As both a product and a symbol of the public interest, the national interest not only provides a guide for policy abroad — it expresses — and in the process fosters and supports — the operation of political virtue at home.


- Realist Interpretation Bad

Neoconservatives claim a “Realist” interpretation of the “national interest” cannot be supported by the public

Michael Williams, University of Wales, 2005, European Journal of International Relations, vol 11(3), What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory, (gated) p. 322-3

Finally, instead of providing security for American society, a Realist foreign policy actually contributes to its decay. Lacking a clear vision of the national interest that can be explained to citizens and connected to their values, Realist foreign policy is of necessity often duplicitous. But mendacious policies abroad only further erode virtue at home, and a Realist policy of the national interest actually exacerbates political cynicism and social decay within the state, as citizens either adopt a similar cynicism in their relations to the political system or turn away from it in disgust. As a consequence, the entropic and cynical tendencies that are at the core of liberal-modernity are heightened by a Realist foreign policy. Realism paradoxically encourages a division between morality and foreign policy that mirrors the liberal divide between interests and ethics, and in the process undermines both. As Kristol and Kagan put the point:

The remoralization of America at home ultimately requires the remoralization of American foreign policy. For both follow from Americans’ belief that the principles of the Declaration of Independence are not merely the choices of a particular culture but are universal, enduring, ‘self-evident’ truths. That has been, after all, the main point of the conservatives’ war against a relativistic multiculturalism. (1996: 31)

In sum, far from protecting the state, Realist theories of the national interest actually endanger it, however advantageous their manipulative actions may appear in the short term. Disconnected from values, Realism cannot give any content to the national interest beyond a minimal and bw ultimately ineffective and debilitating pragmatism, or a corrosive cynicism. A manipulative ‘Realism’ will only lead to decline — incapable of pulling people with it and thereby gaining the necessary resources and support, it will either fail, or will have to resort to secrecy and manipulation, thus furthering in practice the social cynicism about values that it advocates in theory. Corrosive of support abroad and eroding virtue at home, it is ultimately ineffective internationally and destructive domestically.

What is even worse, in this process Realism actually deprives modern societies of one of the most effective means of mobilizing virtue and combating decadence — the idea of the national interest itself. By contrast, in the neoconservative vision the national interest can be used to counter modernity’s worst dynamics. A ‘moral’ foreign policy reinforces those virtues and values in the citizenry of the US, and helps get their support for pursuing the national interest which they can actually see as an expression of their values, and which they can identify with.28 In this way, Realism removes the potential for the national interest to be used as an effective form of political mobilization and reformation in support of a virtuous polity. The national interest thus needs to be recaptured from traditional Realists29 in both theory and practice so that it can become a substantive guide and mobilizing symbol in foreign policy, and contribute to political reconstruction at home

http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/11/3/307.abstract


- “National Greatness”/Neoconservative Interpretation Bad

Embracing a concept of “national interest” as “national greatness” risks virulent nationalism, interventionism, and crusading foreign policy


Morgenthau warned that appeals to national greatness and a principled patriotism could easily contribute to a political culture prone to an imprudent and crusading foreign policy. Patriotism risked becoming identified with a bellicose nationalism, virtue with an aggressive internationalism, and patriotism with support for military adventures.35 Moreover, he felt that an uncritical politics of national greatness would have disastrous impacts on diplomacy, producing a policy that divided the world between true allies who recognized American virtue as well as American power, and who were willing to face up to the existential issues at stake in the struggle between a civilization of values and the renewed spectre of nihilism, and those unreconstructed regimes, decadent liberals, overly optimistic rationalists, or narrowly self-interested cynics who were cast as irresponsibly obstructive at best, positively dangerous at worst.

“National greatness” is not something that can just be asserted


Far from providing the basis for a robust and responsible foreign policy, Morgenthau worried that the uncritical assertion of national greatness and the assumption of legitimacy on the basis of an a priori claim to virtue actually risked undermining the legitimacy and power of the United States. Greatness, he argued, is something that must be recognized by others, not just asserted by the self; while too great a regard for one’s own virtue was a constant temptation to be zealously guarded against, lest it yield an hubristic blindness or arrogance, deaf to the demands of prudence, and leading to disaster rather than glory. Similarly, while calling for a need to recognize the attractions of ‘national greatness’ as an antidote to some of modernity’s most corrosive dynamics, he refused to regard these ideals as adequately realized within the United States itself, and was fearful that engaging in foreign adventures would prove a tempting if ultimately illusory response to deep domestic difficulties.3

Declarations of greatness undermine acceptance of criticism


Finally, Morgenthau was consistently concerned that declarations of national virtue could readily become barriers to criticism, a powerful weapon with which to attack critics at home for being insufficiently virtuous, decadently weak and lacking heroic zeal and fortitude, or even as harboring a suspiciously weak commitment to the American ideal itself. Far from securing democracy, he feared, such ideas could easily become means for stifling the vibrant debate that is both the lifeblood of democratic politics and a vital contribution to successful policy.37


Neoconservative principles damage American foreign policy and create an international backlash


In a recent article, John Ikenberry (2004) has catalogued an impressive array of criticisms of neoconservative foreign policy, ranging from economic unsustainability and military overextension, to the damage caused to international allies and legitimacy upon which the success of American policy depends. On this basis, he proclaims ‘the end of the neoconservative moment’. Ikenberry may well be right, and he is not alone in this prediction (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 338). Certainly, the travails of American policy in Iraq have dimmed some aspects of neoconservative bravado (Brooks, 2004b), as well as bringing to the surface long-standing divisions between the ‘neo’ and other elements of the conservative foreign policy community (Heilbrunn, 2004). There is even recognition among some neoconservatives that criticisms of US policy toward Iraq from across the theoretical and political spectrum may have emerged from something other than a lack of moral fiber and martial virtue.41


Should


-- Should -- Obligation

Should is a duty or obligation Webster's II, 1984, p. 1078 Should is used to express duty or obligation

Should is an expectation or probability Webster's II, 1984, p. 1078 Should is used to express probability or expectation

Obligation or duty WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY THIRD EDITION, 1996, p. 1242. (DRG/UNA7)Should. 2. used to express obligation, duty, propriety, or desirability [you should ask first, the plants should be watered weekly].

Should is equal to obligation WORDS AND PHRASES 1953, Vol. 39, p. 313. The word “should”, denotes an obligation in various degrees, usually milder than ought Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 p.2d 839, 842, 198 Or. 556.

Should expresses obligation and desirability WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 1999, p. 1327 Should v. aux. [[ME scholde < OE sceolde, pt. of sceal, scal, I am obliged: see shall]] 1 pt. of SHALL [I had hoped I should see you] 2. Used to express obligation, duty, propriety, or desirability [you should ask first, the plants should be watered weekly] 3 Used to express expectation or probability [he should be here soon, I should know by tomorrow] 4 Used to express a future condition [if I should die tomorrow, if you should be late] 5 used in polite or tentative expression or opinion [I should think they will be pleased] See usage note at will2


-- Should -- Mandatory

Should implies mandatory action WORDS AND PHRASES 1953, Vol. 39, p. 312. Command implied. The word “should,” as used in Laws 1901, p. 387, c 106, 3, providing that, on proof of certain facts to the county court, it shall be determined whether territory should be disconnected from a city, does not authorize the court to do as it pleases; the statute is mandatory.

“Should” is used to express actions MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 2002, p. http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary 1. Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note. 2. Used to express probability or expectation: They should arrive at noon. 3. Used to express conditionality or contingency: If she should fall, then so would I. 4. Used to moderate the directness or bluntness of a statement: I should think he would like to go.


-- Should -- Likely

Should means likely Webster's New World Dictionary, 1982, p. 934 Should means is likely to happen

Should describes what is probable Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 07, (http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/should?view=uk) should - modal verb (3rd sing. should) 1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness. 2 used to indicate what is probable. 3 formal expressing the conditional mood. 4 used in a clause with ‘that’ after a main clause describing feelings. 5 used in a clause with ‘that’ expressing purpose. 6 (in the first person) expressing a polite request or acceptance. 7 (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope.

Should is used to express probability or expectation WEBSTER'S II, 1984, p. 1078 Should - used to express probability or expectation. They should arrive here soon.

Should means is likely to happen WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1982, p. 934 Should - means is likely to happen.


-- Should – Past Tense

Should refers to past action WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1982, p. 934 Should - refers to past action. To make statements about something that might have happened but did not.

Past tense shall refers to the present OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2nd Ed., 1989 http://dictionary.oed.com shall, v. 17.

In questions introduced by who, whom, what, and followed by but, serving to express the unexpectedness of some past occurrence. The past tense should with modal function. As with other auxiliaries, the pa. tense (orig. subjunctive) of shall is often used to express, not a reference to past time, but a modal qualification of the notion expressed by the present tense. Where in addition the notion of past time is to be expressed, this can often be effected by the use of the perf. instead of the pres. inf. (though sometimes this produces ambiguity); the temporal notion may however be merely contextually implied, and in that case the pa. tense has the appearance of having both functions (temporal and modal) at once. 18. a. In statements of duty, obligation, or propriety (originally, as applicable to hypothetical conditions not regarded as real). Also, in statements of expectation, likelihood, prediction, etc. This conditional form of expression was from an early period substituted for the unconditional shall in sense 2, and in mod.Eng. the pres. tense in this use is obs., and should = ought to. ¶with omission of have in perf. inf. b. should be: ought according to appearances to be, presumably is. Also, ought according to expectation to be, presumably will be (cf. sense 18a). c. you should hear, see = I wish you could hear, if only you could hear, etc. d. Used ironically, expressing the inappropriateness or unlikeliness of the action advocated or state envisaged, as I should worry, there is no reason for me to worry, I am not worried. colloq. (orig. a Yiddishism). 19. In the apodosis of a hypothetical proposition (expressed or implied), indicating that the supposition, and therefore its consequence, is unreal. a. Where shall (in sense 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9) would be used if the hypothesis were accepted. interrogatively. 1834 K. H. DIGBY Mores Cath. V. iii. 84 But where should one finish if one were to speak of the ‘lauda Sion’ [etc.].

Should is the past tense of shall OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2nd Ed., 1989, p. http://dictionary.oed.com/ Should pa. tense of SHALL v.; obs. f. SHOAL.


-- Should -- Future

Future DICTIONARY.COM, no date, p. http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=should. Used before a verb in the infinitive to show: a. Something that will take place or exist in the future: We shall arrive b. tomorrow.

Should is not exclusively in the past tense WORDS & PHRASES, Vol 39, 1953, p. 311

The regulations of the commerce department recommending, as "precautions" and "procedure" for use of mounted type line carrying guns and equipment, that service powder charge "should" be about five ounces, and that powder bags "should" be furnished to vessel containing not more than such quantity of black powder, are "mandatory", and shipowners owe seamen duty of complying therewith. "Precaution" means previous action; proven foresight; care previously employed to prevent mischief or to secure good result; or a measure taken beforehand; an active foresight designed to ward off possible evil or secure good results. "Proced- ure" means manner of proceeding or acting; a course or mode of action. "Should" is the imperfect of "shall"; it is the preterit of "shall" and is used as an auxiliary verb either in the past tense or conditional present. "Ought" is a synonym of "should," and both words clearly imply obligation. b'egan v. LSlccs Bros. S. S. Co., 3 So.2d 632, 635, 193 La. 312.

Should means expectation of future action Remo Foresi v. The Hudson Coal Co, SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A. 910; 1932 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239 July 14, 1932 As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is also the preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century Dictionary: "Obliged or compelled (to); would have (to); must; ought (to); used with an infinitive (without to) to express obligation, necessity or duty in connection with some act yet to be carried out." We think it clear that it is in that sense that the word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit, the word 'should' is not used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought to' and carries [---8] with it the sense of [-313] obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion. A natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate claimants who have been injured while doing something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify, provisions which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the hazardous occupation of mining.


-- Should -- Future

Should implies futurity MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 1999, p. http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/mweb Should: used in auxiliary function to express futurity from a point of view in the past <realized that she should have to do most of her farm work before sunrise-Ellen Glasgow>.

Traditional rules governing should have been abandoned – it is just used for future obligation American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language in ‘00 (4th Edition, p. 1612)

Usage Note Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the traditional rules governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should’ve.


-- Should -- Ought

Should means “ought to” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Fourth Edition 2000, p. http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=should. should ( P ) Pronunciation Key (shd) aux.v. Past tense of shall Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note. Used to express probability or expectation: They should arrive at noon. Used to express conditionality or contingency: If she should fall, then so would I. Used to moderate the directness or bluntness of a statement: I should think he would like to go. Usage Note: Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are based, the traditional rules governing the use of should and would are largely ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however. Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation (the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey and is more common in American usage than should. ·Should have is sometimes incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken contraction should've. See Usage Note at if. See Usage Note at rather. See Usage Note at shall.

Should means “ought” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 2004, p. http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

Main Entry: should Pronunciation: sh&d, 'shud Etymology: Middle English sholde, from Old English sceolde owed, was obliged to, ought to past of SHALL 1 -- used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die -- Gen 44:22 (Revised Standard Version)> 2 -- used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so -- Shakespeare> <this is as it should be -- H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal> 3 -- used in auxiliary function to express futurity from a point of view in the past <realized that she should have to do most of her farm work before sunrise -- Ellen Glasgow> 4 -- used in auxiliary function to express what is probable or expected <with an early start, they should be here by noon> 5 -- used in auxiliary function to express a request in a polite manner or to soften direct statement <I should suggest that a guide... is the first essential -- L. D. Reddick


-- Should – Recommended Course of Action

Should recommends a course of action WORDS & PHRASES, Vol 39, 2003, p. 226. C.A.10 2001. Term "should" in statute indicates recommended course of action, but does not itself imply obligation associated with "shall. "-Qwest Corp. v. F.C.C., 258 F.3d 1191.-Statut 227. C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1999.Common meaning of the term "should" suggests or recommends a course of action, while ordinary understanding of "shall" describes a course of action that is mandatory, and, in absence of clear manifestation of intent on part of Sentencing Commission to attribute to "should" a meaning contrary to the common one, the term should be given its usual meaning when interpreting sentencing guidelines and application notes. U.S.S.G. § 1131.1 et seq., 18 U.S.C.A.-U.S. v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65.-Sent & Pun 661, 665.


-- Should – Implies Desirability

Should expresses desirability WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 1996, p. 1242. Should. 2. used to express obligation, duty, propriety, or desirability (you should ask first, the plants should be watered weekly).

Should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 07 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should-1+0&dict=A)

should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that it is necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action of the following verb


-- Should – Not Mandatory

Should is not mandatory Words and Phrases, 2002. (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 369) C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2001. Word “should,” in most contexts, is precatory, not mandatory. ----U.S. v. Rogers, 14 Fed.Appx. 303.----Statut227

Should is permissive—it’s a persuasive recommendation Words and Phrases, 2002. (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370) Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatory Words and Phrases, 2002. (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373) Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857


-- Should -- Duty

Should is used to express duty or obligation

WEBSTER'S II, 1984, p. 1078

Should - used to express duty or obligation. You should write a thank you note.MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY ONLINE, 2002, p. http://www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.

2. used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should do so - Shakespeare> <this is as it should be - H.L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each meal>.

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY THIRD EDITION, 1996, p. 1242. (MHDRG/A9)Should. 2. used to express obligation, duty, propriety, or desirability [you should ask first, the plants should be watered weekly].


Current


Current Means the Present Time

Google Definitions, no date, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=define:+current DOA: 10-3-15

adjectiveadjective: current

1. 1.

belonging to the present time; happening or being used or done now.

"keep abreast of current events"

synonyms:

contemporary, present-day, modern, present, contemporaneous; Moretopical, in the news, live, burning;bloggable"current events"

antonyms: past

o in common or general use.

"the other meaning of the word is still current"

synonyms:prevalent, prevailing, common, accepted, in circulation, circulating, on everyone's lips, popular, widespread"the idea is still current"

antonyms: obsolete

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“Current Crisis” W/10 Refugees

There has been some discussion of the term "current crisis" in the new Public Forum resolution referring to refugee crises other than the one affecting Europe, Turkey, and Lebanon, which primarily is about refugees fleeing Turkey, Iraq, and Northern Africa.

While this is an understandable concern (and the resolution could have been better written), I think it is a stretch to defend discussion of a crises other than this one.

I did do a Nexis search of "'current crisis'" w/10 refugees" for the last three months ('current') of "All English Language News" and I think all (or 99%) of the articles are talking about this particular refugee crisis.

And, if you do a Google Image Search, you will see photos from articles about this crisis.

Results1. BIGGER BROTHER

The Australian, October 3, 2015 Saturday, REVIEW; Pg. 6, 2412 words, Sharon Verghis... migrant, asylum-seeker, refugee, which is it and does it matter when people are dying?" - surrounding the current crisis engulfing Europe) to what he sees as ...

2. The Syrian Diaspora The Herald: Hobart and William Smith Colleges, October 2, 2015 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 1, 1329 words... insufficient to successfully mitigate the current crisis within its borders.Lebanon has ...... 1.5 million Syrian refugees. Syrians now account ...

3. Refugee crisis: Glasgow becomes first UK city to accept new cohort of Syrian asylum seekers; The city council has made an agreement with the Home Office to identify 63 people from refugee camps in Lebanon and Iraq Independent.co.uk, October 2, 2015 Friday 1:10 AM GMT, HOME NEWS, 393 words, Paul Gallagher... city to accept Syrian refugees since the current crisis began with dozens set to ...

4. Muslim refugees look for compassion Columnists India/Pak, October 1, 2015 Thursday, 1037 words... said it right: The current crisis European countries are facing, shouldn't be framed as a refugee crisis... Europe is facing ...

5. Syrian refugees could begin arriving in Iowa in '16 Des Moines Register, October 1, 2015 Thursday, A; Pg. 4, 854 words, By, Lee Rood... White House raises refugee limits to 100,000 because of the current crisis."That is going to be a much ...

6. Syrian refugees could begin arriving in Iowa in '16 Des Moines Register, October 1, 2015 Thursday, A; Pg. 3, 854 words, By, Lee Rood... White House raises refugee limits to 100,000 because of the current crisis."That is going to be a much ...

7. Veil debate becomes big issue in Canada election, putting Conservatives into lead; One woman's insistence on her right to conceal her face has become a central issue, dividing voters and giving the Conservatives a late boost The Guardian, October 1, 2015 Thursday 2:20 PM GMT, WORLD NEWS, 1104 words, John Barber in Toronto... Canada's intake of Syrian refugees in response to the current crisis - even after the death ...

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8. Elon Musk says climate change refugees will dwarf current crisisNew Europe Blog Europa, 1 October 2015 Thursday, 569 wordsPublished 15:19 October 1, 2015 Updated 15:19 October 1, 2015 Elon Musk says climate change refugees will dwarf current crisis By Wes Knowles New Europe Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share on Google + Share on LinkedIn + In a speech in Germany, Tesla ...http://neurope.eu/article/elon-musk-says-climate-change-refugees-will-dwarf-current-crisis/

9. Compassion is key to tackling refugee crisis North Devon Journal, October 1, 2015 Thursday, NEWS:OTHER; Pg. 40, 691 wordsIN this week's Opinion, refugee campaigner Adam Crowther from Bideford talks about the current crisis and asks "why does it matter and ...

10. Muslim refugees look for compassion Pakistan Observer, October 1, 2015 Thursday, 998 words, Dr Mahboob A Khwaja... said it right: The current crisis European countries are facing, shouldn't be framed as a refugee crisis... Europe is facing ...

11. Peters Urges Obama Administration to Resettle More Syrian, Persecuted Religious Minority Refugees; Letter Urges Obama Administration to Resettle at Least 100,000 Syrians and Persecuted Religious Minorities in Coming Years and 30,000 in Next Fiscal Year; Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) News Release Congressional Documents and Publications, September 30, 2015, U.S. SENATE DOCUMENTS, 1115 words... write in regards to the current crisis impacting refugees, internally displaced people, and ...

12. More than just a refugee crisis The Dominion Post (Wellington, New Zealand), September 30, 2015 Wednesday, NEWS; NATIONAL; Pg. 9, 922 words... a role. Yes, the current crisis is about refugees but it is about ...

13. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly FinancialWire, September 30, 2015 Wednesday, 651 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

14. The only sustainable future is one that includes us all: Rwandan President IBNS, September 30, 2015 Wednesday 6:30 AM EST, 650 words, India Blooms News Service... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

15. The only sustainable future is one that includes us all: Rwandan President India Blooms, September 30, 2015 Wednesday, 682 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

16. Let Syrians come to the U.S. International New York Times, September 30, 2015 Wednesday, EDIT; Pg. 7, 920 words, ANNE SPECKHARD... process.Yet in the current crisis, the United States foreign assistance budget to help refugees overseas remains flatlined.With ...

17. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly M2 PressWIRE, September 30, 2015 Wednesday, 647 words


... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

18. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly PR Newswire Africa, September 30, 2015 Wednesday 7:00 AM EST, 650 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

19. Peters Urges Obama Administration to Resettle More Syrian, Persecuted Religious Minority Refugees Targeted News Service, September 30, 2015 Wednesday 9:39 PM EST, 1107 words, Targeted News Service... write in regards to the current crisis impacting refugees, internally displaced people, and ...

20. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly FinancialWire, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, 651 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

21. Internet access matters - will Facebook or India provide it?; Prevention of communication constitutes exclusion from society. Access to online services should be protected in the same way water and electricity are The Guardian, September 29, 2015 Tuesday 1:29 PM GMT, TECHNOLOGY, 724 words, Ben Wagner and Julia Powles... key services. In the current crisis, the physical separation of refugees is augmented by digital ...

22. Musicians band together for Syria refugees Leek Post and Times, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS:OTHER; Pg. 12, 162 words... raise money to support refugees fleeing the current crisis in Syria.

23. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly M2 PressWIRE, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, 647 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

24. To Combat ISIS, Welcome Syrians The New York Times, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, Section A; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR; Pg. 27, 903 words, By ANNE SPECKHARD. Anne Speckhard, an adjunct associate professor of psychiatry at the Georgetown University School of Medicine, is the author of ''Talking to Terrorists'' and ''Bride of ISIS.''... process. Yet in the current crisis, the United States foreign assistance budget to help refugees overseas remains flatlined. With ...

25. Kagame Warns - Imposing Inappropriate Political Standards 'Unacceptable' News of Rwanda, September 29, 2015, 458 words... on an international refugee law that he said, it has " ...... a factor in the current crisis as if the purpose all along was just to keep the refugees encamped far away from ...

26. UN: Kagame tasks UN member states on SDGs implementation PANAPRESS - Pan African News Agency, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, 518 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...


27. 'The only sustainable future is one that includes us all,' Rwandan President tells UN Assembly PR Newswire Africa, September 29, 2015 Tuesday 4:59 PM EST, 650 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

28. Is this nasty little peep show the seediest Channel 4 series ever? Scottish Daily Mail, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, FEATURES; Pg. 59, 755 words, CHRISTOPHER STEVENS... Spotlight. Meeting Syrian refugees who have made it to ...... local people's response to the current crisis. Plus, a look ...

29. 'THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IS ONE THAT INCLUDES US ALL,' RWANDAN PRESIDENT TELLS UN ASSEMBLY States News Service, September 29, 2015 Tuesday, 653 words, States News Service... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

30. UWinnipeg Team Rides for Refugees Targeted News Service, September 29, 2015 Tuesday 4:55 AM EST, 366 words, Targeted News Service... usually supports one refugee to study at UWinnipeg ...... year. In light of the current crisis, UWinnipeg's Global College has ...

31. 'The Only Sustainable Future Is One That Includes Us All,' Rwandan President Tells UN Assembly UN News Service (New York), September 29, 2015, 643 words... For example, international refugee law has barely been a factor in the current crisis, "as if the purpose all along was to keep refugees encamped far from developed ...

32. How many refugees should the UK take in?; Yvette Cooper has suggested the UK should welcome 10,000 refugees from the Middle East, with each town housing 10 families. Our panellists give their verdict The Guardian, September 28, 2015 Monday 9:23 AM GMT, COMMENT IS FREE, 1798 words, Patrick Kingsley, Diane Abbott, Daniel Hannan, Tim Finch, Jonathan Wittenberg... context, and given the scale of the current crisis, Britain can - and indeed should - take in 10,000 refugees immediately. As Yvette Cooper's ...

33. Meeting in Ludlow on refugee crisis Ludlow Advertiser, September 28, 2015 Monday, NEWS, 117 words, Adrian Kibbler... town can do to help refugees during the current crisis."We want to create an ...

34. Mid Ulster council co-ordinating response to refugee crisis Mid-Ulster Mail, September 28, 2015 Monday, 282 words... new home for refugees caught up in the current crisis, we do need to be ready should the eventuality ...

35. Serbia will not be left to solve migrant problem alone Premium Official News, September 28, 2015 Monday, 299 words... in providing aid to refugees, he said, adding that no ...... alone to solve the problem of the current crisis. In case of any ...

36. RESPOND TO SURVEY ON ATTITUDES TOWARD REFUGEES States News Service, September 28, 2015 Monday, 145 words, States News Service... attitudes and beliefs about the current crisis involving refugees from the conflict in Syria.The ...

37. Refugees need more than just emergency support


The Statesman (AsiaNet), September 28, 2015 Monday, 865 words, Khaled Husseini... inevitably moves away from the current crisis in Europe, that the awareness and goodwill of the public towards refugees across the world remains ...

38. Mid Ulster council co-ordinating response to refugee crisis Tyrone Times, September 28, 2015 Monday, 282 words... new home for refugees caught up in the current crisis, we do need to be ready should the eventuality ...

39. Mark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme povertyCNN Money, 27 September 2015 Sunday, 387 wordsMark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme poverty @ahiza_garcia The key to ending extreme poverty? Internet access, according to Mark Zuckerberg. The Facebook CEO called for on Saturd...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35493/f/676931/s/4a30a9aa/sc/7/l/0Lmoney0Bcnn0N0C20A150C0A90C260Cnews0Cmark0Ezuckerberg0Eunited0Enations0Epoverty0Einternet0Cindex0Bhtml0Dsection0Fmoney0Ilatest/story01.htm

40. Mark Zuckerberg: Internet can eradicate povertyCNN Money, 27 September 2015 Sunday, 387 wordsMark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme poverty @ahiza_garcia The key to ending extreme poverty? Internet access, according to Mark Zuckerberg. The Facebook CEO called for on Saturd...http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/26/news/mark-zuckerberg-united-nations-poverty-internet/index.html

41. Refugee crisis sparks Derry pop-up shop Derry Journal, September 27, 2015 Sunday, 301 words... people.In terms of the current crisis, Save the Children said that many refugee children are frightened, homeless and ...

42. Facebook CEO calls for greater global Internet access Stock Watch, September 27, 2015 Sunday 6:30 AM EST, 211 words, Joseph Garcia... added that, in the wake of the current crisis in Europe, Facebook ...... reach Internet access to refugee camps.With the UN having set ...

43. Mark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme povertyCable News Network, 26 September 2015 Saturday, 381 wordsThe key to ending extreme poverty? Internet access, according to Mark Zuckerberg. The Facebook CEO called for greater global Internet access on Saturday during a speech at the United Nations . "...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35493/f/676931/s/4a30a9aa/sc/7/l/0Lmoney0Bcnn0N0C20A150C0A90C260Cnews0Cmark0Ezuckerberg0Eunited0Enations0Epoverty0Einternet0Cindex0Bhtml0Dsection0Fmoney0Ilatest/story01.htm

44. Mark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme poverty CNN Wire, September 26, 2015 Saturday 7:01 PM GMT, 337 words, By Ahiza Garcia... bring Internet access to refugee camps -- especially timely given Europe's current crisis.Zuckerberg's U.S. partnership is ...

45. It's a bit rasher Cam to keep ham and carry on Daily Record & Sunday Mail, September 26, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 21, 471 words, Des Clarke... pledged to take in refugees in response to the current crisis. He'll accept any ...

46. Martin Dempsey's world is falling apartEuropean Voice, 26 September 2015 Saturday, 3931 wordsChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey | Mark Wilson/Getty Images Martin Dempsey's


world is falling apart By 9/26/15, 3:41 PM CET BERLIN -- As his convoy sliced lights flashing through the busy streets of Berlin on a recent morning, Ge...http://www.politico.eu/article/martin-dempseys-world-is-falling-apart-defense-germany-joint-chirfs-of-staff-career-nato/

47. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey | Mark Wilson/Getty...European Voice, 26 September 2015 Saturday, 3931 wordsChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey | Mark Wilson/Getty Images Martin Dempsey's world is falling apart By 9/26/15, 3:41 PM CET BERLIN -- As his convoy sliced lights flashing through the busy streets of Berlin on a recent morning, Ge...http://www.politico.eu/article/martin-dempseys-world-is-falling-apart-defense-germany-joint-chirfs-of-staff-career-nato/

48. The Gympie Times (Queensland), September 26, 2015 Saturday, Pg. 8, 154 words... embrace any potential refugees from the current crisis engulfing Europe.

49. Comment: Refugee crisis will define Europe for a century Postmedia Breaking News, September 26, 2015 Saturday, 879 words... fans to help welcome refugees.Indeed, the current crisis could fuel a momentum ...

50. Refugee crisis will define Europe for a century Times Colonist (Victoria, British Columbia), September 26, 2015 Saturday, COMMENT; Pg. A15, 879 words, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Times Colonist... fans to help welcome refugees.Indeed, the current crisis could fuel a momentum ...

51. Mark Zuckerberg: Internet access can eradicate extreme poverty CNNMoney.com, September 26, 2015 Saturday 7:11 AM EST, NEWS, 324 words, Ahiza Garcia... bring Internet access to refugee camps -- especially timely given Europe's current crisis.Zuckerberg's U.S. partnership is ...

52. Refugees' long-term needs critical tooChina Post, 25 September 2015 Friday, 1030 words========== Friday, September 25, 2015 By Khaled Hosseini ,The Daily Star/Asia News Network While the public outcry and spontaneous acts of solidarity toward refugees in Europe appear very moving, the hard work lies in ensuring that refugees have access to ...http://www.chinapost.com.tw/print/446695.htm

53. Des Clarke: It's a bit rasher Cam to keep ham and carry on; DES Clarke says the Prime Minister really should say something over those allegations. But he's just being pig-headed. dailyrecord.co.uk, September 25, 2015 Friday 7:20 PM GMT, OPINION,LIFESTYLE, 454 words, By Des Clarke... pledged to take in refugees in response to the current crisis. He'll accept any ...

54. Call for Europe-wide refugee policy Dumfries and Galloway Standard, September 25, 2015, NEWS; Pg. 12, 276 words... pretend that there are easy solutions to the current crisis. But Europe itself was ...... stranger to mass flows of refugees during and after the Second ...

55. French PM says France will only accept 30,000 refugees from current crisis Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), September 25, 2015 Friday, 267 words... will cap the number of refugees it is willing to accept in the current crisis at 30,000 and will ...


56. Comment: Refugee crisis will define Europe for a century Postmedia Breaking News, September 25, 2015 Friday, 879 words... fans to help welcome refugees.Indeed, the current crisis could fuel a momentum ...

57. OPINION: Refugees need more than just emergency support By Khaled Hosseini in Dhaka/The Daily Star/24 September 2015 Asia News Network (ANN), September 24, 2015 Thursday, 905 words... inevitably moves away from the current crisis in Europe, that the awareness and goodwill of the public towards refugees across the world remains ...

58. Polish premier seen to "dominate" party but failing to boost poll ratings BBC Monitoring Europe - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 24, 2015 Thursday, 1217 words... effects in light of the current crisis tied to the influx of refugees into Europe. Adapting herself to the then ...

59. How many Syrian refugees are coming? The Cincinnati Enquirer (Ohio), September 24, 2015 Thursday, A; Pg. 11, 421 words, By, Hannah Sparling... first Syrian family from the current crisis relocated to Cincinnati. Refugees go through a ...



62. Helping hands East Kent Mercury, September 24, 2015, 609 words... particular importance during this current crisis spreading across Europe affecting Syrian refugees.Terry Waite practices ...

63. Raging Bill; The world's richest man is on a humanitarian mission to end poverty, one international pledge at a ; time. As he arrives at the Global Goals summit, Bill Gates tells Rosamund Urwin why he cares The Evening Standard (London), September 24, 2015 Thursday, FEATURES; Pg. 30,31, 1456 words, Rosamund Urwin... I ask him what he would do about the current crisis hitting headlines, that of refugees, and whether the UK and his native US should ...

64. West Norfolk Council should house at least 10 Syrian families', says religious group Lynn News, September 24, 2015 Thursday, 239 words... first group of Syrian refugees to be resettled in Britain since the current crisis began arrived earlier this ...

65. Germany's Merkel Sees Refugee Crisis as Shaping Europe's FutureQatar News Agency, 24 September 2015 Thursday, 234 wordshttp://www.qna.org.qa/en-us/News/NewsBulletin http://www.qna.org.qa/en-us/News/NewsBulletin General International World coun...http://www.qna.org.qa/Request/QNAFeed.ashx?category=0&lang=en-US&Bulletin=General#117735791_11

66. Bill Gates: the world's richest man is on a humanitarian mission to end poverty, one international pledge at a time; As he arrives at the Global Goals summit, Bill Gates tells Rosamund Urwin why he caresabout philanthropy


standard.co.uk, September 24, 2015 Thursday 11:09 AM GMT, LONDON LIFE, 1517 words, ROSAMUND URWIN... I ask him what he would do about the current crisis hitting headlines, that of refugees, and whether the UK and his native US should ...

67. The refugee crisis is a matter for all humanity; Letters to the Editor The Daily Telegraph (London), September 23, 2015 Wednesday, LETTERS; Pg. 21, 245 words... exclude "non-Christian" refugees is a profoundly un-Christian response to the current crisis (report, September 18).

68. Germany warns Cameron EU reform pleas will be ignored unless Britain takes more refugees Express Online, September 23, 2015 Wednesday 9:16 PM GMT, 752 words, Greg Heffer, Political Reporter... about how to deal with refugees and migrants had so far " ...... down" in the face of the current crisis.And he also attributed blame to Mrs ...

69. Cameron tells EU leaders to send economic migrants home - as ONE MILLION head our way Express Online, September 23, 2015 Wednesday 7:31 PM GMT, 1666 words, Tom Batchelor & Macer Hall... countries to do more to end the current crisis, saying each nation ...... take their "fair share" of refugees.In a direct ...

70. Europe's disgrace Premium Official News, September 23, 2015 Wednesday, 1796 words... increased the dependence of migrants and refugees on smugglers, thus making matters worse. The current crisis in the Balkan region ...... Any representation of the current refugee flows as 'massive' is therefore misleading. The current crisis is not one of numbers, ...

71. Sturgeon calls for government to do more on refugees Aberdeen Press and Journal, September 22, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS; OTHER; Others; Pg. 16, 334 words, Calum Ross... people as we can in the current crisis."While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...

72. Working to support refugees Gloucestershire Echo, September 22, 2015 Tuesday, SPORT; Pg. 20, 113 words... backing calls for refugee support in light of the current crisis.The Gloucester City Council ...

73. E.U. Summit; Race to Reach an Asylum Deal Handelsblatt Global Edition, September 22, 2015 Tuesday, POLITICS, 1479 words... Without a deal, the current crisis will continue, Mr. ...... It will worsen, because refugees keep coming. It ...

74. OECD urges "co-ordinated international response" to refugee crisis Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), September 22, 2015 Tuesday, 401 words... two reports on the current crisis: "2015 International Migration ...... Policy Brief on the Refugee Crisis", the OECD said that ...

75. Sturgeon urges more UK help for Syrian refugees Scottish Express, September 22, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS; Pg. 2, 165 words, Tom Martin... people as we can in the current crisis."While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...


76. Nicola Sturgeon demands UK action on refugee crisis Scotsman, September 22, 2015 Tuesday, 939 words, Scott Macnab... people as we can in the current crisis."While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...

77. Volunteers help refugees survive while Europe's leaders still search for solutionsAmnesty International, 21 September 2015 Monday, 1251 wordsVolunteers help refugees survive while Europe's leaders still search for solutions By Eliza Goroya in Greece, Khairunissa Dhala and Lorna Hayes in Germany , 21 September 2015, 11:03 UTC From Greece to Germany, volunteers are joining forces to help newly-ar...http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/09/volunteers-help-refugees-survive-while-europes-leaders-still-search-for-solutions/

78. Nicola Sturgeon calls for more refugees to be admitted to UK Belfast Telegraph Online, September 21, 2015 Monday 6:20 PM GMT, UK, 488 words... people as we can in the current crisis."While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...

79. Volkswagen Shares Tumble After Emissions Scandal; VW Faces Huge Penalties; Pope Leaves for Final Stop on Cuba Tour; European Markets Rise After Greek Vote; Chinese President to Begin US Visit in Seattle; Western Businesses Warming Up to China; Scott Walker Drops Out of US Presidential Race; GE CEO Calls for More Business-Friendly India CNN INTERNATIONAL, September 21, 2015 Monday, NEWS; International, 7628 words, Richard Quest... taking the lead campaigning of refugee relief.The founder of the American ...... donating half his wealth to the current crisis. He's also hiring refugees to help them change their lives and their ...

80. Volkswagen Shares Tumble After Emissions Scandal; VW Faces Huge Penalties; Pope Leaves for Final Stop on Cuba Tour; European Markets Rise Finance Wire, September 21, 2015 Monday, 7719 words... taking the lead campaigning of refugee relief.The founder of the American ...... donating half his wealth to the current crisis. He's also hiring refugees to help them change their lives and their ...

81. For refugees, education is as essential as shelter: just ask Aqeela Asifi; Thousands of girls have been educated in a Pakistan camp thanks to this exiled teacher. Investing in their future is an investment in ours too The Guardian, September 21, 2015 Monday 11:08 AM GMT, COMMENT IS FREE, 803 words, Khaled Hosseini... inevitably moves away from the current crisis in Europe, that public goodwill towards refugees across the world remains ...

82. Volkswagen Shares Tumble After Emissions Scandal; VW Faces Huge Penalties; Pope Leaves for Final Stop on Cuba Tour; European Markets Rise International Wire, September 21, 2015 Monday, 7719 words... taking the lead campaigning of refugee relief.The founder of the American ...... donating half his wealth to the current crisis. He's also hiring refugees to help them change their lives and their ...

83. NICOLA STURGEON CALLS FOR MORE REFUGEES TO BE ADMITTED TO UK PA Newswire: Scotland, September 21, 2015 Monday 5:53 PM BST, PA Newswire: Scotland, 489 words, Mark McLaughlin, Political Reporter, Press Association Scotland... people as we can in the current crisis.``While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...


84. NICOLA STURGEON CALLS FOR MORE REFUGEES TO BE ADMITTED TO UK Press Association Mediapoint, September 21, 2015 Monday 5:53 PM BST, HOME NEWS, 489 words, Mark McLaughlin, Political Reporter, Press Association Scotland... people as we can in the current crisis.``While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...

85. URGENT REFUGEE ACTION REQUIRED States News Service, September 21, 2015 Monday, 483 words, States News Service... people as we can in the current crisis."While I welcome the ...... take in more refugees and pledge more aid, ...

86. First Minister meets UK foreign secretary for refugee crisis talksSTV, 21 September 2015 Monday, 566 wordsFirst Minister meets UK foreign secretary for refugee crisis talks Nicola Sturgeon has urged the foreign secretary to admit an even greater number of refugees to the UK - and also give Scotland more say in the negotiations over European Union (EU ) reform....http://news.stv.tv/scotland-decides/news/1329130-first-minister-to-meet-foreign-secretary-for-refugee-crisis-talks/

87. Volkswagen Shares Tumble After Emissions Scandal; VW Faces Huge Penalties; Pope Leaves for Final Stop on Cuba Tour; European Markets Rise Technology Wire, September 21, 2015 Monday, 7719 words... taking the lead campaigning of refugee relief.The founder of the American ...... donating half his wealth to the current crisis. He's also hiring refugees to help them change their lives and their ...

88. Washington: Van Hollen Urges President Obama to Resettle More Syrian Refugees US Official News, September 21, 2015 Monday, 189 wordsldquo;The number of Syrian refugees that the United States has resettled & ...... insufficient in light of the current crisis,” the Members wrote ...... take into account the enormity of the current crisis.” The letter continued, “We agree with Refugee Council USA’ ...

89. Refugees can drive economic growth in faltering Midwest cities Detroit Free Press (Michigan), September 20, 2015 Sunday, A; Pg. 14, 844 words, By, Steve Tobocman... refugees and some 2,500 refugees have perished at sea ...... humanitarian issues facing the current crisis are truly catastrophic.

90. German Chancellor Merkel is the leader the world must learn from The Statesman: SUNY, Stony Brook, September 20, 2015, OPINIONS, 628 words, Maurice Abernathy... increase in the country's refugee intake to 70,000-85,000 refugees. However, it has not been confirmed whether they will be from the area of the current crisis. As Merkel does her best to rally the ...

91. Humanity requires we help refugees Anderson Independent-Mail (South Carolina), September 19, 2015 Saturday, OPINION; Pg. 10A, 534 words... East strongmen, there would be no current crisis. As many reasons as there are to turn away more refugees, there is one overarching reason why we ...

92. Roosevelt's failure; The second world war The Economist, September 19, 2015, BOOKS & ART, 556 words... without thinking about the current crisis--the refugees fleeing terror and despotism ...


93. EU leaders expect deal on fixed refugee quotas The Independent (London), September 19, 2015 Saturday, WORLD; Pg. 32, 480 words, TONY PATERSON IN BERLIN... 800,000 and one million refugees during the current crisis - more than all of the rest of the ...

94. Refugee Crisis 2015: Humanitarian Groups Rescue 301 People In Mediterranean Sea As Europe Migration EscalatesInternational Business Times, 19 September 2015 Saturday, 471 wordsHumanitarian workers rescued 301 people aboard rubber dinghies floating in the Mediterranean Sea Saturday. Crews made three back-to-back rescues, bringing those saved aboard a northbound vessel, according to reports by two charitable organizations. Doc...http://www.ibtimes.com/refugee-crisis-2015-humanitarian-groups-rescue-301-people-mediterranean-sea-europe-2105008

95. New satellite images show Hungary's rush to keep refugees out of EuropeAmnesty International, 18 September 2015 Friday, 975 wordsNew satellite images show Hungary's rush to keep refugees out of Europe 18 September 2015, 14:19 UTC New satellite images obtained by Amnesty International give a chilling new perspective on Hungary's frenzied efforts to repel refugees and asylum-seekers t...https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/09/new-satellite-images-show-hungarys-rush-to-keep-refugees-out-of-europe/

96. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Boston Standard, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000 refugees from camps on the border with ...

97. Scotland stands ready to welcome refugees European Union News, September 18, 2015 Friday, 1094 words... immediate fair share of refugees from the current crisis with the majority of Scotland’ ...... take our fair share of refugees caught up in this current crisis. The First Minister has made very clear that 1,000 refugees coming to Scotland should be seen as ...

98. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Horncastle News, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000 refugees from camps on the border with ...

99. Refugee crisis: EU leaders expect to reach deal on fixed quotas at summit next week; Setting up EU administered 'hot spots' in Greece and Italy will also be high on the agenda Independent.co.uk, September 18, 2015 Friday 6:50 PM GMT, FRONTPAGE, 521 words, Tony Paterson... 800,000 and one million refugees during the current crisis - more than all of the rest of the ...

100. Timely play about refugees to open at the Unity Liverpool Echo, September 18, 2015 Friday, THE GUIDE;FEATURES; Pg. 5, 220 words, CATHERINE JONES... Theatre, brings the topic of refugees and the current crisis to the city.

101. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Louth Leader, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000


refugees from camps on the border with ...

102. New satellite images show Hungary's rush to keep refugees out of Europe The Malta Independent, September 18, 2015, 782 words... not finding solutions to the current crisis but creating a ...... problems at the expense of refugees and their international obligations." 2013 ...

103. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Market Rasen Mail, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000 refugees from camps on the border with ...

104. Satellite Images at Hungary-Serbia Crossing Lay Bare 'Perverse' Migrant Treatment-Watchdog RIA Novosti, September 18, 2015 Friday, 273 words, РИА Новости,РИАН... not finding solutions to the current crisis but creating a ...... problems at the expense of refugees and their international obligations," she stressed.The ...

105. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Skegness Standard, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000 refugees from camps on the border with ...

106. Lincolnshire expected to accept up to 200 Syrian refugges over next five years Sleaford Standard, September 18, 2015 Friday, 351 words... take up to 200 refugees ion the next five ...... Government's proposals to react to the current crisis.The Government has pledged to accept 20,000 refugees from camps on the border with ...

107. Mayor: Bring refugees here South Burnett Times and Rural Weekly (Queensland), September 18, 2015, Pg. 4, 309 words, Barclay White... embrace any potential refugees from the current crisis engulfing Europe."Whilst that ...

108. NEW SATELLITE IMAGES SHOW HUNGARY'S RUSH TO KEEP REFUGEES OUT OF EUROPE States News Service, September 18, 2015 Friday, 811 words, States News Service... not finding solutions to the current crisis but creating a ...... problems at the expense of refugees and their international obligations." Note to ...

109. New Satellite Images Show Hungary's Rush to Keep Refugees Out of Europe Targeted News Service, September 18, 2015 Friday 1:47 AM EST, 794 words, Targeted News Service... not finding solutions to the current crisis but creating a ...... problems at the expense of refugees and their international obligations."Copyright ...

110. Wales 'preparing ground' for refugeesBBC News, 17 September 2015 Thursday, 435 wordsWales is 'preparing the ground' for refugees, says Carwyn Jones Wales is "preparing the ground" so it is ready to receive refugees when they arrive, the first minister has said. Carwyn Jones hosted a summit on resettling refug...http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-34272141

111. Wales 'preparing ground' for refugees


BBC News, 17 September 2015 Thursday, 434 wordsWales is 'preparing the ground' for refugees, says Carwyn Jones Wales is "preparing the ground" so it is ready to receive refugees when they arrive, the first minister has said. Carwyn Jones hosted a summit on resettling refug...http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-34272141

112. VIDEO: Ensuring Wales is ready for refugeesBBC News, 17 September 2015 Thursday, 139 wordsWe are ensuring Wales is ready for refugees, says Carwyn Jones 17 Septem...http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-34280766

113. VIDEO: Ensuring Wales is ready for refugeesBBC News, 17 September 2015 Thursday, 137 wordsWe are ensuring Wales is ready for refugees, says Carwyn Jones 17 Septe...http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-34280766

114. Queen receives Walther Rathenau Prize Jordanian News Agency, September 17, 2015 Thursday 8:55 PM EST, 1288 words... a large number of refugees during the current crisis, he called on the international ...

115. Queen receives Walther Rathenau Prize Jordan News Agency (Petra), September 17, 2015 Thursday, 1299 words... a large number of refugees during the current crisis, he called on the international ...

116. Lampedusa brings the refugee crisis to Liverpool's Unity; Thought-provoking play tells story of two Europes liverpoolecho.co.uk, September 17, 2015 Thursday 3:00 PM GMT, WHAT'S ON, 213 words, By Catherine Jones... Theatre, brings the topic of refugees and the current crisis to the city.

117. Arab League Secretary General: No Solution To The Syrian Refugees, But The Cease-Fire National Iraqi News Agency (NINA), September 17, 2015 Thursday, 178 words... in the Arab region, and the refugees, which is one of the most important of the current crisis." He added, "What is happening from a ...

118. Syrian refugees to speak at town hall meeting on how people can help in current crisis Postmedia Breaking News, September 17, 2015 Thursday, ONLINE, 177 words... most needed to help refugees in the current crisis, said Queenie Choo, ...

119. OSCE PA Delegates Support International Conference on Migration - Spain Delegation RIA Novosti, September 17, 2015 Thursday, 324 words, РИА Новости,РИАН... needs of at-risk refugees seeking asylum in ...... lawmakers express regret that the current crisis has been used as an expression ...

120. EU Has Moral Duty to Protect Syrian Refugees - EC Official on Migration RIA Novosti, September 17, 2015 Thursday, 126 words, РИА Новости,РИАН... using violence against refugees who are obviously in ...... not the best approach to the current crisis."We don't always ...

121. EU Has Moral Duty to Protect Syrian Refugees - EC Official on Migration RIA Novosti, September 17, 2015 Thursday, 245 words, РИА Новости,РИАН... using violence against refugees who are obviously in ...... not the best approach to the current crisis."We don't always agree with the ...


122. Otley Council pledges to help refugees Wharfedale Observer, September 17, 2015 Thursday, NEWS, 471 words, Jim Jack... support Syrian and other refugees in the current crisis."It reaffirms its own ...... wherever possible, to aid refugees and to assist local residents ...

123. Asylum under theatre spotlight The Citizen Gloucester, September 16, 2015 Wednesday, AGENCY:OTHER; Pg. 22, 317 words... Seekers and Women for Refugee Women have been supporting refugees long before the current crisis hit the headlines. "I'm ...

124. Asylum under theatre spotlight Gloucestershire Echo, September 16, 2015 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 22, 175 words, Giulia Crouch... Seekers and Women for Refugee Women have been supporting refugees long before the current crisis hit the headlines."I'm ...

125. The Government has quietly cut money to house and educate orphan child refugees living here; The little-known 'UASC payments' have been sharply reduced Independent.co.uk, September 16, 2015 Wednesday 7:19 PM GMT, FRONTPAGE, 458 words, Jon Stone, Mollie Goodfellow... reduction as "dreadful"."Child refugees orphaned or separated from their parents are ...... in unprecedented numbers because of the current crisis, and we should rightly do what we can to help."The ...

126. One in five Syrians say they PREFER life under ISIS to their previous existence under Assad, according to survey MailOnline, September 16, 2015 Wednesday 7:55 PM GMT, NEWS, 995 words, JOHN HALL FOR MAILONLINE... Syria will emerge from the current crisis and that peace will one ...... Assad blamed Europe's refugee crisis on Western ...

127. One in five Syrians say they PREFER life under ISIS to their previous existence under Assad, according to survey MailOnline, September 16, 2015 Wednesday 1:04 PM GMT, NEWS, 991 words, JOHN HALL FOR MAILONLINE... Syria will emerge from the current crisis and that peace will one ...... Assad blamed Europe's refugee crisis on Western ...

128. District councils respond to refugee cries for help North Devon Gazette, September 16, 2015 Wednesday, ROP, 282 words, Dhruti Vithani... everything they can to help refugees in the current crisis. "However, the simple truth of the matter is that the ...

129. Refugee crisis spreads Syria woe to Europe Global Times (China), September 15, 2015 Tuesday, 360 words, Global Times... cannot control how the current crisis will evolve. All ...... sentiments associated with the influx of refugees just started to emerge, and the ...

130. Outgoing MP says Canada has obligation to help Guelph Tribune, September 15, 2015 Tuesday, Pg. 0, 452 words... kind of time now" with the current crisis.Valeriote said that as an ...... dealt with "a lot of refugee claims," and he also had some experience with ...

131. A Timeline Of Europe's Tragic Refugee And Migrant Crisis


Huffington Post, 15 September 2015 Tuesday, 135 words| "> Hundreds of thousands of people in search of safety and...http://feeds.huffingtonpost.com/c/35496/f/677529/s/49dfd0e5/sc/7/l/0L0Shuffingtonpost0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceu0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Etimeline0In0I81410A980Bhtml0Dutm0Ihp0Iref0Fimpact0Gir0FImpact/story01.htm

132. How Europe's Tragic Refugee And Migrant Crisis Got So DireHuffington Post, 15 September 2015 Tuesday, 136 words| "> Hundreds of thousands of people in search of safety and...http://feeds.huffingtonpost.com/c/35496/f/677529/s/49dfd0e5/sc/7/l/0L0Shuffingtonpost0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceu0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Etimeline0In0I81410A980Bhtml0Dutm0Ihp0Iref0Fimpact0Gir0FImpact/story01.htm

133. PRIVATE MEETINGS TAINT ZONING VOTE Tampa Bay Times, September 15, 2015 Tuesday, NATIONAL; YOUR LETTERS; Pg. 6A, 911 words... helped to fuel the fire of the current crisis.David M. Mokotoff, St. Petersburg* * *Syrian refugees to U.S. - Sept. 11 ...

134. Indiana University Expert: Building New Camps Won't Solve European Refugee Crisis Targeted News Service, September 15, 2015 Tuesday 10:17 PM EST, 834 words, Targeted News Service... thousands of Syrian and Eritrean refugees crossing their borders, an ...... University professor said the current crisis has been caused by the very solution ...

135. The complex reality of fostering a refugee child in Britain; Thousands of British families want to foster unaccompanied refugee children living in dire conditions, but authorities say it could take up to eight months to do so. So what next? Milli Hill reports telegraph.co.uk, September 15, 2015 Tuesday 1:06 PM GMT, 1275 words, By Milli Hill... fostering a child refugee as a chance to help ...... real difference in the current crisis, don't start getting the ...

136. The complex reality of fostering a refugee child in Britain; Thousands of British families want to foster unaccompanied refugee children living in dire conditions, but authorities say it will take at least eight months to do so. So what to do? Milli Hill reports telegraph.co.uk, September 15, 2015 Tuesday 10:40 AM GMT, 1275 words, By Milli Hill... fostering a child refugee as a chance to help ...... real difference in the current crisis, don't start getting the ...

137. Serbian president, Pope Francis discuss EU bid, refugee crisis BBC Monitoring Europe - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 14, 2015 Monday, 363 words... condition of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, and the importance of ...... a shared solution to the current crisis." Italy's ANSA news ...

138. Scotland stands ready to welcome refugees European Union News, September 14, 2015 Monday, 1082 words... immediate fair share of refugees from the current crisis with the majority of Scotland’ ...... take our fair share of refugees caught up in this current crisis. The First Minister has made very clear that 1,000 refugees coming to Scotland should be seen as ...

139. Room for More The Harvard Crimson: Harvard University, September 14, 2015 Monday, OPINION OPINION; Pg. 1, 547 words... role in combating the current crisis by admitting more refugees into the country and by cooperating with its ...


140. Aleksandar Hemon: 'We have to fight those who have a vision of excluding other people'; The Bosnian-American author on the dehumanisation of refugees, the Bush years, and the nature of zombies The Observer, September 14, 2015 Monday 2:09 PM GMT, BOOKS, 1123 words, Alex Clark... your thoughts on the current crisis? It is appalling in ...... many ways; these people are refugees and they're being shut ...

141. Our services cannot cope with refugees Western Daily Press, September 14, 2015 Monday, NEWS:PEOPLE; Pg. 18, 171 words Regarding the current crisis of refugees and migrants coming to this country, we are ...

142. From Malawi to Tucson, a refugee finds sanctuary Arizona Daily Star (Tucson), September 13, 2015 Sunday, METRO; Pg. C02, 765 words, Ron Medvescek, Ron Medvescek / Arizona Daily Star... High Commissioner for Refugees, which helps resettle refugees from global conflicts, like the current crisis in Europe."I ...

143. Fatal landings The News International, September 13, 2015 Sunday, 1091 words, Dr Arif Azad... a major share of the refugees in the current crisis;2) addressing external and ...

144. Scotland stands ready to welcome refugeesThe Scottish Government, 13 September 2015 Sunday, 1128 wordsScotland stands ready to welcome refugees 13/09/2015 00:01 UN Praise for Scotland's Response to Refugee Crisis. Scotland's Minister for Europe has welcomed the huge surge of solidarity with the men women and children caught up in this refugee crisis, as th...http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Scotland-stands-ready-to-welcome-refugees-1cee.aspx

145. SCOTLAND STANDS READY TO WELCOME REFUGEES States News Service, September 13, 2015 Sunday, 1028 words, States News Service... immediate fair share of refugees from the current crisis with the majority of Scotland's councils, ...... take our fair share of refugees caught up in this current crisis. The First Minister has made very clear that 1,000 refugees coming to Scotland should be seen as ...

146. 'If we accept new refugees and be kind society will flourish' - Anna; From direct provision to the Royal College of Surgeons, Anna Kern is a beacon of hope for new migrants, writes Claire Mc Cormack Sunday Independent, September 13, 2015, NEWS; Pg. 20, 1120 words... Ireland."As for the 4,000 refugees Ireland will take as part of the country's response to the current crisis, Anna says children ...

147. SCOTLAND STANDS READY TO WELCOME REFUGEES UK Government News, September 13, 2015 Sunday 9:10 AM EST, 1058 words... immediate fair share of refugees from the current crisis with the majority of Scotland's councils, ...... take our fair share of refugees caught up in this current crisis. The First Minister has made very clear that 1,000 refugees coming to Scotland should be seen as ...

148. Crisis a priority, says councillor Aberdeen Press and Journal, September 12, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; OTHER; Others; Pg. 6, 177 words, Jane Candlish... for inaction on the current crisis. Mr Gray said that ...... say that the council would deal with refugees after solving its other ...


149. Anti-migrant protest in Warsaw draws thousands Agence France Presse -- English, September 12, 2015 Saturday 3:31 PM GMT, 79 words... seen virtually no refugees arriving during the current crisis.bo-mas/ric

150. Sunday's gossip columnBBC News, 12 September 2015 Saturday, 523 wordsGossip column: Mourinho, Gerrard, Pogba, Berahino For a list of all the latest deals, check out the transfers page. The odds on Chelsea manager Jose Mourinho leaving the club before the end of this year have been shortened following his side's defeat to Ev...http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/34236366

151. Hungary: Police lob food into crowdCable News Network, 12 September 2015 Saturday, 1397 wordsStory highlights Roszke, Hungary (CNN) Video has emerged that shows police throwing bags of food into crowds of refugees from behind a barrier at a migrant transit camp in Hungary, a country at the forefront of Europe's migrant crisis. Men, women and child...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35494/f/676993/s/49c54c92/sc/3/l/0Ledition0Bcnn0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceurope0Ceurope0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Cindex0Bhtml0Deref0Fedition/story01.htm

152. 72 House representatives ask Obama to increase number of Syrian refugees Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), September 12, 2015 Saturday, 217 words... insufficient in the light of the current crisis. More than four million Syrian refugees have been forced to flee the country, and the ...

153. Migration: The Pope Did It Again The Malta Independent, September 12, 2015, 1063 words, Simon Mercieca... part the reason for this current crisis. At least, by ...... rule, those who are truly refugees have succeeded to enter Europe. ...

154. Council promises a 'robust' response to refugee crisis South Wales Echo, September 12, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 6, 300 words... receive Afghan and Syrian refugees. This is not a response to the current crisis but work we have already been ...

155. Cheltenham's Everyman hosts debate and theatre performance on asylum Stroud News and Journal, September 12, 2015 Saturday, WHAT'S ON, 468 words, Matty Airey... GARAS and Women for Refugee Women have been supporting refugees long before the current crisis hit the headlines. I'm ...

156. Migrant crisis: Video shows food being lobbed at crowdCable News Network, 11 September 2015 Friday, 1131 wordsStory highlights Roszke, Hungary (CNN) Video has emerged that shows police throwing bags of food into crowds of refugees from behind a barrier at a migrant transit camp in Hungary, a country at the forefront of Europe's migrant crisis. Men, women and child...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35492/f/676954/s/49c4c8cf/sc/3/l/0L0Scnn0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceurope0Ceurope0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Cindex0Bhtml0Deref0Frss0Ilatest/story01.htm

157. Migrants face inhumane, degrading treatmentCable News Network, 11 September 2015 Friday, 1303 wordsStory highlights Roszke, Hungary (CNN) Video has emerged that shows police throwing bags of food into crowds of refugees from behind a barrier at a migrant transit camp in Hungary, a country at the forefront of Europe's


migrant crisis. Men, women and child...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35492/f/676965/s/49c6641c/sc/3/l/0L0Scnn0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceurope0Ceurope0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Cindex0Bhtml0Deref0Frss0Iworld/story01.htm

158. Migrants face inhumane, degrading treatmentCable News Network, 11 September 2015 Friday, 1397 wordsStory highlights Roszke, Hungary (CNN) Video has emerged that shows police throwing bags of food into crowds of refugees from behind a barrier at a migrant transit camp in Hungary, a country at the forefront of Europe's migrant crisis. Men, women and child...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35494/f/676997/s/49c6070e/sc/3/l/0L0Scnn0N0C20A150C0A90C110Ceurope0Ceurope0Emigrant0Ecrisis0Cindex0Bhtml0Deref0Frss0Iworld/story01.htm

159. Video shows Hungarian police lobbing food into migrant crowd CNN Wire, September 11, 2015 Friday 9:55 PM GMT, 1300 words, By Laura Smith-Spark, Arwa Damon and Michael Martinez, CNN... condition of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, and the importance of ...... a shared solution to the current crisis," it said. EU ...

160. Video shows Hungarian police lobbing food into migrant crowd; premier accuses refugees of 'rebellion' CNN Wire, September 11, 2015 Friday 5:14 PM GMT, 1211 words, By Laura Smith-Spark, Arwa Damon and Michael Martinez, CNN... condition of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, and the importance of ...... a shared solution to the current crisis," it said. EU ...

161. 5 things to know for your New Day -- Friday, September 11 CNN Wire, September 11, 2015 Friday 7:50 AM GMT, 538 words, By Doug Criss, CNN... low numbers of Syrian refugees it has taken in during the current crisis. Now something is being ...

162. 5 things to know for your new day -- Friday, September 11 CNN Wire, September 11, 2015 Friday 7:49 AM GMT, 539 words, By Doug Criss, CNN... low numbers of Syrian refugees it has taken in during the current crisis. Now something is being ...

163. Van Hollen Urges President Obama to Resettle More Syrian Refugees Congressional Documents and Publications, September 11, 2015, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOCUMENTS, 196 words... Syria."The number of Syrian refugees that the United States has resettled - ...... insufficient in light of the current crisis," the Members wrote in ...... take into account the enormity of the current crisis."The letter continued, "We agree with Refugee Council USA's recent ...

164. Van Hollen Urges President Obama to Resettle More Syrian Refugees; Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) News Release Congressional Documents and Publications, September 11, 2015, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOCUMENTS, 195 words"The number of Syrian refugees that the United States has resettled - ...... insufficient in light of the current crisis," the Members wrote in ...... take into account the enormity of the current crisis."The letter continued, "We agree with Refugee Council USA's recent ...

165. MURPHY CALLS ON U.S. TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID FOR SYRIA, CAPACITY TO PROCESS REFUGEES; Murphy: The U.S. Has A "Double Standard...In Which We Fully Fund Our Military Activities And


Then We Shortchange Our Humanitarian Activities. It Comes At A Huge Cost".; Sen. Christopher Murphy (D-CT) News Release Congressional Documents and Publications, September 11, 2015, U.S. SENATE DOCUMENTS, 1122 words... take not 10,000 refugees, but tens of thousands of these refugees who are caught up in this current crisis. He, in fact, is just back from the largest Syrian refugee camp anywhere, which is in ...

166. Refugees welcome: North Ayrshire residents rally round for migrant crisis; Donations are currently being collected by Ayrshire Support for Refugees to send to Calais in the coming weeks. dailyrecord.co.uk, September 11, 2015 Friday 10:40 AM GMT, NEWS,LOCAL NEWS, 725 words, By Peter Diamond... hearts go out to the refugees in the current crisis".The event was arranged at ...

167. County Durham responds to refugee crisis European Union News, September 11, 2015 Friday, 441 words... already to meet the needs of refugees requiring our help -the numbers have been extremely small and the current crisis requires a very targeted and ...

168. Migrants face inhumane, degrading treatmentThe Frontier Post, 11 September 2015 Friday, 1297 wordsRoszke, Hungary (CNN)Video has emerged that shows police throwing bags of food into crowds of refugees from behind a barrier at a migrant transit camp in Hungary, a country at the forefront of Europe\'s migrant crisis. Men, women and children can be seen b...http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/335416//

169. Boundless plains to share so let's welcome refugees Geelong Advertiser (Australia), September 11, 2015 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 36, 663 words, Fr Kevin DILLON... gifts, learning and culture that these refugees have provided to their adoptive country.The current crisis of hundreds of thousands of people ...

170. What is the most effective way to help refugees?; Donations can be helpful but are unsustainable in this instance, whereas political action could bring about real change The Guardian, September 11, 2015 Friday 11:27 AM GMT, COMMENT IS FREE, 853 words, William MacAskill... welcome hundreds of thousands of refugees to work here without damaging our economy.Finally, the current crisis provides an opportunity to ...

171. refugee crisis; Welcome! Now What? Handelsblatt Global Edition, September 11, 2015 Friday, POLITICS, 3733 words... about policies regarding refugees for the first time in the current crisis. Shortly before, 800 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean. ...

172. University of Glasgow launches measures to help support refugee students; Acknowledging the current crisis, the institution describes how it reached out to help two Syrian academics Independent.co.uk, September 11, 2015 Friday 10:53 AM GMT, FRONTPAGE, 543 words, Aftab Ali

173. Europe's response to Syria exodus contrasts with closed door in Japan The Japan Times, September 11, 2015, Friday, News , 1513 words... Japan Association for Refugees, claimed that Tokyo's approach to refugee issues does not address the assistance needs of the current crisis and lags behind that of other ...

174. House Democrats to Obama: 10,000 Refugees Not EnoughMediaite - USA, 11 September 2015 Friday, 335 wordsHouse Democrats are callingon President Barack Obama to accept 200,000 refugees, a number 20 times that


which theadministration proposed allowing into the U.S. over the next fisca...http://www.mediaite.com/online/house-democrats-to-obama-10000-refugees-not-enough/

175. Would you open your home to refugees? Trafford Council responds to crisis Messenger Newspapers, September 11, 2015 Friday, NEWS, 551 words... authorities."What do you think about the current crisis? Would you open your home to refugees? Email your thoughts to ...

176. Changes inspire no confidence in PM The Plymouth Herald, September 11, 2015 Friday, AGENCY:OTHER; Pg. 12-13, 217 words... will decide on refugee number quotas to be taken ...... not just for the current crisis but also for future ...

177. MURPHY CALLS ON U.S. TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID FOR SYRIA, CAPACITY TO PROCESS REFUGEES States News Service, September 11, 2015 Friday, 1102 words, States News Service... take not 10,000 refugees, but tens of thousands of these refugees who are caught up in this current crisis. He, in fact, is just back from the largest Syrian refugee camp anywhere, which is in ...

178. VAN HOLLEN URGES PRESIDENT OBAMA TO RESETTLE MORE SYRIAN REFUGEES States News Service, September 11, 2015 Friday, 160 words, States News Service"The number of Syrian refugees that the United States has resettled ...... insufficient in light of the current crisis," the Members wrote in ...... take into account the enormity of the current crisis."The letter continued, "We agree with Refugee Council USA's recent ...

179. AUDIENCE States News Service, September 11, 2015 Friday, 181 words, States News Service... condition of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, and the importance of ...... a shared solution to the current crisis.Published by VISarchive ...

180. Van Hollen Urges President Obama to Resettle More Syrian Refugees Targeted News Service, September 11, 2015 Friday 1:33 AM EST, 194 words, Targeted News Service"The number of Syrian refugees that the United States has resettled - ...... insufficient in light of the current crisis," the Members wrote in ...... take into account the enormity of the current crisis."The letter continued, "We agree with Refugee Council USA's recent ...

181. Murphy Calls on U.S. to Increase Humanitarian Aid for Syria, Capacity to Process Refugees Targeted News Service, September 11, 2015 Friday 12:44 AM EST, 1117 words, Targeted News Service... take not 10,000 refugees, but tens of thousands of these refugees who are caught up in this current crisis. He, in fact, is just back from the largest Syrian refugee camp anywhere, which is in ...

182. Washington: MURPHY CALLS ON U.S. TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID FOR SYRIA, CAPACITY TO PROCESS REFUGEES US Official News, September 11, 2015 Friday, 1149 words... take not 10,000 refugees, but tens of thousands of these refugees who are caught up in this current crisis. He, in fact, is just back from the largest Syrian refugee camp anywhere, which is in ...

183. Video shows Hungarian police lobbing food into migrant crowd CNN.com, September 11, 2015 Friday 5:55 PM EST, EUROPE, 1261 words, By By Laura Smith-Spark, Arwa Damon and Michael Martinez, CNN


... condition of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, and the importance of ...

... a shared solution to the current crisis," it said.EU ...

184. Mapping the EU's split on refugeesBuenos Aires Herald, 10 September 2015 Thursday, 1435 wordsMapping the EU's split on refugees ByRick Noack The Washington Post (*) Demographics may help explain why some countries are welcoming asylum-seekers and others not BERLIN -- As hundreds of Germans held up "Welcome Refugees" signs last weekend, much of Euro...http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/198374/mapping-the-eu's-split-on-refugees

185. Which European countries are pulling their weight in accepting refugees -- and which ones aren'tBusiness Insider, 10 September 2015 Thursday, 229 wordsWhich European countries are pulling their weight in accepting refugees -- and which ones aren't This summer,eve...http://www.businessinsider.com/which-european-countries-are-pulling-their-weight-in-helping-refugees-and-which-ones-arent-2015-9

186. Which European countries are pulling their weight in accepting refugees -- and which ones aren'tBusiness Insider, 10 September 2015 Thursday, 231 wordsThis summer,every European country has been watchingthe enormous number of refugees seeking asylum making their way th...http://uk.businessinsider.com/which-european-countries-are-pulling-their-weight-in-helping-refugees-and-which-ones-arent-2015-9

187. Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Briefing Federal News Service, September 10, 2015 Thursday, 4585 words... granted to -- for Honduras refugees, given the current crisis of the Honduran population. We should ensure that ...

188. UN agencies 'broke and failing' in face of ever-growing refugee crisis; Damage will be impossible to reverse, warns head of UNHCR, after 10% fall in funding forces cuts to food rations and closure of clinics The Guardian, September 10, 2015 Thursday 3:02 PM GMT, WORLD NEWS, 1404 words, Harriet Grant... driving fresh waves of refugees north-west towards Europe and aggravating the current crisis.Speaking to the Guardian, the UN high commissioner for refugees, AntÛnio Guterres, said: "If you ...

189. Europe's approach to Syria exodus contrasts with Japan's dodging of refugeesJapan Times (English), 10 September 2015 Thursday, 1660 wordsProtesters call on Japan to give asylum seekers visas, on Wednesday in central Tokyo. | REUTERS Europe's approach to Syria exodus contrasts with Japan's dodging of refugees by Magdalena Osumi and Jesse Johnson Staff Writers As Europe faces what is possibly...http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/10/national/europes-approach-syria-exodus-contrasts-japans-dodging-refugees/

190. THE RACHEL MADDOW SHOW for September 10, 2015 MSNBC, September 10, 2015 Thursday, NEWS; Domestic, 7711 words, Rachel Maddow... not that much. Since this current crisis started with all of these refugee families, risking their lives ...... take not 10,000 refugees, but tens of thousands of these refugees who were caught up in this current crisis. He, in fact, is just back from the largest Syrian refugee camp anywhere, which is in ...

191. From My Desk Parkes Champion Post, September 10, 2015, COMMUNITY, 524 words, Roel ten Cate... devote to their tasks is amazing.- - - -The current crisis with the Syrian refugees is a worldwide tragedy which ...


192. Treat refugee crisis 'like an emergency' and open Canada's doors, say federal election candidates Scarborough Mirror, September 10, 2015 Thursday, NEWS; Pg. 1, 916 words... it comes to welcoming refugees, cannot continue to be laggards in the current crisis, said Sitsabaiesan. "I ...

193. DUKE, UNC SCHOLARS TO HOLD PUBLIC FORUM ON REFUGEE CRISIS SEPT. 14 States News Service, September 10, 2015 Thursday, 461 words, States News Service... on the relationship of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the current crisis.-- Niklaus Steiner, director of the ...

194. Duke, UNC Scholars to Hold Public Forum on Refugee Crisis Sept. 14 Targeted News Service, September 10, 2015 Thursday 8:49 PM EST, 473 words, Targeted News Service... on the relationship of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the current crisis.- Niklaus Steiner, director of the ...

195. Why do some European countries welcome migrants, while others don't? It's mostlya question of demographics. The Virginian-Pilot(Norfolk, VA.), September 10, 2015 Thursday, FRONT; Pg. A8, 959 words... accommodating when it comes to refugees, which explains Sweden's quick reaction to the current crisis. Although the Swedish government ...

196. Cardiff council to work with community groups to provide 'sustainable' service for Syrian refugees; The council had previously been criticised for its response to the refugee crisis being 'too slow'. walesonline.co.uk, September 10, 2015 Thursday 6:06 PM GMT, NEWS, 402 words, By Philip Dewey... receive Afghan and Syrian refugees."This is not a response to the current crisis but work we have already been ...

197. New Zealand can do much better on refugees The Wellingtonian (New Zealand), September 10, 2015 Thursday, FEATURES; NATIONAL; Pg. 11, 535 words, POLITICS Gordon Campbell... Historically speaking, the ironies of the current crisis are striking.After World ...... II, the United Nations Refugee Convention was passed because the global ...

198. 5 things to know for your New Day -- Friday, September 11 CNN.com, September 10, 2015 Thursday 7:20 AM EST, US, 522 words, By By Doug Criss, CNN... low numbers of Syrian refugees it has taken in during the current crisis. Now something is being ...

199. Russian Foreign Ministry weekly briefing 3 September 2015 - transcript BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 7092 words... allow continued violation of refugee rights and will duly ...... on uprooting the causes of the current crisis. As for your remark that ...

200. Why U.S. should do more for refugeesCable News Network, 9 September 2015 Wednesday, 920 wordsStory highlights Kathleen Newland is co-founder and senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute . The views expressed are her own. (CNN) The German government's announcement this week that it could cope with as many as half a million refugees a year fo...http://rss.cnn.com/c/35492/f/676963/s/49b319aa/sc/11/l/0L0Scnn0N0C20A150C0A90C0A90Copinions0Cnewland0Eeurope0Erefugee0Ecrisis0Cindex0Bhtml0Deref0Frss0Ius/story01.htm


201. Why U.S. should do more in refugee crisis CNN Wire, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 10:27 AM GMT, 831 words, By Kathleen Newland... routinely resettled more refugees than the rest of the world combined, ...... year.Of course, in the current crisis, we are protected by geography from the huge inflows of refugees arriving directly to the neighboring ...

202. Kirstie campaigns to support refugees Coventry Evening Telegraph, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 12, 299 words, Ben Eccleston... Midlandswide campaign to support refugees affected by the current crisis.Kirstie Kelly and three ...

203. As the Syrian refugee crisis [...] Daily Mirror, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 13, 354 words... experience in a refugee camp and how it has helped mould his view of the current crisis.

204. UK MEPs urge Cameron to join EU response to refugee crisisEU Reporter - Belgium, 9 September 2015 Wednesday, 487 wordsA cross-party group of 14 British MEPs have written a letter to David Cameron urging him to take part in an EU resettlement scheme to address the current refugee crisis facing Europe. Under the proposal, outlined by Commission President Juncker today (9 Se...http://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2015/09/09/uk-meps-urge-cameron-to-join-eu-response-to-refugee-crisis/

205. Dodds welcomes PM commitment to discuss Syria with First Minister European Union News, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 213 words... part in alleviating the current crisis. It is right that the refugees who come to the UK should come from the refugee camps. To do otherwise only ...

206. DO YOUR BIT TO HELP IN REFUGEE CRISIS Evening Chronicle, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, NEWS; Pg. 13, 410 words... already agreed to have 50 refugees from Syria and I have also committed to ...... take more during the current crisis."As you will realise, this is not ...

207. Foreign aid: which countries are the most generous?; With Europe tussling over who is doing more to help refugees in the current crisis, we decided to take a look who gives the most... and the least The Guardian, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 3:51 PM GMT, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS NETWORK, 894 words, Naomi Larsson

208. Refugee crisis: some of the many ways Australians can help; Donations of money, time, food and even rooms in your home will make life easier for those who come here - and those who have to stay in camps overseas The Guardian, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 9:30 AM GMT, WORLD NEWS, 1060 words, Helen Davidson... running specifically to fund the current crisis. You can find more of them here.∑ The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) is providing ...

209. Inverell ready to receive Syrian refugees Inverell Times, September 9, 2015, COMMUNITY, 281 words, MICH??LE JEDLICKA... in Inverell, the local refugee resettlement group is ready.'We're open to this idea of the current crisis in the Middle East because ...

210. Australia to take in 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees Jordanian News Agency, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 8:55 AM EST, 78 words... in 12,000 additional refugees from Syria and Iraq to solve the current crisis.He said Australia will accept 12,000 refugees from persecuted minorities fleeing the ...


211. Australia to take in 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees Jordan News Agency (Petra), September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 82 words... in 12,000 additional refugees from Syria and Iraq to solve the current crisis.He said Australia will accept 12,000 refugees from persecuted minorities fleeing the ...

212. Your MP: Alison McGovern; All the latest news from the local MP working in your borough liverpoolecho.co.uk, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 12:08 PM GMT, NEWS, 262 words, By Community Contributor... concerned about the plight of refugees caught up in the current crisis.The heartbreaking image of the lifeless ...

213. EU to announce plans for refugee quotas Malta Today, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 394 words... fence designed to keep refugees from entering from Serbia and are toughening asylum laws. The current crisis has exposed divisions within the ...

214. MEDIA RELEASESeptember 9, 2015 - for immediate release MediaNet Press Release Wire, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 1:55 PM AEST, 193 words... "The current crisis in the Middle East and the refugee diaspora it has sparked is unprecedented since the end of World War II," she said. ...

215. Australia to take in 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network), September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 73 words... in 12,000 additional refugees from Syria and Iraq to solve the current crisis.He said Australia will accept 12,000 refugees from persecuted minorities fleeing the ...

216. Comment: Greater Victoria mayors urge action on Syria Postmedia Breaking News, September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 675 words... government to increase the number of refugees admitted to Canada in response to the current crisis. We don't know the right target for the number of refugees to admit. But we do know that the ...

217. UN official urges worldwide action to solve Europe's refugee crisis Shanghai Daily (Benchmark), September 9, 2015 Wednesday, 446 words... at present.In the current crisis, the assessment of whether a person has a right to refugee status should be made before they ...

218. Greater Victoria mayors urge action on Syria Times Colonist (Victoria, British Columbia), September 9, 2015 Wednesday, COMMENT; Pg. A11, 675 words... government to increase the number of refugees admitted to Canada in response to the current crisis. We don't know the right target for the number of refugees to admit. But we do know that the ...

219. Why U.S. should do more for refugees CNN.com, September 9, 2015 Wednesday 10:28 AM EST, OPINIONS, 816 words, By By Kathleen Newland... routinely resettled more refugees than the rest of the world combined, ...... year.Of course, in the current crisis, we are protected by geography from the huge inflows of refugees arriving directly to the neighboring ...

220. EUR:Top UN official urges 'global response' AAP Newsfeed, September 8, 2015 Tuesday 10:22 PM AEST, INTERNATIONAL NEWS, 461 words... In the current crisis, the assessment of a person's right to refugee status should be made before they cross the Mediterranean to Europe, he suggested. ...


221. Top UN official urges 'global response' to migration crisisAhram Online - Egypt, 8 September 2015 Tuesday, 568 wordsTop UN official urges 'global response' to migration crisis AFP , Tuesday 8 Sep 2015 UN Special Representative for Migration and Development Peter Sutherland. (Photo: Reuters) Related The United Nations ' top official in charge of migration said Tuesday th...http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/139949/World/International/Top-UN-official-urges-global-response-to-migration.aspx

222. Coventry mum spearheads campaign to help Syrian refugees; Collections in Coventry have been organised by mum-of-three Kirstie Kelly from Earlsdon coventrytelegraph.net, September 8, 2015 Tuesday 5:45 AM GMT, NEWS, 287 words, By Ben Eccleston... wide campaign to support refugees affected by the current crisis.Kirstie Kelly and three ...

223. Dodds welcomes PM commitment to discuss Syria with First Minister European Union News, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 213 words... part in alleviating the current crisis. It is right that the refugees who come to the UK should come from the refugee camps. To do otherwise only ...

224. Dodds welcomes PM commitment to discuss Syria with First Minister European Union News, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 213 words... part in alleviating the current crisis. It is right that the refugees who come to the UK should come from the refugee camps. To do otherwise only ...

225. Top UN official urges 'global response' to migration crisis The Express Tribune, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 521 words... different criteria.In the current crisis, the assessment of a person's right to refugee status should be made before they ...

226. The Mediterranean Crisis: An Open Letter to World Leaders FinancialWire, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 1359 words... driving fresh waves of refugees northwest towards Europe and aggravating the current crisis."This means we are going to continue to see refugees and asylum seekers knocking ...

227. Graham calls on U.S. to accept refugees Gannett News Service, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, Pg. ARC, 626 words, Mary Troyan, USA TODAY... on how many refugees the U.S. should accept. He compared the current crisis to the 1939 voyage of a ...... holding hundreds of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany. The ...

228. Council's bid to help refugees Gazette (Essex), September 8, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS, 182 words... together to help Syrian refugees in the current crisis.

229. Refugee crisis: Durham County Council taking immediate action' Hartlepool Mail, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 287 words, Kevin Clark... already to meet the needs of refugees requiring our help, the numbers have been extremely small and the current crisis requires a very targeted and ...

230. No limit to migrants we will take, says Burton; T·naiste pledges refugees will be able to bring families to Ireland Irish Daily Mail, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS; Pg. 6, 432 words, Senan Molony... limit on the number of refugees Ireland will take in the current crisis, but 5,000 is a ...


231. Top UN official urges 'global response' to migration crisisJakarta Post (Indonesia), 8 September 2015 Tuesday, 564 wordsTop UN official urges 'global response' to migration crisis Agence France-Presse, Geneva | World | Tue, September 08 2015, 7:20 PM Migrants and refugees board a train after crossing the Macedonian-Greek border near Gevgelija on Tuesday. (AFP/Robert Atanaso...http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/08/top-un-official-urges-global-response-migration-crisis.html

232. Shame To Rich Arab Countries Who Refuse To Help Kashmir Observer, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 904 words... hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees during the current crisis?Our pain only worsened when we ...

233. The Mediterranean Crisis: An Open Letter to World Leaders M2 PressWIRE, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 1355 words... driving fresh waves of refugees northwest towards Europe and aggravating the current crisis."This means we are going to continue to see refugees and asylum seekers knocking ...

234. Durham County Council to draw up action plan to support refugees The Northern Echo (Newsquest Regional Press), September 8, 2015 Tuesday, NEWS, 381 words, Gavin Engelbrecht... already to meet the needs of refugees requiring our help -the numbers have been extremely small and the current crisis requires a very targeted and ...

235. Refugee crisis: Durham County Council taking immediate action' Peterlee Mail, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 287 words, Kevin Clark... already to meet the needs of refugees requiring our help, the numbers have been extremely small and the current crisis requires a very targeted and ...

236. Constitutional Changes Cannot Solve Migration Problems in Germany - Lawmaker RIA Novosti, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 325 words, РИА Новости,РИАН... willing to take in refugees."The current crisis is not a crisis of ...

237. Refugee crisis: Durham County Council taking immediate action' Sunderland Echo, September 8, 2015 Tuesday, 287 words, Kevin Clark... already to meet the needs of refugees requiring our help, the numbers have been extremely small and the current crisis requires a very targeted and ...

238. This map helps explain why some European countries reject refugees, and others love them Washington Post Blogs , September 8, 2015 Tuesday 4:29 PM EST, 1794 words, Rick Noack... accommodating when it comes to refugees, which explains Sweden's quick reaction in the current crisis. Although the Swedish government ...

239. Russian Foreign Ministry's Zakharova briefing 3 September - text BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 7, 2015 Monday, 7079 words... allow continued violation of refugee rights and will duly ...... on uprooting the causes of the current crisis. As for your remark that ...

240. Refugee crisis: UK to accept 20,000 people from Syria by 2020 Belfast Telegraph Online, September 7, 2015 Monday 6:05 PM GMT, UK, 358 words... part in alleviating the current crisis."It is right that the refugees who come to the UK should come from the


refugee camps. To do otherwise only ...

241. France, U.K. Open Doors to Refugees; France's Legacy of Accepting Refugees; Imagine a World. Aired 2-2:30p ET CNN INTERNATIONAL, September 7, 2015 Monday, NEWS; International, 3658 words, Christiane Amanpour... a haven for refugees, France has lagged far ...... neighbor, Germany, in this current crisis; The Gulf Arab states ...

242. Debate on refugees is struggle for Slovakia's character-president; Adds background in paras 2-3, Kiska's further statements in last five paras. CTK National News Wire, September 7, 2015 Monday 4:14 PM (Central European Time), GENERAL NEWS, 527 words, ms... Kiska said he perceives the current crisis and the discussion on it very ...... on it.He said refugees have become a big ...

243. Debate on refugees is struggle for Slovakia's character-president CTK National News Wire, September 7, 2015 Monday 3:28 PM (Central European Time), GENERAL NEWS, 355 words, ms... Kiska said he perceives the current crisis and the discussion on it very ...... on it.He said refugees have become a big ...

244. Labour candidates refuse to confirm they will help end refugee crisis by bombing Syria Express Online, September 7, 2015 Monday 8:48 AM GMT, 409 words, Peter Henn... despite the growing number of refugees fleeing Syria.The current crisis has been sparked by a ...

245. Cameron to make counter-terrorism announcement in statement to MPs - Politics live; Rolling coverage of all the day's political developments as they happen, including David Cameron's Commons statement on the refugee crisisNumber 10 lobby briefing - Summary The Guardian, September 7, 2015 Monday 12:51 PM GMT, POLITICS, 3061 words, Andrew Sparrow... for the largest proportion of refugees in the current crisis, but there are also hundreds of thousands from ...

246. Jews Contrast Refugee's European Experience With Their Own. Israel Faxx, September 7, 2015, 361 words... To help European countries cope with the onslaught of refugees from Syria and other countries, Pope Francis on Sunday urged Catholic institutions to open their doors and house refugees until they could get on the their feet. "May every parish, every religious community, every monastery, every sanctuary of Europe host a family, starting from my diocese of Rome," Francis said at the end of a prayer service in Rome Sunday. The refugees, he said were fleeing from "war and hunger," and it was only right that the Church open its doors to aid refugees. By way of example, he said, the Vatican's two parishes would take in two refugee families. For Jewish observers and Holocaust survivors, many of the aspects of the current crisis have been bringing back chilling memories -- and renewed misgivings about how governments and churches in Europe did little to nothing to rescue Jews who were to be murdered by the Nazis. In the Czech Republic, for example, officials halted a program in which they were marking refugees with numbers to identify them for aid purposes. Activists compared the action to the tattooing of Jews by the Nazis during the Holocaust, and after an uproar, the Czech government halted the practice. ...

247. How you can help to tackle crisis The Journal (Newcastle, UK), September 7, 2015 Monday, NEWS; Pg. 6, 425 words... already agreed to have 50 refugees from Syria and I have also committed to ...... take more during the current crisis. As you will realise, this is not ...

248. Crisis needs bigger response from us all The Nelson Mail (New Zealand), September 7, 2015 Monday, FEATURES; NATIONAL; Pg. 5, 351 words


... perhaps several hundred refugees from the current crisis. Of course they will need ...

249. Seminar on the Syrian refugee crisis Premium Official News, September 7, 2015 Monday, 415 words... provide information on the current crisis in Europe – discussing where the refugees arriving in Europe are ...

250. Portugal should accept more refugees than quota: official Xinhua General News Service, September 7, 2015 Monday 12:32 PM EST, WORLD NEWS; Political, 214 words... history of taking in refugees, but that the current crisis was of a larger dimension than what the ...

251. Jews Contrast Refugee's European Experience With Their Own Arutz Sheva, September 6, 2015 Sunday, 378 words, Moshe Cohen... take in two refugee families. For Jewish ...... survivors, many of the aspects of the current crisis have been bringing back chilling ...

252. EU migrant crisis: How people in the North East can help refugees; David Cameron is reportedly prepared to accept 15,000 refugees fleeing ISIS, but if you live in the North East, what can you do to help? chroniclelive.co.uk, September 6, 2015 Sunday 1:30 PM GMT, NEWS, 419 words, By Rachel Wearmouth... already agreed to have 50 refugees from Syria and I have also committed to ...... take more during the current crisis. As you will realise, this is not ...

253. EU is destroying our values and our civilisation, says LEO MCKINSTRY Express Online, September 6, 2015 Sunday 5:00 PM GMT, 931 words, Leo McKinstry... almost a million refugees that sparked the current crisis. Yet now, having encouraged this ...

254. Refugee group moves Appleton offices to central location Oshkosh Northwestern (Wisconsin), September 6, 2015 Sunday, B; Pg. 8, 592 words, By, Katherine Lymn... third wave is coming as refugees, fleeing the current crisis in Syria, she said. ...

255. Refugee group moves Appleton offices to central location Oshkosh Northwestern (Wisconsin), September 6, 2015 Sunday, B; Pg. 1, 592 words, By, Katherine Lymn... third wave is coming as refugees, fleeing the current crisis in Syria, she said. ...

256. Kerry Calls Moscow On Syria Build Up Concerns; U.N.: 2,000 Migrants Arrive Daily in Hungary; Police: Close to Identifying Suspects in Shooting; Clintons Paid State Department Staffer To Maintain Server; Kentucky Clerk Jailed For Denying Marriage License; 24 Officers Killed This Year; Black Lives Matter Activists Marsh to Minnesota State Fair Gates; Scott Walker: Racial Tensions Rise Under Obama; Tom Brady Apologizes for Deflategate Inconvenience; Eagles Cut Tim Tebow. Aired 5-6p ET CNN, September 5, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; International, 6885 words, Deborah Feyerick, Fred Pleitgen, Rosa Flores, Nick Valencia, Marc Lamont Hill, Lenny McAlister... taken less than 1,000 refugees and that's why before this current crisis erupted, Senator Durbin and ...

257. Thousands of Migrants Arrive in Germany; New Lead in Hunt for El Chapo; Police on Edge Accross US; More on Clinton E-Mail Scandal CNN, September 5, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; International, 6424 words, Deborah Feyerick; Fred Pleitgen; Nick Valencia; Brian Todd; Tom Fuentes; Harry Houck; Bob Baer; Kimberly Dozier; Sunlen Serfaty... taken less than 1,000 refugees and that's why before this current crisis erupted, Senator Durbin and ...

258. Exodus casts spotlight on Europe's lack of readiness; West failed to prepare even as fighting in Syria presaged tide of refugees


International New York Times, September 5, 2015 Saturday, NEWS; Pg. 1, 1492 words, ANNE BARNARDThe causes of the current crisis are plain enough. Neighboring ...... Jordan became overwhelmed with refugees and closed their borders to many, ...

259. Jordan says world's failure to deal with refugee plight has led to current crisis The Jordan Times, September 5, 2015 Saturday, 520 words

260. Critics Blame a Passive West as Syrians Flee The New York Times, September 5, 2015 Saturday, Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1, 1339 words, By ANNE BARNARD; Karam Shoumali contributed reporting from Istanbul, Hwaida Saad from Beirut, and an employee of The New York Times from Damascus, Syria. The causes of the current crisis are plain. Neighboring countries ...... Jordan became overwhelmed with refugees and closed their borders to many, ...

261. Refugee group relocates its Appleton branch The Post-Crescent (Appleton, Wisconsin), September 5, 2015 Saturday, A; Pg. 6, 590 words, By, Katherine Lymn... third wave is coming as refugees, fleeing the current crisis in Syria, she said. ...

262. Refugee group relocates its Appleton branch The Post-Crescent (Appleton, Wisconsin), September 5, 2015 Saturday, A; Pg. 1, 590 words, By, Katherine Lymn... third wave is coming as refugees, fleeing the current crisis in Syria, she said. ...

263. Exodus Of Syrians Qatar Tribune, September 5, 2015 Saturday, 1028 words... position today." The causes of the current crisis are plain enough. Neighbouring ...... Jordan became overwhelmed with refugees and closed their borders to many, ...

264. Church leaders want doors opened to save refugees Belfast Telegraph Online, September 4, 2015 Friday 7:59 AM GMT, NORTHERN IRELAND, 700 words, By Amanda Ferguson... quickly and resile from anti-refugee sentiment that has fuelled the current crisis".East Antrim Alliance ...

265. Ulster Church leaders beg politicians: open our doors to refugees Belfast Telegraph, September 4, 2015 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 13, 710 words, AMANDA FERGUSON... quickly and resile from anti-refugee sentiment that has fuelled the current crisis".East Antrim Alliance ...

266. Online campaign pledges more than 6,000 Irish beds to refugees BreakingNews.ie, September 4, 2015 Friday 10:29 AM GMT, IRISH NEWS, 202 words... campaign to offer support to refugees caught up in the current crisis has collected 6,090 bed ...

267. Frances Fitzgerald indicates Ireland will take 1,800 refugees BreakingNews.ie, September 4, 2015 Friday 09:02 AM GMT, IRISH NEWS, 93 words... in the region of 1,800 refugees in response to the current crisis.It is expected the EU ...

268. Frances Fitzgerald indicates Ireland will take 1,800 refugees BreakingNews.ie, September 4, 2015 Friday 09:02 AM GMT, IRISH NEWS, 120 words... in the region of 1,800 refugees in response to the current crisis.


269. Canada's refugee policy questioned after Syrian boy's drowning CBC News, September 4, 2015 Friday 7:41 AM GMT, 887 words, CBC News... act rapidly to accept refugees on an urgent ...... failing to do so during the current crisis in the Mideast.Prime ...

270. Comment: Generosity will make a real difference Edinburgh Evening News, September 4, 2015 Friday, 311 words... pressure. His suggestion that the answer to the current crisis lies in solving the ...... problems in the region from which these refugees are fleeing is only partially ...

271. We must take our share of refugees - Ukip MEP The Journal (Newcastle, UK), September 4, 2015 Friday, NEWS; Pg. 7, 412 words, Rachel Wearmouth... take our fair share of refugees from the current crisis caused by ISIS."Our ...

272. Exodus of Syrian Refugees Highlights the West's FailureMichael-In-Norfolk - Blog, 4 September 2015 Friday, 1009 wordsExodus of Syrian Refugees Highlights the West's Failure While American Christofascists are applauding Kim Davis, fabricating a myth that Christians are facing persecution in America and, of course, making money begs to support their comfortable lifestyles,...http://michael-in-norfolk.blogspot.com/2015/09/exodus-of-syrian-refugees-highlights.html

273. SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL STEPHANE DUJARRIC HOLDS OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING Political Transcript Wire, September 4, 2015 Friday, 4960 words... we've talked about here, the current crisis, refugee crisis and migrants to a ...

274. Kenny: Ireland may accept more than 1,800 refugeesRaidiÛ TeilifÌs …ireann, 4 September 2015 Friday, 1357 wordsTaoiseach says Ireland may accept more than 1,800 refugees of 3 figure" data-cycle-disabled-class="disabled"> Hundreds of people are stranded at a train station in Hungary The L… Niamh has been involved in the rescue of hundreds of migrants (Pic: Defence F...http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0904/725569-ireland-refugees/

275. Corridors of Power Russia & CIS Military Daily, September 4, 2015 Friday 6:30 PM MSK, 96 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

276. Corridors of Power Russia & CIS Military Weekly, September 4, 2015, 96 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

277. Chichester to hold candle-lit vigil for Syria's refugees Bognor Regis Observer, September 3, 2015 Thursday, 532 words... government to do more to help.The current crisis of Syrian refugees fleeing their war-torn ...

278. David Miliband tells ITV News: UK could take 25,000 refugeesChannel Online, 3 September 2015 Thursday, 255 wordsDavid Miliband says Britain could take 25,000 refugees as crisis deepens Former Foreign Secretary David Miliband has told ITV N...http://www.itv.com/news/2015-09-03/david-miliband-says-britain-could-take-25-000-refugees-as-crisis-deepens/


279. EU migrant crisis: North East UKIP Euro-MP says country has a 'moral duty' to help; An unprecedented number of people are fleeing ISIS control in countries like Syria and Jonathan Arnott believes the UK shares a 'human responsibility' chroniclelive.co.uk, September 3, 2015 Thursday 12:19 PM GMT, NEWS, 518 words, By Rachel Wearmouth... take our fair share of refugees from the current crisis caused by ISIS."Our ...

280. Jonathan Arnott: 'We have a moral duty to accept our fair share of refugees'; The UKIP MEP has spoken out as unprecedented numbers of people flee ISIS-control to EU countries in the hope of finding safety chroniclelive.co.uk, September 3, 2015 Thursday 11:30 AM GMT, NEWS, 855 words, By chroniclelive.co.uk... take our fair share of refugees from the current crisis caused by ISIS. Our ...

281. SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL STEPHANE DUJARRIC HOLDS OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING, CQ Transcriptions , September 3, 2015 Thursday, LOAD-DATE: September 4, 2015... we've talked about here, the current crisis, refugee crisis and migrants to a ...

282. International migration crisis: What distinguishes economic from war refugees? The Dallas Morning News: Blogs, September 3, 2015 Thursday, DALLAS MORNING VIEWS, 1104 words, Tod Robberson Editorial Writer... among the criteria for refugee status. Yet the current crisis in Europe, like the ...

283. Crying children wrenched from parents in Budapest as migrant crisis reaches breaking point Express Online, September 3, 2015 Thursday 2:36 PM GMT, 765 words, Alix Culbertson... needed to take their share of refugees during the current crisis.ReutersPeople are climbing ...

284. Office Of The Spokesman For The United Nations Secretary General Regular News Briefing Federal News Service, September 3, 2015 Thursday, 4998 words... we've talked about here, the current crisis, refugee crisis and migrants to a ...

285. The Guardian view on the refugee crisis: much more must be done, and not just by the UK; There are no perfect solutions, here or in Syria. But compassion is necessary and there are hard decisions to be made about Europe's place in the world The Guardian, September 3, 2015 Thursday 7:32 PM GMT, COMMENT IS FREE, 768 words, Editorial... essential in discussion of the current crisis to remember the legal distinction between refugees - seeking sanctuary from imminent ...

286. 4 charts that show how this refugee crisis compares to previous crises; One in every 122 people in the world is currently either a refugee, internally displaced or seeking asylum Independent.co.uk, September 3, 2015 Thursday 7:42 AM GMT, FRONTPAGE, 223 words, Rose Troup BuchananThese charts show how the current crisis compares to recent history: ...... 15 years, the number of refugees has increased by 7 ...

287. David Miliband: Britain could take 25,000 refugeesITV, 3 September 2015 Thursday, 129 wordsITV Report 3 September 2015 at 10:30pm David Miliband says Br...http://www.itv.com/news/2015-09-03/david-miliband-says-britain-could-take-25-000-refugees-as-crisis-deepens/

288. Chichester to hold candle-lit vigil for Syria's refugees Midhurst and Petworth Observer, September 3, 2015 Thursday, 532 words


... government to do more to help.The current crisis of Syrian refugees fleeing their war-torn ...

289. David Cameron breaks his silence on migrant crisis - but he won't commit to taking more refugees; The Prime Minister refused to commit to Britain taking in any more refugees than it is already mirror.co.uk, September 3, 2015 Thursday 4:19 PM GMT, NEWS,UK NEWS, 753 words, By Mikey Smith... by the UN to deal with the current crisis - in the last year. ...... agreed to take 35,000 refugees under the same scheme. ...

290. Labour MP Andy Burnham demands "urgent" government action to rescue refugees amid humanitarian "tragedy"; The politician questioned where the government had been during the current crisis mirror.co.uk, September 3, 2015 Thursday 2:18 PM GMT, TV,TV NEWS, 430 words, By James Leyfield

291. Explainer: Who Gets Asylum In Germany? Radio Free Europe, September 3, 2015, NEWS STORIES AND DOCUMENTS, 997 words... on the acceptance of migrants and refugees vary widely.German ...... Merkel this week called the current crisis a major test of ...

292. Explainer: Who Gets Asylum In Germany?Radio Free Iraq, 3 September 2015 Thursday, 1042 wordsBy September 03, 2015 The hundreds of thousands of people who have braved treacherous seas and arduous journeys in search of better lives in affluent Europe -- and the many who have lost their lives trying -- have prompted soul-searching within the Europea...http://www.rferl.org/content/germany-migrants-refugees-asylum-explainer/27225247.html

293. Who Gets Asylum In Germany?Radio Free Iraq, 3 September 2015 Thursday, 1042 wordsBy September 03, 2015 The hundreds of thousands of people who have braved treacherous seas and arduous journeys in search of better lives in affluent Europe -- and the many who have lost their lives trying -- have prompted soul-searching within the Europea...http://www.rferl.org/content/germany-migrants-refugees-asylum-explainer/27225247.html

294. DAILY PRESS BRIEFING BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 3 SEPTEMBER 2015 States News Service, September 3, 2015 Thursday, 5006 words, States News Service... we've talked about here, the current crisis, refugee crisis and migrants to a ...

295. EXPLAINER: WHO GETS ASYLUM IN GERMANY? States News Service, September 3, 2015 Thursday, 980 words, States News Service... on the acceptance of migrants and refugees vary widely.German ...... Merkel this week called the current crisis a major test of ...

296. Daily Headline News for September 3, 2015 Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire, September 3, 2015 Thursday 8:47 PM MSK, 2283 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

297. Daily Headline News for September 3, 2015 Russia & CIS General Newswire, September 3, 2015 Thursday 8:47 PM MSK, 2283 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...


298. Rights of migrants coming from Africa, Middle East to EU countries not to be violated - Russian Foreign Ministry Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama, September 3, 2015 Thursday 5:44 PM MSK, 78 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

299. Rights of migrants coming from Africa, Middle East to EU countries not to be violated - Russian Foreign Ministry Russia & CIS Military Newswire, September 3, 2015 Thursday 5:05 PM MSK, 89 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

300. Rights of migrants coming from Africa, Middle East to EU countries not to be violated - Russian Foreign Ministry Russia & CIS General Newswire, September 3, 2015 Thursday 5:02 PM MSK, 89 words... further violations of the rights of refugees and duly address the roots of the current crisis," Russia's Foreign Ministry ...

301. Slovak extreme right staging anti-immigrant rally; Adds paras 9-11. CTK National News Wire, September 1, 2015 Tuesday 8:32 PM (Central European Time), GENERAL NEWS, 321 words, pvr... facing the main influx of refugees in the current crisis and is not one of the countries of their ...

302. Slovak extreme right staging anti-immigrant rally CTK National News Wire, September 1, 2015 Tuesday 4:43 PM (Central European Time), GENERAL NEWS, 249 words, pvr... facing the main influx of refugees in the current crisis and is not one of the countries of their ...

303. How European Leaders Are Battling Over Borders To Confront The EU Migrant And Refugee CrisisInternational Business Times, 1 September 2015 Tuesday, 1119 wordsPleas of "Go free!" were chanted Tuesday by migrants and refugees at Hungary's Keleti train station in Budapest while they waited in vain to board trains headed to Western Europe, according to reports. Hungarian authorities, which have already built a razo...http://www.ibtimes.com/how-european-leaders-are-battling-over-borders-confront-eu-migrant-refugee-crisis-2077772

304. 'Stop giving migrants asylum' Arab Times, August 30, 2015 Sunday, 500 words... under the disguise of political refugees or economic migrants. The current crisis underlines some of Europe's ...

305. Europe needs more 'rational' discussion on migrants: UN refugee chiefDigital Journal, 21 August 2015 Friday, 638 wordsEurope needs more 'rational' discussion on migrants: UN refugee chief By Ben Simon (AFP) 5 hours ago in World Attitudes towards migrants in Europe "are more emotional than rational", with denial about the realities of migration helping fuel the current cri...http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/europe-needs-more-rational-discussion-on-migrants-un-refugee-chief/article/441629

306. Europe needs more 'rational' discussion on migrants: UN refugee chief Agence France Presse -- English, August 20, 2015 Thursday 5:41 PM GMT, 527 words... migration helping fuel the current crisis, the head of the UN's refugee agency, Antonio Guterres, ...

307. Europe needs more 'rational' discussion on migrants: UN refugee chiefDigital Journal, 20 August 2015 Thursday, 629 words


By Ben Simon (AFP) 2 hours ago Attitudes towards migrants in Europe "are more emotional than rational", with denial about the realities of migration helping fuel the current crisis, the head of the UN's refugee agency, Antonio Guterres, said Thursday. In a...http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/europe-needs-more-rational-discussion-on-migrants-un-refugee-chief/article/441629

308. WE MUST ACT Herald Sun (Australia), August 13, 2015 Thursday, NEWS; Pg. 4, 774 words, DAN TEHAN... unless the world acts. The current crisis in Syria has created ...... internally displaced or external refugees, more than Iraq, South ...

309. "Marauding migrants": UK government plumbs depths of inhumanity and ignorance European Union News, August 12, 2015 Wednesday, 523 words... wants to obscure the causes of the current crisis.Reading the actual list of the refugees' main countries of origin - ...

310. A real rescue plan for Syria's refugees; It's lazy and wrong just to focus on the migrants who make it here The Spectator, August 8, 2015, FEATURES, 1701 words, Paul Collier... violent conflict - and in the current crisis, that means focusing on ...... Yes, there are other legitimate refugees on those boats, but ...

311. Refugee crisis is flag of shame for us all Stoke The Sentinel, August 8, 2015 Saturday, NEWS:LETTERS; Pg. 8-9, 110 words... suffering in the past. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

312. Nazarian: All political parties must support EDL National News Agency Lebanon (NNA), August 6, 2015 Thursday, 248 words... huge presence of Syrian refugees are largely responsible for the current crisis that the country is experiencing." "Moreover, ...

313. Pakistan Forefronts Rohingya Children Plight -- International Community's Shameful Silence Strongly Denounced by the Pak-UN Envoy Dr. Maleeha LodhiDigital Journal, 4 August 2015 Tuesday, 1370 wordsPakistan Forefronts Rohingya Children Plight -- International Community's Shameful Silence Strongly Denounced by the Pak-UN Envoy Dr. Maleeha Lodhi Burma 's Horrendous Savagery on Desperate Children, Categorically Exposed by Pakistan-initiated SAIRI Report....http://www.digitaljournal.com/pr/2632618

314. Pakistan Forefronts Rohingya Children Plight - International Community's Shameful Silence Strongly Denounced by the Pak-UN Envoy Dr. Maleeha Lodhi FinancialWire, August 4, 2015 Tuesday, 1272 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark 'a-new- ...

315. MIGRATION: PAKISTAN ONE OF THE WORLD'S FIRST SAFE HAVENS FOR REFUGEES IPS - Inter Press Service, August 4, 2015 Tuesday, 1089 words, Thalif Deen... among other crises."And the current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

316. Pakistan Forefronts Rohingya Children Plight - International Community's Shameful Silence Strongly Denounced by the Pak-UN Envoy Dr. Maleeha Lodhi M2 PressWIRE, August 4, 2015 Tuesday, 1268 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark 'a-new- ...


317. Tackling roots of Rohingya crisis The News Today (Bangladesh.), August 4, 2015 Tuesday, 1134 words... who represents the UN's refugee agency, UNHCR, in Malaysia, says the current crisis provides a unique ...

318. Pakistan Strongly Denounces World Leaders' 'Shameful Silence' on Rohingya Crisis--Children's 'Mess-Predicament' Plight Voiced ResolutelySBWire - USA, 3 August 2015 Monday, 1245 wordsNew York, NY -- (ReleaseWire) -- 08/03/2015 -- Over 1,78000 children prone to high risks of state-sponsored savagery according to an analytico-descriptive situation report primed by SAIRI Post-doc Multiversity, which debunked the multiple manifolds of the ...http://www.releasewire.com/press-releases/pakistan-strongly-denounces-world-leaders-shameful-silence-on-rohingya-crisis-childrens-mess-predicament-plight-voiced-resolutely-614851.htm

319. Diplomats call for addressing root causes of big refugee and migrant flows at Pakistan-organized event The Balochistan Times (AsiaNet), August 1, 2015 Saturday, 1043 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

320. Pakistan criticises world community for not acting decisively on massive human suffering Dawn (Pakistan), August 1, 2015 Saturday, 236 words, MASOOD HAIDER... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

321. UN hails Pakistan for hosting millions of Afghan refugees The Frontier Star, August 1, 2015 Saturday, 646 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

322. Diplomats call for addressing root causes of big refugee and migrant flows at Pakistan-organized event The Frontier Star, August 1, 2015 Saturday, 1043 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

323. Pakistan praised at UN for hosting refugees The Frontier Post, August 1, 2015 Saturday, 775 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

324. UN hails Pakistan for hosting millions of Afghan refugees The Messenger, August 1, 2015 Saturday, 646 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

325. World urged to do more for refugees, migrants The Nation (AsiaNet), August 1, 2015 Saturday, 1118 words... among other crisis. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

326. Pakistan: Diplomats call for addressing root causes of big refugee and migrant flows at Pakistan-organized event Right Vision News, August 1, 2015 Saturday, 1088 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

327. Pakistan points out plight of Rohingya Muslims at UN Daily Times (PK), July 31, 2015 Friday, 529 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...


328. Diplomats call for addressing root causes of big refugee and migrant flows at Pakistan-organized event Daily The Pak Banker, July 31, 2015 Friday, 1051 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

329. RIGHTS: U.N. PANEL SPOTLIGHTS PLIGHT OF REFUGEES IPS - Inter Press Service, July 31, 2015 Friday, 557 words, Nora Happel... among other crises. And the current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

330. At United Nations Pakistan receives praise for hosting millions of Afghan refugees for over three decades and for bearing this burden despite its modest resources - Press Note issued by Press Information Department Pakistan Official News, July 31, 2015 Friday, 740 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

331. At United Nations Pakistan receives praise for hosting millions of Afghan refugees for over three decades and for bearing this burden despite its modest resources - Press Note issued by Press Information Department Pakistan Press International, July 31, 2015 Friday, 740 words... among other crises. The current crisis of refugees could mark a new ...

332. Britain renews support to Jordan plan for Syrian refugees Jordanian News Agency, July 26, 2015 Sunday 10:45 PM EST, 125 words... help Jordan deal with the current crisis, referring to an additional ...... country pledged to Syrian refugees and host countries, of which 18.5 ...

333. Britain renews support to Jordan plan for Syrian refugees Jordan News Agency (Petra), July 26, 2015 Sunday, 128 words... help Jordan deal with the current crisis, referring to an additional ...... country pledged to Syrian refugees and host countries, of which 18.5 ...

334. Leaders skirt Burundi issue Daily News (South Africa), July 21, 2015 Tuesday, 744 words... direct interest in the current crisis because most of the refugees who have fled Burundi ...

335. Burundi situation called for less diplomatic finesse; Regional havoc will probably follow SA's decision to meet excess with restraint The Star (South Africa), July 21, 2015 Tuesday, Pg. 8, 679 words... direct interest in the current crisis because most of the refugees who have fled Burundi ...

336. Writer decries SAfrica's failure to "decisively" intervene in Burundi crisis BBC Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 20, 2015 Monday, 715 words... direct interest in the current crisis because most of the refugees who have fled Burundi ...

337. Decisive intervention needed by SA to rescue Burundi Cape Times (South Africa), July 20, 2015 Monday, Pg. 11, 614 words... direct interest in the current crisis because most of the refugees who have fled Burundi ...

338. African leaders skirt Burundi minefieldIol.Co.Za, 20 July 2015 Monday, 784 wordsAfrican leaders skirt Burundi minefield Peter Fabricius says turf jealousies and sensitivities are preventing African leaders from intervening in the Burundi crisis. For the past three months, Burundi has been heading for an appalling smash, in agonising s...


http://www.iol.co.za/african-leaders-skirt-burundi-minefield-1.1888038

339. African leaders skirt minefield that is Burundi Pretoria News (South Africa), July 20, 2015 Monday, Pg. 7, 678 words... direct interest in the current crisis because most of the refugees who have fled Burundi ...

340. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria Premium Official News, July 14, 2015 Tuesday, 128 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

341. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria Emirates News Agency, July 13, 2015 Monday 3:58 AM EST, 106 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

342. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria Emirates News Agency (WAM), July 13, 2015 Monday, 106 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

343. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network), July 13, 2015 Monday, 100 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

344. United Arab Emirates : HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria TendersInfo, July 13, 2015 Monday, 98 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

345. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for SyriaUAE Interact, 13 July 2015 Monday, 132 wordsH.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister, on Sunday...http://uaeinteract.com/docs/Abdullah_bin_Zayed_receives_UN_Special_Envoy_for_Syria/69755.htm

346. Abdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for SyriaUAE Interact, 13 July 2015 Monday, 150 wordsAbdullah bin Zayed receives UN Special Envoy for Syria posted on 13/07/2015: 1...http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Abdullah_bin_Zayed_receives_UN_Special_Envoy_for_Syria/69755.htm

347. 12 killed in Burundi clashes on Rwanda border Global English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network), July 12, 2015 Sunday, 347 words... protests, with over 158,000 refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, ...... United Nations.There are fears the current crisis could plunge the impoverished, landlocked ...

348. HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Receives UN Special Envoy for Syria UAE Government News, July 12, 2015 Sunday 6:30 AM EST, 109 words... people come out the current crisis, and the refugees in neighbouring countries ...

349. 12 killed in Burundi clashes on Rwanda border: official Agence France Presse -- English, July 11, 2015 Saturday 1:44 PM GMT, 349 words... protests, with over 158,000 refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, ...... United Nations.There are fears the current crisis could plunge the impoverished, landlocked ...


350. Czech Republic says to accept 1,500 refugees in three years Xinhua General News Service, July 9, 2015 Thursday 9:02 AM EST, WORLD NEWS; Political, 324 words... said the partial redistribution of refugees was necessary assistance provided ...... Czech Republic in the current crisis situation, which matches the capabilities of the ...

351. Burundi government tells UN mediator to go The Daily Monitor, July 6, 2015 Monday, 527 words, Agencies... attempt, with almost 144,000 refugees fleeing into neighbouring nations. There are fears the current crisis could plunge the impoverished, landlocked ...

352. Burundi government tells UN mediator to goThe Gulf Today, 6 July 2015 Monday, 523 wordsBurundi government tells UN mediator to go July 06, 2015 BUJUMBURA: Burundi's ruling party and its allies on Sunday told a United Nations mediator to step down, just two weeks after he was sent to help resolve the central African nation's political crisis....http://www.gulftoday.ae/portal/ab3d1d08-d9d8-4be4-a7a1-66fa63107491.aspx

353. Burundi government tells UN mediator to goVietnam News (Vietnam), 6 July 2015 Monday, 544 wordsBurundi government tells UN mediator to go BUJUMBURA, Burundi -- Burundi's ruling party and its allies on Sunday told a United Nations mediator to step down, just two weeks after he was sent to help resolve the central African nation's political crisis. Sen...http://vietnamnews.vn/miscellany/272669/burundi-government-tells-un-mediator-to-go.html

354. Burundi government tells UN mediator to go Agence France Presse -- English, July 5, 2015 Sunday 5:29 PM GMT, 526 words... attempt, with almost 144,000 refugees fleeing into neighbouring nations.There are fears the current crisis could plunge the impoverished, landlocked ...

355. Burundi government tells UN mediator to goDigital Journal, 5 July 2015 Sunday, 662 wordsBy AFP 1 hour ago Burundi's ruling party and its allies on Sunday told a United Nations mediator to step down, just two weeks after he was sent to help resolve the central African nation's political crisis. Senegal's Abdoulaye Bathily was told to "resign f...http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/burundi-government-tells-un-mediator-to-go/article/437570


History of Refugee Law & Obligations


History of Refugee Law

Historical evolution of refugee law


18 In the history of mankind, there have always been people fleeing their habitual place of residence and seeking refuge elsewhere. However, it was only in the 20th century that refugees became an issue on the international level. Before World War I, refugees were treated in accordance with national laws concerning aliens . There were no rules of customary international law taking into account the specific situation of refugees; nor did any bilateral or multilateral agreement exist to regulate their status. As a consequence of the peace treaties after World War I, huge numbers of people had to seek refuge in foreign countries. The League of Nations had to cope not only with the protection of minorities within States but also with complicated refugee problems across borders. Initially, the Assembly of the League of Nations and the States in general thought that the refugee problem would be a temporary phenomenon. But within a short period of time, the problem turned out to be serious and of lasting character (see also Refugees, League of Nations Offices).

19 In 1928 the first international instrument with relevance to the legal status of refugees was developed within the League of Nations, the Arrangement relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees . It was followed by the first legally binding treaty, the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees , which was limited in its application to the then existing refugees. As a model instrument, it dealt not only with the issue of travel documents (see also Passports) but with a variety of matters affecting the daily lives of refugees such as personal status, employment, social rights, education, exemption from reciprocity, and expulsion.

20 Based on preparatory work under the auspices of the United Nations, especially within the Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) (United Nations, Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]), the Refugee Convention was adopted on 28 July 1951 as a fundamental legal instrument of refugee law. As the application of the Refugee Convention was limited to the refugee problems known at the time of its adoption, its terms were later made applicable to all new refugee situations by the 1967 Refugee Protocol.

Regional refugee protections


21 The growing number of refugees fleeing wars and internal conflicts in Africa, starting in the late 1950s, led to the adoption of what is generally considered the most comprehensive and significant regional treaty dealing with refugees. On 10 September 1969, the Organization of African Unity (African Union [AU]) adopted the SARPA Convention. The primary importance of this convention is its expanded definition of the term refugee (see above). The SARPA Convention complements rather than duplicates the Refugee Convention. Apart from the broad refugee definition, the SARPA Convention regulates the question of asylum (Art. 2 SARPA Convention). It also contains important provisions on voluntary repatriation (Art. 5 SARPA Convention) and on the prohibition of subversive activities by refugees (Art. 3 SARPA Convention).























22 Latin America has a long tradition of asylum. The Treaty on International Penal Law ([signed 23 January 1889, entered into force 3 September 1889] OAS Treaty Series No 34 [1967]) was the first regional instrument to deal with asylum. Within the OAS, two legal instruments of 28 March 1954 are concerned with refugees, the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum and the Convention on Territorial Asylum. The notion of refugee is very close to the notion laid down in the Refugee Convention. In the 1980s the outbreak of civil strife in Central America resulted in mass exoduses of nearly a million people, posing serious economic and social problems for the countries towards which this massive flow was directed. In 1984, these host countries adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees which laid down the legal foundations for the treatment of Central American refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, the importance of integrating refugees, and undertaking efforts to eradicate the causes of the refugee problem. The definition of refugee in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is similar to that of the SARPA Convention encompassing ‘persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’ (part III para. 3). The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is not binding on States. It is, however, applied in practice by a number of Latin American States and, in some cases, has been incorporated into domestic legislation.

23 The Council of Europe (COE) has adopted several instruments concerning refugees. Among the most important are the 1959 European Agreement for the Abolition of Visas for Refugees, the 1967 Resolution on Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, the 1980 European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees, the 1981 Recommendation to Member States on the Harmonisation of National Procedures relating to Asylum, and the 1984 Recommendation to Member States on the Protection of Persons Satisfying the Criteria in the Geneva Convention Who Are Not Formally Recognised Refugees. European Conventions on extradition and social security also contain provisions on refugees (Extradition). Taking into account the status of ratification of each binding agreement, the work of the COE has not led to a coherent set of refugee law. Nevertheless, it has contributed to the improvement and consolidation of the protection of refugees in Europe.

24 The fastest development of refugee law can be observed in the law of the European Union. Art. 18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) grants a right to asylum with due respect for the Refugee Convention. It repeats the content of Art. 78 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’ [signed 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009] [2008] OJ C115/47; Art. 78 TFEU was formerly Art. 63 EC Treaty), limiting the scope of the right to asylum, because the provisions do not aim at exceeding the already existing international obligations of the Member States. However, the law of the European Union provides for precise and detailed rules applicable to refugees and asylum seekers. Arts 67–79 TFEU (formerly Arts 61–69 EC Treaty) provide for a common policy on visa, asylum, immigration, and other policies concerning the free circulation of persons.

25 The approximation of rules on the recognition and content of refugee status and subsidiary protection status is implemented by secondary law. Some of the most important legislative acts are Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the Establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the Dublin Convention; Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, which was enacted as a reaction to the situation during the civil wars on the Balkan peninsula since 1990 (see also Yugoslavia, Dissolution of); Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, according to whose Art. 2 lit. b application for asylum is defined as application made by a third-country national or a stateless person which can be understood as a request for international protection by a Member State; Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-country National; and Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification providing for conditions of family reunification in the Member States of the EU and the specific rights of third-country nationals under given circumstances. Yet, its definition of family is more restrictive than the understanding of family eg in parts of Asia and






















http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e866#law-9780199231690-e866-p-6



includes only the core family, especially parents and children. Of particular importance are also Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted creating a legal status of subsidiary protection; Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status asserting the importance of procedural rules and procedural rights for a person seeking refuge; and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, which entered into force on 13 January 2009 and whose deadline for implementation is 24 October 2010.

26 Guidelines for further steps towards a common policy on visa, asylum, and immigration have been adopted in a basic political EU document on migration—the Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union—endorsed by the European Council on 4–5 November 2004 and implemented by the Council and Commission Action Plan of 10 June 2005. The European Council has declared its will to introduce a Common European Asylum System by 2010, based on the existing directives and regulations on asylum.

History of international refugee law and action


The modern law can now be traced back nearly 100 years, to legal and institutional initiatives taken by the League of Nations, first, in the appointment of a High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921, and then in agreement the following year on the issue of identity certificates to ‘any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who has not acquired another nationality’. After the Second World War, the refugee question became highly politicized (Goodwin-Gill 2008), and the UN’s first institutional response to the problem—the














International Refugee Organization (IRO), a specialized agency—was opposed by the Soviet Union and its allies, remaining funded by only 18 of the 54 governments which were then members of the United Nations. Notwithstanding the politics of the day, tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons were resettled under IRO auspices, through government selection schemes, individual migration, and employment placement (Holborn 1975; Loescher and Scanlan 1986).

In 1951, the IRO was replaced by a new agency, an initially non-operational subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly charged with providing ‘international protection’ to refugees and seeking permanent solutions. The Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was adopted on 14 December 1950, and the Office came into being on 1 January 1951.2 Its mandate was general and universal, including refugees recognized under earlier arrangements, as well as those outside their country of origin who were unable or unwilling to return there owing to well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Once a temporary agency, UNHCR was put on a permanent basis in 2003, when the General Assembly renewed its mandate ‘until the refugee problem is solved’.3

From the start, UNHCR’s protection responsibilities were intended to be complemented by a new refugee treaty, and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was finalized by states at a conference in Geneva in July 1951; it entered into force in 1954 (Goodwin-Gill 2009).4 Notwithstanding the intended complementarity, there were already major differences between UNHCR’s mandate, which was universal and general, unconstrained by geographical or temporal limitations, and the refugee definition forwarded to the Conference by the General Assembly. This reflected the reluctance of states to sign a ‘blank cheque’ for unknown numbers of future refugees, and so was restricted to those who became refugees by reason of events occurring before 1 January 1951; the Conference was to add a further option, allowing states to limit their obligations to refugees resulting from events occurring in Europe before the critical date.

The difficulty of maintaining a refugee definition bounded by time and space was soon apparent, but it was not until 1967 that the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees helped to bridge the gap between UNHCR’s mandate and the 1951 Convention.5 The Protocol is often referred to as ‘amending’ the 1951 Convention, but in fact it does no such thing. States parties to the Protocol, which can be ratified or acceded to without becoming a party to the Convention, simply agree to apply Articles 2 to 34 of the Convention to refugees defined in Article 1 thereof, as if the dateline were omitted (Article I of the Protocol). Cape Verde, the United States of America, and Venezuela have acceded only to the Protocol; Madagascar and St Kitts and Nevis remain party only to the Convention; and Madagascar and Turkey have retained the geographical limitation. The Protocol required just six ratifications and it entered into force on 4 October 1967.









Humanitarian Law vs. Human Rights Law

There is a difference between humanitarian law and human rights law


Focusing on non-refoulement While often conflated, humanitarianism and human rights are different. Each arose out of separate historical trajectories, bodies of law, and representative institutions.7 Each has different goals and notions of impartiality. International humanitarian law began to arise in 1864 to codify answers to jus in bello debates on noncombatant protection and acceptable means of war. It addresses urgent needs amidst war regardless of their source or a person's side, and tries to lessen needless suffering. The main group associated with humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross, sets aside culpability and condemnation so as to better access and serve needy victims.8 The thought is that “one cannot be at the same time a champion of justice and charity. One must choose … the CRC has long since chosen to be a defender of charity.”9

In contrast, contemporary human rights law emerged after World War II with the 1948 United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent conventions. It is traditionally concerned with individual rights against abuses of state power in both war and peacetime, and with the lower limits of state duties towards constituents and outsiders.10 Human rights involve judgments within and across societies, calls to action or reform, and verdicts of accountability. Human rights advocacy groups like Amnesty International pioneered “naming and shaming,” which foregrounds the culpability of rights-violators and identifies parties responsible for remedy. Although human rights set minimal thresholds, they often require radical transformations. In contrast to humanitarian pragmatism, human rights are aspirational: they condemn and praise to induce reform or prevent harm instead of seeking to define and mitigate unnecessary suffering.






Sources of International Legal Protection for Refugees

Refugee protections established by international law, customary international law, general principles of law, national laws, and evolving standards


The international law of refugee protection, which is the source of many such exceptions, comprises a range of universal and regional conventions (treaties), rules of customary international law, general principles of law, national laws, and the ever-developing standards in the practice of states and international organizations, notably the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.






International Law Supports Humanitarian Objectives

International law is important to humanitarian action

Huma Haider, International Development Research Fellow, March 2013, International Legal Frameworks for Humanitarian Action: Topic Guide, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/International%20Legal%20Frameworks%20for%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf DOA: 10-2-15

Why is international law important to humanitarian actors? The existence of different disciplines and sources of international law relevant to humanitarian protection and assistance results in a comprehensive framework applicable to a range of circumstances. International humanitarian law has provided the basis for core humanitarian principles, such as humanity and impartiality. It can thus provide insight into, or add weight to, the principles of humanitarian assistance on which humanitarian actors rely. Such actors include not only direct providers of assistance but also local groups and communities advocating to obtain better assistance

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/International%20Legal%20Frameworks%20for%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf



International Humanitarian Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance

Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), assistance should be provided to those impacted by hostilities


What are the aims and sources of IHL? Aims

Although the origins of IHL can be traced to at least the nineteenth century, the principles and practices on which it is based are much older. International humanitarian law, also referred to as the law of armed conflict or the law of war, is designed to balance humanitarian concerns and military necessity. It subjects warfare to the rule of law by limiting its destructive effect and mitigating human suffering. IHL covers two key areas: 1. Protection and assistance to those affected by the hostilities

2. Regulation of the means and methods of warfare.

Grounding for international humanitarian law


Sources The sources of IHL are the same as those for international law in general: International convention The two main treaty sources of IHL are the Hague Convention (1907), setting out restrictions on the means and methods of warfare, and the four Geneva Conventions (GCs) (1949), providing protection to certain categories of vulnerable persons. These are the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (GCI); the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (GCII); prisoners of war (GCIII); and protected civilians (GC IV). The Fourth Geneva Convention is particularly relevant to humanitarian protection and assistance. It was established to prevent in future conflicts the scale of civilian suffering experienced during the two World Wars. The two branches of law covered in the Hague and Geneva Conventions are further developed by the first two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians (1977). These are referred to as Additional Protocol I (AP I), governing international armed conflict, and Additional Protocol II (AP II), governing non-international armed conflict. The four Geneva Conventions have achieved universal applicability as they have been universally ratified. The Additional Protocols, however, have yet to achieve near-universal acceptance. The United States and several other significant military powers (e.g. Iran, Israel, India and Pakistan) are currently not parties to the protocols.






International custom A comprehensive study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on IHL and customary law indicates that the majority of rules enshrined in treaty law have received widespread acceptance and have had a far-reaching effect on practice. They thus have the force of customary law. Some provisions in the Hague and Geneva Conventions were reflections of existing customary law, whereas others have developed into customary law. They are therefore binding on all states regardless of ratification, and also on armed opposition groups in the case of non-international armed conflict (Henckaerts, 2005). The application of customary international law is particularly significant for non-international armed conflicts, as treaty law has remained limited in this area.

General principles of law


IHL recognises a number of jus cogens norms, from which no derogation is allowed, for example, prohibitions against genocide and torture. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as subsidiary sources International courts have played a role in interpreting and developing IHL (examples are provided in this guide).

International Humanitarian Law protects those displaced by war

Different areas of international law – primarily international human rights law, international refugee law and international criminal law – can operate at the same time as IHL, combining to create a comprehensive legal framework for protection and assistance. It is now generally accepted that human rights law applies during armed conflict as well as in peacetime. Civilians are often displaced as a result of armed conflict, resulting in the possibility of simultaneous application of international refugee law and IHL. International criminal law and IHL are also linked. IHL provides that persons may be held individually criminally responsible for ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions, of Additional Protocol I and for other serious violations of the laws and customs of war (war crimes). The statutes of international criminal tribunals have established jurisdiction over war crimes.

Humanitarianism is based on a recognition of shared humanity


Human rights, humanitarianism (the humanitarian tradition) and IHL are linked: they are universal in their application and based on recognition of shared humanity. Three fundamental principles common to human rights law and humanitarian law are inviolability, non-discrimination and security of the person (Pictet, 1975, p. 34). These principles are the basis of a number of human rights and IHL rules, such as the right to life/protection of human life, the prohibition of torture or any inhuman or degrading treatment, the prohibition of discrimination, and basic rights to a fair trial






Human rights, humanitarianism and IHL are also linked to human need, although human rights are concerned more broadly with safeguarding comprehensive aspects of an individual’s physical, economic, political and social security. It is the public and political aspect of human rights that has often made humanitarian workers and IHL lawyers wary of delving into this area for fear of compromising the neutrality of humanitarian work (Darcy, 1997).

International humanitarian law supported by many human rights treaties


The concurrent application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law has been expressly recognised by various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The ICJ observed in its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that ‘the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political [ICCPR] rights does not cease in ti

International Humanitarian Law and refugee law apply to those fleeing conflicts


Refugees caught up in armed conflict are protected under both IHL and international refugee law. Article 5 of the Refugee Convention allows for the concurrent application of the Convention and other instruments granting rights and benefits to refugees. IHL and refugee law can also apply successively. The existence of an armed conflict is not in itself sufficient criteria to qualify someone as a refugee under the Convention. Where a victim of armed conflict is forced to leave his or her country due to violations of IHL (or IHRL), however, such violations can form part of the refugee definition and become a key factor in triggering refugee protection (Jaquemet, 2001). This may be more likely where armed conflicts have an ethnic or religious dimension, as it could trigger the condition of fleeing because of fear of persecution (ICRC, 2005a). In situations where armed elements are engaging in severe violations of IHL, this could be sufficient to accept that all civilians belonging to or associated with the ‘enemy’ side will have a well-founded fear of persecution, without having to engage in individual determinations (Jaquemet, 2001).

International Humanitarian Law establishes rights to have the humanitarian needs of refugees met









Prevention of displacement and protection of refugees under IHL Prohibition of forced displacement: Parties to a conflict are expressly prohibited from forcibly moving civilians, whether in cases of occupation (GCIV, Art 49) or non-international armed conflicts (APII, Art 17). There is an exemption under exceptional circumstances (where the security of the civilian population involved or imperative military reasons so demand). Violations of these provisions are war crimes under international criminal law (ICC Statute, Art 8).

Protection from the effects of hostilities in order to prevent displacement: The prohibitions against targeting civilians and civilian property/objects, as well as duties to take precautions to spare the civilian population, are also aimed at preventing displacement (ICRC, 2005a).

Protection during displacement: IHL provisions that seek to protect displaced and legally evacuated civilians include the need to ensure that any necessary evacuations are carried out under satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition; and that the displaced have appropriate accommodation and that families are not separated. Refugees also benefit from protections afforded to aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict under the GCIV (ICRC, 2005a)

Article 9 of the 1951 Convention allows for derogation from treaty provisions in times of war. Unlike international human rights law, the Convention does not provide for certain non-derogable rights. IHL can therefore be a particularly important safeguard in such situations.

Humanitarian principles are protected under International Humanitarian Law and support the alleviation of suffering


In the broadest sense, humanitarian principles are rooted in international humanitarian law. In a more narrow sense, they are the principles devised to guide the work of humanitarian actors (Mackintosh, 2000). These principles are widely recognised as: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed whenever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings. Neutrality: Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality: Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions. Operational Independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actors may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.




The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) mes of war’ (apart from in situations of derogation).


Grounding for International Human Rights Law

International Human Rights Law is grounded in multiple conventions


IHRL’s main treaty sources are the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Other sources include the Conventions on:

Genocide (1948)

Racial Discrimination (1965)

Discrimination against Women (1979)

Torture (1984)

Rights of the Child (1989)

Persons with Disabilities (2006).

The main regional instruments are: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and Convention on Human Rights (1969); the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and Convention on Human Rights (1969);




International Refugee Law Applies to All States

International refugee law applies to all states through customary international law


The absence of effective national protection results in the need for international protection. International refugee law applies to states that are party to the relevant treaties and to all states under customary law. Internally displaced persons, who remain within the borders of their own country, are subject to national law and applicable international law such as IHL and IHRL. IHL and IHRL are incorporated in binding regional instruments as applicable and as reflected in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998). While not part of binding treaty law, the Guiding Principles establish standards for the protection of IDPs. It can be challenging, however, to encourage states to comply with non-binding frameworks. In recent years, there have been significant developments in elaborating binding legislative frameworks – _including, for example, the codification of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, and the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs.




International Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, individuals are entitle to humanitarian assistance


The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols do not define ‘humanitarian assistance’ but provide a basic description of the rights and responsibilities of parties to the conflict and the potential role for humanitarian agencies. The provision of relief to civilian populations falls within the scope of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the two Additional Protocols and common Article 3. This includes the supply of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing (GCIV, Art 59), distribution of materials for educational, recreational or religious purposes (GCIV, Art 108) and measures to protect civilians and assist them to ‘recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide conditions necessary for [their] survival’ (API, Art 61).

Since the conventions and protocols are addressed to states, they do not directly confer rights or obligations upon humanitarian agencies. Provisions in the GCs and APs describe situations in which states must allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to civilians in their power, the forms of assistance that are entitled to protection, and the conditions which states are allowed to impose on their delivery (Mackintosh, 2000). These provisions are relevant and useful to humanitarian agencies as they provide insight and guidance into the conditions that they must meet should they seek to provide assistance. They also provide tools to argue for and to secure humanitarian access and cooperation from states, other parties to the conflict and countries that fall under the transit route for delivery of assistance.




Customary International Law Supports Humanitarian Assistance

Under Customary International Law, civilians are entitled to receive the assistance they need to survive


While most provisions are expressed in terms of the duties of parties to the conflict to provide or allow for relief, Article 30 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions grants protected persons ‘every facility for making application to [international and national relief organisations] that might assist them’. There is debate about whether these provisions can translate into a right to (appeal for) assistance. In addition, Article 62 provides that ‘protected persons in occupied territories shall be permitted to receive the individual relief consignments sent to them’, subject to security issues. There is support for such civilian entitlements under customary international law. There is practice that indicates not only that parties to the conflict are obligated to accept humanitarian assistance but that also points to recognition that civilians in need are entitled to receive humanitarian relief necessary to their survival (ICRC, 2005b; Spieker, 2012).




What is Customary International Law?

Customary International Law defined

Wikipedia, no date, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=customary+international+law DOA: 10-2-15

Customary international law are those aspects of international law that derive from custom. Along with general principles of law and treaties, custom is considered by the International Court of Justice, jurists, the United Nations, and its member states to be among the primary sources of international law.

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=customary+international+law


Extent of the Problem


60 Million Refugees (Global)

60 million refugees on the move

Matthias Schwartz, September 8, 2015, The New Yorker, The Refugees at Our Gates, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-refugees-at-our-gates?intcid=mod-latest DOA: 9-22-15

New, expanded quotas would mean the world to a lucky few, but their sum effect would be small. According to the U.N., sixty million people have now been forced to flee their homes, ten million more than at the height of the Second World War. The westward rush of Syrian exiles through Hungary over the past few weeks is only one wave of a sea change. Significant parts of the so-called “developing” world have been made unbearable, if not effectively uninhabitable, by conflict, tyranny, famine, and climate change. Those with the means to leave will do so, whether or not they have the right paperwork. They are coming whether we want them or not; the choice is how to treat these refugees, and how much dying we are willing to tolerate among those who want something better than a tent in a camp in Lebanon, Ethiopia, or Jordan.

60 million have been displaced from homes, 20 million are refugees

Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Susan Fratzke, September 24, 2015, Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and What’s next? Natalia http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next DOA: 9-30-15

The sheer scale of displacement worldwide has tested the limits of the international protection regime built around the 1951 Refugee Convention and revealed existing fault lines and failures in current humanitarian policies. As of 2014, UNHCR estimates that 59.5 million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes, of whom 19.5 million are refugees outside their countries of origin

60 million refugees on the move world-wide

LA Times Editorial, September 5, 2015, LA Times, What Others Say: World Needs Moral Policy on Refugrees, http://onlineathens.com/opinion/2015-09-05/what-others-say-world-needs-moral-policy-refugees-los-angeles-times DOA: 9-6-15

The photo was heartbreaking: A toddler in shorts and a red T-shirt lay face down at the edge of the surf, waves lapping at his head, his body settled into the sand like a piece of driftwood. His name, the world would learn, was Aylan Kurdi, and he and his Kurdish family were heading from Syria to Canada — from war to peace and, they hoped, safety. Instead, 3-year-old Aylan, his 5-year-old brother Galip and their mother all drowned when their smuggler’s boat capsized off Bodrum, Turkey. The image won’t end the wars in Syria and Iraq. Most likely, it won’t even change European policies toward the migrants and refugees pouring in from the Middle East and Africa. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has reported that the flow of displaced people around the world, some 60 million now, is at its highest level since World War II. While attention has focused understandably on the crisis in the Mideast and Africa, with the desperate drowning at sea or suffocating in the backs of trucks as they try to

http://onlineathens.com/opinion/2015-09-05/what-others-say-world-needs-moral-policy-refugees-los-angeles-times


http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next


http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-refugees-at-our-gates?intcid=mod-latest


reach Europe, people are on the move around the world, fleeing war, oppression, persecution and poverty.

60 million refugees are on the move

Stewart Patrick, 9-3-15, World on the Move: Understanding Europe’s Migration Crisis, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2015/09/03/world-on-the-move-understanding-europes-migration-crisis/ DOA: 9-6-15

People have been on the move since the dawn of time, of course, but never in such numbers. By the end of 2014, 59.5 million individuals had been uprooted due to conflict or persecution—the highest level since World War II. Despite knowing the risks, every day thousands continue to board rickety boats, or pay smugglers for the promise of safety and better lives ahead.

Largest migration crisis in world history

Raymond Smith, September 2015, The Migration Crisis, page number @ end of card. Kindle Edition

Worldwide, 59.5 million people are on the move as refugees or displaced people within their home countries. That population would be enough to make them citizens of the world’s 24th biggest country. Humanity has never seen such displacement, ever. Smith, Raymond E. (2015-09-18). The Migration Crisis (Kindle Locations 212-215). Sanway Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Dramatic increase in emmigration from Africa

Jean Park, Deputy Director, Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2015, Europe’s Migration Crisis, http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874 DOA: 9-6-15

Increased patrols in the waters off western Africa were thought to have effectively curbed migration along the Western Mediterranean passage to Spain in recent years, but 2014 saw a dramatic uptick in attempted border crossings from migrants and asylum seekers fleeing conflict in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, and South Sudan. According to the Spanish Interior Ministry, the number of migrants trying to enter Spain illegally in 2014 rose by almost 70 percent from the previous year to 12,549. And despite efforts to fortify the borders of Melilla and Ceuta, Spanish territories that are contiguous with Morocco, a steady stream of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa continue to scale the fences of these two enclaves.

Many fleeing Eritrea and Myanmar

Amanda Taub, 9-5-15, Vox, Europe’s refugee crisis, explained, http://www.vox.com/2015/9/5/9265501/refugee-crisis-europe-syria DOA: 9-7-15

Political and sectarian repression in other countries has contributed as well. Many families in Eritrea, for example, are fleeing the dictatorship there that is sometimes called Africa's own North Korea. In Myanmar, the a Muslim minority group known as the Rohingya has endured brutal violence and ethnic cleansing, sometimes with the tacit support of the Myanmar government or even at the hands of government forces

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15699&LangID=E

http://www.vox.com/2015/9/5/9265501/refugee-crisis-europe-syria

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/28/melilla-spain-morocco-400-migrants-break-fence

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/28/melilla-spain-morocco-400-migrants-break-fence

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11539439/Illegal-immigration-in-Spain-up-70-per-cent-in-2014.html


http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html

http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2015/09/03/world-on-the-move-understanding-europes-migration-crisis/


themselves. Fleeing Rohingya made headlines in recent months after thousands became stranded at sea, marooned in dangerous boats because neighboring countries refused to take them in.

Arab Spring sparked the refugee crisis


For years, the EU kept refugees out of sight and out of mind by paying Libyan dictator Moammar Qaddafi's government to intercept and turn back migrants that were heading for Europe. Qaddafi was something like Europe's bouncer, helping to keep the potentially significant number of African migrants and refugees from ever reaching the continent. His methods were terrible: Libya imprisoned migrants in camps where rape and torture were widespread. But Europe was happy to have someone else worrying about the problem. But then the Arab Spring. In 2011, Libyans rose up against Qaddafi, Europe and the US eventually intervened, and with Qaddafi's regime gone, Libya collapsed into chaos. Though the journey through Libya remained dangerous, it was also suddenly open, making it easier for both refugees and economic migrants from across Africa use the country's shores as a launching pad for the cross-Mediterranean journey to Europe. At the same time, the Arab Spring also helped lead to Syria's war, and to conflict in Yemen, and eventually to the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Of course none of this caused the exodus of refugees from, say, Afghanistan or Myanmar, but the Arab Spring was perhaps the largest single spark of the ongoing, global refugee crisis.

http://www.theweek.co.uk/6515/how-libya-kept-migrants-out-of-eu-at-any-cost

http://www.theweek.co.uk/6515/how-libya-kept-migrants-out-of-eu-at-any-cost


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32686328


Afghanistan Refugees

Many Afghanistan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, some in Europe

Hannah Bloch, September 26, 2015, Imagine It’s The Year 2045. Will the Syrian Refugee Crisis Be Resolved? http://wfdd.org/post/imagine-its-year-2045-will-syrian-refugee-crisis-be-resolved DOA: 9-26-15

Afghans are still on the move today. After Syrians, Afghans make up the highest number of migrants landing in Europe now, with 40,000 arriving this year alone.

But the European refugee numbers are a small fraction of those closer to home. In the cases of both Afghanistan and Syria, neighboring countries have borne a disproportionate share of the refugee burden. In Syria's case, 95 percent of refugees have fled to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. All three countries are feeling the strain.

For Afghans, the main destinations have been Iran and Pakistan. These neighbors, despite their hospitality, have had limited resources to assist the huge numbers of Afghans.

Iran still hosts about 950,000 Afghans, and Pakistan hosts about 1.5 million. And those are just the officially registered Afghan refugees. There are an estimated 2 million additional Afghans in those two countries who are unregistered, which would put the actual number at somewhere around 4.5 million.

Many Afghans have gone home since the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban in 2001. Nearly 6 million have returned from Pakistan alone since 2002.

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html

http://wfdd.org/post/imagine-its-year-2045-will-syrian-refugee-crisis-be-resolved


Existing Resettlement Fails

Existing resettlement is inadequate


Second, the international community has failed to offer anything like meaningful burden-sharing to host countries in conflict regions, which care for the vast majority of the world’s refugees. Neither assistance funding nor resettlement places—insufficient before the latest surge in displacement—have increased apace with the level of need. And the resources that are available are finite, and dwindle as time wears on. In Lebanon, for example, the World Food Program (WFP) announced in July it would have to reduce food vouchers given to Syrian refugees by half. The 2015 UN joint appeal for the region had received just 40 percent of requested funding as of September. Although all categories of the appeal are underfunded, support for livelihoods development and host-community resilience has been particularly low, adding to the prospect of long-term vulnerability in the affected countries. European leaders acknowledged the significance of the funding gap facing the Syria refugee response at an extraordinary EU summit on September 23, promising an additional 1 billion euros to UNHCR and WFP to ease the deficit (half will come from EU funds and half from Member States). Prior to the latest announcement, European countries had provided more than one-third of the funding for the United Nations’ response, with the United States providing a further one-third of the financing. But outside Europe and the United States, financial support for the Syria region has been less than forthcoming. Other than Japan, no countries in Asia or Latin America have contributed, and while Kuwait has been the third largest financial contributor to the international response, other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia have come under criticism for not doing more.

Furthermore, UNHCR-reported resettlement departures have barely increased over 2009 levels. Countries not immediately affected by the crisis have been slow to offer resettlement places. Recent offers by traditional resettlement countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States to provide an additional 10,000-12,000 places each for Syrians are just a drop in the bucket in comparison with the 4 million refugees who have been displaced. And so far offers from countries without established resettlement programs have been even less forthcoming.




Massive Crisis -- Europe

500,000 this year, 8,000 per day

BBC, September 25, 2015, Europe Gets 8,000 refugees from Iraq and Syria Daily, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34356758 DOA: 9-25-15

A daily flow of about 8,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees to Europe is likely to continue, the United Nations warns. The figure came from UN regional coordinator for refugees Amin Awad, who spoke to Reuters news agency. More than 5,000 refugees are arriving daily in Greece. That flow could continue during the winter if the weather remains good and the borders open, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) told the BBC. About half a million migrants - mostly from Syria and other conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa - have arrived in Europe this year.

464,000 have cross by sea in the last 9 months


Political upheaval in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia is reshaping migration trends in Europe. The number of illegal border-crossing detections in the EU started to surge in 2011, as thousands of Tunisians started to arrive at the Italian island of Lampedusa following the onset of the Arab Spring. Sub-Saharan Africans who had previously migrated to Libya followed in 2011–2012, fleeing unrest in the post-Qaddafi era. The most recent surge in detections along the EU's maritime borders has been attributed to the growing numbers of Syrian, Afghan, and Eritrean migrants and refugees. The IOM estimates that more than 464,000 migrants have crossed into Europe by sea for the first nine months of 2015. Syrians fleeing their country's four-and-a-half-year-old civil war made up the largest group (39 percent). Afghans looking to escape the ongoing war with Taliban rebels (11 percent), and Eritreans fleeing forced labor (7 percent) made up the second and third largest groups of migrants, respectively. Deteriorating security and grinding poverty in Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan have also contributed to the migrant influx.

More details on Dublin


Entry-point states bear unilateral responsibility for migrants under the Dublin Regulation. Revised in 2013, this EU law stipulates that asylum seekers must remain in the first European country they enter and that country is solely responsible for examining migrants' asylum



http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34356758


applications. Migrants who travel to other EU states face deportation back to the EU country they originally entered.

Many policymakers agree that reforming the Dublin Regulation is an important step to establishing a common European asylum policy. Under the current system, the burden of responsibility falls disproportionately on entry-point states with exposed borders. In practice, however, many of these frontline countries have already stopped enforcing Dublin and allow migrants to pass through to secondary destinations in the north or west of the EU. Germany and Sweden currently receive and grant the overwhelming majority of asylum applications in the EU."Both the burden and the sharing are in the eye of the beholder. I don't know if any EU country will ever find the equity that is being sought," says Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Fellow Heather Conley.

Recent numbers astronomical

Leo Cendrowicz, September 24, 2015, The Independent, Refugee Crisis: Though decisions needed to avoid a “surge” of extreme right” across Europe, warns leaders, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-tough-decisions-needed-to-avoid-a-surge-of-the-extreme-right-across-europe-warn-eu-10515964.html DOA: 9-25-15

The scale of the crisis was underlined by figures from Hungary, which had a record number of migrant crossings on Wednesday: 9,939 entering from Croatia and 102 from Serbia; while Croatian police said that more than 51,000 refugees and migrants had entered the country in the last 10 days.

Europe facing the largest refugee crisis since World War II

RTE News, 9-5-15, Over 6,000 refugees arrive in Munich with more to follow, http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0905/725835-migrants/ DOA: 9-5-15

Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz said their plight and the growing human cost was a "wake up call" for Europe to resolve its biggest refugee crisis since World War II. Austrian police said 4,000 people crossed into the country early this morning, with the number predicted to rise to 10,000.

The number of refugees will not slow

RTE News, September 25, 2015, UN Sees Flow of Refugees to Europe Growing, http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0925/730263-refugees-europe/ DOA: 9-25-15

The UN's refugee agency, UNHCR, does not expect the flow of about 8,000 refugees per day into Europe to abate. Amin Awad, UNHCR’s regional refugee coordinator, warned that it could be "the tip of the iceberg". Meanwhile, the UN's deputy humanitarian coordinator in Iraq said 10 million people in Iraq were expected to need humanitarian support by the end of the year, where 3.2 million are already displaced. Dominik Bartsch said the United Nations was planning for the displacement of 500,000

http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0925/730263-refugees-europe/

http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0905/725835-migrants/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-tough-decisions-needed-to-avoid-a-surge-of-the-extreme-right-across-europe-warn-eu-10515964.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-tough-decisions-needed-to-avoid-a-surge-of-the-extreme-right-across-europe-warn-eu-10515964.html


people from the Iraqi city of Mosul if Iraqi forces launch an attempt to recapture the city from the so-called Islamic State group.

Austria expects 80,000 more

New York Times, September 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/europe/pope-calls-on-europeans-to-house-refugees.html DOA: 9-6-15

Austria faces a similar influx — 80,000 asylum applicants are expected this year in a country of eight million, about one-tenth the population of Germany. That prospect has bolstered far-right populists at the expense of the governing Social Democrats and conservatives, who face bellwether elections in Vienna in early October.

340,000 have tried to reach Europe this year

Lukas Kaelin, 9-2-15, Foreign Affairs, Europe’s Broken Borders, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-09-02/europes-broken-borders DOA: 9-7-15

Frontex, the agency in charge of guarding the EU border, estimates that about 340,000 migrants have tried to sneak into Europe in 2015 so far, almost three times as many as in 2014. Along with the surge in numbers, the demographics of the travelers have also changed. These days, the bulk of them are Syrians fleeing violence at home, Afghans escaping their own ongoing civil war, Roma from Kosovo looking to avoid discrimination, and Eritreans fleeing a dictatorship comparable to the one in North Korea. Whereas in 2014, the bulk of refugees came to Europe through Italy from Libya and Tunisia, now more people arrive in Greece after crossing Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Macedonia and Hungary have also seen a surge in traffic. Although the reason for this shift remains uncertain, it seems likely that reports of frequent drownings on the long journey from northern Africa to Italy, and the increasingly volatile situation in Libya, have convinced many refugees to try their luck over land.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-09-02/europes-broken-borders

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/europe/pope-calls-on-europeans-to-house-refugees.html



Reasons People Flee

UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards, September 25, 2015, Seven Factors Behind Movement of Syrian Refugees to Europe, http://www.unhcr.org/560523f26.html DOA: 9-25-15

While more than 4 million Syrian refugees are in countries neighbouring Syria, recent months have seen an increase in the number of Syrians seeking refuge further afield – there have been almost 429,000 asylum applications by Syrians in Europe since 2011. Based on ongoing monitoring and assessments, surveys, focus group discussions, and daily interaction with refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq, UNHCR has identified seven principal factors behind this. The information gathered here mainly applies to Syrians living as refugees in the region, rather than people moving directly out of Syria. ( See UNHCR briefing note of 8 September 2015 on drivers out of Syria.)

Loss of hope

With Syria's crisis now into its fifth year and no sign of a solution in sight, hope is dwindling for many refugees. Feelings of uncertainty about the future are compounded by miserable conditions, fuelling a sense of despair and desperation.

High costs of living/Deepening poverty

Refugees in Lebanon cite the high cost of living as a factor in deciding to stay or go. In Egypt, refugees say it is getting harder to pay rent, manage high levels of indebtedness and afford their basic needs. In Jordan, the inability to provide for one's family was the most common reason cited by people who knew someone who had left.

The cumulative effect of four years in exile with restricted access to legal employment was also said to be taking its toll. In many cases savings are long depleted, precious valuables have been sold off and many refugees across the region live in miserable conditions, struggling to pay rent, feed their families, and cover their basic needs.

Limited livelihood opportunities

Without ability to work, many refugees struggle to make a living. Lack of livelihood opportunities or access to the formal labour market was cited as a problem by refugees in Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan. Syrian refugees in Iraq say the large number of internally displaced people has increased competition for jobs in the Kurdistan region of the country. Meanwhile, work on construction sites in the region has dried up with the drop in oil prices.

The lack of access to legal work leads refugees, desperate to provide for themselves, to resort to informal employment – risking exploitation, working in unsafe conditions or having payment withheld by unscrupulous employers. If caught working illegally, some refugees face sanctions, for example in Jordan being returned to a camp. Under new regulations in Lebanon, refugees must sign a pledge not to work when renewing their residency status.

Aid shortfalls

Aid programmes for refugees and host communities in the region have been plagued by chronic funding shortages. The current inter-agency Syrian regional refugee and resilience (3RP) plan for 2015 is only 41% funded, which has meant cuts in food aid for thousands of refugees, and those that get it having to survive on US$0.45-0.50 a day. Many refugees in Jordan told UNHCR the WFP food aid cuts were the last straw in

http://www.unhcr.org/560523f26.html


their decision to leave the country. Tens of thousands miss out on cash assistance, sinking deeper into debt. As a result people resort to negative coping strategies – including begging, child labour, and increased indebtedness. Shrinking humanitarian aid was cited by refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt as cause of desperation and a driver of onward movement.

In Jordan, inadequate funding has seen refugees losing free access to healthcare. As a result, 58.3 per cent of adults with chronic conditions do without medicine or health services, up from 23 per cent in 2014. There is also a marked decrease in access to curative and preventative health care.

Hurdles to renew legal residency

In Lebanon, new regulations for Syrian refugees have made it harder for Syrians to access asylum, and increasingly Syrians transit through Lebanon to Turkey. Refugees already in the country must pay US$200 per year to renew their stay. They are required to sign a pledge not to work and they must present a certified lease agreement. Many refugees are fearful of arrest or detention and feel vulnerable because of lapsed residency visas.

In Jordan, an urban verification exercise launched by the authorities in February to ensure that all Syrians residing outside of camps are issued with a new identity document to access services presents a number of challenges. The cost of obtaining a health certificate (JD30/US$42 for those over 12 years of age) as part of the process can be prohibitive.

Scant education opportunities

Limited education opportunities were cited as a problem for refugees in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. Education is highly valued among Syrians, who enjoyed free and mandatory schooling at home before the war. The worsening conditions that refugees face in exile are having a devastating impact on the education of refugees. In Jordan, some 20 per cent of children are abandoning school in order to work and in some cases girls are being forced into early marriage. Some 90,000 Syrians of school age have no formal education, with 30,000 of those accessing informal education and the rest missing out completely.

In Lebanon, where education is free to Syrians in a two-shift system, many children struggle to attend or find the new curriculum too difficult while at the same time working to support their families. While the Ministry of Education has increased by 100% the number of places for Syrian children (that is, 200,000 in the 2015/2016 school year), another 200,000 Syrian children will be out of school this year.

Across the region, Syrian youth are missing out on tertiary education and losing hope about their future.

Feeling unsafe in Iraq

The majority of displaced Iraqis UNHCR spoke to who were travelling outside Iraq reported feeling unsafe in the country. Many people from minority groups have told UNHCR they see migration as the key to their physical safety.


Actions by Specific Countries


Germany Intake

Germany has taken 550,00 refugees, Spain has taken 230,000, others have taken very few

LA Times Editorial, September 5, 2015, LA Times, What Others Say: World Needs Moral Policy on Refugees, http://onlineathens.com/opinion/2015-09-05/what-others-say-world-needs-moral-policy-refugees-los-angeles-times DOA: 9-6-15

But those truths should not become excuses. Earlier this year, the European Union came up with a triage plan for trying to resettle 60,000 refugees around Europe, but the plan exempted Hungary and Bulgaria, and Britain opted out. Clearly, the EU plan is inadequate to the task. Germany’s reception centers have received nearly 550,000 migrants, and Sweden’s 230,000. Other European nations, such as financially troubled Spain, have taken only slivers of the population. Meanwhile, Hungary’s nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orban, has cynically sought to frame the crisis as a battle for European identity against Muslim interlopers, introducing a repugnant layer of intolerance

Germany expects 800,000 more this year

Alison Smale, 9-6-15, New York Times, Pope Calls on All of Europe’s Catholics to House Refugees, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/europe/pope-calls-on-europeans-to-house-refugees.html DOA: 9-6-15

In Germany, which has taken in the most refugees and expects 800,000 asylum seekers this year, volunteers were active again Sunday at the main Munich rail station and other locations across the country, welcoming the new arrivals in a determined display of hospitality that counters right-wing resistance to the newcomers.

Germany registered 10,000 in August

Michael Neinaber, 9-7-15, The Star, Merkel splits conservative bloc with green light to refugees, http://www.thestar.com.my/News/World/2015/09/07/Merkel-splits-conservative-bloc-with-green-light-to-refugees/ DOA: 9-6-15

Germany expects a record influx of 800,000 migrants and refugees this year, by far the most in the European Union. More than 100,000 asylum seekers were registered in August alone.

Germany acting to implement more accommodations

Michael Neinaber, 9-7-15, The Star, Merkel splits conservative bloc with green light to refugees, http://www.thestar.com.my/News/World/2015/09/07/Merkel-splits-conservative-bloc-with-green-light-to-refugees/ DOA: 9-6-15

Merkel's coalition was expected to agree a series of measures later on Sunday including cutting red tape to facilitate the construction of asylum shelters, increasing funds for federal states and towns, and speeding up asylum procedures. The agenda will include widening the list of countries deemed "safe" -- meaning their citizens have no claim to asylum -- probably to include Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro. Among those already in that category are Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia. The aim is to speed up asylum and extradition procedures for migrants from southeastern Europe, in order to focus on war refugees from states like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://www.thestar.com.my/News/World/2015/09/07/Merkel-splits-conservative-bloc-with-green-light-to-refugees/








Accepting the migrants will cost Germany $10 billion next year

BBC, 9-7-15, Migrant crisis: Influx will change Germany, says Merkel, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34173720 DOA: 9-7-15

Mrs Merkel thanked volunteers who had helped and welcomed those arriving, saying they had "painted a picture of Germany which can make us proud of our country". However, she said that although Germany was "a country willing to take people in", it was "time for the European Union to pull its weight". Germany - which expects 800,000 asylum requests this year - could face costs of €10bn (£7.3bn) next year because of the influx, she added.

Germany is Europe’s wealthiest countryBrinley Bruton, 9-5-15, NBC News, “Germany to Spend $6.6 billion on 800,000 Refugees and Migrants,” http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/billions-migrants-germany-spend-6-6b-800-000-newcomers-n422811 DOA: 9-7-15

Germany, Europe's wealthiest country, also said it would make it easier to deport asylum seekers from countries considered "safe," such as Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania, to cope with the huge influx from war-torn states like Syria, Iraq and Eritrea.

Germany will spend $6.5 billion assist the refugees this year

Brinley Bruton, 9-5-15, NBC News, “Germany to Spend $6.6 billion on 800,000 Refugees and Migrants,” http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/billions-migrants-germany-spend-6-6b-800-000-newcomers-n422811 DOA: 9-7-15

Germany will spend around $6.6 billion to cope with some 800,000 migrants and refugees expected to have crossed into the country by the end of 2015, the government said early Monday. The announcement by Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition government came after Germany and neighboring Austria threw open their borders to the wave of refugees making their way north and west from the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Hungary has been letting the human tide move on after holding it up for days.

http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/germanys-angela-merkel-hold-crisis-talks-migrants-refugees-stream-n422531

http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/germanys-angela-merkel-hold-crisis-talks-migrants-refugees-stream-n422531

http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/billions-migrants-germany-spend-6-6b-800-000-newcomers-n422811







Syrian Refugees Will Increase

Syria will continue to unravel, increasing refugees

Nicholas Kristof, September 10, 2015, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/opinion/nicholas-kristof-compassion-for-refugees-isnt-enough.html?_r=0 9-22-15

Then there’s the far more difficult task of trying to make Syria habitable again. This may be impossible, but let’s be clear: As things stand, we’re on a trajectory for Syria to become even more horrific than it is now. Many experts expect the war to drag on for years, kill hundreds of thousands more people, and lead to an exodus of millions more refugees. We’re likely to see street-to-street fighting soon in Damascus, lifting the suffering and emigration to a new level.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/opinion/nicholas-kristof-compassion-for-refugees-isnt-enough.html?_r=0



Status Quo Distribution Plan

EU has approved a plan to distribute 120,000 refugees though it is not clear if some of the Eastern European countries will comply

James Kanter, EU ministers approve plan to distribute refugees, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/world/europe/european-union-ministers-migrants-refugees.html?_r=0, DOA: 9-22-15

RUSSELS — European Union ministers approved a plan on Tuesday that would compel member countries to take in 120,000 migrants seeking refuge on the Continent — but only after overruling four countries in Central Europe. The plan to apportion the migrants, still only a small fraction of those flowing into Europe, was approved by home affairs and interior ministers of the member countries after a vigorous debate. In a departure from normal procedures that emphasize consensus, particularly on questions of national sovereignty, the ministers took a formal vote. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted no. Finland abstained. The plan will be discussed further on Wednesday by leaders from across the 28-member bloc, who will gather here for an emergency summit meeting. It is not clear if the dissenting countries, which have vigorously opposed mandatory quotas, will comply. The crisis has tested the limits of Europe’s ability to forge consensus on one of the most divisive issues to confront the union since the fall of communism. It has set right-wing politicians, including those who govern Hungary, against pan-European humanitarians, who have portrayed the crisis in stark moral terms.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/e/european_union/index.html?inline=nyt-org

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/world/europe/european-union-ministers-migrants-refugees.html?_r=0



Hungary’s Anti-Immigrant Response

Hungary using all but lethal force against refugees


One of the most intransigent countries in the migration crisis has been Hungary. It has built a razor-wire fence along its border with Serbia and is fortifying its border with Croatia. It has also granted its army extra powers to deal with migrants, including allowing the use of tear gas, rubber bullets and other weapons, provided no lethal force is used.

Hungarian police allowed to use non-lethal force against refugees


Hungary’s parliament has passed a law allowing the government to deploy its army to handle refugees at its borders and the use of non-lethal weapons such as rubber bullets and tear gas grenades. Speaking ahead of the vote on Monday Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban claimed that millions of refugees are “laying siege” to the borders of his country and of Europe, and said: “The migrants are not just banging on our door, they’re breaking it down,” before reiterating his view that most were coming for economic and not safety reasons. The new law will allow soldiers to be sent to help police manage the refugee crisis, carrying out many of the same tasks such as checking ID, detaining suspects and controlling the flow of traffic at the borders. It also allows the army to use non-lethal force against refugees, which includes the use of rubber bullets, pyrotechnical devices, tear gas grenades and net guns, according to the text posted on the parliament’s website.






Mediterranean Border Crossing

Greece’s construction of a border fence has made it more difficult for refugees to cross by land, meaning more deadly sea crossings

Danae Leivada, September 24, 2015, Huffington Post, Why Greece Shuts the Shortest, Safest Route for Migrants and Refugees, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-turkey-border-fence_55f9ab73e4b0d6492d63ec12 DOA: 9-25-15

ATHENS, Greece -- As thousands of refugees arrived on Greece's shores this summer on their way to western Europe, and the harrowing images of young children who drowned in the Eastern Aegean Sea made headlines around the world, attention is shifting to Greece's land borders. The record numbers of migrants and refugees arriving in Greece from Turkey by boat -- more than 2,500 on Wednesday alone -- are a recent phenomenon. Not so long ago, the shortest, and safest, route was the 125 mile land border that runs along the Evros river in northern Greece. The river is a natural barrier, but a 6.5 mile strip of fields between the villages of Kastanies and the town of Nea Vyssa was a popular way to enter. This changed, however, when Greece started constructing a fence in October 2011. It was completed in December 2012, at a cost of about $3.3 million dollars. Built on a concrete base and made of strong barbed wire, it's 4 meters tall and equipped with thermal cameras, which scan the surrounding area. The decision to build the fence was controversial. The European Commission argued in 2011 that it "would not effectively discourage immigrants or smugglers who would simply seek alternative routes into the European Union.” But the government of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras went ahead, fearing that access to Greece at the land border was too easy. The numbers of migrants and refugees arrested while trying to cross into the country from Turkey reached 100,000 in 2011, according to the UN refugee agency. The effects of the fence were instantly felt, according to the authorities, with migration numbers in the area falling as much as 90 percent immediately after it was erected.

Though the flow of migrants and refugees crossing the northern land border reduced, the numbers of those arriving on the Eastern Aegean islands rose considerably from 2012 to 2013, and dramatically from 2014 onwards, according to the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. The journey for those who still attempt to cross the river is perilous.

Three months before the fence was completed, Greece launched Operation Shield, which reinforced patrols along the length of the land and river border. Despite funding problems the operation's mandate was renewed indefinitely in June. A number of police officers even offered to continue working at the border voluntarily.

The fence in Evros almost collapsed last winter because of heavy rain and winds. While it was partially repaired, the incident renewed the debate about whether or not it should be there in the first place.

Discussion of border protection policy has been dividing opinion in Greece, among politicians and citizens. Though the previous New Democracy-PASOK government that built the fence considered it an easy and cost-effective way to protect Greek borders, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' Syriza party appears divided. Some prominent members, like former Migration Minister Tasia Christodoulopoulou, have explicitly argued against it, while others, like former Minister of Citizen Protection Giannis Panousis, have argued that the fence has been useful and should be kept.

The challenge of migrant and refugees flows has reached crisis levels and is an issue concerning politicians in Greece, and Europe more broadly. The heads of European governments convened for an emergency summit in Brussels on Wednesday. The leaders agreed to increase funding to humanitarian aid organizations, provide assistance to transit countries, relocate 120,000 migrants and refugees across the region, and intensify identification procedures in Italy and Greece by November. The EU leaders appeared

http://www.e-evros.gr/gr/eidhseis/3/den-exei-episkeyas8ei-akoma-o-fraxths-toy-ebroy/post27824?fb_comment_id=832377040203563_832779116830022#f20a8036fcf9a6e

http://www.e-evros.gr/gr/eidhseis/3/den-exei-episkeyas8ei-akoma-o-fraxths-toy-ebroy/post27824?fb_comment_id=832377040203563_832779116830022#f20a8036fcf9a6e

http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/MIDAS-REPORT.pdf

http://www.naftemporiki.gr/cmsutils/downloadpdf.aspx?id=516752

http://www.unhcr.gr/1againstracism/en/greek-fence-up-at-turkish-border-as-immigrants-come-by-sea/

http://www.ekathimerini.com/137519/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-will-not-fund-evros-fence

http://www.ekathimerini.com/137519/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-will-not-fund-evros-fence

http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/MIDAS-REPORT.pdf

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/23/us-europe-migrants-greece-idUSKCN0RN12K20150923

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-turkey-border-fence_55f9ab73e4b0d6492d63ec12

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-turkey-border-fence_55f9ab73e4b0d6492d63ec12


divided, however, over long-term solutions to deal with the massive flow of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe.


Greece

Greek refugee centers are inhumane


The results have been disastrous. Doctors Without Borders' Stathis Kyrouthis described the current refugee crisis in Greece as the worst he has ever seen. "I have worked in many refugee camps before, in Yemen, Malawi, and Angola. But here on the island of Kos, this is the first time in my life that I have seen people so totally abandoned." According to Human Rights Watch, the Greek reception centers, where arriving refugees are held, lack sufficient food and health care, and are so severely unsanitary and chronically overcrowded that the conditions in them may amount to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under international law.

Greece does not have the economic resources to absorb the migrants and treats them poorly


The situation is especially acute in Greece, which has been hit hard by a five-year debt crisis and successive rounds of austerity measures. Overcrowded facilities lacking proper ventilation, clean water, and sanitation have been blamed for compromising migrants' health, and police mistreatment and harassment continue to elicit censure from rights groups. Right-wing extremist groups like Golden Dawn that campaign on anti-immigrant platforms have also contributed to an uptick in xenophobic violence. The country's soaring unemployment rates and drastic cuts in public spending mean there is scant economic opportunity and welfare support for migrants and refugees.

Most migrants entering through Greece


Greece: By 2012, 51 percent (PDF) of migrants entering the EU illegally did so via Greece. This trend shifted in 2013 after Greek authorities enhanced border controls under Operation Aspida (or "Shield"), which included the construction of a barbed-wire fence at the Greek-Turkish border. But by July 2015, Greece had once again become the preferred Mediterranean entry point, with Frontex reporting 132,240 illegal EU border crossings for the first half of 2015, five times the number detected for the same period last year. Syrians and Afghans made up the "lion's share" of migrants traveling from Turkey to Greece (primarily to the Greek islands of Kos, Chios, Lesbos, and Samos) in the first seven months of 2015. This most recent migrant surge coincided with the country's tumultuous debt crisis, which brought down its banking system and government this summer.


http://www.hrw.org/node/108554/section/1

https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/greece-alleged-racist-remarks-police-chief-must-be-investigated-2013-12-19

http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/25/updated-human-rights-watch-submission-united-nations-committee-against-torture-greec

http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2011/final_1106_Report_Evros_EN.pdf


https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-islands

http://www.msf.org/article/greece-no-welcome-migrants-and-refugees-landing-greek-dodecanese-islands



Status Quo US Action

US taking in more refugees

Associated Press, 9-21-15, Kerry says US will take in 85,000 refugees next year; 100,000 in ’17, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/21/kerry-says-us-will-take-85000-refugees-next-year-100000-in-17/ DOA: 9-22-15

Scrambling to address a growing Syrian refugee crisis, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced Sunday that the United States would significantly increase the number of worldwide refugees it takes in over the next two years, though not by nearly the amount many activists and former officials have urged. The U.S. will accept 85,000 refugees from around the world next year, up from 70,000, and that total would rise to 100,000 in 2017, Kerry said at news conference with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier after they discussed the mass migration of Syrians fleeing their civil war. Many, though not all, of the additional refugees would be Syrian, American officials have said. Others would come from strife-torn areas of Africa. The White House had previously announced it intended to take in 10,000 additional Syrian refugees over the next year. Asked why the U.S. couldn't take more, Kerry cited post-Sept. 11 screening requirements and a lack of money made available by Congress.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/21/kerry-says-us-will-take-85000-refugees-next-year-100000-in-17/



European Border Controls

Many countries reinstating border controls


Germany reinstated border controls along its border with Austria in September 2015, after receiving an estimated forty thousand migrants over one weekend. Implemented on the eve of an emergency migration summit, this move was seen by many experts as a signal to other EU member states about the pressing need for an EU-wide quota system. Austria, the Netherlands, and Slovakia soon followed with their own border controls. These developments have been called the greatest blow to Schengen in its twenty-year existence.

While Schengen rules allow member countries to erect temporary border controls under extenuating "public policy or national security" circumstances, CSIS' Conley fears that a sustained influx of migrants could spur more member states to suspend borderless travel for longer stretches of time. "I suspect if the politics surrounding migration really start getting messy, you'll see countries reintroducing internal borders with greater frequency, which means they would have chiseled away at one of the main pillars of Europe, which is the free movement of people," she says.



Italy Route

Italy is the main entry point


Illegal border crossings most often fall along several major routes spanning the southern and eastern borders of Europe. The central Mediterranean passage, with Italy serving as the main entry point to Europe, is currently the most frequented for migrants and asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia. Deteriorating security in Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan are also seen as contributing factors to the migrant influx.

Libya->Italy is the most common route


However, the most heavily trafficked route along Europe's Southern perimeter remains the Central Mediterranean passage from Libya to Italy, which has borne the burden of the most recent wave of irregular migration. According to the EU border agency Frontex, there were approximately forty thousand illegal border crossings (PDF) along this route in 2013, almost quadruple the number of crossings detected in 2012. This passage is also considered one of the most perilous: The IOM estimates that a majority of the 3,279 Mediterranean migrant deaths in 2014 occurred along this route; the organization says that the toll could reach 30,000 by the end of 2015. Several incidents involving capsized boats, including one in April 2015 that killed more than 800 people, have garnered global attention and elicited calls from human rights activists, Pope Francis, and policymakers for a united European response to the migrant crisis.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-boat-capsize.html

https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2015/pbn-listing/at-least-3800-migrants-rescued-f.html

http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf

http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf




Justice Justice is not absolute – it can be defined in many ways and mean many things

Michael Walzer, philosopher, 2008, Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

Justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way. At any rate, I shall begin by doubting, and more than doubting, this standard philosophical assumption. The questions posed by the theory of distributive justice admit of a range of answers, and there is room within the range for cultural diversity and political choice. It’s not only a matter of implementing some singular principle or set of principles in different historical settings. No one would deny that there is a range of morally permissible implementations. I want to argue for more than this: that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves— the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 6). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.


Pro


Morality – Crisis Specific Cards


Morality – General – Current Crisis Specific Cards

Allowing refugees to die is immoral

Daniel Altman, 9-8-15, Foreign Policy, We Should Be Competing to Take in Refugees, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/08/we-should-all-be-competing-to-take-in-refugees-europe-syria/ DOA: 9-22-15 Daniel Altman is senior editor, economics at Foreign Policy and is an adjunct professor at New York University's Stern School of Business.

Refugees are spending thousands of euros to make treacherous journeys over land and sea. As the world has lately been reminded (but too infrequently for my taste), many die along the way. This is an economic problem as well as a moral one. An impoverished refugee will have a harder time making a fresh start, and a dead refugee never gets the chance. That’s why it makes sense for Germany and other host countries to pay for refugees’ safe transit; they’ll have to shell out less to support refugees upon arrival, and they’ll likely have more successful refugees paying taxes in the future.

Failure to help refugees is a moral failure

Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, Refugees Who Could Be Us, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-refugees-who-could-be-us.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0 DOA: 9-22-15

Granted, assimilating refugees is difficult. It’s easy to welcome people at the airport, but more complex to provide jobs and absorb people with different values. (In Jordan, I once visited a refugee family hoping for settlement in the United States and saw a poster of Saddam Hussein on the wall; I wondered how that adjustment would go.) In any case, let’s be clear that the ultimate solution isn’t to resettle Syrians but to allow them to go home. “Stopping the barrel bombs will save more refugees dying on the route to Europe than any other action, because people want to return to live in their homes,” noted Lina Sergie Attar, a Syrian-American writer and architect. There has been a vigorous public debate about whether the photo of Aylan’s drowned body should be shown by news organizations. But the real atrocity isn’t the photo but the death itself — and our ongoing moral failure to save the lives of children like Aylan.

Moral and humanitarian obligation to accept more refugees. US must lead


After months of dithering as Europe struggles to take in tens of thousands of Syrians fleeing the war in their homeland, the U.S. finally agreed over the weekend to increase the number of refugees it would admit to this country for resettlement. The U.S. isn't responsible for the brutal, three-sided civil conflict that has forced some 4 million Syrians to seek refuge outside their country. But it can no longer avoid addressing the crisis; not only is it the right thing to do on humanitarian and moral grounds, it's also vital that the U.S. show the kind of principled leadership that the rest of the world can respect. Secretary of State John Kerry said the U.S. will raise the number of refugees it accepts annually from around the world from 70,000 to 100,000 over the next two years, including some 10,000 Syrians the White House



http://www.karamfoundation.org/the-team/

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-refugees-who-could-be-us.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0


http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/08/we-should-all-be-competing-to-take-in-refugees-europe-syria/



has proposed admitting next year. Given the hundreds of thousands of Syrians expected to arrive in the E.U. this year alone, those numbers are a drop in the bucket. Compare our efforts to those of Germany, which is preparing to resettle at least 800,000 refugees by the end of the year. The U.S. could surely do better than the token increase it announced, but at least it's a start.

Moral obligation to help refugees, economic benefits irrelevant

Martin Wolf, September 22, 2015, Financial Times, A refugee crisis that Europe Cannot Escape, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3967804c-604b-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#ixzz3mWOWGivB

In deciding what to do, the EU must draw a distinction between refugees and immigrants. Countries have legal and moral obligations to refugees. They do not have such obligations to other immigrants. Compassion for the desperate has to be distinct from a cooler assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of immigration. It may be helpful to argue that refugees could provide economic benefits to the recipient country. In many cases, no doubt, resourceful people who so much want to enter will do just that. But that is not the reason why they should be accepted.

We have duty to show compassion and stand in solidarity with the refugees

Komorowski et al, September 22, 2015, The Guardian, Our duty in Central Europe is to show compassion to refugees, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/our-duty-in-central-europe-is-to-show-compassion-to-refugees DOA: 9-22-15

But this rift within a united Europe resurfaces today. This time it has a moral dimension. It is true, we are not accountable for the instability and collapse of refugees’ home countries. We are not the ones who have turned them into states plagued by incessant fear, where people are at risk of violent death, and where human life is brutish and short. Unlike the former colonial and imperial powers that took in large numbers of immigrants after the second world war, we have little experience of coexisting with people of different cultures, from far-off lands.

Nonetheless, as human beings, we have a duty to show compassion and to provide them with assistance. This is also our duty as Europeans. The European community was founded on the principle of solidarity. Today we must not refuse to take joint responsibility for the union, nor turn a blind eye to human suffering and the situation of countries most affected by the rising tide of migration.

Bronisław Komorowski President of Poland from 2010 to 2015

Aleksander Kwaśniewski President of Poland from 1995 to 2005

Danilo Türk Former president, Slovenia

Jerzy Baczyński Editor-in-chief of the Polityka weekly, Poland

Gordon Bajnai Former prime minister, Hungary

Mirosław Bałka Sculptor, Poland

Zuzana Bargerova Lawyer, Human Rights League, Slovakia

Zygmunt Bauman Sociologist, University of Leeds, Poland/Great Britain

Igor Blaževič Founder of One World Festival

Uldis Bērziņš Poet and interpreter, Latvia

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/our-duty-in-central-europe-is-to-show-compassion-to-refugees

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/our-duty-in-central-europe-is-to-show-compassion-to-refugees


Henryka Bochniarz President of Konfederacja Lewiatan, Poland

Michał Boni Member of European Parliament, former minister of administration and

digitalisation, Poland

Marek Borowski Senator, former finance minister, vice prime minister and marshal of the

Sejm, Poland

Bogdan Borusewicz Marshall of the senate, Poland

Martin Bútora Sociologist, adviser to the president, Slovakia

Bogusław Chrabota Editor-in-chief of the Rzeczpospolita daily, Poland

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz Former prime minister, Poland

Liudas Dapkus Deputy editor-in-chief of the Lietuvos rytas daily, Lithuania

Aleš Debeljak Poet and essayist, Slovenia

Pavol Demeš Former minister of foreign affairs, Slovakia

Tibor Dessewffy President of Demos Hungary

Ivaylo Ditchev Professor of social science, writer, Bulgaria

Magda Faltová Director, Association for Integration and Migration, Czech Republic

Zsuzsa Ferge Professor of social science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary

Władysław Frasyniuk Former dissident and member of parliament, Poland

Rayna Gavrilova Historian of culture, University of Sofia, Bulgaria

Rajko Grlić Director, Croatia

István Gyarmati Diplomat, Hungary

Tomáš Halík Theologian and writer, Czech Republic

Agnes Heller Philosopher, Hungary

Agnieszka Holland Director, Poland

Štefan Hríb Editor-in-chief, .týždeň weekly, Slovakia

Michal Hvorecký Writer, Slovakia

Ivars Ījabs Political scientist, Latvia

Vlasta Jalusic Funding member, former director and current senior research fellow, Peace

Institute, Slovenia

Josef Jařab Former senator, rector emeritus of Palacký University in Olomous, Czech Republic

Leszek Jażdżewski Editor-in-chief of the Liberté! quarterly, Poland

Jerzy Jedlicki Historian of ideas, former dissident, Poland

Jana Juráňová Writer, Slovakia

Aleksander Kaczorowski Journalist and essayist, Poland

Éva Karádi Editor-in chief of the Magyar Lettre Internationale quarterly, Hungary

Dávid Korányi Former undersecretary of state, deputy director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia

Center, Hungary/United States


János Kornai Professor emeritus, Harvard University and Corvinus, University of Budapest,

Hungary

András Kováts Director, Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants

Dominika Kozłowska Editor-in-chief of the Znak monthly, Poland

Ivan Krastev Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Bulgaria

Marcin Król Historian of ideas, University of Warsaw, Poland

Andrius Kubilius Former prime minister, Lithuania

Jarosław Kuisz Editor-in-chief of the Kultura Liberalna internet weekly, Poland

Ewa Kulik-Bielińska Director of the Stefan Batory Foundation, chairman of the European

Foundation Centre

Miroslav Kusý Political scientist, former dissident, Slovakia

Tomasz Lis Editor-in-chief of the Newsweek Polska weekly, Poland

Ondřej Liška Former minister of education, chairman of the Green party, Czech Republic

Ewa Łętowska Former ombudsman, Poland

Vita Matiss Political analyst, essayist, Latvia

Jiří Menzel Director, Czech Republic

Adam Michnik Editor-in-chief of the Gazeta Wyborcza daily, Poland

Piotr Mucharski Editor-in-chief of the Tygodnik Powszechny weekly, Poland

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi Chairwoman of the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and

State Building Research, Romania

Alvydas Nikžentaitis President of Lithuanian National Historians Committee

Jan Němec Writer, chairman of Czech Writers Association

Zbigniew Nosowski Editor-in-chief of the Więź monthly, Poland

Janina Ochojska President of Polish Humanitarian Action

Andrzej Olechowski Former finance minister and minister of foreign affairs, Poland

Jurica Pavičić Writer, Croatia

Márta Pardavi Co-chair, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungary

Solomon Passy Former minister of foreign affairs, Bulgaria

Jiří Pehe Political scientist and writer, Czech Republic

Dimitrina Petrova Executive director Equal Rights Trust, Bulgaria

Petr Pithart Former prime minister, Czech Republic

Adam Pomorski President of the Polish PEN Club

Wojciech Przybylski Editor-in-chief Respublica Nowa and Eurozine, Austria/Poland

Zoran Pusić President of Civic Committee for Human Rights, Croatia

László Rajk Jr Architect, designer and political activist, Hungary

Rein Raud Author and cultural theorist, Estonia


Pauls Raudseps Journalist, Diena daily, Latvia

Adam Daniel Rotfeld Former minister of foreign affairs, Poland

Martin Rozumek Director, Organisation for Aid to Refugees , Czech Republic

Peter Salner Ethnologist, Slovakia

Andrzej Seweryn Theatre actor and director, Poland

Sławomir Sierakowski Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Poland

Martin Milan Šimečka Writer, journalist, Slovakia/Czech Republic

Marta Šimečková Journalist, interpreter, Slovakia

Karel Schwarzenberg Former minister of foreign affairs, Czech Republic

Aleksander Smolar Chairman of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Poland

Ladislav Snopko Playwright, former minister of culture, Slovakia

Jan Sokol Philosopher, former dissident, Czech Republic

Andrzej Stasiuk Writer, Poland

Petruška Šustrová Former dissident, Czech Republic

Jerzy Szacki Sociologist, University of Warsaw, Poland

Małgorzata Szczęśniak Set designer, Poland

Monika Sznajderman Editor, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Poland

Soňa Szomolányi Political scientist and sociologist, Slovakia

Erik Tabery Editor-in-chief of the Respekt weekly, Czech Republic

Béla Tarr Director, Hungary

Stefan Tafrov Diplomat, human rights activist, Bulgaria

Vesna Teršelič Director, Documenta – Center for Dealing with the Past, Croatia

Róża von Thun und Hohenstein Member of European Parliament, Poland

Dubravka Ugrešić Poet and essayist, Croatia

Rimvydas Valatka Journalist, former member of parliament, Lithuania

Magdaléna Vášáryová Member of parliament, Slovakia

Tomas Venclova Poet, Lithuania

Krzysztof Warlikowski Theatre director, Poland

Jakub Wygnański Chairman of the board, Unit for Social Innovation and Research – Shipyard,

Poland

Adam Zagajewski Poet and essayist, University of Chicago, Poland/United States

Péter Zilahy Writer, Hungary

Andrzej Zoll Former president of the Constitutional Tribunal, Poland

http://www.theguardian.com/world/refugees


Morality – Walzer

Obligation to provide aid and assistance to strangers outside of our political community


I won’t try to recount here the history of Western ideas about strangers. In a number of ancient languages, Latin among them, strangers and enemies were named by a single word. We have come only slowly, through a long process of trial and error, to distinguish the two and to acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, strangers (but not enemies) might be entitled to our hospitality, assistance, and good will. This acknowledgment can be formalized as the principle of mutual aid, which suggests the duties that we owe, as John Rawls has written, “not only to definite individuals, say to those cooperating together in some social arrangement, but to persons generally.” 1 Mutual aid extends across political (and also cultural, religious, and linguistic) frontiers. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 33). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.


Morality – Right to Asylum

Refugees have a right to asylum if there is no other place for them to live


The cruelty of this dilemma is mitigated to some degree by the principle of asylum. Any refugee who has actually made his escape, who is not seeking but has found at least a temporary refuge, can claim asylum— a right recognized today, for example, in British law; and then he cannot be deported so long as the only available country to which he might be sent “is one to which he is unwilling to go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality ... or political opinion.” 20 Though he is a stranger, and newly come, the rule against expulsion applies to him as if he had already made a life where he is: for there is no other place where he can make a life. But this principle was designed for the sake of individuals, considered one by one, where their numbers are so small that they cannot have any significant impact upon the character of the political community. What happens when the numbers are not small? Consider the case of the millions of Russians captured or enslaved by the Nazis in the Second World War and overrun by Allied armies in the final offensives of the war. All these people were returned, many of them forcibly returned, to the Soviet Union, where they were immediately shot or sent on to die in labor camps. 21 Those of them who foresaw their fate pleaded for asylum in the West, but for expediential reasons (having to do with war and diplomacy, not with nationality and the problems of assimilation), asylum was denied them. Surely, they should not have been forcibly returned— not once it was known that they would be murdered; and that means that the Western allies should have been ready to take them in, negotiating among themselves, I suppose, about appropriate numbers. There was no other choice: at the extreme, the claim of asylum is virtually undeniable.. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 51). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.

Meeting the needs of refugees requires taking them in


There is, however, one group of needy outsiders whose claims cannot be met by yielding territory or exporting wealth; they can be met only by taking people in. This is the group of refugees whose need is for membership itself, a non-exportable good. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 48). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.

Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger



Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless persons. That condition doesn’t preclude every sort of distributive relation: markets, for example, are commonly open to all comers. But non-members are vulnerable and unprotected in the marketplace. Although they participate freely in the exchange of goods, they have no part in those goods that are shared. They are cut off from the communal provision of security and welfare. Even those aspects of question: How is that group constituted? I don’t mean, How was it constituted? I am concerned here not with the historical origins of the different groups, but with the decisions they make in the present about their present and future populations. The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and services. Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless persons. That condition doesn’t preclude every sort of distributive relation: markets, for example, are commonly open to all comers. But non-members are vulnerable and unprotected in the marketplace. Although they participate freely in the exchange of goods, they have no part in those goods that are shared. They are cut off from the communal provision of security and welfare. Even those aspects of security and welfare that are, like public health, collectively distributed are not guaranteed to non-members: for they have no guaranteed place in the collectivity and are always liable to expulsion. Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 32). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.


Morality – Golden Rule

We should follow the Golden Rule when dealing with refugees

Arizona Central, September 24, 2015, Pope Francis Urges Congress to Show Compassion for Immigrants, http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2015/09/24/pope-francis-urges-congress-show-compassion-immigrants/72734356/ DOA: 9-25-15

Pope Francis delivered lawmakers a message of compassion and understanding for immigrants Thursday as part of his historic, nearly hour-long speech to joint session of Congress, a bitterly divided body that has grappled with border-security and immigration-reform issues for a decade. In doing so, the pope appealed to the United States' time-honored reputation as a nation of immigrants. "We, the people of this continent, are not fearful of foreigners, because most of us were at once foreigners," said Pope Francis, the first-ever leader of the Roman Catholic Church to address U.S. senators and representatives. "I say this to you as the son of immigrants, knowing that so many of you are also descendants of immigrants." Citing the global refugee crisis as well as immigration to the United States from Mexico and Central America, the pope, who was often interrupted by applause, reminded lawmakers of the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." He also told the joint session on Capitol Hill that immigrants are looking for a better life for themselves and their loved ones, which is the same that anyone would want for their children. "We must not be taken aback by their numbers, but rather view them as persons, seeing their faces and listening to their stories, trying to respond as best we can to their situation," the pope said. "To respond in a way which is always humane, just and fraternal. We need to avoid a common temptation nowadays, to discard whatever proves troublesome." The Golden Rule guides in "a clear direction," he said. "Let us treat others with the same passion and compassion with which we want to be treated," Pope Francis said. "Let us seek for others the same possibilities which we seek for ourselves. Let us help others to grow, as we would like to be helped ourselves."In a word, if we want security, let us give security," he continued. "If we want life, let us give life. If we want opportunities, let us provide opportunities."

http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2015/09/24/pope-francis-urges-congress-show-compassion-immigrants/72734356/

http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2015/09/24/pope-francis-urges-congress-show-compassion-immigrants/72734356/


Morality – General – Empathy

Empathy compels us to help the refugees

Nicholas Kristof, 9-4-15, New York Times, Refugees Who Could Be Us, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-refugees-who-could-be-us.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0 DOA: 9-6-15

WATCHING the horrific images of Syrian refugees struggling toward safety — or in the case of Aylan Kurdi, 3, drowning on that journey — I think of other refugees. Albert Einstein. Madeleine Albright. The Dalai Lama. And my dad . In the aftermath of World War II, my father swam the Danube River to flee Romania and become part of a tide of refugees that nobody much cared about. Fortunately, a family in Portland, Ore., sponsored his way to the United States, making this column possible. If you don’t see yourself or your family members in those images of today’s refugees, you need an empathy transplant. Aylan’s death reflected a systematic failure of world leadership, from Arab capitals to European ones, from Moscow to Washington.

Empathy demands assistance for refugees

Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a visiting professor at Brandeis University's Heller School. His latest book is Debtors' Prison: The Politics of Austerity Versus Possibility, Co-founder and co-editor, American Prospect, September 9, 2015, Huffington Post, Refugee Blues, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/post_10092_b_8097064.html DOA: 9-22-15

On Sunday, I accompanied the employment minister, Ylva Johansson, to a rally organized by the youth movements of the Social Democrats, the Greens, and other progressive parties. The featured speaker was the prime minister himself. As thousands braved a nasty rainstorm to attend the outdoor rally, Löfven declared, "We need to decide right now what kind of Europe we are going to be. My Europe takes in refugees. My Europe doesn't build walls," he said. Johansson added, in our conversation, "In Sweden we are different and we need to stay different. To feel empathy with the suffering of another person, a person who is not like ourselves, is part of being human. To solve this refugee crisis is not rocket science, it is not impossible."

We should have empathy and take in refugees

Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a visiting professor at Brandeis University's Heller School. His latest book is Debtors' Prison: The Politics of Austerity Versus Possibility., 9-6-15, Huffington Post, Refugee Blues, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/post_10092_b_8097064.html DOA: 9-7-15

On Sunday, I accompanied the employment minister, Ylva Johansson, to a rally organized by the youth movements of the Social Democrats, the Greens, and other progressive parties. The featured speaker was the prime minister himself. As thousands braved a nasty rainstorm to attend the outdoor rally, Löfven declared, "We need to decide right now what kind of Europe we are going to be. My Europe takes in refugees. My Europe doesn't build walls," he said. Johansson added, in our conversation, "In Sweden we are different and we need to stay different. To feel empathy with the suffering of another person, a person who is not like ourselves, is part of being human. To solve this refugee crisis is not rocket science, it is not impossible."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/post_10092_b_8097064.html


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/opinion/20kristof.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html?_r=0




Morality – Syrians HAVE to Leave Syria

Syrians have been massacred - -they have no choice but to leave

Michael Ignatieff is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, September 5, 2015, New York Times, The refugee crisis isn’t a ‘European Problem,” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/the-refugee-crisis-isnt-a-european-problem.html?_r=0 DOA: 9-22-15

The Vietnamese and Hungarians were fleeing Communism. What’s holding back sympathy for the Syrians? They’ve been barrel-bombed in Aleppo by their own regime, they’ve been tortured, kidnapped and massacred by miscellaneous jihadis and opposition militias. They’ve been in refugee camps for years, waiting for that cruelly deceiving fiction “the international community” to come to their aid. Now, when they take to the roads, to the boats and to the trains, all our political leaders can think of is fences, barbed wire and more police. What must Syrians, camped on the street outside the Budapest railway station, be thinking of all that fine rhetoric of ours about human rights and refugee protection? If we fail, once again, to show that we mean what we say, we will be creating a generation with abiding hatred in its heart. So if compassion won’t do it, maybe prudence and fear might. God help us if these Syrians do not forgive us our indifference.

Syria is unlivable

Baltimore Sun, September 21, 2015, A Limited Welcome for Syria’s Refugees, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-refugees-20150921-story.html DOA: 9-23-15

Taking in more Syrian refugees is a humanitarian obligation the U.S. must share with its European allies by virtue of its being the world's most powerful and wealthy nation and the fact that it has a vital stake in stabilizing one of the world's most volatile regions. But increasing the U.S. quota of refugees won't by itself solve the larger problem of the intractable conflict in Syria that is driving the exodus to Europe. For civilians trapped between the brutality of Syrian President Bashar Assad and the barbarism of ISIS and its allies, the country has become unlivable, and it's likely to stay that way until the war there ends.

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-refugees-20150921-story.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/the-refugee-crisis-isnt-a-european-problem.html?_r=0


http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/michael-ignatieff


Morality -- Responsibility

Failure to act is the cause of the refugee crisis


“This crisis is on the group of world leaders who have prioritized other things,” rather than Syria, Kitchen said. “This is the result of that inaction.” António Guterres, the head of the U.N. refugee agency, said the crisis was in part “a failure of leadership worldwide.” “This is not a massive invasion,” he said, noting that about 4,000 people are arriving daily in a continent with more than half a billion inhabitants. “This is manageable, if there is political commitment and will.”

The world, including the US, has done nothing to stop the violence in Syria

Anne Applebaum is a Pulitzer Prize-winning author. Her most recent book is Iron Curtain: the

Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956. , 9-4-15, Slate, Europe’s Deadly Denial, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/09/europe_refugee_crisis_the_eu_has_failed_to_confront_the_wars_in_syria_and.html DOA: 9-7-15

But if those praising Merkel’s “brave” stance were honest, they would acknowledge that she isn’t offering any long-term solutions either. Even if Europe does take another couple of hundred thousand people, dividing them up between countries—as it should—won’t prevent others from coming. To avoid accusations of heartlessness, the Italian coast guard rescues thousands of people from tiny boats and rubber dinghies. As a result, people keep taking the terrible risk. Here is what no one wants to say: This is, in essence, a security crisis. For years now, Europeans have chosen to pretend that wars taking place in Syria and Libya were somebody else’s problem. It’s also a foreign policy crisis: At different times and for different reasons, all of the large European states—the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany—have blocked attempts to create a common foreign and defense policy, and as a result they have no diplomatic or political clout. They haven’t wanted European leadership, and most of them wouldn’t have wanted American leadership either, even if any had been on offer. The richest economy in the world has a power vacuum at its heart and no army. Now the consequences are literally washing up on Europe’s shores.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/09/europe_refugee_crisis_the_eu_has_failed_to_confront_the_wars_in_syria_and.html

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/09/europe_refugee_crisis_the_eu_has_failed_to_confront_the_wars_in_syria_and.html




Morality – Responsibility (US)

US responsible for the refugee crisis -- the war in Iraq triggered it

Steve Hilton is co-founder and chief executive of Crowdpac and former senior adviser to the British prime minister, New York Times, September 10, 2015, Who’s Responsible for the Refugees? http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/opinion/whos-responsible-for-the-refugees.html DOA: 9-10-15

And here’s the second simple truth. While we can argue forever about the causes of conflict in the Middle East, it is impossible to ignore the impact of American foreign policy on what’s happening in Europe. It was shocking to see an “expert” from the Council on Foreign Relations quoted on Saturday saying that the situation is “ largely Europe’s responsibility .” How, exactly? The Iraq invasion (which could reasonably be described as “largely America’s responsibility”) unleashed a period of instability and competition in the region that is collapsing states and fueling sectarian conflict.

Toppling Saddam and exacerbating Sunni-Shiite tensions in Syria triggered the crisis

Christopher Hill, September 23, 2015, Who Caused the Refugee Crisis?, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who-caused-the-refugee-crisis-by-christopher-r-hill-2015-09 DOA: 9-10-2-15

Refugees are a natural consequence of war; indeed, there has seldom been a war without civilians trying to flee from its carnage. But what causes the wars? In some cases, demands for regime change. After all, the regimes being overthrown are often brutal, and unlikely to back down without a fight. Nowhere has this inexorable sequence been more evident than in Syria. President Bashar al-Assad, with his narrow Alawite base, has overseen a brutal dictatorship for years – one that has never given an inch to those demanding democratic reform, nor made any room in the country’s polity for those motivated by a less sectarian conception of government. In fact, Assad’s regime is a continuation of that instituted by his father and predecessor, Hafez al-Assad, when he took over the presidency in 1971. The elder Assad’s approach was, if anything, more brutal than his son’s, as the survivors of his 1982 siege of the town of Hama, aimed at quelling an uprising by Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, can attest. Hafez al-Assad’s effort to subdue Islamist resistance with iron-fisted authoritarianism held for decades. His secular Ba’athist ideology sought to blur the distinctions among the various Syrian communities, especially between Sunnis and his own Alawite tribe, which follows a version of Shiism. But in 2003, when a United States-led coalition overthrew another Ba’athist dictator, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, the 1,300-year-old Sunni-Shia divide – which had been largely hidden, or even in remission, for many of those centuries – gained renewed and lethal salience. Iraq’s Sunni minority, which had long dominated Saddam’s government, lost power to the majority Shia, whose own brand of narrow sectarian rule has fueled violent resistance to the central government. Since dismantling Saddam’s version of Ba’athism, which many viewed as a cover for Sunni-minority rule, Iraq’s Shia leaders have done little to soften the blow – an approach that has not gone unnoticed elsewhere in the region. In the Middle East, there is always plenty of blame to go around, and those who blame the US for renewing sectarianism in the region fail to recognize its antecedents and its cyclical nature. Still, the US did play a major role in the Syrian drama. In July 2011, the US and France sent their ambassadors to Hama, the site of so much bloodshed and enmity toward Syria’s government, in order to urge the “opposition” there – that is, a then-peaceful Muslim Brotherhood – to unite against the regime.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who-caused-the-refugee-crisis-by-christopher-r-hill-2015-09

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who-caused-the-refugee-crisis-by-christopher-r-hill-2015-09

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/many-obstacles-are-seen-to-us-taking-in-large-number-of-syrian-refugees.html?src=me&_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/opinion/whos-responsible-for-the-refugees.html


http://www.crowdpac.com/

https://twitter.com/stevehiltonx


Following that visit – the culmination of an effort to bring about regime change in Syria – any prospect of dialogue or negotiation with Assad (whose family, for better or worse, had controlled Syria for decades) was destroyed. Neither ambassador ever had a consequential meeting in Damascus again. American and French leaders had mistaken the war clouds that gathered in Syria after the Arab Spring as early signs that, at long last, the country was ready for democracy. Rallying the opposition and overthrowing the government, it was thought, would be enough to transform the country’s entire system of – and, indeed, approach to – governance. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once called war a serious means to a serious end. The same is true of a policy of regime change, as evidenced by the ruinous state of Syria today and the millions of people seeking refuge in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Western Europe. To be sure, the Assad regime bears most of the blame for Syria’s current situation. But, in the absence of any meaningful political process, it would appear that external demands for regime change back in 2011 – which amounted to a choice between Assad and extremist Sunni terrorist organizations – were not entirely thought through, to say the least. With more consideration, those contemplating regime change would have noted that Assad and his cronies provided no indication whatsoever that they would heed the call and leave. As Syrian refugees in their hundreds of thousands risk everything for a chance at safety, those who advocated for regime change four years ago should reflect seriously on their choice. Instead of joining the chorus of criticism against countries like Hungary and Serbia – which are beset with internal problems and played no part in inciting the war – they should take more responsibility for helping the refugees. And they should start to encourage the establishment of inclusive political structures that can help end Syria’s hineous civil war.

US responsible -- failure to intervene in the Syrian civil war is caused the crisis

Steve Hilton is co-founder and chief executive of Crowdpac and former senior adviser to the British prime minister, New York Times, September 10, 2015, Who’s Responsible for the Refugees? http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/opinion/whos-responsible-for-the-refugees.html DOA: 9-10-15

European leaders wanted, years ago, to intervene directly in Syria in order to check President Bashar al-Assad’s cruelty; the United States didn’t. You can understand why — I wouldn’t for one second question the judgment of American political leaders that their country was reluctant to participate in another military conflict. But at least acknowledge the consequences of nonintervention: the protracted Syrian civil war, the emergence of a lawless territory ripe for exploitation by the sick zealots of the Islamic State, and the resulting flood of millions of displaced people.

Obama miscalculated on Syria


Yet as long as we’re talking about Syrian dysfunction, let’s also note European and American dysfunction. The Obama administration has repeatedly miscalculated on Syria and underestimated the problem, even as the crisis has steadily worsened. And some leading Republicans want to send in troops to confront the Islamic State (think Iraq redux).

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/opinion/nicholas-kristof-from-dc-to-syria-a-mess.html





http://www.crowdpac.com/

https://twitter.com/stevehiltonx


Morality – Responsibility (US) – A2: Nothing US Could Have Done

A No-Fly-Zone would substantially reduce violence in Syria


The least bad option today is to create a no-fly zone in the south of Syria. This could be done on a shoestring, enforced by U.S. Navy ships in the Mediterranean firing missiles, without ground troops. If we can simply declare a "no-fly zone," then why can't we just as easily declare that the war is over? Doesn't a no-fly zone have to be... That would end barrel bombings. Just as important, the no-fly zone would create leverage to pressure the Syrian regime — and its Russian and Iranian backers — to negotiate. “If they can’t use their aircraft, the day after they will know they can’t survive, and that will bring them to the table,” said Reza Afshar, a former British diplomat who now advises the Syrian opposition through his group, Independent Diplomat.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/syria-lebanon/syria/163-new-approach-in-southern-syria.aspx




Morality – General – Theoretical Evidence


Should Include Refugees

Excluding refugees is based on violence

Jeffrey ISAAC Poli Sci @ Indiana ’96 “A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 70-72

Such examples of political praxis illustrate two of the most important features of Arendt's vision of the politics of human dignity. The first is that the most important locus of such a politics is neither the nation-state nor the international covenant or tribunal. These are, of course, crucial loci of power. The nation-state is still the preeminent political actor on the world scene. Constitutional limitations on the exercise of state power, forms of federated authority, and international legal codes--each a way of placing a kind of constraint upon state sovereignty--are all necessary if the rights of minorities, refugee s , and dissenters are to be secured. But the primary impetus for such rights will always come from elsewhere, from the praxis of citizens who insist upon these rights and who are prepared to back up this insistence through political means. The words of Albert Camus are apposite: "Little is to be expected from present-day governments, since these live and act according to a murderous code. Hope remains only in the most difficult task of all: to reconsider everything from the ground up, so as to shape a living society inside a dying society. Men must therefore, as individuals, draw up among themselves, within frontiers and across them, a new social contract, which will unite them according to more reasonable principles" (1991, 135-36).Arendt's essays "Civil Disobedience" and On Revolution take up this very theme of a new social contract. Both deal with the subject of resistance to moribund and oppressive power and treat this resistance as a prefiguration of a new politics centered upon voluntary associations and council forms rather than formal or official state institutions. The "lost treasure" of the revolutionary tradition is, for Arendt, the model of an associational politics that exists beneath and across frontiers, shaking up the boundaries of the political and articulating alternative forms of allegiance, accountability, and citizenship (see Isaac 1994). Echoing Camus, Arendt writes that if there exists an alternative to national sovereignty, then it is such an associational politics, which works according to "a completely different principle of organization, which begins from below, continues upward, and finally leads to a parliament." She quickly adds that the details of such a politics are less important than its civic spirit, a spirit that resists the deracinating tendencies of modern political life (1972, 231-33).(29) That such a politics runs against the principle of sovereignty is for Arendt one of its strengths. As many commentators have observed, there is a deep pathos to Arendt's treatment of revolution, which is for her a glorious, empowering, and yet evanescent phenomenon, like a fire that burns brightly for only a moment (see Miller 1979). Arendt recognized the paradox of rebellion in the modern world, namely, that powerful associational impulses would be coopted by more official forms of politics. Yet, this can be viewed as the great virtue of this kind of politics--that it challenges the status quo and calls attention to itself in ways which demand redress and incorporation. In other words, such forms of resistance invigorate formal politics and keep it true to the spirit of human dignity. Their vigilant insistence gives force to the support for human rights that is proclaimed, but often honored in the breach, by more authoritative domestic and international bodies. The second important feature of Arendt's vision of the politics of human dignity is that there is no single community, or single category of citizenship, that can once and for all solve the problem of human rights in the late modern world. One arena of human rights praxis is clearly the state itself, and one kind of citizenship appropriate to it is clearly what we think of as "domestic" citizenship--membership in the nation state as an American, or Italian, or Croatian. But i should be clear that the idea of "domestic" is simply an adjunct of the idea of sovereignty itself; it denotes those matters contained within the boundaries of sovereign power and subject to it. As such it encourages domesticity where vigor is also needed. For there is no reason to imagine that relevant human rights issues, or relevant communities, correspond to the boundaries of nation-states. Local, regional, and global forms of citizenship are equally possible and equally real. One can speak about the rights of aborigines, for example, as a Mohawk, as a Canadian, as a North American, as a human. In each case different forms of organization would be appropriate; in each case one would speak to a different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, audience. How human rights claims are articulated and mobilized can and will vary from case to case and from time to time, as political identities are transformed and new alliances forged.(30) It would be equally mistaken to conflate ideas of community and citizenship with formal political organizations, be they states, nations, or confederations. In On Revolution Arendt writes about self-chosen "elites," groups of citizens distinguished by nothing but their deep interest and participation in specific public matters. She describes such elites as constituting, through their very own efforts, "elementary republics." In the Arendtian view it is possible to imagine a multiplicity of overlapping "republics," sometimes in tension with one another, sometimes in support of one another. The kinds of international legal institutions and federated state arrangements that she endorses would constitute ineffective security for human rights were they not authorized, empowered, and invigorated by a robust civil society of such "republics."The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, formed in 1990 as an outgrowth of links formed between East European dissidents and West European peace activists after the Helsinki Accords in 1975, is an interesting example of what Arendt might have envisioned.(31) As Mary Kaldor, a co-founder, describes the assembly, "it is not addressed to governments except in so far as they are asked to guarantee freedom of travel and freedom of assembly so that citizens' groups can meet and communicate. It is a strategy of dialogue, an attempt to change society through the actions of citizens rather than governments...in short, to create a new political culture. In such a situation, the behavior of governments either changes or becomes less and less relevant"


(Kaldor 1989, 15). The assembly has been described as a loose association of citizens acting together in self-organized associations, movements, and initiatives across national boundaries. It is hardly indifferent to the policies of governments; petitioning, demonstrating, and fostering debate about state policies regarding human rights have been central to its activities. But the power that its members have been able to constitute is an important force in its own right; indeed, it is only because of this power, an organizational and an ethical power, that it is capable of supporting more directly "political" efforts, such as legislation, and of influencing the course of state action. According to Kaldor, "we don't represent anyone except the movements and institutions in which we are involved. In many cases, we represent no one but ourselves. And our power rests not on whom we represent but in what we do--in what we say, in our ideas, in our quest for truth, in the projects we undertake. It rests on our energy and commitment" (Kaldor 1991, 215). Groups such as the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and Amnesty International embody the kind of associational politics central to Arendt's conception of modern citizenship. They are forms of collective empowerment that might provide a new foundation for human dignity. They play an indispensable role in calling attention to human rights abuses, giving voice to the disenfranchised and persecuted, and empowering citizens to act in concert on behalf of the expansion of rights. They seek not only to alter state policies, for example, on matters such as minority and refugee rights, but also to offer their own , unofficial support for displaced or persecuted peopl e . A group such as Spanish Refugee Aid, with which Arendt was involved, was no substitute for state policies hospitable to the rights of Spanish refugees, nor was it a substitute for diplomatic efforts to change a dictatorial regime; but the voluntary organization of relief efforts and forms of solidarity is itself an indispensable and preeminently political effort, without which more hospitable state policies would not be possible. Not a wholesale alternative to other, more inclusive or official, forms of political community, such endeavors themselves constitute vital forms of civic participation and empowerment. They can be viewed as "elementary republics" of citizens committed to human rights. Our world is in many ways different from the one Arendt described in her Preface to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism. Writing in 1951, with the recent experiences of world war and Holocaust seared into her memory, and another world conflict dangerously imminent, she noted that "this moment of anticipation is like the calm that settles after all hopes have died" (1973, vii). From her perspective the world, still reeling after the traumatic shocks of totalitarianism and mass destruction, seemed to be hurtling toward other, no less disturbing, forms of violence and human suffering. In contrast, we are witnesses to the end of the Cold War. Our more optimistic contemporaries, invoking Hegel with apparent conviction, only yesterday proclaimed the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracy. Yet, few today are sanguine about the state of the world. As I write this essay millions of innocent civilians are starving in Rwanda and Kenya, the victims of brutal civil conflict. Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and countless other national minorities clamor for human rights. In the heart of Europe, Sarajevo is under Serbian siege, and Bosnian Muslims suffer a brutal, murderous campaign of "ethnic cleansing."(32) German neo-Nazi youth regularly vandalize and burn refugee hostels, to the cheers of large crowds of sympathetic bystanders. Throughout France, Italy, and Germany there are increasingly audible calls to exclude "foreigners" in the name of "real citizens," "true" French, or Italians, or Germans who do not wish to share their country with the others. Across the Atlantic Ocean things are no different, as the Clinton administration recently turned back Haitian refugees fleeing a brutal dictatorship, just as its predecessors had done before with refugees displaced by economic trauma and civil war in El Salvador and Guatemala (see United Nations 1993, Zolberg 1989).The 1992 Human Rights Watch World Report notes that in the wake of the Cold War "respect for human rights faces a dangerous challenge in the rise of exclusionary ideologie s ...the quest for ethnic, linguistic or religious purity, pursued by growing numbers, lies behind much of today's bloodshed. By closing the community to diversity and stripping outsiders of essential right s , these dangerous visions of enforced conformity nourish a climate of often brutal intolerance" (1992, 1). Arendt, writing more than forty years ago, observed that "under the most diverse conditions and disparate circumstances, we watch the development of the same phenomena--homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth" (1973, vii). Such a vision sounds grimly familiar.While Arendt is not a theorist well known for her reflections on human rights, her writing is an indispensable resource for thinking about the threats to human dignity in the late modern world. As she recognized, human rights are not a given of human nature; they are the always tenuous results of a politics that seeks to establish them, a vigorous politics intent on constituting relatively secure spaces of human freedom and dignity. And as she saw, the nation-state, far from being the vehicle of the self-determination of individuals and peoples, is in many ways an obstacle to the dignity that individuals and communities seek. Those interested in human rights, who wish to provide a new guarantee for human dignity, have no alternative but to take responsibility upon themselves, to act politically as members of elementary republics, locally and globally, on behalf of a dignity that is in perpetual jeopard y in the world in which we live. A


Supporting Basic Needs Protects Human Rights

Supporting basic needs is essential to rights protection

Jacqueline Bhabha, Jr. Lecturer in Law at Harvard Law School, director of Harvard’s University Committee on Human Rights Studies, 2009, Human Rights Quarterly, “Arendt’s Children: Do Today’s Migrant Children Have a Right to Have Rights?” Project Muse. http://muse.jhu.edu/search/results?action=search&searchtype=author&section1=author&search1=%22Bhabha%2C%20Jacqueline.%22.

Access to basic shelter, subsistence level welfare payments, and in-kind benefits is as fundamental to modern conceptions of rights in general, and children’s rights in particular, as is protection from physical violence . The same is true for access to such social and economic rights as education and health care, as the Committee on the Rights of the Child has frequently noted in its concluding observations on states parties’ periodic reports. 38 Yet here too, public officials operate under personal codes of conduct that translate into dramatic rights denials . Sylvia da Lomba has remarked, “Curtailments of social rights for irregular migrants in host countries have become essential components of restrictive immigration policies. . . . The threat of destitution as a deterrent against irregular migration generates acute tensions within host states between immigration laws and human rights protections.” 39 Consider this Spanish case: Sixteen-year-old ‘Abd al Samad R. has been in Ceuta [an autonomous Spanish city located on the Moroccan coast] for about five years, including two and a half years living at the San Antonio Center. While at San Antonio he was diagnosed as suffering from renal disease, a potentially life-threatening medical condition, and he received medical treatment. Then, in October 2001 he was told to leave San Antonio, apparently for disciplinary infractions. When we interviewed ‘Abd al Samad on November 8, 2001, he was living with a group of other children and youth in makeshift hovels squeezed between a breakwater and piles of ceramic tiles and other building supplies. He had received no medical treatment since leaving San Antonio, although he was frequently in severe pain. “The pain comes often, when it is cold, or when someone hits me,” he said. “I tried to go to the hospital when I was in pain but they wouldn’t admit me. They won’t accept you at the hospital unless some one from San Antonio comes with you. When the pain comes I can’t move so who will come to take me to the hospital?” 40 Without official confirmation of the child’s social entitlements, he remained outside the categories established by the state—in effect not a person before the law. These exclusionary attitudes were translated directly into rightlessness. The acute risks to which this willful exclusion, combined with the fear of detection as an irregular migrant by state officials, can give rise were noted by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Siliadin v. France. In this case, an unaccompanied child from Togo, “unlawfully present in [France] and in fear of arrest by the police . . . was . . . subjected to forced labour . . . [and] held in servitude,” compelled to carry out housework and child care for fifteen hours a day without holidays. 41 The Court commented that the applicant “was entirely at [her employers’] mercy, since her papers had been confiscated . . . [S]he had no freedom of movement or free time. As she had not been sent to school . . . the applicant could not hope that her situation would improve.” 42

Irregular migration status increases the risk of invisibility and thus gross rights violations. As the Court pointed out, states parties must recognize this serious risk and act “with greater firmness . . . in assessing the infringements of the fundamental values of democratic societies.” In other words, according to the Court, states have an obligation to “see” Arendt’s children—willful and selective blindness is not a legitimate option .


Need to Protect the Human Rights of the Stateless

Statelessness is equal to losing the right to have rights- leads to totalitarianism

Seyla Benhabib, professor of political science and philosophy at Yale, June 2004, “The Rights of Others.” http://books.google.com/books?id=3cuUHAJNmuYC&dq=Seyla+Benhabib+“Rights+of+Others”&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=d-pqxd2bJq&sig=Oyb7-wKlE-80M8AlnsdkH3bLD80&hl=en&ei=rqtKSqWVIYqmNurxjIoO&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1

After Kant, it was Hannah Arendt who turned to the ambiguous legacy of cosmopolitan law, and who dissected the paradoxes at the heart of the terminally based sovereign state system. One of the great political thinkers of the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt argued that the twin phenomena of "political evil" and “statelessness” would remain the most daunting problems into the twenty-first century as wel l (Arendt 1349.;,134; [1951]1968;seeBenhabib[1996] 21103). Arendt always insisted that among the root causes of totalitarianism was the collapse of the nation— state system in Europe during the two world wars. The totalitarian disregard for human life and the eventual treatment of human beings as "superfluous" entities began, for Hannah Arendt, when millions of human beings were rendered “stateless" and denied the "right to have rights." Statelessness, or the loss of nationality status, she argued, was tantamount to the loss of all rights. The stateless were deprived not only of their citizenship rights; they were deprived of any human rights. The rights of man and the rights of the citizen, which the modem bourgeois revolutions had so clearly delineated were deeply imbricated. The loss of citizenship rights, therefore, contrary to all human rights declarations, was politically tantamount to the loss of human rights altogether . This chapter begins with an examination of Arendt contribution; thereafter, l develop a series of systematic considerations which are aimed to show why neither the right to naturalization nor the prerogative of denaturalization can be considered sovereign privileges alone; the airs: is a universal human right, while the second - denaturalization · is its abrogation.


Children

There is a special moral obligation to refugee children because they are uniquely vulnerable

Julianne Duncan, Ph.D. Director, Office of Children's Services Migration and Refugee Services/U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. Joint Testimony of Migration and Refugee Services/U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service before The Senate Subcommittee on Immigration February 28, 2002. http://www.usccb.org/mrs/duncantestimony.shtml

Because of our long experience in caring for and advocating on behalf of unaccompanied minors, Mr. Chairman, our testimony today will point out changes in law we believe are required, as laid out in Senator Feinstein's bill, to reform the current system. In the view of MRS/USCCB and LIRS, our government's treatment of unaccompanied alien children should be governed by the following principles: The Federal government has a special responsibility to ensure that unaccompanied alien children are treated with dignity and care . Children are our most precious gifts. Their youthfulness, lack of maturity, and inexperience make them inherently vulnerable and in the need of the protection of adults. Unaccompanied alien children are among the most vulnerable of this vulnerable population. They are separated from both their families and their communities of origin, they are often escaping persecution and exploitation, they often find themselves in a land in which the language and culture are alien to them, and they are thrust into complex legal proceedings that even adults have great difficulty navigating and understanding. Unaccompanied minors should be held in the least restrictive setting as possible, preferably with family members or with a foster family. Secure facilities should be used on a very limited basis and only when absolutely necessary to protect a child's immediate safety or the safety of the community. Minors should be reunited with parents, guardians, or other family members within the United States as soon as possible. While a family is in temporary detention, they should not be separated unless it is in the best interest of the child. Because of their special vulnerability and inability to represent themselves, unaccompanied children should be provided with legal representation and guardians ad litem to assist them in immigration proceedings and to see that care and placement decisions are made with a child's best interest in mind. Mr. Chairman, these principles are not currently governing U.S. policy toward unaccompanied alien children in the United States. Instead, thousands of children each year are held in detention, some with juvenile criminal offenders, with little or no access to legal assistance and with decreasing ability to reunite with family members.

International consensus – US must fulfill moral responsibility to protect child asylee seekers.Rachel Bien an associate at Outten & Golden LLP, clerked for Judge Thomas G. Nelson on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ‘03. “NOTHING TO DECLARE BUT THEIR CHILDHOOD: REFORMING U.S. ASYLUM LAW TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN” Journal of Law and Policy 12 pg. 840-841

http://www.usccb.org/mrs/duncantestimony.shtml


The growing international consensus that child asylum seekers require special protections has important implications for U.S. asylum laws. Although the U.S. asylum system currently does not differentiate between adult and child applicants, the United States should build on recent proposals to afford greater procedural protections to child asylum seekers with substantive provisions that address the forms of persecution unique to children. With millions of children suffering from the consequences of armed conflicts around the world, the international community has a special legal and moral obligation to ensure that child asylum seekers receive adequate care and protection. As this record of violence makes clear, a world unwilling to protect children is one in which “children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed . . . exploited as soldiers . . . starved and exposed to extreme brutality.”202 In short, it is a world devoid of the most basic of human values. The United States has an important role to play in ensuring that children who escape such turmoil are properly protected.

Refugee children suffer trauma and often do not receive the help they need

National Child Traumatic Stress Network and Refugee Trauma Task Force, Established by Congress in 2000 is a collaboration of academic and community-based service centers whose mission is to raise the standard of care and increase access to services for traumatized children and their families across the United States. Combining knowledge of child development, expertise in the full range of child traumatic experiences, and attention to cultural perspectives, the NCTSN serves as a national resource for developing and disseminating evidence-based interventions, trauma-informed services, and public and professional education. 2005 <http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:8wvH_mjc7L0J:www.nctsnet.org/nctsn_assets/pdfs/promising_practices/MH_Interventions_for_Refugee_Children.pdf+social+services+available+for+refugee+children&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>

As discussed extensively in the White Paper I, refugee children experience a great number of stressors throughout their pre-migration, flight, and resettlement experiences that impact on their psychological well being. Refugee children experience trauma resulting from war and political violence in their countries of origin prior to migration, as well as during flight or in refugee camps. These multiple stressors include direct exposure to war time violence and combat experience, displacement and loss of home, malnutrition, separation from caregivers, detention and torture and a multitude of other traumatic circumstances affecting the children’s health, mental health and general well being. A large number of studies have documented a wide range of symptoms experienced by refugee children, including anxiety, recurring nightmares, insomnia, secondary enuresis, introversion, anxiety and depressive symptoms, relationship problems, behavioral problems, academic difficulties, anorexia, and somatic problems (Allodi, 1980; Almqvist & Brandell-Forsberg, 1997; Angel, Hjern, & Ingleby, 2001; Arroyo & Eth, 1985; Boothby, 1994; Cohn, Holzer, Koch, & Severin, 1980; Felsman, Leong, Johnson, & Felsman, 1990; Gibson, 1989; Goldstein, Wampler, & Wise, 1997; Hjern, Angel, & Hoejer, 1991; Hodes, 2000; Kinzie, Sack, Angell, Manson, & Roth, 1986; Krener & Sabin, 1985; Macksoud & Aber, 1996; Masser, 1992; McCloskey & Southwick, 1996; McCloskey, Southwick, Fernandez-Esquer, & Locke, 1995; Mollica, Poole, Son, Murray, & Tor, 1997; Muecke & Sassi, 1992; Paaredekooper, de Jong, & Hermanns, 1999; Papageorgiou et al., 2000; Weine, Becker, Levy, & McGlashan, 1997; C. Williams & Westermeyer, 1983), and linked the presence of these symptoms to exposure to trauma prior to migration. With high prevalence of posttraumatic stress symptoms among refugee children reported to be between 50-90% (Lustig et al., 2004), many refugee children are in need of trauma-informed treatment and services. Despite evidence for the need for such treatment, refugee children in resettlement are unlikely to benefit from mental health services because they rarely use them. This problem is not unique to refugee children, as many recent reviews have observed that few U.S. children in need of mental health services receive care (Collins &


Collins, 1994; Kataoka, Zhang, & Wells, 2002; Stephenson, 2000; Surgeon General's Report, 1999). Epidemiological studies report that fewer than 20% of children who need mental health care actually receive services (Lahey, Flagg, Bird, & Schwab-Stone, 1996). In addition, of those children who do receive services, fewer than 50% receive the appropriate service relative to their need (Kazdin, 1996). Because refugee children face additional barriers to receiving care, experts suspect that most refugee children in need of mental health services do not find their way into the existing mental health care system (Geltman, Augustyn, Barnett, Klass, & Groves, 2000; Westermeyer & Wahmanholm, 1996). One survey of refugee health programs in nine metropolitan areas in the U.S. found that while 78% of the sites offered mental health care, only 33% of the sites carried out mental health status examinations (Vergara, Miller, Martin, & Cookson, 2003). This suggests that refugees with mental health problems are unlikely to be identified, and thus unlikely to receive treatment. Overall, these findings suggest that interventions that facilitate access and engagement in mental health services for refugee children are needed.


Hospitality

We should be hospitable and welcome others in need – embracing is a means to overcome our own racism and fear of the other

LAACHIR2007 [Karima, lecturer in cultural theory at university of Birmingham, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p _177-178___]

The European popular imagination has been haunted by images of Europe inundated by foreigners — economic and political refugees — perceived as 'we scroungers', job-snatchers' and 'threats to security' .' Some politicians started to foment these fears to pick up extra votes, especially extreme right- movements , which have been gaining ground in local and parliamentary elect The increasing popularity of leaders of far right parties, who all publicly voice xenophobia and racism against those perceived as foreigners, are alarming examples of the return of exclusionist popular nationalism and fascism to haunt postcolonial Europe. 'Immigration' demands and those of ethnic minorities, especially religious demands, have become contentious issues in Europe. Hospitality has become more difficult since the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 'war on terror' led by the American Government . The terrorist bombings in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) have been interpreted by some as a conflict between contending civilizations, Western and Islamic. The lives of diasporic Muslims and of immigrants in Europe and the United States have become subject to constant surveillance and are the subject of various regulations that aim to keep Muslim Fundamentalist networks under control . However, the lives of ordinary European Muslims have been deeply affected by these changes and, as a result, their loyalty, together with their European citizenship and strong cultural affiliation to Europe as their homeland, have been brought into question. They are now viewed with distrust and caution . Hospitality is important , therefore, as an analytical concept since it opens up the debates of welcoming 'otherness' beyond issues of the reception of immigrants by their 'host' countries, towards more important problems of living together with people of 'different' cultural, religious and social affiliations . More than ever before, the world is a melting pot of different cultures and thus we are confronted with the theme of how to survive with the 'other', or those perceived as others, without seeing them as a threat or danger. The problem of xenophobia and racis m ( which is not limited to Europe) in the last decades after the horrors of colonialism and fascism raises a crucial question about the relationships between communities of different `race', religion and culture. The `us' and 'them' differentiation — camouflaged in various discourses: 'ethnic' (a soft word for `racial'), 'religious', but mainly cultural terms — is marked by a strong degree of xenophobia, fear and racism . Technological and communicative revolutions, economic and political upheavals, such as de industrialization, unemployment, poverty and the mass displacement of populations are all factors that have 'once again invited many to find in populist ultranationalism. racism, and authoritarianism, reassurance and a variety of certainty that can answer radical doubts and anxieties over self-hood, being, and belonging ' (Gilroy, 2000: 155).

OUR AFFIRMATIVE IS AN EMBRACE OF INFINITE HOSPITALITY TO THE OTHER. THERE IS DANGER SURROUNDING GIVING FULL ACCESS TO NONCITIZENS, AND WE INVITE IT ANYWAYS. THE STATUS QUO’S PLACING OF CONDITIONS ON HOSPITALITY, THIS INSPIRES NATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE OVER THE OTHER. OUR INFINITE HOSPITALITY TOWARD THE OTHER INTERRUPTS THESE ATTEMPTS AT MASTERY AND CREATES A NEW POSSIBILITY FOR ETHICS.

MOLZ AND GIBSON IN 2007 [Jennie, asst prof of sociology, college of Holy Cross, and Sarah, lecturer in cultural studies at University of Surrey, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __8-10__]

The metaphor of hospitality structures contemporary debates on nationalism, migration, multiculturalism, and asylum. Who feels at home within the nation? Who is excluded or fails to feel at home in the nation? Is a host necessarily a citizen of the host


nation-state? Why are immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers imagined as guests of the host nation-state? These are important questions for understanding the metaphors of hospitality and the home in contemporary debates on national identity and citizenship (see Kelly 2006). Hospitality is intimately connected to nationalism where crossing the border into the nation (whether as an immigrant or as a tourist is dependent upon national definitions of what counts as hospitality, and the figure towards whom hospitality is offered and received (Rosello, 2001, viii). In the context of debates on nationalism and immigration, discourses of hospitality work to blur 'the distinction between a discourse of rights and a discourse of generosity, the language of social contracts and the language of excess and gift-giving' (Rosello (2001: 9). In these debates, the Kantian cosmopolitan right to ùniversal hospitality' is in tension with the sovereignty of the nation-state (see Benhabib, 2004, 2005). In studies of migration, multiculturalism and postcolonialism, the metaphor of hospitality is frequently invoked (Ahmed, 2000, 2004; Rosello, 2001; Hage, 2002, 2003; Chan, 2005; Still, 2006). But this metaphor of hospitality is a dead metaphor (Rosello, 2001: 3) since such studies employ the metaphor of 'hospitality' precisely to reveal the hostility present within such policies of managing diversity within the ̀ host nation'. In constructing `the immigrant as guest' (Rosello, 2001), the host nation excludes the immigrant from feeling at home in the nation. This opposition between host/guest, native/stranger maintains the line between power/powerlessness, ownership/dispossession, stability/nomadism (Rosello, 2001: 18). Such a rhetoric of hospitality is ideological as it enables `some people to have fantasies of control' (Hage, 2002: 165; see Gibson, this volume) in the power to host and welcome. Similarly multicultural national imaginaries which often employ the metaphor of hospitality are revealed to be, in fact, 'not very hospitable' (Ahmed, 2000: 190) as they continue to position 'the natives' as hosts who decide which guests/ strangers will or will not be welcomed. Discourses of multiculturalism involve the contradictory processes of ìncorporation and expulsion' (Ahmed, 2000: 97) or an ìnclusive exclusion' (Laachir this volume). The guests/strangers in such a narrative of multiculturalism are consequently placed under a 'debt of hospitality' (Chan, 2005: 21) to the host nation . Such uses of the metaphor of hospitality in studies of migration and multiculturalism similarly ignore the historical social relations of colonialism, which involved the transformation of guests into hosts (Ahmed, 2000: 190). Whether the host nation welcomes, expels, or deters the stranger these responses to the other are all premised on the same power relation. It is the native who is empowered to feel at home and to assume the position of the host. If the immigrant is imagined as `the guest,' the 'host nation' maintains its historical position of power and privilege in determining who is or is not welcome to enter the country, but also under what conditions of entry. Hospitality, however, is not simply a question of crossing (or not) the border. The question today, Bauman argues, is how to live with strangers daily and permanently (1997: 55).The host nation, despite explicit evidence to its contrary, often imagines itself narcissistically as being hospitable. Derrida's distinction between a limited, conditional hospitality and an infinite, unconditional hospitality has been critically engaged with to puncture these narcissistic myths nations use to construct the current so-called problem of asylum (on Britain see Ahmed, 2004, and Gibson, 2003, 2006, and in this volume; on the Netherlands see Metselaar, 2005; on France see Rosello, 2001, and Still, 2004; on Australia see Kelly, 2006, Pugliese, 2002, and Schlunke, 2002; and on New Zealand see Worth, 2006). In such studies, the figure of the asylum seeker is constructed as `the uninvited' (Harding, 2000), where the nation- state imagines itself to be a 'reluctant host' (Joly and Cohen, 1989) who is unwilling to generously offer hospitality to such unwelcome and parasitical guests . The tension between the human right to asylum (which is ratified in international agreements) is often in contrast to the right of the nation-state to maintain control over its borders.While the metaphor ofhospitality in discourses of nationalism and immigration has empowered the native to assume the powerful position of the host, it is precisely this metaphor that needs to be deconstructed in order to conceive new ways of figuring the social relations between citizens, immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and nation- states. The metaphor of hospitality needs to be deconstructed in order to interrogate the different contexts in which it is deployed as a means of legitimating the power of some while disavowing the rights of others. If the immigrant is imagined as a guest (Rosello, 2001), the figure of the immigrant is conceived either negatively in anti- immigration discourses as a parasite or positively

in discourses of multiculturalism as a grateful guest. While the host-guest paradigm has been useful in theorizing social relations between strangers within studies of nationalism, immigration, and multiculturalism, rather than imagining the immigrant through the binary opposition of host/guest it is important to re-conceive the social relations that characterize the relationships between host and guest, citizen and immigrant. Hospitality is about the other questioning and interrupting the self, rather than reasserting the mastery of the self . Instead of rejecting the metaphor of hospitality, the contributors to this book take the opportunity to consider the promise of hospitality (see the chapters by Gibson, Kuntsman, Laachir, and Still in this volume) in reconfiguring social relations between strangers within studies of nationalism, immigration, and multiculturalism.A key point of intersection between the discourses we have just described is the way the concept of home is evoked in the ethics and politics of welcoming the other. National discourses of hospitality frame the nation-state as a 'home' that is open to (certain) foreigners, but whose borders must be protected; while in tourism, the notion of hospitality suggests a range of possible homes, including the cities and local places tourists visit, the homes of friends and family members who host travellers, or the hotel or resort that serves as the tourist's 'home-away-from-home'. Tourism and migration mobilities both imply a movement away from home, but also toward a new (permanent or temporary) home. For example, migration studies often `foreground acts of "homing"


and "re-grounding" which point towards the complex interrelation between travel and dwelling' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006: 10; and see Hage 1997 on 'migrant home-building' and Brah 1996 on diasporic 'homing desires'). The chapters in this book suggest that as much as hospitality is associated with mobility, it is equally concerned with stasis and rest (a place to eat, sleep, or recuperate). Indeed, hospitality occurs precisely at this intersection between travel and dwelling. To host or to be hosted are both forms of travelling-in-dwelling and dwelling-in-travelling where the mobilities of guests, travellers and foreigners intersect with hosts and homes.

OUR AFFIRMATIVE IS AN EXTENSION OF INFINITE HOSPITALITY TO THE OTHER THAT CHALLENGES THE WAY THAT STATES ONLY RELATE POSITIVELY TO ITS OWN CITIZENS. THIS SEEMINGLY IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE ALLOWS A NEW MODEL OF LIVING WITH DIFFERENCEMOLZ AND GIBSON IN 2007 [Jennie, asst prof of sociology, college of Holy Cross, and Sarah, lecturer in cultural studies at University of Surrey, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __4-5__]Because several of the chapters in this collection engage directly with Derrida's work on hospitality, we want to take a moment here to outline Derrida's critique of Kant's universal hospitality and to reflect on Derrida's contribution to our understanding of hospitality as a framework for thinking about the ethics of social relations in a mobile world. Derrida explains that because Kant's notion of hospitality relies on conditions of reciprocity, duties and obligations between people and nation- states it delimits rather than opens up borders and possibilities. Derrida admonishes that Kant's hospitality is 'only juridical and political: it grants only the right of temporary sojourn and not the right of residence; it concerns only the citizens of States' (Derrida, 1999: 87). In contrast, Derrida draws a distinction 'between an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or apolitics of hospitality ' (Derrida, 1999: 19), seeing Kant's formulation of hospitality as a politics of conditional hospitality as opposed to an ethics of infinite, unconditional and absolute hospitality (Gibson, 2003). The laws of hospitality place a series of conditions upon the welcoming of others, but the law of hospitality — hospitality as an ethics — 'tells us or invites us, or gives us the order or injunction to welcome anyone, any other one, without checking at the border ' (Derrida and Duttmann, 1997: 8).What Derrida encourages us to think about is a hospitality that is infinite, absolute and completely open — a welcoming of the other and regardless of who that other is, regardless of the potential dangers and risks involved. An ethics of hospitality entails opening one's borders or doors to anyone, acting beyond our own self-interest. It is not an easy thing to imagine, and indeed Derrida is fully aware of this difficulty. As Gibson observes:Absolute hospitality is impossible as it undermines the very condition of a nation or state, which is constituted through the erection of frontiers and borders. Absolute hospitality requires the "generosity" of the state even as the ethical notion of absolute hospitality goes beyond any frontier or border of the state (2003: 374-375). Absolute hospitality is impossible for the nation-state, and equally aporetic in the case of interpersonal exchanges of hospitality, for in welcoming the foreigner unconditionally, the host must relinquish the mastery of his or her home which is the condition of being able to offer hospitality in the first place. In other words, absolute hospitality requires us to go beyond, even beyond the very conditions that enable a state or a person to offer hospitality at all. Derrida is concerned with the difficulty in thinking through these two supplementary meanings of hospitality as an ethics and as a politics.If the two meanings of hospitality remain mutually irreducible, it is always in the name pure and hyberbolic hospitality that it is necessary, in order to render it as effective as possible, to invent the best arrangements [dispositions], the least bad conditions, the most just legislation. This is necessary to avoid the perverse effects of an unlimited hospitality whose risks I tried to define. This is the double law of hospitality: to calculate the risks, yes, but without closing the door on the incalculable, that is, on the future and the foreigner (Derrida and Duttmann, 2005: 6). His concern is not to reconcile the politics of hospitality with an ethics of hospitality, but rather to extend a provocative challenge that speaks to the politics of self-other relations and draws out a model for living with difference .

OUR POLITICS IS PART OF A CONSTANT ONGOING ATTEMPT AT INSTITUTING A TRUE DEMOCRATIC TREATMENT OF THE OTHER. OUR PLAN ALLOWS A GLIMPSE OF EMBRACE TOWARD NONCITIZENS WHICH MAKES POSSIBLE A MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICSLAACHIR IN 2007 [Karima, lecturer in cultural theory at university of Birmingham, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __188-189__]

Derrida introduces the absolute irreducibility between the ethics of unconditional hospitality, which is based on the absolute welcome of the Other without any restrictions, and the politics of conditional hospitality, which is based on the restrictions of law making . Even though the hiatus between the ethics (the law) of hospitality and the politics (the laws) of hospitality exists, the two cannot exist separately. This aporia does not mean paralysis, but in fact, it means the primacy of the ethics of hospitality over politics, and thus, keeping alive the danger of hostility in the making of the politics of hospitality by 'political invention' that respects the uniqueness of the other every time a decision is taken .Derrida stresses that neither hospitality nor ethics can exist without politics or democracy and vice versa. Democracy, like hospitality is


marked by the same aporia between the law and the laws, between incalculation, unconditionality and calculability, conditionality. Derrida suggests the idea of democracy-to-come that would free the interpretation of the concept of equality from its `phallogocentric schema of fraternity', which has dominated Western democracies. The concept of fraternization has played an important role in the history of the formation of political discourse in Europe, especially in France. Such a democracy would be 'a matter of thinking alterity without hierarchical difference' (Derrida, 1997a: 232). Democracyto-come has the character of 'the incalculable', like that of unconditional hospitality, but its incalculability, that resists 'fraternization', or the tribal and the national, allows the calculability of politicization and thus ameliorates the existing democracy. It is an opening of democracy beyond the juridical and towards a space where the juridical and the ethical can intersect, where the law and laws of hospitality could uncomfortably and paradoxically cohabit. It is a form of 'providing constant pressure on the state, a pressure of emancipatory intent aiming at its infinite amelioration, the perfectibility of politics, the endless betterment of actually existing democracy' (Critchley, 1999: 281).If post-war immigrants in Europe were considered for a long time as a temporary foreign labour force and thus had to be kept outside political and social affairs, the most recent realization of their settlement in the host countries has given rise to a 'sociological approach' that still grants them a marginal place in society. The immigrants and their descendants are used to 'strengthen' the coherence of the main community and thus reinforce the dialectic of proximity and distance, which situates the immigrants and their descendants (who are European citizens) in a position of social foreignness and territorial exteriority. Moreover, the cultural specificity of Europe's postcolonial diaspora has been constructed in terms of the 'double culture', that is, a culture that cannot integrate with the European one (especially Muslim cultures) because of their irreducible differences. The emergence of Islam in the public sphere has made Islamic rituals visible and thus has raised the idea of its incompatibility with Europe's 'secular' values. Therefore, hospitality is not only marked by the `autochthonous', the 'familial' and the national that exclude other, but it is also marked by the legacy of colonialism with its hierarchical and racist subordination of other cultures and people. Descendants of postcolonial migrants still carry the image of the ex-colonial 'immigrant' with its violent colonial residue that relegates them to the margins of society on the basis of their 'cultural', `ethnic', 'religious' and social affiliations that are sometimes deemed incompatible with European values. The history of post-war migration to Europe must not be limited to the crude economic perspective (Europe's need of a labour force after the Second World War) because that denies the historical complexity of colonialism and postcolonialism. The history of immigration is part of the imperial history of Europe. With their mixed origins and cultures, descendants of post-war immigrants can resist monolithic representations of cultures and histories and can suggest new alliances and solidarity that transcend skin colour and thus open hospitality beyond nationalistic and ethnic determinism.

UR AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT CONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY. WE ARE ETHICAL BECAUSE WE INVITE THE OTHER INTO THE HOME WITH INFINITE HOSPITALITYLAACHIR IN 2007 [Karima, lecturer in cultural theory at university of Birmingham, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __178-179__]

This chapter engages with Derrida's critique of the concept of hospitality in Western philosophy and culture, which he defines as being a conditional hospitality, a hospitality of invitation and not visitation. You invite someone to your country, to your house and you set the rules for that invitation. In that sense, your welcome of the other remains limited by law and jurisdiction. This type of hospitality, according to Derrida, does not interrupt the mastery of the host over his/her home or national space, quite the opposite; it is a reassertion of that mastery. Unconditional hospitality, on the other hand, is about allowing the self to be interrupted or questioned by the welcome of the other, that is, to welcome the other without setting restrictions or limitations. My question is how can we use Derrida's idea of the intervention of unconditional hospitality or ethics in the making of conditional hospitality or politics at a time when hospitality is marked by closure and fear, especially in France, his 'home' country? I examine the way hospitality is marked by an 'inclusive exclusion' of Europe's postcolonial settlers, who are still perceived as aliens with no links to their host country and who are viewed as a threat to the uniformity and integrity of the nation. I argue that the attempt to fix the social, economic and cultural mobility of these diverse postcolonial diasporic communities is a manifestation of the perpetuation of colonial culture that still preserves the same power structures that existed in the colonies.

CONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY IS A GESTURE THAT MAINTAINS CONTROL OVER THE OTHER. UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY INTERRUPTS THIS.MOLZ AND GIBSON IN 2007 [Jennie, asst prof of sociology, college of Holy Cross, and Sarah, lecturer in cultural studies at University of Surrey, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __5-6__]


As critics working especially in the area of migration and multiculturalism remind us, our official and informal policies toward welcoming the other for the most part fall far short of Derrida's ideal of absolute hospitality (see Gibson in this volume). While we might find in political and popular rhetoric gestures toward multiculturalist tolerance and metaphors of generous hospitality surrounding the reception of migrants, these discourses often serve to reiterate a specific power relation between the self and the other . As Yegenoglu (2003) notes, 'far from laying the grounds for an interruption of sovereign identity of the self, multiculturalist respect and tolerance implies the conditional welcoming of the guest within the prescribed limits of the law and hence implies a reassertion of mastery over the national space' (16). In other words, hospitality tends to reassert the identity and belonging-ness of the host against the movement, shifting, unstable, un-belonging- ness of the guest . But in Derrida's deconstruction of hospitality, the binary opposition between host and guest unravels:The h&c' who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hóte (the guest), the welcoming h&c, who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hóte received in his own home. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he receives it from his own home — which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hôte as host is a guest (Derrida, 1999: 41). Like Derrida, we want to destabilize hospitality as a paradigm and 'host' and ̀ guest' as distinct categories, by 'mobilizing hospitality' — by opening it up and by questioning its closures, by examining the nuanced fluidity of categories such as host and guest , and by disassociating stasis with hosts/homes and movement with guests/travel. We take as our starting point the mobilities of tourism and migration, which are generating new patterns of circulation, intersection and proximity between strangers . The chapters in this book bring debates around voluntary and obligatory mobilities into conversation by examining the politics of travelling and staying still and by interrogating the ethical responses to mobile others who are more or less invited, more or less welcome. >

CURRENT WESTERN HOSPITALITY IS MARKED BY PATERNALISTIC CONTROL. OUR HOSPITALITY THROWS THAT NTO QUESTION. WE INTERVENE IN THE NAME OF THE UNCONDITIONAL. WE SHOULD REFUSE RISK MANAGEMENT POLITICS BECAUSE IT IS THE CONTROL OF THESE CALCULATIONS THAT CLOSES US OFF TO THE BORDERS. WE MUST HOLD OPEN A SPACE FOR THE INCALCULABLE OTHER.LAACHIR IN 2007 [Karima, lecturer in cultural theory at university of Birmingham, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p __182-183__]

According to Derrida, hospitality in the 'Western' tradition is marked by the paternal and the phallogocentric, or by the logic of the master/host, nation, the door or the threshold. His critique calls into question the limitations of this specifically ̀European' history of hospitality and suggests a future beyond this history, and thus a hospitality beyond the logic of 'paternity' (and its extension to the nation) or the logos. This does not mean that nation states should open their borders unconditionally to any 'new' comer or that they should go beyond their national interests to 'welcome' the other . In fact, Derrida's critique is a call to resist the tyranny of the state and its law making while opening up democratic institutions beyond a certain patriotic reductionism. That is what Derrida calls his 'New International', a rebellion against patriotism: 'compatriots of every country, translator-poets rebel against patriotism' (1997a: 57). Hospitality lives on the paradox of presupposing a nation, a home, a door for it to happen but once one establishes a threshold, a door or a nation, hospitality ceases to happen and becomes hostility (Derrida, 2001: 6). Therefore, hospitality is marked by a double bind and its impossibility is the condition of its possibility. It stays on the threshold that keeps it alive and open to new-corners. The distinction introduced in Derrida's works between, on the one hand, unconditional hospitality or 'absolute desire for hospitality' and on the other, conditional hospitality or the rights and duties that condition hospitality Ca law, a conditional ethics, a politics') is not a distinction that 'paralyses' hospitality . In fact, it aims at directing our attention to find an 'intermediate schema' between the two, 'a radical heterogeneity, but also indissociability' in the sense of calling for the other or prescribing the other. To keep alive the aporia between ethics (the law of hospitality) and politics (the laws of hospitality) is to keep political laws and regulations open to new changes and circumstances and to keep alive the fact that hospitality is always inhabited by hostility. It is the question of intervening in the conditional hospitality in the name of the unconditional, an intervention that, though surrounded by contradictions and aporias, recognizes the need of 'perverting' the laws for the sake of 'perfecting' them. Derrida stresses the aporetic relationship between the unconditional hospitality or ethics, which starts with risks, and


the conditional hospitality or politics that starts with the calculation or controlling of these risks. However, if this calculation means the closure of all boundaries, not only territorial but also cultural, social and linguistic, this would mean the death of the nation. If the other by definition is incalculable, political calculations have to include a margin for the incalculable . In other words, Derrida (1997a: 13) refuses to close down hospitality to the logic of 'paternity' and (its extension the nation) or the logos because hospitality is the anti-logic of the logos, that is, of closure and determinism.

OUR HOSPITALITY CANNOT BE CALCULATED – IT IS INFINITELY RELATABLE TO THE OTHERLAACHIR IN 2007 [Karima, lecturer in cultural theory at university of Birmingham, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p _180-181___]

Kant's universal hospitality as a condition for world peace does not leave any space for any form of ethical consideration as it is solely based on the 'legal' or the juridical . In light of this, Derrida (2001: 22) accuses Kant of restricting hospitality to sovereignty, as he defines it as a law: 'Hospitality signifies here the public nature (publicite) of public space, as it is always the case for the juridical in the Kantian sense; hospitality is dependent on and is controlled by the law and the state police'. Kant limits universal hospitality to a number of juridical and political conditions (it is first limited only to citizens of states, it is only temporary, and so on) which, though institutional, are based on a common 'natural right' of the possession of surface of the earth . Unlike Kant, Emmanuel Levinas introduces the disjunction between the host and the guest, the host becoming the guest of the guest in his/her own home as the home of the other, that is, to be welcomed by the face of the other that one intends to welcome . In Totalite et Infini, Levinas (1961) criticizes the 'tyranny of the state' when hospitality becomes part of the state or becomes political because even though this becoming political is a response to the call of the third and a response to an 'aspiration', it still deforms the I and the other and thus introduces 'tyrannical violence'. Politics, therefore, should not be left on its own, because in Levinas's words 'it judges them [the I and the other who have given rise it] according to universal rules, and thus as [being] in absentia' .4 In other words, the political renders the face invisible at the moment of bringing it into the space of public phenomenality. In Adieu To Emmanuel Levinas (1999a: 21), Derrida reflects on Levinas' Totalite et Infini, which he perceives as 'an immense treatise of hospitality'. In this treatise, Levinas insists that the face that must be welcomed, must not be reduced to `thematization' (thematization) or description, and neither must hospitality. The face refers to the infinite alterity of the other who is free from any theme and who cannot be described. In other words, the other cannot be possessed or mastered. Hospitality, therefore, is opposed to thematization because it is the welcoming of the other who cannot be calculated or known, that is, the other is infinite and 'withdraws from the theme ' (Derrida, 1999a: 23). Welcoming or receiving in the Levinasian sense implies the act of receiving as an ethical relation. Thus, the welcome to come presupposes `recollection' (le recueillement) or the 'the intimacy of the at-home-with-oneself'. He claims that the 'at-home-with-oneself does not mean to close oneself off, but rather is a 'desire' towards the transcendence of the other (Derrida, 1999a: 92). Therefore, Levinas recognizes that there can be no welcome of the other or hospitality without this radical alterity which in turn presupposes 'infinite separation'. Thus, 'the athome-with-oneself would thus no longer be a sort of nature or rootedness but a response to a wandering, the phenomenon of wandering it brings to a halt' ( Derrida, 1999a: 92). Levinas suggests a theory of respecting the other instead of 'mastering' him/her; that is, a theory of desire that bases itself on infinite separation instead of negation and assimilation.' Levinas attempts to change the conventional tradition of the relation to alterity as an appropriation of the same in its totality to a different mode of relation based on respect of the infinity and heterogeneity of the other. Hospitality in the Levinasian sense also presupposes feminine alterity. 6 Hospitality comes before or precedes property and thus its law dictates that the host who welcomes the invited or received guest is in truth a guest received in his own home. It is this absolute precedence of the welcome where the master of the house is already a received h&c' (host) or a guest in his own home, that would be called `feminine alterity' (Talterit6 feminine'). The pervertible or perverting nature of the law of hospitality implies that absolute hospitality should break with hospitality as a pact or a right or duty, as the former means the welcoming not only of the foreigner but of the absolute, unknown other. What is needed today in comparing Kant and Levinas, and with regard to the right of refuge in a world of millions of displaced people, Derrida argues (1999a: 101), is to 'call out for another international law, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that effectively operates beyond the interests of the Nation-States.'

OUR AFFIRMATIVE INVIGORATES A POLITICS NOT BASED ON DESPAIR OR INJURY, BUT HOPE.MOLZ AND GIBSON IN 2007 [Jennie, asst prof of sociology, college of Holy Cross, and Sarah, lecturer in cultural studies at University of Surrey, Mobilizing Hospitality, isbn: 9780754670155, p _15___

The metaphor of mooring moves us in this direction, suggesting as it does the notion of safe harbour, but also the possibility of (re)launching our journey. For Ghassan Hage (2002, 2003) hospitality is intertwined with hope:[W]hat we are talking about


when it comes to discussing hospitality towards asylum seekers, or compensation for the colonised indigenous people of the world, or compassion towards the chronically unemployed [is]: the availability, the circulation and the exchange of hope. Compassion, hospitality and the recognition of oppression are all about giving hope to marginalised people (2003: 9).Thus, hospitality is not just about the gift of repose, but also about the gift of hope. Making the guest feel at home is not just about seeing to his or her physical comfort or embodied needs (though these are certainly important); it is also about instilling the guest with a feeling of hope and a sense of being 'propelled' forward (Hage, 2005). As Hage has eloquently argued. hospitality provides not only a place to be safely still, but also the hope of moving:For what is security if it isn't the capacity to move confidently? And what is 'home' if not the ground that allows such a confident form of mobility [... ]. A home has to be both closed enough to offer shelter and open enough to allow for this capacity to perceive what the world has to offer and to provide us with enough energy to go and seek it (2003: 28.) In other words, hospitality mobilizes the guest. Hospitality, home and hope are all intricately inscribed upon one another as the gift of staying still and moving forward.

We should extend hospitality to stop oppression

Fasching 95 1995 (Darrell J. Fasching, “Response to Peter Haas,” The Ellul Forum, January) KD

Finally, let me say that I have little patience for the argument that narratives of hospitality

andhuman dignity (for after all, to offer hospitality to the stranger is to recognize the dignity of precisely theone who does not

share my story) are exclusively Western and a form of liberal Western imperialism through which we are trying to impose our morality on other societies. First of all, in The Ethical Challenge, I show that Buddhism is the bearer of the tradition of hospitality to the stranger and human dignity in Asia (i.e., welcoming the outcast) in much the same way that Judaism is in the West But secondly, wherever you go around the world it is not the persecuted and oppressed who are say ing that the ethics of human dignity and human rights are a form of cultural imperialism . On the contrary, this is an argument you find promoted by those in power who are doing the persecuting and oppressing . I see no reason why I should be co-opted by that shoddy little game

into legitimating the suffering imposed on my brothers and sisters in every culture around the world. Our ethical task is to unmask the bad faith of all such ideologies that legitimate violence under the guise of cultural diversity.


Should Provide Aid

Our obligation to the other extends to addressing material miseryVan Der Merwe, professor of philosophy at Stellenbosch, 2006W.L. van der Merwe, professor of philosophy at University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, “The Ethics of Responsibility”, http://hdl.handle.net/10019/49

“The other concerns me in all his material misery. It is a matter, eventually, of nourishing him, of clothing him”, says Levinas (2001: 52). In the same vein his notion of substitution aims to disclose our capacity to feel the other’s pain in our own flesh (Levinas 1981: 117). In fact, one’s responsibility for the other can be likened to one’s devotion to oneself (Levinas 1989b: 83). Levinas’s understanding of “ethics” does not provide for responsibility as a psychological event theorisation remains in order to solve moral and practical problems. The other person is both the ethical other and the political third (Levinas 1981: 160), and it is the presence of the third that necessitates justice, knowledge, equality, politics, and so forth, for decisions need to be made as to how responsibility has to be divided and fulfilled. The third therefore enables a respite from infinite responsibility and includes the I in an equality and a reciprocity.


Should Support “The Other”

Responsibility to Other is a prerequisite to making other moral systems humane. Failure to ground other ethical or ontological theories in this encounter makes genocide inevitableGrob 99 Leonard Grob, Professor of Philosophy at Farleigh Dickinson University, 99, Ethics After the Holocaust, p. 8-11This face-to-face encounter is thus no cognitive event. As we have seen, I cannot know the Other as Other without diminishing his or her otherness. I can , however, e ncounter that Other in what Levinas terms an ethical even t . Indeed, it is only with the rending of the ontological schema that ethics first becomes possible. Prior to my meeting with the Other, there is no ethics as such. Within the totality of being, I am limited in my egoist ambition only by a lack of power. The Other who meets me face-to-face challenges my very right to exercise power. In so doing, ethics is born . Cognition no longer represents the highest activity of which a human is capable; it is replaced by "revelation" of the Other as an ethical event in which, for the first time, I come to realize the arbitrariness of my egoist ambitions. The thematizing of the cognitive subject is replaced by nothing short of an act of witness on the part of a being who now becomes an ethical subject. The Other who contests me is an Other truly independent of my appropriative powers and thus one to whom I can have, for the first time, ethical obligations. As Levinas puts it, this Other is the first being whom I can wish to murder. Before the totality is rent by the manifestation of the face, there can be no will to act immorally, as there can be no will to act morally, in any ultimate sense of that word. If one begins with the "imperial I" appropriating its world, ethics as such can never be founded. The other with whom I interact is simply a datum, an aspect of my universe. Morality makes its first appearance when I confront the Other who is truly Other. Although the Other appears to me now, on principle, as someone I could wish to kill, he or she in fact summons me to respond with nonviolence : I am called to willingly renounce my power to act immorally. What I hear from the Other, Levinas claims, are the words "Thou shalt not kill." Harkening to this injunction constitutes my inaugural act as an ethical being. In Levinas's words, "Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent." Addressing the face of the Other I become ethical. In a turnabout from what has been the norm in the history of Western thought, ethics now is seen, by Levinas, to constitute the essence of philosophy. Ethics is now "first philosophy," a position usurped until now by the ontological enterprise. The meeting with the Other-who-is-truly-Other is a primordial event: "Since the Other looks at me," Levinas exclaims, "I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard " In encountering the Other, I assume responsibility for him. "Responsibility," Levinas proclaims, "is the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity.... Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical relationship."'" In other words, my structure as a human being, in any significant sense of that word, is to be responsible to the Other . My personhood is not to be identified with that of the solitary ego appropriating its world; it is rather a personhood fundamentally oriented toward the Other. Ethics, for Levinas, is thus not to be identified with any ethical or even meta-ethical position. Levinas speaks neither as deontologist nor consequentialist. He does not attempt to articulate any list of rights or obligations , or even the principles on which the latter would be based. All ethical theories, he implies, are secondary to, or derivative from, a primordial or founding moment: the encounter with the face of the Other . It is this moment-of-all-moments which institutes the very possibility of the "ethical" systems so hotly debated within the history of Western thought. Before there can be any ethical positioning—before there can be discussions of virtue, happiness, duties—there is the meeting with the Other . Ethics is no set of directives; rather, in Levinas's words, “Already of itself ethics is an 'optics,'” a way of seeing which precedes—and founds—all that has heretofore been identified as ethical philosophy. The import of this notion of the primacy of ethics for a rethinking of philosophy in the post-Holocaust age cannot be emphasized strongly enough. For Levinas, philosophy-as-ontology reveals being as nothing short of "war": The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality which


dominates Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers offerees that command them unbeknown to themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality. Individuals within the "being" constructed by philosophers are merely creatures of the schematizing mind. Such a concept of philosophy is ill-equipped to address the great ethical issues which arise in the study of the Holocaust. Indeed, for Levinas, "War is not only one of the ordeals—the greatest—of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory." Within the terms of warfare, lying, stealing—even killing—lose whatever ethical import they might have. I simply engage in these acts as "necessary" within the universe created by war. If the being studied by traditional philosophy is conceived of as war, morality loses its core meaning. Not only is no fundamental ethical critique of the events of the Holocaust possible within the terms of philosophy-as-ontology, but, as I have noted above, it can be argued that the mode of appropriative thinking of philosophers in our Western tradition has contributed to the creation of a climate in which genocide can flourish. If , in ontological terms, individual beings are said to have their meaning solely within the totality in which they find themselves, totalizing thinking may well become totalitarian. Jews and other victims of Nazi oppression were dehumanized precisely by being viewed in terms of racial categories applied to them as a whole. If philosophy is a mere egology, as Levinas claims, the totalizing cognitive subject can, at the far end of a continuum, be seen to pass over into the autocratic "I" of the leaders of the Third Reich. In contrast to that appropriative thinking which can lead to the brutal dehumanization of the kind present in war, the face-to-face relationship is a pacific one. It is a relationship which establishes a peace which is no mere truce, no temporary cessation of inevitable hostilities. For traditional philosophy, knowledge is power, a power capable of harnessing technology to evil ends. The absolute end of philosophy is its goal of achieving total mastery of being; it is thus not at all illogical to foresee a progression from conceptual to physical mastery of one's world. Once the locus of an "absolute" is placed in the powers of the "I," the other person cannot fail to become merely another datum in a world whose meaning derives itself entirely from me. Often I may treat her or him in terms of what in the West has been called "goodness." Yet such goodness, for Levinas, is accidental, the product of a determination on my part that it is in my self-interest to act in a given manner in a given situation. The fundamental reference point remains the "I." Goodness thus established, I argue, along with Levinas, is a goodness which is simply not good enough!

Acting in obligation to the other prior to acting for the self is essential to founding a basis for ethics.

Peter Jowers Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of the West of England. 2005 Trust, Risk, and Uncertainty. “Risk, Sensibility, Ethics and Justice in the Later Levinas” Pgs. 47-73

During the Rwandan massacres of 1997, Paul Rusesabagina, manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines in Kigali, repeatedly used a fax line which the Hutu leaders had forgotten to cut, vainly attempting to alert the White House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France and others to the horrors of the genocide there, knowing that if caught, he faced instant death. 'He would stay up until four in the morning - sending faxes, calling, ringing the whole world.' The church of Sainte Famille was just down the hill from the hotel. Later, Paul exclaimed, 'But you know, Sainte Famille also had a working phone line, and that priest Father Wenceslas, never used it. My goodness!' Asked why, he answered, 'That's a mystery ... Everyone could have done it.' Challenged during the period as to the incongruity of carrying a gun, Father Wenceslas replied, 'They've already killed fifty-nine priests; I don't want to be the sixtieth' (Gourevitch, 1998: 132-6). Anton Schmidt was a German soldier whose name came up in the course of the Adolf Eichmann trial. He helped Jewish partisans by supplying them with forged papers and trucks until apprehended and executed by the Germans. Hannah Arendt, noting the silence which descended on the court on hearing this tale, remarks, 'How utterly different everything would be today in this courtroom, in Israel, in Germany, in all of Europe, and perhaps in all countries of the world, if only


more such stories could have been told' (Arendt, cited in Bernstein, 2002: 259). Under these extreme conditions, of maximum uncertainty risking almost certain death, why did two men act on behalf of others rather than themselves? Why are we not prepared to risk hospitality in the form of asylum when we know that she whom we turn away risks death? Why do we not trust our instinct to help her? I examine Emmanuel Levinas’s contribution to these pressing questions and his contention that to act ethically is to be willing to go to the point of substituting one’s life, for strangers

The obligation to the other precedes alternate concerns.Peter Jowers Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of the West of England. 2005 Trust, Risk, and Uncertainty. “Risk, Sensibility, Ethics and Justice in the Later Levinas” Pgs. 47-73

We cannot refuse responsibility to the Other in this sensible dimension. Levinas never ceases to hammer this point home. It is not an issue of conscious choice. For the moment let us imagine that he means that in proximity, one creature as minimal self necessarily responds to another. True to his phenomenological leanings, Levinas is concerned with first-person experience. Proximity is conceived as the self's experience as 'mine'. I am called into question. My enjoyment is traumatically blown apart. I alone am responsible. As only a little more than sensate creature, I am passive, my responsibility is affective not cognitive, I have no choice in the matter and do not seek reciprocity, exchange or return care. The space between creatures is asymmetrical, curved. The Other, my 'neighbour' or the stranger, and so forth, is 'higher', and as my ethical master as teacher, is inspirational and holy in the sense that as infinite, unknowable, non reducible, she opens out onto the infinite beyond totality, beyond or otherwise than any cognized being (OR: 63).6

Levinas is driving at a form of encounter between human beings prior to consciousness which, through proximity, 'is the implication of approaching one in fraternity'. Response to the Other's subjectivity as self, is 'prior to consciousness, but via sensibility one is caught up with him in fraternity [sic]' (OR: 82-3). Proximity arises neither from the 'the troubled tranquillity' of a sovereign ego which wants to be left alone, nor is it merely an intersection of random affective flows, nor 'the makeshift of an impossible confusion'. The once ego now become self and now 'almost' creature is exposed. This is the minimal point at which proximity, the opening of one to the Other, occurs. Here, or then, the self is open, vulnerable, restless, decentred and metaphorically naked, without defence. Not all the metaphors are negative. Proximity might be regarded as 'better than all the rest’ or other momnts, it might be the ‘plentitude of an instant arrested’ (OB: 92).

The relationship to the other is the most important ethical encounter – even in the presence of another we must not abandon the other.Peter Jowers Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of the West of England. 2005 Trust, Risk, and Uncertainty. “Risk, Sensibility, Ethics and Justice in the Later Levinas” Pgs. 47-73

Justice stems from the entry of the third party. All questioning and consciousness, and hence philosophy, stems from the incipient realization in any proximity there is, implied, in another. Paying attention, being taken hostage by the Other, excludes the possibility at the same relation with another at the same time. Her suffering might be more urgent! We do her an injustice, but to turn from our neighbor, from the immediacy of the present encounter, would also be to commit a crime. We are


trapped in debt we have not chosen, but which we have incurred. The responsibility to the Other is an immediacy antecedent to questions', but ills troubled, becomes a problem 1when a third party enters'. The entry of another or the scene perturbs the one-way relation from the self to the Other; my responsibility to you. It introduces an experiential contradiction in the 'Saying'. Whom should we respond to? Why? At this point 'the limit of responsibility' is reached. The question is born. Levinas notes:Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling order, thematisatlon, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system arid thence also a Co presence on an equal footing as before a court of justice. (OR: 157)If the entry of the third party triggers the emergence of consciousness, it is one founded in proximity. Without proximity would be mere enjoyment and suffering, utterly egotistical and hence pointless, fatal, lonely and inhuman. The reversal of the ethical and ontological is to he found in these simple lines.

Levinas is careful to specify that the entry of the third is not necessarily empirically present, the 'other is from the first, the brother [sic] of all other men' (08: 157). Sensibility prior to cognition must contain an inherent movement beyond itself, in the direction of consciousness as transition towards proto-abstractive abilities if that thesis can be sustained. Levinas's logic at this point is extremely opaque when he argues that weighing, thought, objectification' depends on a decree which betrays the Illeity of the Other (OR: 158). lllelty understood in one way is the sheer sensed presence, the himness [sic] of the Others presence, prior to arty demanding of shibholeths, identification as one of mine or theirs, before all questions, before language as the said, before any discernment as benign stranger or malevolent alien. The absurdity of traumatised asylum-seekers having to resister their request within a few hours in a language and bureaucratic system they cannot understand sustains the more general point (Derrida, 2002a:' I cannot discuss here the 'gratingly patriarchal' (Sandford, 2002: 147) tone of Levinas's treatment, exclusion and subordination of the feminine nor the full complexities surrounding Illeity.

The emergence of justice betrays Illelty, it is a violence perpetrated on the one-for-another relationship of proximity, but simultaneously it opens a different relation to 'her', that of justice. I am now responsible to her, still not as understood as abstraction, but simultaneously as a member of society and as citizen, The betrayal has cooled the immediacy of proximity, but still informs it with its 'warmth'. The movement to abstraction, to questioning informed by the demand for justice, signals the origins (arcS) of society, legally secured rights and specified responsibilities or duties. The scales of justice as comparative weighing up of competing claims demand representation; the Saying becomes and must be fixed in the said as book. law and science. Philosophy's time has cone.

Derrida's beautiful Archive Fever is a profound meditation on this necessity and the dangers of ethical betrayal on the part of those with the authority (archons) who control access to and interpretation of the book as written law (Derrida, 1996). This 'violent' betrayal of ethical proximity necessarily persists. Ethics is entwined 'before' the law emerges. Betrayal occurs because, as conscious subjects, we become concerned with justice. As citizens we have become subject to, or always potentially capable of, being hauled 'before' the law. These themes are developed in Derrida's seminal essay 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" (1990).

Justice is given meaning because it is always entwined with and can draw breath from proximity. 'The one for the other of proximity is not a deforming abstraction. In it justice is shown from the first ... It is born from ... the one-for-the-other, signification' (08: 159). Proximity is the 'centre of gravitation' around which the edifice of being, the state, politics and techniques revolve. It is important that 'society' for Levirias does not mean our ethnos, ir notion, us'. The state is always 'on the verge of integrating into a we, which congeals both me and my neighbor (GB: 161). Thus, 'justice remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest' (OR: 139). There the guest has no responsibility. I only have it for and to her. Our hospitable laws should welcome her. The motif of the ethical encounter in I.evinas's late work has been explored. Its dependence on materiality and sensibility has been established. The creature as sensibility was distinguished from self and ego- An examination of saying, proximity, pain, worked towards understanding Levinas's conception of the psyche, singular responsibility and being for others. The source and point of justice were traced. The ethical encounter is one of


almost absolute risk. Few take it consciously. Is Levinas convincing when arguing that it happens to us all as sensate creatures? Was Levinas whistling in the wind, merely offering hope when lacing the appalling horrors of the age? Paul and Anton showed that some act both responsibly and consciously!


Our existence is inherently violent-we must address this by being for the other.Van Der Merwe, professor of philosophy at Stellenbosch, 2006W.L. van der Merwe, professor of philosophy at University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, “The Ethics of Responsibility”, http://hdl.handle.net/10019/49

As is clear from his interviews,6 Levinas (1985) is not unaware of the implications of the gravity which he affords ethics, but counters these by recounting that he lives and thinks in a wounded world.7 His philosophy is an attempt to give a voice to the unbear-able guilt experienced by the survivors — the survived victims of the Holocaust — at having survived (Peperzak 1995: 5). The focus of such a person is not his own innocence, but instead his implicit contribution to the fact that another, with one digit differing from his own serial number, did not make it. It is the shattered innocence of a human being who knows that his usurpation of the position of survivor could only have come about by denying an other a chance to life. The survived victim is the vivid symbol of all people — despite our own victimisation or innocence, we are responsible for our neighbour beyond choice or excuse. As Pascal stated in his Pensées, one’s “being in the world” or “place in the sun” is the beginning of usurpation of the whole earth (Levinas 1999: 130). Thus, one is violent and murderous toward all others whom one displaces by the simple act of taking up a place. And so it is not the suffering of the other per se that gives rise to the ethics of responsibility, but this capacity of the self both to harm and to “be-for” the other. As we have seen, this responsibility is already embedded in the “neutrality” of simply maintaining one’s own space and merely facing the other, being exposed to his alterity and infinity. Though the other may not actually be suffering, I discover myself in the nakedness of his face as one who can hurt him or simply choose to live only for myself. Not “being-for-the-other” results in hunger, poverty, and ultimately killing (Levinas 1985: 96-7). Hence, denying the humane within ourselves manifests these concrete examples of the “flesh of life” and ultimately points to a responsibility prior to any action or neglect on the part of the individual.

Levinas’s distinction between our suffering and the suffering of other is crucial-it’s crucial we take steps to alleviate the suffering of others

Edelglass, professor philosophy Colby, 2006William Edelglass, professor of philosophy at Colby College, 10/26/2006, “Levinas on Suffering and Compassion”, http://www.springerlink.com/content/r626p602m2r7kg02/ [Luke]

With the end of theodicy, the end of theories that subsume the singular suffering of the Other into systems of knowledge, Levinas finds a grounding for ethics in the compassionate exposure to the suffering Other. The end of theodicy poses the question of the value and truth of morality, the question which inspires much of Levinas's philosophy, if not his project as a whole. Echoing the well-known sentence that begins Totality and Infinity, in 'Useless Suffering' Levinas writes, 'The philosophical problem, then, that is posed by the useless pain that appears in its fundamental malignancy through the events of the twentieth century, concerns the meaning that religiosity, but also the human morality of goodness, can continue to have after the end of theodicy' (US99). With the end of theodicy, Levinas hears a commandment 'that now demands even more from the resources of the I in each one of us, and from its suffering inspired by the suffering of the other, from its compassion which is a non-useless suffering (or love), which is no longer suffering 'for nothing,' and immediately has meaning' (US 100).


In the 'ethical perspective of the interhuman' suffering can be meaningful when it is the compassionate suffering for the Other: 'In this perspective,' Levinas writes, 'there is a radical difference between the suffering in the other, where it is unforgivable to me, solicits me and calls me, and suffering in me, my own experience of suffering, whose constitutional or colagenital uselessness can take on a meaning, the only one of which suffering is capable, in becoming a suffering for the suffering (inexorable though it may be) of someone else' (US94). 15


Should Act on Ethics

Human survival requires acting with a conscious

Ketels, 1996[Violet, associate professor of English at Temple University, where she formerly directed the Intellectual Heritage Program, THE HOLOCAUST: REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE: "Havel to the Castle!" The Power of the Word, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1996, 548 Annals 45, Lexis]Even though, as Americans, we have not experienced "by fire, hunger and the sword" n19 the terrible disasters in war overtaking other human beings on their home ground, we know the consequences of human hospitality to evil. We know about human perfidy: the chasm that separates proclaiming virtue from acting decently. Even those of us trained to linguistic skepticism and the relativity of moral judgment can grasp the verity in the stark warning, "If something exists in one place, it will exist everywhere." n20 That the dreadful something warned against

continues to exist anywhere should fill us with an inextinguishable yearning to do something. Our impotence to action against the brutality of mass slaughter shames us. We have the historical record to ransack for precedent and corollaries--letters, documents, testaments, books--written words that would even "preserve their validity in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death." n21 The truths gleanable from the record of totalitarian barbarism cited in

them may be common knowledge; they are by no means commonly acknowledged. n22 They appear in print upon many a page; they have not yet--still not yet--sufficiently penetrated human consciousness. Herein lies the supreme lesson for intellectuals, those who have the projective power to grasp what is not yet evident to the general human consciousness : it is possible to bring down totalitarian regimes either by violence or by a gradual transformation of human consciousness; it is not possible to bring them down " if we ignore them , make excuses for them, yield to them or accept their way of playing the game" n23 in order to avoid violence. The history of the gentle revolutions of Poland, Hungary, and [*51] Czechoslovakia suggests that those revolutions would not have happened at all, and certainly not bloodlessly, without the moral engagement and political activism of intellectuals in those besieged cultures. Hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and peasants joined in the final efforts to defeat the totalitarian regimes that collapsed in 1989. Still, it was the intellectuals , during decades when they repeatedly risked careers, freedom, and their very lives, often in dangerous solitary challenges to power , who formed the unifying consensus, developed the liberating philosophy, wrote the rallying cries, framed the politics , mobilized the will and energies of disparate groups, and literally took to the streets to lead nonviolent protests that became revolutions. The most profound insights into this process that gradually penetrated social consciousness sufficiently to make revolution possible can be read in the role Vaclav Havel played before and during Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution. As

George Steiner reflects, while "the mystery of creative and analytic genius . . . is given to the very few," others can be "woken to its presence and exposed to its demands." n24 Havel possesses that

rare creative and analytic genius. We see it in the spaciousness of his moral vision for the future, distilled from the crucible of personal suffering and observation; in his poet's ability to translate both experience and vision into language that comes as close as possible to truth and survives translation across cultures; in the compelling force of his personal heroism. Characteristically, Havel raises local experience to universal relevance. "If today's planetary civilization has any hope of survival ," he begins, " that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit ." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves


with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet , without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then we must --as humanity, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility--somehow come to our senses. n25 Somehow we must come together in "a kind of general mobilization of human consciousness , of the human mind and spirit, human responsibility , human reason ."

The ethical and the political are not separated-politics is the ethical relationship between more than one Other. Infusing Levinasian ethics into politics will create a more ethical, less violent state.Simmons, associate prof social sciences ASU, 2003William Paul Simmons, associate professor of social sciences at Arizona State University, 2003, “An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought”

Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical relationship with the Other from justice which involves three or more people.2° The an-archical relationship with the Other is the pre-linguistic world of the saying. Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third, however, demands an explanation. "In its frankness it [language] refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other-.language is justice."2' In order to judge between Others, they must be co-present, or synchronous. Thus, the Third also opens up the world of knowledge and consciousness. "Here is the hour and birthplace of the question: a demand for justice! Here is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others; here is the hour of knowledge and, then, of the objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the nudity of the face; here is the hour of consciousness and intentionality."22Finally, the Third introduces the realm of politics. The ego's infinite respon-sibility must be extended to all humanity, no matter how far off. Ethics must be universalized and institutionalized to affect the others. "To the extent that someone else's Face brings us in relation with a third party, My metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We, and works toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality."

Before delving into the relationship between ethics and politics, several implications of Levinas's move from the Other to the Third need to be addressed. First, does the ego still have an infinite responsibility for the Other? In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines justice as "the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question?'24 However, in the same work, he also claims that "in no way is justice a degradation of obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic responsibility.us How can these conflicting statements be resolved? Either justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it does not. The contradiction is resolved by considering, once again, Levinas's theoretical emphasis on the separation between the saying and the said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both relation and separation. Neither can be reduced to the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite responsibility for the Other the ego remains infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible for the Other. This responsibility always maintains its potency. However, the ego is also invariably transported by the Third into the realm of the


said. The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not possible to respond infinitely to all Others. The original demand for an infinite responsibility remains, but it cannot be fulfilled. Ethics must be universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has already reneged on its responsibility for the Other. Thus, Levinas's peculiar formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent "Only justice can wipe it [ethical responsibility] away by bringing this giving-oneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating it by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, who are also my 'others,' but justice is already the first violence."

War is inevitable in the current utilitarian politics-the only escape from world war is embracing ethicsXiangchen, Professor of Philosophy at Fudan, 2008Sun Xiangchen, Professor of Philosophy at Fudan University, China, “Emmanuel Levinas and the Critique of Modern Political Philosophy” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121573478/HTMLSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

According to Hobbes's logic, there is initially a natural state of war. In order to escape violent death, people want to enter into political society, and finally morality is established to guarantee peace and stability within this political framework. This logic is opposed by Lévinas, who holds to a logic according to which we have no possibility of escaping war. For Lévinas, war is a normal state of the Western world, and the Second World War is the necessary result of the Western political tradition. We can even say that it resulted from traditional Western philosophy, which has a possessive orientation, as the extreme expression of the Western ontological tradition. Even in ancient Greece, Heraclitus had already held that being reveals itself as war.The modern world shows this tendency to war more strongly than ever, but the root of this tendency is still in the ancient ontological tradition, which pursues sameness and totality, implying some kind of violence. I think that this is the ultimate reason why Lévinas is prepared to struggle with the whole Western philosophical tradition. The defect of this tradition is not, as claimed by Heidegger, in the oblivion of Being, but is in the oblivion of the other, or rather, in the suppression of the other. Hegel seemed to pay more attention to the other than other philosophers in the Western tradition, but in fact what Hegel does is to transform the other into his own wholeness. Lévinas's position is totally different, opposing this tradition from Greece to Heidegger, including the Hegelian attitude to the other, by placing not ontology but ethics as first philosophy. From this point of view, he also opposes the structure of modern society by claiming that society should be based on the ethical and not the political. If politics is the basis of the whole society, Lévinas's question in the preface to Totality and Infinity, "whether we are not duped by morality"1 would be crucial. Because war, which is behind modern politics, suspends the strength of morality, Hobbes held that morality could be a cheat. For political reasons, the sovereign could even burn all the books of geometry, which Hobbes regards as the sole gift from God.2 Because this is precisely what Lévinas cannot accept, he must seek another foundation for society in order to limit the logic of politics and violence within politics. Lévinas wants to establish a prepolitical ethics, which can overturn the logic of war underlying the political. Lévinas thinks that modern political theory is based on individualism and calculation, by which modern society is built up. If so, there is no chance to avoid violence and war. From the viewpoint of Hobbes, there are only two kinds of peace: Cold peace, in which people are scared of each other and keep a terrible balance, and the peace of sovereignty, in which there is one sovereignty with the rest of the population as subjects. We can imagine that the background of this theory of peace is war. From Hobbes to utilitarianism, the inner logic of calculation is same. By this calculation, peace is temporary, utilitarian, and only the interval between wars.Regarding the question of whether the basis of society is political or ethical, Lévinas's answer is clear: It is definitely ethical. When Lévinas tries to resolve the tension between the political and


the ethical, he does not rest on the political, like modern philosophers. He seeks to justify a prepolitical ethical life-world to serve as the foundation of the political. This is what Lévinas has done in Totality and Infinity. He appeals to other resource of thought in the world, such as Jewish tradition, although he does not refer to it directly. He considers that the only real peace is a kind of messianic peace: Morality will oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself upon the ontology of war.3

The State is the beginning of all violence-not helping those who aren’t “its own” ignores responsibility for the other and is the root cause of all violence. Aronowicz, prof Judaism Franklin and Marshall, 2006Annette Aronowicz, professor of Judaic studies at Franklin and Marshall College, Summer 2006, “Levinas and Politics” http://66.102.1.104/scholar?q=cache:5L5lnjhcUSgJ:scholar.google.com/+levinas%2Bholocaust%2Bpolitics&hl=en

What remains after so much bloodshed and tears shed in the name of immortal principles is individual sacrifice, which, amidst the dialectical rebounds of justice and all its contradictory aboutfaces, without any hesitation finds a straight and sure way (1990: 29). Once again, we have a very violent reality, “the cruelty inherent in rational order (andperhaps simply in Order)” says Levinas (1990: 29). Countering this is the act of protection and mercy extended from one to the other. This is not to suggest that Levinas’ solution to the problem of violence lies simply in the individual’s act of responsibility. It is neither that simple nor that simplistic. In ‘Judaism and revolution’, a very complex commentary dealing with the relationship of the Jewish tradition and the State, Levinas makes clear that the State itself is responsible for guaranteeing conditions that permit for the fulfillment of the human (Levinas 1990: 99). Yet the State claims a universalism that is deceptive, for while it attempts to protect the individual person, it limits that protection to its own and thus divides the world into an ‘us and them’, quelling the responsibility of one to the other, beyond any distinctions whatsoever. The Jewish tradition’s universalism, on the other hand, does not recognize limits to responsibility for the other person. It thus introduces a wedge between the Jewish people and the State, for the latter cannot limit the responsibility of the former. As such, the Jewish tradition always signals a loyalty beyond the State, and propels political activity in two directions. The first is in the direction of care for the most vulnerable members within it, setting the standard by which the State offers guarantees against dehumanization (Levinas 1990: 99-100). The second is in refusing to identify the good with a particular State, thus preventing the State from turning into an object of idolatry. Levinas warns, however, that even arevolutionary movement whose aim is to overthrow a hopelessly corrupt government can turn into a mirror image of the violence it contests, dividing the world into us and them just as much. A revolution always risks the very thing it is opposing. This does not mean that revolution is never justified but once again, we are left, as our only recourse, vigilance against abuses, rather than a once and for all transformation: Revolutionary action is first of all the action of the isolated man who plans revolution not only in danger but also in the agony of conscience. In the agony of conscience that risks making revolution impossible: for it is not only a question of seizing the evil-doer but also of not making the innocent suffer (Levinas 1990:110).


This recognition of violence creates an infinite responsibility for us to push for justice regardless of the consequences.Smith, dept phil Berry, 03Dr. Michael Smith, Depts of Religion and Philosophy at Berry College, “Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics of Responsibility," Mike Ryan Lecture Series, Kennesaw State College, October 7, 2003 (http://www.kennesaw.edu/clubs/psa/pdfs/Smith_2003_PSA.pdf) (GENDER MODIFIED)

One of the most surprising aspects of Levinas’s ethics—perhaps “meta-ethics,” or better yet “proto-ethics,” would be a preferable term, since Levinas’s philosophical work is really a revamping of philosophy that replaces ontology by ethics: his “ethics” is not simply layered onto thinking-as-usual — one of the most surprising

aspects of this protoethics, then, is that there is no parity between my situation and yours from an ethical standpoint. You are always better than me. I am responsible, not only for my transgressions, but for yours as well! There are two aspects or stages of Levinas’s ethical thought: my relation to you (as if you were the only other person in the world) and my relation to you seen in relation to the other of you, my other. Your other may have conflicting claims, so that I am put in the position of comparing incomparables, to the extent that each person is a world. From the relation of me to my other, you, love is enough. To realize the intention of love in a broader sociality, justice is necessary. Justice, the harsh name of love, must realize love’s intentions, and in doing so may lose sight of its original intent, become alienated into a self-serving institution . This risk, in Levinas’s view, is one that must be taken. 8 Here Levinas seldom develops his thought along the lines of strict reasoning. One senses that the stays of being are relaxed and

we would have no possible means of directing our thought beyond this point without a certain “inspiration.” Knowledge is no longer sought after: it is inescapable. We are the “hostage” of the other. No discussion, even as brief a one

as this, can be complete without some mention of the face . This is a term that Levinas elevates to status of a philosopheme, a term endowed with a specific

philosophical role. The face does not refer to the plasticity of a visual form in Levinas, nor is it just the look of the other , since the face speaks in Levinas. It is perhaps the phenomenal basis, or as Levinas sometimes says, the “mise-enscène” or

theatrical “production” of the appearance of the person, and it is the way in which we may become aware of God. I quote: “ The face puts into question the sufficiency of my identity as an I, it compels me to an infinite responsibility.”4 It is by substitution for the other, or by taking on the fate of the other, that I embrace a responsibility for which I never signed up. Here Levinas diverges from the usual notion of responsibility, since the ethical meaning of responsibility is bound up with the notion of freedom. We are not to imagine that Levinas is involved in some sort of

Skinnerian “beyond freedom,” but Levinas does enter a realm that is distinct from the dialectic of promise and promise-keeping and

freedom such as we find in the thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre, for example. This taking up of responsibility is not a virtue (virtue in the sense of strength), nor is it a weakness (as suggested by the late Michel de Certeau), but precisely the carrying out of the mitzvah, or commandment of God. We should not expect gratitude, for this would entangle us in an endless dialectic of quid pro quos . ( It is interesting to note in passing that Levinas praises the institution of money, despite its possible abuses, because if frees us from having to have a personal relation with each person with whom we deal in life. We can carry on without this burden.) If we should expect anything, it is rather ingratitude. There is an impersonal—transpersonal?—sense in which action, good conduct, is nothing more nor less than a going beyond the bog of being. What is ethical behavior? It is (I quote) “the original goodness of [hu]man toward the other in which, in an ethical dis-inter-estedness—word of God—the inter-ested effort of brute being persevering in its being is interrupted.”5 This “ethics of ethics,” as it has been termed (by Jacques Derrida in his critical essay on Levinas, “Violence and Metaphysics” in 1964), is not only so called because it does not prescribe any specific acts, but also because Levinas’s ethics of responsibility cannot, as the philosopher himself states, be preached. Is it because humility (which is not listed among the virtues by Aristotle) permeates Levinas’s manner? No doubt, but it is also the case for what could be called a technical reason. We noted that the I-Thou relation in Levinas is not symmetrical. The other is always greater than I, and my responsibility cannot be transferred to anyone else. This responsibility extends to and includes responsibility for the evil perpetrated against me! In commenting on Philippe


Nemo’s book Job and the Excess of Evil, Levinas ventures a surprising interpretation of a well-known biblical verse of the book of Job ( Job 38: 4). “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?” The usual interpretation is that God is reprimanding the creature for questioning His ways, and perhaps also implying that if man knew the whole story a theodicy would be possible—and this would be seen as being the best of all possible worlds after

all. Levinas: Can one not hear in this “Where were you?” a statement of deficiency (constat

de carence) that cannot have meaning unless the humanity of man is fraternally bound up with creation, that is, responsible for that which has been neither his I (son moi) nor his work? Might this solidarity and this responsibility for any and all—which cannot be without pain—be spirit itself?6 A remarkable interpretation indeed, worthy of the Talmudic spirit of interpretation Levinas studied and admired so ardently. I

liken the observation to the following extraordinary remark made by a child to his mother, spontaneously metaphysical: “Mother, when did we have me?” This retrogressive movement of being is very close to the sense of retrogressive and all-encompassing responsibility Levinas finds in this passage from Job. Neither his “I” nor his work. “I” in the sense of his ego, that limited “moi” that must, in Levinas’s view, be transcended by the ethical self toward responsibility for the other.

Obligation solves war and catastrophe Hanley, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola, 2007Catriona Hanley, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola College, “Levinas on Peace and War”, www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id [Luke]

Justice provokes justice; injustice perpetrates injustice. On what grounds do we argue for peace in a time when the resort to violence is increasingly tolerated and even championed by both individuals and governments? Do we need an ethical foundation for the practice of justice beyond that of the recognition that the rights extended to the other should match those I expect to enjoy? Is the continued affirmation of the sameness of the other not enough to ensure that my principled outrage at abuses be grounded? This form of universality may provide a ground – but so far it has not led to true peace. It has not led to an equal co-recognition of subjects, since the equality was always only theoretical, and outside the real context of historical suffering. It has led to war, to the imposition of my interests over others, since it begins with the assumption that you are me, and the forgetting that you are precisely not me, and in your uniqueness, inassimilable to me. The calculation of what we, who are equal but wounded, owe to each other always seems to devolve to the logic of revenge – or worse, “pre-emptive” action. You are me – then you might do to me what I could do to you, or what I have in mind to do to you – so I had better do it first. And we are all wounded by history, by circumstance, by origin, by experience, by the very particularity, which makes each of us who we uniquely are. My wounds, my suffering is not universal, but intimately particular.

We must constantly interrupt the political with the ethical-exposing the other’s face in all available venues is key to creating a more ethical state.

Jordaan, prof Poli Sci at Stellenbosch, 2006, we reject the gendered languageEduard Jordaan, Professor of Political Science at Stellenbosch, 2006, “Responsibility, Indifference, and Global Poverty: A Levinasian Perspective”

In light of the above preliminaries, every self has a responsibility to bring about a society that maintains and treats the other as complexly and as sensitively as possible. Since much injustice and cruelty are committed unwittingly and unintentionally, a political strategy that emphasizes and describes human complexity will help us


to become aware of the (unnoticed) ways in which we have neglected and oppressed the other, and of all the ways in which he should be protected and cared for. However, an element is missing, that of activating our concern for the other. For Levinas, it is imperative that the political be forever interrupted by the ethical; the question is how? Awakening us to our responsibility for the other is the second function of the proposed strategy, which is intended to describe and emphasize human complexity to the greatest extent possible.Throughout this study, authors in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate have been criticized for suppressing various aspects of the ethical relation with the other, which has resulted in us being left in good conscience, despite having failed the global other. At the start of this chapter it was argued that the cosmopolitan strategy to convince us of our guilt and responsibility for the global poor is counterproductive given that its emphasis on human equality numbs that which incites us to responsibility for the other, namely glimpses of him as inexpressibly different from everyone else, unique. So, it seems as though our task is to confront the world with the ‘face’ of the other, to accuse the world of having left the other to quite literally ‘die alone’. It is imperative that we “expose” the ‘skins’ of complacent selves to “wounds and outrage,” that we elicit a “suffering for the suffering of the other” (CPP 146). In order to bring the world into proximity to the other, to expose third parties to his ‘face,’ it is claimed that actions aimed at conveying the other in as great a complexity as possible can help us do this. Human complexity/difference/dissimilarity is therefore not important for its own sake (and therefore to be maintained at all costs), but insofar as it insinuates the uniqueness of the other.Of course, this ‘strategy’ immediately has to confront the objection that all representations of the other betray his alterity and suppress his otherness (see Broody, 2001). Granting this, the claim made here is that there are representations (and positionings) of the other and articulations of his situation that are more suggestive of his otherness and therefore of my ethical responsibility for him. That this is so is suggested by the opposite, namely an extreme form of negating the other’s alterity, his de-humanisation through racist and stereotyped representations whereby the way is paved for social and political disregard, maltreatment, or ‘disciplining’. Though one cannot be sure of the direction of causality, there seems to be a direct correlation between the fullness with which people are viewed and the extent of the concern we have for them. Is it not generally the case that the people we are most indifferent towards are also those most absent from our imaginations, those persons/groups we know least about? Returning to the group of people I am most concerned with in this study, the global poor, is it not the case that we generally know very little about tem, compared to say, Americans? And, for example , is this not part of the reason that while the world reacted with great sympathy for the victims of the September 11th attacks in which approximately three thousand people died, we do not pay much attention to the fact that every day approximately 30,000 children die from preventable illnesses, which translates into more than 10 million deaths per year (UNDP 2003: 5; World Bank, 2004)? It is my contention that there is a relationship between the fullness with which we view people and the concern we have for them, and a large part of the reason is that a fuller conception of the other person is a stronger suggestion of his altery and the ethical command that issues from the fact of his otherness.


A2: Con Arguments (Morality Related)


A2: Humanitarian Claims Bad

Humanitarian claims for refugees are fine as long as they are supplemented by rights-based claims


For present purposes, the most salient point is how rights reference normative background commitments that direct action and give claimants normative control over another's duty. Morally grounded entitlements must be supplemented by a normatively justified specification of “the burdens that the right will impose on at least one other party.” Rights claims need to explain why a certain agent bears a specific duty (or normative burden) with respect to a given claimant. “What needs to be added to an entitlement to turn it into a moral right” then, are “norms that direct the conduct of the addressees in ways not fully subject to the addressees' discretion.” These norms need not be legal, but they need to be accepted by relevant burden- or duty-bearers before it makes sense to talk about “rights” in a more than hortatory way.

[25-7 Nickel, James. 1987. Making Sense of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.]


A2: States Have the Right to Exclude

No right to exclude persecuted refugees from war zones

Michael Blake, Philosopher, 2003, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 41, Issue 2, Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion, pages 103–130, Spring 2013

The second objection is more simple, but also potentially more important. It notes, simply, that the structure of the argument is as follows: we can exclude unwanted would-be immigrants, because these immigrants already have adequate rights-protection within their countries of origin, and are seeking now to oblige us to act in defense of their rights. The argument only holds, that is, when there in fact is adequate rights-protection in the country from which the individual is seeking to emigrate. This was, of course, true for me in my emigration from Canada, and it is doubtless true of many would-be immigrants. It is unlikely to be true of most immigrants, however, many of whom are fleeing circumstances that could be described (rather bloodlessly) as insufficiently rights-protecting. This means, of course, that the justificatory story now fails to hold. We are unable to exclude the unwanted migrant, because the story we would have to tell—namely, that we have no obligation to become obligated to protect that migrant's rights—is inaccurate. The migrant would, upon entry into our territory, simply acquire that set of rights-protections to which she is entitled. If we propose to use force to prevent that individual from entering into our territory, we are simply using force to keep her in a morally indefensible situation. There is no possibility of that use of force being legitimate. As such, we might think that the story I tell here—despite its general defense of the right to exclude—is, in fact, considerably more radical than it would at first appear. It would mandate something like a radically revised account of refugee and asylum law, on which we cannot use force to exclude outsiders from entry when those outsiders are coming from countries that are insufficiently attentive to basic human rights.

This is, again, an objection to the view if interpreted as a blanket defense of our current practices; it is not, however, an objection I want to reject in its entirety. I will suggest two means by which the objection's force is potentially subject to some limitations, but on the whole I believe the objection to be accurate. Indeed, if we focus on the justification for the use of force, I believe we are likely to arrive at an account of refugee and asylum law on which we are unable to refuse admission to a great many would-be migrants.37 This view of immigration will be, I think, considerably more robust than a related view given by Christopher Heath Wellman, who allows the legitimate state to purchase the right to exclude by devoting an adequate share of its resources and efforts to development in foreign countries.38 On my view, this is not even in principle permissible. We cannot justify the use of force against one party by citing benefits to others; the justification must be in terms that the coerced party can accept without requiring that party to unduly identify with the interests of others. This is, after all, the lesson John Rawls taught about the separateness of persons: it is wrong to demand that an individual who is treated badly by a coercive institution be mollified by the comparatively greater benefits received by others.39 The idea that we can justify using force against someone whose rights are unprotected by citing the fact that we have helped other people elsewhere seems to fly in the face of this idea. We can only justify the coercive force of the border if we use it against people whose rights are adequately protected in their current homes. To use it elsewhere seems simply to use force to defend an illegitimate status quo; this is morally impermissible regardless of how just our foreign policy might otherwise be.

If we are going to limit the rights of immigrants from oppressed countries, then we will have to do so in a manner that defends their right to be treated as a moral equal. Is there any way of doing this? I believe there are, in principle, two ways of doing so, although neither will offer much consolation to those who want to defend the international status quo. The first way begins with the simple fact that the obligation to become obliged is held not simply by an individual state, but by all legitimate states collectively. To return to the

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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papa.2013.41.issue-2/issuetoc


modified violinist case: a dying violinist might have a right to have someone offer her the necessary support needed for a decent life, but she does not have the right to pick her favorite agent as provider. Nothing in the picture of basic rights we are imagining here mandates that we are allowed to insist that the general obligation to protect the rights of persons can be made into a particular obligation—that is, an obligation to be pressed against one particular agent—simply through the wishes of the one to whom we are obliged. This means, I think, that the story we can tell about exclusion might have to be more complex. We are not entitled to use force to exclude individuals who want to enter our jurisdiction when they come from jurisdictions that do not adequately protect their rights. But nothing in this says that we are obligated to be the jurisdiction in which those individuals ultimately make their lives. If the burden of refugee flows is one that ought to be borne by the wealthy states of the world collectively, then it is entirely open to a particular state to argue that some other state is refusing its share of the bill. This opens up the possibility that we can develop a secondary moral analysis of what fairness would demand in the allocation of the burdens of doing justice through immigration. It also opens up the possibility of legitimate international covenants excluding individuals when they have passed through rights-protecting countries on their way to their chosen country of refuge. The Dublin Regulation, for example, insists that an individual's asylum claim must be heard by the first European Union state into which that individual enters.40 This regulation may be unfair toward border states, which tend to bear a higher proportional cost from refugee flows; but it cannot be said to be unfair toward refugees themselves.

The second sort of restriction we can imagine is more complex—and, potentially, more dangerous. It goes to the idea that we can, under some circumstances, demand that people pay some costs to maintain just institutions. This is, of course, hardly a controversial idea, stated this generally; we accept that individuals have the duty to pay taxes to support just states, for example. But we might similarly think that individuals have the obligation to bear some of the costs involved in setting up just institutions, too. We might, for example, demand that individuals from a particular state bear some of the costs involved in transitioning that state toward democratic legitimacy. These costs, moreover, might include things other than financial burdens; we do, under some circumstances, insist that individuals bear some personal risk in the name of justice. (Most accounts of just war, after all, include the idea that justice is a sufficient ideal to warrant the imposition of a risk of violent death.) So: if individuals want to emigrate to a given country from a non-rights-respecting country, we might want to have the right to insist that those individuals remain where they are, and improve circumstances in their country of origin.41 Is this a sufficient reason for us to think that we can insist that people fleeing from a non-rights-respecting country return to that country and improve it from within?

I do not want to reject these ideas entirely; I do believe, however, that they are insufficient to generate anything like a right to exclude would-be migrants from oppressed states. The reason is, I think, the fairly simple one that it is unfair to insist that someone fleeing an oppressive state has more duties to that state than someone outside of it.42 The relationship between that state and the emigrant is hardly that of someone who is a party to an ongoing, valuable relationship, who thereby acquires some duties to the other parties in that relationship. If we did not accept this simply in virtue of the fact that the state is engaging in unjustified coercion, we might accept it in virtue of the fact that the emigrant is actively trying to sever that relationship. To insist that this relationship generates duties, then, is something very much like insisting that an ascriptive fact—a mere fact of birth—is sufficient to generate an obligation. This, however, seems to be morally impermissible. Why, the migrant might ask, should she be asked to bear a higher burden of the shared task of democratizing her country of origin? She was born there, but that hardly seems sufficient to justify a greater obligation to help that place than there is for those lucky enough to be born in more wealthy jurisdictions. (She may have greater knowledge, and therefore ability, to help, but those seem to be separate issues; and, besides which, it seems unjust for us to insist that obligation increases with ability.) The only way, I think, in which we might use the idea of a burden to work for democratization is if the argument treats all parties—current residents and would-be immigrants—as moral equals, with each having an equivalent duty to build the democratic capacity of the state in question. This might legitimate asking the would-be immigrant to bear some costs in rebuilding the state from which they come; but it would equally ask those who currently reside within the rights-respecting jurisdiction to give of themselves to help the shared task of building a rights-protecting world. The idea of a special duty to one's home country, I said, was dangerous because it tempts us to see those who come from a place as





specially obligated to sacrifice themselves to improve that place. The shared sacrifice, I think, must be actually shared, justly, among all the citizens of the world; it seems hard to imagine that we could actually use these ideas to exclude would-be immigrants, at least unless we ourselves are bearing costs equivalent to those we expect these migrants to pay. This is a test, of course, I do not think any current state is likely to meet.

The result of all this is that the right of a state to exclude people from underdeveloped and oppressive nations is likely to prove rather weak. I do not think this is a defect; it strikes me as true that a state that proposes to use force to keep people out of its jurisdiction has to account for the rights of the people against whom that force is directed. I have ignored, here, many relevant questions. We have reason to ask what human rights are those that ought to be defended by international law and by immigration law. We have reason to ask what sorts of considerations other than the protection of basic human rights ought to affect the right to exclude.43 For the moment, I am content to leave these questions to one side. What I have said here, I believe, might give us some reason to think that the right to exclude exists, and that this right is far from able to justify the sorts of policies all wealthy societies currently undertake. We have, collectively, the right to exclude some unwanted would-be immigrants. We should not, however, take any comfort from this fact; much of what we are doing now is profoundly unjust, and should be recognized as such. This defense of a right to exclude should therefore be taken as a plea for reform, not for quietism; we can indeed seek to exclude some unwanted immigrants, but we should not therefore conclude that we are allowed to exclude as we currently do. Justice, I suggest, demands more discussion both of the moral foundations of this right and of the relationship between that right and our own acts. I will, therefore, be quite satisfied if I have shown the need for such a discussion to take place.

States cannot excluded unwanted immigrants under any circumstance


This right to exclude, however, is not a trump against the rights of all would-be immigrants; these immigrants have rights to the circumstances under which their basic human rights are protected. As such, there will be many circumstances under which the liberal state is not permitted to exclude unwanted would-be immigrants, since liberalism obliges the inhabitants of that state to enter into a legal relationship with these prospective immigrants. The right to exclude, I suggest, exists, but cannot justify anything like the exclusionary practices undertaken by modern wealthy states.

Right to exclude assumes culture is unified and that some cultures are better than others


These defenses of the right to exclude have some common failings. They are, first, committed to the thesis that the relevant relationships conducive to these goods are all found inside the legal state. This is rarely, if ever, true; there is no cultural group that is found entirely within one state, and there is no state that has only one cultural group within its jurisdiction. The supposed right to exclude from the state, then, is poorly served by a justification that looks to cultural relationships within it.5 More often, a cultural justification for the right to exclude amounts to little more than a political declaration that some cultures—or, indeed, some races—are more desirable, more worthy, than others. This declaration, in turn, is entirely antithetical to liberal egalitarianism; we cannot ground the right to exclude in a declaration that some people are worth more than others.6

These defenses, moreover, derive a right from a purported interest; and, even if that interest were genuine and morally defensible, it is never entirely clear how the equation between interests and rights is meant to







work. From the fact that we have an interest in a particular set of policies, we cannot infer that we have a right to it—particularly if other people may have interests, or even rights, in the absence of those policies. Phillip Cole has argued convincingly that we are wrong to think that we can simply declare that our interests in a particular form of life are sufficient to give us a right to that form of life. Other people, after all, have rights too, and we cannot take our interest in a particular sort of community as a sufficient reason to legitimate force against others.7 Martin Chamorro, finally, has argued that even if we were genuinely interested in promoting a particular form of life, we would be unable to justify using violent means to do so, if there were other means by which this good might be promoted; as such, we may not have a right to use violence against would-be immigrants, if—as seems likely—there are means by which community might be created in even a fully open world.8




A2: Right to Exclude -- Wellman

Right to Association is not that strong


Wellman's argument is a step forward, in that the right he defends begins with deontic considerations rather than mere interests; it is not, however, without its problems. In the first instance, it is not clear that the right to freedom of association is quite such a strong right as Wellman takes it to be. We regularly weigh this right against the competing rights of others in domestic policy, as we do with antidiscrimination law; the right to freedom of association does not always outweigh such competing considerations domestically, and it is hard to see why it should therefore outweigh them in considerations of immigration.10 The second issue is that Wellman takes the source of the right to be the relations of people in civil society; what matters is that people do not want to deal with one another in public life, to see one another in markets and in churches. This vision makes the fact that people are bound together by politics a merely incidental fact. Individuals have the right to develop a particular picture of what they want their civil society to look like, and then to employ politics to defend that picture. This, to my mind, ignores what is distinctive about a political community, namely, that it is a political community, bound together by ties of law and politics rather than simply by the shared understandings of its inhabitants. Wellman's vision might be more appropriate if we were excluding people from a social reality constituted by the mental states of its members—if, for example, we were excluding people from a society of people gathered together out of a shared love of knitting (for, presumably, not loving knitting with adequate fervor). What is striking about politics, though, is that it applies to the members of a given jurisdiction regardless of what happens to be in those members' heads. Wellman's analysis, while powerful, reduces politics to an accidental aspect of what is shared in a society; such a reduction, on my view, is a reason to regard Wellman's account as flawed.

Right to associate not an absolute right, can be trumped by consequences

Christopher Heath Wellman, professor of philosophy, University of St. Louis, 2008, Immigration and the Freedom of Association, Published in Ethics, October, http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/phil267fa12/Immigration%20Proofs.pdf DOA: 9-30-15

I hasten to emphasize, however, that, while I conceive of freedomof association in deontological terms, I do not thereby suppose that itis necessarily absolute. I consider freedom of association a deontologicalmatter because it is something to which a party can be entitled (it issomething to which people can have a moral right), and I do not believethat matters of entitlement can be adequately cashed out in exclusivelyconsequential terms. In saying this, however, I do not thereby commit

http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/phil267fa12/Immigration%20Proofs.pdf




myself to the view that such a right must be perfectly general and ab-solute. A right can be independent of, and largely immune from, con-sequential calculus without being entirely invulnerable to being out-weighed by all competing considerations. (Prince William has a rightto marry anyone who will have him, for instance. And while this rightgives him the discretion to marry any number of people, presumably itwould be defeated if his marrying a particular person would set off achain of events leading to World War III.) In this regard, my views tendto resemble those of W. D. Ross more than those of Immanuel Kant.Moreover, like Ross, I know of no algorithm for determining in advancewhen and under what circumstances a party’s right to freedom of as-sociation would be defeated. In the end, then, I see nothing contra-dictory about conceiving of freedom of association as a deontologicalconsideration (and thus of speaking of a right to choose one’s associates)and simultaneously conceding that the case in favor of freedom of association is merely presumptive


A2: Allow States to Refuse Refugee Resettlement

Allowing states to refuse immoral and threatens refugee rights


THE world has millions of refugees. How should our institutions respond? One longstanding proposal with wide support is to expand the legal definition of a “refugee” so more desperately needy people qualify for resettlement. More recent proposals approach the refugee burden like carbon trading: by determining fair quotas for each state and letting them pay one another to achieve “protection elsewhere” 1 for refugees they want to exclude. Refugees would be resettled somewhere, but states could unilaterally exclude them. I claim the second proposal only appears plausible because of mistaken assumptions in the first. Both would further imperil refugee rights.

My argument is clarificatory and critical. Many criticize the legal definition of a “refugee” as too restrictive. Such criticism is often rooted in misunderstandings or worries about the definition's potential for misapplication. I defend the current definition because it captures the uniqueness of refugee claims, its underlying justification is sound, and an expansion harbors its own risks. On this basis I offer a new argument2 against proposals that defend a legitimate state's right to unilaterally exclude outsiders (including refugees) by relying on protection elsewhere schemes.3





A2: Should Act on a “Realist” Interpretation of the National Interest

When you only act to protect interests such as US interests, that justifies decisions like the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Francis Harbour, Professor of Government, George Mason University, THINKING ABOUTINTERNATIONAL ETHICS, 1999, p.95.

From the basically realist perspective that virtually the entire U.S. government applied, by early summer 1945 there was every incentive to use atomic bombs in any way that would bring the end of the war sooner. Virtually all costs to the United States at this point were "sunk costs." That is, the enormous expense of designing the first atomic bombs and putting them into production and the lesser costs of training the crew had already been incurred, whether or not the bombs were used. The only new costs to the United States were a few planes, crews, and observers -and the actual bombs themselves. Not giving the Japanese explicit warning of an atomic bombing to come even eliminated the possibility of loss of "face" if the bombs turned out not to work after all. No other potential alternative could significantly reduce costs to Americans, since these were already so low.

Realism encourages people to completely ignore moral concerns. Teams can argue for the importance of protecting morality in foreign policy.

John Baylis, Professor of International Politics, University of Wales, Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 71

For some realist writers, the laws of morality cannot be applied to nuclear weapons or indeed to any weapons of war. Given the cultural diversity of the world in which we live and the lack of consensus on a universal moral code, ethical issues are regarded as being irrelevant to policy decisions about the use, or threat to use, nuclear weapons. According to this Machiavellian view, a nation's national interests are - or should be - all that considers in its interactions with other nations. Prudence is seen as having a higher priority than morality.


A2: Other Governments Will Protect

Governments can not rely on the protection of refugees “elsewhere” – they must protect them


These schemes have started showing up in arguments about permissible exclusion.90 For instance, Wellman claims legitimate states have a presumptive right to “unilaterally design and enforce their own immigration policies”91 such that they “are entitled to exclude all outsiders”92 including “even refugees desperately seeking asylum.”93 This conclusion stems from combining a collective right to free (dis)association with a disjunctive duty to needy outsiders. Wellman claims states hold the collective right to free (dis)association if they maintain legitimacy by protecting human rights internally and respecting those of outsiders. And, states will always be able to respect outsiders' rights, even when excluding them, because they are disjunctively duty-bound: states can either accept refugees as new members or ensure they “no longer need fear their domestic regimes”94 in other ways—either by forcible intervention or by paying legitimate, rights-respecting states to accept refugees as members. Here I focus on the protection elsewhere schemes referenced in the second branch of his disjunctive duty.95

[91- Wellman, Christopher H. 2008. Immigration and freedom of association. Ethics, 119, 109–141.; 93- Wellman, Christopher H. 2011. Freedom of association and the right to exclude. Pp. 13–155 in Wellman, Christopher H. and Phillip Cole. Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford University Press.; ]

Wellman claims that even if there were an international institution authoritatively assigning parts of the global refugee burden to legitimate states,96 they would still have the discretion to unilaterally exclude refugees. For, similar to carbon trading,97 a state “could simply pay a neighboring country” and thereby “hire someone else to do its chore” of discharging its “share of responsibility for the world's refugees.”98 This seemingly respects human rights and non-refoulement: refugees are protected elsewhere, not refouled. So, even refugees don't constitute an exception to the claim that “legitimate political states are morally entitled to unilaterally design and enforce their own immigration policies.”99

[96-99 - Wellman, Christopher H. 2011. Freedom of association and the right to exclude. Pp. 13–155 in Wellman, Christopher H. and Phillip Cole. Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford University Press.]

I claim that, without further details, protection elsewhere policies like this would unwittingly be complicit in human rights violations because they neglect the importance of adjudicative

procedures between the “design” and “enforcement” of border policies. Even if these schemes

could (theoretically) work for camp refugees, a state cannot “ simply pay a neighboring country,” even a legitimate rights-respecting state, “to do one's chore” towards irregularly arriving potential refugees. For states non-voluntarily incur an adjudicative duty towards irregular arrivals 100 to ensure their rights are respected through fair and non-discriminatory status adjudications. Moreover, this duty concerns an internationally defined status that is not fixed by the unilateral













discretion of states.101 Protection elsewhere schemes face steep implementation challenges. But, beyond practicalities, the issue is that however we craft them, such schemes cannot avoid adjudicative duties that must be multilaterally discharged.

When outsiders show up at borders irregularly they are not presorted. They may be refugees, refugee-like, immigrants, or all three arriving together. Authorities encountering them do not know who they are. Before states can permissibly return people, they have an adjudicative duty to determine they are not refugees. 102 States committed to human rights therefore have fair, non- discriminatory procedures that try to discern which people are refugees to be taken in (somewhere) and which may be returned (and helped otherwise). Practically speaking, there are two basic ways to uphold non-refoulement yet withhold membership. The duty to ensure fair and non-discriminatory status adjudications is involved in both.

[100- Blake, Michael. 2013. Immigration, jurisdiction and exclusion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 41, 103–130.; 101- Legomsky, Stephen. 2009. Refugees, asylum seekers and the rule of law in the USA. Pp. 122–170 in Susan Kneebone (ed.), Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]

First, if authorities encounter someone “en route” they could divert them to another state for claim adjudication and protection. This could occur with high-seas interdictions if, following Miller, we see a difference between prevention and coercion: “coercion involves forcing a person to do some relatively

specific thing, and prevention involves forcing a person not to do some relatively specific thing while leaving [adequate] other options open … The distinction is clear but not sharp. As more alternatives are ruled out by an intervention, prevention slowly comes closer to coercion, and vice versa.”103 On this view, diverting irregularly arriving persons is permissible if they are left with an “adequate range of options.”104 The United States could divert boats originating in Haiti to Canada if there was an agreement for adjudicative and protective duties to be discharged there.

[103- Miller, David. 2010. Why immigration controls are not coercive: a reply to Arash Abizadeh. Political Theory, 38, 111–120.]

It is important to note that when diverting potential refugees, adjudication and protection must be ensured by a preexisting agreement, subject to ongoing oversight, between states. The diverting state may hold it acquires no additional protective duties to these outsiders via membership, but the duty to respect their rights is augmented and made more stringent. States may typically be able to respect outsiders' rights simply by not violating them,105 but irregular arrival scenarios are different. The duty to refrain from violating outsiders' rights becomes couched in a higher standard of due diligence to make sure the state people are diverted to does not refoul them, violate their human rights, or leave them insecure. To guard against this, the contracting state must be certain the contracted state will perform procedurally appropriate status adjudications and grant membership to refugees. There are good practical reasons to worry about the prevention versus coercion distinction, especially for interdictions.106 But, in theory, such policies could separate respect for rights from the protection or fulfillment of membership.107

[107-Foster, Michelle. 2007b. Protection elsewhere: the legal implications of requiring refugees to seek protection in another state. Michigan Journal of International Law, 28, 223–286.]

The second way states could uphold non-refoulement but withhold membership is to discharge adjudicative duties yet outsource protective duties. States encountering irregular arrivals would determine their status. Refugees would then be transferred to contracted states for new membership. This has fewer practical problems but strict due diligence must still be reflected in agreements regarding what it means to be a refugee and how to protect their rights.









In both scenarios, mere forbearance is augmented by stronger due diligence. The outsourcing state must now proactively concern itself with the procedures and standards of adjudication and protection in (and during transfer to) the contracted state. A state cannot initiate or maintain a contract with another unless it concerns itself in an ongoing way with procedures for adjudicating status and human rights protection standards there. States cannot simply turn outsiders over to foreign authorities they have paid, even those of legitimate rights-respecting states, and leave matters there.

Michelle Foster articulates this point:

The question is whether a state party can remove a refugee to whom obligations have been incurred under the Refugee Convention to a third state in which all or some of these rights will not be respected … whether a state party to a human rights treaty (such as the Refugee Convention) can transfer its obligations to another state and thereby avoid liability under the treaty. The answer is that a state cannot “contract out” of its international legal obligations or transfer responsibility for such obligations to another state. In particular, removal or transfer of a person from the territory or jurisdiction of one state to another does not also transfer legal obligations to that other state.108

Even after a diversion or transfer, the outsourcing state is not absolved. It bears some responsibility if protection fails—especially if it was (or should have been) known that the contracted state refouls, violates rights, leaves them insecure, or has relevant treaty reservations.109 The measures needed to avoid such complicity pose steep challenges of monitoring and evaluation. Yet, beyond these challenges, there are conceptual problems with using protection elsewhere schemes to buttress the unilateral design and enforcement of border policies to exclude refugees.

[108-9Foster, Michelle. 2007b. Protection elsewhere: the legal implications of requiring refugees to seek protection in another state. Michigan Journal of International Law, 28, 223–286.]

Above I noted how the difference between camp refugees and irregularly arriving potential refugees stems from the different ways adjudication and protection are distributed. Camp refugees, having been recognized, possess a general right to asylum that is unenforceable against particular states. In contrast, irregularly arriving potential refugees have received neither status adjudication nor protection. But, their method of attempted access has imposed an adjudicative duty on a particular state to ensure their rights are respected (and they are not refouled) through an adequate status determination (and subsequent entitlements). My claim is that protection elsewhere schemes could function so as to retain a state's unilateral discretion over where and how it helps camp refugees, but that they cannot similarly function to retain unilateral discretion with respect to irregularly arriving potential refugees. This follows from the way rights give their holders normative control over others' duties and from the interrelated procedural and substantive aspects of a right. But we cannot appreciate these points until we have moved beyond the humanitarian view's interest-based conception of refugee rights.

If the humanitarian view of refugees were correct, then apart from practical challenges, protection elsewhere schemes would be fine. On that view, “a general right to asylum in other states” is grounded in a state's failure to sufficiently protect human needs.110 Outsiders who fall below a “need threshold” are, in virtue of that need, entitled to an outcome of goods and opportunities: food, shelter, work, and so on. Protection elsewhere schemes would work if membership in any legitimate state provided a bundle of goods and opportunities above this threshold.

[110-Kuosmanen, Jaakko. 2013. What (if anything) is wrong with trading refugee quotas? Res Publica, 19, 103–119.]

But, thinking of rights this way is problematic because it confuses the object of a right or the interests served by it with the right itself and, in so doing, ignores both processes of asserting rights and the full normative empowerment of right-holders. For, “rights create—in an important sense ‘are'—a





field of rule-governed interactions centered on, and under the control of, the right holder.” Whatever else they do, rights “outline the relationships” of right-holders and duty-bearers with respect to one another and a claim. Rights “empower, not just benefit, those who hold them” and are not “reducible to enjoying a benefit.”111 In short, confusing a right with its object or the interests it serves overlooks the specific ways right-holders are “ acting to oblige others ”112 —how they come to control others' duties. In the present context, confusing a right with its object (goods and opportunities of new membership) or the basic interests it serves (needs above some threshold) causes us to overlook how an irregularly arriving potential refugee has normative control over a certain state's duty to make sure they receive an adequate adjudication and are not refouled.113

While refugees are entitled to a certain outcome that serves their interests, thinking about outcomes alone skips a step. The first thing a potential refugee is entitled to is an appropriate adjudication of their claim to be a refugee. This may seem trivial. Surely it matters whether desperate people get what they need—whether violated or unfulfilled basic interests are met. I agree. Indeed, precisely because I agree I think procedural rights are important.114

[111-Donnelly, Jack. 2002. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 2nd edn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.; 112-Blake, Michael. 2013. Immigration, jurisdiction and exclusion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 41, 103–130; 113-We “should be careful not to confuse possessing a right with the respect it receives or the ease or frequency with which it is enforced.” Donnelly 2002, p. 11.]

Although the difference between procedural and substantive rights can be parsed in various ways,115 we can nevertheless say some things with certainty. Procedural rights are distinguishable from, yet inextricably tied to, substantive rights. While sound procedures cannot guarantee good substantive outcomes, they increase accuracy, uphold fairness, and express dignity. Procedural rights have value (at least, perhaps merely) because they promote substantive rights; their value largely derives from the substantive rights they help secure. 116 For instance, my right to the procedures of a fair trial gains much of its value from the substantive justice rendered by that trial. As procedural and substantive rights are intertwined in this way, we may think about them as “substance/procedure packages.” 117

[115-May, Larry. 2011. Global Justice and Due Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Murphy, Colleen. 2005. Lon Fuller and the moral value of the rule of law. Law and Philosophy, 24, 239–262.; 117-Alexander, Larry. 1998. Are procedural rights derivative substantive rights? Law and Philosophy, 17, 19–42.]

What does all this have to do with refugees and protection elsewhere? My suggestion is that the practical challenges protection elsewhere schemes pose to our ability to respect rights and the added due diligence they require can be understood as a function of a conceptual feature of rights: an inability to fully separate the procedural and substantive. The two methods for attempting to uphold non-refoulement yet withhold membership either sever the procedural and substantive aspects of a right (one state carries out status adjudications and another grants membership) or try to “outsource” both elements (one state pays another to do both). Yet, even in this second scenario, it is not accurate to say the outsourcing state has no duties (not even of a procedural nature) towards diverted persons, nor that these persons have no rights against it. For the outsourcing state is bound to exercise due diligence in deciding where to divert people and it must have a viable, efficacious contractual arrangement (subject to monitoring) with the state where persons are sent. The substantive rights of diverted persons only end up being respected because of two layers of procedures in the contract: how status adjudications and protections will be carried out by the recipient state and the ongoing monitoring to ensure the contract's continued efficacy as a way for the outsourcing state to permissibly avoid obligations it would otherwise incur. Whichever way these policies are crafted, the conclusion is the same: if states are to be sure they are respecting outsiders' rights when using such schemes,




http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jopp.12071/full#jopp12071-bib-0011






heightened due diligence must be exercised such that states harmonize their adjudicative procedures and substantive protections.

This focus on the interrelated procedural and substantive aspects of rights may seem to present no hurdle for protection elsewhere schemes. If contracting states use the same adjudicative standards and procedures with the same levels of accuracy, and if the rights protection and fulfillment in both states are commensurate, there is no issue. However, notice what has happened: the exclusion of outsiders through reliance on these schemes is no longer unilateral . The outsourcing state and the state of new

membership must have a bilateral agreement with harmonized standards for how they will both interpret and apply the legal definition of a refugee, and for the functional equivalency of rights protections refugees will receive.

Moreover, such agreements are only superficially bilateral, as they are constrained by international standards regarding the definition of a refugee. States cannot unilaterally create a narrower definition of a refugee or the protections they receive. A state cannot simply decree that those fleeing religious persecution no longer count as refugees, nor that refugees it accepts will be permanently barred from full membership. This also applies to agreements between states. In order to permissibly pursue protection elsewhere schemes, states may only contract with other legitimate rights-respecting states, both parties need harmonized definitions, procedures, and standards for claim adjudications and rights protections, and this harmonization needs to coalesce around the Refugee Convention definition. It would thereby involve a third authority, the United Nations, and harmonize standards and norms amongst all three actors. The exclusions could only permissibly take place multilaterally.118

These observations yield an interesting conclusion: given the nature of the contemporary state system, the internationally-defined status of a refugee, and the role of procedural rights in dealing with irregular arrivals, policies of robust unilateral exclusion are impermissible. Before the Refugee Convention, states would try to ultra-minimally discharge their obligations to desperate outsiders through practices such as arranging for safe passage through their territory or letting deported irregular arrivals choose the border from which they were expelled.119 These sorts of policies are no longer available to states, at least not unilaterally.120 Protection elsewhere schemes are the closest contender, yet they turn out to be parasitic upon background agreements that are arrived at and maintained through multilateral efforts to ensure due diligence.





A2: Bostrum

Privileging “infinite” magnitude negates probability and destroys ethical decision-makingOliver Kessler 8, Professor of Sociology at the University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity . The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is

envisaged), then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down . Under the historical condition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deterrence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastrophe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, catastrophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major implications for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes happen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "rationality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastrophe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For example, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur- rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main problem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation

from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that even

the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By constructing a chain of potentialities,

improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. " Although the

likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility.

"54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very beginning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war

the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of

an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of

evidence is not evidence of absence. "* This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncertainty, different

evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.


Right to Receive Membership


General Right to Receive Membership

Refugees have a right to receive membership somewhere and not to be returned


Having moved past the humanitarian definition's interest-based conception of refugee rights, I conclude by showing why protection elsewhere schemes do not allow legitimate states to permissibly achieve the unilateral exclusion of all outsiders, including refugees. The core of refugee law isn't simply about meeting a certain kind of need. It is also about avoiding a specific wrong: returning people to persecution. Contrary to popular misconceptions, refugees do “not have a right to admission as such, but rather a right to protection which includes the right to non-refoulement.” 85 Refugees cannot be sent back. They

must receive membership somewhere. But, beyond the state where they flee, they can be protected by another state that agrees to accept them as members. The difference between refraining from refoulement and granting new membership is key to protection elsewhere schemes.

By relying on this difference such schemes distinguish between respecting versus protecting or

fulfilling rights. Following standard terminology,86 we can say rights claims must be reasonably secured to be enjoyed. To secure rights, actors must discharge three correlative duties: (i) avoid depriving people of their rights, (ii) protect people from being so deprived, and (iii) aid people who are deprived. These duties can fall on different actors. While everyone has duties to respect rights, only

certain actors have duties to protect specific persons against deprivations and fulfill their rights if deprived. Governments may have duties to respect, protect, and fulfill rights of those in their jurisdiction, but merely duties to respect outsiders' rights.

[85- Schotel, Bas. 2012. On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics, and Immigration Policy. Oxford/New York: Routledge.; 86- Blake, Michael. 2013. Immigration, jurisdiction and exclusion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 41, 103–130.]

Refugees have a right to membership in another state


First, it is crucial to realize there are slight yet important differences between irregularly arriving potential refugees and camp refugees.69 They are both entitled to the same three things: a “fair and non-discriminatory”70 status adjudication and, if they are found to be refugees, both non-refoulement and the “durable solution” of new membership.71 Yet, the way each group tries to access relief distributes these entitlements differently across actors with varying capacities. Camp refugees have received a status adjudication affording them camp residence and protection against refoulement. But, the institution they have pressed their claim against (UNHCR) cannot give them new membership nor compel others to do so.







They are stuck in camps with a general right to asylum against no particular state.72 On the other hand, irregularly arriving potential refugees have received neither status adjudication nor the entitlements to non-refoulement and durable protection through new membership. Everything hangs in the balance. Yet, they have pressed their claim against an institution (a state) that can give them new membership. Indeed , if they are found to be a refugee, a state must grant (or secure)

membership . They have a right against a particular state to adjudication and subsequent entitlements.

[69-Carens, Joseph. 1992. Refugees and the limits of obligation. Public Affairs Quarterly, 6, 31–44.

70 - Helton, Arthur. 2003. What is refugee protection? A question revisited. Pp. 19–33 in N. Steiner, M. Gibney and G. Loescher (eds), Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights. New York/London: Routledge.

72 - Smith, Merrill. 2004. Warehousing refugees: a denial of rights, a waste of humanity. Pp. 38–56 in World Refugee Survey 2004. Washington: US Committee on Refugees.]



Humanitarian Needs of Refugees


Smuggling Advantage

No help for refugees leaves them vulnerable to smugglers


Most of all, however, leaders aren’t acting because no one back home is putting any pressure on them. Now, thanks to heart-sickening photographs, let’s hope the pressure grows. This is a truly biblical movement of refugees and it demands a global response. If governments won’t help refugees escape Syria, smugglers and human traffickers will, and the deadly toll will rise.





Death

Limits on refugee resettlement force refugees to take dangerous routes


Finally, the principles of protection enshrined in the Refugee Convention (in particular the requirement that refugees be located outside their country of origin) have resulted in territorially based national asylum systems—refugees must gain access to a state’s territory in order to exercise their rights to claim asylum. At the same time, wealthy nations have undertaken a large-scale effort to secure and “push out” their borders. Visa restrictions and airline sanctions, for example, have made it difficult—if not impossible—for most of those seeking protection to reach their destinations through common means of entry. As a result, refugees are forced to rely on increasingly risky and dangerous routes, often requiring the use of smugglers, to gain entry to asylum systems in Europe and elsewhere.




Sea-Crossing Death

Number of refugees cross the Med who will die will increase

Jess McHugh, September 30, 2015, International business Times, EU Refugee Crisis Death TolL Rises, http://www.ibtimes.com/eu-refugee-crisis-death-toll-rises-woman-child-die-near-greece-worst-yet-come-greek-2120483 DOA: 9-30-15

A woman and a 2-year-old child died overnight Wednesday off the coast of the island of Lesbos, in eastern Greece, after the boat they were traveling in capsized. The deaths were two of the latest in the dangerous sea crossings that hundreds of thousands of refugees have taken to enter Europe, and the worst is yet to come, according to a new report.

The number of deaths was set to increase dramatically, according to Protothema, a newspaper in Greece. The Aegean Sea crossing where the woman and child died has seen the deaths of more than 3,000 people this year, but the route is still one of the most popular for refugees trying to cross into the European Union, as the eastern island of Lesbos is only a few hours away from Turkey, where many Syrian refugees are coming from.

The majority of people who take boats across the Aegean are using smugglers, whom they have often paid up to 2,000 euros. Aylan Kurdi, the 2-year-old boy who made headlines after photos of his drowned body were published all over the world, also died making the same crossing.

They die crossing the sea because they can’t get an entry visa. People should be able to get refugee status outside of Europe and fly there

Kavitha Surana, July 9, 2005, Data Show How Manageable Europe’s Refugee Crisis Could Be, http://qz.com/448228/data-show-how-manageable-europes-refugee-crisis-could-be/ DOA: 9-30-15

Currently, the EU makes it all but impossible to apply for asylum without first illegally entering the country. This is important because one of the main reasons the EU is rethinking their policy now is due to the dramatic increase in refugees coming to Europe on unseaworthy boats owned and operated by smugglers; and the correspondingly high death toll in such trips. But many of these people take the boat trip in the first place because no other legal pathways are available.

Last year, 219,000 people took dangerous, irregular routes to Europe by land and sea, and about 3,500 drowned, according to the UN. This year it estimates that already 137,000 people arrived to EU countries by boat, a third of them from Syria, and many others from Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. There have been at least 1,867 deaths at sea in 2015 thus far.

Though many would-be refugees are able to enter the EU via airplane on tourist visas and apply for asylum once they touch down, for those displaced and fleeing the chaos of war, or living under an authoritarian government, there’s no chance of getting an exit visa. Virtually the only option is trying their luck on the boats crossing the Mediterranean, or land routes through Eastern Europe—though most Eastern border countries have built or are in the process of building walls to keep migrants out.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-18/hungary-to-fence-off-border-with-serbia-to-stop-migrants/6554826

http://www.unhcr.org/5592b9b36.html

http://www.unhcr.org/54db82536.html

http://qz.com/448228/data-show-how-manageable-europes-refugee-crisis-could-be/

http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/513772/neo-nauagio-prosfugon-sti-mutilini-nekroi-ena-paidi-kai-mia-gunaika/

http://www.ibtimes.com/eu-refugee-crisis-death-toll-rises-woman-child-die-near-greece-worst-yet-come-greek-2120483

http://www.ibtimes.com/eu-refugee-crisis-death-toll-rises-woman-child-die-near-greece-worst-yet-come-greek-2120483


Michael Diedring, the secretary general of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, calls this dynamic backward: “When you look at the amount of money that a Syrian needs to pay a smuggler to Europe,” typically $2,000 to $4,000, “you could fly to Europe first class with that money.”

Increasing refugee-resettlement programs, which relocate people with refugee status in countries outside the EU to a member country, might help alleviate the problem.

Thousands have dies crossing the Mediterranean

Zach Beauchamp, 9-27-15, The Syrian Refugee Crisis, Explained in One Map, http://www.vox.com/2015/9/27/9394959/syria-refugee-map DOA: 9-27-15

These routes are dangerous. Refugees crossing the Mediterranean often travel in poorly constructed dinghies that make even the short trip from Turkey to Greece dangerous. Around 2,700 people (that's a total, not just Syrians) have died so far trying to cross the Mediterranean, including roughly 200 in one desperate late-August boat trip.

http://news.yahoo.com/austrian-police-3-suspects-arrested-hungary-connection-deaths-092358958.html

http://www.vox.com/2015/9/27/9394959/syria-refugee-map


Forgetting

Protecting refugees is an important way to overcome the culture of forgetting the holocaust

Daniel Blei, 9-4-15, Foreign Policy, The Banality of History, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/04/the-banality-of-history-germany-migrants-neo-nazis/ DOA: 9-6-15 Blei is a historian and editor of scholarly books

Few public figures have connected the current refugee crisis to the culture of forgetting. Green Party politicians Cem Özdemir and Sven-Christian Kindler have warned in recent years that waning public memory of the Holocaust threatens present-day politics, especially for minority communities. The case for German pluralism depends heavily on the past, but for young citizens, a population more diverse than the country’s gray-haired generations, history has become more abstract; emotional ties to it are fading. In several German states, education officials are grappling with changing demographics. Diversity challenges how German history is taught and culturally constructed beyond the classroom. A 2010 poll published in Die Zeit highlighted Turkish-German ambivalence toward the Holocaust and limited knowledge about the Nazi past.

A small minority in the media has begun speaking out against the culture of forgetting in light of recent events. On Aug. 31, Alan Posener, the British-German journalist and influential blogger at “Strong Opinions,” issued a call to readers to remember that millions of Germans, not so long ago, were homeless, starving, and bedraggled. In the aftermath of World War II, entire towns of Germans fled Poland, the Czech Sudetenland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the former eastern lands of Germany, East Prussia, Silesia, and parts of Brandenburg, and Pomerania. The first postwar population census, conducted in 1946, counted 9.6 million German refugees in the four occupation zones of the vanquished Reich. In subsequent decades, hundreds of thousands of Germans left the communist East, seeking the freedoms of the Federal Republic. In each case, refugees were absorbed and integrated into German society without conflict.

This July, in the closing arguments of Gröning’s trial, state prosecutors made their case for putting a contrite former Nazi in his twilight years behind bars. Gröning’s conviction mattered, they explained, as a commitment to pluralism in the 21st century. This was the disavowal of a Germany in which only one culture was present. The notion that the German nation must share one culture has deep historical roots, going back to the 19th-century philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, shaped by the experience of French occupation and writing before the creation of a German state, the nation was more of a cultural than political concept, based on a common language and shared forms of public life.

The German past is sometimes understood as a long search for national unity, the Third Reich being the perverse fulfillment of this dream. It is easy, even for Germans, to forget that German history is not just Nazism. It is also the stories of Jews, Muslims, Blacks, Sinti, and Roma, of various immigrants and guest workers and their descendants. To fight the culture of forgetting is to stand up for refugees and asylum-seekers. In Germany, the past isn’t a foreign country. It is the knowledge that history will never repeat itself.

https://books.google.com/books?id=EGPZIenDpjwC&pg=PA6&lpg=PA6&dq=9.6+million+German+refugees&source=bl&ots=eDQVRjKMbg&sig=M_o-hWNRAOgUtfNRNQbyRLHqbUE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAGoVChMIt7DVyLnexwIVjFuOCh3j_wEx#v=onepage&q=9.6%20million%20German%20refugees&f=false

http://www.starke-meinungen.de/

http://www.starke-meinungen.de/

http://www.publikative.org/2014/05/08/erinnerung-mehr-als-ein-ritual/

http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Cem-Oezdemir

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/04/the-banality-of-history-germany-migrants-neo-nazis/


http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Editorial-Umfrage


Migrant Detention Centers Bad

Migrant detention centers violate human rights


Migrant detention centers along Europe's southern periphery—in Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain—have all invited charges of abuse and neglect over the years. Many rights groups contend that a number of these centers violate Article III of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. “We used to think of migration as a human security issue: protecting people and providing assistance,” says Geneva Center for Security Policy deputy director Khalid Koser. “Now we clearly perceive—or misperceive—migration as a national security issue. And the risk of securitizing migration is that you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses.

http://www.gcsp.ch/About-Us-Qui-sommes-nous/Staff/Management/Senior-Management-Team/Dr-Khalid-KOSER

http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/news/national/Detention-centres-opened-to-the-media-20130719

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/europe/italys-migrant-detention-centers-are-cruel-rights-groups-say.html?pagewanted=2

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/21/eu-s-dirty-hands



Starvation

Refugees lack adequate food aid

EU Observor, September 25, 2015, Six EU States Slash Food Aid for Syrian Refugees, https://euobserver.com/migration/130400 DOA: 9-25-15

Every member state, except the Netherlands, has slashed contributions to the World Food Progamme (WFP) in 2015. EU leaders at an emergency summit in Brussels on Wednesday (23 September) are being asked to shore up contributions. The drastic cuts over the past year mean the UN agency has been unable to hand out food vouchers to hundreds of thousands of Syrians at refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey. The lack of food and deplorable conditions at the camps is, in part, compelling many to take the journey to the EU. At the camp in Jordan, some 229,000 Syrians stopped receiving food aid in September. In Turkey, around 60,000 women gave birth in the camps since the start of the conflict. WFP has since had to halve assistance to almost 1.3 million Syrian refugees in the region. Most live off $0.50 a day. The agency is warning that disruptions to water supplies could provoke major outbreaks of disease. “Faced with such harsh conditions who can blame people for seeking a safe haven in Europe”, said European parliament president Martin Schulz. Austria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovakia made the most drastic cuts. All sliced their contributions by 100 percent this year, compared to last year. Sweden’s contribution dropped by 95 percent, followed by Lithuania at 69.5 percent, and Belgium at 54.7 percent. The UK also dropped by 29.5 percent. Others like Croatia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania gave nothing in the past two years. The Netherlands stands alone as the only member state, at plus 5.8 percent, which has increased contributions. It means member state contributions went from €895 million in 2014 to €675 million this year, a 38 percent drop. But Sweden, for its part, contested the 95 percent drop in figures given by the European Commission. It says it usually makes the disbursements quite late in the year, which was not reflected in the commission's data. "The Swedish contribution for 2015 at the moment stands at $69.3 million. This is without the increase just announced, which takes the total to about $72.3 million", said a contact at Sweden's ministry of international development cooperation. The WFP said Sweden's contribution was registered last week.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_annex_5_en.pdf

https://euobserver.com/migration/130400


Poverty/Abuse

Failure to protect refugees results in child labour, gender-based violence, early marriage

Jachit Balsari, et al, March 3, 2015, The Lancet, Syrian refugee crisis: when aid is not enough, http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2960168-4/fulltext?rss%3Dyes DOA: 9-26-15

Although not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jordan has historically offered protection to refugees. With international support, Jordan gave refugees free access to public schools and hospitals. However, the overwhelming demand has taken its toll on local infrastructure: Jordanians report that quality of education and health care has suffered, rents have risen, wages have fallen, and unemployment has grown. 3 The pervasive sense of insecurity, dependence, and impoverishment has resulted in profound loss of hope and dignity among refugees. Negative coping mechanisms have manifested in an alarming rise in child labour, gender-based violence, and early marriage.4

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)60168-4/fulltext?rss%3Dyes



Health Risks

Refugees face health risks, including diseases (spreading), mental health, injuries, exposure, and dehydration

Ashley Welch, September 25, 2015, Amid crisis, refugees face numerous health risks, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amid-crisis-refugees-face-numerous-health-risks/ DOA: 9-25-15

The current refugee crisis in the Middle East and Europe has seen millions of people flee their homes amid horrific violence. While escaping immediate threats is their first priority, experts say displaced people go on to face numerous health risks, from trauma injuries to disease-causing pathogens to mental illness. And a new report from Jane's Intelligence Review cautions of the danger of potential outbreaks among refugees and, to a lesser extent, host populations. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the civil war in Syria has left 12.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. More than 7 million Syrians are internally displaced and over 4 million are registered as refugees living outside the country. Deteriorating security in Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen, as well as dire living conditions for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, have also increased the number of people seeking safe haven in the European Union. "For the refugees coming by boat , the immediate health concerns are exposure, dehydration, and if there's capsizing, there's going to be the risk of drowning or near-drownings," Dr. E. Anne Peterson, Senior Vice President of Global Programs at AmeriCares, a disaster relief organization that has delivered millions of dollars in medical aid to the region, told CBS News. "There's also a portion of refugees who end up in local communities with relatives or places that are culturally similar where they're squatting, so there's overcrowding and displacing of the health care resources available there," she said. "These refugees embedded in host communities are also not always eligible for health care services, making them particularly vulnerable because they're not in the refugee camps where refugee organizations typically go." Refugee camps present a host of their own health problems, including over-crowding, inadequate access to water and poor sanitation services. This can subsequently lead to outbreaks, such as cholera and typhoid.

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/uniformed-men-accost-refugees-leave-them-adrift-at-sea/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-crisis-europe-diplomats-strategy-end-fighting/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/european-countries-tighten-borders-to-stem-flow-of-refugees/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amid-crisis-refugees-face-numerous-health-risks/


Human Rights


Refugees Human Rights Must Be Protected

Refugees have a number of rights


D. Rights of Refugees

27 Within the scope of the Refugee Convention, refugees have a status under international law implying State obligations and individual rights. The Refugee Convention accords a variety of treatments and a variety of rights to persons satisfying different criteria. The set of rights granted to a refugee by a State accrues with the level of factual attachment to the State and the level of legal recognition. Some rights apply as soon as a refugee comes under a State’s (de facto) authority, a second group of rights applies when the refugee enters the territory and falls under the effective jurisdiction of the State of refuge. A third group of rights applies once the refugee is lawfully in the territory of a State Party and a fourth group when the refugee lawfully stays or durably resides in the State’s territory. It has to be carefully examined which refugee is entitled to hold which kind of rights according to the Refugee Convention.

1. Refugee Status

28 The recognition of refugee status by a State is of declaratory character, but it may often be necessary to assure an adequate protection of the refugee. States may grant the rights linked to the refugee status only if there was a formal determination of the status. Before the authorities of the State can take this decision, it has to be examined if the person satisfies the relevant criteria, especially if a ground of persecution provided for by Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention is given. During the procedure, the refugee is in most cases physically present in the State and enjoys procedural rights. The State of refuge is obliged to guarantee fairness and a minimum standard of substantial rights. Fair and effective procedures are an essential element in the full application of the Refugee Convention. The right to free access to the courts laid down in Art. 16 Refugee Convention can only be effectively exercised if the procedure for the determination of refugee status is fair. As the Refugee Convention does not explicitly provide for procedural rules, the content and realm of the procedural rights can not be easily identified and State practice is not coherent. In many countries, the UNHCR participates in the procedures or, at least, tries to influence the procedure of determination of refugee status.

2. The Principle of Non-refoulement(a) Legal Basis29 The principle of non-refoulement is embodied in Art. 33 Refugee Convention stipulating that

[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

For the international protection of refugees, the right not to be returned or expelled to a situation which would threaten one’s life or freedom is of crucial importance . The principle of non-refoulement finds further expression in Art. 3 (1) United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’ [adopted on








10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987] 1465 UNTS 85 ; Torture, Prohibition of ) which stipulates that

[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

Furthermore, Art. 3 (2) CAT lays down that

[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.

30 The principle of non-refoulement affects State sovereignty because Art. 33 Refugee Convention gives rise to duties of the State of protection which may constrain the State to admit the refugee to its territory. Therefore, Art. 33 Refugee Convention is one of the most discussed provisions of the Refugee Convention. Bearing in mind that States are reluctant in acknowledging an individual right to asylum, the State duties resulting from Art. 33 Refugee Convention must nevertheless endorse an effective protection of the refugee. It has been evoked that a prohibition of refoulement has evolved on the level of customary international law. However, a careful examination of opinio iuris and State practice does not confirm this view for the time being.

(b) Scope of Application

31 The principle of non-refoulement laid down in Art. 33 Refugee Convention applies to refugees within the meaning of Art. 1 Refugee Convention. All refugees physically present give rise to an obligation for the State of refuge, to grant effective protection to persons falling under its de facto jurisdiction. The scope of application can be extended to all asylum seekers, although this interpretation of Art. 33 Refugee Convention may not yet be consented to by the majority of States and scholars. However, the development in the interpretation of effective protection, for example by the Member States of the European Union, seems to point in the direction of a wide interpretation of the obligation including asylum seekers.

32 Blunt denials of access or turn-back policies of States are hardly compatible with the principle of non-refoulement. States are entitled to introduce or continue a system of immigration control including the imposition of visa requirements. However, mechanisms of non-entrée like the ‘safe country rules’ must comply with Art. 33 Refugee Convention. These restrictions on the admission and the stay of aliens are applied, for example, in the European Union as a procedural device (Arts 26–27 and 29–31 Council Directive 2005/85/EC in relation to third States and Council Regulation [EC] 343/2003 between Member States). The ‘first country of arrival rule’ or ‘safe third country rule’ may lead to a deportation chain at the end of which the refugees will find themselves back in the country where they first arrived after leaving their home States out of fear of persecution. If the ‘safe country of origin rule’ is applied, the refugee is deported to his country of origin, because the State of refuge estimates that there is no persecution in the country of origin. The design of these rules has to take into account that the refugees should enjoy sufficient protection in the State they are deported to. If a State sends back a refugee to a State, where the status determination procedure or the understanding of the refugee definition is deficient, this constitutes a breach of the duty to avoid the refoulement of a refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever’ (Art. 33 (1) Refugee Convention).

33 States Parties to the Refugee Convention cannot escape their responsibilities by intercepting refugees or by deporting them to areas outside the State borders including the territorial sea or the so-called international zones. Extraterritorial refoulement is subject to the same rules as any other refoulement. The practice of the US of intercepting Haitians in international waters and sending them back to Haiti was approved by the majority of the US Supreme Court ( Sale v Haitian Centers Council [21 June 1993] 509 US 155) , but it was found to breach Art. 33 Refugee Convention by the Inter-








American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) ( Haitian Interdiction Case 10.675 IACommHR Report No 51/96 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc.7 Rev [1997] 550 paras 156–58).

(c) Exceptions

34 Exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement are laid down in Art. 33 (2) Refugee Convention. If the refugee can be regarded as a danger to the security of the country, they can be expelled or deported. Unlike persons falling under the narrow scope of Art. 1 (F) Refugee Convention and thus being excluded from protection, individuals who are covered by the criminality provision of Art. 33 (2) Refugee Convention fulfil the requirements of the refugee definition. According to Art. 33 (2) Refugee Convention, the danger to national security must lie within the very person of the refugee. Hence, if a refugee arrives as part of a mass influx causing a danger to national security, the application of the principle of non-refoulement cannot be suspended. Scholars assuming an inherent exception for mass influx situations refer to the high costs and propose a more effective international burden-shearing. However, the concept of the principle of non-refoulement only allows exceptions on individual grounds.

3. Rights of Refugee Status

35 Refugees lawfully staying in the territory enjoy non-discrimination in relation to the nationals of the State with respect to public relief and assistance (Art. 23 Refugee Convention) or relating to aspects of labour legislation and social security (Art. 24 Refugee Convention). This group of refugees also enjoys the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country concerning the right to association (Art. 15 Refugee Convention; Association, Freedom of, International Protection) and on behalf of wage-earning employment (Art. 17 Refugee Convention). Refugees lawfully staying in the territory enjoy a treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that generally accorded to aliens regarding the right to self-employment (Art. 18 Refugee Convention), the right to exercise liberal professions (Art. 19 Refugee Convention) or regarding housing (Art. 21 Refugee Convention; Housing, Right to, International Protection). Refugees having their habitual residence in the State possess a non-discriminatory position concerning artistic rights and intellectual property (Art. 14 Refugee Convention; Intellectual Property, International Protection ). If they enter the territory of the State of protection and fall under the State’s effective jurisdiction, refugees are entitled to exercise their freedom of religion ( Art. 4 Refugee Convention ), the State shall issue them identity papers ( Art. 27 Refugee Convention ), and they shall not be expelled save on grounds of national security or public order (Art. 32 (1) Refugee Convention). A number of core rights apply to refugees with no further qualification. The State applies the provision of the Refugee Convention without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin (Art. 3 Refugee Convention) and it accords to a refugee exercising his property rights a treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances (Art. 13 Refugee Convention; Property, Right to, International Protection). Every refugee has free access to courts (Art. 16 Refugee Convention) and enjoys the same treatment as accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education (Art. 22 Refugee Convention). Finally, the duty of non-refoulement obliges States not to return refugees to a place where they risk being persecuted for a reason laid down in the Refugee Convention (Art. 33 Refugee Convention).

4. Subsidiary Protection

36 Subsidiary protection is granted to persons who do not fulfil the criteria of Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention. It can guarantee the right not to be expelled. The relationship between subsidiary protection and refugee protection is not explicitly determined. Persons in a refugee-like situation and asylum seekers who fail to qualify as refugees under the Refugee Convention do nevertheless fall under the scope of international refugee law. As the Refugee Convention does not explicitly govern the granting of subsidiary protection, the safeguards and entitlements provided for by subsidiary protection widely depend on the interpretation of international law by States.





















37 A common approach to subsidiary protection by the Member States of the European Union is laid down in Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection. According to its Art. 2 lit. e, a

‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country.

Art 2 lit. f Council Directive 2004/83/EC stipulates that ‘“subsidiary protection status” means the recognition by a Member State of a third country national or a stateless person as a person eligible for subsidiary protection’.

Sources of Human Rights for Refugees

38 There are relevant provisions on refugees in human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates some habeas corpus rights which are applicable without discrimination (Art. 9 UDHR), the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution (Art. 14 UDHR), the right to a nationality (Art. 15 UDHR), and the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State (Art. 13 UDHR; Movement, Freedom of, International Protection). The latter right is also provided for in Art. 12 ICCPR. The two Covenants are based on the non-discriminatory character of human rights. According to Art. 2 (1) ICCPR, each State Party must ensure the rights in the ICCPR to ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. Referring to this provision, the Human Rights Committee has adopted General Comment No 15: The Positions of Aliens under the Covenant ([9 April 1986] GAOR 41st Session Supp 40, 117), in which it holds that the ICCPR does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State Party. Yet it also states that in certain circumstances the ICCPR may afford protection to an alien ‘even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise’ (No 5 General Comment No 15).

39 The protection of children seeking refuge is guaranteed by Art. 22 Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CROC’ [adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990] 1577 UNTS 3). The duty of States to protect the family unity of refugees is in general affirmed by State practice, and the necessary opinio iuris can be derived from legal material. The obligation of States to protect the family is laid down in Art. 23 ICCPR and relating to family unification in Art. 10 CROC. The obligations of States do not necessarily result in an individual right of a family member.

40 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) holds the view that States have the right to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens (Vilvarajah v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Series A No 215 at 34 para. 102). There is no right to political asylum in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (‘ECHR’) or its Protocols. Nevertheless, the ECtHR holds that the rights safeguarded by the ECHR can provide for a legal position of aliens implying far-reaching State obligations towards refugees.

41 Within the scope of Art. 3 ECHR, the ECtHR has strengthened the protection of aliens from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (eg Chahal v UK [ECtHR] Reports 1996-V 1831 at 21 para. 74); see also Human Dignity, International Protection). It is well established in the case-law of the ECtHR that expulsion or any other kind of removal by a State Party may engage the responsibility of that State. If substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Art. 3 ECHR in the receiving country, Art. 3 ECHR implies













the obligation not to expel the person in question to that country (see Soering Case [ECtHR] Series A No 161 at 35 paras 90–91; Cruz Varas v Sweden [ECtHR] Series A No 201 at 28 paras 69–70) . In favour of third-country nationals, the right to family life guaranteed in Art. 8 ECHR can—on exceptional conditions—encompass the right to remain in a country (Dalia v France [ECtHR] Reports 1998-I 76 at 91 para. 52; Boultif v Switzerland [ECtHR] Reports 2001-IX 119 at 130 para. 46) . For specific situations, the ECtHR holds that the right to family life provides for the right to legalize the stay by granting a formal residence permit or a similar document (Sisojeva v Latvia [ECtHR] App 60654/00 paras 104–107; in this case, the Grand Chamber struck the application in its judgment of 15 January 2007; in Rodrigues da Silva v Netherlands [ECtHR] Reports 2006-I 223 , the Grand Chamber rejected the application on 3 July 2006).

42 Interpreting the law of the European Union, the European Court of Justice ruled in its judgment of 27 June 2006 (C–540/03 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-05769 ) on some aspects of Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification but also stressed in its judgment the human rights dimension and the State obligations in international law, especially stemming from the CROC.

International human rights law protects refugees during armed conflict

Vincent Chetail, June 2014, Director of the Global Migration Centre and Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. He is a Board Member of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and, from 2004 to 2012, was Research Director of the Geneva Academy. He was also Head of the Master in International Affairs from 2009 to 2012, Armed Conflict and Forced Migration: Systematic Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, and International Human Rights Law, In The Oxford Handbook of International Law and Armed Conflict, http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780199559695.001.0001/law-9780199559695-e-28 DOA: 9-25-15

The continuing applicability of human rights law in times of armed conflict is beyond any doubt. In fact, ‘the question is no longer whether international human rights law applies in armed conflict but how it applies’.56 Similarly to the Refugee Convention, the answer mainly depends on whether the derogation clause applies or not.

Compared to its refugee law counterpart, derogation clauses under human rights law contain five substantive conditions. First, there must be an emergency threatening the life of the nation.57 Secondly, the derogation must be limited to, and go no further than that ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ in due respect (p. 715) with the principle of proportionality. Third that the derogating measures must not be inconsistent with the state’s other obligations under international law, thus including international humanitarian law and refugee law. Lastly, derogating measures must not involve discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin.58

Further to the substantive conditions, some rights cannot be subject to derogation notwithstanding the existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. While the list of these nonderogable rights varies from one instrument to another,59 some are common to all, namely: the right to life; the prohibition of torture, inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment; prohibition of slavery and servitude; and the prohibition of criminal conviction or punishment not based on a pre-existing law.60 As basic as they are, these rights are not mentioned at all in the Refugee Convention. Refugee status is indeed relatively weak with regard to civil and political rights; here human rights law provides a vital source of protection.

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Finally, a state seeking to invoke the derogation clause, must fulfil the procedural requirement of immediately informing other states parties and the Secretary General of the relevant organization of the provision from which it wishes to derogate from. Such notice should, at the very least, explain the reasons for the derogation,61 although General Comment 29 of the Human Rights Committee, and the Siracusa Principles, call for more detailed information to be provided.62

Overall, the conditions required by human rights treaties for a derogation to be valid substantially circumscribe the vast margin of appreciation granted by Article 9 of the Refugee Convention, when the relevant exceptional measures interfere with human rights. From this angle, one could even assert with Davy that ‘provisional measures under art. 9 of the 1951 Convention have, over time, become outdated by human rights law’.63

The centrality of human rights law in times of armed conflict is even more obvious when the derogation clause under this branch of law does not apply. This may (p. 716) happen for a variety of political and legal reasons, mainly when states abstain from using the derogation clause or when such a possibility is not permitted by the relevant instrument. As far as the first is concerned, states frequently abstain from using the derogation clause in order to avoid any sort of recognition that a rebel group is involved in an internal armed conflict. As notably confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in the leading case Issayeva v Russia, when ‘no derogation has been made under Article 15 of the Convention […], the operation in question therefore has to be judged against a normal legal background’.64

The same conclusion must be drawn for the great majority of treaties which do not contain any derogation clause. Such a clause remains a purely conventional mechanism established for the exclusive purpose of the relevant treaty. In fact, it is enclosed in a very limited number of six instruments, whereas the vast majority of human rights treaties contain no derogation clause. As confirmed by international courts and treaty-bodies,65 these conventions remain applicable in armed conflicts. This notably concerns the ten core UN instruments (with the only exception of the ICCPR) as well as a substantial number of regional treaties (including for example the ACHPR, or the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings).

In short, even if a state uses its right to derogate from the Refugee Convention and/or the relevant human rights treaties, a broad range of human rights obligations still applies concurrently with humanitarian law. Nevertheless, most human rights are not absolute, and can be restricted with due regard to the conditions spelled out in the relevant treaties. Against such a normative framework, a contextualized approach to human rights law is required in order to take into account the particular situation of armed conflict. While a comprehensive comparison of all applicable norms under humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law is beyond the scope of this Chapter, a typical example may be found in the right to leave which constitutes a common guarantee enshrined in the three branches of international law.

Following our frame of analysis, the legal regime governing the right to leave depends on whether the concerned state derogates from the Refugee Convention and all the relevant human rights treaties. If yes, humanitarian law constitutes an important safeguard. Yet, even in such a case, the parallel obligation under human rights law remains utterly applicable as the right to leave is reinforced in a wide range of universal and regional conventions without any possibility of derogation.66 The (p. 717) normative prevalence of human rights law is more apparent when the state refrains from using the derogation clause under the few relevant instruments. The personal scope of this basic freedom and the permissible restrictions to it clearly underline the crucial protection provided by this last branch of international law. Under humanitarian law, freedom to leave is limited to non-nationals in the hands of a party to an international armed conflict,67 whereas refugee law confines its benefit to ‘refugees lawfully staying in [the] territory’ of asylum states.68 In stark contrast to humanitarian law, human rights law does apply to everyone including nationals of belligerent states. Furthermore, contrary to refugee law, the human right to leave any country also applies to all non-nationals without regard to their legal status and documentation in the concerned state.69











Besides its broad personal scope, human rights law substantially delineates and conditions the permissible restrictions on the right to leave. Both international humanitarian law and refugee law offer a large discretion for prohibiting departure: under the former, leaving the country can be ‘contrary to the national interests of the State’,70 whereas, under the latter, ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order [may] otherwise require’.71 By contrast, under human rights law, restrictions are only permissible when the three following conditions are duly fulfilled: (1) permissible restrictions must have a legal basis; (2) they must be necessary to protect national security, public order, public health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others; and (3) such restrictions must be consistent with the other rights recognized in the relevant instruments.72 (p. 718)

One should further add that, contrary to refugee law, both humanitarian law and human rights law provide procedural guarantees governing restrictions to the right to leave. According to Article 35(1) of GC IV, any refusal to leave the country must be reviewed by ‘an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose’. Human rights law achieves the same result through the right to an effective remedy as applied in connection with the right to leave.

Refugees have protection against refoulement


When refugees and other victims of armed conflicts have left the belligerent state, the crucial issue is then to find protection in another state. This is primarily governed by the principle of non-refoulement which is a common feature of international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law. Its application to refugees from war nonetheless raises two major questions: first, the access to protection and more specifically entry to the territory of an asylum state in a situation of massive influx (Section A); and secondly, the type of protection granted to these persons (Section B).

A. Access to protection: the principle of non-refoulement and the spectre of massive influx

Although the principle of non-refoulement clearly encompasses rejection at the frontier, its applicability in case of massive influx represents the most vexed controversy of international refugee law.73 While states’ anxiety towards mass influx is (p. 719) palpable, international refugee law does not provide a clear-cut answer in favour of one or another interpretation. In fact, the two opposite views can be equally justified by sensible arguments.

On the one hand, state delegates made clear during the drafting of the Refugee Convention that ‘the possibility of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by article 33’.74 This interpretation has then been endorsed as an exception to the principle of non-refoulement in the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the General Assembly in 1967. According to its Article 3(2), ‘exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons’. This resurfaced ten years later, in 1977, at the abortive Conference on Territorial Asylum. Turkey proposed an amendment whereby non-refoulement could not be claimed ‘in exceptional cases, by a great number of persons whose massive influx may constitute a serious problem to the security of a Contracting State’.75




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On the other hand, nothing in the text of Article 33 arguably precludes its application to mass influx. Its wording is particularly inclusive as it prohibits ‘in any manner whatsoever’ any act of forcible removal or rejection towards a country of persecution.76 The plain applicability of the principle in situations of mass influx has been further acknowledged by the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).77 By contrast, the two exceptions endorsed in Article 33(2) do not envisage massive influx: they are instead limited to an individual refugee who is a danger to the security or to the community of the state. Even assuming that the notion of national security has in fact been enlarged to cover similarly exceptional threats arising from massive influxes, effective refusals of entry based on such a ground are relatively rare,78 when compared (p. 720) to the longstanding state practice of granting temporary protection in a situation of massive influx.79

Whatever the respective merits of the two possible interpretations, human rights law compensates for the uncertainty surrounding Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Two main arguments may be invoked to justify such a stance. First, the principle of non-refoulement under human rights law is absolute; it does not permit any exceptions or derogations when there is a real risk of torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment.80

As a result, a danger to national security arising from a massive influx does not exempt states from their human rights duty of non-refoulement. Secondly, the prevalence of human rights law in situations of mass influx finds additional support in its prohibition of collective expulsion. This absolute prohibition is endorsed in all regional human rights treaties.81 Though not explicitly mentioned in the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has also construed Article 13 as implicitly prohibiting collective expulsion.82 Likewise, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination comes to the conclusion that collective expulsions violate the prohibition of racial discrimination.83

A parallel prohibition of mass transfers and deportations can be found in international humanitarian law within Article 49(1) of GC IV.84 Its applicability is nevertheless confined to protected persons in the hands of an Occupying Power. Its content is further qualified by the possibility of undertaking evacuation of a given area ‘if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand’.85 (p. 721) Besides such a margin of appreciation, the exact scope and content of Article 49(1) has also raised some longstanding controversies.86

In any event, the continuing applicability of human rights law in times of armed conflict obviates the limits and ambiguities of both refugee law and humanitarian law. The human rights prohibition of collective expulsion suffers from no exception or derogation. It further applies to any non-citizens—whether documented or not—who are within the jurisdiction of the state and without regard to the risk of ill-treatment in the country of destination. One could still contend that the prohibition of collective expulsion does not apply to massive influx, because the term ‘expulsion’ does not cover ‘refusal of entry’ or ‘rejection at the border’. Such a line of reasoning is, however, not convincing. Although expulsion may have a particular understanding in domestic law, under international law this notion has an autonomous meaning determined by the object and purpose of the relevant treaty and in due accordance with the principle of effectiveness. This has been restated by the European Court of Human Rights in the leading case Hirsi v Italy. The Court dismissed the argument of the Italian Government according to which the contested measure (maritime interception) was a ‘refusal to authorize entry into national territory rather than “expulsion”’.87 By doing so, the Grand Chamber unambiguously confirmed that the prohibition of collective expulsion generally applies to any measure ‘the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push them back to another State’.88

As a result of this general prohibition, expulsion and other related measures of refoulement can only take place after an individual examination of each particular case.89 In sum, under international human rights law, the general prohibition of collective expulsion combined with the principle of non-refoulement converges in ensuring that, even in situations of mass influx, asylum-seekers shall have temporary asylum during the examination of their request. The next issue is then to identify on which grounds victims of armed conflict may be protected in asylum states. (p. 722)

B. The grounds of protection: between a rock and a hard place?
















The grounds of protection for victims of armed conflicts provide for another paradigmatic illustration of the complementarity approach. Indeed, each of the three branches of international law virtually covers war refugees, though their respective scope significantly varies from one to another.

Under international refugee law, the definition spelled out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (as amended by its 1967 Protocol) is normally apt to cover most victims of armed conflicts.90 Eligibility for refugee status depends on three cumulative conditions: (1) a well-founded fear of (2) being persecuted (3) for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership to particular social group and political opinion. In fact, each of these requirements is plainly relevant when applied to the particular context of armed conflicts. With regard to the first condition, the very notion of ‘well-founded fear’ requires a prospective assessment grounded on two prognostic factors: the personal circumstances of the applicant as well as the general situation prevailing in the destination country. Clearly, the existence of an armed conflict is a key consideration for assessing the general situation in the state of origin and thus the risk of ill-treatment in case of return.

Furthermore, even if the fear is individual by nature, such a fear might find its origin in a collective phenomenon affecting a whole group of persons indistinctively. Indeed a distinction must be drawn between the individual nature of the fear and the collective character of the persecution: the former does not exclude the latter. On the contrary, in some circumstances, the collective character of the persecution may even presume the individual nature of the fear. The very notion of collective persecution is further confirmed by the wording of the Refugee Convention. The five grounds of persecution are primarily identified by reference to membership to a group of persons (whether racial, religious, national, social, or political). They further coincide with the typical causes of most contemporary armed conflicts. (p. 723)

Against such a framework, acts of war perpetrated against civilians on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership to a particular social group arguably constitute the archetype of persecution. In this regard, several commentators have further suggested that international humanitarian law should provide guidance for construing the refugee definition under Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention.91 Such a possibility may nevertheless be counterproductive. On the one hand, defining persecution as a violation of humanitarian law may distract the attention of decision-makers in placing too much emphasis on peripheral issues which are not crucial for assessing an asylum request (eg whether the situation in the state of origin corresponds to the legal definition of an armed conflict, whether the applicant is a protected person, or whether the balance between humanitarian considerations and military necessity has been adequately applied by the belligerents …). On the other hand, the notion of persecution under the Refugee Convention already benefits from a well-established definition as a serious violation of human rights.92 With the continuing applicability of human rights law in armed conflicts, there is no need to further complicate the assessment of asylum requests by resorting to another branch of law. In any event, any grave violation of humanitarian law already corresponds in substance to a serious violation of human rights for the purpose of the refugee definition.93

In practice, however, the potential of the refugee definition for victims of armed conflicts starkly contrasts with the reticence of states parties to the Geneva Convention. Though nothing precludes the application of the refugee definition to persons fleeing armed conflicts, states’ interpretations remain highly divergent and frequently restrictive.94 This is exemplified by the wide disparity in refugee (p. 724) recognition rates concerning persons coming from the same countries plagued by conflicts.95 The most common ground for refusing protection is to require a so-called ‘differentiated risk’ over and above that of other civilians caught up in the armed conflict.96

The uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the refugee definition and the correlative gap of protection have been partially mitigated by some regional instruments following two different approaches. In the Global North, the European Union has consecrated a specific regime of subsidiary protection based, inter alia, on ‘indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.97 Subsidiary protection appears as an additional—and arguably concurrent—device to the Refugee Convention. It indirectly gives a pretext for justifying the restrictive interpretation of the refugee definition in the context of armed conflicts. Resort to subsidiary protection for victims of armed conflict has proved to be










disappointing and its application has raised many controversies regarding its exact scope and content.98 (p. 725)

Regional endeavours carried out in the Global South have followed a different approach, ultimately less convoluted and more protective: the refugee definition under the Geneva Convention has been explicitly extended to any person fleeing armed conflicts. The pioneer regional instrument in this area was adopted in 1969 by the Organization of African Unity. Article 1(2) of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa states:

The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside of his country of origin or nationality.

The African model of refugee protection has been further endorsed in Latin America with the 1984 Declaration of Cartagena.99

At the universal level, however, human rights law still remains the most clear-cut avenue for compensating the restrictive interpretation of the refugee definition. Under this branch of law, the principle of non-refoulement unequivocally prohibits states from sending back persons who are exposed to a real risk of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in the midst of an armed conflict.100 Compared to the Refugee Convention, its large and objective scope highlights two main characteristics: its absolute character impedes any possible derogation and the notion of inhuman or degrading treatment is not qualified by one of the five limitative grounds of persecution.

Furthermore, the human rights principle of non-refoulement has been construed as establishing a presumption of inhuman or degrading treatment in some cases of generalized violence. As underlined by the European Court of Human Rights, (p. 726) ‘a general situation of violence in a country of destination [can] be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention’.101 Though such a level of intensity remains exceptional by nature,102 the Court has also made clear that membership of a group systematically exposed to ill-treatment is sufficient on its own to trigger the duty of non-refoulement without any further distinguishing features.103

Protection against forced return in times of armed conflict finds an additional support in international humanitarian law. According to Article 45(4) of GC IV, ‘[i]n no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs’. Although this provision has been partially reproduced in the refugee definition endorsed two years later in the 1951 Convention,104 it has subsequently been overtaken by human rights law for three main reasons.

First, the notion of torture, degrading and inhuman treatment is broader than the one of persecution on account of political opinions or religious beliefs, even if they may overlap in practice.105 Secondly, though worded in categorical terms, the prohibition of transfer does not prejudice extradition provided that this is done ‘in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities’ and for ‘offences against ordinary criminal law’.106 By contrast, the human rights principle of non-refoulement applies to all measures of removal (including extradition) and without regard to the criminal record of the person at risk of torture, degrading, or inhuman treatment.107 Thirdly, the scope of the prohibition contained in international humanitarian law is confined to protected persons on the territory of a state party to an international armed conflict. (p. 727)

International refugee law protects refugees in a time of armed conflict













International refugee law is as indifferent to armed conflict as international humanitarian law is to refugees. This comes as no surprise as it reflects the segmented approach which prevailed at the end of World War II when the first universal treaties for the protection of individuals were adopted. As a result of such compartmentalization, refugees are approached by humanitarian law within the interstices of its particular norms, whereas refugee law refers to armed conflicts in a transversal and occasional manner.

Nevertheless, the few references to armed conflict in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) epitomize the cross linkages and the mutually supportive interactions between refugee law and humanitarian law. The provisions specifically addressing armed conflict in the Refugee Convention are clearly informed by international humanitarian law. The first and most obvious reference appears in the refugee definition.42 Article 1(F)(a) excludes from the benefit of the Refugee Convention a refugee who ‘has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes’. The grave breaches of GC IV and AP I are instrumental for defining war crimes under the exclusion clause of the refugee definition.43 Though less ratified than the former international instruments, the Rome Statute of the ICC is also bound to play a substantial role in defining the crimes covered by Article 1(F)(a). (p. 712)

Another implicit reference to international humanitarian law may be found in Article 8 of the Refugee Convention44 which reproduces in substance Article 44 of GC IV.45 Their respective scope nevertheless differs slightly. On the one hand, exemption from exceptional measures under international refugee law is broader than its humanitarian law counterpart, since Article 8 applies both in time of armed conflict and peace.46 On the other hand, as mentioned above, the rationae personae scope of Article 44 is not circumscribed by the refugee definition under the Refugee Convention.47

In any event, under both branches of international law, the relevant provisions suffer from the same weakness: exceptional measures may be taken against refugees provided that they are not applied on the sole ground of their nationality. As underlined during the drafting of the Refugee Convention, ‘States would be at liberty to advance a variety of reasons, other than that of nationality, why refugees should be subjected to the measures in question’.48 According to commentators, this would be notably the case when ‘a refugee, in spite of his genuine fear of persecution by the regime in power in his country of origin, contributes or has contributed to the war effort of that country, or otherwise carries on or has been participating in activities which the measure in question aims at suppressing’.49 The main concern of the drafters was clearly the fear of fifth columnists, namely ‘enemy aliens professing to be refugees’,50 carrying out sabotage, espionage and other related activities against the asylum state. (p. 713)

States’ reduced concern towards refugees in times of armed conflict is further displayed by the particularly broad derogation clause contained in Article 9 of the Refugee Convention:

Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in













fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security.

Article 9 is clearer on what it does not say than on what it does. It does not provide any particular procedure to be followed for invoking such a derogation clause. It does not identify nonderogable rights, nor specify the types and the limits of the measures which can be taken under Article 9. Though virtually applicable to all provisions of the Refugee Convention, this derogation clause has raised considerable debates about its exact scope and content. Authors are divided as to whether it applies in individual cases or in massive influx, and whether it concerns only asylum-seekers during the examination of their request, or all refugees formally recognized as such.51

In any event, the vague and permissive wording of this provision offers a considerable margin of appreciation. Davy even argues that ‘Article 9 provides a carte blanche: contracting States may introduce measures of control as they see fit in order to contain the threat to national security’.52 In practice, however, although several proposals have been made for using the derogation clause in a refugee context,53 Article 9 has hardly ever been invoked by states parties.

If the derogation clause is not applied the whole Refugee Convention remains plainly applicable even in times of armed conflict. This does not mean, however, that national security concerns are totally ignored in such exceptional circumstances. They are in fact incorporated into three major provisions which echo the main concerns of asylum states in times of armed conflict.54 First, under Article 28, states parties are no longer bound to deliver travel documents to refugees wishing to leave their asylum state when ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require’. Secondly, Article 32(1) of the Refugee Convention restates (p. 714) that ‘[t]he Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order’. When expulsion is resorted to on these two grounds, the procedural guarantees specified in Article 32(2) can also be suspended for ‘compelling reasons of national security’.55 Thirdly, the cornerstone of international refugee law—the principle of non-refoulement—may be derogated from on the ground of the two exceptions contained in Article 33(2). The first exception specifically refers to ‘a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is’.

However, the tribute paid by the Refugee Convention to national security does not give free rein to asylum states caught in an armed conflict. On the one hand, concerns of national security are incorporated within the Refugee Convention as an exception to the basic guarantees contained therein. As a result, they call for a restrictive interpretation with due regard to the circumstances of each particular case. On the other hand, even when exceptions are clearly justified on the ground of national security, this does not suspend the basic guarantees granted by international humanitarian law and human rights law. Indeed, the three branches of international law must be applied cumulatively so that possible restrictions and exceptions permitted by one of them—can be overridden or conditioned by the rules and guarantees under the other branches.







Human Rights Protection Outweighs National Interest


Prioritizing the National Interest Over Human Rights Leads to Genocide

Paul Hoffman is the Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International. He is a civil rights and human rights lawyer with the Venice-based law firm of Schonbrun, DeSimone, Seplow, Harris & Hoffman LLP, Human Rights Quarterly, Nov 2004, p. 932-955

History shows that when societies trade human rights for security, most often they get neither. Instead, minorities and other marginalized groups pay the price through violation of their human rights. Sometimes this trade-off comes in the form of mass murder or genocide, other times in the form of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, or the suppression of speech or religion. Indeed, millions of lives have been destroyed in the last sixty years when human rights norms have not been observed.'' Undermining the strength of international human rights law and institutions will only facilitate such human rights violations in the future and confound efforts to bring violators to justice.'


A2: Human Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Refugees

Humanity should defend undocumented migrants as having rights as beings, international law not controlling

P. Sean Morris, University of Helsinki, Philosophy Review, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law. Oxford University Press, 2012, February 2015,

It is from the case law that the theme of the undocumented migrant and their right to have rights fully emerges. Whilst European Roma’s may not necessarily be seen as undocumented, prior to the application of the EU free movement rules to the Czech Republic (and other East European countries), Romas were notoriously known for claiming asylum in different countries, but Kesby argued that such external borders that countries such as the UK employed only ‘emplaced’ non-nationals. The Al-Kateb case demonstrated more profoundly the right to have rights as an undocumented migrant and it here that Kesby argues that their vulnerability and powerlessness is partly derived from the absence of free movement. Kesby’s emphasis on the undocumented (although not easily discerned by the untrained eye) ensures that their right to have rights are not merely exhausting the legal process in a state, but also humanity itself should ensure that humanity defends the rights of the undocumented as a bein g .


A2: No Foundation for Human Rights

Human rights derived from the inherent dignity of the human person

Dr. Georg Lohmann, philosophy professor, 2015, Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci. (2015) 8:369–385, Different Conceptions and a General Concept of Human Rights,

New in this international conception is the emergence of the term ‘‘human dignity’’. First, it is only mentioned in Article 1 (‘‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’’, Article 1 UDHR), but then, as further defined in the German Grundgesetz (basic law), human dignity is determined to be a justificatory and motivational fundament for having human rights. In the preambles to the International Covenants on Civil and Liberal Rights (ICCLR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in 1966, States Parties formulate that they are convinced ‘‘that these rights derive from the inherent human dignity of the human person’’. [UNDR=Universal Declaration of Human Rights”]

“Human dignity” of international law treaties provide a foundation for human rights

Dr. Georg Lohmann, philosophy professor, 2015, Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci. (2015) 8:369–385, Different Conceptions and a General Concept of Human Rights,

Secondly now, in the international human rights documents a third conceptionof ‘‘dignity’’ is used, which I call, to distinguish it from the other conceptions:‘‘human dignity’’. It is a new ‘‘created’’ conception of ‘‘dignity’’, in particular asa political answer to the ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ (Lohmann 2012a ), statingthat no human being should ever become a lawless person, and a pure object ofbarbarism. Basically, human dignity attributed to all people by international lawgives rise to the fundamental equivalence and equal legal status of all people andensures their basic respect (appreciation and respect). It demands that all humanbeings are not merely bearers of human rights, but also that they can act ascoauthors of their own rights. It shows the normative expectation of how peoplecan live according to their human dignity, with the assumption that all peoplecan live their lives in deliberative self-determination. As a result of the socialisttradition, this new understanding of ‘‘human dignity’’ now contains a reference toan ‘‘adequate standard of living’’ and justifies also ‘‘basic social rights’’(Lohmann 2015 ). It shows what is at stake with the appreciation and declaredrecognition of ‘‘human dignity’’: that every human being is able to lead life byhaving human rights which must be respected, protected and fulfilled by allstates that are state parties in international law. In this sense, the term ‘‘humandignity’’ of the international human rights treaties functioned as a basis forhuman rights (Lohmann 2013a ).


Europe Obligated Under International Law

The EU signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, which obligates it to provide asylum


“It should not be a question of what is doable because the EU and the member states have signed up to legal obligations under international law,” Diedring said, pointing to the and the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enshrine the right to asylum. “You cannot agree to all of these responsibilities and then try to put a cap on that.”

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html



International Law


Can’t Send Refugees Back

Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law. It’s protected as part of customary international law, the International Convention on Civil and Political rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Refugee Convention


States want to be seen as respecting non-refoulement because it is an incredibly strong norm. While the Refugee Convention first articulated the duty of non-refoulement, it is also in the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and other legal instruments. 87 Non-refoulement is part of customary international law. 88 States are bound by it whether they have signed conventions enshrining it. Non- refoulement is also increasingly seen as peremptory —a fundamental principle of international law that cannot be derogated. 89 While protection elsewhere schemes may “toe the line” of non- refoulement, no state openly denies its importance.

Refugees cannot be returned – it’s a fundamental principle of refugee law


Besides identifying the essential characteristics of the refugee, states party to the Convention also accept specific obligations which are crucial to achieving the goal of protection, and thereafter an appropriate solution. Foremost among these is the principle of non-refoulement. As set out in the Convention, this prescribes broadly that no refugee shall be returned in any manner whatsoever to any country where he or she would be at risk of persecution.7

The word refoulement derives from the French refouler, which means to drive back or to repel. The idea that a state ought not to return persons to other states in certain circumstances was first referred to in Article










3 of the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees. It was not widely ratified, but a new era began with the (p. 40) General Assembly’s 1946 endorsement of the principle that refugees with valid objections should not be compelled to return to their country of origin.8 An initial proposal that the prohibition of refoulement be absolute and without exception was qualified by the 1951 Conference, which added a paragraph to deny the benefit of non-refoulement to the refugee whom there are ‘reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country...or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’ Apart from such limited exceptions, however, the drafters of the 1951 Convention made it clear that refugees should not be returned, either to their country of origin or to other countries in which they would be at risk; they also categorically rejected a proposal allowing for ‘cancellation’ of refugee status in cases of criminal or delinquent behaviour after recognition.

Today, the principle of non-refoulement is not only the essential foundation for international refugee law, but also an integral part of human rights protection, implicit in the subject matter of many such rights, and a rule of customary international law.

Read in connection to other treaties and agreements, the 1951 Convention establishes a responsibility to protect refugees


The 1951 Convention is sometimes portrayed today as a relic of the Cold War, inadequate in the face of ‘new’ refugees from ethnic violence and gender-based persecution, (p. 45) insensitive to security concerns, particularly terrorism and organized crime, and even redundant, given the protection now due in principle to everyone under international human rights law.

The 1951 Convention does not deal with the question of admission, and neither does it oblige a state of refuge to accord asylum as such, or provide for the sharing of responsibilities (for example, by prescribing which state should deal with a claim to refugee status). The Convention does not address the question of ‘causes’ of flight, or make provision for prevention; its scope does not include internally displaced persons, and it is not concerned with the better management of international migration. At the regional level, and notwithstanding the 1967 Protocol, refugee movements have necessitated more focused responses, such as the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration; while in Europe, the development of protection doctrine under the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights has led to the adoption of provisions on ‘subsidiary’ or ‘complementary’ protection within the legal system of the European Union.







Nevertheless, within the context of the international refugee regime, which brings together states, UNHCR, and other international organizations, the UNHCR Executive Committee, and non-governmental organizations, among others, the 1951 Convention continues to play an important part in the protection of refugees, in the promotion and provision of solutions for refugees, in ensuring the security and related interests of states, sharing responsibility, and generally promoting human rights. Ministerial Meetings of States Parties, convened in Geneva by the government of Switzerland to mark the 50th and 60th anniversaries of the Convention in December 2001 and December 2011, expressly acknowledged, ‘the continuing relevance and resilience of this international regime of rights and principles...’ and reaffirmed that the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol ‘are the foundation of the international refugee protection regime and have enduring value and relevance in the twenty-first century’.25

In many states, judicial and administrative procedures for the determination of refugee status have established the necessary legal link between refugee status and protection, contributed to a broader and deeper understanding of key elements in the Convention refugee definition, and helped to consolidate the fundamental principle of non-refoulement. While initially concluded as an agreement between states on the treatment of refugees, the 1951 Convention has inspired both doctrine and practice in which the language of refugee rights is entirely appropriate.

The concept of the refugee as an individual with a well-founded fear of persecution continues to carry weight, and to symbolize one of the essential, if not exclusive, reasons for flight. The scope and extent of the refugee definition, however, have matured under the influence of human rights law and practice, to the point that, in certain well-defined circumstances, the necessity for protection against the risk of harm can trigger an obligation to protect.

Persons can be persecuted for many different reasons


2. Grounds and Criteria of Persecution

8 For the purposes of the Refugee Convention, a person is persecuted if life, freedom, or other substantial rights of the person are endangered or threatened by measures or a menacing situation which can be ascribed to a State or a State-like entity. Thus, persecution is a concept based on the possible or actual violation of substantial rights of the refugee. Persecution is mostly intentional, but the violation of the individual sphere of a refugee can also be caused by a situation without an intentional measure directed against the refugee. Persons can be persecuted as victims of armed conflicts, of violence motivated by ethnic conflicts (Ethnicity) or other political and social upheavals. The prerequisites and the scope of persecution are subject to discussion.

9 The definition of persecution in Art. 7 (2) lit. g Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ([adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002] 2187 UNTS 90) is limited to the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights, since—for the purposes of the Rome Statute—persecution is part of the concept of crimes against humanity committed by individuals against other individuals. However, the question of individual guilt of a person is different from the question of responsibility of a State and the protection of the victims of persecution (Individual Criminal Responsibility; State Responsibility). The purpose of the Refugee Convention is the protection of refugees, implying a wider notion of persecution.

10 Originally, the concept of persecution referred to State persecution. Still, State authorities are responsible for many cases of persecution, causing individuals to flee their countries. However, non-State actors can also be held responsible, for example in civil wars or in a failing State situation (Failing States). As the Refugee Convention does not limit the concept of persecution, the well-founded fear of persecution












can be a result of any danger to individual integrity and human dignity resulting in a lack of protection in the territory the refugee leaves to seek refuge elsewhere.

11 The list of the five grounds of persecution laid down in Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention limits the concept of persecution. Although the Refugee Convention creates a specific regime, other international instruments may be consulted in interpreting the terms (see Art. 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] 1155 UNTS 331). With regard to race, the definition of Art. 1 (1) International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination ([opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969] 660 UNTS 195) contributes to the determination of the notion in refugee law. Racial discrimination can be based on race, colour, descent, or national ethnic origin (Racial and Religious Discrimination). Persecution on grounds of religion has a long history. The violation of the freedom of religion as set forth by Art. 18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (‘ICCPR’) constitutes a breach of international law (Religion or Belief, Freedom of, International Protection). Violations of Art. 18 ICCPR can lead to a qualification as refugee under the Refugee Convention. Nationality in Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention does not only refer to the situation that a State persecutes its own nationals, but can be interpreted as including origins and even the membership of particular ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic communities. This overlaps with the persecution on account of the membership of a particular social group. Cross-over effects occur with the international protection of minorities (Minorities, International Protection). With respect to the wide notion of social groups, this ground of persecution implies an extensive interpretation. The self-perception of a person as member of a social group may play an important role. Therefore, criteria for the membership of a social group may be sexual orientation or the linguistic or economic background. Part of the concept is the gender-related persecution of women (see also Women, Rights of, International Protection). Even if details may be of controversial character, the persecution due to the membership of a particular social group represents an evolving concept which enables States and international organizations to include recent social developments into refugee law. However, a possible restrictive State practice should be taken into account. With respect to persecution due to political opinion, the Refugee Convention can be understood as a safeguard for the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Opinion and Expression, Freedom of, International Protection). This right is laid down in Art. 19 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (‘UDHR’) and in Art. 19 ICCPR. As the expression of a political opinion is linked to political activity, members of the political opposition or a minority in their respective home States can refer to this reason of persecution.

12 There can be other grounds for persons to flee their home States than the grounds set forth in Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention. Persons may leave their home on grounds of war or famine, natural disasters, over-population, or mass expulsions of populations (Forced Population Transfer). Purely economic reasons do not entitle to refugee status (Migration). However, in combination of several reasons motivating a person to leave his home and to seek refuge, one of the relevant grounds of Art. 1 A (2) Refugee Convention may play an important role, eg in the combination of economic reasons and membership of a particular social group. Then, it is possible to qualify the person as a refugee under the Refugee Convention.

International law establishes that refugees are protected under parts I and III of Geneva Convention IV


The fundamental legal instrument for the protection of refugees is the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), modified by the 1967 Protocol relating to the























Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Protocol’). Both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol are in force for 144 States, with a slight difference of States Parties as of March 2010. There are further legally binding international provisions relating to the situation of refugees or their status, eg Art. 44 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (‘Geneva Convention IV’ [adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950] 75 UNTS 287; Geneva Conventions I–IV [1949]), which deal with refugees and displaced persons, and Art. 73 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts ([adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978] 1125 UNTS 3; Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I [1977]), which stipulates that refugees and stateless persons shall be protected persons under parts I and III Geneva Convention IV.












Need to Uphold International Law

For international law to be meaningful in the context of refugees, states have to act to uphold it

Volker Türk and Rebecca Dowd, June 2014, Protection Gaps, in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-024 DOA: 9-25-15

For it to be effective, the international protection of refugees and other forcibly displaced people requires a solid legal and institutional underpinning, which is reflected primarily in international and regional legal instruments for the protection of refugees, notably the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Effective protection also greatly depends on the genuine commitment of states to implement these instruments, both individually and through international cooperation. At the institutional level, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established as the main global refugee institution in the wake of the Second World War. Given the particular character of refugees as people who lack the protection of their own countries, UNHCR was created as the legal entity able to intercede on their behalf, as best illustrated by its supervisory responsibilities in respect of international refugee and statelessness instruments. The effective exercise of UNHCR’s mandate both presupposes and is underpinned by the commitment from states to cooperate with it. From the outset, one of the main challenges has been addressing gaps in protection both as regards the legal regime and how it operates in practice.




Other Advantages – Economies of Intake Countries


Economy

Refugees a huge economic boost to aging and shrinking populations

Christian Bodewig, program leader, World Bank, September 24, 2015, Newsweek, Refugees should be welcomed by Europe’s aging nations, http://www.newsweek.com/refugees-should-be-welcomed-aging-european-nations-376201 DOA: 9-25-15

But wait a minute. Opposition to immigration appears counterintuitive for countries that face the prospect of aging and rapid population declines.

For example, the Baltic countries and Bulgaria have already seen their populations shrink by more than 15 percent since 1990, Croatia by 10 percent and Romania and Hungary by more than 5 percent. The share of the population aged 65 and above in the countries of Central Europe and the Baltics increased by more than a third between 1990 and 2010.

Unlike in Western Europe, where people are living longer, aging in Central Europe and the Baltic countries has driven significant emigration, especially of young people of child-bearing age and often to Western Europe, and by substantial drops in fertility.

Fertility rates in Central Europe and the Baltic countries today are generally below 1.6. They are as low as 1.3 in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia—far below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1.

Population projections suggest that aging and demographic decline will continue and even accelerate, putting economic growth at risk and adding to fiscal pressures through a greater reliance on old age pensions and health services.

How can Europe turn this challenge around? Countries can minimize economic and social consequences of demographic change through policies that makes smaller workforces more productive, including through improvements in workers’ skills and health so that they can be employed more productively and during longer working lives.

Given the vast size of emigration from countries in Central Europe and the Baltics over the last two decades, immigration will not make up for the decline in working-age populations. But with refugee numbers in Europe surging, immigration will gradually become an element of the policy response.

The real policy question for the countries of Central Europe and the Baltics today is therefore not whether to accept migrants or not but, rather, how to turn the challenge of today’s refugee crisis into an opportunity. At a minimum, the examples of Turkey and Jordan show that hosting far larger numbers of refugees than Europe need not be an economic drag.

Given the terrible and intractable conditions in their countries of origin, refugees from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea arriving in Europe today are likely to stay for a while. This suggests that once short-term humanitarian emergency needs are met, they require stable housing, schooling, health and employment solutions for the medium term.

For example, since large numbers of refugees are coming with children of schooling age, schools need capacity for introductory classes to allow children to learn the language of the host country and to get integrated into general classrooms. Education systems in countries in Central Europe and the Baltics are adjusting to declining student numbers, so there should be infrastructure and teacher capacity to accommodate incoming refugee children and youth.

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/05/000425962_20120605171239/Rendered/PDF/548900ESW0P1180choolAutonomyReforms.pdf

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/05/000425962_20120605171239/Rendered/PDF/548900ESW0P1180choolAutonomyReforms.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali

http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/ECA/aging%20europe.pdf

http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/ECA/aging-europe-background-papers.zip

http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/ECA/aging-europe-background-papers.zip



http://www.newsweek.com/refugees-should-be-welcomed-aging-european-nations-376201

http://www.newsweek.com/refugees-should-be-welcomed-aging-european-nations-376201


Many migrants arriving in Europe today come with the skills and motivation to be successful and to make a contribution to their host countries’ economies. Many come with children. They have the potential to not just alleviate declining numbers of workers but also to boost innovation through bringing fresh ideas and perspectives. Integrating migrants is challenging.

I can think of plenty of examples across Europe where integration has not been successful. But there are others.

Take the example of the Vietnamese community that has been living in the Czech Republic for decades. There are more than 60,000 ethnic Vietnamese in the Czech Republic today—20 times more than the European Commission’s refugee quota would allocate to the country. Many Vietnamese have excelled in education and are active in the business community.

Examples of both failure and success of integration provide lessons to inform policy about how to make Europe’s response to the refugee crisis not just an essential humanitarian act but also a smart investment in its economic prosperity.

https://www.czso.cz/documents/11292/27914491/1506_c01t13.pdf/f11adb42-34bd-42a5-a418-274129f1e4b1?version=1.0

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/10/20/vietnamese-in-the-czech-republic-fruit-veg-and-beyond/


Germany/France Economy Advantage

Distributing people across Europe takes pressure of Germany and France


The idea behind the plan — backed by Germany and France, the dominant powers in Europe — is to relieve the pressure on front-line nations like Italy and Greece, which migrants from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa have been flooding. Germany has estimated that it will give refuge to as many as one million people this year. The dispute has highlighted a political divide between wealthier countries like Germany and Sweden, which have emphasized multiculturalism and humanitarian aid, and poorer countries from the former Communist bloc, like Hungary and Slovakia, that are alarmed at the economic and social challenges of absorbing so many migrants.




Other Advantages -- Geopolitical


Croatia Advantage

Failure of the EU to act leaves thousands of refugees stuck on the border with Croatia

Raymond Smith, September 2015, The Migration Crisis, page number @ end of card. Kindle Edition

The EU's failure to find a unified response to the crisis left Croatia, one of the poorest countries in the European Union, squeezed between the blockades thrown up by Hungary and Slovenia and the unending flood of people flowing north from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Smith, Raymond E. (2015-09-18). The Migration Crisis (Kindle Locations 264-266). Sanway Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Though sympathetic to their plight, Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic demanded that the EU step forward and take responsibility for the people in transit through this country of 4.2 million. More than 20,000 have arrived since Wednesday. Smith, Raymond E. (2015-09-18). The Migration Crisis (Kindle Locations 267-268). Sanway Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Failure to enact a larger resettlement leaves all the refugees at the borders of Hungary and Croatia


With the unprecedented volumes of new arrivals, even the best-prepared European countries have reached a breaking point in their ability to meet European Union (EU) standards for receiving and processing applicants. Those with less experience managing immigration or hosting asylum seekers have given in at times to rash or counterproductive impulses. The question of who is responsible for those arriving has reignited deep internal divisions between Member States. Months of tense negotiations over efforts to relocate tens of thousands of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy resulted in a September 22 majority vote among EU interior ministers approving the relocation of 120,000 refugees across the continent, overriding objections to the redistribution scheme from several Eastern Member States. Frontline states such as Greece and Italy bear a disproportionate responsibility for receiving new arrivals, although most newcomers quickly move on to wealthier European Union (EU) countries including Sweden and Germany—which in 2015 received almost half of all EU asylum applications. In the process, a new front line has emerged in transit countries such as Hungary and Croatia that suddenly face enormous pressures at their borders, and in the case of Hungary the reaction has been to erect barbed-wire fencing and try at times to contain (or push back) the asylum seekers.




Conflict and oppression will not abate


Elsewhere, conflict and oppression seem unlikely to abate. Political oppression in Eritrea, including forced conscription, will continue to drive flows. At the same time, growing instability in Egypt and escalating conflicts in Libya and Yemen may prove to be new sources for refugee flows to Europe; violence in Yemen has already driven many to seek safety across the Gulf of Aden in Somalia—reversing long-time regional flows. Yet Europe has few early-warning systems in place equipped to predict mass movements before they happen. Indeed, migration is usually used as an indicator of brewing political conflicts or large-scale natural disasters, rather than a policy target in and of itself. In the short term, the usual reduction in Mediterranean arrivals over the winter months may not materialize as migrants and refugees use the shorter and safer crossing from Turkey to Greece.




EE/Balkan Conflict

Failure to act to resolve the refugee crisis risks conflict in the Balkans

Adam Lebor, September 29, 2015, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/09/europe-refugee-crisis-fans-old-balkan-tensions-377714.html DOA: 9-29-15 Europe's Refugee Crisis Stirs Bad Blood Among Old Enemies in the Balkans

The newest crisis in the Balkans began with a fence rather than a bout of ethnic or nationalist bloodletting. In July, Hungary began building a barrier along its 110-mile border with Serbia, and it plans similar fences on its borders with Croatia and Romania to prevent an influx of refugees. “We are practiced at this now, and we are very good at it,” Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, told a group of foreign journalists in September.

The regional reaction to the fence-building was immediate: Governments in the region sealed more borders, introduced trade bans and began a tit-for-tat torrent of insults. And as the war of words intensified, columns of weary refugees continued trudging northward through these troubled lands. Once again, Europe’s poorest and most volatile region was turning into a flashpoint.

It was not supposed to be like this. The wars in the former Yugoslavia ended in 1999. Regional prosperity may be some way off, but peace has held, other than the occasional flare-up. Croatia joined the European Union in 2013. Membership negotiations for Serbia and some of its neighbors proceed. But the migrant crisis has re-animated traumas, highlighted the region’s underlying structural weaknesses and raised pointed questions about the integration of Europe’s poorest regions. “This crisis has no precedent. Nobody knows how long it will last, and nobody knows how to tackle it,” says György Schöpflin, a Hungarian member of European Parliament for the ruling Fidesz party. “The Balkan countries are relatively poor, and this is putting a serious strain on their resources. The EU has to act if it wants to maintain stability.”

The response to Hungary’s fence-building came quickly, and a domino effect played out across the region. When Hungary closed its doors to the tens of thousands of refugees heading north, Serbia diverted them across its border to Croatia. Zoran Milanovic, the prime minister of Croatia, demanded that Serbia send some of the refugees to Hungary or Romania and pledged that he would not allow Serbia to “make fools of us.” (The two countries fought a brutal war in the early 1990s.) Then Victor Ponta, Romania’s prime minister, weighed in, saying that Hungarian decision-makers were “no better than those in Syria, Libya or other countries that refugees flee from.”

Croatia quickly banned all Serbian vehicles from entering the country. Serbia ramped up the rhetoric in response, declaring that Serbia had been “brutally attacked,” even comparing the new regulations to the racial laws imposed by the Croatian Nazi puppet state in World War II. Serbia then banned the import of Croatian goods.

Meanwhile, in Budapest, Orbán’s government declared verbal war on Germany and almost all of Hungary’s neighbors. The Hungarian prime minister accused Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, of “moral imperialism” in trying to impose her liberal vision on the rest of Europe. Hungarians, he said, “cannot think with German minds.” Péter Szijjártó, the foreign minister, accused the Romanian and Croatian prime ministers and the Greek interior minister of lying.


“The regional leaders’ exchanges for the past couple of weeks look more like a show of political entertainment than serious debate,” says Vessela Tcherneva, head of the Sofia office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “These societies and states feel that they are threatened and have been abandoned by the EU. The EU was the glue that held them together, so now their neighbors are the easiest targets.”


EU Leadership/Growth

The refugee crisis presents the EU with an opportunity for leadership, growth, and development

The Guardian, September 25, 2015, Things may look bad, but the EU has been forced to stop naval gazing and is edging forward, slowly, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/25/refugee-crisis-european-union DOA: 9-26-15

But how about a counterintuitive take? Despite the negative headlines, Europe is edging forward. It’s a messy and quarrelsome process. It is slow and tedious, but it is happening. Internally, more is being added to Europe, not less. Externally, Europe is having to take a much harder look at its geopolitical environment. The EU is slowly realising it will only weather multiple crises if it starts thinking of itself more as an actor of history, rather than an object of history.

Europeans long dreamed of being part of a 500 million-strong Switzerland, disconnected from global turmoil. That illusion is gone. If one lesson has been drawn, it is that Europe must anticipate, not just scramble to react. It must be a strategic actor, not a passive Kantian ideal, feeling overrun.

More Europe is coming. It’s often said that the European construct progresses only when it seems on the verge of obliteration. Crises are opportunities: that may be ridiculed as a mantra, but it’s not altogether wrong. Witness some recent developments.

Little noticed amid talk of a new east-west clash, Poland, the largest country in the central and eastern bloc, broke ranks this week with the anti-refugee quota group (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania). Having previously sided with its neighbours, Poland announced that it would take in more refugees than initially allocated to it by the European commission.

This shift may have its origins in strong messaging from Germany and also from the realisation that Poland might one day be glad to find European help and cooperation if a wave of Ukrainian refugees were to arrive on its territory in the event of more war in the Donbass. Nor is Poland, the largest recipient of EU cohesion funds, indifferent to half-veiled threats of some of that aid being cutting off. Crude as such pressure may seem, solidarity cannot be a one way street. But Poland put a brave face on this by referring to the importance of Polish-German reconciliation as a pillar of post-cold war Europe.

Witness, also, what happened on an institutional level this week. At a meeting of EU interior ministers, a qualified majority vote on refugee quotas isolated the awkward squad. There were protests, especially from Slovakia, but treaties are treaties. For the first time, the qualified majority mechanism – by which 55% of EU countries representing at least 65% of the EU population can decide for all 28 members of the EU – was used on a highly sensitive issue (immigration, asylum), historically always left to the nation states. That was a step forward for the EU, however painfully it occurred. Yes, solidarity was imposed, but the principle of European solidarity was upheld as a strategic priority.

The refugee crisis has also spelled the end of Europe’s navel-gazing – of which there was so much during the Greek crisis. Europeans are waking up to the fact they don’t live in a bubble. Wednesday’s EU leaders’ summit produced a text announcing the EU would work towards peace in Syria, a settlement in Libya, cooperation with Turkey, and dialogue with sub-Saharan African states – all regions, to various degrees, which are at the origin of the refugee crisis.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantianism

http://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/25/refugee-crisis-european-union


It’s not just the symptoms of the problem that are now on the agenda but its roots. Easy of course, to mock the notion that the EU might sort out Syria, but at least this rekindles the concept of a European common foreign and security policy. The US administration may have been content to let Syria drift, but Europe is the place, outside the Middle East, where the consequences of that catastrophe are being felt very directly.

If – as Donald Tusk, president of the European council has warned, “the greatest tide of refugees and migrants is yet to come”– expect more images of desperate families being tear-gased, or blocked by fences and armed police. But it is precisely because such scenes of rejection are a disgrace for the EU and because most European citizens watch them, thinking “this is not who we are”, that a collective realisation is under way.

In the end, the problem boils down to what type of society we want to live in, and what image Europe wants to project to the world. Let’s face it, we are rich and lucky. The EU, in global terms, represents 7% of the population, 25% of GDP, and 50% of social spending. It distributes 65% of development aid and more than 50% of the humanitarian aid. Europe is a magnet because, despite all its problems, it has one of the highest GDP per capita ratios, and the lowest inequalities. It is a haven of stability and respect for individual rights.

The EU is a unique construct, neither a federation nor an intergovernmental organisation. It is a constantly evolving project based on the sharing of sovereignty. Look closely and you won’t find a single European leader ready to go down in history as the one who dismantled what has been accomplished in 60 years. That, and the many gestures of solidarity from European citizens who want to feel decent, not selfish, is why this crisis will not spell the end of Europe.

If EU aces, they could re-establish leadership on the issue

Adam Lebor, September 29, 2015, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/09/europe-refugee-crisis-fans-old-balkan-tensions-377714.html DOA: 9-29-15 Europe's Refugee Crisis Stirs Bad Blood Among Old Enemies in the Balkans

The crisis has also put the EU under enormous strain, highlighting how its institutions work well under smooth conditions but are dismal at responding to such massive problems. The EU has failed to show leadership, says Ines Sabalic, head of Zagreb’s representation office in Brussels. “This crisis did not happen yesterday. There was enough time to make plans. Instead, we have had the core countries, the old Europe, reprimanding the new Europe for not being welcoming, forward-thinking and progressive. But the core countries, France and Germany, have failed to provide leadership. We need a compromise not only between Berlin, Paris and London, but also between the old and new member states.”

Some in Brussels whisper that the crisis could mark the beginning of the end for the EU. The Schengen zone of visa-free travel—the area in which citizens of EU member states can travel without impediment—has already been restricted as member states reintroduce de facto border controls. That’s a huge symbolic and practical blow to the European dream.

But there are others in Brussels and the Balkans who say this crisis might present Europe with an opportunity to draw closer rather than to fragment. If and when the EU discusses how to handle the flow of people from the south, the discussions need to include all countries affected, not just member states, says Tcherneva. “Serbia and Macedonia do not want to be recipients of political decisions. They want to be included in the decision-making process. The western Balkans have to be stabilized and have to be helped. Otherwise the migrant crisis could take these countries down. Hopefully, this will be southeast Europe’s moment.”

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/eu-refugee-summit-in-disarray-as-donald-tusk-warns-greatest-tide-yet-to-come

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/eu-refugee-summit-in-disarray-as-donald-tusk-warns-greatest-tide-yet-to-come


A2: Con Arguments (General)


A2: Too Many People to Absorb

Relative to Europe’s entire population, it is an insignificant number of people

Martin Wolf, September 22, 2015, Financial Times, A refugee crisis that Europe cannot escape, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3967804c-604b-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mTKajB48 DOA : 9-22-15

The number of accepted asylum seekers this year would still amount to only 0.1 per cent of the EU’s population, hardly an unmanageable figure. The numbers reaching the EU are also small relative to the total number of refugees. The number of forcibly displaced people in the world at the end of last year was 59.5m. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the displaced remain within the borders of their own countries, while 86 per cent of all refugees are in developing countries. Turkey hosts at least 1.7m, Lebanon 1.3m and Jordan 1m. Given the size and prosperity of the EU, the task it faces is relatively trivial,

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3967804c-604b-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mTKajB48


A2: Most are Migrants, Not Refugees

No, most are refugees

Channel News Asia, September 27, 2015, UN Says World Waited too Long to Act on Refugee Crisis, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/un-says-world-waited-too/2153336.html DOA: 9-26-15

The United Nations high commissioner for refugees said on Saturday the world waited far too long to respond to the refugee crisis sparked by the wars in Syria and elsewhere, though rich countries now appear to understand the scale of the problem."Unfortunately only when the poor enter the halls of the rich, do the rich notice that the poor exist," U.N. refugee chief Antonio Guterres told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of the annual gathering of world leaders at the U.N. General Assembly."Until we had this massive movement into Europe, there was no recognition in the developed world of how serious this crisis was," he said. "If, in the past, we had more massive support to those countries in the developing world that have been receiving them and protecting them, this would not have happened."The sudden arrival in Europe of tens of thousands refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, many abandoning refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon, has stirred sharp disagreement between European Union countries on how to "process" and accommodate them.While governments such as Germany have proven more welcoming, Eastern European countries have resisted plans for quotas to disperse refugees.For years, Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan have struggled to cope with millions of refugees from Syria's 4-1/2-year civil war."The refugees are living worse and worse," he said. "They're not allowed to work, the overwhelming majority of them live below the poverty line. It's more and more difficult for them to have any hope in the future."Without peace in Syria, and without massive support to the neighbouring countries ... we risk a massive exodus" of refugees from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.He also disputed some assessments, including Hungary's, that most of the people reaching the EU's doorsteps from the Balkans were economic migrants, not refugees who deserve protection. Most of them are genuine refugees, he said.

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/un-says-world-waited-too/2153336.html


A2: Refugees Hurt the Economy

Refugees are not an economic drain


First, let’s be clear: Countries that refuse refugees are usually damaging their own prospects. Refugees are some of the best bets for almost any economy. The extraordinary journeys they undertake to flee conflict and insecurity show that they’re motivated, enterprising, and able-bodied. They want to work and support their families — they just prefer to do it somewhere safe. In the United States, a higher share of foreign-born people join the labor force than native-born people, and their unemployment rate is typically lower as well.

Germany has a low unemployment rate, needs new workers


Perversely, the realities of politics and prejudice have stopped many countries from opening their doors more than a crack, if at all. An exception is Germany, which is expecting 800,000 asylum applications this year and is prepared to take in 500,000 more refugees annually for the foreseeable future. With the unemployment rate hovering around its lowest levels in decades, Germany is ready to absorb new workers.

Refugees improve the economy by boosting consumption


But countries with tight labor markets aren’t the only ones for which refugees can provide an economic boost. Refugees are consumers before they’re workers, in fact as soon as they arrive in their new homes. Before they have jobs, they typically receive financial aid from relatives, community groups, charities, and the government so they can pay rent and buy necessities. In each of these cases, money is converted from savings to consumption. Donations that might otherwise have sat in bank accounts join funds from treasury coffers in a massive short-term stimulus to the economy. This stimulus doesn’t come at the cost of future growth, either. Instead, it’s an upfront payment for a wellspring of long-term economic activity.

Refugees net positive economically



https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LRHUTTTTDEM156N




http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf




New Scientist, September 9, 2015, Why Welcoming More Refugees Makes Economic Sense for Europe, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730383-800-why-welcoming-more-refugees-makes-economic-sense-for-europe/ DOA: 9-22-15

Even without a worker shortage, migrants needn’t be a burden. On 4 September the World Bank, the UN’s International Labour Organization and the OECD club of rich countries issued a report concluding that “in most countries migrants pay more in taxes and social contributions than they receive.”

In a study last year, researchers at University College London found both European and non-European immigrants to the UK more than pay their way. Non-Europeans living in the UK since 1995 brought £35 billion worth of education with them. Those who arrived between 2000 and 2011 were less likely than native Brits to be on state benefits, and no more likely to live in social housing. Unlike natives, they contributed a net £5 billion in taxes during that period.

That is partly because most migrants are young and need relatively little in the way of benefits. Their economic impact approaches that of natives as they age and assimilate. But the positive effect can be substantial: Carlos Vargas-Silva of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford reported this year that letting in 260,000 immigrants a year could halve the UK’s public debt 50 years from now. “There are more than a dozen good studies now that point to a net positive effect of migrants on the economy,” says Goldin.

Most data shows the economic impact is generally positive,” agrees Betts, especially when immigrants are well educated, as most Syrians are. “Unlike ordinary migrants, refugees didn’t choose to come,” says Betts, potentially making their impact slightly different.. But that means they will go home if they can, or if not, adapt like other migrants. “There can be local negative effects on jobs, but that can be managed,” says Betts. For example minimum wages can stop immigrants undercutting locals. Some studies show migrants create jobs for locals, says Mathias Czaika of the International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford. “An influx of migrants can depress wages, but mostly for other migrants, and only 1 to 3 per cent. Mostly the impact on wages or jobs is neutral or positive.” Germany has no doubts. “Every euro we spend on training migrants is a euro to avoid a shortage of skilled labour,” German state governments declared last week. Otherwise, they say, they would have to spend more on benefits, as the labour shortage hurts industry and jobs.

Refugees tend to be ambitious and entrepreneurial

CNN, September 10, 2015, Today’s refugee could be tomorrow’s entrepreneur, http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/10/news/migrant-crisis-refugees-business/ DOA: 9-22-15

But for countries that agree to take more refugees from Syria, Iraq, Eritrea and Afghanistan, the payoff could be significant. Those nations could benefit from an influx of new, largely young, workers, and may even become home to future stars of the business world. "Migrants who take huge risks to get where they want to go often tend to be more entrepreneurial people ... that may also help to keep an aging economy vibrant," noted Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg bank. History is studded with migrants who have made it to the top. Some fled persecution, others left their native lands in search of more opportunity. George Soros is one of the most famous examples. Soros fled communist Hungary in 1947 after surviving the Nazi occupation of his home country during World War II. He emigrated first to England and later settled in the U.S.

http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/30/investing/ukraine-soros-billion-russia/?iid=EL

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/09/europe/europe-migrant-crisis/?iid=EL

http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/10/news/migrant-crisis-refugees-business/

http://eu.boell.org/en/2015/09/02/joint-declaration-current-state-refugee-policy

http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/people/mathias-czaika

http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/fiscal-impact-immigration-uk

http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/fiscal-impact-immigration-uk

https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26605-opening-the-door-to-immigrants-is-good-for-the-economy

http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/multilateral-system/g20/reports/WCMS_398078/lang--en/index.htm

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730383-800-why-welcoming-more-refugees-makes-economic-sense-for-europe/



A2: Too Expensive

The issue isn’t money—Europe can afford it


That problem would be much easier to solve if it were just a question of money. Europe is wealthy, and so are Australia and the United States. There is no doubt that we could bear the costs of resettling and sheltering the refugees who need help, even with their growing numbers. And in the long run, such a program would likely pay for itself: immigration tends to be a net economic positive for immigrants and their new home countries alike. But the problem isn't really about money. Rather, the challenge is about overcoming the domestic political forces that drive nativism, right-wing populism, and anti-immigration policies. The political forces are complex, but they often come down to an anxiety about change.

http://www.vox.com/2015/8/7/9117143/immigration-debate-discrimination

http://www.vox.com/2015/8/7/9117143/immigration-debate-discrimination



A2: Refugees Could be Terrorists

Rare for refugees to be terrorists

Anne Speckhard is adjunct associate professor of psychiatry at Georgetown University in the School of Medicine and of security studies in the School of Foreign Service. She served with her husband, U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Daniel Speckhard from 2007-2010 during which time a large influx of refugees made their way from Turkey to Greece. She is author of Talking to Terrorists, coauthor of Undercover Jihadi, and her newly released book is Bride of ISIS, September 9, 2015, Taking Refugees is not a risk to National Security, http://time.com/4024473/taking-in-refugees-is-not-a-risk-to-national-security/ DOA: 9-22-15

But as a national security expert who has spent more than 20 years working alongside government defense and security experts, I know that the majority of Syrian refugees fleeing war are not using the opportunity of refugee status to embed themselves as terrorists in the West. The majority are trying to escape barrel bombs, chemical attacks, and barbaric violence, caught between the violence of a dictatorial regime and that carried out by terrorists. They are, for the most part, much less likely to have been involved in terrorism than to have been the victims of it. In fact, refugees who become terrorists are extremely rare. There are only a small number of cases of refugees admitted into the U.S. who have been arrested on terrorism charges—the actual data shows that this is a rare phenomenon. Refugees from Syria will be carefully vetted, and those with terrorist ties refused. Security concerns should not be a reason to turn away desperate doctors, teachers, nurses, engineers and salt-of-the-earth laborers who simply want to escape a horrific humanitarian crisis alongside their innocent children.

These refugees are not terrorists

Matt Welch is editor in chief of Reason magazine and co-author with Nick Gillespie of The Declaration of Independents: How Libertarian Politics Can Fix What's Wrong With America., September 30, 2015, Reason.com, https://reason.com/blog/2015/09/30/no-ben-carson-and-donald-trump-the-major DOA: 9-30-15

Nevertheless, fear of the Muslim "military-aged male" has shot through the commentary about the refugee crisis, particularly as it concerns Europe—where at least the assertion has more statistical validity. Here's a typical recent claim, from Rep. Brian Babin (R-Texas):

Seventy percent of these people that are going into Western Europe today are military-aged males 20-30 years old. According to the UN, only 15 percent are [children] and 13 percent are women.

The most recent figures from the UNHCR about sea-born arrivals to Europe in 2015 do bear some resemblance to Babin's math: Just 13% of the nearly 521,000 transplants (of which 55% come from Syria) have indeed been female, 18% have been children, and 69% men. But note that that 69% is for all men, not those in their 20s (as in the congressman's claim), or those between 20 and 40, as you also often hear.

So just how many of those 69% are of military age? I've got a request into the UNHCR for clarification. But it's safe to assume that the proportion is considerably larger than that of the overall population of Syrian refugees. Why is that?

Rush Limbaugh, for one, suspects "sleeper agents," and he’s hardly alone. But there's another explanation hiding right there in plain sight: Military-aged males are better suited for potentially deadly international travel. What's more, they are precisely the people most likely to be targeted and conscripted by various regimes and armed gangs within a war-zone hellhole.

https://reason.com/blog/2015/09/30/no-ben-carson-and-donald-trump-the-major

https://reason.com/blog/2015/09/30/no-ben-carson-and-donald-trump-the-major

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20150624/103655/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-JonesS-20150624.pdf

http://time.com/4024473/taking-in-refugees-is-not-a-risk-to-national-security/


On the hardiness factor, consider these two charts from the Pew Hispanic Center, showing the demographic differences between legal and illegal immigrants in the United States:

Pew Hispanic Center


Pew Hispanic Center

In the legal-immigrant category, the biggest cohorts are between ages 30 and 50, and the males and females are evenly split. Among illegals—by definition the ones most inclined to take risks, including to their physical wellbeing—the demographics tilt decisively toward—wait for it!—military-aged males.

As for motivation, I can testify having lived not far from Yugoslavia for most of the 1990s that a preponderance of war refugees into the rest of Europe were men in their 20s, for the very good reason that they didn't want to die, or to kill people.

Which makes our Syrian refugees a bunch of goddamned pussies, according to American tuff guys like Kurt Schlichter:

Here's a better response from the United States and Europe to the hordes of primarily military-aged males fleeing Syria, Iraq, Libya and other war-torn Third World hellholes: Go home and fight for your own damn countries, you cowards. The situations their people have created for themselves back home are apparently so bad that we Westerners are morally compelled to open our homes and checkbooks to them, so why the hell would we want a bunch of mostly young men who left behind their women and children? America is supposed to be the Home of the Brave, not the Hostel of the Gutless.


Fox NewsThese people "should be back fixing their own countries," concurred Lt. Col. Ralph Peters. It's a helluva thing, decrying the courage of people facing categories of hardship no native-born American has had to endure. Should those Jews have just stayed in Russia in the 1980s? Should the boat people have instead stood their ground against the likes of Pol Pot?

Well, at least no one is calling the refugee crisis a "false flag" operation engineered by Washington elites to trigger a "color revolution" in Macedonia. Ha ha, just kidding.

Refugee resettlements on this scale make for very hard public policy, and security concerns are definitely part of the complexity. There's a reason why the '80s-era party platforms of both Republicans and Democrats talked less about illegal immigration than about the "refugee crisis." I for one think America's first moral obligation should be toward people in Afghanistan and Iraq who face misery as a result of cooperating with us during our long occupations there.

But the challenge of making good refugee policy is that much harder when seemingly everyone is talking nonsense.

Refugees are fleeing violence, not trying to cement it


Moreover, the families fleeing Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and other countries — totaling perhaps 20 million people — are unlikely to pose a security risk. They’re trying to escape extremism and violence, not foment it. They couldn’t be further from the stereotypical villains of the global war on terror.

No significant increased risk, terrorists won’t try to mask as Syrian refugees



http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-figures.html




Moreover, we can't close our border to tens of thousands of desperate people for fear that one or two of them might be dangerous. If we've learned anything since the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, it's that the terrorist threat can come from any direction, and the only truly effective defense is constant vigilance. That wouldn't change because a few thousand for more Syrians are admitted to the country. And smart terrorists probably wouldn't pose as Syrian refugees anyway, since they would know in advance they would be subject to more intense scrutiny simply because of where they claimed to be from.


A2: Military Action Better

We’d have to invade Syria


Short of a massive ground invasion to topple the Assad regime and push ISIS back, there's no obvious U.S. military option to resolve the Syrian conflict. Even a stepped-up U.S. effort to arm and train the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition could easily backfire and leave the country worse off than it is now. At the very least, our efforts so far in that direction have proved wholly ineffective. Difficult as it may prove to work with Russia and Iran on the issue, at this point, a negotiated cease-fire may be the only practical way to stop the fighting and end Syria's agony.

Military intervention not an effective way to protect refugees


I don't see humanitarian intervention as a viable preemptive measure against refugees. It is often unwise. And, if interventions occur without set triggering conditions, they may foster pretextual interventions. Avoiding such concerns would effectively require a Ring of Gyges (see Wellman 2012). My concerns run deeper. Conceptually, internal and external legitimacy seem asymmetrical. Moreover, sovereignty can protect a thin “rule of law” (Fullerian legality) that, beyond instrumentally protecting human rights, has conditional non-instrumental value. For, even poor legal systems structure political relationships that constitutively express some moral value (collective self-determination, weak reciprocity, associative obligations). See van der Vossen (2012) and (2014) and Murphy (2005). I'm therefore skeptical that armed intervention—which risks abolishing all membership in a state—is a clear remedy for refugees' repudiated membership.







A2: Benefits Cause People to Flee Their Homeland

People want to stay at home. They only flee because they have to

New Scientist, September 9, 2015, Why Welcoming More Refugees Makes Economic Sense for Europe, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730383-800-why-welcoming-more-refugees-makes-economic-sense-for-europe/ DOA: 9-22-15

Apart from that, the EU has never used its emergency plan, says Garlick, because “member states fear this will be a pull factor for other people from the same country”. Observers say this is why the UK refuses migrants who have already entered Europe – it would encourage more to come. “No existing sound research substantiates the political claim that giving people asylum in Europe stimulates more flow,” says Alexander Betts, head of the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. “Nearly all refugees want to go home. They don’t sit in refugee camps calculating where they can get the best benefits.”

“There is no evidence of a pull factor,” agrees Ian Goldin, head of the Oxford Martin School on global challenges. “If you halved the risk of death, would that make more come? Desperate people don’t make that calculation.”

Any pull is insignificant compared to push – such as the ever-increasing hardship in Middle-Eastern refugee camps, Goldin says.

http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/about/director

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/people/alexander-betts




A2: Jordan Resopnse Plan Solves

Jordan response plan won’t be funded


The US$2·99 billion Jordan Response Plan, endorsed by the Jordanian government, moves away from a solely aid-focused strategy, towards one that places comprehensive host community development at the front and centre of the humanitarian response, to meet the needs of both refugees and host communities.5 However, the likelihood that this money will be raised is low; previous funding appeals have fallen markedly short of their targets. The Government contends that a funding shortfall would necessitate the reduction of other refugee services, including education, cash assistance, and protection services for women and children.

Aid not a sustainable solution


However, aid handouts were never a sustainable solution. Syrian refugees are not returning home in the foreseeable future, and with a few exceptions, rich nations have not met their obligation to offer refuge to Syrians fleeing the war. Self-reliance would therefore be key to provision of a semblance of human security in the region. However, the scale of economic devastation necessitates a huge influx of capital, knowledge, innovation, and infrastructure to create and sustain more jobs. At the World Economic Forum in 2015, the UNHCR high commissioner, stated that the “international humanitarian community no longer has the capacity to respond,” and called for a re-imagining of the humanitarian aid model, in which the business sector can play a constructive part.6 Private sector engagement is desirable, but the spiralling instability in the region might dissuade businesses from swift intervention. The humanitarian imperative is not likely to outweigh safety and profit.






A2: Refugee Camps Solve Refugees currently warehoused for years, have no prospect of returning home


First, existing approaches to protection have proven singularly unable to find solutions for long-term displaced populations. Almost half of refugees under UNHCR’s care in 2014 had been displaced for five years or more. For most, return to their origin country or resettlement in a third country remains a distant possibility; in 2014, approximately 105,000 refugees were resettled through UNHCR, representing less than 1 percent of all refugees displaced globally. Humanitarian responses in refugee situations have been criticized for focusing too heavily on the “care and maintenance” of refugee populations, leaving refugees essentially “warehoused” for years on end, their lives in limbo, with little focus on long-term, sustainable solutions.

Camps “warehouse” refugees at tremendous costs


Second, if we note the interaction between national systems for irregularly arriving potential refugees and refugee camps, the unfairness of recognizing irregularly arriving persons as refugees even though they could be helped otherwise is clear: high human costs would be borne yet hidden by being displaced into camps where the wait is deplorable and human rights are insecure. In 2004, UNHCR estimated the average wait for those fleeing protracted situations was 17 years. 74 This has been called the “warehousing” of refugees. 75 If we falsely believe that discharging our duty to shield others from non-persecutory peril can be credited towards our separate but equally stringent duty to shield others from persecutory peril76 (or vice versa), we fail to see how this squanders resources, unfairly displaces costs, and treats persons arbitrarily. In the hypothetical, poor allocations and unfairly displaced costs were foreseeable because a specialized tool was used for something it wasn't made for. Membership for humanitarian refugees was meted out to the lucky few who irregularly entered instead of to those fleeing persecution (wherever they are) for whom membership is the only durable solution.77

74 - Smith, Merrill. 2004. Warehousing refugees: a denial of rights, a waste of humanity. Pp. 38–56 in World Refugee Survey 2004. Washington: US Committee on Refugees.]

While immigrants and refugee-like outsiders lucky enough to make it to well-off shores would be benefitted by (and have strong interests in) membership, they are only entitled to have their unfulfilled basic needs met.78 Refugee law protects human rights for those whose membership is destroyed by persecution. If its remedy of new membership is used for other purposes—to merely meet generalized need or provide better futures—it is unsurprising that more refugees would be stuck in limbo. Refugee law supplements other mechanisms of international law, but cannot replace (or be replaced by) them.









As with all scarce good allocation, saying “yes” to some means saying “no” to others.79 Accepting irregularly arriving refugee-like outsiders or immigrants for resettlement as refugees would reinforce refugee warehousing. To take a clear case: Australia annually caps refugee resettlement, lumping together irregularly arrived persons and camp refugees.80 Without further legislation,81 this would mean fewer camp refugees would be accepted if more irregularly arrived persons were recognized as refugees. If such caps coexisted with a domestically applied humanitarian definition, it would be unfair to camp refugees.

[80- Legomsky, Stephen. 2009. Refugees, asylum seekers and the rule of law in the USA. Pp. 122–170 in Susan Kneebone (ed.), Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]

Refugees leaving camps, it’s hopeless

Maria Gallucci, International Business Times, Syrian Refugee Crisis 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-crisis-2015-record-levels-humanitarian-aid-still-not-enough-support-2105083 DOA: 9-22-15

As the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe grows, the number of people staying in regional refugee camps is declining. The population at the Zaatari camp in Jordan has dropped to 79,000 people, down by 2,000, since the beginning of August, Hovig Etyemezian, the U.N. director of the camp, told the AP.

Refugees are growing weary after years of staying in the camps with little expectation their lives will improve, he said. The international community "hasn't woken up yet to the need to assist Jordan, the state institutions and the humanitarian agencies, so we can continue serving the refugees here," he told the news organization.

Warehousing refugees in camps is immoral

Merrill Smith, 2004, Warehousing Refugees: A Den ial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, http://www.uscrirefugees.org/2010Website/5_Resources/5_5_Refugee_Warehousing/5_5_3_Translations/Warehousing_Refugees_A_Denial_of_Rights.pdf DOA: 9-30-15

Of the world’s nearly 12 million refugees, morethan 7 million have languished in refugeecamps or segregated settlements in situationslasting ten years or more, some for generations(see Table 3, p. 3). Advocates traditionally envision threedurable solutions to refugee outflows: voluntary repatriationwhen conditions in the source country change, permanentlocal integration in the country of first asylum, orresettlement to another country. Refugee warehousing,however, has emerged as a de facto fourth and all-too-durablesolution. This article attempts to define it, describeits failings, explain its continuance, and explore alternatives.Briefly put, condemning people who fled persecutionto stagnate in confinement for much of the remainderof their lives is unnecessary, wasteful, hypocritical, counterproductive,unlawful, and morally unacceptable.

W arehousing is the practice of keeping refugees inprotracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idle-ness, and dependency—their lives on indefinite hold—in

http://www.uscrirefugees.org/2010Website/5_Resources/5_5_Refugee_Warehousing/5_5_3_Translations/Warehousing_Refugees_A_Denial_of_Rights.pdf


http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-crisis-2015-record-levels-humanitarian-aid-still-not-enough-support-2105083






violation of their basic rights under the 1951 UN RefugeeConvention. Egregious cases are characterized by indefi-nite physical confinement in camps. Encamped or not, refu-gees are warehoused when they are deprived of the free-dom necessary to pursue normal lives.

Refugees die in the camps


Refugee warehousing typically occurs in the most desolateand dangerous settings in harsh, peripheral, insecure borderareas, typically for political and military, rather thanhumanitarian, reasons (see, e.g., maps, pp.79, 85).3 Referringto the 1994 deaths from cholera and dehydration ofsome 50,000 Rwandan refugees in only two weeks in overcrowdedcamps near Goma, then-Zaire, a UNHCR officeracknowledged “there is no doubt that refugees are betteroff living outside camps.”

Refugees subject to violence and crime, including rape, in camps


Warehousing is not just a miserable, but all-tooconvenient,means of disposing of refugees while the internationalcommunity attempts to find durable solutions—it threatens refugee protection in and of itself. In its GlobalConsultations, UNHCR recognized that restrictions onrefugee economic activity might become “a means to promoteearly repatriation.”5 This amounts to constructiverefoulement—a violation of international law.6 More generally,as Guglielmo Verdirame notes, “human rights cannotbe respected in refugee camps.”7 UNHCR’s Standing Committeenotes “the high incidence of violence, exploitationand other criminal activities are disturbing manifestations”of refugees remaining “passive recipients of humanitarianassistance and continu[ing] to live in idleness and despair.”8

UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection recognizes that “seriousprotection problems, including gender-basedviolence…can result from over-dependency and idleness.”9

Domestic violence in the camps in Kakuma, Kenya, for example,is notably worse than in southern Sudan where mostof the refugees originate. Camp life often upends traditionalgender dynamics by depriving men of functions thatgave them authority and status, whereas women not onlyretain traditional roles, but also may even receive enhancedstatus from refugee agencies. Somali refugees in Dadaab,






Kenya, complained that men, bored and frustrated by extendedperiods of inactivity and confinement, chew psychoactivekhat leaves and become aggressive against womenand girls as the effects wear off.10

Sudanese women in the Achol-Pii refugee settlementin Uganda report that rape at the hands of other refugees,locals, rebels and Ugandan soldiers is common.11

Refugee women, girls, and even young men in warehousedsituations often fall into various forms of sexual concubinage,including sexual abuse by aid agency employees thathas come to be known as “assistance-related sexual exploitation.”12

Camp administrators often operate outside thehost country judicial system with no checks on powers orlegal remedies against abuses and violate refugees’ rights.In Kakuma, in particular, in 1994 and 1996, camp authoritiessubjected the entire population to collective punishmentby withholding food distributions for two or threeweeks at a time in retaliation for unidentified persons vandalizingenclosures used for counting refugees and distributingrations.13 The camp’s international administratorsalso forcibly relocated an Ethiopian refugee from Kakumato Dadaab for organizing “human rights lectures” after the1994 incident, which allegedly caused disruption of publicorder.14

Warehousing can also inhibit voluntary returnwhen refugees fall under the control of authoritarian militaryleaders in camps.15 The misery of warehousing alsocontributes to illegal secondary migration.1

Warehousing distorts economies and causes violence


Warehousing not only wastes the economic andcreative energies of refugees, but the “relief economy” thatsupports it also distorts local economies. Parallel relief programsassisting refugees separately from local populationsare the most expensive ways of responding to their needswith the cost per refugee typically well over the per capitaGNP of the host nation.17 Less confining, but still segregated,refugee settlements are also very much aid-orientedand dependent on outside assistance. Aid agencies servingrefugee settlements in Uganda are the largest employers,manage most of the activities, and make all major investmentsin the areas.18 This exacerbates the refugees’ seclusionand aggravates tensions between them and local populations.“Ugandan nationals often perceive refugees as beingbetter off than they are,” note Sarah Dryden-Petersonand Lucy Hovil, “as they witness World Food Programme(WFP) trucks moving into the settlements.”19 In 1996, the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group believed tohave ties to the Sudanese government, massacred more than100 Sudanese refugees in Kitgum, allegedly because theyfound UNHCR ration cards on captured Sudan People’s




Liberation Army fighters, and attacked the settlements inAdjumani. Rebels also looted food and medicine immediatelyafter distributions in the settlements.20 Furthermore,Ugandan locals, resenting international aid given to refugeesisolated in the Kyaka I settlement, also took back landpreviously allocated to the refugees.21

Separate and unequal assistance combined withrestrictions on work is a particularly self-defeating mixture.Kenya initially gave businesses run by Somali refugees whoarrived in Mombasa in 1991 tax-free status within thecamps, although there is no basis for such a privilege in theConvention. This skewed much of the local market in their favor. At the same time, the government did not allow therefugees work permits, rendering their activities in the informalsector illegal. As a result, sectors of the local businesscommunity pressured the government to close thecamp and move the refugees to the desert camps of Kakumaand Dadaab.22

Warehousing refugees disempowers them


Most of all, warehousing refugees aggravates theirnear total disempowerment. Many warehoused refugeesbecome spectators to their own lives rather than active participantsin decision-making. Authoritarian military conditions,camp confinement, and almost complete relianceon international assistance can generate pathological dependency,low self-esteem, and lack of initiative.23 Overtime, warehousing can engender fatalistic paralysis, evidentin the following observations by various encamped refugeesin Uganda:I like it here. The Camp Commander is bringing me food.There is no other place I could go to. I am just like a childnow. I don’t know where I am, I don’t know where to go.I am like a blind person who doesn’t know what will happenin the future.We refugees are like small children, we only follow whatthe Camp Commander says and orders.As I am under the umbrella of UNHCR it is impossible forme to move of my own accord. It is up to them. Theychoose our life.We don’t have any suggestions as refugees, it is UNHCRwho have all the suggestions.I know nothing, unless people like you take me. I am like amonkey of the bush. I know nothing that I can do.24

The disempowerment of camp life in Uganda alsocreated an atmosphere of intimidation where refugees werereluctant to speak to researchers for fear they would be transferredabruptly to another camp.25




Camps become havens for those bent on genocide


A common rationalefor warehousing refugees is that allowing them to settlefreely would threaten security. Foreign nationals living atlargein disputed border areas may indeed pose risks, butcamps can become hotbeds of political agitation as well.44

As Barbara Harrell-Bond notes, “it is very nearly impossibleto maintain the civilian character of a camp.”45 Source governmentsoften target them for cross-border incursions andhold host governments responsible.46 Ironically, if bordertensions militate for any restriction on the movement ofunarmed refugees, it would make more sense to let themlive freely anywhere but in the border area.47

The Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania and then-Zaire in 1994–96 became notorious safe havens, not forrefugees, but for genocide perpetrators who diverted aid tomilitary and paramilitary personnel and intimidated residents.48 The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) usesthe Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya. According to Jeff Crisp:The SPLA plays an important role in the selection of communityleaders and hence the administration of the camp.Kakuma provides recruits (and possibly conscripts) for therebel forces. It acts as a safe refuge for the wives and childrenof men who are fighting in southern Sudan. It isvisited on a regular basis by SPLA commanders.49

SPLA fighters also reportedly use the Mirieyi receptioncenter in Uganda, where the government is widelybelieved to support them and their war against the govern-ment of Sudan, for rest-and-recreation. Theguerrillas march to and from the centeropenly armed and intimidate and forciblyrecruit refugee men and boys.50

Not only do camps often not solvesecurity problems, they can aggravate existingproblems and create new ones. Accordingto Jacobsen:In addition to the military problems like raidsor direct attacks experienced by camps, theirculture and organization make for a climateof violence and intimidation. …The presenceof weapons increases the combustibilityof the situation in and around the camps, asdoes the problem of bored and frustratedyoung men. These are ingredients for crimeand violence, the rise of political and ethnicfactions, and the increased likelihood of recruitmentinto militias or organized crime.51

Jacobsen also cites specific examples of drugsmuggling, human trafficking, illegal logging,and gunrunning flourishing in refugeecamps in West Africa and on the Thai-Myanmar border and notes the camps’ tendencyto fall under the control of political




or military elements, undermining local lawenforcement authorities.

Generally refugees contribute to economic development


Other experts disagree. According to Harrell-Bond,“By failing to recognize the resources which refugees themselvesbring to the situation, the relief model inhibits themobilization of these resourcesand networks for the benefit ofboth the refugees and the localeconomy.”55 Self-settled andlocally integrated refugees maycompete with local people inlabor markets, but their enterprisecan also have a catalytic ormultiplier effect on the localeconomy, especially where it isunderdeveloped and underpopulated.This can expand thelocal economy’s capacity andproductivity as refugees bringnew goods and services withthem for sale or barter and localsrespond to the marketgrowth caused by new populationinflows by importing orproducing more goods.56 Tibetan refugees, for example,made carpet-making the largest foreign exchange earner inNepal, even exceeding tourism.57 In the 1980s Kenya largelyameliorated its doctor and teacher shortages by grantingrefugees, mostly Ugandans, the right to work.58 Angolanrefugees in Zambia “turned the bush into villages,” accordingto locals, and led in the production of sweet potatoes,providing commercial opportunities for Zambian businessesas well (see “Providing for Ourselves: Angolan Refugeesin Zambia,” p. 74).59 In 1989 Guinea decided not toput the nearly 500,000 arriving Sierra Leonean and Liberianrefugees in camps, but instead directed assistance to thevillages that welcomed them.60 The refugees introduced riceproduction techniques—previously unknown in Guinea—in lower swamp areas.61 Among the key determinantswhether refugees make a positive contribution are growthorientedeconomic policies on the part of the host country(see Côte d’Ivoire sidebar, p. 43).62 Countries that warehouserefugees tend to rank poorly on international indicesof corruption and economic freedom.63




Inadequate assistance is being provided for those in refugee camps

Nicholas Kristof, 9-4-15, New York Times, Refugees Who Could Be Us, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-refugees-who-could-be-us.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0 DOA: 9-6-15

As millions of Syrian refugees swamped surrounding countries, the world shrugged. United Nations aid requests for Syrian refugees are only 41 percent funded, and the World Food Program was recently forced to slash its food allocation for refugees in Lebanon to just $13.50 per person a month. Half of Syrian refugee children are unable to go to school. So of course loving parents strike out for Europe.

Providing financial assistance to house refugees is not a long-term solution

Shelly Kerebell, September 22, 2015, Forbes, Refugee Crisis: Why Are Europe’s Leaders Failing? http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2015/09/22/refugee-crisis-why-are-europes-leaders-failing/2/ DOA: 9-22-15

One suggestion to mitigate the present emergency was suggested by French President Francois Hollande – assist Turkey financially and otherwise – in sheltering asylum seekers. The suggestion was not doubt influenced by the fact that France is already home to the largest Moslem population in Europe, but there is also a recent precedent: this was essentially what Germany did in the early 1990s – paying Poland to reopen former East German military barracks to house and process refugees from the former Yugoslavia. Helping non-European countries provide even temporary shelter could substantially diffuse the crisis but it is not a long-term solution.

Inadequate foreign assistance for refugees

Anne Speckhard is adjunct associate professor of psychiatry at Georgetown University in the School of Medicine and of security studies in the School of Foreign Service. She served with her husband, U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Daniel Speckhard from 2007-2010 during which time a large influx of refugees made their way from Turkey to Greece. She is author of Talking to Terrorists, coauthor of Undercover Jihadi, and her newly released book is Bride of ISIS, September 9, 2015, Taking Refugees is not a risk to National Security, http://time.com/4024473/taking-in-refugees-is-not-a-risk-to-national-security/ DOA: 9-22-15

The world is experiencing the largest refugee population since World War II. Yet the portion of the U.S. budget going to help refugees has remained flat-lined. The entire U.S. foreign assistance budget makes up less than 1% of the federal budget and is stretched thin across a range of life-changing programs addressing issues including maternal and child health, water and sanitation development, vaccines, medicines and disease prevention, farming assistance, and children’s education. Only about an estimated 12% of the foreign assistance budget goes to humanitarian support for refugees caught in the crosshairs of war. The U.S. can do better.

Refugee camps have inadequate resources

Malala Yousafzai is a student, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and co-founder of the Malala Fund, a nonprofit organization that empowers girls globally through education to achieve their potential

http://www.cgdev.org/page/foreign-assistance-and-us-budget

http://www.cgdev.org/page/foreign-assistance-and-us-budget

http://time.com/4024473/taking-in-refugees-is-not-a-risk-to-national-security/

http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2015/09/22/refugee-crisis-why-are-europes-leaders-failing/2/

http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2015/09/22/refugee-crisis-why-are-europes-leaders-failing/2/

http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-forced-make-deeper-cuts-food-assistance-syrian-refugees-due-lack-funding




and be agents of change in their community, September 9, 2015, Time, Malala: The World’s Response to Refugees Has been Pitiful, http://time.com/4027099/malala-refugee-crisis-angela-merkel/ DOA: 9-22-15

The world’s response has been pitiful — only 37% of the U.N.’s response plan for this year has been funded and more than 63% of funding needs are unmet. Food rations for refugees are being cut because nations will not contribute their fair share to help. Entire refugee camps have only one or two schools for children. If we say we care, we must not just use words, but take action.

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

http://time.com/4027099/malala-refugee-crisis-angela-merkel/

http://time.com/4027099/malala-refugee-crisis-angela-merkel/


A2: Racist Backlash

Neo-Nazis in Germany are only a small percentage of the population


I was in Berlin in August, watching the storm of controversy surrounding Reschke’s cri de coeur and wondering why she had struck a deeper nerve in German society than the actual attacks she described. Moral responsibility for creating a culture of decency, she implied, lay not with right-wing extremists — but with regular Germans. Neo-Nazis are indeed a small minority; an official estimate in 2012 counted 22,150 right-wing extremists in a population of some 80 million.

http://www.netz-gegen-nazis.de/artikel/rechtsextremismus-zahlen-7552




A2: Aid Solves

Not enough aid

Maria Gallucci, International Business Times, Syrian Refugee Crisis 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-crisis-2015-record-levels-humanitarian-aid-still-not-enough-support-2105083 DOA: 9-22-15

Humanitarian groups have raised only 40 percent of the funds they say they need to support Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons, the United Nations refugee agency said Saturday. While the international community has sent "record amounts" of aid dollars for refugee camps and support programs, aid workers say it's still not enough to match the scale of the rising humanitarian crisis, the Associated Press reported.

Aid agencies requested about $7.4 billion for 2015 to assist Syrians fleeing their country's 4 1/2-year-old civil war. Yet so far, they've received just $2.8 billion, or 38 percent of the total, the U.N. refugee agency told the AP.

The funding shortfall is forcing many aid groups to curtail programs in regional refugee host countries, including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. As conditions in the camps deteriorate and food supplies run low, growing numbers of Syrians are streaming into Europe or even heading home.

"Need has risen so much that even though we are securing record amounts of funding, record amounts of political will and support, nonetheless the [funding] gap has widened," Stephen O'Brien, the U.N. undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, told the AP during a tour Saturday of the Zaatari refugee camp, the largest camp in Jordan for Syrian refugees.

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ee1a046204f344c39078e636434cd712/un-record-amount-aid-syria-crisis-still-not-enough




A2: Sovereignty Good DA

If sovereignty is treated as an absolute the sovereign loses authority

Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

But we should not be naïve about where a defense of moral pluralism may lead us. The burqa in Afghanistan, the expropriation of white farmers in Zimbabwe, the death penalty in Texas all secure moral cover—and every other violation of human rights likewise—under the sovereign right of states to be wrong about justice. States do have a right to be wrong about justice: that is clearly what the U.N. Charter means when it places sovereignty above all other rights. Yet there must be some limits to this right, as there are to all rights, or else sovereignty loses any moral standing or justification.

If the sovereign does not protect individual rights, it has no authority

Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

These processes are absent in many of the states of the world. And where sovereignty is unconstrained, we could argue that human rights invigilation by third party outsiders becomes justified, to exercise the scrutiny and control of sovereignty that insiders would exercise if their sovereigns allowed them to. On this account, the moral authority of human rights NGOs together with U.N. bodies is a residual right to protect the subjects of a sovereign when they lack the institutional means to protect themselves. But why, Roth might reply, do they have the right to assume functions of invigilation that belong to the sovereign people alone? The answer, I think, is that the legitimacy of collective self-determination— the right of states to be sovereign—derives in turn from individual self-determination, the right of individuals to be free. If this individual right is crushed, an individual retains the right to appeal for help outside, and those outside have a duty to assist. The duty to assist is not indeterminate. It is correlated to the individual rights that have been abused and stays there, in peaceful advocacy of change from within, unless the sovereign goes further and pushes abuse to the level of wholesale murder or massacre, ethnic cleansing or genocide. At this point, an individualized duty to assist and support rights claimants would evolve into a responsibility to protect whole populations whose existence is threatened. This is the doctrine of sovereign responsibility articulated in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It appeared in 2001, was ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005, and saw its first application in the Libyan intervention of 2011.

Globalization means that nation states are not containers of sovereignty

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056


The problem with the new sovereigntists’ move from identifying the tension between democratic popular sovereignty and global governance to the condemnation of the latter is that it gets this relationship backward. Rabkin’s comments notwithstanding, the new sovereigntists argue that global governance should be rejected as undemocratic because it conflicts with popular sovereignty. The normative ideal of popular sovereignty justifies their opposition to recent empirical developments. From the point of view we are presenting, these developments instead provide evidence that the empirical presumptions on which the normative ideal of popular sovereignty rests are increasingly shaky. Although globalization is notoriously hard to define, at a minimum it connotes increasing global interdependence, a growing density and significance of various types of transnational and international transaction and interaction. These trends stimulate (among other things) increasing demand for governance of these transactions and interactions, whether in the form of law, regulation, bureaucratization, or politicization (the creation of political entities to decide transnational policy questions). Increasing interdependence leads to an increasing demand for global governance; like other states, the United States faces pressure to embrace this trend toward global governance and the internationalist outlook animating it. This trend is both an instance of and a response to globalization, one that undermines independence, autonomy, and control and renders the notion of states as containers of politics implausible. Moreover, globalization has penetrated the public consciousness through academic and political debate and through the popular media, such that there exists today a widespread and growing perception that interdependence and interconnectedness are transforming politics profoundly. Both reality and perceptions of it are changing in ways that directly challenge the empirical presumptions of popular sovereignty as a normative ideal. Extensive empirical evidence supports these claims.15 There is no point reviewing it here, however, because the new sovereigntists themselves acknowledge that globalization is profoundly transforming governance. It is precisely this transformation that they deem so threatening to popular sovereignty and constitutional government. The ICC seeks to impose binding rules to limit the conduct of states; the WTO, through its appellate body, creates mechanisms that allow for binding trade rules to be imposed without the consent of all members (Rabkin 2005: chapter 8); the citation of foreign court decisions and CIL transforms the domestic systems of constitutional government, allowing a way for international norms to find their way into domestic law and policy;16 European-style regulatory regimes dealing with labor, the environment, and human rights subordinate democratic legislative processes to supranational judges and bureaucrats and empower non-governmental organizations and so-called global civil society to influence international regulators directly, circumventing domestic political processes and altering the constitutional dynamics of sovereign government.

It’s in states’ own interests to participate in global governance structures

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056

Each of the new sovereigntists’ own examples of dangerous developments in global governance can be understood as an effort by states to regain or retain control or influence in areas where heightened interdependence undercuts them. To the extent that globalization compromises states’ capacity to protect and promote their citizens’ rights, welfare, and interests effectively, these efforts could be seen as democratically required. As Drezner (2001) and others have shown, the US government itself uses global governance to promote American aims and interests—just as Bolton recommends. To abandon global governance would necessarily


(further) reduce American control and influence vis-a`-vis other actors (and in the case of unilateral withdrawal, vis-a`-vis other states). This too has democratic costs that the new sovereigntists simply overlook—perhaps because American power blinds them to what observers in other countries can see more clearly. The Irish, for example, no more want to leave the EU than they want to cede influence within it.17 If democracy obliges states to protect and promote their citizens’ rights and interests, the fact of growing interdependence strongly implies that states should seek to assert whatever control and influence they can. It is of course true that doing so through global governance regimes undermines domestic authority in the traditional sense, as the new sovereigntists assert. But it is equally true that with respect to the requirements of popular sovereignty, this simply means that states are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. Paradoxically, popular sovereignty requires and also rules out global governance.

Popular sovereignty is not workable under modern conditions

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056-7

This is what we mean by saying that popular sovereignty as a normative doctrine becomes incoherent once its empirical presumptions are fundamentally altered. It is in this sense that the reassertion of democratic sovereignty in an age of globalization is increasingly less plausible. Popular sovereignty’s territorial conception of political authority, on the one hand, and the protection and promotion of citizens’ freedom and equality, on the other, sometimes pull in opposite directions in conditions of increasing interdependence. The point is not that the new sovereigntists are wrong about what popular sovereignty ideally requires; it is rather that the complex normative demands of popular sovereignty can only be simultaneously satisfied under particular, historically contingent, conditions. As those conditions change, popular sovereignty becomes unworkable. Popular sovereignty is not wrong or flawed; it is inadequate and increasingly ineffective in securing freedom and equality.

Strong conceptions of sovereignty kill global cooperation necessary to solve international problems

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 6

Third, binding sovereignty territorially and nationally separates peoples across borders such that a transnational populist concern with, say, preventing pollution conceivably confronts (and is defeated by) state (so-called “national”) interests in stimulating and perpetuating economic growth despite environmental degradation.

The purpose of sovereignty is to promote the good of citizens

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 13

This article thus challenges the opposition between human rights and sovereignty, and takes its cue from The Responsibility to Protect: from whence does the notion of “sovereignty as


responsibility” arise? Here, I contend that democratic, isocratic, humanistic elements (what may be thought of as human rights precursors) are actually embedded in early notions of sovereignty, including what I call Bodin’s hierarchical, Althusius’s confederative, Hobbes’ singular, and Hegel’s progressive sovereignty.6 I focus on these four because each offers a unique, early conception of sovereignty tied to a particular governmental structure: Bodin to monarchy ediated by sub-associations, Althusius to confederation, Hobbes to unmediated monarchy and Hegel to constitutional regimes. Despite differences in government structure, however, each (radically) disassociates sovereignty from its agents and aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). While their “sovereignties” may seem remote from contemporary debate, and even, as with Bodin and Hobbes, antithetical to the argument, they serve to illustrate the theoretical abyss between today’s IR-dominated conceptions of sovereignty and earlier, more human rights friendly ones. From each theorist I derive eight foundational theses to ground what I call a democratic sovereignty. In the language of The Responsibility to Protect (2001), obligation towards and responsibility for a state’s citizens is arguably the sine qua non of sovereignty—and thus forms its theoretical foundation.

SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT ABSOLUTE BECAUSE ALL GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT ELECTED

George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 102)

The principle of sovereignty needs to be reconsidered. Sovereignty belongs to the people; the people are supposed to delegate it to the government through the electoral process. But not all governments are democratically elected and even democratic governments may abuse the authority thus entrusted to them. If the abuses of power are severe enough and the people are deprived of opportunities to correct them, outside interference is justified. International intervention is often the only lifeline available to the oppressed.


A2: Criticisms of International Law

I-law can serve as a vehicle for resistance and avoid legitimizing Western violence Seyla Benhabib 9, PhD, Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University and Adjunct Prof of Law at Yale Law, “Cosmopolitan Norms, Human Rights and Democratic Iterations,” http://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/cosmopolitan%20norms,%20human%20rights%20and%20democratic%20iterations2.docI do not wish to deny, therefore, the many ambivalencies, contradictions and treacherous double meanings of the current world situation, which often

transforms cosmopolitan intents into hegemonic nightmares. However, I do wish to claim that some of these general assertions and criticisms derive from a faulty understanding of multilateral convenantalism, in that they view the new international legal order as if it were a smooth “command structure” emanating from a hegemonic source – whether this be global capitalism, the modern nation-state as complicit in the spread of global capitalism or the

Security Council itself. In all these diagnoses little attention is paid to the social dissemination of human rights norms throughout member states and to the legal, social, cultural and political institutions through which this takes place . But I want to argue the distinguishing feature of the period we are in cannot be captured through the bon mots of ‘globalization’ and ‘ empire’ ;

rather, we are facing the rise of an international human rights regime and the spread of cosmopolitan norms,

while the relationship between state sovereignty and such norms is becoming more contentious and conflictual. I will argue that these human rights instruments can empower democracies

by creating new vocabularies for claim-making for citizens in signatory states as well as opening new

channels of mobilization for civil society actors who then become part of transnational

networks of rights activism and hegemonic resistance .¶ The public law documents of our world -- the UDHR, the various international human rights covenants, and the Geneva Conventions of 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees and their Protocol of 1967 -- are distillations of collective struggles as well as of collective learning. It may be too utopian to name them steps toward a “world constitution,” but they are more than mere treaties among states. They are global public law documents which are altering the terrain of the international domain. They are constituent elements of a global and not merely international civil society. In this global civil society, individuals are rights-bearing not only in virtue of their citizenship within states but in virtue of

their humanity. Although states remain the most powerful actors, the range of their legitimate and lawful activity is increasingly limited. We need to rethink the law of peoples against the background of this newly emergent and fragile global civil society, which is always being threatened by war, violence, and military intervention. ¶ In recent works such as The Rights of Others. Aliens, Citizens and Residents (2004) and Another Cosmopolitanism (2006), I have argued that understanding cosmopolitanism in terms of the legal and moral status of the individual in the world civil society goes back to Kant’s concept of “Weltbuergerrecht,” as expounded in “Perpetual Peace.” (1797) I will not be concerned

with this genealogy in this essay nor with the philosophical problems of the justification of human rights except very briefly to set out the terms of my argument. I have done so elsewhere. Rather, I want to suggest a model of ‘democratic iterations’ for analyzing the relationship between cosmopolitan norms and the will of democratic majorities. ¶ Human Rights and the Generalized and Concrete Other¶ I need to offer some brief philosophical clarifications. I want to argue that rights claims are in general of the following sort: “ I can justify to you with good reasons that you and I should respect each others’ reciprocal claim to act in certain ways and not to act in others, and to enjoy certain resources and services.” Some rights claims are about liberties, that is, to do or to abstain from doing certain things without anybody else having a moral claim to oblige me to act or not to act in certain ways. Liberty rights generate duties of forbearance. Other rights claims are about entitlement to resources. Such rights, as the right to an elementary

school education or to secure neighborhoods, for example, entail obligations on the part of others, be they individuals or institutions, to act in certain ways and to provide certain material goods. As Jeremy Waldron observes, such rights issue in “cascading obligations.” ¶ For me human rights or basic rights are moral principles that need to be

embedded in a system of legal norms such as to protect the exercise of communicative freedom. ¶ First and foremost, as a moral being capable of communicative freedom you have a fundamental right to have rights. The right to have rights involves the acknowledgment of your identity as a generalized as well as a concrete other. If I recognize you as

a being entitled to rights only because you are like me, then I deny your fundamental individuality which entails your being different. If I refuse to recognize you as a being entitled to rights because you are so other to me, then I deny our common humanity. ¶ The standpoint of the ‘generalized other’ requires us to view each and every individual as a being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from the individuality and the concrete identity of the other. We assume that the other, like ourselves, is a being who has concrete needs, desires and affects, but what constitutes his or her moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each other, but rather what we, as speaking and acting and embodied beings, have in common. Our relation to one another is governed by the norms of formal equality and reciprocity: each is entitled to expect from us what we can expect from him or from her. In treating you in accordance with these norms, I confirm in your person the rights

of humanity and I have a legitimate claim that you will do the same in relation to me.¶ The standpoint of the ‘concrete other,’ by contrast, requires us to view each and every being as an individual with an affective-emotional constitution, concrete history and individual as well as collective identity, and in many cases as having more than one such collective identity. In assuming this standpoint, we bracket what constitutes our commonality and focus on individuality. Our relation to the other is governed by the norms of equity and complementary reciprocity. Our differences in this case complement rather than exclude one another. In treating you in accordance with these norms, I confirm not

only your humanity but your human individuality. If the standpoint of the generalized other expresses the norm of respect, that of the concrete other anticipates experiences of altruism and solidarity. ¶ Such reciprocal recognition of each other as beings who have the right to have rights involves political struggles, social movements and learning processes within and across classes, genders, nations, ethnic group and religious faiths. This is the true meaning of universalism: Universalism does not consist in a human essence or nature which we are all said to have or to possess, but rather in experiences of establishing commonality across diversity, conflict, divide and struggle. Universalism is an

aspiration, a moral goal to strive for; it is not a fact, a description of the way the world is.¶ Variations in Rights and Legal Systems¶ Human rights, on this account, then embody principles which need contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms. How is this legal content to be shaped? Basic human rights, although they are based on the moral principle of the communicative freedom of the person, are also legal rights, i.e. rights that require embodiment and instantiation in a specific legal framework. As Ronald Dworkin has observed, human rights straddle that line between morality and justice; they enable us to judge the legitimacy of law. The core content of human rights would form part of any conception of the right to have rights as well: these would include minimally the rights to life, liberty (including to freedom from slavery, serfdom, forced occupation, as well as protecting against sexual violence and sexual slavery); the right to some form of personal property; and equal freedom of thought (including religion), expression,

association and representation. Furthermore, liberty requires provisions for the “equal value of liberty” (Rawls) through the guarantee not only of socio-economic goods, including adequate provisions of basic nourishment, shelter and education, but also through the right to self-government. ¶ Let us raise at this point a question concerning the legitimate range of rights : if we agree on the centrality of a principle such as “freedom of religious expression,” must we also accept that minority religions are entitled to rights to public expression equally with the majority, as I would argue, or can we maintain that freedom of religious expression is compatible with some reasonable restrictions upon its exercise, as Rawls has claimed? Certainly, the juridical, constitutional, as well as common law traditions of each human society, the history of their sedimented interpretations, their internal debates and disagreements will shape the legal articulation of human rights. For example, while equality before the law is a fundamental principle for all societies observing the rule of law, in many societies such as Canada, Israel and India, this is considered quite compatible with special immunities and entitlements which accrue to individuals in virtue of their belonging to different cultural, linguistic and religious groups. There is, in other words, a legitimate range of variation even in the interpretation and implementation of such a basic right as that of “equality before the law.” But the legitimacy of this range of variation and interpretation is crucially dependent upon the principle of self-government. My thesis is that without the right to self-government which is exercised through proper legal and political channels, we cannot justify the range of variation

in the content of basic human rights as being legitimate. ¶ Herein lies the distinctiveness of an approach based on communicative freedom. Freedom of expression and association are not merely citizens’ political rights the content of which can vary from polity to polity; they are crucial conditions for the recognition of individuals as beings who live in a political order of whose legitimacy they have been convinced with good reasons. They undergird the communicative exercise of freedom, and therefore, they are basic human rights as well. Only if the people are viewed not merely as subject to the law but also as authors of the law can the contextualization and interpretation of human rights be said to result from public and free processes of democratic opinion and will-formation. Such contextualization, in addition to being subject to various legal traditions in different countries, attains democratic legitimacy insofar as it is carried out through the interaction of legal and political institutions with free public spaces in civil society. When such rights

principles are appropriated by people as their own, they lose their parochialism as well as the suspicion of western paternalism often associated with them. I will call such processes of appropriation “democratic iterations.” ¶ By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the associations of civil society. In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the first intended usage or its original meaning: rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever so-subtle ways. The iteration and interpretation of norms and of every aspect of the universe of value, however, is never merely an act of repetition. Every act of iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is

reposited and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases or stops making sense, then the original loses its authority upon us as well. ¶ If democratic iterations are necessary in order for us to judge the legitimacy of a range of variation in the interpretation of a right claim how can we assess whether democratic iterations have taken place rather than demagogic processes of manipulation or authoritarian indoctrination? Do not democratic iterations themselves presuppose some standards of rights to be properly evaluated? I accept here Juergen Habrmas’s insight that “the democratic principle states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation which has been legally constituted.” The “legal constitution of a discursive procedure of legislation” is possible only in a society that institutionalizes a communicative framework through

which individuals as citizens or residents can participate in opinion- and will-formation regarding the laws which are to regulate their lives in common. ¶ Democratic legitimacy reaches back to principles of normative justification, though the two are not identical. Democratic iterations do not alter conditions of the normative validity of practical discourses that are established independently of them; rather, democratic iterations enable us to judge as legitimate or illegitimate processes of opinion and will-formation through which rights claims are contextualized and contested, expanded and revised through actual institutional practices in the light of such criteria. Such criteria of judgment enable

us to distinguish a de facto consensus from a rationally motivated one. ¶ Cosmopolitan Norms and Democratic Iterations¶ What is the interaction between cosmopolitan norms and actual legislative processes, and how can democratic iterations help us understand such processes better ? Because the UDHR is “only” a declaration of principles and does not detail mechanisms for enforcement, some argue it does not function sufficiently as law, while others see it as a different kind of law. In several articles Judith Resnik has argued that by ratifying treaties, domestic obligations are altered, and that particularly in a federal system, judges duly regard valid treaties as binding law. Resnik calls such processes “law’s migration” and cites numerous examples: “…federalism is also a path for the movement of international rights across borders, as it can be seen from the adoption by mayors, local city councils, state legislatures, and state judges of transnational rights including the United Nations Charter and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Such actions are often trans-local – with municipalities and states joining together to shape rules that cross borders.” Another common method of implementation for UN provisions are the establishment of “expert bodies” chartered to elaborate the meaning of conventions by promulgating “general comments” and by receiving reports from member-states, which in turn are obliged to detail how they are compliant with or failing to live up to their commitments as parties to conventions. Further, in some jurisdictions (but not generally in the United States), international obligations can be a direct source of

legally enforceable rights through litigation in national courts. In addition to processes of law’s migration and the establishment of ‘expert bodies,’ cosmopolitan norms enshrined in multilateral covenants can enter the process of democratic iterations in specific polities via the action of social movements and civil society actors. ¶ In a forthcoming article entitled “Global Feminism, Citizenship and the State,” the Iranian sociologist, Valentine Moghadam analyzes the effects of an international human rights regime, of transnational civil society, and of a global public sphere on women’s rights in Muslim countries. Moghadam, who considers case studies from the Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Morocco in addition to Egypt, Algeria and Turkey, explores how “local communities or national borders” are affected by globalized norms. She asks: “What of the migration and mobility of feminist ideas and their practitioners? How do local struggles intersect with global discourses on women’s rights? What role is played by feminists in the diaspora, and

what is the impact of the state?” By analyzing the formation of women’s rights and feminist organizations both within specific countries and through transnational feminist networks, she argues that international conferences and treaties such as CEDAW have created tools that women tailor to their own contexts. ¶ Moghadam maps the “significant variations in women's legal status and social positions across the Muslim world.” Yet in general, “similar patterns of women's second-class citizenship” can be identified in terms of family life and economic opportunity. Citizenship is transmitted through fathers, and marriage laws give men rights that women do not have. In both Iran and Morocco, for

example, the state, the family and economic forms of dependency create what Moghadam calls the “patriarchal gender contract.” ¶ Responding in the 1980s to efforts to strengthen application of gendered Muslim family law, various women's networks came into being. Nine women from Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Mauritius and Tanzania, formed an action committee that resulted in Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which serves as a clearinghouse for information about struggles and strategies. WLUML includes women with differing approaches to religion; some are anti-religious while others, such as Malaysia’s ‘Sisters in Islam,’ are observant Muslims. Some

women work to abandon religious strictures while others challenge interpretations of religious laws and make arguments from within texts and traditions. ¶ Moghadam identifies features of these efforts that distinguish their work from counterparts in North America and Europe. Many Middle Eastern women's groups display “a tendency to work with men and to engage state agencies” rather than adopt more radical feminist postures characteristic of some groups in other parts of the world. Furthermore, these groups are relatively isolated “from the transnational feminist networks” perhaps in part because of language barriers. Yet, by reviewing recent conflicts in Iran and in Morrocco on family rights, Moghadam argues that WLUML, along with the Women Learning Project, had an impact through interactions between state-centered and transnational action. Thus she concludes that “The integration of North and South in the global circuits of capital and the construction of a transnational public sphere in opposition to the dark side of globalization has meant that feminism is not ‘western’ but global.” Raised by her examples are ironies in global struggles: the struggle for women’s equality requires revisiting the discourse of universalistic human rights just as the conditions of global migrations raise questions about whether to aspire to global citizenship, to particularized affiliations, or

combinations thereof. Further, in an important confirmation of democratic iterations Moghadam suggests that the more culturally embedded a group is within a nation-state, the more effective could be their efforts to incorporate universalist norms. ¶ An extraordinarily interesting case of democratic iterations occurred when, in the course of a debate

in Canada concerning whether or not religious arbitration courts ought to be legalized, Canadian Muslim women turn to WLUML to help them overturn Muslim arbitration courts. This case is worth considering in some detail: ¶ Many countries now promote “alternative dispute resolution” to create state-enforced private settlements of conflicts in lieu


of adjudication of rights. As Audrey Macklin explains, under the law of the Canadian Province of Ontario, women are rights holders when families dissolve and they can seek compensation for household labors that enabled their husbands to develop careers. Ontario also permits resolutions through negotiations that result in “domestic contracts.” In

addition, when disputants use arbitration, those outcomes are enforceable in court. (In contrast, in Quebec, family law arbitrations are advisory rather than binding.)¶ In 2003, a then-new “Islamic Institute for Civil Justice” offered to arbitrate family and inheritance conflicts under Muslim law, prompting an inquiry about whether faith based arbitration ought to be given legal force. Opposition came from the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, who worked with the transnational group, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), discussed by Moghadam. Reliant on networks “as Canadians, as women, as immigrants, and as Muslims,” the opponents built constituencies both locally and globally, just as they argued from national and transnational principles including the UDHR’s commitments to dignity and equality. Proponents of faith-based resolutions were similarly domestic and international — including “the Christian Legal Fellowship, the Salvation Army, B’nai Brith, the Sunni Masjid El Noor, and the Ismaili Muslims.” The denouement was

Canadian legislation that does not prohibit parties from turning to faith-based tribunals but gives such judgments no legally enforceable effect. ¶ As Macklin details, women played central roles in this case, expressing “political citizenship in the public sphere of law reform,” and doing so through transnational and transcultural claims of equality.

“Claiming their entitlement as legal citizens of Canada to participate in governance… [they] demanded equal citizenship as Canadian women. At the same time, they pointedly refused to renounce their cultural citizenship or to confine their gender critique to the specific cultural context.” ¶ Such practices not only render the meaning of citizenship more complex by revealing the interaction of the language of universal rights and culturally embedded identities; they also expand the vocabulary of public claim-making in democracies and aid them in evolving into “strong democracies.” They are reconstituting the meaning of local, national and global citizenship through processes of democratic iterations in

which cosmopolitan norms enable new vocabularies of claim-making, assume a concrete local and contextual coloration, and often migrate across borders and jurisdictions in increasingly complex and interconnected dialogues, confrontations and iterations. ¶ Returning now to a question I posed earlier concerning the relevance of my account to contemporary debates around global justice, this would be twofold: first, the degree of development of multilateral covenantalism suggests that international public law exceeds the articles of the Rawlsian “law of peoples:” transnational law creates wider and deeper interdependencies among nations, pushing them farther and farther towards structures of global governance. While the world system of states is not one of perfect cooperation with defined rules of justice, neither are relations among states “mere contractual obligations,” as Thomas Nagel has argued. The current global system of interdependence is, as Cohen and Sable argue, sufficiently thick as to trigger significant relations of

justice, which are weaker than those within nation states but certainly stronger than those envisaged by the world picture of sovereigntistes. The demands for global coordination in response to the recent economic world-wide meltdown is but one indication, among many others, of this new phase of global interdependence. ¶ Second, the law’s migrations and processes of democratic iterations both reveal that global human rights discourse moves across increasingly porous borders to weaken, and render irrelevant, the distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘decent-hierarchical’ societies. Particularly those societies where the human rights of women, of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities were curtailed on grounds of faith and religion, must now contend with increasingly transnational movements and actors who network across borders in developing new strategies of claim-making expanding the human rights’ agenda. These developments are all the more significant since they undermine the divide between ‘liberal tolerance’ on the one hand and ‘liberal interventionism’ on the other, by inducting citizens, social movements, churches, synagogues, mosques, cultural institutions, the global media etc., into a contentious dialogue about ‘justice across borders.’ Recent movements mobilizing to end genocide in Darfur; to help AIDS victims in Africa; against the practice of female genital

mutilation; for protecting the rights of undocumented migrants – les sans papiers and many others are illustrative of this new global activism enabled, in part, by the spread of cosmopolitan norms.¶ A Disquieting Conclusion¶ What I have called “multilateral convenantalism” is a new stage in the development of global civil society, in which the relationship between state sovereignty and the spreading human rights regime may generate increasing interventionism on the one hand as well as open up spaces for democratic iterations on the other. I see no reason not to

acknowledge the ambiguities of this moment. But as a critical social theorist, I look for those moments of rupture and possible

transformation when social actors reappropriate new norms both to enable new subjectivities to enter the public sphere and to alter the meaning of claims-making in the public sphere itself .

This is the promise of democratic iterations and cosmopolitan norms in the present. However, despite these developments I also have a disquieting thought: increasingly I am convinced that we need to understand the creation of “ zones outside the law ” alongside this process. From renditions of enemy combatants to

unknown locations with the cooperation of US and European governments to the emergence of maquilladoras in Central and South America and free-growth zones in China, Southeast Asia, and not to mention the decline of the state everywhere in Africa,

there is also a process of “dejuridification ” afoot . The attempt is to resist the spread of global law and to create enclaves of lawlessness and of the denial of the right to have rights altogether. In many free-trade and growth zones, the rights of workers to fair pay, to assemble, unionize and organize are suspended and violently controlled. In the desperate straits that the current world economic crises will generate in many developing countries, it is likely that these norms will be further

suspended in a Faustian bargain to keep foreign direct investment coming and the economies growing.¶ I don’t have a good explanation for how or

why these processes continue to coexist in the world society at the present; but I want to insist on the significance of existing instruments of cosmopolitan norms to help combat them. These are not complicit in the

legitimation of but rather they are enabling conditions of resistance to the forces of a global capitalism run

amok. Any defensible vision of global justice in the current world-order will have to take these

legal instruments and documents seriously and work with them rather than against them . For

this project, we not only need to overcome the reductionist resistance of many on the Left to the force of transnational law but also the defensiveness of many on the Right who see transnational law as undermining democratic sovereignty, when in fact, it can enhance it.

I-law can be reformed to prevent imperialism---engagement is vital to prevent worse crackdownsAntony Anghie 4, Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney School of Law, University of Utah, “Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,” http://kingdomofhawaii.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/anghie-imperialism-sovereignity-and-the-making-of-international-law.pdfThe further important issue is the question of whether it is possible to create an i nternational law that is not imperial; that can, in fact, ¶ further justice, increase the well being of humanity, without relapsing ¶ into the imperial project that I have attempted to sketch here. This is¶ a large question, to which

again I have no adequate answer. It is not ¶ my intention here to be deterministic , to relentlessly demonstrate

that ¶ colonialism has always been reproduced by international law over the¶ last five centuries of its

existence and that this will therefore inevitably ¶ continue to be the case . Rather, I see this work as expressing certain ¶ historically based concerns which , if recognized, can surely be remedied . In making this argument regarding imperial sovereignty. I hope¶ I have also demonstrated that there is no inherent logic to sovereignty¶ doctrine; that imperialism has been continuously contested by jurists, ¶ peoples and individuals from both the First and the Third Worlds; and ¶ that it is possible to imagine and argue for very different understandings of the meaning of sovereignty – and, indeed, of i nternational law . This is¶ demonstrated, for example, by the arguments that were made by devel-¶ oping states in the


context of the debate over permanent sovereignty over¶ natural resources (PSNR). Sovereignty doctrine, then, is articulated, sup- ¶ ported and developed through particular argumentative practices that ¶ are expressed through and underlie the decisions of jurists, the writings ¶ of scholars, and the resolutions of international institutions. It is possible to question these practices . To question, for example the

strategic way¶ that Vitoria characterizes the non-European peoples in a manner that¶ brings them under the rule of international law without providing them¶ with any of the benefits of that law, thus ensuring a particular outcome¶ that appears inevitable and legally valid. Having identified these strategies, it may be possible to contest them , to deny whatever claims they ¶ make to being universal and logical interpretations of the doctrines in ¶ question. In other words. I hope that even as I have illustrated the con- ¶ stitutive persistence of colonialism, I have also shown the problems and ¶ weaknesses of the colonial doctrines and framework, the incoherence¶ of the attempts of the nineteenth-century jurists to place and manage¶ the uncivilized barbarian. The interrogation and undermining of these¶ official narratives might enable the emergence of alternative histories,¶ an aspect of a much larger project of struggle and contestation that has¶ to take place at all levels.¶ I continue to hope, together with the many scholars who are working¶ to reconstruct an international law precisely because of their awareness¶ of the many ways in which it has operated to exclude and subordinate¶ people on account of their gender, race and poverty, that i nternational law can be transformed into a means by which the marginalized may be empowered . In short,

that law can play its ideal role in limiting and resisting power . At the very least. I believe that the

Third World cannot abandon i nternational law because law now plays such a vital role in the ¶ public realm in the interpretation of virtually all international events . It is through the vocabulary of i nternational law, concepts of 'self-defence',¶ 'human rights' and 'humanitarian intervention’

that issues of cause, ¶ responsibility and fault are being discussed and analysed, and interpre- ¶ tations of these doctrines which reproduce imperial relations must be contested . The construction of the 'other', I have argued, is crucial to¶ the extension and universalization of international law. Complex issues¶ arise as to whether it is possible to somehow imagine the 'other' and¶ behave towards it in some different and non-imperial way. The Peace¶ of Westphalia. I have already suggested may be seen as one approach to¶ precisely this problem.

International law is inevitable and part of the solution to violence even if it’s not a panacea --- the alt is impossible and allows the right to fill inEmmanuelle Jouannet 7, Professor, Universite Paris I - Pantheon Sorbonne, “ESSAY: WHAT IS THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A 21ST CENTURY GUARDIAN OF WELFARE”, 28 Mich. J. Int'l L. 815, Michigan Journal of International Law, LexisIt now seems impossible to turn back from the present course . To deny the new aims of

contemporary law and to press for a return to minimalist liberal law would be to allow the neo-

liberal powers that be to exploit the downfall of the international system for their own

advantage . n94 Under no circumstance should we succumb to the ultraliberal refusal to tackle mutual problems in the way welfare-inducing law does , as the latter would thus become a regrettable avatar of classical liberal law. It is not, however, surprising that there is currently a resurgence, in [*850] international law, of the old debate between ultraliberals, who express discontentment with too much law and bureaucracy, and moderate liberals, whose sole intent is to reform the system. Yet restoring the image of a classical but incentive-creating system would be inconsistent with the profound socio-cultural changes the contemporary international system has undergone, and with the legitimate aspirations held by millions of individuals, is therefore not an option either.¶ The shift toward ethical and functionalist welfare-inducing law is the product of a redefinition of politics and of the fabric of international society itself, and is accompanying the evolution of this society and structuring it accordingly. Classical society and liberal international law were based on international politics as defined solely by States. Contemporary welfare-inducing society presupposes that political power must aim at fostering communal wellbeing around the planet. But the 1945 consensus deteriorated long ago, as it was borne out of exceptional circumstances. It now needs to be reconstituted in the context of the new society. The legal values and objectives contemporary international law aspires to correspond to political priorities and certainly do not flow from a universal consciousness. They are the result of choices that were quite understandable in 1945, but that now need to be reformulated or revoked outright, as even if the same objectives undoubtedly still remain, the modalities have changed and the circle of addressees has become considerably larger. n95 Some have represented current phenomena in the international system as the result of a "crisis of authority" related to a double crisis of State sovereignty and of

territoriality. n96 This is deemed to explain the inability of international law to regulate the current disorder and to create a stable order. However, just as one refers to a "global inversion" to describe the diminishing of sovereignties faced with emancipated groups and individuals, one could equally refer to an "inversion of international law" since this law

is increasingly restraining States and empowering individuals , minorities, and peoples

through the recognition of rights . This approach is said to be based on "the actor getting his own back on the system." n97 States are no longer the sole members, actors,


and subjects of international society, and individuals and NGOs are now seeking recognition under international law. Today, there are hundreds of international organizations, thousands of NGOs - including 2,719 with ECOSOC status - and hundreds of multinationals [*851] thriving in the 208 States and territories. These are the entities with which States, international

organizations, and international politicians interact, n98 which is why political cohesion and the

legitimacy of the existing system require that all actors adhere to shared values . n99 All could be different if

there were greater consciousness of the fact that a legal system can be used beneficially and not simply endured passively. That being said, one should not minimize the role played by States, and should acknowledge the amicable concurrence of interstatists and cosmopolitans, voluntarists, and communitarians.¶ This is not to put in question the principle of interventionist welfare-inducing law, but rather to question its functioning and the limits to which it should be subject. This may appear surprising and perhaps even shocking considering the sociological state of the planet with all its inequalities and injustices, where collective and individual suffering has never been as dramatic and devastating. The neo-Marxist economists Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein have illustrated how major conflicts of interest, monopolist and exclusionary phenomena, and the unequal development of powers have persisted due to an excess of unequal resistance from the periphery. n100 But this is precisely what has prompted the

present essay, since the solution might actually lie in subjecting law to certain limits. I nternational law may be "part of the problem," but it is also, as has been emphasised by Philippe Sands, n101 " part of the solution ," so long as possible options do not go to the detriment of social or political processes or the will of the State. Without returning to classical minimalist law, we need to fight the preconception that reducing law is equivalent to regression, and that any limitation on sovereignty is a victory . How far

should international law go in accomplishing its aims? Is it the miracle solution to all of the world's problems ? ¶ The answer is obviously no. Law is not a universal panacea . Politics determine international law, even if sometimes they appear to ignore it. Any discourse that glorifies

international law and its virtues is usually [*852] accompanied by criticism of its weaknesses and perverse effects. This anthropomorphic vision of international law has the aim of turning it into a being in its own right that can be conveniently accused of defaults that are in fact those of the entities that created it, i.e. principally States, politicians, international experts such as us international jurists, but also those who would like to appropriate international law, such as NGOs, lobbies, individuals/associations, think tanks, and multinational corporations, which undoubtedly exercise political power despite hesitating to acknowledge it openly. This anthropomorphic vision needs to be rejected so that everyone can be allocated their proper role and usefulness. In fact, the present situation is interesting in that it reveals the functioning of western political modernity and its tendency to isolate the legal dimension in order to attribute an exclusive and exorbitant role to it. Yet the difficulties and tensions that have resulted illustrate the necessity of re-evaluating the two other dimensions to which international law is fundamentally connected: the political and the social. No doubt it is therefore necessary to search for a better balance, or more precisely, to be more conscious of the political and social dimensions that are concealed behind the law, and which are masked by the heightened role of all that is legal. They no longer have the same mobilizing effect they used to have, at least less than is the case of, say, legal discourse on human rights. Law does not actually provide a response to all problems, even if law is now omnipresent. In fact, the merit of contemporary deconstructivist critique is to have deconstructed the illusion of complete legal emancipation and to have attempted to rehabilitate all that is purely political in the elaboration, interpretation, and application of rules; and it is undoubtedly this critique that will enable us to accept that international law can regain strength as a political means of regulating conduct. n102¶ What thus takes place behind the smokescreen of welfare-inducing law is a political game of inclusion and exclusion. Why has poverty not been eliminated as proclaimed? Is it because law has remained ineffective and impotent when faced with international reality? Or is it merely a tree concealing a forest of international renouncement? Reducing world poverty is a commensurable challenge and therefore a realizable objective, but it will not be possible as long as States and other actors have not set themselves truly fundamental and overriding aims for the benefit of the planet, as well as for their own domestic systems. "Poverty is an invention of civilisation," n103 and it is on the latter that its eradication will depend. Studies on the phenomenon of poverty are very interesting in [*853] this respect, because they show that at a given moment in the development of a society, poverty always calls for collective action (and not individual acts of charity). No sooner are substantial amounts of property constituted that give rise to inequalities and merciless confrontation between the rich and the poor, do "asymmetrical dependencies" appear as the most frequent result. n104 The possible defaults and dysfunctions of welfare-inducing law should not mask political deferral and inaction at the domestic and international levels, or the fact that international law has always been used in a profoundly ambiguous way: as a positive model of inclusion and simultaneously as a negative model of exclusion, as a positive model of cooperation yet also as a negative model of domination. The somewhat paradoxical yet inescapable fact is that welfare-inducing law is, as we have seen, easier to instrumentalize than strictly liberal law aimed at regulating conduct, and is thus, ironically, less social and more unjust. It can be used to accelerate necessary corrections to gaping inequalities between nations or between individuals, but can also enable superpowers and economic operators to increase their revenue and importance. Furthermore, it can be conveniently denounced by the most virulent dictatorships in underdeveloped countries on the basis that it is inefficient. It can also be used as a means of obtaining international aid, despite the fact that the sharp rise in poverty and famine over recent years has actually been due to negligence, blind collectivism, terror, or civil war. n105¶ Here, legal interventionist and welfare-orientated discourse can be a vector of domestic or international domination, much like a powerful lever of transformation. It should

also be noted that strictly legal discourse will not tell us why things are as they are and which might be the best way to change them. That is not its role, and it is therefore not a problem if law does not trump other types of discourse. Law has , however, become so entrenched

in international society that the latter can no longer be conceptualized independently of it . Although it has undoubtedly always been an instrument of international social and political action, law has never played as important a role as it does today. International legal

problems are no longer external problems one can simply resolve by calling international

State conferences ; they have become internalized by all societies, and we are gradually

losing our ability to distance ourselves from them, and indeed from law itself . Yet distinguishing roles and

finalities is all the more difficult when law is not in [*854] itself capable of effectuating change and remains dependent on politics and adaptation.¶ The debate on the ability of politics to bring about change on an international level is as old as international society itself, and its current prevalence indicates its re-emergence. Although many analysts have taken neo-realist, neo-institutionalist, neo-functionalist, globalizationist, or transnationalist positions on this issue, n106 the present trend emphasises that the scope for manoeuvre of "real international politics" is limited due to the rise in bureaucracy, corporate interest groups, legalism in international relations, transnational networks of private actors, the incapacities of fragile States, etc., as if there existed within a decentralized society (which, however, has never been centralized and thus cannot be decentralized) a sort of political center-point providing a measure of the effectiveness or legitimacy of international political action, n107 when in reality the concepts most often evoked - namely collective State action, "international regimes," or global governance n108 - actually only recentralize politics in different manners. n109 Should we perhaps nuance the idea of an international political "center" or "system," either pessimistically by reference to a new Middle Age, n110 or more optimistically by emphasizing the importance of the individual's new role as an international actor, n111 the emergence of networks, or of orderly pluralism, n112 in order to enlarge our perspective on politics and better understand it? In fact, the increasing relevance of international law is not putting limitations on power, but bringing about a reorganization of power. The impression of reduced political leeway is thus deceptive, since in fact, new political powers are emerging that involve decisions affecting people and their environment. The sensation of political powerlessness or of simulacrum derives from [*855] the fact that politics are reduced to the activities carried out within the official international political system. n113¶ However, whatever is the actual scale of these illusions and developments, they have instilled a sense of unease in internationalist culture, which is necessarily political as well as legal given the indissoluble links between the two. This is the result of the latent but visible state of disequilibrium between the official appearance of the classical center-points of political power - States, international organizations, etc. - where official activities appear efficient and regulatory, but often fall short of attaining the fixed objectives, and an international society that is inexorably straying from official political decisions and introducing new actors with new objectives, decision-making competencies, and political dimensions. That is not to say that States and international organizations are not the prime institutional actors on the international scene, but simply that behind the unchanged facade of the politics they engage in, new political centre-points are taking shape. Consequently, the boundary between the political and the non-political is becoming ever more indeterminate, just as the boundary between the legal and the non-legal. To paraphrase Prosper Weil, one can say that politics, much as the law, have become "diluted." The categories of the political and the non-political, as well as those of the legal and non-legal, must be re-conceptualized with a view to redefining political priorities and redefining them collectively, to the extent that this is possible. How can welfare-inducing law prevail without a strong and interventionist political center-point to ensure its application as the European States did in the post-war period from the fifties to seventies? How can one reconcile the changes in the law and international politics? Is not what initially seemed paradoxical but explicable becoming completely contradictory?¶ In any case, there is little point in pinning all our hopes on

politics. Welfare does not seem to be induced by politics, by the law or by the State, although we have not altogether reached a dead point. n114 International politics does not define man's happiness, but rather it regulates the conduct of domestic and international actors, combats misery, and prevents risks.


Rejecting international legal frameworks and sovereignty triggers great power friction Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches”, pp. 136-139In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of 'emancipatory' security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that

the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states.¶ This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen,

the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to , for

example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift , the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and 'blindness' to

the content of a state are overturned . Instead , international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in

weak or unstable states in order to 'protect' and emancipate individuals globally . ¶ Critical and emancipatory security

theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere

represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, "if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed' (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a 'cosmopolitan' legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005).¶ For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo. Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [0]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today's conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably

should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189)¶ Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problem atic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and

wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people be have in a nicer way to each other .

Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory

theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material

circumstances of the time.¶ It seems clear that since the 1990s and the shift away from formal framework for

international affairs in terms of formal sovereign equality and non intervention, weak and troubled states have become increasingly opened up to interference and intervention by great powers. There is no global political

constituency in existence and the world order as it currently is one in which power is unevenly distributed. Shifting away from even formal

prohibitions against intervention and formal sovereign equality simply gives more powerful states greater power . This cannot represent a step towards greater emancipation for the citizens of those states, in fact it represents an increasing lack of freedom. For contemporary critical theorists, there is a failure to understand that rights are not things in themselves that can create freedom. In certain concrete situations human rights can easily become their opposite, a system in which external powers become sovereign. For this reason, a critical approach must entail an engagement with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, but this is exactly what contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists are not doing.¶ An example of this trend can be found in Booth's arguments that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other declarations of rights have challenged the sovereign state (2007: 166—167). In the first place, as we have seen in chapter 1, despite such declarations the pluralist security framework remained in place during the Cold War, but perhaps more importantly a concrete engagement with the


exercise of post-Cold War power relations would show that the UN was an institution set up by the new hegemonic power, America, as a way of cementing its authority. In this

context the various declarations of human rights were not a challenge to power but a fundamental part of the exercise of power (Sellars, 2002).¶ Critical and emancipatory theorists have an abstract and idealised view of the international system, excluding broader questions about international organisation and

power inequalities. Critical security theorists wish the complicated world , and complex conflicts, to conform to an abstract moral framework . Yet, as 'traditional' theorists E H Carr and Hedley Bull warned, this is simply an evasion of engagement with the actually existing international order and a substitution of the moral preferences of the theorist. As Carr argued about contemporary idealists: The Utopian is necessarily voluntarist: he believes in the possibility of more or less radically rejecting reality, and substituting his Utopia for it by an act of will ... the Utopian makes political theory a norm to which political practice ought to conform. (1964 [1939]: 11, 12)¶ Of course, this is not to say that a real cosmopolitan order cannot exist, but this would entail a genuine

transformation of the international and national order. The international order as it exists is still one that is divided into states and one which is marked by major power inequalities . In this context, the prescriptions of critical security theorists which aim to achieve a more 'cosmopolitan' international order becomes one in which power inequalities are entrenched even further . Moreover, there seems to be a step backwards in terms of a re-division between those members of the international community entitled to be full members and those which are there under sufferance and may be punished

for their failings. This is quite clear in the human security framework, as discussed in chapter 7.


Solution -- Should Increase Aid


Should Increase Aid

$5.5 billion in aid is needed


This summer, the European Union, United States, and Kuwait respectively pledged $1.2 billion, $507 million, and $500 million for aid to refugees. That's good, but it's still far short of the $5.5 billion in aid that the UN says is needed for these refugees, as well as another $2.9 billion for displaced Syrians within Syria. As a result, the camps are often crowded and undersupplied, which leaves the people who live in them cold, hungry, and subject to the ravages of disease.

Aid needs to go to Jordan and Lebanon

Dan Bilefsky, 9-7-15, New York Times, European Leaders Pledge to Take in More Migrants, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis.html DOA: 9-7-15

The European Union needs to provide “massive humanitarian aid” to countries like Jordan and Lebanon that have taken in millions of Syrian refugees, Mr. Hollande said. The French leader added that the European Union needed to create so-called hot spot reception centers in countries like Greece, Hungary and Italy to identify and register migrants as they arrived in the European Union and to turn back those who do not fulfill the requirements for asylum. It was not clear how such centers would operate.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis.html

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/mar/31/us-eu-kuwait-pledge-more-than-2bn-aid-syrians-un



Need to Increase Aid

Inadequate assistance to the refugees now


Aylan’s death reflected a systematic failure of world leadership, from Arab capitals to European ones, from Moscow to Washington. This failure occurred at three levels:

■ The Syrian civil war has dragged on for four years now, taking almost 200,000 lives, without serious efforts to stop the bombings. Creating a safe zone would at least allow Syrians to remain in the country.

■ As millions of Syrian refugees swamped surrounding countries, the world shrugged. United Nations aid requests for Syrian refugees are only 41 percent funded, and the World Food Program was recently forced to slash its food allocation for refugees in Lebanon to just $13.50 per person a month. Half of Syrian refugee children are unable to go to school. So of course loving parents strike out for Europe.

■ Driven by xenophobia and demagogy, some Europeans have done their best to stigmatize refugees and hamper their journeys.

Need to respond with compassion and provide refugees with aid


So by all means let’s respond with compassion to the refugees (not as jerks, as Hungarian officials have). But above all, let’s address the crisis at its roots, particularly in the Middle East. One essential step is to improve conditions for the 3.7 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. The World Food Program was just forced to cut 229,000 refugees in Jordan off food rations because it ran out of money, and if the world won’t pay for refugees to eat in Jordan, it will have to feed them in the West.



http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-forced-make-deeper-cuts-food-assistance-syrian-refugees-due-lack-funding

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/163-new-approach-in-southern-syria.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-estimate-of-dead-in-syrian-conflict-to-191000.html




Solution -- Need Massive Resettlement


Status Quo Plan Fails

Current plan inadequate

Joshua Keating, 9-22-15, Slate, EU Refugee Plan is Too Much for Eastern Europe, but still not enough, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/09/22/eu_agrees_on_plan_to_take_in_120_000_refugees.html DOA: 9-22-15

The plan passed by majority vote with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania voting no and Finland abstaining. Eastern European countries, with little experience in accommodating large-scale non-European immigration, have been extremely hostile toward European pressure to take in more refugees. The new plan would compel them to take people in against their will, something that is likely to further deepen tensions within the bloc and could lead to further backlash against Brussels and the reimposition of border controls within the union.

Even so, the plan doesn’t come near to addressing the scale of the crisis, which has seen nearly 500,000 people entering the EU so far this year to escape war and poverty in the Middle East and North Africa. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the 120,000 people addressed under the new system would account for about 20 days worth of arrivals. So it seems likely that the crowds gathered in the Balkans and Turkey outside the increasingly fortified gates of Europe will continue to grow.

Current plan only addresses a small fraction

Bloomberg View, September 25, 2015, Europe Again Fails to solve its Refugee Crisis, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-25/europe-again-fails-to-solve-its-refugee-crisis DOA: 9-25-15

On Tuesday, European interior ministers voted through a plan calling for 120,000 refugees to be resettled among the member countries. That's a tiny fraction of the asylum seekers who've already turned up, to say nothing of those expected to arrive in the coming months. A conservative estimate is 1 million refugees this year, and the flow might continue at the same rate for the foreseeable future.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-25/europe-again-fails-to-solve-its-refugee-crisis

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-25/europe-again-fails-to-solve-its-refugee-crisis

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/22/us-europe-migrants-eu-idUSKCN0RM10A20150922

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/26/europe_s_open_borders_are_in_serious_danger.html

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/26/europe_s_open_borders_are_in_serious_danger.html

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/09/14/here_s_why_eastern_europe_is_so_much_more_antagonistic_to_syria_s_refugees.html

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/09/22/eu_agrees_on_plan_to_take_in_120_000_refugees.html

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/09/22/eu_agrees_on_plan_to_take_in_120_000_refugees.html


Need a Comprehensive Resettlement Plan

A comprehensive refugee settlement program is needed – need to included employment, education, and general assistance.

David Milband, 9-22-15, How the US Can Welcome Refugees, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/opinion/how-the-us-can-welcome-refugees.html DOA: 9-22-15

The mismatch between need and response is all the more striking since the United States has given a home to some three million refugees since 1975. In 2013, they came from 64 different countries.

The experience of the United States Refugee Admissions Program, which is a consortium of federal agencies and nonprofit organizations, offers a number of valuable lessons. The first is that successful resettlement needs more than big-hearted citizens. It needs an effective combination of resources provided by both the public and the private spheres.

Government needs to set the legislative framework, oversee security checks and provide funding for initial housing, case management and language training. Once these needs are met, resettlement agencies in the United States work within their communities to develop volunteer programs and raise funds to augment the public provision. The success of the refugee admissions program lies in this partnership between the public and the private sectors.

Second, refugees need to be seen for their potential contribution to society. The language of “burden” is mistaken. Rather, economic self-sufficiency is the central pillar in successful refugee resettlement.

Resettlement agencies work to help refugees gain employment as soon as possible after their arrival. According to the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement’s annual report to Congress for 2013 (the most recent year for which figures are available), the rate of refugees’ self-sufficiency at 180 days was 69 percent. A recent survey by the Washington-based Migration Policy Institute found that refugees were, in fact, more likely to be employed than the American-born population.

Third, education for the children of refugees is crucial for effective integration. Many refugee children arrive with little formal education and limited to no English skills. Yet resettlement experience in the United States shows that, with proper support, refugee children are able to thrive at school in a short time.

The final lesson is that refugees prosper most when they become citizens. Refugees need support to achieve it as soon as they become eligible. Studies show that naturalization as a United States citizen correlates with higher levels of employment and earnings.

The United Nations has called for the resettlement of 400,000 Syrian refugees over the next several years — which amounts to about 10 percent of those who have been displaced to neighboring countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Historically, the United States has taken 50 percent of the world’s refugees who are eligible for resettlement; that is why the I.R.C. is appealing to America to take 100,000 Syrians next year.

That will require political will and the funding to back it up — both of which most of Europe has conspicuously lacked. European Union leaders meeting this week must put that right.

http://www.unhcr.org/548737926.html

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/office-of-refugee-resettlement-annual-report-to-congress-2013

http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/28/where-refugees-to-the-u-s-come-from/

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/opinion/how-the-us-can-welcome-refugees.html


With more people fleeing conflict and disaster than at any time since World War II, renewed leadership is required. No country is better placed than the United States to offer it.


Resettling Large Numbers Practically Possible

US resettled 800,000 Vietnamese after the war


Even if the U.S. took in 30,000 Syrians over the next two years — an unlikely outcome, given that only 1,500 have been admitted since the start of the war — that number would pale in comparison to the hundreds of thousands that Germany is expected to accept, or the 800,000 Vietnamese that the U.S. resettled in the years after the Vietnam war.




Should Allow Asylum Claims Outside of Europe

They die crossing the sea because they can’t get an entry visa. People should be able to get refugee status outside of Europe and fly there


Currently, the EU makes it all but impossible to apply for asylum without first illegally entering the country. This is important because one of the main reasons the EU is rethinking their policy now is due to the dramatic increase in refugees coming to Europe on unseaworthy boats owned and operated by smugglers; and the correspondingly high death toll in such trips. But many of these people take the boat trip in the first place because no other legal pathways are available.

Last year, 219,000 people took dangerous, irregular routes to Europe by land and sea, and about 3,500 drowned, according to the UN. This year it estimates that already 137,000 people arrived to EU countries by boat, a third of them from Syria, and many others from Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. There have been at least 1,867 deaths at sea in 2015 thus far.

Though many would-be refugees are able to enter the EU via airplane on tourist visas and apply for asylum once they touch down, for those displaced and fleeing the chaos of war, or living under an authoritarian government, there’s no chance of getting an exit visa. Virtually the only option is trying their luck on the boats crossing the Mediterranean, or land routes through Eastern Europe—though most Eastern border countries have built or are in the process of building walls to keep migrants out.

Michael Diedring, the secretary general of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, calls this dynamic backward: “When you look at the amount of money that a Syrian needs to pay a smuggler to Europe,” typically $2,000 to $4,000, “you could fly to Europe first class with that money.”

Increasing refugee-resettlement programs, which relocate people with refugee status in countries outside the EU to a member country, might help alleviate the problem.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-18/hungary-to-fence-off-border-with-serbia-to-stop-migrants/6554826

http://www.unhcr.org/5592b9b36.html

http://www.unhcr.org/54db82536.html



Solution -- Resettlement – Tradable Quota System


The System

Tradable quota system

Jaakko Kuosmanen, political theorist, University of Edinburgh, 2013. What (if anything) is wrong with trading refugee quotas? Res Publica, 19, 103–119

In the context of migration ‘a tradable quota scheme’ refers to an institutionalised system of interstate migration in which quotas of migrants are traded between recipient states. In this type of system migrant quotas are established through certain criteria, and the quotas are then allocated to states participating in the scheme. The participating states can either provide access to the quota migrants that were assigned to them during the initial allocation process, or they can try to offer compensation to other countries that might be willing to accommodate their quota of migrants on their behalf. Tradable migrant quotas can, at least in principle, be formulated in many different ways and through the use of different criteria. Schuck (1997) was the first to introduce the idea of tradable quotas in the context of the existing asylum regime founded on the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Convention’ hereafter). Schuck proposed that the tradable quota scheme could function as a model for providing protection to persons that the Convention recognises as being eligible for asylum. Following Schuck’s seminal article other writers have pursued the idea, and some have examined whether tradable quotas could function more broadly as a means for poverty reduction (De la Croix and Gosseries 2007; Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 2011). Before turning to examine the ethical dimensions of the tradable refugee quota scheme, let us focus on its general characteristics. The establishment of a tradable refugee quota scheme in any particular circumstance requires the following: (1) a process for determining the number of those in need of protection; (2) criteria for allocating burdens of refugee protection; (3) an international administrative authority; (4) a market for buying and selling quotas (Schuck 1997, p. 271). [p. 104-5]

Tradable quota system superior to the status quo


Before turning to the normative evaluation of the market, it is worth noting thatthe tradable quota scheme seems to have—at least prima facie —certain desirablecharacteristics that are missing from the two institutional schemes from which itderives. Compared to the compensatory scheme, the tradable quota scheme seemsmore capable of recognising that some states can be ‘unlucky’ in the sense that theyeither share borders with countries facing humanitarian crises or they are notsuccessful in diverting refugee flows to other countries. The compensatory schemedoes not take this adequately into consideration, as the central mechanism fordistributing refugees to recipient countries in the scheme is the non-refoulement principle. The duty-bearing citizens in states facing an influx of refugees canreasonably ask: ‘is it really fair that we are obligated to accommodate all the rightbearersentering the territory of our state?’ The second advantage of the tradable refugee quota scheme is that it seems more capable of deterring false asylum


applications than the compensatory scheme. Those who are not in actual need ofprotection may attempt to exploit the asylum system to gain entry to a particularcountry. But if the applicants are not certain that they will eventually beaccommodated in the country where they have applied for asylum, those withoutgenuine need might be more reluctant to claim asylum.Compared to the physical burden-sharing scheme, the tradable quota schemeleaves open a broader range of ways to discharge obligations in global refugeeprotection. In other words, it provides flexibility to duty-bearers. If an institutionalscheme dedicated to the protection of a human right can take into considerationduty-bearers’ desire to voluntarily change places with one another without thisleading to any moral problems, it seems reasonable to suggest that the scheme issuperior to a scheme that—ceteris paribus —does not include the same flexibility.Of course, it still needs to be examined whether or not the establishment of themarket for trading refugee quotas constitutes ‘one step too far’ in the institutionalisationof the right to asylum. In other words, it needs to be considered whether ornot the extension of the physical burden-sharing scheme with a market introducesinsurmountable moral problems.


A2: Tradeable Quotas Undermine Refugee Preference

Refugees are not entitled to choose what state they will live in


One immediate concern that arises in the trading of refugee quotas is that it takesaway refugees’ power of decision over the final country of asylum. The tradablequota scheme cannot take into consideration refugees’ preferences well, as thelocation of asylum will be decided by market transactions. Even if in the initialquota allocation the preferences of refugees would be matched with recipientcountries as much as possible, it may still be the case that the quotas are traded withother countries. This concern may be formulated into a general objection against thetrading practices: ‘the trading of refugee quotas should be abandoned, as it entailsindifferent distribution of refugees through market mechanisms to recipientcountries’. Does this objection constitute an insurmountable moral problem forthe tradable refugee quota scheme?Let us start by considering what exactly the general right to asylum entitles itsbearers to. The claim to asylum may be understood as an ‘insurance policy’ for theprotection of basic welfare provisions in other states in non-ideal circumstances.The claim to asylum is a general claim to the satisfaction of basic needs in ‘a’country other than one’s home country, and as Joseph Carens rightly points out,‘from a moral perspective, refugees are entitled to safety and basic provisions fortheir well-being, not a choice of where these needs will be met’ (Carens 1997 ,p. 37). The normative foundation of the general right to asylum is basic needs, andduty-bearers are allowed to organise the protection of these needs as they wish,provided that the arrangements satisfy conditions of effectiveness and fairdistribution of burdens. In other words, having a general claim to the protectionof one’s basic needs with the means of asylum does not directly amount to having aclaim to access any particular country.The same also applies to preferences qua non-fundamental desires. The fact thata refugee has a preference to access a particular country does not directly entail thatthe country has a moral obligation to take this preference into consideration.Preferences can be manifestations of something much less fundamental than basicneeds, and the two do not necessarily always coincide (Jones 1994 , p. 149). Basicneeds represent urgent needs of a person regardless of the person’s backgroundculture, and they carry with them much greater normative force than low-levelpreferences or non-fundamental desires. Many philosophers argue, I believe rightly,that basic needs seem to have the kind of normative force we are looking for in thejustification of human rights (Miller 2007 , ch. 7). In turn, it seems questionable thatpreferences in virtue of being low-level desires have the kind of normative weightthat would be required for there to be a claim to have access to a country of one’spreference. In other words, when a refugee has a preference to be accommodated bya particular country, but this preference is based on non-fundamental desires, itseems reasonable to conclude that the refugee does not have a claim to access thecountry of his or her choice.


A2: Preference Key to Meet Basic Needs

Preferences that meet basic needs can be accommodated in the quota system


There are still two possible scenarios regarding preferences that arguablyconstitute problems for the trading of refugee quotas. Firstly, it is possible thatsometimes preferences are in fact grounded in basic needs. In such cases refugeesclearly have a claim of justice to preference satisfaction. For example, a desire to beunified with one’s immediate family surely represents a need that is universal andbasic, and there is a strong moral claim for all refugees to be united with theirfamilies wherever they are.3 In some cases it may be possible to take family unityinto consideration in the quota calculation. This is the case especially when familymembers seek to be united within a limited timeframe after the first asylumapplication, or the initially accommodated family members have not been in acountry of asylum for a long period of time. In such cases families may be treated inthe scheme as unbreakable units that are allocated to a particular state for trading.But this is not always possible. When some family members have stayed in acountry for a long period of time, it seems that the only way to accommodate theirpreferences is by offering access to the country. These examples do seem to presenta problem for the tradable refugee quota scheme.


A2: Other Important Reasons for Preference

All Western countries can accommodate preference

Jaakko Kuosmanen, political theorist, University of Edinburgh, 2013. What (if anything) is wrong with trading refugee quotas? Res Publica, 19, p. 110-11

For the sake of simplicity, let us treat both these kinds of cases together. If thearguments above are correct, then the final extent of refugees’ preferences thatshould be taken into consideration in quota trading is dependent on where thethreshold between refugees’ strong interests and non-fundamental desires is located.This is a complex question, and a thorough examination of it is beyond the scope ofthis paper. But it seems reasonable to suggest that strong interests include at the veryleast certain meaningful opportunities to practice one’s religion, to express one’sculture, and to develop capacities to participate in the activities of the recipientsociety. Conversely, it seems excessive to claim that strong interests encompass allrefugees’ desires regarding improvements to their lives.How does the recognition of these two scenarios of preferences affect the tradingof refugee quotas? In general terms, the refugee preferences that seem to causeproblems to the tradable quota scheme are those that have moral force and can eitherbe addressed only in a particular country or in a particular ‘type’ of country. Thereare two central implications that follow. The first is that at times the scope of themarket may need to be narrowed. If the preferences that have moral force are suchthat some but not all countries comprising duty-bearers can accommodate them, thequota trading should take place between the ‘suitable countries’. All Westerncountries, for example, seem equally capable of addressing refugees’ strong desireand fundamental need to practice their religion. The second implication is thatsometimes the tradable refugee quota scheme may need to be complemented withcompensatory arrangements. If refugees have preferences to be accommodatedwithin a particular country, and these preferences do have moral force, it seems thatthe only meaningful solution is to provide compensation to the recipient state foraccommodating the preferences.

The practical effects of this on the tradable refugee quota scheme dependscentrally on the actual preferences of refugees that are grounded in basic needs andstrong interests as well as the actual range of countries that are able to accommodatethese preferences. In other words, the morally acceptable extent of the market placeis dependent on contextual circumstances. For our current purposes, however, it isenough to recognise the following general conclusion: while the preferenceobjection entails that in some cases the scope of the market may need to benarrowed due to moral considerations related to refugee preferences, it does notprove to be detrimental to the tradable refugee quota scheme as a generalinstitutional proposal. The moral requirement to narrow the scope of the tradablequota scheme does not directly entail that the scheme’s internal components areinherently problematic. Rather, it only shows that some—but not necessarily all—refugees can have preferences regarding the place of asylum that have moral force.The tradable refugee quota scheme may still be considered as an institutional optionin certain circumstances, i.e., in circumstances where refugees do not havepreferences that have moral force and where refugees have preferences that havemoral force but the preferences can be accommodated in several countries.


A2: Tradable Quotas Threaten the Dignity of Refugees

Dignity objection is flawed


The second objection is related to the dignified treatment of refugees. MatthewGibney sketches this line of criticism against the scheme. Gibney claims that thetrading of refugee quotas should be rejected as a solution to inter-state protection ofpersons, as it ‘demeans refugees by treating refugees as if they possess negativevalue’ (Gibney 2008 , p. 70). More specifically, Gibney suggests that three issuescause problems for the tradable refugee quota scheme: (1) negative valuation, (2)commodification, and (3) discrimination. Let us consider each of these issues inturn.Negative ValuationGibney suggests that the trading of refugee quotas is problematic because the tradedrefugees are treated akin to ‘toxic waste’, i.e., as an unwanted burden that somestates attempt to avoid by offering monetary compensation to other states. Gibneyargues that in the case of waste as well as in the case of tradable refugee quotas ‘thegood in question is really a ‘bad’, something possessing a negative value’ (Gibney2008 , p. 72). In other words, Gibney seems to be claiming that the trading of refugeequotas involves negative valuation of refugees, and that this represents a failure totake the requirements of dignified treatment of persons adequately into consideration.What should we make of this claim?Gibney’s argument is questionable on several levels. In the tradable quota schemesome states may prefer to compensate other states rather than to accommodaterefugees. Yet, although an act of trading surely entails having preferences, it does nottell us directly about how strongly states consider the traded quotas to be of negativevalue. In other words, Gibney’s claim is dependent on empirical contingencies.

The existence of trading alone does not provide conclusive evidence that refugees arevalued negatively in any substantive way. It is, after all, possible that a trading stateconsiders that it is making a choice between two positively valued options.For the sake of argument, however, let us accept Gibney’s claim, and grant thatthe trading states would in fact ‘attach negative value to refugees’. Regardless ofthis concession, there are strong reasons to be sceptical of the conclusion that thenegative valuation of refugees somehow proves to be detrimental to the trading ofrefugee quotas in particular. As far as the claim regarding negative valuation ofrefugees is concerned, all institutional schemes dedicated to burden -sharing seem toshare this problem. The tradable quota scheme assigns a particular starting quota toeach state, and this quota depends on the requirements of burden-bearing set foreach state. But all burden-sharing schemes start from a similar position. Thecompensatory scheme as well as the physical burden-sharing scheme recognises thatthere is a ‘burden’ or a ‘cost’ to be shared by states, and a moral requirement foreach state to bear its share of it. In burden-sharing the question is about obligations,and—in contrast to rights—more often than not it can be the case that they areconsidered to be something that an agent would rather be exempted from. Likewise,in a compensatory scheme or a physical burden-sharing scheme a state mayreluctantly accommodate what it views as ‘toxic waste’ rather than an asset. In otherwords, if negative valuation is something that amounts to undignified treatment, itconstitutes a broader problem for refugee protection rather than a specific problem


for the trading of refugee quotas.


A2: Bad to Commodify Refugees

The system doesn’t set a price on people

Jaakko Kuosmanen, political theorist, University of Edinburgh, 2013. What (if anything) is wrong with trading refugee quotas? Res Publica, 19, 110-112

Even if the negative valuation alone is not morally problematic, it might still beargued that negative valuation in price terms is . This seems to be one of Gibney’sworries, as he argues that ‘there is something uniquely dubious about a market thatregisters in price terms how much states don’t want particular groups of refugees’(Gibney 2008 , pp. 72–73). Does this constitute a forceful objection against thetradable refugee quota scheme? Do the trading practices lead to demeaning andundignified treatment of refugees? Kant’s account of dignity is useful here.5 In TheGroundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals Kant argues:In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity . What has aprice can be replaced by something else as its equivalent. Whatever bycontrast is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent has a dignity(Kant 2002 , p. 235).At first sight, Gibney’s claim seems to be supported by Kant’s account of dignity.After all, Kant is claiming that setting a price on a person violates the person’sdignity and effectively entails treating the person as a means instead of an end. Whatshould we make of this argument? One possible way to understand Kant’s idea of dignity is that it involves a requirement not to trade persons against each other.Jeremy Waldron, among others, suggests this interpretation. Waldron argues that theKantian idea of dignity should be understood primarily as a reference to the ‘simpleconception of human worth precluding trade-offs’ (Waldron 2009 , p. 18). He refersto an often-cited German Constitutional Court case as an example of the rejection ofsuch trade-offs. In this well-known case the German court rejected the permissibilityof the military to shoot down airliners hijacked by terrorists.6 In its decision thecourt appealed to the concept of human dignity, which is outlined in the Article 1 ofthe German Basic Law, and stated that ‘human dignity enjoys the sameconstitutional protection regardless of the duration of the physical existence ofthe individual human being’ (Waldron 2009 , p. 18). The court decision may beinterpreted as a claim that human dignity rules out a utilitarian calculus that wouldset a price on those on board a hijacked plane and lead to a possibility of evaluatingwhether they can be traded against lives on the ground.The idea of ‘price’ in the tradable refugee quota scheme differs from this idea ofprice. The price in the tradable refugee quota scheme does not represent a currencywith which individuals are traded against each other. By virtue of their humanityrefugees have a claim to be provided certain protection by the internationalcommunity and not to be traded against each other. In other words, regardless ofwhether or not refugee quotas are traded between states all refugees are—by virtueof having the right to asylum—entitled to same basic protection. The trading ofrefugees would clearly lead to undignified treatment if it would lead to the erosionof the protection of some refugees. But this is not the way the trading of refugeequotas functions. Regardless of the specific preferences of the trading states, tradinghas no impact on the basic protection that the refugees are entitled to, so it seemsquestionable to claim that the scheme undermines the value of refugees as Kantianends by setting a price on them. In fact, instead of understanding the scheme assomething that aims to treat refugees as means, we should rather interpret it as an


effort by all member states to restore for each person circumstances where she or he can be in the position in the end


A2: Countries Might Discriminate Based on Type of Refugee

Adjustments can be made to solve this type of discrimination


Gibney’s final argument focuses on specific groups of refugees. Gibney claims thatwhen a state considers specific groups of refugees as less desirable than othergroups, and attempts to purchase the physical accommodation of these refugeegroups from other states, the traded refugees are humiliated as a consequence. Inturn, once refugees are humiliated, their inherent dignity is violated. Gibneyexamines the US and France as example cases. Both of these countries might limitthe trading of quotas to asylum claimants with certain characteristics. While the USmight be willing to accept its allocation of Cuban refugees, it might also attempt tobuy its way out of accommodating refugees from Haiti. France might similarly wantto pay other countries to take in Muslim refugees, and it might prefer toaccommodate Christian refugees. Gibney argues that the negative valuations ofparticular refugees can go ‘to the core of personal identity’ and may result in ‘longlastingfeelings of resentment and humiliation’ (Gibney 2008 , p. 73).One way of addressing the concerns of humiliation is by introducing a nondiscriminationclause requiring states to refrain from engaging in discriminatorytrading practices. There is no principled reason why the scheme could not beestablished in such a way that it takes into consideration the possibility ofdiscriminatory trading practices. As was pointed out earlier, in order for any burdensharingscheme to function effectively there is a need to establish administrativeinstitutions that advance transparency, accountability, and compliance. The institutionsadministering the trading could also be dedicated to ensuring compliance with the nondiscriminationclause. One practical way to operate a trading regime dedicated toupholding the non-discrimination clause would be to establish the quotas ‘blind’, andthen to allow states to trade quotas of refugees whose background they do not know.But in the end, it is questionable whether there is a need to rely on theintroduction of the non-discrimination clause at all. In his account of humiliation(to which Gibney refers), Avishai Margalit suggests that in the normative sense weshould understand humiliation as ‘any sort of behaviour or condition that constitutesa sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-respect injured’ (Margalit1996 , p. 9). Then the question becomes, what constitutes a sound reason for a personto consider his or her self-respect injured? One reason might be that a person issubjected to treatment in which the inherent rank or status accorded to all personsregardless of their background is not recognised (Margalit 1996 , ch. 6). But does itamount to humiliation of refugees that a state ranks a particular group of refugees asless desirable than some other group, and attempts to purchase the accommodationof its quota from some other state?

If this were the case, it seems that all social groups that are not considered to beof equal value by other social groups would have a sound reason to feel humiliated.7

It is important to recognise here that the existence of a preference-ranking regardingthe desirability of different refugee groups does not have any practical impact on theprotection they are entitled to in virtue of being bearers of the right to asylum. Whenentering the scheme each complying state effectively commits itself to recognisingthe inherent dignity of all refugees regardless of their country of origin, ethnicity,religion, gender, and sexual orientation. This is centrally because they are


committed to providing—in one state or another—asylum to all refugees assignedto their quotas. Put differently, there is no inherent institutionalised bias againstrefugees with particular backgrounds in the tradable quota scheme. The scheme isdedicated to guaranteeing equal protection of the right to asylum to all right-bearersregardless of states’ preference rankings. Thus it may reasonably be asked whetherrefugees have a sound reason to feel humiliated by preference-ranked tradingpractices. Regardless of their background, refugees can unapologetically makedemands on each state in the scheme, and insist without embarrassment or shame ontheir claim to asylum


A2: Poorer Countries Will be Exploited

No They won’t


The final moral objection against the scheme examined here focuses on theinteractions that occur between the trading states. This objection claims thatalthough the tradable quota scheme aims towards a fair distribution of burdens, itleads instead to the exploitation of less affluent countries by more affluent states. Inhis analysis Gibney suggests that this objection might prove to be insurmountable tothe tradable quota scheme, but in the end he stops short of examining it in asystematic way (Gibney 2008 , p. 74). Here, I will try to fill in the blanks for Gibney,and see whether this type of objection provides a sufficiently strong reason toabandon the tradable refugee quota scheme.The objection might be formulated in the following way: due to their wealth andsuperior purchasing power affluent states are in a strong position to buy their wayout of obligations to accommodate refugees in a tradable quota scheme. As theactual costs of providing asylum in the developing countries can be a fraction ofwhat they are in the more developed countries, this means that it would be lesscostly for the affluent states to pay for the same absolute level of well-being for theirquota of refugees in the developing countries than it would be for them toaccommodate their quotas. Therefore, in the scheme the affluent states would be in aposition to effectively opt out of the provision of asylum by exploiting developingcountries as ‘refugee accommodating factories’.The exploitation objection does not suggest that the trading of quotas per se isproblematic, but rather that the trading between countries is problematic when itinvolves the moral wrong of exploitation. Then the question becomes, what exactlydoes it mean to say that someone is exploited. One general way to understandexploitation is that it occurs when ‘an agent A is taking advantage of agent Bunfairly’. But from this general definition it is hard to conclude with greater claritywhat exactly it means for an agent to be exploited. After all, there is an appeal toanother famously elusive concept in the definition: fairness. Richard Arneson’sdepiction captures well the burdensome nature of the analysis of the concept ofexploitation: there will ‘be as many competing conceptions of exploitation astheories of what persons owe to each other by way of fair treatment’ (Arneson 2001 ,p. 350).As the question here is primarily about whether developed countries would be ina position to take unfair advantage of developing countries when engaging in quotatrading with them, the enquiry of exploitation can be limited on the question of market transactions. Under what circumstances are the transactions exploitative?There are two ways to approach the issue. The first way is to focus on the fairness ofthe transaction process . If it is the case that a transaction process between countriesis unfair, then it can be concluded also that the outcome of the market transaction isexploitative. One way in which a process can be unfair is if it involves coercion.9 Ifa trade agreement is the result of a coercive contract offer, the country making thecoercive offer has taken advantage of the coerced country unfairly.But once we look at what would be at stake for states if they failed to come to anagreement regarding quota trading, it is not directly evident that in the tradablequota scheme less affluent countries would be in a position to be subjected tocoercive trading offers. One generally recognised feature of a coercive offer is the


level of desperation of the party to whom the offer is made. But the quota systemevades the issue of severely desperate trading partners, as states would be obligatedto participate in the scheme only if they had sufficient capacities to assist the refugeerights-bearers. Even if we accepted that the duties of assistance corresponding to thegeneral right to asylum are extremely stringent rather than only moderatelystringent, there would still be no obligation for those states to participate in thescheme that are not able to protect sufficiently their citizens’ basic needs. There isno obligation of justice to satisfy a person’s basic needs if doing so involvesharming the basic needs of other agents, i.e., the separateness of persons has to betaken into account when establishing the final scope of basic needs that matter fromthe perspective of justice. As for example Miller rightly points out, ‘before a needcan ground a right, we have to know that the proposed right would not imposeobligations on others that would necessarily violate their own human rights’ (Miller2007 , p. 188). In other words, in the possible trade agreements it is not the basicneeds of the citizens of any trading country that would be at stake. The statesengaging in trading would exclusively be ones that sought to gain some benefits fortheir citizens beyond satisfaction of their basic needs.

In the end, however, there is no need to rely strictly on the validity of theprevious argument in order to rescue the tradable quota scheme from theexploitation objection. This is centrally because the issue of the coercive tradingprocess could be addressed with the mediating institutions that would be part of themarket. As was pointed earlier, the implementation of any comprehensive burdensharingscheme should be coupled with the establishment of an internationalauthority overseeing accountability, compliance, and transparency. In the context ofthe tradable quota scheme this overseeing authority could be dedicated toconsidering also whether the quota trading is linked to coercive offers betweencountries. In cases where the offers would be deemed coercive, the mediatinginstitution could be authorised to invalidate the trades which occur. The authority ofthe administrative institution could also be extended in such a way that it wouldconsider trade agreements ex post , i.e., it would evaluate the broader context inwhich the agreements took place.Apart from focusing on the unfairness of the trading process, the exploitationobjection might also be fleshed out by focusing on the unfairness of outcomes intrade agreements. A critic taking this position might draw an analogy betweensweatshops and the tradable refugee quota scheme, and argue that the developedcountries would be in a position to exploit the developing countries by using theirbargaining position to gain more than their fair share of benefits from the trading ofquotas.10 On this account, the unfairness consists in insufficient compensations tothe developing countries in the scheme. What is the force of this formulation of theexploitation objection?The objection suggests that in order for the quota transaction to be nonexploitative,there is a requirement that all countries receive sufficient compensationfor the accommodation of other countries’ quotas. It is not, of course, anuncomplicated question what level of compensation allows us to conclude that noexploitation occurs in quota trading. There are many ways to approach the issue ofsufficient compensation philosophically. But in the end, the question of theappropriate framework for establishing an account of sufficient compensation doesnot have to be solved here in order for us to be able to address the secondformulation of the exploitation objection. The second formulation of the exploitationobjection can be addressed in a similar way to the first formulationThe inherent structure of the tradable refugee quota scheme allows thearrangement of the markets in such a way that the requirement of fair compensationis integrated in it —whichever more specific account of sufficient compensation isaccepted. Not even Marxist concerns about sufficient compensation seem to be atodds with the inherent structure of the tradable quota scheme. On Marxist grounds it


might be argued that any trading below the costs of accommodation to the developedcountry would be exploitative to the developing country because it can be equatedwith ‘working for a capitalist’. On the Marxist view of exploitation, the labourer isthe only person who creates a product that has value. If the capitalist receives some ofthe value of the product, the labourer receives less value than the value of what he orshe creates. Therefore, the capitalist is exploiting the labourer (Cohen 1979 , p. 356).Even if we accept that this claim represents an appropriate analogy in the currentcontext, which in itself is questionable, I see no principled reason why we could notconclude that the trade may be limited to a price that would reflect the burden ofaccommodation for the country to which the quota has been initially allocated. Thisrequirement could then be overseen by the mediating trading authority, which coulddeclare null all trade agreements that do not satisfy the requirement of fair compensation.Admittedly, when established as a laissez -faire system it is a genuine possibilitythat the tradable refugee quota scheme would lead to exploitation. It seemsquestionable whether a free market trading system would adequately take intoconsideration the possibility that quota trading between countries may be the resultof coercive offers or that it does not involve sufficient compensation. But this doesnot entail that there is something in the components of the tradable quota schemethat necessarily leads to exploitative trading practices. The general idea of thetradable refugee quota scheme is broad enough to accommodate concerns aboutexploitation.


Solution -- Canada

Canada will not take more refugees

Associated Press, 9-5-15, In election year, Canada less welcoming to refugees, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.674741 DOA: 9-6-1

AP - Canada has long prided itself for opening its doors wider than any nation to asylum seekers, but the number it welcomes has waned since Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper took power almost 10 years ago. Harper has rejected calls to take immediate action to resettle more Syrian refugees, despite the haunting image of a drowned 3-year-old washed up on a Turkish beach that has focused the world's attention on the largest refugee crisis since World War II.

Canada has the capability to quickly resettle refugees


In times of crisis in decades past, Canada resettled refugees quickly and in large numbers. It airlifted more than 5,000 people from Kosovo in the late 1990s and more than 5,000 from Uganda in 1972 and resettled 60,000 Vietnamese in 1979-80. More than 1.2 million refugees have arrived in Canada since World War II.

Canada could bring in more refugees


Immigration Minister Chris Alexander has said Canada will accept 10,000 Syrian refugees over the next three years in response to a United Nations Refugee Agency's global appeal to resettle 100,000 refugees worldwide. But leaders of the two main opposition parties challenging Harper in the October election say Canada should do more. Liberal leader Justin Trudeau said Canada should take in 25,000 Syrian refugees immediately. “We have it done in the past, and we can do that again," Trudeau told a campaign event Friday. "It is something that has made Canada the country that we are." Tom Mulcair, leader of the New Democrats, said military action would not have saved the little boy on the beach. "Canadians that I meet with across this country want Canada to do its share," Mulcair said. "If we're elected, there will be 10,000 people brought to Canada before the end of this year." The New Democrats advocate an accelerated plan to bring more than 46,000 refugees to Canada by 2019.

Canada could bring in 50,000 more this year and 100,000 more next year


Catherine Dauvergne, an immigration expert and the dean of law at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, said that with countries like Turkey taking in 1.59 million Syrians, Canada should take in 50,000 this year and 100,000 next year, considering the scope of the crisis. Conservative cabinet minister and former immigration minister Jason Kenney disputed criticism that Canada needs to be more welcoming, tweeting that since 2006 Canada has welcomed 1.6 million new citizens and 240,000 refugees.

If countries agree to take more refugees that will encourage more to flee

http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.674741





Alison Smale, 9-6-15, New York Times, Pope Calls on All of Europe’s Catholics to House Refugees, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/europe/pope-calls-on-europeans-to-house-refugees.html DOA: 9-6-15

The British do not want to add any further incentive, or “pull factor,” that will encourage more refugees to risk the passage to Europe, nor to favor those migrants who could afford to pay people smugglers over those who are in the regional camps. With euroskeptics inside and outside Mr. Cameron’s ruling Conservative Party critical of Brussels, Britain will continue to reject the idea of mandatory quotas to distribute migrants and asylum seekers already in Europe



Solution -- Aid to Refugee Camps

Increasing aid to Middle East refugee camps stops the flow to Europe

Paul Wesley Sullivan, September 28, 2015, Refugee Crisis Creates Culture Clash, Disunity in Europe, http://www.msnewsnow.com/story/30094135/refugee-crisis-creates-culture-clash-disunity-for-europe DOA: 9-27-15

At least 3 million refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey will join the human tidal wave arriving on Europe’s shores if the West does not send relief to the Middle East, said Dr. Krzysztof Jasiewicz, a native of Poland and professor of sociology at Washington and Lee University. “If Europe would work in those countries and help to accommodate them (refugees), they would not have the influx,” he said.

http://www.msnewsnow.com/story/30094135/refugee-crisis-creates-culture-clash-disunity-for-europe



Solution -- Have Some Countries Absorb Most

Germany’s culture is more prepared for the refugees – it’s multicultural and doesn’t oppose refugees


Germany is among Europe’s leaders in transforming to a multi-cultural society, while Hungary, for example, is still a classic nation-state. “Hungary has a very distinct language and culture. Germany was not multi-cultural 20 years ago but has changed dramatically," Clemens said. "And the hope in the EU is that this will broadly be the case in Eastern Europe. Hungary is showing the most resistance." The migrant influx has led to political resistance, as well. Anti-immigrant parties in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece and Denmark have gained steam. The exception is Germany where there is no major political party giving voice to anti-immigrant sentiments, Clemens said.

Germany, Spain Portugal, and France have negative population growth and should absorb more


Denmark is an example of an Old World European nation that has stemmed the flow of migrants because of assimilation problems. Western European nations need a younger labor force, but not all EU nations agree to take migrants for that reason alone, Jasiewicz said, adding that the views of mostly Muslim refugees can run counter to Europe’s embrace of freedom. “The natural growth in population is negative in Germany … in Spain, Portugal, and France,” Jasiewicz said. “If you look at it simply, those refugees should be accommodated and assimilated.” But many people don’t want refugees in their neighborhood. They look differently, speak differently and there is a lot of resentment. “People usually show mistrust toward people who are different. Sometimes it can be overcome and sometimes not," Jasiewicz said. "There is a cultural clash - the role of women in society and dress. The Dutch, Danes and French are in favor of gender equality. The immigrants see differently.” He said assimilation can’t be forced on the host citizens or the new residents, either. “Citizens don’t want refugees as part of a ghetto,” Jasiewicz said. “Both sides need to be willing to assimilate and have to be willing to accept.”






Solution -- Multilateral Action

A robust, multilateral immigration mechanism needs to be developed


Finally, Europe’s current predicament carries a larger lesson. The nations of the world need a more robust multilateral mechanism to develop and promote common global standards for the processing and treatment of migrants and refugees. The building blocks of such a system already exists, including in the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But the IOM is mainly an assistance body rather than a forum for negotiation, and UNHCR is stretched thin by multiple humanitarian crises. However, rather than seeking to create an entirely new international organization, UN member states should look to strengthen these existing ones so that they can do more to assist countries and regions coping with unexpected spikes in refugees and migrants. Ban Ki-moon’s upcoming emergency summit on migration (planned for September 30) is a welcome step in this direction.

aspect of what

http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8938



Con


Morality/Should Prioritize National Interest & Realism


Should Prioritize National Interest

Governments have to concern themselves with their own survival because their decisions impact many people and impact future generations

Hans Morgenthau, political scientist, 1950, The American Political Science Review, The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest v. Moral Abstractions, p. 853

Indeed, the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government; while the consequences of the private actions of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow compass

Since no international body can protect individual nations, individual nations must protect themselves

Hans Morgenthau, political scientist, 1950, The American Political Science Review, The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest v. Moral Abstractions, p. 854-5

The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreignpolicy in thought and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The equation of political moralism with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles, divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles, derived from political reality.

The basic fact of international politics is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the interests, of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to neglect them; for as the international society is at present constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to national suicide. Yet it can be shown that there exists even a positive moral duty for the individual nation to take care of its national interests. In the absence of an integrated international society, in particular, the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power. It is obvious that such a state of affairs falls far short of that order and realized morality to which we are accustomed in national societies. The only relevant question is, however, what the practical alternative is to these imperfections of an international society based upon the national interests of its component parts. The attainable alternative is not a higher morality realized through the application of universal moral principles, but moral deterioration through either political failure or the fanaticism of political crusades. The juxtaposition of the morality of political moralism and the immorality of the national interest is mistaken. It operates with a false concept of morality, developed by national societies but unsuited to the conditions of international society. In the process of its realization, it is bound to


destroy the very moral values which it is its purpose to promote. Hence, the antithesis between moral principles and the national interest is not only intellectually mistaken but also morally pernicious. A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles.

Failure to protect the national interests of the state will result in its destructionKenneth Waltz, Political Scientist, 1984 (NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, ed. Keohane, pp. 117-8)

A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all the actors. The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. Obviously, the system won't work won't work if all states lose interest in preserving themselves. It will, however, continue to work if some states do, while others do not, choose to lose their political identities, say, through amalgamation. Nor need it be assured that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system.

tates must act in their own interests or they will fail due to others exploiting their weaknesses.

Kenneth Waltz, Political Scientist, 1984 (NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, ed. Keohane, pp. 117-8)



A2: Walzer

There is no enforceable right to accept refugees and Walzer’s claims do not apply to current mass numbers


Since ideological (far more than ethnic) affinity is a matter of mutual recognition, there is a lot of room here for political choice— and thus, for exclusion as well as admission. Hence it might be said that my argument doesn’t reach to the desperation of the refugee. Nor does it suggest any way of dealing with the vast numbers of refugees generated by twentieth-century politics. On the one hand, everyone must have a place to live, and a place where a reasonably secure life is possible. On the other hand, this is not a right that can be enforced against particular host states. (The right can’t be enforced in practice until there is an international authority capable of enforcing it; and were there such an authority, it would certainly do better to intervene against the states whose brutal policies had driven their own citizens into exile, and so enable them all to go home.) Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 50). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.

There may be an insistence on charity for those outside the political community, but it cannot be an issue of justice because they are outside the community


We might opt for a world without particular meanings and without political communities: where no one was a member or where everyone “belonged” to a single global state. These are the two forms of simple equality with regard to membership. If all human beings were strangers to one another, if all our meetings were like meetings at sea or in the desert or by the side of the road, then there would be no membership to distribute. Admissions policy would never be an issue. Where and how we lived, and with whom we lived, would depend upon our individual desires and then upon our partnerships and affairs. Justice would be nothing more than non-coercion, good faith, and Good Samaritanism— a matter entirely of external principles. If, by contrast, all human beings were members of a global state, membership would already have been distributed, equally; and there would be nothing more to do. The first of these arrangements suggests a kind of global libertarianism; the second, a kind of global socialism. These are the two conditions under which the distribution of membership would never arise. Either there would be no such status to distribute, or it would simply come (to everyone) with birth. But neither of these arrangements is likely to be realized in the foreseeable future; and there are impressive arguments, which I will come to later, against both of them. In any case, so long as members and strangers are, as they are at present, two distinct groups, admissions decisions have to be made, men and women taken in or refused. Given the indeterminate requirements of mutual aid, these decisions are not constrained by any widely accepted standard. That’s why the admissions policies of countries are rarely criticized, except in terms suggesting that the only


relevant criteria are those of charity, not justice. It is certainly possible that a deeper criticism would lead one to deny the member/ stranger distinction. But I shall try, nevertheless, to defend that distinction and then to describe the internal and the external principles that govern the distribution of membership. Walzer, Michael (2008-08-05). Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality (p. 34). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.


A2: Rights

States have an obligation to protect the rights of their own citizens, not the rights of other citizens


What I want to emphasize, in this context, is that, while the first demand is universal, the second two are emphatically local. The state is under a universal demand to avoid violating human rights, that is, whether the violation occurs within its jurisdiction or not. But the state is under no correspondingly universal obligation to protect or fulfill the rights of humans qua humans. The state is instead obliged to protect and fulfill the rights of only some humans, namely, those who happen to be present within its territorial jurisdiction. This limitation does not seem by itself to run up against the liberal demand for the equality of persons; it is instead the means by which that equality is to be made operational in a world of territorial states. Thus, an assault in France upon a French citizen is undoubtedly a violation of human rights, and is undoubtedly to be regretted by all states, French or otherwise. But the United States is not obliged to devote its institutional capacity to the vindication of the rights of the French citizen to be free from assault. (Indeed, it would likely strike the French government as rather problematic if the Americans began to build institutions devoted to the punishment of French rights-violators.) The United States is able to devote its own institutional capacity to the protection and fulfillment of the rights of those present on American soil. It does this not because it values French lives less than American lives; after all, it would—if it were just—devote just as much time and effort to an assault upon a French tourist as to an assault upon an American citizen. It is able to devote its own institutional capacity in this way because of the jurisdictional limitation of the United States government, which is authorized and obligated to protect and fulfill human rights only within a particular part of the world's surface.18 Those who participate in the American system, further, are authorized and obligated to help support this system's ability to protect and fulfill human rights in this way. If we believe—as I do—that we have as individuals a general duty to uphold just institutions, then those who live and work within the jurisdiction of the United States have an obligation that is both legal and moral to protect and fulfill the human rights of their (jurisdictional) neighbors.19





Turn - Responsibility

Their self-righteous moralizing is irresponsible and makes the perfect the enemy of the good – we must first avoid doing harm to everyone on Earth

George Kennan, Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Ambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia, Professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies 1986 Foreign Affairs Winter 85-86, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/price/373/kennan.pdf DOA: 9-30-15

In a less than perfect world, where the ideal so obviously lies beyond human reach, it is natural that the avoidance of the worst should often be a more practical undertaking than the achievement of the best, and that some of the strongest imperatives of moral conduct should be ones of a negative rather than a positive nature. The strictures of the Ten Commandments are perhaps the best illustration of this state of affairs. This being the case, it is not surprising that some of the most significant possibilities for the observance of moral considerations in American foreign policy relate to the avoidance of actions that have a negative moral significance, rather than to those from which positive results are to be expected. Many of these possibilities lie in the intuitive qualities of diplomacy -- such things as the methodology, manners, style, restraint and elevation of diplomatic discourse -- and they can be illustrated only on the basis of a multitude of minor practical examples, for which this article is not the place. There are, however, two negative considerations that deserve mention here. The first of these relates to the avoidance of what might be called the histrionics of moralism at the expense of its substance. By that is meant the projection of attitudes, poses and rhetoric that cause us to appear noble and altruistic in the mirror of our own vanity but lack substance when related to the realities of international life. It is a sad feature of the human predicament, in personal as in public life, that whenever one has the agreeable sensation of being impressively moral, one probably is not. What one does without self-consciousness or self-admiration, as a matter of duty or common decency, is apt to be closer to the real thing.

We can’t wish an ethically perfect world into being – responsibility demands realist ethics

STENSLI Commander Norwegian Naval Forces 2003 Pacem n.1http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/

In his bold attempt at constructing an alternative to political realism, Rolfsen in fact lends himself to a description of certain current developments that is built on elements of realism, while his proposals (a new understanding of security) is based on strong appeals to idealism in the sense that he sees his own suggestions as a real alternative to PR. Concerning the latter point, Rolfsen could have found a richer tradition of thought in PR if he had also looked elsewhere than in Morgenthau. The core of realism is prudence, not aggression, unilateralism or imperialism. In my opinion, the gap between idealism and realism is such in Rolfsen`s contribution that it deserves an answer concerning his conception of political realism. Having said this, I believe Rolfsen`s attempt should be applauded for its frankness and its refreshing normative statements. My main concern here is not to criticise a particular author, but rather to illuminate the weaknesses I have come to see as inherent in all contributions to normative theory in which political realism is too easily condemned, grossly simplified, ridiculed or simply ignored. Rolfsen on Realism The first aspect in Rolfsen`s article that strikes me as odd is his very selective reading of political realism. As Wæver shows, there is no such thing as a single “political realism” that can be treated as a Theory. Rather, Political realism should be seen as a group or class of theories, hypothesis and world views that have no more in

http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/

http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/price/373/kennan.pdf


common than a pessimistic view towards utopian notions of progress solely based on appeals to reason and values. Unfortunately, realists tell us, our first task is to secure relative peace (absence of war) and stability. Realists thus are sceptical against any thinker or politician who claims to have found a promising path towards a platform on which to build a universal approach to secure democracy, toleration, the rule of law, human rights and peace, all being the ultimate goals of both idealists and realists. But building peace is actually far more difficult than wishing it . This latter truism is a classical inspiration of political realism, since it leads the scholar into considering an ethics of responsibility and expected consequences rather than elaborate attempts at analysing universally applicable ethical norms. As mentioned, the central normative appeal in realism itself is that the survival of the polity is the precondition for thinking about foreign policy (including ethics) at all. I believe that any serious discussion of ethics in politics, and policies of security, should acknowledge this heritage of PR as a starting point of the discussion. I believe most realists would pose the following question; how can it be immoral to lay emphasis on the survival of one’s own polity? Realists will claim that, in principle, there is nothing wrong a priori, in striving to meet the most basic of all national interests; namely survival.


Turn -- Utopianism

All moral systems that attempt to override practical obstacles to their implementation with revolutionary fervor culminate in absolute crime CHENG Rockefeller Fellow – UVA 2003 Cardozo Law Review 24 1108-9

"Morality, when it is formal, devours," observes Camus. n42 As both Camus and Lacan point out, morality alone does not lead to terror. It is only when morality asserts itself as absolute and inflexible that it becomes sadistic. For both Camus and Lacan, terror arises from the failure to set a limit to any action or practice . Morality is necessary because it sets a limit on what the subject is allowed to do , but morality itself can become terror when it asserts unlimited authority. In fact, Nietzsche himself might not be too far from the position taken by Camus and Lacan. Even though Nietzsche appears to be more ready to dismiss morality in toto, the kind of morality he has in mind is one that seeks absolute control - driven as it is by the spitefulness and vengefulness of ressentiment. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, he calls the human need for morality "the worst of all tastes," because it is "the taste for the unconditional." In other words, it is the unconditional character of morality that Nietzsche finds objectionable. Absolute virtue leads to absolute crime because "absolute" virtue can exist only as a formal, rational idea, unresponsive to empirical and human reality. Since it cannot operate in sync with reality, to reaffirm its status as the absolute Truth, it must persecute and even eliminate reality until its sovereignty reigns unchallenged. Revolutionaries are often susceptible to the temptation of "absolute virtue," because they see themselves and the old regime in terms of absolute good versus absolute evil. They are impatient to implement their vision of the "new society" and anxious to demonstrate the differences between the old society and the new - between "the bad" and "the good." Convinced that a bad society corrupts its citizens, revolutionaries are eager to reform not only society but also humanity. Reforming necessitates shaping materials according to a certain idea. Revolutionaries thus often have a set of principles and virtues that they impose on the new society, be it liberty, equality, fraternity, or justice. Unfortunately, once these virtues have been formalized into inflexible laws which increasingly deviate from human reality, Saint-Just's conclusion that "no one is virtuous innocently" becomes inevitable: "From the moment that laws fail to make harmony reign, or when the unity which should be created by adherence to principles is destroyed, who is to blame? Factions. Who compose the factions? Those who deny by their very actions the necessity of unity."

B. Scaled-down moral demands of realism are the best way to achieve a middle ground and avoid holocaust FRANKEL Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs – Columbia and FormerAssistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs 1975www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18_i006_a006.pdf - Google cache

Realists have insisted that foreign policy should be based on man as he is, not on man as a theoretician might desire him to be. Niebuhr used the Christian doctrines of history and human nature to make this point, stressing the incurable seed of corruption in\+l things human and the peculiar character of sin, which masks egoistical drives behind universalist creeds. Foreign policy realism, and particularly that of Niebuhr, must be seen against the background of the failed political faiths of the present century. It offered a framework for the belief that if people scaled down their moral demands, they might

http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18_i006_a006.pdf


develop a foreign policy capable of accomplishing modest but decent purposes and of avoiding major disasters.

16


Turn -- Intervention

The Pro’s uncompromising stance necessitates a global war on oppression – this is the rhetorical strategy adopted by political Hawks and ultimately ensures the spread of nuclear weapons and undermines global peace

Robert F. Ellsworth & Dimitri K. Simes, 2005, Realism’s Shining Morality, Robert F. Ellsworth is a life-science venture capitalist in California. He is vice-chairman of the Nixon Center. He has served as ambassador to NATO, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and as a Republican member of Congress. Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center and co-publisher of The National Interest, http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_69.shtml DOA: 9-29-15

But how foreign policy is conducted also matters, and here it is vitally important that President Bush, in his second term, avoid wrong choices that may bring catastrophic consequences. The second Bush Administration will have to deal with two fundamental dilemmas: first, how to reconcile the war against terror with a commitment to make the world safe for democracy; and second, how to assure that unchallenged U.S. military supremacy is used to enhance America's ability to shape the world rather than provoke global opposition to the United States, making us more isolated and accordingly less secure. The neoconservative vision for conducting American foreign policy is fraught with risks. And continuing to follow the prescriptions of the neoconservative faction in the Republican party may damage President Bush's legacy, imperil the country's fiscal stability and complicate America's ability to exercise global leadership. It has become an article of faith for the increasingly influential alliance of liberal interventionists and neoconservatives that the United States, as the world's democratic hegemonic power, is both entitled and even morally bound to use whatever tools are necessary to save the world from brutality and oppression and to promote democratization around the globe. Up to a point, the War on Terror and encouraging democracy worldwide are mutually reinforcing. President Bush is quite right that democracy, particularly if we are talking about democracy in a stable society coupled with a rule of law and with adequate protection of minority rights, is not only morally preferable to authoritarian rule, but also is the best prescription against the emergence of deeply alienated radical groups prone to terrorism. The "democracy project" also appeals to the highest aspirations of the American people. After all, the Cold War was never driven solely by the need to contain Soviet power, but by the moral conviction that defending freedom in the United States and in the world in general was something worth fighting and dying for--even, in the Berlin Crisis, risking nuclear war itself. High-minded realists do not disagree with the self-appointed champions of global democracy (the neoconservatives and the liberal interventionists) that a strong preference for liberty and justice should be an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. But they realize that there are tradeoffs between pushing for democracy and working with other sovereign states--some not always quite democratic--to combat global terror. Realists also, following the advice of General Charles Boyd, understand the need to "separate reality from image" and "to tell the truth, if only to ourselves"--not to play fast and loose with facts to create the appearance of acting morally. And they are aware that there are important differences in how the United States helps the world achieve freedom. Indeed, in his first press conference after his triumph at the polls, President Bush used three different terms in talking about America's global pro-democracy effort. He discussed the need "to encourage freedom and democracy", to "promote free societies", and to "spread freedom and democracy." "Encouraging" democracy is not a controversial position. Nearly everyone in the world accepts that the sole superpower is

http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_69.shtml


entitled and indeed expected to be true to its core beliefs. "Promoting" democracy is vaguer and potentially more costly. Still, if the United States does so without resorting to military force and takes into account the circumstances and perspectives of other nations, then it is likely not to run into too much international opposition. "Spreading" democracy, however, particularly spreading it by force, coercion and violent regime change, is a different thing altogether. Those who suspect they may be on the receiving end of such treatment are unlikely to accept American moral superiority, are bound to feel threatened, and cannot reasonably be expected to cooperate with the United States on other important American priorities, including the War on Terror and nuclear proliferation. Worse still, they may decide that acquiring nuclear weapons is the last--perhaps their only--option to deter an American attempt to overthrow their governments. This already appears to be the dynamic in the case of Iran and North Korea. Also, in dealing with the likes of Tehran and Pyongyang, there can be no certainty with whom they may share nuclear technology. Accordingly, there is a clear and present danger that pro-democracy zeal may enhance the greatest possible threat to U.S. security and the American way of life--the threat of nuclear terrorism.

They’ll say their advocacy is non-violent but their rhetoric and their defense of coercive action creates a slippery slopeKAGAN Professor of History and Classics – Yale 1983 Washington Quarterly v.6 n.1

People raised in the Western moral tradition will find it difficult to accept this conclusion, but the alternative is less acceptable. A foreign policy committed to normal relations only with virtuous regimes that protect human rights and to hostility toward wicked governments that violate them would be either excessively dangerous or hypocritical . Because most regimes now in place, and most that have existed throughout history, have violated our notion of human rights to a considerable degree, a nation seeking consistently to oppose such regimes would have few friends and many enemies. Current advocates of human rights as a basic element in foreign policy rarely face the full consequences of their position. They usually begin with the idea merely of refusing to provide diplomatic, material, and military support for regimes they oppose, even when such aid is entirely in accord with international law and custom. Unless such an action is to be a meaningless gesture, however, it should help bring about the fall of the targeted regime and its replacement by a better one. But if morality requires so much, why not more? If the United States government is justified in intervening so far in the internal affairs of another country, why should it not lend active support to insurgents, indeed, by the same moral criteria, isn't it bound to? If material aid to insurgents is not enough, why not direct military support? What moral principle interrupts that chain of necessity? If someone should decry such actions as interference with the independence and autonomy of a sovereign state, as a form of imperialism, let him understand that they differ only in degree from the first step on the ladder.

This makes the Aff on its face unethical – we have to accept that the world is less than ideal and we have only a limited ability to change itFRANKEL Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs – Columbia and FormerAssistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs 1975www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18_i006_a006.pdf - Google cache

The realists have been extraordinary men: George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Gifted scholars and courageous public men, their realism is anything but the tired view that moral principles are for children and that nothing counts foreign affairs but



success. Indeed, what has given their positions much of their attractiveness is the depth of their moral conviction that in foreign affairs we deal with the corruptions of human nature and must accept less than the ideal. Kennan, an historian, a professional diplomat, a man of unusual sensitivities to cultural climates different from his own, has not been repelled merely on practical grounds by the American tendency to lecture others on the moralities. The tendency-so, at least, it seems to this observer-has cut him to the moral quick: He has seen it as a breach of basic principles of tolerance and respect for others. In his view it is not merely naivete; it is contempt for human diversity, for the profusion of God’s creation, to fail to see that the world cannot be governed in accordance with any particular nation’s conception of right and wrong. Morgenthau, more the systematizer than Kennan, is explicit in his concern for rationality in foreign policy. He regards it as a moral norm, not simply a technical imperative, as an instrument for reducing human pain, and not only for achieving tactical victories. Finally, Niebuhr was to the realists, in Kennan’s words, “the father of us all.” No one who knew him or his writings could fail to see that he was animated by both an acute

moral sensibility and a passion for justice.


Turn – Social Contract A. They take on an unconditional burden that assigns the US government responsibility for everything bad that happens anywhere – this is arrogant and dangerous

Robert F. Ellsworth & Dimitri K. Simes, 2005, Realism’s Shining Morality, Robert F. Ellsworth is a life-science venture capitalist in California. He is vice-chairman of the Nixon Center. He has served as ambassador to NATO, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and as a Republican member of Congress. Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center and co-publisher of The National Interest, http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_69.shtml DOA: 9-29-15

Every American administration faces pressure to act as if the United States were responsible for the affairs of others. Realists often argue that succumbing to this pressure is both arrogant and dangerous. It is arrogant because it presumes that we always understand the circumstances of others and are well equipped to offer indispensable guidance on how they should conduct their affairs. Cicero offered useful counsel along these lines to Roman leaders, urging that they "do not recklessly and presumptuously assume something to be true" when they do not know it to be so with certainty. Iraq is a case in point. Despite constant attention to Iraq for over a decade, the United States has experienced regular surprises there--most recently the level of opposition to the American occupation among Iraqis and the speed, extent and sophistication of foreign terrorist infiltration of the country. This suggests that greater humility may be in order in making judgments about what is happening in other countries to which we have paid less attention, and in deciding what is "right" for them (not to mention our judgments about the costs of making it happen). The pressure to assume responsibility for others is also dangerous. While removing Saddam Hussein from power was not immediately necessary, the war was on balance a correct response to an untenable nowar, no-peace situation. Still, the temptation to transform Iraq into a successful democracy implies an American commitment that could overwhelm our ability to pay attention to other challenges, strain our resources and undermine other U.S. objectives. For example, the United States is hardly in a position to apply credible military pressure on North Korea while it is preoccupied militarily, financially and politically with Iraq. This leads to a situation in which America is very specific about what it is unwilling to accept from Pyongyang but rather vague about the consequences of defiance. Kim Jong-il may be more irritated than intimidated and other nations may feel that disciplining his regime has little urgency. BECAUSE doing what is right in international politics often comes at a high price, as it is in Iraq, realists tend to insist not only that proposed actions be sound on their merits, but also that their benefits outweigh their costs, including potential unintended consequences. The Clinton Administration's "optional war" to liberate Kosovo is a dramatic illustration. Realists do not dispute Serbian brutality, the contribution of NATO's victory to Slobodan Milosevic's electoral defeat or the benefits to Serbs and their neighbors of this villain's removal. Still, the Clinton team undermined the moral clarity of the effort by failing to level with the American people about its pre-war ultimatum to Serbia to allow free access for NATO troops throughout Serbia, something that few sovereign states would be expected to accept without offering armed resistance--and something that Milosevic was not actually forced to accept even after weeks of NATO air strikes. General Wesley Clark's increasing insistence on attacking civilian infrastructure targets, like bridges, was also problematic, especially in light of the comparatively limited destruction of infrastructure during the current administration's much more essential war in Iraq. Finally, the inaction of NATO forces in the face of massive ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Serbs by the victorious Albanians--often led by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) thugs--raises serious questions. Some U.S. officials had accused the KLA of committing terrorist acts before it was recast as the Clinton Administration's proxy.

http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_69.shtml


The US government isn’t responsible for everyone everywhere – its citizens must come first

George Kennan, Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Ambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia, Professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies 1986 Foreign Affairs Winter 85-86, http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/price/373/kennan.pdf DOA: 9-30-15

There will be a tendency, I know, on the part of some readers to see in these observations an apology for the various situations, both domestic and international, against which we have protested and acted in the past. They are not meant to have any such connotations. These words are being written -- for whatever this is worth -- by one who regards the action in Afghanistan as a grievous and reprehensible mistake of Soviet policy, a mistake that could and should certainly have been avoided. Certain of the procedures of the South African police have been no less odious to me than to many others. What is being said here does not relate to the reactions of individual Americans, of private organizations in this country, or of the media, to the situations in question. All these may think and say what they like. It relates to the reactions of the U.S. government, as a government among governments, and to the motivation cited for those reactions. Democracy, as Americans understand it, is not necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the U.S. government to assure that it becomes that. Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, not everyone in this world is responsible, after all, for the actions of everyone else, everywhere. Without the power to compel change, there is no responsibility for its absence. In the case of governments it is important for purely practical reasons that the lines of responsibility be kept straight, and that there be, in particular, a clear association of the power to act with the consequences of action or inaction.

They violates the social contract – Americans don’t elect their leaders to make value judgments – there’s no consensus about values in America and promoting them abroad is divisive and is undemocratic KAGAN Professor of History and Classics – Yale 1983 Washington Quarterly v.6 n.1

Elected officials of a representative republican government, however, have no such right. While always professing a general morality, they do not run for office on the basis of a specific, declared hierarchy of moral values and judgments, but rather, at best, on a stated notion of the national interest. Certainly none has ever run on a program of subordinating the security and interests of the country to any particular view of the morality of foreign governments. Yet such a program is implicit in any policy that is shaped by the internal behavior of foreign nations. Such a policy is not only at odds with a correct understanding of representative government and impossible to follow consistently and honestly, but it would also be dangerously divisive. However much Americans may disagree on what is in their national interest, they differ far more strongly and deeply on the application of particular views of morality to foreign policy. We are a people of varied origins with vestigial attachments to the lands of our heritage . During World War I Americans of German and Irish descent felt very differently about the morality of the British blockade and of German submarine warfare than did Americans of British origin. Only attacks on American ships created a consensus that made war against Germany possible. On the eve of World War II many German-Americans and Italo-Americans were of a decidedly different view than were others of the need to fight against the wickedness of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy alongside the wickedness of communist Russia, nor were ethnic differences the only deep and important ones. Only Japan's attack on their country rallied all Americans to the common cause.Although Wilson and then Roosevelt had no

http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/price/373/kennan.pdf


doubt where virtue and iniquity lay, neither could have brought his nation into war on that basis; both had to wait until the nation's security and vital interests were obviously at stake. Even to try to do otherwise would have rent the nation into bitterly hostile factions and done it great harm. When Americans vote for presidents and members of Congress they do not think their votes give the government the right to make moral judgments for them -- only prudential ones, especially when the possibility of war exists. The losing 45 percent of more of the electorate can tolerate the winning party making practical decisions on their behalf, but not far-ranging moral ones. In a disparate, plural society moralism in foreign affairs divides, while enlightened self-interest unites.


Ethical Pragmatism Necessary to Prevent War

An ethics of pragmatic realist consequence assessment produces opposition to war – that’s why realists have opposed most of the 20th century’s wars.

STENSLI Commander Norwegian Naval Forces 2003 Pacem n.1http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/

Morgenthau is not a-ethical. His ethics is simply an ethics of expected consequences . In this respect, he is not so different from the founder of empirical sociology, Max Weber. Having said this, I agree with Rolfsen that Morgenthau is not very sophisticated on the distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of his theory. Morgenthau is actually quite honest; he does not purport to present a theory of ethics. I believe it unfair to PR, however, to exclusively explain PR on the basis of Morgenthau`s writings. Why has Rolfsen not quoted E.H. Carr? Why is structural realism totally ignored? Perhaps the ethical implications of these theories are harder to address? The alternative to this kind of ethics in politics is not necessarily attractive. This does not exclude the possibility that genuinely altruistic behaviour might occur in international relations, whenever this is possible under the given circumstances. But most importantly, there might be good reasons for following the implicit ethics of PR - the ethics of consequences, judged by pragmatically interpreted moral criteria. Perhaps it was this line of reasoning that led Morgenthau to criticise the US decision to wage war in Vietnam in the first place? Let us go a bit further in evaluating the practical consequences of political realism versus idealism in discourses on armed intervention. When considering this question, one could perhaps continue by reflecting over the war between NATO and FRY in 1999. To many a political realist, including officers and old “hawks” as Henry Kissinger, the justification, the diplomacy leading up to, as well as the conduct of, the war on behalf of NATO seemed dubious . The idealistic “humanists” on the other hand, more or less portrayed the conflict as a classical drama between Good and Evil, in which other means than military force was seen as insufficient in order to reach a peaceful solution . At the time of writing, there is much debate worldwide, including in the US polity (Rolfsen is silent on the latter debate), whether and how the USA should invade Iraq. Again, political realists seem to be much more reluctant to such unilateral US actions. These critics include Lawrence Eagleburger, Norman Schwartzkopf, A. Zenni, B. Scowcroft, Wesley Clark, Samuel Huntington and again, Henry Kissinger. The debates on Vietnam, Kosovo and Iraq show that political realism might perhaps be a more sophisticated ethical platform than Rolfsen thinks. In line with Jon Hellesnes, the reason is perhaps that political realism is less ideologically laden than any other alternative. Consistent political realists do not demonise the “Other”. Thus, one is forced to balance the possible with the desirable, to recognise one’s opponent or allied as a bearer of a distinct identity. The point made by Hellesnes actually is that there can be good reasons to follow what he calls the methodological a-moralism (22) of political realism, since the ultimate aim of realism is to decrease levels of destruction and the use of violence.


http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/#22


Ethics Of Prudence

A. Prudence is the highest political virtue

John Hulsman Senior Fellow – Davis Institute for Foreign Policy Studies and Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies - Russia and Eurasia Center – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005, The Ethics of Realism, http://modern-radio.com/board/88120-the-ethics-of-realism/ DOA: 9-29-15

Ethical realism is therefore also characterized by prudence in shaping goals and deciding on actions. This is derived from assumptions about human knowledge, goodness and perfectibility that link ethical realism to the conservative tradition of Edmund Burke, to much older Christian assumptions, and indeed to the spirit that helped frame the U.S. Constitution. Burke said of prudence that it is "not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but . . . is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all." He referred to prudence as "the god of this lower world." Courage is essential in confronting obvious, proven and serious threats; but prudence is a moral imperative for states men who have in their hands the lives of their countries' soldiers and the safety of their fellow citizens.

B. Survival of the political order is a prerequisite for ethical ends – their argument is politically ineffective as long as it refuses the idea that nations should act to defend their interests; it also justifies increasingly brutal conduct in international crises STENSLI Commander Norwegian Naval Forces 2003 Pacem n.1http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ - bottom

The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics. In PACEM 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen, A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics. Rolfsen`s aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an undemocratic environment. Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people. This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between “realists” and “idealists”. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept. In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him. Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions, but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding of PR. The reason simply is, that since the existence of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and - theories implicitly rest on minimum requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism. Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is

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http://modern-radio.com/board/88120-the-ethics-of-realism/

http://modern-radio.com/board/88120-the-ethics-of-realism/


necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.


Policy Relevance Turn

A. Ethical frameworks must be empirically testable and have policy relevance to meaningfully affect modern political decisionmaking – your refusal of pragmatism makes your arguments socially irrelevantSTENSLI Commander Norwegian Naval Forces 2003 Pacem n.1http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/

I applaud all scholars who seek to construct an alternative to political realism as description of and prescription for international politics. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is a considerable gap between practitioners and students of foreign policy on the one hand, and theologians and philosophers interested in ethics and politics on the other. To us empirical social scientists, and to officers, I dare say, such alternative modes of thinking about politics should seek certain criteria. First, it should be rather consistent.. Second, it should be possible to check the theory on the phenomena with the corresponding, observable real world-phenomena. Thus, the theory must principally be of such character that its basic assumptions and deductions can be refuted by empirical observations. Thirdly, it should be substantial. I believe that Rolfsen`s “Ethics of vulnerability” (in contrast to his analysis of realism) meets the first and third criteria. He might argue that the second criterion is irrelevant, since his contribution primarily is in the field of ethics. But in that case, he supports Morgenthau`s assertions about the autonomy of the political, ethical and economic spheres of thought. In my view, Rolfsen has to accept criteria number two in order to present an alternative framework for thinking about security. In the social sciences, as well as in operational art, military theory and strategy, we construct theories that simplify complex reality. These devices then help us understand parts of more complex systems or processes. But in order to construct theories and hypothesis, we must make our assumptions explicit; that is, make them available and open to debate and refutation. Morgenthau did just that in his classical work Politics Among Nations. Although Morgenthau was overly ambitious, it is clear that his aim was to see what scope and limitations there was in the construction he called “A Realist Theory of International Politics”; The test by which such a theory must be judged is not a priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic. The theory, in other words, must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible. It must meet a dual test, an empirical and a logical one. To me, as an officer with at least some training in the social sciences, theories that do not meet the criteria above remain purely theoretical constructions that cannot help us interpret our environment. As Morgenthau stressed repeatedly, in the study of war and peace as empirical phenomena, we are forced to make assumptions about human behaviour and the system we call society . Against this, the scholar of ethics will argue that he is doing normative theory. But in that case, normative theory will still occupy its own sphere, distinct from empirical or descriptive theories and research. I am a strong supporter of debates on ethics and moral conduct both in politics and in the use of violence by military units as ordered by the modern state apparatus. Thus, Feltprestkorpset should continue to raise questions concerning both jus ad bellum and certainly concerning jus in bello.



Policy Relevance Turn

B. This forecloses the possibility of applying just war norms to US foreign policy

WEIGEL President of the James Madison Foundation 1987 Washington Quarterly v.10 n.4

First, assuming that the United States government is not filled with pacifists and/or radical neo-isolationsts, there is inevitably going to be a military component to America's encounter with a persistently hostile world. This suggests that the intellectual and cultural health of just war theory -- that is, our ability to think through the ways in which the proportionate and discriminate use of armed force can (and cannot) contribute to peace, security and freedom in the world -- is of crucial importance. Where is just war theory alive in American political culture? Where has it died? It is alive in our military manuals, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in the service academies and the officer corps. It is alive among political philosophers, even if, like Stanley Hoffman and Michael Walzer, they feel compelled to reinvent it. It is alive in international law, although in a truncated form. And it is alive among Roman Catholic, mainline and evangelical Protestant, and Jewish theologians, ethicists, and religious leaders. It is dead or dying among many religious peace activist intellectuals and ecclesiastical leaders, and among Realists like Robert Tucker who continue to insist that just war theory is a matter of squaring the circle. n8 A revival of just war theory in the argument over morality and foreign policy would address, among other things, the new pressures that modern forms of political violence -- terrorism, guerilla warfare, low-intensity conflict -- have put on the classic just war criteria. International law in its present form poses one set of problems, recognizing as it does that self-defense is the only legally legitimate reason to threaten or resort to force of arms. But what constitutes self-defense in a situation of chronic ideological and political conflict such as one finds in U.S.-Soviet relations? Can just war theory adequately ground the practice of deterrence, for example, and in what form? How does one discriminate between combatants and noncombatants in guerrilla warfare? What is proportional use of armed force in Third World conflicts? How does one determine that the last resort has been reached, and armed force thus justified, in revolutionary situations? What does just war theory do to illuminate decisions faced by U.S. policymakers in a situation like Grenada, where the immediate threat to U.S. security is minimal but the possibilities for supporting democrats and displacing tyrants are great? And how, if at all, can just war theory's classic ad bellum criterion of "punishment for evil" as a legitimate moral reason for the resort to armed force help guide policy in the face

of international terrorism, particularly if it is state sponsored? Absent persuasive answers to, or at least persuasive argument on, these pressing issues, one important resource for considering the relationship between moral norms and foreign policy practice may well continue to die the death of a thousand intellectual cuts in our political culture. Such a death is also possible because just war theorists, in the main, have done a less than satisfactory job in relating their theory to the pursuit of peace. Classic just war theorists speak of the ius ad bellum (what William V. O'Brien has called "war-decision law") and the ius in bello ("warconduct law," in O'Brien's terminology). But it can also be argued -- and, in an American context, must be argued -- that just war theory contains, in its interstices and its basic intellectual trajectory, an ius ad pacem, a concept of peace as rightly ordered political community. The resort to proportionate and discriminate armed force must be directed toward peace, which is to say toward the establishment of a minimum of public order in international affairs. How this can be done in a way that avoids the sentimentalities of much contemporary "world order" thinking is a large, although not impossible, task. But given the pressures put on the classic theory by modern forms of political violence and, perhaps above all, by the fact of nuclear weapons, a just war theory that does not address the nature and pursuit of peace is unlikely to play the significant role it should in American political discourse.


1NC Lead By Example Turn

A, The only defensible role of government is defending its population from threats to its survival – we have to reign in government interventions, not give them moral sanction

KAGAN Professor of History and Classics – Yale 1983 Washington Quarterly v.6 n.1

The only rationally defensible and practical foreign policy for a nation like our is one based on a clearly limited definition of the national interest, that is, the defense of our freedom and autonomy, defense of our physical security against foreign attack , and defense of the national economic security against assault by foreign nations. Such a limited policy is in the spirit of reining in the power and pretensions of government that liberals favored in the late 1960s and 1970s when they complained of an "imperial Presidency," but it should be no less welcome to conservatives in the Reagan era. If the government's role in the practical lives of its citizens should be reduced, no less should its power be reduced to usurp their moral decisions. Both practically and morally the government's power should be confined to doing only what is appropriate to it and what cannot be done by anyone else.

B. The Aff on its face utilizes government coercionJames A. Dorn, Cato Institute, 1996, The Cato Journal, Volume 16, No. 1, Spring/Summer, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-5.html

The threat of using trade restrictions to advance human rights is fraught with danger. Free trade is itself a human right and rests on an individual's rights to life, liberty, and property--rights the U.S. Founding Fathers regarded as inalienable and self-evident. When the federal government closes U.S. markets to countries with governments that deny their citizens certain civil liberties, it robs those citizens of one more freedom and undermines the market dynamic that in the end is the best instrument for creating wealth and preserving freedom. China serves as a case in point. Denying China most-favored-nation status or imposing sanctions would politicize trade, strengthen the CCP, and harm many innocent people. Sanctions also would violate Americans' rights to liberty and property by interfering with free trade. The proper function of government is to cultivate a framework for freedom by protecting liberty and property, including freedom of contract (which includes free international trade)--not to use the power of government to undermine one freedom in an attempt to secure others. The right to trade is an inherent part of our property rights and a civil right that should be protected as a fundamental human right.


1NC Lead By Example Turn

C. Leadership by example is the most effective and ethical way of promoting human rights and

democracy

HENDRICKSON AND TUCKER Professor Emeritus – American Foreign Policy – Johns Hopkins

and Distinguished Service Professor – Colorado College 2005 The National Interest Fall 2005

None of this should suggest that American ideals and institutions lack universal appeal. The constitutional principles on which this nation is founded--representative government, freedom of expression, the separation of church and state, federalism, the legal protection of private property and individual rights, restrictions on the powers of government--have shown remarkable applicability in cultures vastly different from our own. But we must also remember that in the liberal tradition, the rights of nations--above all the right to determine their own domestic institutions--were just as essential as the rights of individuals and that the right of revolution belonged to each people and no one else. The Bush Administration itself bows to the principle of national independence in claiming that "the United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else." But as this declaration is deemed compatible with invading another country for the purpose of liberating its population and is considered applicable only after a violent external revolution has been effected, the conclusion is inescapable that its actions betray its words. At bottom, what is most objectionable about the Bush Doctrine is the junction it postulates between freedom and force. When John Quincy Adams declared that America should be the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all, but the champion and vindicator only of her own, he argued that the contrary policy would entail an insensible shift in our maxims "from liberty to force." By the maxims of force he meant what today would be called militarism--"a tendency", in Andrew Bacevich's words, "to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means." That was the way of the "war system" of the European powers to which the Americans of Adams's day had such strong objections, and it is also the way of the contemporary United States. Charity, it has been said, begins at home. So does respect for the principles of freedom. If we are to hope that others might gain instruction and profit from our example, we ought to make certain that our example is a good one. The current generation of Americans might gain instruction from the liberal tradition as much as others. The prohibition against the "midnight knock of the secret police" does not have attached to it a large asterisk that allows the supposed apostles of freedom to engage in such practices when they find it necessary or convenient. Above all, the liberal tradition condemns a promiscuous attitude toward the use of force. Nothing can be more damaging to the tradition of civil freedom than invoking the name while the substance is violated, nothing more revolting than the prostitution of the "sacred fire of liberty" to purposes at odds with its central precepts. "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all", observed George Washington in his Farewell Address. "Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it?" Washington believed that "the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it." It is a measure of the distance we have traveled from the principles of our Founding that these temporary advantages are now seen as dispositive, as the supposed dictates of necessity repeatedly trump respect for principles dear to the liberal heritage. Such an attitude mocks, rather than respects, "the honorable achievement of our fathers.


Moralizing Terrible

A. Moralizing arguments are selfish and negate true moral sentiment COADY Professor of Philosophy – University of Melbourne 2005Journal of Applied Philosophy v.22 n.2, p. 134

In conclusion, I hope to have shown that, properly understood, the doctrine of realism has something to teach about the role of morality in international affairs. Broadly that lesson is: beware of moralism. It is a salutary lesson, not of course restricted to foreign relations, but particularly significant there, because the stakes are often so high. What specific guidance will be drawn from such a warning will depend upon the particular circumstances involved. I have tried to show that some of the typical realist claims about what are actually moralistic policies and in what their moralism consists are highly debatable. Realist prescriptions for avoiding moralism are sometimes useful, sometimes not. It is folly, and sadly a folly to which realists are prone to succumb, to see the only alternative to moralism to lie in some form of national egoism. We might compare this with a parallel reaction to moralism at the personal level. It would be absurd to think that a retreat into relentless selfishness was the only feasible response to the haughty unreality of Pecksniff’s smug assessments in Dickens’ Martin Chuzzlewit or the cruel and arrogant judgementalism of the Puritan townsfolk in Hawthorn’s The Scarlet Letter. Such moralizing stands exposed and condemned by morality itself, not by mere self-interest. Similarly, a recognition of the dangers of moralism in the international (or national) arena is itself morally driven and needs the response of a healthy, prudent moral understanding. It will of course need to take account of the realities of international interactions, including those generated by power relations and the duties of group representation. But these do not negate the moral categories underlying any form of moral response. A proper concern for national well-being will have a place in such a response, but only one place amongst others. The right replacement for moralism is not national self-interest, but a suitably nuanced and attentive international morality

B. An ethical realism acknowledges the limitations of the USFG in achieving ethical ends – sacrificing modest progress in the name of otopian ethics is on its face immoralHULSMAN AND LIEVEN Senior Fellow – Davis Institute for Foreign Policy Studies and Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies - Russia and Eurasia Center – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005National Interest Summer 2005

For realists, then, there is no avoiding the morality debate if they are to prevail politically. Nor should there be. Any foreign policy without a moral component should be anathema to a country that aspires to stand as "a shining city on a hill" to the rest of the world. So realists must beat the utopians at their own game. Fortunately they can, because realism itself is inherently moral. To update ethical realism, these moral principles can be distilled into one common-sense phrase about the state of the country and the world: America is good, but it is not perfect. Neoconservatism emerges as immoral in failing to live up to either of these precepts. The ethical realist response to those who would claim the moral high ground in foreign policy was sharply phrased by Morgenthau: "The equation of political moralizing with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality and another set of moral principles derived from political reality." For those who see the


possibility of a utopian world within the reach of America's power and influence, this seems a bleakly negative view. And indeed, neoconservatives have a point in criticizing realists for positing that America behaves merely as any other great power in pursuing its national interests. Thus, in a crude realist formulation, all other states should automatically begin to balance geostrategically against America, as such states inevitably fear the threat of encroachment by stronger countries. There is one problem with this theory, however: It has not so far generally applied to the United States. For all that they criticize America, Canada and Mexico--not to mention continental Europe--do not fear America's might turning on them militarily. There is little doubt, therefore, that the world is fortunate that the United States stands as the ordering power at the century's end. A strong America is the bastion of the present civilized political order. Preserving it as such remains the truest form of American internationalism. However, neoconservatives, through their policies of expending blood and treasure for problematic gains such as Iraq, are significantly retarding America's ability to act against the true barbarians at the gate--Al-Qaeda and Islamist extremists. It is precisely because America is good--is in many ways the last, best hope for man kind--that a frittering away of its military, economic and diplomatic power is so immoral . It is not neoconservative intentions, but their wrong-headedness, that is corroding America's ability to do good in the world. Being a good steward of what one has been given, in order to leave the world as good or better for one's children than one found it, is at the bedrock of the e

C. The Pro can only justify war. Our alternative does not foreclose the possibility that we as individuals might register our strong opposition to the policies of foreign governments, even refuse to purchase their products or communicate with them. BUT elevating such moral considerations to state policy is uniquely dangerous. KAGAN Professor of History and Classics – Yale 1983 Washington Quarterly v.6 n.1

If support for human rights is to be more than talk, and therefore mere hypocrisy, it must lead to unfriendly actions and, sometimes, to war. If a nation pursuing such a policy acted prudently, choosing to support human rights abroad only when it was safe and in accord with it own interests, it would rightly be accused, once again, with hypocrisy. Such a nation would also be forbidden to seek alliances with wicked nations that violate human rights, no matter how vital they might be for its security. A nation following such a policy could not long survive in the kind of world mankind has known since people first organized themselves into discrete societies. Advocates of moralism in foreign affairs, however, rarely recognize such problems. They always seem to find that their particular moralisms coincide with the national interest, but in the real world such perfect coincidence occurs infrequently. The test is this: would the international moralists really propose that their nation choose its friends and enemies on the basis of their treatment of their own citizens, even at the risk of its own safety? If they would, few of their fellow citizens would or should accept such quixotic advice. If they would not urge such a policy, they are merely saying something with which we all agree -- that it is pleasant when morality and self-interest coincide. Naturally, it is both right and practical for a government and a nation such as ours to pursue a moral course when there is a choice between two or more policies that may serve the national interest and when the moral choice is clear. Individuals, moreover, are free to give their sympathy and private support, within the law, to other nations or factions within those nations on the basis of their private ideas of morality. They, unlike the government, are free moral agents answerable only to their own consciences; they have a right to put their own interests at risk on behalf of higher values. Elected officials of a representative republican government, however, have no such right.


While always professing a general morality, they do not run for office on the basis of a specific, declared hierarchy of moral values and judgments, but rather, at best, on a stated notion of the national interest. Certainly none has ever run on a program of subordinating the security and interests of the country to any particular view of the morality of foreign governments. Yet such a program is implicit in any policy that is shaped by the internal behavior of foreign nations.


Moralizing Is Immoral

High-minded moralizing and self-righteousness are themselves unethical – they indicate a lack of concern for the messy and difficult work of ethics and enable cooption

COADY Professor of Philosophy – University of Melbourne 2005Journal of Applied Philosophy v.22 n.2

Moralism of deluded power. This is less a distorted form of moral judgement or understanding, than a distorted belief in the power of moral utterances and moral stands , often accompanied by a sense of self-righteousness. Moralism of this sort is the mistaken, or at least overconfident, belief that appeals to moral standards, ideals, and principles will have by themselves powerful effects in altering behaviour. Realists oppose this belief and phenomena associated with it because they think that it ignores the realities of international behaviour, and in particular the realities of power and self-interest . It can also far too often provide a camouflage, wittingly or unwittingly, for the promotion of interests that have little to do with morality. This can be seen vividly in George Kennan’s denunciations of the politics of moral rhetoric. The following is taken from Kennan’s Morality and foreign policy in which he calls for “the avoidance of what might be called the histrionics of moralism at the expense of its substance.” He continues: By that is meant the projection of attitudes, poses and rhetoric that cause us to appear noble and altruistic in the mirror of our own vanity but lack substance when related to the realities of international life. It is a sad feature of the human predicament , in personal as in public life, that whenever one has the agreeable sensation of being impressively moral, one probably is not This catches both the delusional belief in the efficacy of mere high-sounding words, and the self-deceptive element involved in the self-importance so often characteristic of moralism. Again, this realist emphasis is instructive and might usefully be brought to the attention of many of the world’s leaders today when overblown moral (and sometimes religious) rhetoric is so prominent. But Kennan is not denouncing sober moral talk or sensible moral judgement on world affairs, as is clear from his final point that the agreeable sensation of being moral is a bad indicator of the presence of true morality . His strictures are against a form of moralism, not morality.


Ethics Of Consequences Prevents War

An ethics of pragmatic realist consequence assessment produces opposition to war – that’s why realists have opposed most of the 20th century’s wars. STENSLI Commander Norwegian Naval Forces 2003 Pacem n.1http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/

Morgenthau is not a-ethical. His ethics is simply an ethics of expected consequences . In this respect, he is not so different from the founder of empirical sociology, Max Weber. Having said this, I agree with Rolfsen that Morgenthau is not very sophisticated on the distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of his theory. Morgenthau is actually quite honest; he does not purport to present a theory of ethics. I believe it unfair to PR, however, to exclusively explain PR on the basis of Morgenthau`s writings. Why has Rolfsen not quoted E.H. Carr? Why is structural realism totally ignored? Perhaps the ethical implications of these theories are harder to address? The alternative to this kind of ethics in politics is not necessarily attractive. This does not exclude the possibility that genuinely altruistic behaviour might occur in international relations, whenever this is possible under the given circumstances. But most importantly, there might be good reasons for following the implicit ethics of PR - the ethics of consequences, judged by pragmatically interpreted moral criteria. Perhaps it was this line of reasoning that led Morgenthau to criticise the US decision to wage war in Vietnam in the first place? Let us go a bit further in evaluating the practical consequences of political realism versus idealism in discourses on armed intervention. When considering this question, one could perhaps continue by reflecting over the war between NATO and FRY in 1999. To many a political realist, including officers and old “hawks” as Henry Kissinger, the justification, the diplomacy leading up to, as well as the conduct of, the war on behalf of NATO seemed dubious . The idealistic “humanists” on the other hand, more or less portrayed the conflict as a classical drama between Good and Evil, in which other means than military force was seen as insufficient in order to reach a peaceful solution.) At the time of writing, there is much debate worldwide, including in the US polity (Rolfsen is silent on the latter debate), whether and how the USA should invade Iraq. Again, political realists seem to be much more reluctant to such unilateral US actions. These critics include Lawrence Eagleburger, Norman Schwartzkopf, A. Zenni, B. Scowcroft, Wesley Clark, Samuel Huntington and again, Henry Kissinger. The debates on Vietnam, Kosovo and Iraq show that political realism might perhaps be a more sophisticated ethical platform than Rolfsen thinks. In line with Jon Hellesnes the reason is perhaps that political realism is less ideologically laden than any other alternative. Consistent political realists do not demonise the “Other”. Thus, one is forced to balance the possible with the desirable, to recognise one’s opponent or allied as a bearer of a distinct identity. The point made by Hellesnes actually is that there can be good reasons to follow what he calls the methodological a-moralism (22) of political realism, since the ultimate aim of realism is to decrease levels of destruction and the use of violence.


http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/#22


Avoid the Worst

We turn the case – the Pro is overzealous moralizing that ultimately produces global wars – only realism can give a reasonable assessment of America’s ethical possibilities and avoid another holocaust

FRANKEL Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs – Columbia and FormerAssistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs 1975www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18_i006_a006.pdf - Google cache

It is in this context that the emergence of that approach to American foreign policy known as realism must be understood. The realists, chastened by the consequences of the combination of isolationism and high pronunciamento that characterized American policy during the long armistice of 1918-39, wanted the United States to become a member, permanent, dues paying, active, of the interstate system of continuous negotiations. But they did not believe that this system would be or could be a redeemed system. They were internationalists who agreed, philosophically, with Henry Cabot Lodge’s jaundiced estimate of the diplomatic world. They needed to put American participation in the international system, therefore, on a new basis. The outcome was realism. It was an effort to put American thinking about foreign affairs in a plane compatible with the country’s conducting a long, unremitting diplomatic enterprise, lit occasionally by successes, darkened much more often by disappointments and frustrations, possibly keeping the planet from another holocaust, but never to be conceived as terminating in a final victory of Light over Darkness.

The Aff is an exercise in moral evasion – only our arguments embody an ethics of responsibilityHULSMAN AND LIEVEN Senior Fellow – Davis Institute for Foreign Policy Studies and Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies - Russia and Eurasia Center – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005National Interest Summer 2005

A certain degree of ruthlessness in making such choices lies at the heart of ethical realism, and this is linked to a capacity for decisive action when truly necessary in defense of the country or of higher human goals. Niebuhr, for example, was prepared to justify the Allied bombardment of both Germany and Japan as an essential part of the necessary war against these states. This is coupled with a readiness to acknowledge and take full moral responsibility for such actions. In this sense, ethical realism is closely related to what Max Weber called the ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik), as opposed to the ethic of conviction, or of "ultimate ends" (Gesinnungsethik)--or, as it has been expressed in these pages, the difference between a " morality of intentions" and a " morality of results." Under an ethic of responsibility, having good intentions is not remotely adequate. One must also weigh likely consequences and, perhaps most importantly, judge what actions are truly necessary for the defense of the national interest or of other essential goals. An ethic of conviction, while superficially more moral, often refuses to take responsibility for actions in the real world. But ethical realism recognizes that while ruthless actions in the real world may be necessary evils, they are still evils.



Absolute Virtue Bad

Absolute virtue culminates in absolute crimeCHENG Rockefeller Fellow – UVA 2003 Cardozo Law Review 24 1099, pp. 1107-8

When [Terror] is revolutionary, it conforms to its essence; in other circumstances, it becomes perverted. When it is revolutionary, it is ... both the "dictatorship of liberty" and the "sword of the law." Alternatively, we might say that it is the law in action, the law which makes the sharp distinction between good and evil, between being and nothingness. The terror of the tyrant, in contrast, does not have this great ability to discriminate; the tyrant suppresses that which resists, disturbs or displeases him. Having no knowledge of good and evil ... he strikes cruelly, but at random , without even knowing who the enemy is. In that sense, the revolutionary Terror seems to have converted the terror of old into a truth or ... to have elevated it to the status of truth... . The formula Robespierre uses on more than one occasion: "the despotism of liberty" ... the "slave of liberty." The Terror, then, is not a means; it is imprinted upon liberty just as, for Saint-Just, it is imprinted upon virtue. The problem emerges when revolutionary Terror "elevates [itself] into the status of truth" - when it is no longer a means but becomes "imprinted upon" liberty and virtue. This is exactly what happens with the new regime in 1984. For O'Brien's Party, "power is not a means, it is an end": We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power. What pure power means you will understand presently. We are different from all the oligarchies of the past, in that we know what we are doing... . The German Nazis and the Russian Communists ... never had the courage to recognise their own motives... . We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it... . Power is not a means, it is an end. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power. Power in the new regime is hypostatized as "pure power," it becomes "Truth," an absolute unto itself. What O'Brien overlooks is that this terrible power is actually imprinted upon the liberty and virtue, upon the love and justice fought for by the "old civilisations." While Robespierre declares "the despotism of liberty," Saint-Just proclaims that "morality is stronger than tyrants" - an insight that Albert Camus highlights when he comments, "[Morality] has, in fact, just killed Louis XVI."] society of absolute justice and virtue necessarily harbors terror within itself. The reason, as Camus puts it, is that "Absolute virtue is impossible, and the republic of forgiveness leads, with implacable logic, to the republic of the guillotine." Absolute virtue is accompanied by an absolutely inflexible law to whose standard no human being can measure up. Once the standard of virtue and law are set at the "absolute," every failure to live up to that absolute is regarded as coming "not from an imperfection in the law, which is presumed to be impossible, but from a lack of virtue in the refractory citizen." n40 Any imperfection in the big Other - that is, any imperfection of law in the Republic - must be concealed by transferring the guilt to the citizens whenever conflicts or discrepancies arise between law and social or human reality. Not surprisingly, Saint-Just exclaims at the Convention: "One might think that each person was afraid of his own conscience and of the inflexibility of the law, and had said to himself: "We are not sufficiently virtuous to be so terrible.'"1


Morality Answers Frontline -- Defense

TURN -- ONE MUST DIVERT TO UTILITARIANISM WHEN THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO LET EVERYONE DIEKateb, Professor of Politics, 1992 (George, Prof of Politics, Princeton Univ., The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture; Cornell University Press, p. 12)

The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. the situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to he killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third parry—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.

YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUTCOMES THAT ARE CAUSED BY OTHERS WHEN YOU CAUSE THE OTHERS TO DO THE OUTCOME

Uniacke (University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia) ’99 (Suzanne, Jun99, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, “Absolutely Clean Hands? Responsibility for What’s Allowed in Refraining from What’s Not Allowed,” Vol. 7 Issue 2, p189, 21p)

We bear responsibility for the outcome of another’s actions, for instance, when we provoke these actions (Iago); or when we supply the means (Kevorkian), identification (Judas), or incentive (Eve); or where we encourage another to act as he [or she] does (Lady Macbeth). Despite his disclaimer, Pilate cannot acquit himself entirely of the outcome of what others decide simply by ceding the judgment to them. In these examples agents are indirectly, partly responsible for the outcomes of what others do in virtue of something they themselves have done. But indirect, partial responsibility for what another person does can also arise through an agent’s non-intervention and be grounded in intention or fault; for example, when Arthur does not prevent Brian killing Catherine, because Arthur wants Catherine dead, or because Arthur simply cannot be bothered to warn her or call the police. Of course attributions of indirect, partial responsibility can be dif cult. And as far as absolutism is concerned, the relevant sense of ‘brings about’, outlined earlier, will� sometimes be quite stretched where an agent is attributed with responsibility for what someone else does. All the same , by our non-intervention we can help bring about some things that are directly and voluntarily caused by others.


POLICY-MAKERS MUST EMBRACE UTILITARIANISM BECAUSE THEY MAKE AGGREGATE DECISIONS WITH LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DEONTOLOGY REQUIREIS,

Robert Goodin, fellow in philosophy, Australian National Defense University, THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE, 1990, p. 141-2

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty , and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

THE SURVIVAL OF THE BODY POLITIC IS A PREREQUISITE FOR ETHICAL ENDS

Olva Stensli Commander Norwegian Naval Forces PACEM, 2003, p. http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/.

Political realism is certainly not incompatible with democracy, toleration, and the defence of human rights. But PR is not a theory about these phenomena as such! Rather, PR is a school of thought overwhelmingly preoccupied by how to protect these values . Morgenthau has never claimed to present a Theory of Ethics, simply because politics always is about the tension between ethics (including “ultimate aims”, in the words of Morgenthau) and feasible actions and outcomes (immediate aims). When political realism was constructed in the Western World in the 20th Century, it was implicitly in defence against appeasement as well as against what Kissinger called revolutionary powers. By revolutionary powers, Kissinger meant the powers that seek destruction of others in order to secure themselves. To avoid the destruction of its own polity clearly must be given priority in times of crises. Furthermore, there has never existed a modern democracy without a functioning state. And in modern history, the rule of law and respect for basic human rights has hardly existed outside of democracies. It is for these reasons political scientists have been so occupied with the study of the relations between states, state institutions and democratisation.



OUR ARGUMENTS DON’T FORSAKE ETHICS – THEY DEMAND AN ETHICS THAT ACCEPTS THE REALITY OF COMPROMISE AND THE INEVITABILITY OF SACRIFICES IN THE MODERN WORLD, WHICH IS MORE THAN WE CAN SAY FOR YOUR FRAMEWORK

Joseph Nye, international relations professor, JFK School of Government, Harvard NUCLEAR ETHICS, 1986. p. 24.

Whether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more eclectic way to include and reconcile the three dimensions of complex moral issues, there will often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not just because of the complexity of the problems “but simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues – at least none that appears to avoid in practice what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of value.” When value is sacrificed, there is often the problem of “dirty hands.” Not all ethical decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the problem of dirty hands, but often at the cost of having no hands at all. Moral theory cannot be “rounded off and made complete and tidy.” That is part of the modern human condition. But that does not exempt us from making difficult moral choices.

SELF-RIGHTEOUS MORALIZING IS AN UNETHICAL ETHICS – ONLY OUR ARGUMENTS ENABLE A BALANCED AND REASONABLE CONSIDERATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN LIGHT OF MORAL CONSIDERATIONS

Charles Frankel Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs, Columbia, MORALITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1975, p. www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18_i006_a006.pdf .

Whatever one’s judgment as to the soundness of the position they have taken, these realists opened the windows and let in air. They have put the pontificators on the defensive, and made it more difficult ,to discuss every national choice as though it were one between Heaven and Hell. In clarity, candor, humility, and compassion for the condition of real human beings, in contrast to concern for impalpable and deceptive abstractions, they have raised the moral level of discussion by a considerable measure. That is one reason, perhaps the main reason, why they have won a following.

THE RISK OF EXTINCTION VIA NUCLEAR WAR OUTWEIGHS ALL - ETHICS DEMANDS YOU EVALUATE OUR DISADRobert A. Seeley, Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, 1986, The Handbook of Non-Violence, p. 269-70

In moral reasoning prediction of consequences is nearly always impossible. One balances the risks of an action against its benefits; one also considers what known damage the action would do. Thus a surgeon in deciding whether to perform an operation weighs the known effects (the loss of some nerve function, for example) and risks (death) against the benefits, and weighs also the risks and benefits of not performing surgery. Morally, however, human extinction is unlike any other risk. No conceivable human good could be worth the extinction of the race, for in order to be a human good it must be experienced by human beings. Thus extinction is one result we dare not-may not-risk.



Though not conclusively established, the risk of extinction is real enough to make nuclear war utterly impermissible under any sane moral code.


Answers to: “Must Aid the Stranger”

TURN – MORAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THOSE CLOSE TO US, NO DUTY TO ASSIST THE UNKNOWN STRANGER

Raziel Aberson, Philosophy Professor, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM, Spring 2005, pp. 31-8

Peter Unger, in Living High and Letting Die, seems to agree with what he calls “Libertarianism” (and I call “common sense morality”) that we have moral obligations to aid those who are emotionally close to us which take precedence over our obligations to unknown strangers: Very briefly, here’s a fallible formulation of a fair bit of Libertarianism’s substantive side. Insofar as they need her help to have a decent chance for decent lives, a person must do a great deal for those few people, like her dependent children, to whom she has the most serious sort of special obligation. Insofar as it’s compatible with that, which is often very considerable indeed, and sometimes even when it’s not so compatible, she must do a lot for other innocent folks in need [. . .]5 Setting aside Unger’s tantalizing next-to-last clause: “and sometimes when it’s not so compatible,” he does recognize the relevance of emotional closeness to degree of responsibility to aid. Yet throughout his thoughtful study, he argues persuasively for a position very similar to that of Peter Singer, whom he frequently quotes with approval to the effect that, if we do not contribute all we have except the necessities of life to famine relief, we are guilty of severe moral callousness in letting people die whom we could have, and should have saved: [. . .] we can conclude that, if it’s needed for there to be as much (sic) as three fewer children dying soon, it’s seriously wrong for you (not) to impose a nonserious loss on yourself, however large. Now as we all know, by imposing on yourself as large a financial loss as you can, and easily aiming the fund toward efficient vital programs, you will lessen serious suffering to a far greater extent than that. So it’s seriously wrong not to send to the likes of Unicef and Oxfam, about as promptly as possible, nearly all your worldly wealth. In drawing these utilitarian conclusions, Unger seems to have overlooked his initial agreement with Libertarianism, as quoted above, to the effect that those emotionally close to us have a prior moral claim on our assistance.

TURN: UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRANGER JUSTIFIES KILLING SOMEONE, INCLUDING A STRANGER, TO SAVE THE STRANGER. MOREOVER, DUTIES TO THE STRANGER CAN BE OVERRIDEN


Shelley Kagan’s discussion of these issues in his important book, The Limits of Morality, offers a subtle and challenging critique of the agent-centered ethics I have been defending. Kagan argues that if the cost to the agent, or to those close to the agent, can override the pro tanto principle that one should promote the general good, as the “moderate” (read common sense) view maintains, then such cost can also override any moral constraint on action, such as the rule not to cause serious, even lethal, harm. One could, then, if one’s child or one’s friend needed a heart transplant, kill a stranger to obtain one could then, if one’s child or one’s friend would die without a heart transplant, kill a stranger to obtain his heart. After all, if considerations of cost generate reasons that oppose making considerable sacrifices, then it is logically possible that these same reasons will outweigh (or balance) the reasons that normally generate the constraint. The possibility remains, therefore, that it will be permissible for the agent to do harm when the cost to the agent of not doing so would be significant.7 I cannot agree with Kagan that common sense morality ever allows reasons of cost to the agent or to those close to the agent to override the constraint not to do serious harm. That possibility suggested by Kagan is, I believe, foreclosed by the common sense (and Kantian) distinction between the strict (i.e., not overrideable) duty not to do


serious harm and the meritorious (overrideable) duty to aid others (NOTE: THIS TURNS THEIR KANT ARGUMENT).

THE CLOSER WE ARE TO SOMEONE, THE GREATER THE OBLIGATION TO AID


Generalizing, it seems fair to say that we normally develop a general commitment to the principle that our moral obligations to aid vary in strength with the emotional closeness to us of our fellows. When we know whom we are aiding, that very fact brings our beneficiaries closer to us than unknown strangers, and we therefore feel more responsible for their well being. This should not be brushed aside as an irrational prejudice. It is a matter of moral obligation grounded in our fundamental commitments. Having engendered in those who are emotionally close to us the expectation that we will place their needs and interests ahead of strangers, it would be wrong for us to violate those expectations, providing, of course, that they are not grossly disproportionate, like those of a demanding parent or a spoiled child, in which case we are indeed at fault for having encouraged such excessive expectations. I have argued at some length elsewhere, for the reasonableness of the principle of covariance of degree of responsibility for well being with the emotional closeness to us of the beneficiaries of our actions, but whether reasonable or not, the fact that we are committed to it and that others depend on our commitment makes it morally obligatory that we act accordingly.


Rawls Answers

CAN’T DETERMINE EQUALITY OR THE VALUE OF THE RISK IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION

Ralph Ellis, philosophy professor, Florida, JUST RESULTS: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, p. 22

The most serious problem with the argument as Rawls originally proposed it is that there is no way to determine how safe or daring the person in the original position would want to be in her risk-taking behavior. As Kaye (1980) and other critics to be discussed later have shown, a very daring risk taker in the original position might be willing to risk the loss of some very necessary kinds of goods for the chance of gaining a very large amount of less necessary goods. We, therefore, cannot determine how much equality or inequality would be tolerated in a society from the standpoint of the original position.

THE NORMS RAWLS USES TO JUSTIFY THE “ORIGINAL POSITION” ARE UTILITARIAN

Leonard Rattner, law professor, UCLA, HOFSTRA LAW JOURNAL, Spring 1984, p. 760-1

Despite his explicit rejection of utilitarian thought, Rawls intimates a utilitarian foundation for his equal-treatment conclusions by noting a sense of justice, moral feelings, and altruistic reciprocity may have evolutionary origins and by designating scarce resources, conflicting resource claims, and resulting collaborative arrangements as “circumstances of justice.”


Levinas/Infinite Responsiblity Answers – Util

Vote to save lives—The existence of endangered 3rd parties makes responsibility impossible to determineDavid Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, 1999, p. 35-36

Levinas's thought is appealing for rethinking the question of responsibility, especially with respect to situations like the Balkan crisis, because it maintains that there is no circumstance under which we could declare that it was not our concern. As Levinas notes, people can (and obviously do) conduct their relationship to the Other in terms of exploitation, oppression, and violence. But no matter how allergic to the other is the self, "the relation to the other, as a relation of responsibility, cannot be totally suppressed, even when it takes the form of politics or warfare." In consequence, no self can ever opt out of a relationship with the other: "[I]t is impossible to free myself by saying, 'It's not my concern.' There is no choice, for it is always and inescapably my concern. This is a unique 'no choice,' one that is not slavery." This unique lack of choice comes about because in Levinas's thought ethics has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity—that is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by pregiven, autonomous agents—to something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity. Accordingly, ethics can be understood as something not ancillary to the existence of a subject; instead, ethics can be appreciated for its indispensability to the very being of the subject. This argument leads us to the recognition that "we" are always already ethically situated, so making judgments about conduct depends less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulations and more on how the interdependencies of our relations with others are appreciated. To repeat one of Levinas's key points: "Ethics redefines subjectivity as this heteronomous responsibility, in contrast to autonomous freedom." Suggestive though it is for the domain of international relations where the bulk of the work on ethics can be located within a conventional perspective on responsibility — Levinas's formulation of responsibility, subjectivity, and ethics nonetheless possesses some problems when it comes to the implications of this thought for politics. What requires particular attention is the means by which the elemental and omnipresent status of responsibility, which is founded in the one-to-one or face-to-face relationship, can function in circumstances marked by a multiplicity of others. Although the reading of Levinas here agrees that "the ethical exigency to be responsible to the other undermines the ontological primacy of the meaning of being," and embraces the idea that this demand "unsettles the natural and political positions we have taken up in the world and predisposes us to a meaning that is other than being, that is otherwise than being:" how those disturbances are negotiated so as to foster the maximum responsibility in a world populated by others in struggle remains to be argued. To examine what is a problem of considerable import given the context of this essay, I want to consider Levinas's discussion of "the third person," the distinction he makes between the ethical and the moral, and—of particular importance in a consideration of the politics of international action—the role of the state in Levinas's thought.

Infinite responsibility fails – a responsibility we can never fulfill does not drive us to calculate in favor of the other, but rather to surrender to self-interestDr John Fitzsimmons and Dr Wally Woods, Faculty of Arts, Health and Sciences at Central Queensland University, “Chapter 3 - Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener" and "Benito Cerino," 2000, http://www.ahs.cqu.edu.au/humanities/litstud/52283/schedule/chap3/p5.htm, accessed 11/8/02

Anderson believes that the lawyer’s charity seems to go beyond what most would have given. This raises a question, he believes, which underpins the story: is it possible to perform acts of altruism without, finally, having regard to self–interest? What this suggests is that Christ’s commandments reflect an ideal, one that the rest of us find impossible to live up to because, at a certain point, we all turn back to self–preservation (that is, unlike Christ who went "all the way"


and gave up his life). The contrast between capitalism (Wall Street being one of its dominant symbols) with its self–interest, and the Christ–like Bartleby could not, Anderson argues, be stronger. He concludes that the "divine–logos," which Bartleby represents, shows itself as an impossible practice within the confines of "institutionalised self–interest". Or to put it another way, if we are our brother’s keeper, Bartleby, in demanding to be kept without offering anything in return, is so exasperating that even the apparently charitable lawyer gives in and moves out when Bartleby refuses to quit his offices.


Levinas Answer – Quantification

The Pro obliterates the infinite. Providing concrete examples of responsibility creates artificial connections that hide the face of the infinite otherKarim Benammar, Faculty of Cross-cultural Studies at Kobe University, “The Project of Community,” Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae, Vol 14, 1996http://ccs.cla.kobe-u.ac.jp/Kihan/karim/project.html

The other in Levinasian ethics is thus certainly not faceless, because it is precisely the face of the other, the individual face of this other, which puts me under an ethical imperative not to kill and not to harm. This is an imperative to always consider the other as a fellow-human, as someone whose humanity, right to live and right to respect are sacred and inviolable. And yet, although this other is an individual, with an expressive, individual face, with brown or green eyes, with features deep-set or hard to fathom, the other must be a stranger. The other who commands me, who puts me under an ethical obligation to refrain from harm, is not my father or sister-in-law, is neither my boss nor my neighbor, cannot be my business partner or high-school friend. The force of the ethical obligation I am put under comes from the fact that the other is a stranger to whom I owe nothing and who owes me nothing. The other we encounter in Levinas is thus an other with a face, a unique and individual other, who is nevertheless not primarily related to me or engaged in any constructive endeavor or relation with me. The other in contemporary French philosophy fait irruption, emerges to dislodge the symmetrical and determined relations between individuals, comes from the outside, unknown, to break up the status quo. The relational context, which was so neatly defined in Watsuji's ethics, is never enclosed, finished, exhaustively described, or even at rest. This is, after all, partly what we mean by "other": someone who is not the same as us, who cannot be reduced to or tamed by the I, who cannot be exhaustively described in terms of categories that apply to the I. The other is the unknown who destroys the possibility of reciprocity and balance, the chance at a self-enclosed relationship between equals. The other is always something of an alien.


Levinas Answer – Nazism

Levinas’s ethics create Nazi-like ideological blindness – they can’t account for the nuance of post-ethics decisionsDidier Pollefeyt, Professor of Moral Theology, Katholieke Universiteit, 1999, Ethics After the Holocaust, p. 37

Second, in an important way Levinas's thought leads towards a reduction of the Jewish religion to an ethical religion. Religion is threatened in that its concerns can become exclusively a matter of ethics, that is, doing what is good. But what if the person fails, if courage falls short, and one falls into sin? An ethical God can only judge. Here the danger and terror of ethics arises. The paradox is that Nazism could also be interpreted along these lines, as becomes clear in the thought of Peter Haas. Nazism seems to be founded on a definite, ruthless (indeed perverted) "ethical" code. Nazism was in all possible respects merciless. Whoever did not comply with its "ethical" demands inevitably "deserved" to be eliminated. Of course, Levinas's ethics and Nazi ethics are fundamentally different (see my contribution to this volume), precisely because Levinas's ethics is centered on openness and Nazi ethics on closedness. But at the same time, Levinas's ethics should also be questioned as to its possibility of becoming fanatic in confrontation with evildoers. We must therefore also put forth the question: "What comes after ethics?" The Judaeo-Christian tradition is also a tradition of mercy. Ethics can hereby be saved from its mercilessness. A persons existence can never be completely reduced to one moment. One is always more than what one has done. For ethics after Auschwitz, however, one of the most pressing questions is whether there are situations where humanity has done such great violence that we find ourselves in the ethical impossibility of forgiveness. In the case of genocide one can without the least doubt speak of him pardonable." If not, a forgiveness that is too easily granted leads once again to a trivialization of ethics. The philosophy of Levinas, in other words, should be an occasion that initiates reflection on the relationship between ethics and forgiveness.


Answers to: “Be for the Other” Being for the Other can only happen when traditional moral frameworks of obligation are eschewed. Calling for reparations frames the Other as knowable only through our moral framework

Karim Benammar, Faculty of Cross-cultural Studies at Kobe University, “The Project of Community,” Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae, Vol 14, 1996http://ccs.cla.kobe-u.ac.jp/Kihan/karim/project.html

The possibility of an ethical relation with an other human being is the foundation of humanity. We are cast out of our own immanence, towards the other, towards the unknown other, the alien. If we understand and experience our ethical relation with the other by basing it on kinship, we will always reduce the other's otherness, make sense of the other only in terms of our own rationality. We will not be able to go beyond understanding his or her faith in terms of our own religion. Alternatively, by privileging the ethical act over the relation between the other and myself, I reduce the other to a variable. And yet, if the fundamental ethical relation with the other is not based on something we have in common, on our common labor, our common language, on our common ethnicity, then what is the basis for ethics? Is an ethical relation with an other who is not the universal other even possible? Alphonso Lingis has sought to go as far as possible outside of his own society, language, religion, and rationality, in a search for "the community of those who have nothing in common": ”... we should have to find ourselves, or put ourselves in imagination, in a situation at the farthest limit from kinship - in a situation in which one finds oneself in a country with which one's own is at war, among foreigners bound in a religion that one cannot believe or which excludes one, with whom one is engaged in no kind of productive or commercial dealings, who owe one nothing, who do not understand a word of one's language, who are far from one in age (for even being of the same age-group is a commitment) - and on whom one finds oneself completely dependent, in one's very life." To find what? To be suddenly confronted with another human being: an other fait irruption. Suddenly, the other is here; aware of each other, we confront each other, face to face. The other for me is not a list of attributes, a speaker of such and such language, a believer in such and such a creed, a person determined by a job and a passport, a member of a clan and various clubs. If I were to acknowledge the other in this way, it would only give me reasons to exclude or include him or her, to evaluate him or her in terms of my own sets of values, to measure him or her by his income or IQ. What I have in common with the other tells me nothing about my ethical relation to him or her; if anything, it obscures this relation.

Even Levinas agrees being for the other does not apply in every case

Michael Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawai’i, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, 1999, p. 68-69

When the question of Palestinians as Other was posed bluntly to Levinas (“[I]sn’t the ‘other above all the Palestinian?”) Levinas’s response was to refer to the Palestinians as aggressors and enemies, concluding that “there are people who are wrong.” What makes Palestinians wrong? It becomes evident that in Levinas’s understanding of what “Israel” is: a “coincidence of the political and spiritual.” Israel provides the “opportunity to carry out the social law of Judaism.” This is astounding partisanship from one committed to wholly non-anticipatory ethics of encounter, one who grants right to the “neighbor” that are “prior to all entitlement,” rights based on “absolute identity.” Levinas attempts to take Israel beyond partisanship by interpreting “Jewish life” as it is represented though Israel past and present as a


model for all humanity. Jewish doctrine—the rabbinic tradition as Levinas reads it—is “a doctrine that is none the less offered to everyone...this is the sovereignty of Israel.”

Creation of borders limits responsibility. Their construction of the United States as an agent enables us to lessen our responsibility

David Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, 1999, p. 38-39

This view needs to be contrasted with Levinas's belief, cited above, that not even in politics or warfare can the relationship with the other, the relationship of primary responsibility and the demand it imposes, be eradicated. Levinas's faith in the state as the sovereign domain in which freedom can be exercised has the capacity to overlook the restrictions, the freedom of others the state's security requires. This potential was, disturbingly, most evident in an interview Levinas gave on the topic of the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps, which occurred during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, after Israeli forces knowingly let Lebanese Christian soldiers into the camps to pursue suspected "Arab infiltrators." Although Levinas spoke of those events as a "catastrophe" and as events "which we would rather hadn't happened," and although he sees profound need for the "honor of responsibility," he concludes that there is a "lack of guilt.'" The following exchange ensued: (Q.] Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the "other." Isn't history, isn't politics the very site of the encounter with the "other," and for the Israeli, isn't the "other" above all the Palestinian? [A.] My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you're for the other, you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. In this answer the notion of the Other is restricted to the neighbor in such a way as to keep the Palestinians outside of the reach of those to whom the "I" is responsible. Although Levinas elsewhere argues that "justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off:' it seems that the border between societies, the state border that is enabled by the transformation of alterity into enmity (and especially those borders that separate Israel from its neighbors), permits the responsibility for the Other as neighbor to be diminished. Indeed, while Levinas argued in the 1982 interview that he rejected the idea that responsibility had limits — "my self, I repeat, is never absolved from responsibility towards the Other"—in Otherwise Than Being he remarked almost in passing that "my responsibility for all can and has to manifest itself also in limiting itself."

Levinas’ formula lacks the power to explain or guide everyday ethical calculations: Philosophy can only obscure the sacredness of the Other

David Hirsch, professor emeritus of English and American literature and Judaic studies at Brown University, 1999, Ethics After the Holocaust, p. 20-22

I take Grob to be saying that if philosophers overcome their obsession with ontology, they will be able to devote their philosophical exertions to following the path of ethics set forth by Emmanuel Levinas. When philosophers stop trying to gain a mastery over Being, Grob feels, then they can start concentrating on the encounter between the I and the Other. I also take Grob to be implying, if he is not actually saying it explicitly, that once philosophers concentrate their energies on the philosophy of ethics, philosophy itself may then take its place in bringing about the conditions that would prevent a future Holocaust, or future genocides. I am not certain that even if academic philosophers were to put the study of ethics above their concern with ontology, this would translate into a significant change in the behavior of a significant number of human beings. By its nature, philosophy—with its sophisticated and often esoteric vocabulary, its involved and


convoluted arguments, its long difficult tradition, from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger—is not designed, or intended, to impact on the behavior of ordinary people. For example, let us consider one of Grob's explications of a text by Levinas. Grob writes, "I cannot know the Other as Other without diminishing his or her otherness. I can, however encounter that Other in what Levinas terms an ethical event... .Within the totality of being, I am limited in my egoist ambition only by a lack of power. The Other who meets me face to face challenges my very right to exercise power. In so doing, ethics is born." Is Grob providing a model of human behavior, here, or is he providing, rather, a philosophical description, a set of expressions that will encompass the full range of the ways in which all human ' beings should, in an ideal world, relate to all other human beings? ' Grob's translation of Levinas asserts the desirability of having human beings relate to each other ethically, but it does not, in my opinion, indicate why they should behave this way, or what would induce them to behave that way, or why they do not always behave that way in the world as we know it. In other words, an ethics should address itself to people as we know them in the world. But Grob's formulation does not do this; it does not address itself to the needs, fears, lusts, passions, phobias, irrationalities that drive individuals to behave unethically. If every "I" were content to "encounter" every "Other," that is, if every self were willing, always, and in every "encounter with an Other," to agree to let himself or herself be limited, to have his or her selfhood contained, by "the face of the Other," then ethical behavior would burst into bloom everywhere, it would become commonplace, and human conflict would eventually wither and become nothing more than a distant memory. Can this description of ethical behavior that Grob attributes to Levinas be said to constitute an imminent reality, or must it always remain nothing more than an expression of desire? Grob states that "A traditional ego-centered philosophy must be replaced by a philosophy which grants primacy to the primordial encounter of an 'V with a Thou/ of humans who acknowledge the sacredness of one another's personhood." I must admit that I am surprised by this statement, and am not sure what Grob intends by the phrase, "sacredness of one another's personhood." Is "sacred ness" a philosophical category that Grob arrives at by means of pure reason? Does "sacredness" belong to the realm of philosophy at all? It seems to me that we already possess a scheme of thought, or a set of beliefs, that calls for "humans [to] acknowledge the sacredness of one another's personhood," and that is biblical religion, or biblical faith. I shall be referring, here, only to Judaism and Christianity, since those are the two faiths of which I am least ignorant. Surely, both Jews and Christians are obliged to recognize "the sacredness of another's personhood" on the basis of their faith alone, without the aid of philosophy. In fact, philosophy is more likely to diminish the notion of the sacredness of the Other than reinforce it.


BEING FOR THE OTHER GROUNDS DISCUSSION OF IMPACTS, IT DOESN’T TRUMP THEM. EVEN IF THEY WIN THEIR FRAMEWORK, IF THEY MAKE THINGS WORSE, THEY LOSED. G. Myers, Associate professor of English and religious studies at Texas A & M, “Responsible for Every Single Pain: Holocaust Literature and the Ethics of Interpretation,” Comparative Literature, 51, Fall, 1999, p. 266-288, http://www-english.tamu.edu/pers/fac/myers/responsible.html

Nevertheless, I must expect to betray them more often than I am adequate to the challenge of their need. Holocaust literature is a summons to responsibility for the victims of genocide, but this merely describes what is possible, not what is real. Historicity is a reminder that some things are past changing. The reality of six million deaths is something I can neither alter nor deny; the suffering on six million faces is something to which I can never adequately respond. But if I can do nothing about the past I may yet affect the future. It is often said that the purpose of studying the Holocaust is to prevent it from ever happening again. As the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman says: Much more is involved in [studying the Holocaust] than the tribute to the memory of murdered millions, settling the account with the murderers and healing the still-festering moral wounds of the passive and silent witnesses. Obviously, the study itself, even a most diligent study, is not a sufficient guarantee against the return of mass murdere[r]s and numb bystanders. Yet without such a study, we would not even know how likely or improbable such a return may be. What this indicates is that the Holocaust does not belong only to history but also to possibility. If we cannot affect its outcome we can still do something about its meaning. Events mean nothing in themselves; they must be interpreted. But what this also indicates is that meaning arises from our responsibility. The counterfactual possibility of doing something appropriate about the Holocaust is what creates our responsibility to it, and if what we want is to discover its meaning—that is, to interpret the Holocaust—then our interpretation must be shaped and guided by our responsibility.


Liberalism Causes War

LIBERALISM LED TO WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR Patrick Glynn, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, CLOSING PANDORA'S BOX, 1992, p.84

That Wilsonianism -- and disarmament and arms limitation efforts -- played an important role in setting the stage for World War II has long been acknowledged by Western commentators and historians (even if it has been forgotten by much of the public). Less widely appreciated even in historical writing of the twentieth century has been the crucial role played by the Wilsonian vision in the genesis of the Cold War. Yet just as liberal-pacifist assumptions blinded Western leaders in the 1930s to the growing threat posed by Nazi Germany, so the Wilsonian perspective continued to blind American officials during World War II to the dangers posed by the emergent power of the Soviet Union.

WILSONIANISM LED TO WORLD WAR II, THE COLD WAR, AND VIETNAM William Pfaff, syndicated columnist, International Herald Tribune, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2001, p.226-7

Wilsonian sentimentality has led to disastrous consequences over the past 80 years, yet these fiascoes seem to have left no trace on the minds of Wilson's modern followers. His naivete about universal national self-determination contributed to the conditions in central and eastern Europe that, in the 1930s and 1940s, invited Hitler's intervention. His influence on Franklin Roosevelt led the latter to oppose Winston Churchill's efforts to use "Power politics" in central Europe to secure it from postwar Soviet control. Wilson's legacy was also responsible for Roosevelt's belief that a new League, the United Nations, could resolve postwar geopolitical problems. Even U.S. policy in the Vietnam War was a confused amalgam of anticommunism and Wilsonian sentimentality: Lyndon Johnson justified his foreign policy as a means to give others what they "want for themselves --liberty, justice, dignity, a better life for all."


Liberalism Leads to Foreign Policy Failure

WILSONIANISM PRODUCED FOREIGN POLICY DISASTERS Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, DIPLOMACY, 1994, p.908-9 At the same time, Wilsonian idealism has produced a plethora of problems. As embodied in the Fourteen Points, the uncritical espousal of ethnic self-determination that failed to take account of power relationships and the destabilizing effects of ethnic groups singlehandedly pursuing their accumulated rivalries and ancient hatreds. The failure to give the League of Nations a military enforcement mechanism underlined the problems inherent in Wilson's notion of collective security. The ineffectual Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929, by which nations renounced war as a means of policy, showed the limits of exclusively legal restraints. As Hitler was to demonstrate, in the world of diplomacy, a loaded gun is often more potent than a legal beef. Wilson's appeal to America to go forth in the pursuit of democracy produced acts of great creativity. It also led to such disastrous crusades as Vietnam.

WILSONIAN NEGLECT OF INTERESTS LED TO FOREIGN POLICY FAILURE Kenneth Thompson, Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia, MORALISM AND MORALITY IN POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY, 1985, p.29

Professor Graebner writes: "In its relations with Japan the United States sought peace. But its proposals [fueled by the moral indignation of leaders such as Cordell Hull], based on the assumption that the right belonged totally to the status quo sought not compromise but capitulation. The capitulation never came." History repeated itself in some respects following World War II. American efforts to apply the doctrine of self-determination failed to undo specific repressions which existed behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains. Graebner concludes: The Wilsonian appeal ... could not prevent the destruction of the Versailles order; the postwar appeal to the Atlantic Charter could not restore it ... What the American experience, in many ways unique, has demonstrated is the fact that policy goals unsupported by generally recognizable interests will not receive much credence elsewhere. There is no dignity in goals a nation is not prepared to carry into effect measured by all possible consequences.

CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM IS UPDATED WILSONIANISM David Rieff, deputy editor, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2000, p.105 For the most part, the American foreign policy debate remains one between competing versions of internationalism. Conservatives may indignantly deny that they are "Wilsonians," but most look with nostalgia on the activism of the Reagan era. And what was that period of crusading enthusiasm if not a species of Wilsonianism? As for liberals, is not their faith in international institutions, from the United Nations to the new structures like the International Criminal Court that are designed to give teeth to the often utopian theorizing of international lawyers, the updated, twenty-first-century version of Wilsonian internationalism?


CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY FAILED BECAUSE OF ITS ANTI-REALISM Benjamin Frankel, editor, SECURITY STUDIES, Spring 1996, p.x-xi We may point to several examples of a postwar intensification of antirealist sentiment in policy circles and academia. The Carter administration provides an example of an administration whose foreign policies were guided, at least in part, by an earnest desire to find a measure of relief from the grim choices realism posits as unavoidable. The argument is offered that the foreign policy of the Carter administration, especially in its early days, explicitly espoused non-realistic notions. At the root of that administration's policies was the painful le gacy of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. As Robert W. Tucker writes, the Carter administration was seized by an "almost obsessive desire that the great failure of the 1960s never be repeated." At the same time, however, the administration was unwilling to abandon the continuity of U.S. role and interest in the world-indeed, the administration added to that role by vigorously pursuing the expansion of human rights in other countries and the replacement of authoritarian regimes with democratic ones. In what we may describe, using Zakaria's language, as an effort to transcend international politics, the Carter administration created a world "in which the American role might be preserved while the former dangers and hardships that attended this role might be avoided." Some of the foreign policies the Carter administration pursued were judged to have failed because they had little relevance to the world the administration was confronting. Trying to transcend reality and the hard choices it imposed, so the argument goes, the administration devised policies which addressed a futuristic world, not the world the administration found upon assuming office.


Liberalism Undermines Foreign Policy

LIBERALISM UNDERMINES FOREIGN POLICY, REALISM IS A NECESSARY CORRECTIVE Patrick Glynn, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, CLOSING PANDORA'S BOX, 1992, p.xi

In the broadest sense, the liberalism of liberal democracies has often proved a liability in foreign affairs. Successful democratic statesmanship -- such as that of Dean Acheson or of the preeminent democratic statesman of the twentieth century, Winston Churchill -has always involved somehow marrying or offsetting liberalism with a more traditional foreign policy realism.

DISAGREEMENTS AMONG LIBERALS LEAD TO PARALYSIS IN BOSNIA Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1995, p.171

Other liberals are doubly dubious about the resort to force because of a traditional tendency to look at it as an instrument of last resort only, and because of a conviction that many of these uses of force could only lead to quagmires and entrapments. Both sides often agree on the dispatching of U.N. peacekeepers, but when it comes to having these troops actually use force (except in self-defense), or to having "peace-builders" with missions far more extensive than peacekeepers, disagreement reappears. The Bosnia fiasco has been the result of all these cleavages. Bosnia has been the victim of the imbalanced compromise between those who gave priority to the restoration of peace, however unfair the solution may be, and those who gave priority to the suppression of what they saw as a double assault on liberal values: Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing.


Liberalism Supports Intervention

LIBERALISM IS DISPOSED TOWARD INTERVENTION AGAINST WEAK THIRD WORLD STATES Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.272

Imprudent vehemence is also associated with Liberal foreign policy toward weak non-Liberal states; no greater spirit of accommodation or tolerance informs Liberal policy toward the many weak non-Liberal states in the Third World. This problem affects both conservative Liberals and welfare Liberals, but the two can be distinguished by differing styles of interventions. Harvard Kritiks Realism Kritik Links

CARTER AND CLINTON BOTH DISPLAYED LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM Michael Do yle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.275

Another instance of this approach was President Carter's support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which was explained by one U.S. official in the following analogy: "There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits." President Clinton's administration seems to have succumbed to a similar dose of optimistic interventionism in its conviction that nations could be rebuilt democratically in both Somalia and Haiti, although democracy had never existed in the first and was led in the second by Jean Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Socialist and an eloquent critic of American imperialism.

LIBERALISM IS THE MOST INTERVENTIONIST OF FOREIGN POLICY THEORIES Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, WORLD DISORDERS, 1998, p.159

Such prominent and thoughtful liberals as Mill and Michael Walzer have attempted to find a middle ground -- in Walzer's case, intervention is justified when self-determination is at stake, when genocide is being committed, and, more broadly (and recently), in order "to put a stop to actions that, to use an old-fashioned but accurate phrase, shock the conscience of humankind." Indeed, it is liberals who have been the most fervent champions of intervention, or rather critics of the dogmas of sovereignty and non-intervention. One can summarize their case in three points.

MANY CURRENT LIBERALS SHOW AN INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1995, p.171


The other great division is over the use of force. Traditionally, liberalism has tried to limit legitimate force to self-defense and collective defense against aggression. But the scope of state chaos, as well as the murderousness of some contemporary tyrannies, has led many liberals to endorse in principle the idea of an outside resort to force whenever domestic chaos threatens the peace and security of other states (for instance through the mass flight of refugees) or whenever domestic chaos or tyrannical government results in massive violations of human rights, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide.

LIBERALISM SUPPORTED THE VIETNAM WAR, WHILE REALISM OPPOSED IT Michael Smith, Professor of International Relations, University of Virginia, TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, Terry Nardin and David Mapel, eds., 1992, p.214-5

More recently, the prominent liberal Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. employed similar arguments about arresting the spread of tyranny to support American intervention in Vietnam -- even as realists like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau opposed it. American intervention began with a consensus among orthodox liberal internationalists in the foreign-policy establishment that it was a worthwhile and necessary effort to assist a people struggling to establish their freedom. In an era of communist insurgency, they argued, it was important for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to help people, seeking to establish or maintain liberal, democratic institutions. According to this view, even if those institutions are flawed, our assistance is required if there is to be any chance of development -toward democracy. A similar argument is made by partisans of the Reagan Doctrine like Norman Podhoretz or Charles Krauthammer, who are liberals re-christened as neo-conservatives.


Liberalism Undermines U.S. Power

NEOLIBERALISM HAS HAMSTRUNG AMERICAN POWER Lawrence Kaplan, executive editor, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2000, p.154 Comforted by the notion that it could achieve democratization by means of sheer acquisitiveness, the administration promptly turned a blind eye to human rights violations in countries where American corporations happened to do business. And in the name of its ostensible commitment to political liberty, the White House has maintained sanctions against states of marginal commercial significance while actively promoting trade with states like China, which boast no less abysmal human rights records but large markets. As for U.S. efforts to influence the behavior of its adversaries, the neoliberal obsession with trade has, if anything, proved less of a help than a burden, creating an interest in maintaining the status quo and inhibiting America's ability to use its power for political ends. Thus has neoliberalism ensnared the United States in moral complications to which, finally, it provides no adequate response.

LIBERAL IDEOLOGY CAN LEAD TO NEGLECT OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.276

Ideologically based policies can also be self-indulgent. Oligarchic or authoritarian allies in the Third World do not find consistent support in a Liberal policy that stresses human rights. Contemporary conservative critics claim that the security needs of these states are neglected, that they fail to obtain military aid or more direct support when they need it (the-shah's Iran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and South Africa). Equally disturbing from this point of view, Communist regimes are shunned even when a detente with them could further United States strategic interests (Cuba, Angola). Welfare Liberals particularly shun the first group, while laissez-faire Liberals balk at close dealings with the second. In both cases our economic interests or strategic interests are often slighted.


Liberalism Promotes Isolationism LIBERALISM CAN PROMOTE EXCESSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.277

A second manifestation of complaisance lies in a reaction to the excesses of interventionism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal affects policy toward strategically and economically important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical failing of the Liberal great power, so complaisance characterizes declined or "not quite risen" Liberal states. Especially following the exhaustion of wars, representative legislatures may become reluctant to undertake international commitments or to fund the military establishment needed to play a geopolitical role. Purely domestic concerns seem to take priority, as they did in the United States in the 1920s and may be doing in the 1990s. Rational incentives for "free riding" on the extended defense commitments of the leader of the Liberal alliance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the nineteenth century the United States informally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs. Today the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic analysts, fall to bear their "fair" share of alliance burdens.


Liberalism Supports Imperialism

LIBERAL IDEOLOGY IS AN INSTRUMENT JUSTIFYING U.S. DOMINATION Mark Peceny, Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, November 1997, p.416

Second, a Gramscian argument interprets the idea of the liberal pacific union as an attempt by the American state to exercise an 'ideological hegemony' over its own citizens and subordinate states (Cox, 1986; Gill, 1993; Robinson, 1996). Critics of the Kantian argument often emphasize power and national interest as an alternative to a focus on domestic political institutions and culture. The Gramscian approach, however, offers, a way to integrate power considerations into an argument which still emphasizes the importance of shared liberal norms. Liberal ideology is an instrument used for the legitimation of US 'leadership' in the international system.

LIBERAL SOCIETIES COMMITTED SYSTEMATIC COLONIALIST VIOLENCE Michael Mann, Professor of Sociology, UCLA, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND, Steve Smith, ed al., eds, 1996, p.234-5

Thus colonial militarism did not occur in single acts of policy cent ered on state or para-state agencies like the Nazi Holocaust. Not that states remained on the sidelines. The US army was used throughout the nineteenth century in ruthless Indian-clearance projects, while the elimination of native Tasmanians was a planned operation. Several governments also proclaimed the legal doctrine of terra nullis. Land occupied by native peoples was declared 'empty', without property or settlement rights, especially if the natives were hunter-gatherers who had not 'improved' the land. But most atrocities were committed in a series of irregular, decentralised waves organised in para-military forms by vigilante or volunteer units of the local population itself, with states turning a blind eye or with its local agents complicit because they too belonged to 'White' civil society. They were also intermingled with the more devastating but usually unintended effects of disease and destruction of the natural habitat. Perhaps those studying these events have used the word 'Holocaust' a little too freely. The word means 'total slaughter' and this was rarely practised by a single organised group at one point in time. On the other hand the Caribs were completely wiped out and most of the other native peoples of the Americas and Australasia were reduced to 10 per cent of their numbers at the first point of contact. Such persistent, organised violence for social purposes eventually petered out -- when it had achieved the almost total annihilation of the indigenous peoples. This was horrendous militarism, sufficiently independent of states to be given the label of civil society militarism. Thus the association of liberalism, constitutionalism or democracy with pacifism is a complete and utter fabrication.


Liberalism Supports Imperialism

LIBERAL SOCIETIES WERE DISPOSED TOWARD COLONIALIST GENOCIDE Michael Mann, Professor of Sociology, UCLA, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND, Steve Smith, ed al., eds, 1996, p.236

For liberal countries there is no single horrific case like the Nazi Holocaust marring a record which would otherwise be merely a normal story of human exploitation. Such was the militarism of absolutism and authoritarianism until the inter-war period. But 'liberal' civil society contained a systemic tendency lasting through the entire modern period towards committing genocide when seeking Lebensraum and towards cruel coercion when merely employing labour. These two tendencies have an unmistakable resemblance to those of the SS state.

LIBERALISM JUSTIFIES HEGEMONY AS A SOURCE OF THE COLLECTIVE GOOD OF SECURITY

Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.224

International collective goods, such as collective security against aggression, similarly fail out of "fear" when the sense of solidarity among the law-abiding states is insufficient to enable them to form an overwhelmingly large coalition against the aggressor. A Liberal hegemon can resolve the dilemma of cooperation by providing the collective good if its private benefit from the collective good is larger than its private costs. It thus takes either hegemony or solidarity to redress this third "inconvenience."

CURRENT LIBERALISM SEEKS HEGEMONY William Pfaff, syndicated columnist, International Herald Tribune, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2001, p.222

A hegemonic spirit nonetheless underlies both the liberal activism and the neoconservative unilateralism evident in much of recent American foreign policy. It is behind the aggressive congressional initiatives to impose sanctions or boycotts on states regarded as miscreants -- and even on allies insufficiently accommodating on trade. It was also responsible for the Clinton administration's program to enlarge NATO's membership and extend its operations "out of area," first to the Balkans and eventually beyond Europe. This essentially unilateralist initiative (the other NATO members reacted coolly to it) reflected a larger concept of extended American influence that has become the principal theme of post-Cold War policy thinking. Some even envisage NATO's eventual expansion toward the frontiers of another American-led strategic system -- this one in the Pacific.


Answers to: “Liberalism Peaceful”

LIBERALISM ISN'T INHERENTLY PEACEFUL Mic hael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.252

But contrary to the pacifists, Liberalism is not inherently "peace-loving," nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent. Furthermore, Liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions that a world peace may well require in the nuclear age.

LIBERAL STATES FREQUENTLY INITIATE WARS Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.268-9

Nonetheless, establishing the statistical significance of Hume's assertion appears remarkably difficult. The best statistical evidence indicates that "libertarian" or "democratic" states (slightly different measures) are not less warprone than nonlibertarian or nondemocratic states. Indeed, in these measures they appear to be more war-prone. War proneness is not, however, a measure of imprudent aggression since many wars are defensive. But that does not mean that we can simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do. Liberal states ("libertarian") acted as initiators in 24 out of the 56 interstate wars in which they participated between 1816 and 1980 while non-Liberals were on the initiating side in 91 out of 187 times. Although non-Liberal states initiated a higher percentage of interstate wars, Liberal metropoles were the overwhelming anticipators in "extrasystemic wars," colonial wars, which we can assume to have been by and large initiated by the metropole (see below). Furthermore, the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-1979." Relatedly, the United States devoted one-quarter and the Soviet Union, one-tenth, of their respective defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character).



LIBERALISM WON'T NECESSARILY LEAD TO WORLD PEACE Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.484

Liberal states of the industrial world have entered a nearly unprecedented condition of international security, and it appears to be significantly linked to the surge of Liberalism worldwide. But that good fortune is not guaranteed to persist, nor will it necessarily involve worldwide peace. Even if a war of the scale of the U.S.-UN Gulf War against Iraq is unlikely to be repeated soon, Grenadas and Somalias and Bosnias are likely to arise frequently in the new world order we are entering. If we want to avoid their becoming revivals of destructive imperialism or arenas of neglect, we will need to reinforce the steadying institutions of multilateral security, whether in the UN or regional organizations, ready to provide guidance and multilateral support.

COVERT OPERATIONS UNDERMINE LIBERAL PEACE Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.292

Unfortunately, despite major advances in public disclosure and constitutional control, the CIA still engages in operations inimical to the stability and spread of a Liberal peace. In 1995 the French government revealed a CIA attempt to bribe its trade negotiators, and in March 1995 it was revealed the CIA had kept information concerning its continued support for Guatemalan military intelligence and death squads secret from not only the public but also the U.S. State Department, which had assured the public that such links had ended.



LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM EMPIRICALLY FAILS John Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1995, p. 15

There is an important theoretical failing in the liberal institutionalist logic, even as it applies to economic issues. The theory is correct as far as it goes: cheating can be a serious barrier to cooperation. It ignores, however, the other major obstacle to cooperation: relative-gains concerns. As Joseph Grieco has shown, liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains. Keohan acknowledged this problem in 1993: Grieco has made a significant contribution by focusing attention on the issues of relative gains, a subject that has been underempasized, especially by liberal or neoliberal commentators on the world economy. This oversight is revealed by the assumed order of preference in the prisoners’ dilemma game: each state cares about how its opponents strategy will affect its own (absolute) gains, but not about how much one side gains relative to the other.


Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. States are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage. There is a “special peril of deflection” in the military realm, because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shirts in the balance of power.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM EMPIRICALLY FAILS

T.V. Paul, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESEARCH: BALANCE OF POWER REVISITED – THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, May 17, 2002, p. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/bop/index.asp#organizers Although some global forces have had a positive impact on international security relations, events during the past decade including the most recent terrorist strikes have disappointed many who believe in the emergence of a democratized, globalized and (hence) more peaceful world governed by universally accepted norms. The not so successful performance of the UN's peacekeeping forces in many conflict zones and the ineptitude of the UN Security Council have underlined the weaknesses of international institutions to provide collective security globally. The UN has been generally inept in dealing with sub-state challenges as well.



RELIANCE ON LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION WILL FAIL AND SACRIFICE THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE

Joseph Greico, Political Scientist, 1998 (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Summer, p. 487)

This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neo-liberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong. Neoliberalism's claims are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively better gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former, and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.


Liberalism Theoretically Flawed

LIBERALISM FAILS TO UNDERSTAND DOMESTIC PROCESSES Jennifer Sterling-Folker, University of Connecticut, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 1997, p.23

As for systemic liberalism, it is hard to imagine theories that are less conducive to domestic process theorizing. Although billed as process-based theories, they are actually less interested in how process determines identities, interests, and behaviors, and more interested in how particular situations generate a functional demand of their own. Process is at the disposal of the situation, not the other way around, and situations may occur through the ir own dynamics and not as a result of process. When systemic liberalism is viewed in this way, it is no wonder that most rational choice and game theorists reach conclusions that support liberal rather than realist contentions (Powell, 1991; Niou and Ordeshook, 1994). These approaches adopt a methodology that assumes that situations can be examined out of context, that they spring up or vary indiscriminately, and that the attributes of any given situation are more causal than the processes in which actors were engaged (Stein, 1983; Snidal, 1986:41-4). When the functional imperatives of a given situation and domestic processes come into explanatory conflict in liberal explanations, it is the latter that are regularly jettisoned.

NEOLIBERALISM LACKS AN ADEQUATE NORMATIVE THEORY Chris Brown, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, April 1997, p.279

However, by their acceptance of rational egoism as the key motivator of state conduct. and anarchy as the condition of the international system, neoliberals have condemned themselves to a very 'thin' account of norms. At best, such norms would amount to little more than habits of co-operation which might emerge as a result of the growth of networks of international institutions and, as such, they would always be vulnerable to the short-term advantages that might accrue from cheating. In any case, given the assumptions of rational egoism and anarchy, the neorealist assumption that states are concerned with relative ga ins seems highly plausible, and thus even the thin notion of norms upon which neoliberals rely is put in jeopardy. This is a familiar story: once again International Relations theorists are looking to solve problems of co-operation set up on Hobbesian lines without resort to a Hobbesian sovereign. In this respect at least, the scepticism of neorealists is justified.



LIBERALISM CAN'T EXPLAIN THE PERSISTENCE OF WAR Stephen Krasner, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND, Steve Smith, et al., eds., 1996, p.114

Liberal analysis is, however, much less adequate for addressing other questions. It has little to say about war. For military conflict, as opposed to internationa l political economy, the basic liberal contention has been that the world is changing: the opportunities for mutual gain through exchange have increased and the cost of war has spiralled. It makes more sense to trade than to fight (Rosecrance, 1986; Doyle, 1983). This change in incentive structures does not, however, seem to have altered the behaviour of leaders in Iran, Iraq, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Aden, Somalia and elsewhere.

LIBERALISM CAN'T EFFECTIVELY ANALYZE SITUATIONS OF EXTREME CONFLICT Robert Jervis, Professor of International Politics, Columbia University, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1999, p.51

States can cooperate by reducing transaction costs (the costs and risks associated with reaching and carrying out agreements) and, in turn, the successful reduction of such costs can facilitate cooperation. Institutions can play a large role here, and this helps explain why institutionalized cooperation can continue even when the initially propitious conditions have disappeared. But it is hard to see how changes in information can be effective when changes in preferences over outcomes are required. Thus neoliberals do not discuss how states do or should behave when vital interests clash: there are no neoliberal analyses of the Cold War, the diplomacy of the 1930s, or relations between the United States and Iraq, and the approach could help in Kosovo only if there are some outcomes acceptable to both sides absent changes in power.



LIBERALISM MISUNDERSTOOD THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR Patrick Glynn, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, CLOSING PANDORA'S BOX, 1992, p.44

And yet by 1919, the same war that once was regarded as an indictment of the liberal vision of foreign policy was treated as the most compelling argument for its implementation. In the end, the notion that war had been caused by the arms race was less an observation based on events than a complicated reaffirmation of the once-discredited liberal-pacifist vision of international politics. Yet in setting the framework for efforts to prevent another war, the arms race paradigm pointed the democracies in exactly the wrong direction. It taught that democratic Britain had been too militaristic before the war, when the truth was that it had been not quite firm or vigilant enough. It encouraged at best a certain insouciance about military power, implying that deterrence was an inherently dangerous or simply unnecessary arrangement, something to be transcended or dispensed with -- when the real lesson of Sarajevo was that hegemonic states could be prevented from unleashing war only by ensuring that deterrence and defensive alliances remained unambiguously strong. However, from the standpoint of British liberalism, such a conclusion would have amounted to an unpalatable acknowledgment that power politics was -- and is a permanent feature of the human condition.

LIBERALISM DEALS POORLY WITH A WORLD OF DISINTEGRATING STATES Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1995, p.168-9

Liberalism -- or the U.N. Charter -- finds it difficult to cope with a variety of phenomena: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; ethnic conflicts in the successor states; civil wars among rival ethnic, religious, or political factions in countries long ravaged by the Cold War (such as Cambodia or Afghanistan) or in much of Africa; the failure of many post-colonial states, especially in Africa but also in parts of Asia, to become nation-states; and the attempts by Islamic or Hindu fundamentalists to replace a secular with a religious and thus highly exclusionary definition of the state. To arrive at a world of liberal polities, there must be a clear idea of the state. If the world consists of disintegrating states, then the cooperative processes and institutions that are supposed to fuel harmony under the banner of liberal internationalism are easily overwhelmed by millions of refugees who flee massacres and disasters and seek asylum in liberal states, or call for protection whenever they cannot escape.



LIBERALISM DEALS POORLY WITH CONTEMPORARY BOTTOM UP VIOLENCE Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1995, p.167

Basically, the plight of the liberal vision results from the fallacy of believing that all good things can come together. They rarely do, and many that were expected to be good have turned out rotten. More specifically, the liberal vision was focused on one particular enemy: the Moloch of power, wherever found, either arbitrary and excessive at home or imperial and militaristic abroad. Insofar as abuse of power is a hardy perennial, liberalism remains an indispensable source of inspiration and value. But there is another enemy in today's world: not the violence that results from the clash of mighty powers or from the imposition of the power of the strong on the weak, but the violence that results from chaos from below. The world today is threatened by the disintegration of power -- by anomie, which denote's the absence of norms but can also refer to the collision of norms.

EVENTS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S INVALIDATE LIBERALISM Joseph Grieco, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM, David Baldwin, ed., 1993, p.120-1

Postwar events, and especially those of the 1970s, appeared to support realist theory and to invalidate liberal institutionalism. States remained autonomous in setting foreign policy goals; they retained the loyalty of government officials active in "transgovernmental networks"; and they recast the terms of their relationships with such seemingly powerful transnational actors as high-technology multinational corporations (Russell 1973; Krasne r 1978; Grieco 1984). Industrialized states varied in their economic performance during the 1970s in the face of similar challenges (oil shortages, recession, and inflation). Scholars linked these differences in performance to divergences, and not converge nce, in their domestic political-economic structures (Zvsman 1977, 1983; Katzenstein 1978, 1985; Gourevitch 1986:181-217). A number of events during the 1970s and early 1980s also demonstrated that the use of force continued to be a pervasive future of world politics: increases in East-West tensions and the continuation of the Soviet-American arms competition; direct and indirect military intervention and counterintervention by the superpowers in Africa, Central America, and Southwest Asia; and the Yom Kippur and Iran-Iraq wars. International institutions appeared to be unable to reshape state interests; instead they were often embroiled in and paralyzed by East-West and North-South disputes. Finally, supranationalism in West Europe was replaced by old-fashioned intergovernmental bargaining, and the advanced democracies frequently experienced serious trade and monetary conflicts and sharp discord over economic relations with the Soviet Union.



NEOLIBERALS UNDERESTIMATE THE SECURITY MOTIVATIONS OF STATES David Baldwin, Professor of World Order Studies, Columbia University, NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM, 1993, p.4.

Joseph A Grieco (1988a:497-98) contends that neoliberals and neorealists fundamentally diverge with respect to the nature and consequences of anarchy. He asserts that the neoliberal institutionalists underestimate the importance of worries about survival as motivations for state behavior, which he sees as a necessary consequence of anarchy.

LIBERALISM MISTAKENLY ASSUMES HIGH LEVELS OF RATIONALITY Henning Riecke, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Weatherland Center for International Affairs, Harvard, JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, March 2000, p.31-2.

The rationalist approach of the neo-liberals faces similar limitations as the logic of deterrence underlying the alliance's reform. The assumption that all states (in the region) equally deny the possession and use of WMD, and consider using them only under the influence of a prisoners dilemma-like situation, is certainly weak. Also contestable is the concept of rationality, which is applied as a regular pattern of decision-making to all actors. It might be misleading to analyse the use of WMD from this starting point, especially with regard to the damage some actors might be willing to risk on their population or their international reputation.

LIBERALS DISAGREE AMONG THEMSELVES Michael Doyle, Professor, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, 1997, p.301

Like the realists, Liberals display significant differences. The institutionalists (Locke and Bentham) focus on individual-level (Image I) determinants, the commercialists (Smith and Schumpeter) on societal-level (Image II), and the internationalists (Kant) on interstate (Image III) determinants of the state of war. Their conceptions of what describes the state of war also differ.




There is an important theoretical failing in the liberal institutionalist logic, even as it applies to economic issues. The theory is correct as far as it goes: cheating can be a serious barrier to cooperation. It ignores, ho wever, the other major obstacle to cooperation: relative-gains concerns. As Joseph Grieco has shown, liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains. Keohan acknowledged this problem in 1993: Grieco has made a significant contribution by focusing attention on the issues of relative gains, a subject that has been underempasized, especially by liberal or neoliberal commentators on the world economy. This oversight is revealed by the assumed order of preference in the prisoners’ dilemma game: each state cares about how its opponents strategy will affect its own (absolute) gains, but not about how much one side gains relative to the other.


Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. States are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage. There is a “special peril of deflection” in the military realm, because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shirts in the balance of power.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM EMPIRICALLY FAILS T.V. Paul, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESEARCH: BALANCE OF POWER REVISITED – THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, May 17, 2002, p. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/bop/index.asp#organizers

Although some global forces have had a positive impact on international security relations, events during the past decade including the most recent terrorist strikes have disappointed many who believe in the emergence of a democratized, globalized and (hence) more peaceful world governed by universally accepted norms. The not so successful performance of the UN's peacekeeping forces in many conflict zones and the ineptitude of the UN Security Council have underlined the weaknesses of international institutions to provide collective security globally. The UN has been generally inept in dealing with sub-state challenges as well.



RELIANCE ON LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION WILL FAIL AND SACRIFICE THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE

Joseph Greico, Political Scientist, 1998 (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Summer, p. 487)

This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neo-liberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by internationa l anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong. Neoliberalism's claims are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and in cooperative arrangeme nts also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively better gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former, and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.

FAILURE TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE WILL RESULT IN ITS DESTRUCTION Kenneth Waltz, Political Scientist, 1984 (NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, ed. Keohane, pp. 117-8)



Realism Theoretically Superior toe Liberalism

REALISM OFFERS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THAN LIB

Joseph Grieco, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM, David Ba ldwin, ed., 1993, p.131

Realism and neoliberal institutionalism offer markedly different views concerning the effects of international anarchy on states. These differences are summarized in table 5.2. Compared to realist theory, neoliberal institutionalism understates the range of uncertainties and risks states believe they must overcome to cooperate with others. Hence, realism provides a more comprehensive theory of the problem of cooperation than does neoliberal institutionalism.

REALISM BETTER UNDERSTANDS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THAN LIBERALISM Joseph Grieco, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM, David Baldwin, ed., 1993, p.118

In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.


Morality/Responsiblity


A2: US Responsible -- US Could Have Intervened in Syria

Intervention would almost certainly have failed

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 9-21-15, Foreign Policy, Could We Have Stopped this Tragedy?, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/21/could-we-have-stopped-this-tragedy-syria-intervention-realist/ DOA: 9-22-15

Having thought a lot about it, and having spoken with a number of knowledgeable friends who hold different views on this matter, I still believe intervening in Syria was not in the United States’ interest and was as likely to have made things worse as to have made them better. I take no pleasure in my conclusions; I base my unhappy verdict on the following arguments.

The Limits of Air Power. Proponents of “no-fly zones” typically exaggerate their impact and in so doing overstate the capacity of air power to determine political outcomes. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. naval air power can do a lot of impressive things, but air power remains a crude instrument and is not very good for controlling events on the ground. Remember that the United States operated “no-fly zones” over Iraq throughout the 1990s, and Saddam Hussein remained solidly in power until we invaded in 2003. Similarly, the United States has flown thousands of sorties in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade or so (not to mention drone strikes), and these efforts didn’t allow Washington to dictate terms to those on the ground or shape their political futures in any predictable way.

To be sure, a no-fly zone would have limited some of the Assad regime’s worst excesses — such as its use of barrel bombs — and would probably have saved some lives. But grounding the Syrian air force would not have prevented Assad & Co. from using other means to a greater extent. And it would not have driven Assad from power quickly. As skeptics warned at the time, a “no-fly zone” was the first step onto a potentially slippery slope: If air power had failed to dislodge Assad, demands to do more would surely have increased, thereby putting the United States and others on course for a more costly and consequential involvement.

Assad’s “Gamble for Resurrection.” From the very start, a key problem in Syria was the lack of an attractive exit option for the entire Assad regime. As the titular leader of the Alawite minority that has dominated Syria since 1970, Assad and his followers saw relinquishing power as a mortal threat. (Needless to say, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s brutal murder at the hands of Libya’s rebels likely did little to reassure the Syrian president.) And it wasn’t just Assad and his immediate entourage that were in danger: Losing power could open the door to violent retribution against the entire Alawite minority. Thus, the Assad regime had little choice but to “gamble for resurrection” — to fight on no matter how bleak things appeared and to use any and all methods to ensure they were still standing at the end of the day or at least were in a position to bargain for survival.

Given these incentives, U.S. demands that “Assad must go” fell on deaf ears, and outside intervention (air power, no-fly zones, arms for rebels, etc.) weren’t likely to alter Assad’s calculations very much. The only possibility for ending the war quickly had to include leaving Assad in a defensible position, but the United States had ruled that (admittedly unappealing) option out from the start. Add to this the widespread tendency to assume early on that the Syrian government was on its last legs, and you can see why many believed a little nudge from the outside would have been enough to topple him completely and that serious and flexible diplomacy wasn’t necessary.

https://mideastwire.wordpress.com/2015/09/15/nicholas-noe-in-huffpost-when-ngos-call-for-military-intervention-in-syria-the-case-of-the-international-crisis-group/

https://mideastwire.wordpress.com/2015/09/15/nicholas-noe-in-huffpost-when-ngos-call-for-military-intervention-in-syria-the-case-of-the-international-crisis-group/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambling_for_resurrection

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/21/could-we-have-stopped-this-tragedy-syria-intervention-realist/

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/21/could-we-have-stopped-this-tragedy-syria-intervention-realist/


What About the Jihadis? Intervening to push Assad out faced another obvious objection: It might open the door for al Qaeda or other violent extremists. This concern also complicated proposals to arm anti-Assad forces like the Free Syrian Army. How could Washington ensure U.S. weapons didn’t end up in the wrong hands? To make matters worse, the most effective anti-Assad forces were precisely those groups the United States most feared. That’s the real lesson of Benghazi: Early U.S. intervention might have reproduced the Libyan disaster, reminding us that that only thing worse than a truly awful government is no government at all.

Why Can’t Uncle Sam Teach Anyone to Fight? In theory, early U.S. intervention might have been accompanied by a sustained effort to build up pro-Western or at least moderate Syrian forces, thereby creating the kernel of a new and more benign Syrian regime. And in theory, I have a chance to win a gold medal in the 2016 Olympics. The problem here is two-fold. It was impossible to find very many Syrians who fit this job description, and the Pentagon doesn’t seem to be very good at training foreign forces anymore.

Something seems to have gone badly wrong with U.S. military training efforts over the last 15 years. The Pentagon has poured tens of billions of dollars into training Afghans, Iraqis, and, more recently, a few friendly Syrians, but all we seem to get for it are foreign forces that lose battles, desert at a whim, and remain dependent on U.S. logistics, command advice, and other kinds of support. The groups our various proxies are fighting against — the Taliban, Hezbollah, al-Nusra Front, for example — don’t get any American training or advice, yet they consistently out-perform the recipients of American largesse. What gives? In any case, our recent track record at building reliable and competent foreign security forces cautions against believing that quicker and more vigorous U.S. involvement would have produced a successful outcome.

Face It: The United States Is Toxic. The ineffectiveness of U.S. training efforts and other forms of advice may be partly due to the negative opinion most people in the Middle East have of U.S. policy. America may be admired for its democracy, its achievements in science and technology, and the friendliness of its people, but U.S. Middle East policy is widely reviled. The United States was once regarded in positive terms — in particular, it wasn’t seen as a duplicitous imperial power like France or Britain — but that was 70 years ago. I won’t delve into the diverse sources of local anti-Americanism (some of them justified, others bogus), but there’s no sense in denying it at this point. Overt U.S. intervention can easily backfire by reinforcing prevailing narratives about “Western” interference and encouraging more people to conclude Osama bin Laden was right. In short, even if the United States and its allies had gone into Syria with the noblest of intentions, plenty of people in the region would have been suspicious, if not actively hostile. When mistakes occurred and civilians died — as they inevitably would, for such is the nature of war — Washington would have been blamed and fresh conspiracy theories would have proliferated.

Whose Interests Are Truly Engaged? There is a clear humanitarian interest in ending the Syrian civil war. But neither great nor minor powers typically run big risks or bear large costs for strictly humanitarian reasons. For most leaders, convincing their fellow citizens to make significant sacrifices usually requires a strategic justification as well. As noted above, for the United States, the strategic issues were complicated and do not point directly or unambiguously toward deeper involvement. After all, neither Democratic nor Republican administrations ever cared very much that a thuggish minority was running Syria before 2010, and the United States did business with Assad — père et fils — when it seemed useful. In this sense, U.S. strategic interests in Syria are limited (and all the more so now that Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal is gone).

By contrast, the interests of other states, including the Europeans, are much more deeply engaged. The problem, however, is that hardly anyone else has the capacity to exert a decisive impact on the war. Even

http://b.3cdn.net/aai/04651e9aa1b5dcc741_3wm6brd3d.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/asia/afghans-see-american-general-as-crucial-to-countrys-defense.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/middleeast/isis-isil-syrians-senate-armed-services-committee.html?ref=world&_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/middleeast/isis-isil-syrians-senate-armed-services-committee.html?ref=world&_r=0


Russian goals seem limited to preserving Assad for as long as possible and giving him an escape route if he needs one in extremis . Even as Russia increases its support for the Syrian regime, Moscow still hasn’t sent nearly enough arms or Russian forces to tip the balance in Assad’s favor. Perhaps the refugee crisis will convince the EU that it can no longer sit disarmed in its post-modern Garden of Eden and that it needs to rebuild a more serious military capability, but that task will take years and I wouldn’t bet on it happening anyway.

So as I wrestle with a counterfactual history and turn these problems over in my head, where do I come down? Should the United States have intervened to try to end Syria’s civil war or not? I conclude — with some genuine reluctance — that my non-interventionist instincts were correct in this case. Given what we’ve witnessed, I wish I could think up a clever strategy that would allow the United States and its allies to fix this problem, but I’ve drawn a blank. Nor has anyone else come up with a compelling solution, either.

It follows that the least bad option at this point would be a re-energized effort to end the fighting. The United States should stop insisting Assad must go, and listen carefully to the other powers with a stake in the outcome, including Russia. The good news is that the Obama administration is taking some tentative steps in that direction, but we don’t know yet if they will pay off or not. If ending the fighting and stopping the refugee exodus requires preserving a visible role for Assad, so be it. That outcome wouldn’t make me happy, but neither does a seemingly endless war. I don’t know if it will be possible to reconstitute a unified Syrian state; if not, then an organized and internationally supervised partition plan will have to be negotiated and implemented.

Politics, it is often said, is the art of the possible. This maxim is especially true in foreign policy and especially when dealing with the chaos of civil war. There are some problems for which there are no good solutions, only lesser evils. Back in 2011, I thought the most important tasks in Syria were caring for refugees and finding some way to end the bloodshed. I think I was right back then, and I think that’s the right course now. But am I 100 percent certain? No, and you shouldn’t be either.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/europe/us-to-begin-military-talks-with-russia-on-syria.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/europe/us-to-begin-military-talks-with-russia-on-syria.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article


A2: Responsibility to Refugees

Most of the “refugees” are just people seeking Europe’s riches, they aren’t from war zones

Scott Greer, September 24, 2015, Daily Caller, Illegal Immigrants Don’t Follow the Pope’s Golden Rule, http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/24/illegal-migrants-dont-follow-the-popes-golden-rule/ DOA: 9-25-15

Ever since becoming pope in 2013, Francis has been an outspoken advocate for illegal immigrants in both Europe and the United States. He started visiting the migrant camps that now dot the coastlines of France and Italy, demanding European Union states take in these migrants almost immediately upon his coronation. These camps house thousands of African migrants, the majority of whom came to Europe not to flee war or oppression, but to find employment or simply enjoy the benefits of the welfare state. (RELATED: Bleeding Hearts Will Only Make Europe’s Migrant Crisis Worse)The same is also probably true with many of the so-called refugees who flooded Europe this summer from the Middle East — another group Francis believes deserves the unquestioning support of Europe. Of course, a sizable number are fleeing war-torn Syria, bringing their families to the continent in hopes they’ll be granted asylum. But the overwhelming number of “refugees” are young men leaving the safety of Turkey, Jordan and other states in the hopes they’ll enjoy the wonders of Europe.

http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/24/illegal-migrants-dont-follow-the-popes-golden-rule/


A2: Infinite Ethical Responsibility to the Other

Infinite responsibility fails – a responsibility we can never fulfill does not drive us to calculate in favor of the other, but rather to surrender to self-interest

Dr John Fitzsimmons and Dr Wally Woods, Faculty of Arts, Health and Sciences at Central Queensland University, “Chapter 3 - Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener" and "Benito Cerino," 2000, http://www.ahs.cqu.edu.au/humanities/litstud/52283/schedule/chap3/p5.htm, accessed 11/8/02

Anderson believes that the lawyer’s charity seems to go beyond what most would have given. This raises a question, he believes, which underpins the story: is it possible to perform acts of altruism without, finally, having regard to self–interest? What this suggests is that Christ’s commandments reflect an ideal, one that the rest of us find impossible to live up to because, at a certain point, we all turn back to self–preservation (that is, unlike Christ who went "all the way" and gave up his life) (386). The contrast between capitalism (Wall Street being one of its dominant symbols) with its self–interest, and the Christ–like Bartleby could not, Anderson argues, be stronger. He concludes that the "divine–logos," which Bartleby represents, shows itself as an impossible practice within the confines of "institutionalised self–interest" (386). Or to put it another way, if we are our brother’s keeper, Bartleby, in demanding to be kept without offering anything in return, is so exasperating that even the apparently charitable lawyer gives in and moves out when Bartleby refuses to quit his offices (387).

The Pro obliterates the infinite. Providing concrete examples of responsibility creates artificial connections that hide the face of the infinite otherKarim Benammar, Faculty of Cross-cultural Studies at Kobe University, “The Project of Community,” Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae, Vol 14, 1996http://ccs.cla.kobe-u.ac.jp/Kihan/karim/project.html

The other in Levinasian ethics is thus certainly not faceless, because it is precisely the face of the other, the individual face of this other, which puts me under an ethical imperative not to kill and not to harm. This is an imperative to always consider the other as a fellow-human, as someone whose humanity, right to live and right to respect are sacred and inviolable. And yet, although this other is an individual, with an expressive, individual face, with brown or green eyes, with features deep-set or hard to fathom, the other must be a stranger. The other who commands me, who puts me under an ethical obligation to refrain from harm, is not my father or sister-in-law, is neither my boss nor my neighbor, cannot be my business partner or high-school friend. The force of the ethical obligation I am put under comes from the fact that the other is a stranger to whom I owe nothing and who owes me nothing. The other we encounter in Levinas is thus an other with a face, a unique and individual other, who is nevertheless not primarily related to me or engaged in any constructive endeavor or relation with me. The other in contemporary French philosophy fait irruption, emerges to dislodge the symmetrical and determined relations between individuals, comes from the outside, unknown, to break up the status quo. The relational context, which was so neatly defined in Watsuji's ethics, is never enclosed, finished, exhaustively described, or even at rest. This is, after all, partly what we mean by "other": someone who is not the same as us, who cannot be reduced to or tamed by the I, who cannot be exhaustively described in terms of categories that apply to the I. The other is the unknown who destroys the possibility of reciprocity and balance, the chance at a self-enclosed relationship between equals. The other is always something of an alien.


Levinas’s ethics create Nazi-like ideological blindness – they can’t account for the nuance of post-ethics decisions

Didier Pollefeyt, Professor of Moral Theology, Katholieke Universiteit, 1999, Ethics After the Holocaust, p. 37

Second, in an important way Levinas's thought leads towards a reduction of the Jewish religion to an ethical religion. Religion is threatened in that its concerns can become exclusively a matter of ethics, that is, doing what is good. But what if the person fails, if courage falls short, and one falls into sin? An ethical God can only judge. Here the danger and terror of ethics arises. The paradox is that Nazism could also be interpreted along these lines, as becomes clear in the thought of Peter Haas. Nazism seems to be founded on a definite, ruthless (indeed perverted) "ethical" code. Nazism was in all possible respects merciless. Whoever did not comply with its "ethical" demands inevitably "deserved" to be eliminated. Of course, Levinas's ethics and Nazi ethics are fundamentally different (see my contribution to this volume), precisely because Levinas's ethics is centered on openness and Nazi ethics on closedness. But at the same time, Levinas's ethics should also be questioned as to its possibility of becoming fanatic in confrontation with evildoers. We must therefore also put forth the question: "What comes after ethics?" The Judaeo-Christian tradition is also a tradition of mercy. Ethics can hereby be saved from its mercilessness. A persons existence can never be completely reduced to one moment. One is always more than what one has done. For ethics after Auschwitz, however, one of the most pressing questions is whether there are situations where humanity has done such great violence that we find ourselves in the ethical impossibility of forgiveness. In the case of genocide one can without the least doubt speak of him pardonable." If not, a forgiveness that is too easily granted leads once again to a trivialization of ethics. The philosophy of Levinas, in other words, should be an occasion that initiates reflection on the relationship between ethics and forgiveness.

They claim responsibility outweighs everything else. Levinas only concludes responsibility is inherent in all action. Treatment of it as an absolute undermines decidability and true responsibility which is grounded in recognition of consequences

David Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, 1999, p. 43-44

"Undecidability" is one of the Derridean concepts that most attracts criticism. Often (mis)understood as licensing an anarchical irresponsibility, it is taken to be the very negation of politics, understood in terms of the decision, and a concomitant denial of responsibility. However, as Derrida makes clear, he has never "proposed a kind of 'all or nothing' choice between pure realization of self-presence and complete freeplay or undecidability.” Indeed, the very notion of undecidability is the condition of possibility for a decision. If the realm of thought was preordained such that there were no options, no competing alternatives, and no difficult choices to make, there would be no need for a decision. Instead, the very existence of a decision is itself a manifestation of undecidability, so that we can comprehend undecidability "as an opening of the field of decision and decidability." As Derrida argues, "even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by this experience and experiment of the undecidable.” It is for this reason that Derrida has talked in terms of undecidability rather than indeterminacy: the former signifies the context of the decision, a context in which there is "always a determinate oscillation between possibilities," whereas the latter suggests a relativism or indeterminism absent from deconstruction.” Moreover, just as deconstruction is necessary for politics, undecidability is a prerequisite for responsibility. Were there no decisions to be made, were all choices eradicated by the preordination of one and only one path, responsibility— the ability to respond to differing criteria and concerns — would be absent. Rather than being its


abnegation, the possibility of decision ensured by undecidability is the necessary precondition for the existence and exercise of responsibility. Which leads Derrida to state: "There can be no moral or political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the undecidable.

The call for infinite responsibility degrades into revulsion for the incurable other.

Ted Billy, Department of English at SUNY Binghamton, “Eros and Thanatos in ‘Bartleby,’” Arizona Quarterly, 31, 1975, http://www.ku.edu/~zeke/bartleby/billy.htm, accessed 11/8/02

Just as Bartleby embodies thanatos, separation, the death instinct, Melville's narrator represents eros, the impulse toward unification, the life instinct in the author's psyche. The "life instinct also demands a union with others and with the world around us based not on anxiety and aggression"7 but on love, freedom, and the release of nervous tensions. "The principle of unification or interdependence sustains the immortal life of the species and the mortal life of the individual; the principle of separation or independence gives the individual his individuality and ensures his death."8 In this regard, the narrator acts as the agent of the life impulse to react against the death drive of Bartleby in Melville's literary dialectic. Eros operates through the narrator's personality chiefly in the guise of Christian compassion. The theoretical Christian concern for the community of souls is diametrically opposed to Bartleby's heightened individuality and the diseased consciousness it engenders. The greatest example of love for Melville, as it is for St. Paul, is the act of charity. Surely charity is the predominant virtue in the narrator's character. Time after time he offers substantial financial help to the morose scrivener with the promise of further aid. The narrator visits him in prison and sees to it that Bartleby will receive good treatment, should he "prefer" to accept it. The narrator exhibits generosity and selflessness in reaction to Bartleby's eccentricities. "... when this old Adam of resentment rose in me and tempted me concerning Bartleby, I grappled him and threw him .... simply by recalling the divine injunction: 'A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another.'... charity often operates as a vastly wise and prudent principle--a great safeguard to its possessor .... no man, that ever I heard of, ever committed a diabolical murder for sweet charity's sake. Mere self-interest, then, if no better motive can be enlisted, should ... prompt all beings to charity and philanthropy" (p. 52). There is only one thing wrong with the narrator's charitable behavior toward Bartleby--it doesn't work. No amount of well-meaning humanitarianism can unravel the knot of tension built into the conflict of eros and thanatos in human nature. The narrator is most vulnerable to appeals to the bond of "fellow-feeling." He finds it difficult to divorce himself from Bartleby's plight. "The bond of a common humanity now drew me irresistibly to gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For both I and Bartleby were sons of Adam" (p. 40). Bartleby's corrosive individuality would not permit him to share this sentiment. His self is severed from its natural relation to life. The narrator's original feeling of pity turns to repulsion when Bartleby's pervasive despair infects him with the hopelessness of ever relieving the scrivener's anguish. "Disarmed" and "unmanned" by Bartleby's fatalistic resignation, the narrator feels "sundry twinges of impotent rebellion" (p. 38) in the antagonism. Despite the constant sympathy he expresses for the scrivener, the narrator is overburdened by the afflictive "millstone" of Bartleby on his conscience. The cross is too heavy for this Christian to bear. "The scrivener was the victim of innate and incurable disorder. I might give alms to his body; but his body did not pain him; it was his soul that suffered, and his soul I could not reach" (p. 42).

Being for the Other grounds discussion of impacts, it doesn’t trump them. Even if they win their framework, if they make things worse, they lose


D. G. Myers, Associate professor of English and religious studies at Texas A & M, “Responsible for Every Single Pain: Holocaust Literature and the Ethics of Interpretation,” Comparative Literature, 51, Fall, 1999, p. 266-288, http://www-english.tamu.edu/pers/fac/myers/responsible.html

Nevertheless, I must expect to betray them more often than I am adequate to the challenge of their need. Holocaust literature is a summons to responsibility for the victims of genocide, but this merely describes what is possible, not what is real. Historicity is a reminder that some things are past changing. The reality of six million deaths is something I can neither alter nor deny; the suffering on six million faces is something to which I can never adequately respond. But if I can do nothing about the past I may yet affect the future. It is often said that the purpose of studying the Holocaust is to prevent it from ever happening again. As the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman says: Much more is involved in [studying the Holocaust] than the tribute to the memory of murdered millions, settling the account with the murderers and healing the still-festering moral wounds of the passive and silent witnesses. Obviously, the study itself, even a most diligent study, is not a sufficient guarantee against the return of mass murdere[r]s and numb bystanders. Yet without such a study, we would not even know how likely or improbable such a return may be. (88) What this indicates is that the Holocaust does not belong only to history but also to possibility. If we cannot affect its outcome we can still do something about its meaning. Events mean nothing in themselves; they must be interpreted. But what this also indicates is that meaning arises from our responsibility. The counterfactual possibility of doing something appropriate about the Holocaust is what creates our responsibility to it, and if what we want is to discover its meaning—that is, to interpret the Holocaust—then our interpretation must be shaped and guided by our responsibility.


Not Just Europe’s Responsibility

It’s a global problem, not just the European problem


THOSE of us outside Europe are watching the unbelievable images of the Keleti train station in Budapest, the corpse of a toddler washed up on a Turkish beach, the desperate Syrian families chancing their lives on the night trip to the Greek islands — and we keep being told this is a European problem.

The Syrian civil war has created more than four million refugees. The United States has taken in about 1,500 of them. The United States and its allies are at war with the Islamic State in Syria — fine, everyone agrees they are a threat — but don’t we have some responsibility toward the refugees fleeing the combat? If we’ve been arming Syrian rebels, shouldn’t we also be helping the people trying to get out of their way? If we’ve failed to broker peace in Syria, can’t we help the people who can’t wait for peace any longer?

It’s not just the United States that keeps pretending the refugee catastrophe is a European problem. Look at countries that pride themselves on being havens for the homeless. Canada, where I come from? As few as 1,074 Syrians, as of August. Australia? No more than 2,200. Brazil? Fewer than 2,000, as of May.

The worst are the petro states. As of last count by Amnesty International, how many Syrian refugees have the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia taken in? Zero. Many of them have been funneling arms into Syria for years, and what have they done to give new homes to the four million people trying to flee? Nothing.

The brunt of the crisis has fallen on the Turks, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the Iraqis and the Lebanese. Funding appeals by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have failed to meet their targets. The squalor in the refugee camps has become unendurable. Now the refugees have decided, en masse, that if the international community won’t help them, if neither Russia nor the United States is going to force the war to an end, they won’t wait any longer. They are coming our way. And we are surprised?





States Have a Right to Exclude

Freedom of Association means states can close its borders to anyone it wants, including refugees


In this article I appeal to freedom of association to defend a state’s rightto control immigration over its territorial borders. Without denying thatthose of us in wealthy societies may have extremely demanding dutiesof global distributive justice, I ultimately reach the stark conclusion thatevery legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potentialimmigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum from incompetentor corrupt political regimes that are either unable or unwilling toprotect their citizens’ basic moral rights.

High value place on the right to associate


To appreciate the presumptive case in favor of a state’s right to controlits borders that can be built upon the right to freedom of association,notice both that (1) freedom of association is widely thought to beimportant and that (2) it includes the right not to associate and even,in many cases, the right to disassociate.That freedom of association is highly valued is evident from ourviews on marriage and religion. In the past, it was thought appropriatefor one’s father to select one’s marital partner or for one’s state to determine the religion one practiced, but, thankfully, those times have(largely) passed. Today, virtually everyone agrees that we are entitled tomarital and religious freedom of association; we take it for granted thateach individual has a right to choose his or her marital partner and theassociates with whom he or she practices his or her religion. Put plainly,among our most firmly settled convictions is the belief that each of usenjoys a morally privileged position of dominion over our self-regardingaffairs, a position which entitles us to freedom of association in themarital and religious realms.




Freedom to associate includes the right to disassociate


Second, notice that freedom of association includes a right to rejecta potential association and (often) a right to disassociate. As Stuart Whiteexplains: “Freedom of association is widely seen as one of those basicfreedoms which is fundamental to a genuinely free society. With thefreedom to associate, however, there comes the freedom to refuse as-sociation. When a group of people get together to form an associationof some kind (e.g., a religious association, a trade union, a sports club),they will frequently wish to exclude some people from joining theirassociation. What makes it theirassociation, serving their purposes, isthat they can exercise this ‘right to exclude.’

In the case of matrimony, for instance, this freedom involves morethan merely having the right to get married. One fully enjoys freedomof association only if one may choose whether or not to marry a secondparty who would have one as a partner. Thus, one must not only bepermitted to marry a willing partner whom one accepts; one must alsohave the discretion to reject the proposal of any given suitor and evento remain single indefinitely if one so chooses. As David Gauthier putsit, “I may have the right to choose the woman of my choice who alsochooses me, but not the woman of my choice who rejects me.”2

We understand religious self-determination similarly: whether, how, andwith whom I attend to my humanity is up to me as an individual. If Ielect to explore my religious nature in community with others, I haveno duty to do so with anyone in particular, and I have no right to forceothers to allow me to join them in worship.

Countries have the right to associate with who they wish





The nonvoluntary nature of political states can raise complex problems forthose who would defend a state’s right to political self-determination(problems I address at length elsewhere), but here I would like merelyto highlight some of the unpalatable implications that follow from de-nying a country’s right to freedom of association.4

In particular, considerthe moral dynamics of regional associations like the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union (EU). If le-gitimate states did not enjoy a right to freedom of association—a rightwhich entitles them to decline invitations to associate with others—thenthey would not be in a position to either accept or reject the terms ofthese regional associations. Think of Canada’s choice to join NAFTA,or Slovenia’s decision to enter the EU, for instance. No one believesthat it would be permissible to force Canada into NAFTA or to coerceSlovenia to join the EU. (Of course, nor may Canada or Slovenia uni-laterally insert themselves into these associations!) And the reason it iswrong to forcibly include these countries is because Canada’s and Slo-venia’s rights to self-determination entitle them to associate (or not)with other countries as they see fit. Put plainly, if one denies that le-gitimate states like Canada and Slovenia have a right to freedom ofassociation, one could not explain why they would be righteously ag-grieved at being forced into these mergers.

Indeed, there would be even more awkward implications because,without positing a right to freedom of association, we could not satis-factorily explain what is wrong with one country forcibly annexing an-other. Imagine, for instance, that a series of plebiscites revealed boththat an overwhelming majority of Americans wanted to merge with Can-ada and that an equally high proportion of Canadians preferred tomaintain their independence. Would it be permissible for the UnitedStates to forcibly annex Canada? I assume without argument that, evenif the United States could execute this unilateral merger without dis-rupting the peace or violating the individual rights of any Canadians,this hostile takeover would be impermissible. The crucial point for ourpurposes is that one cannot explain the wrongness of unilateral annex-ations like this unless one supposes that countries like Canada enjoy aight to autonomy, a right which accords Canadians the freedom toassociate with others as they see fit

States have the right to associate



If the analysis to this point has been sound, then there is no reasonto doubt that groups, even political states, can have rights to autonomyanalogous to those enjoyed by individuals. Even if one agrees that le-gitimate states can have rights to self-determination, though, one mightstill question the argument sketched above on the grounds that theintimacy of marriage makes freedom of association immeasurably moreimportant in the marital context than in the political realm. After all,in the vast majority of cases, fellow citizens will never even meet oneanother. On this point, consider Stuart White’s contention that “if theformation of a specific association is essential to the individual’s abilityto exercise properly his/her liberties of conscience and expression,or to his/her ability to form and enjoy intimate attachments , then exclusion ruleswhich are genuinely necessary to protect the association’s primary purposes have an especially strong presumption of legitimacy.”6

Transposing White’s reasoning, one might insist that, since there is no intimacyamong compatriots, it is not at all clear why we need to respect freedomof association for groups of citizens.

Important for states to be able to control membership in their own state


What is more, for several reasons it seems clear that control overmembership in one’s state is extremely important. To see this, thinkabout why people might care about the membership rules for their golfclub. It is tempting to think that club members would be irrational tocare about who else are (or could become) members; after all, they arenot forced to actually play golf with those members they dislike. Butthis perspective misses something important. Members of golf clubstypically care about the membership rules because they care about howthe club is organized and the new members have a say in how the clubis organized. Some members might want to dramatically increase thenumber of members, for instance, because the increased numbers willmean that each individual is required to pay less. Other members mightoppose expanding the membership because of concerns about the dif-ficulty of securing desirable tee times, the wear and tear on the course,




and the increased time it takes to play a round if there are more peopleon the course at any given time.And if there is nothing mysterious about people caring about whoare (or could become) members of their golf clubs, there is certainlynothing irrational about people being heavily invested in their country’simmigration policy. Again, to note the lack of intimacy among com-patriots is to miss an important part of the story. It is no good to tellcitizens that they need not personally (let alone intimately) associatewith any fellow citizens they happen to dislike because fellow citizensnonetheless remain political associates; the country’s course will be c harted by the members of this civic association. The point is that peoplerightly care very deeply about their countries, and, as a consequence,they rightly care about those policies which will effect how these politicalcommunities evolve. And since a country’s immigration policy affectswho will share in controlling the country’s future, it is a matter ofconsiderable importance

An important part of self-determination is determining who the “self” is


These examples of the golf club and the political state point towarda more general lesson that is worth emphasizing: because the membersof a group can change, an important part of group self-determinationis having control over what the “self ” is. In other words, unlike individualself-determination, a significant component of group self-determinationis having control over the group which in turn gets to be self-deter-mining. It stands to reason, then, that if there is any group whose self-determination we care about, we should be concerned about its rulesfor membership. This explains why freedom of association is such anintegral part of the self-determination to which some groups (includinglegitimate states) are entitled. If so, then anyone who denies that weshould care about the freedom of association of nonintimate groupswould seem to be committed to the more sweeping claim that we shouldnot care about the self-determination of any nonintimate groups. But,unless one implausibly believes that we should care only about intimategroups, then why should we suppose that only the self-determinationof intimate groups matters? Thus, people rightly care deeply about theirpolitical states, despite these states being large, anonymous, and mul-ticultural, and, as a consequence, people rightly care about the rulesfor gaining membership in these states. Or, put another way, the very



same reasoning which understandably leads people to jealously guardtheir state’s sovereignty also motivates them to keep an eye on who cangain membership in this sovereign state.

Self-determination over immigration is important because it impacts resource allocation


A second, less obvious, reason to care about immigration policy hasto do with one’s duties of distributive justice. As I will argue in the nextsection, it seems reasonable to think that we have special distributiveresponsibilities to our fellow citizens. If this is right, then in the sameway that one might be reluctant to form intimate relationships becauseof the moral freight attached, one might want to limit the number ofpeople with whom one shares a morally significant political relationship.Thus, just as golf club members can disagree about the costs and benefitsof adding new members, some citizens might want to open the doorsto new immigrants (e.g., in order to expand the labor force), whileothers would much rather forgo these advantages than incur specialobligations to a greater number of people.

Finally, rather than continue to list reasons why citizens ought tocare about issues of political membership, let me merely point out thatcitizens today obviously do care passionately about immigration. I donot insist that the current fervor over political membership is entirelyrational, but it is worth noting that anyone who submits that freedomof association in this context is of no real importance is committed tolabeling all those who care about this issue as patently irrational. Thus,even though the relationship among citizens does not involve the mor-ally relevant intimacy of that between marital partners, the consider-ations quickly canvassed above, as well as the behavior of actual citizens,indicate that we need not conclude that control over immigration istherefore of negligible significance. If so, then neither the observationthat (1) individual persons are importantly disanalogous to politicalstates nor the fact that (2) freedom of association is much more im-portant for individuals in the marital context than for groups of citizensin the political realm should lead us to abandon our initial comparisonbetween marriage and immigration. As a consequence, we have no rea-son to abandon the claim that, like autonomous individuals, legitimate



political regimes are entitled to a degree of self-determination, oneimportant component of which is freedom of association. In sum, theconclusion initially offered only tentatively can now be endorsed withgreater conviction: just as an individual has a right to determine whom(if anyone) he or she would like to marry, a group of fellow-citizens hasa right to determine whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into itspolitical community. And just as an individual’s freedom of associationentitles him or her to remain single, a state’s freedom of associationentitles it to exclude all foreigners from its political community.

The right to exclude immigrants is deontological


Before turning to the case against political freedom of association,I would like to highlight two features of the view I am advancing here:(1) I defend a deontological right to limit immigration rather than aconsequential account of what would be best, and (2) my view mightbe dubbed “universalist” rather than “particularist” insofar as it neithersuggests nor implies that only distinct nations, cultures, or other “com-munities of character” are entitled to limit immigration. Consider eachof these points in turn.First, let me stress that I seek to defend a deontological conclusionabout how legitimate states are entitled to act, not a consequential pre-scription for how to maximize happiness or a practical recipe for howstates might best promote their own interests. I understand that groupscan have weighty reasons to limit immigration in certain circumstances,but what the best policy would be for any given state’s constituents (and/or for those foreigners affected) will presumably depend upon a varietyof empirical matters, matters about which others are more knowledge-able. Thus, I doubt that any one-size-fits-all immigration policy exists,and I, qua philosopher, have no special qualification to comment onthe empirical information that would be relevant to fashioning the bestpolicy for any given state. However, if anything, I am personally inclinedoward more open borders. My parents were born and raised in differentcountries, so I would not even be here to write this article if peoplewere not free to cross political borders. What is more, my family and Ihave profited enormously from having lived and worked in several dif-ferent countries, so it should come as no surprise that I believe that,just as few individuals flourish in personal isolation, open borders aretypically (and within limits) best for political communities and their



constituents. Still, just as one might defend the right to divorce withoutbelieving that many couples should in fact separate, I defend a legitimatestate’s right to control its borders without suggesting that strict limitson immigration would necessarily maximize the interests of either thestate’s constituents or humanity as a whole. My aim is merely to showthat whatever deontological reasons there are to respect freedom ofassociation count in favor of allowing political communities to set theirown immigration policy.

No obligation to accept asylum seekers


As implausible as it might initially seem, I suggest that, even in casesof asylum seekers desperately in need of a political safe haven, a stateis not required to take them in. I adopt this stance not because I amunmoved by the plight of asylum seekers but because I amnot convincedthat the only way to help victims of political injustice is by shelteringthem in one’s political territory. In my view, these people might also be helped in something like the fashion in which wealthy societies couldchoose to assist impoverished foreigners: by, as it were, exporting justice.Admittedly, one cannot ship justice in a box, but one can intervene,militarily if necessary, in an unjust political environment to ensure thatthose currently vulnerable to the state are made safe in their homelands.26 Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that this is always easy oreven advisable, nor do I assert that states are necessarily obligated totake this course of action. I claim instead that where asylum seekers aregenuinely left vulnerable because their government is either unable orunwilling to protect their basic rights, then their government is illegitimate,it has no claim to political self-determination, and thus it standsin no position to protest if a third party were to intervene on behalf of(some of) its constituents. Think, for instance, of the Kurds in Iraq.One way to help them is to allow them to emigrate en masse. Anotheroption, though, is to use military force to create a safe haven and noflyzone in Northern Iraq. And since the Iraqi government was the partythreatening the Kurds, it had no right to object to this interference withits sovereignty. I suspect that Walzer stops short of this conclusion onlybecause he wrongly, I think, respects the political self-determination ofvirtually all states, even those persecuting asylum seekers Walzer and I diverge on this point, then, not because I am lessimpressed than he by the plight of asylum seekers but because he ismore impressed than I by the claims to political self-determination offailed and rogue states, those regimes either unable or unwilling tosecure their citizens’ basic moral rights. Thus, I once again concludethat affluent societies have a duty to help but that it is a disjunctive duty:just as global poverty requires wealthy states to either export aid orimport unfortunate people, the presence of those desperately seeking



political asylum renders those of us in just political communities dutybound either to grant asylum or to ensure that these refugees no longerneed fear their domestic regimes. Miller seems to me to get it just rightwhen he suggests: “The lesson for other states, confronted with peoplewhose lives are less than decent, is that they have a choice: they musteither ensure that the basic rights of such people are protected in theplaces where they live—by aid, by intervention, or by some othermeans—or they must help them to move to other communities where their lives will go better. Simply shutting one’s borders and doing nothingelse is not a morally defensible option here.”28

Accepting refugees is morally arbitrary


It is important to note, though, that those who make an exception for refugees(as defined by international law) apparently cannot do so on principled grounds. Astheorists like Andrew Shacknove and Michael Dummett have pointed out, restricting thestatus of refugees to those who have crossed an international border because of a well-founded fear of persecution is morally arbitrary. See Andrew Shacknove, “Who Is a Ref-ugee?”Ethics95 (1985): 274–84; and Michael Dummett,On Immigration and Refugees(NewYork: Routledge, 2001).



A2: Other Advantages


A2: International Humanitarian Law

International Humanitarian Law doesn’t protect refuges in conflict situations


Refugees caught in armed conflicts represent an archetypal case for testing the potential of the complementarity approach. The overlapping between international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law is not disputable in this particular situation and their cumulative application reveals some unexpected conclusions. Although international humanitarian law is supposed to be the main branch of international law applicable in times of armed conflict, closer scrutiny of its specific norms proves rather frustrating (Section A). Indeed, international humanitarian law has little to provide for protecting the specific needs of refugees caught up in armed conflicts.

International Humanitarian Law indifferent to refugees


The impact of international humanitarian law on the refugee protection regime is particularly complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, its primary function in the field of forced migration is a preventive one. The explicit prohibition of forced displacement aims to prevent civilians from becoming refugees.15 On the other hand, international humanitarian law is relatively indifferent to the specific needs of refugees who are in the territory of a party to an armed conflict.

Among the 576 articles of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, only three provisions explicitly refer to refugees.16 Furthermore, all of them are exclusively applicable in times of international armed conflict and occupation. By contrast, international humanitarian law does not contain any specific provision on refugees in non-international armed conflicts despite these representing the majority of armed conflicts around the world. Neither Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and AP II, nor the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary Study specifically addresses refugees.17 This curious










omission does not mean that refugees are left without protection by international humanitarian law. (p. 705) They are still protected as civilians provided they are not directly participating in hostilities. Nevertheless, besides the general protection of the civilian population as a whole, refugees are not conceived by international humanitarian law as persons in need of specific protection in non-international armed conflicts.

Even in international armed conflicts, international humanitarian law still apprehends refugees through the particular prism of its own concepts and categorization schemes. From this angle, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is one of ‘the cardinal principles […] constituting the fabric of humanitarian law’.18 Though it is frequently assumed that ‘one cannot be a refugee and a fighter at the same time’,19 this question remains open both in law and practice. It even constitutes the prerequisite for identifying the relevant applicable norms under international humanitarian law.

Refugees may fall within the definition of ‘combatant’ under Article 4 of GC III as supplemented by Article 43(1) of AP I, when they belong to a party to the conflict—other than their country of origin—fighting against the latter or any other states.20 If not, refugees are civilians and accordingly benefit from the protection against the effect of hostilities. The crux of the matter is then whether refugees are ‘protected persons’ under international humanitarian law. There is, however, no unequivocal answer to this question. International humanitarian law instead provides a piecemeal frame of protection which depends on a complex set of various factors, including the ratification of AP I, the nationality of refugees, and the time of their arrival on the territory of states parties. While some are protected persons under AP I, the great majority of refugees caught in international armed conflicts are not covered by this last instrument. In such a case, they must accordingly fulfil the ordinary conditions required by international humanitarian law to be considered as protected persons. (p. 706)

IHL doesn’t protect refugees against internment


If refugees do not fulfil the conditions imposed by Article 73, or if they are in the hands of a state not party to AP I, they may fall under the general definition of protected persons contained in Article 4 of GC IV. This last provision covers most—but not all—refugees once they are ‘in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. In such cases, they will benefit from the full range of guarantees contained in GC IV as well as the specific protection granted by Article 44. This last provision acknowledges that refugees who are by definition not protected by their state of origin cannot be treated as an ‘enemy alien’ because they simply have the nationality of the other party to the conflict.29 Article 44 thus mitigates the traditional criterion of nationality, which determines the applicability of GC IV, in order to take into account the particular situation of refugees.

Though limited to nationals of the other state party to an international armed conflict, the rationae personae scope of Article 44 is more inclusive than Article 73 of AP I. Contrary to the latter, the former is not confined to those who were recognized as refugees before the beginning of hostilities, but also covers those who fled their own country during the conflict. Furthermore, Article 44 retains a broad and factual definition of the term ‘refugee’ as referring to all nationals of an enemy state ‘who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government’. It is thus not limited to the refugees under the UN Convention relating to








the Status of Refugees which was adopted two years after GC IV and then amended in 1967 by the New York Protocol. Article 44 also includes beneficiaries of other complementary forms of protection in the state of asylum, whether such protection is based on its domestic law or other international instruments.30 (p. 708)

However, the potentially significant number of persons covered by Article 44 is undermined by the vague and permissive obligation contained therein. As confirmed by the drafting history,31 the ICRC Commentary,32 and the legal doctrine,33 the provision’s loose wording recommends that belligerents do not consider refugees as enemies exclusively because of their nationality. The Detaining Power thus retains a particularly broad discretion in considering whether or not refugees should be treated as enemy nationals. Hence, Article 44 does not prevent the Detaining Power from taking security measures, such as internment, against refugees who are considered as a danger to its own security.

At best, IHL provides some very limited protectionVincent Chetail, June 2014, Director of the Global Migration Centre and Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. He is a Board Member of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and, from 2004 to 2012, was Research Director of the Geneva Academy. He was also Head of the Master in International Affairs from 2009 to 2012, Armed Conflict and Forced Migration: Systematic Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, and International Human Rights Law, In The Oxford Handbook of International Law and Armed Conflict, http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780199559695.001.0001/law-9780199559695-e-28 DOA: 9-25-15

The general definition of ‘protected persons’ under GC IV does not include all refugees who are non-nationals of a party to an international armed conflict. Article 4(2) explicitly excludes nationals of a neutral or co-belligerent state which has ‘normal diplomatic representation’ in the belligerent state on whose territory they are located or nationals of a co-belligerent state with diplomatic relations with the occupying state in whose hands they are.34 In such cases, refugees who have fled from neutral or co-belligerent states will only benefit from the general protection afforded to the civilian population, unless the concerned state has ratified AP I and the refugees have been recognized as such before the outbreak of the hostilities.

Furthermore, nationals of an Occupying Power who are in the territory of the occupied state are not covered by the definition of protected person because Article 4 is circumscribed to non-nationals. Though not considered as protected persons, refugees who are nationals of the Occupying Power are specifically addressed by Article 70(2) of GC IV. The wording of this last provision is again not a model of clarity and needs to be quoted in extenso:

Nationals of the Occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.

(p. 709)

Article 70(2) is the only provision in the whole Fourth Geneva Convention which explicitly applies to nationals of a state party to an international armed conflict. Such a departure from the traditional stance of international humanitarian law remains nevertheless in line with the general duty of the Occupying Power to respect the laws in force in the occupied country. As stressed by the ICRC Commentary, the rationale of Article 70(2) ‘is derived from the idea that the right to asylum enjoyed by them [ie refugees] before the








occupation began must continue to be respected by their home country, when it takes over control as Occupying Power in the territory of the country of asylum’.35

However, the protection granted by international humanitarian law should not be overestimated. Article 70(2) suffers from three main drawbacks. First, the prohibition expressed in this provision is limited to some specific measures only: arrest, prosecution, conviction, and deportation. As observed by Dinstein, it says nothing about the other measures which may be taken against refugees (such as confiscation of property or denial of religious freedom).36 This represents a considerable lacuna where Article 73 of AP I does not apply.

Secondly, similarly to Article 73 of AP I, Article 70(2) of GC IV is confined to refugees who reached the occupied territory ‘before the outbreak of the hostilities’.37 This rationae temporis qualification creates a dangerous protection gap. Indeed, nationals who fled from their own country during a conflict are the most vulnerable to acts of revenge by their state of origin when the latter occupies the territory of the asylum state.38 States’ obsession not to encourage desertion and treason is further confirmed by this last limitation.

Thirdly, the prohibition contained in Article 70(2) is not absolute. It may be exposed to two significant exceptions which reflect the conflicting interests at stake. First, refugees can be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and deported for non-political offences committed before the hostilities, provided that these offences would have justified extradition in time of peace under the law of the occupied territory. This subtly qualified exception endorses the traditional distinction made in refugee law between ordinary criminals and refugees.39 It is aimed at ensuring that refugees are not sanctioned for the reasons they have fled their own state when it becomes (p. 710) the Occupying Power. However, the risk of abuse is still apparent since Article 70(2) says nothing about the procedure to be followed, and in particular whether this is up to the Occupying Power or the occupied authorities to interpret and apply the conditions laid down therein.

The other exception is even more straightforward, as it refers to any ‘offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities’ without any other qualifications. From the angle of international humanitarian law, the refugee is still considered as a national of the Occupying Power. He retains, as such, some duties of allegiance towards his own country in times of armed conflict and must abstain from activities which may be construed as treason.40 In an echo of the concern of states, the ICRC Commentary assumes that ‘once war has broken out, […] the higher interest of the State take precedence over the protection of individual’.41

As exemplified by Article 70(2), the reach of international humanitarian law is equivocal to say the least. Overall, while providing a vital protection to civilians, it has little to offer to refugees as a specific group of concern. Refugee protection under international humanitarian law thus remains incomplete and fragmented. Under both treaty and customary law, international humanitarian law offers no specific protection to refugees caught in non-international armed conflicts. Even in international armed conflict, it does not provide a tailored, specific, and comprehensive regime of refugee protection. International humanitarian law attempts instead to encapsulate refugees within its own notion of protected persons. By doing so, it gives the impression of trying to resolve a problem it has itself created.

More fundamentally, enclosing refugees under the generic label of protected person fails to address their specific needs. On the one hand, the definition of protected persons under international humanitarian law does not include all refugees and other persons in need of protection. Beside the cases mentioned before, it excludes all nationals of a belligerent state who flee to a state that is not a party to the conflict during and/or because of the hostilities. On the other hand, even if refugees correspond to the definition of protected persons, they benefit as such from the same guarantees as ordinary aliens within the territory of a party to the conflict. As demonstrated above, the only two provisions specifically devoted to refugees in GC IV are conspicuously weak and ambiguous.

EU cannot force resettlement



Of course, the EU is an unwieldy conglomerate of member countries with their own national laws and decision-making bodies, not a federal country like the United States. Martin Schain, a professor of politics at New York University who is working on a book comparing border politics in the United States and Europe, told Quartz, “The EU as an entity has very little power with regard to immigration, it’s completely the opposite of the US.” Since member countries retain national sovereignty, they also have separate ways of managing migration. “It’s as if [the US states of] Arizona and Florida and Texas would be the primary movers with regard to immigration,” he added.



Forced Resettlement Bad


Redistributing Refugees Across Europe Fails

Free movement within the EU makes resettlement quotas useless


In September 2015, EU ministers agreed to resettle 120,000 migrants—a small fraction of those seeking asylum in Europe—from Greece and Italy across twenty-three member states. (Greece and Italy will not be required to resettle more migrants, and Denmark, Ireland, and the UK are exempt from EU asylum policies under provisions laid out in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.) This plan was approved despite the vocal objections of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. This agreement builds upon a previous voluntary quota system that called on member states to resettle forty thousand migrants from Greece and Italy over a two-year period. Critics of this approach argue that free movement inside the Schengen zone effectively nullifies national resettlement quotas.

Redistributing refugees doesn’t solve the underlying problem


Quota plans and naval operations may help EU member states better manage this crisis, but experts caution that these proposals alone will not stem the tide of migrants. For that, European leaders must address the root causes of migration: helping to broker an end to Syria's civil war, restoring stability to Libya, and upping aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Barring a political solution to these regional crises, Europe will continue to struggle with migrant inflows.

Countries can only accommodate so many, melting pot will fail

Reg Henry, September 30, 2015, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, The Refugee Crisis We Cannot Ignore, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/reg-henry/2015/09/30/Reg-Henry-The-refugee-crisis-that-we-cannot-ignore/stories/201509300072 DOA: 9-30-15

Granted, even with abundant goodwill, which of course is sometimes lacking, millions of refugees can’t be accommodated easily, especially at a time when economies are sputtering. Any melting pot can successfully absorb only so many ingredients over a short period.

Another cautionary note is that Europe has places where Arab immigrants long ago came and failed to properly assimilate — and some of these are now home to alienated recruits for the Islamic State. The compelling principle that refugees should not be discriminated against because of their religion and ethnicity must be tempered by careful pragmatism. It is a difficult situation, but one that calls for us to act with heart and head.

http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/reg-henry/2015/09/30/Reg-Henry-The-refugee-crisis-that-we-cannot-ignore/stories/201509300072

http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/reg-henry/2015/09/30/Reg-Henry-The-refugee-crisis-that-we-cannot-ignore/stories/201509300072




Can’t Force Resettlement

Resettlement can’t be enforced

Jen Kirby, September 22, 2015, New York Magazine, With Some Opposition, European Leaders Establish Refugee Quotas, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/european-leaders-come-up-with-refugee-quotas.html DOA: 9-23-15

However, the Eastern European countries that protested are included in the proposal, and it's not entirely clear how those that don't want any part of this agreement will be forced to comply. The BBC reports that countries will face a fine of 0.002 percent of GDP, but some, such as Slovakia , have basically said they will reject any and all attempts by the European Union to force them to accept refugees. Hungary — which, despite its opposition, will actually benefit from the plan, as it will eventually relocate more than 54,000 people within its borders — questioned how the EU could enforce such quotas when refugees themselves only want to go to Germany or other, more economically stable member states.

Forced redistribution irrelevant. Once people are settled they can move where they want

Martin Wolf, September 22, 2015, Financial Times, A refugee crisis that Europe cannot escape, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3967804c-604b-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mTKajB48 DOA : 9-22-15

In the short run, incomers need to be processed. Germany has stated that it expects to receive 800,000 asylum-seekers, or 1 per cent of the population, this year — the largest number ever recorded in a member of the OECD. But its decision to do so is causing huge stresses inside the EU. Jean-Claude Juncker, the commission president, has proposed that refugees be shared out among the member states. EU ministers did vote on Tuesday to relocate 120,00 people across the continent over the next two years. But members differ greatly in their true willingness to take refugees. In any case, once inside the border-free Schengen area, people cannot be tied down. They will move wherever they expect the best lives. The EU needs a common policy, at least for the Schengen area. The UK and US also need to take more refugees.

Immigration policy in Europe is about individual countries, there is no “European” immigration policy

Ian Tranor, 9-5-15, The Guardian, Refugee Crisis: East and West Split as leaders resent Germany for waiving rules, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/migration-crisis-europe-leaders-blame-brussels-hungary-germany DOA: 9-6-15

There is no “European” immigration policy or regime. There is a mish-mash of national policies, a patchwork of systems and criteria which are contradictory, incoherent, fragmented. Italy is very far way from Finland, not only geographically, but when it comes to immigration and asylum. France and Germany have quite different historical approaches to integrating newcomers. Sweden and Denmark are neighbours with a close shared history, but their immigration policies are chalk and cheese. National governments guard these prerogatives jealously. “Europe” in the form of the EU authorities in Brussels has minimal say over policymaking. Almost all power here lies with heads of national governments and interior ministries. Yet, in this crisis, Brussels-bashing has become routine, the cheap and easy option for shameless national leaders acting unilaterally, blocking every suggestion that comes out of Brussels and then blaming it for the

http://www.theguardian.com/world/germany

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/migration-crisis-europe-leaders-blame-brussels-hungary-germany

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/migration-crisis-europe-leaders-blame-brussels-hungary-germany

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3967804c-604b-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mTKajB48

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/eu-governments-divisive-quotas-deal-share-120000-refugees

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/eu-attempt-resolve-refugee-quota-dispute-150922044717786.html


http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/european-leaders-come-up-with-refugee-quotas.html

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/european-leaders-come-up-with-refugee-quotas.html


ensuing chaos. Orbán proved the point in Brussels last week. “Europe” had failed, its leaders had irresponsibly created this mess, their response was “madness”. He has put up a razor-wire fence on the border with Serbia and announced he was fasttracking legislation to establish a zero-immigration regime within 10 days, with the army deployed on the border. Brussels cannot stop him because these powers are national. If need be, he said, he would put up another fence on the border with Croatia, a barrier between two EU countries. On Friday Brussels shrugged and said it did not like this, but couldn’t do anything about it. The all-powerful busybodies of Brussels are relatively impotent when it comes to immigration. For months the Italians, French, Austrians and Germans have been quietly re-establishing controls on the internal national borders of the open Schengen travel zone, which are supposed to be proscribed. Brussels cannot stop them. A commission spokeswoman said Italian police controls on the border with Austria were not border controls… For more than a year the Germans have been complaining bitterly that people entering Italy and Greece were deliberately not being registered by the national authorities, but simply encouraged to board trains and buses for Germany. Then they shifted and declared unilaterally that Syrians could come anyway. The commission can propose a panoply of measures aimed at creating more joined-up policies. It did so in May and will extend the effort this week. But they are instantly shot down by national police ministries. As its vice-president, Frans Timmermans, said on Friday, “asylum policies in Europe are not aligned”. The European parliament, as ever, has plenty to say about immigration, but absolutely nothing to do because it has no remit over policymaking, which remains overwhelmingly national. The countries of Europe prefer it that way, while blaming Brussels for the ever-worsening state of the union.

Quote

Jay Bookman, September 14, 2015, Atlanta Journal Constitution, ‘Give me your tired, your poor…but not your Muslim refugees,” http://jaybookman.blog.ajc.com/2015/09/14/give-me-your-tired-your-poor-but-not-your-muslim-refugees/ DOA: 9-22-15

It’s easy to think of ourselves as the “exceptional nation,” the “most charitable” nation, the nation where a person’s race or religion doesn’t matter. It is so much harder to actually act that way, particularly at times of crisis or when it involves taking a risk of some sort. But the truth is, that’s the only time it really matters.

Responsible – US and Europe destabilized the region, triggering the refugees

Mehran Arbab, September 9, 2015, Post Gazette, We have a responsibility to admit refugees, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/09/09/We-have-a-responsibility-to-admit-refugees/stories/201509090093 DOA: 9-22-15

Pictures of refugees coming onshore in Europe tell a horrifying tale of a people until recent years having normal lives in now war-torn lands.

http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/09/09/We-have-a-responsibility-to-admit-refugees/stories/201509090093

http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/09/09/We-have-a-responsibility-to-admit-refugees/stories/201509090093

http://jaybookman.blog.ajc.com/2015/09/14/give-me-your-tired-your-poor-but-not-your-muslim-refugees/

http://jaybookman.blog.ajc.com/2015/09/14/give-me-your-tired-your-poor-but-not-your-muslim-refugees/

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/hungary-closes-border-serbia-starts-building-fence-bar-migrants


These mothers, fathers and children were not born to be refugees. To protect and to give their children an opportunity for a dignified life, they are crossing dangerous borders on land and sea.

We must respect them for that. They are risking their lives for a slim chance, and that is more than most of us will ever have to do.

It is easy to avoid the fact that in a large part we caused this mass immigration. For ideological and geopolitical reasons we — the United States and Europe — destabilized Iraq, Libya and Syria and allowed the Islamic State group and the like to wreak havoc in a large part of the Middle East and North Africa. In spite of their dictatorial nature, the ruling regimes of these countries had maintained a state of stability.

Through conspiracy and war we prematurely removed that stability, and we now must act responsibly and admit these refugees into our own communities.

Europe deadlocked and facing a backlash

Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a visiting professor at Brandeis University's Heller School. His latest book is Debtors' Prison: The Politics of Austerity Versus Possibility., 9-6-15, Huffington Post, Refugee Blues, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/post_10092_b_8097064.html DOA: 9-7-15

The obvious solution would be to offer a legal route for Syrian refugees to settle in Europe so that they didn't have to brave leaky boats and hostile border guards. That solution would require countries to each take their fair share -- including the United States and Canada. President Roosevelt proposed something similar for German Jews. A conference was convened in 1938 at Evian-les-Bains in France to see if agreement could be reached among major nations on admission of Jewish refugees. The conference was a flop. Only the Dominican Republic offered to take serious numbers. With the EU machinery deadlocked, the practical question is whether nations that are relatively sympathetic to the refugee crisis, such as Germany and France, can join with Sweden and create a coalition of the willing, bypassing the EU. This will not be easy. Even before this latest refugee influx, Europe was experiencing a huge backlash against immigrants. Much of Europe had been compassionate in its acceptance of refugees and had also admitted citizens of its former colonies. During the boom years, Europe had welcomed guest workers. By 2008, many countries had immigrant or second-generation immigrant populations approaching 10 percent. High unemployment in the prolonged aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis only increased local resistance. Really bad austerity policy has made an immigration crisis into a political catastrophe. Germany's stance on the refugees is relatively liberal, but its relentless pursuit of austerity has made the crisis worse. This rightwing nativist upsurge has undermined social democratic politics in Europe's most tolerant and advanced societies. Large numbers of local working class voters, frightened of unemployment, have turned to nationalist parties -- fragmenting parliamentary systems and making it impossible for social democrat or labor parties to lead stable majority governments. Rightwing populist parties have been surging in the most progressive nations of Europe. In Denmark, Norway and Finland, where center-right coalitions now govern, the rightwing anti-immigrant parties are now the second largest.

Forcing refugee settlement fails and undermines support for the UK in the EU

Dominic Waghorn, September 23, 2015, Sky News, Refugee Crisis Threatens Support for EU in UK, http://news.sky.com/story/1557489/refugee-crisis-threatens-support-for-eu-in-uk DOA: 9-23-15

Europe has failed to agree on what to do with even a fraction of the hundreds of thousand of refugees pouring into the continent. Instead, a majority of countries have voted against the will of four smaller nations on a quota system distributing just over a hundred thousand migrants. That has set-up today's refugee summit in Brussels in an atmosphere of toxic acrimony. The Czechs say only the future will reveal how big a mistake the move was. The Slovaks say they won't accept it. The majority vote was an act of

http://news.sky.com/story/1557105/eu-ministers-back-quota-system-for-migrants

http://news.sky.com/story/1557105/eu-ministers-back-quota-system-for-migrants

http://news.sky.com/story/1557489/refugee-crisis-threatens-support-for-eu-in-uk

http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005520



failure. Only a voluntary system sharing out refugees will work. It will be impossible to force unwilling countries to take refugees if they do not want to. It plays into the hands of the EU's enemies and opponents. Already, Eurosceptic Conservatives and UKIP have said it is proof that EU membership requires loss of control of nations' borders. Last night in Brussels, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond admitted to reporters the refugee crisis was undermining support in the UK for Europe ahead of Britain's referendum on EU membership. "A sense of chaos and disarray tends to cause public opinion to react negatively," he said.


No Support for Increased Redistribution

Czech government opposes any required distribution of refugees


But there were early signs of resistance to the plan. “I’m very surprised by this unprecedented decision,” Slovakia’s interior minister, Robert Kalinak, said after the vote. The Czech prime minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, said his government would “reject any attempt to introduce some permanent mechanism of redistributing refugees.”




European Action Generally Fails

Four key barriers to an effective European response


The pressures of uncontrolled migration are hardly restricted to Europe—as the U.S. presidential campaign has underscored. But the EU’s predicament is particularly acute. The sudden influx of migrants has appeared to catch European governments by surprise, and has exposed fissures among the members of the Union. There at least four reasons why Europe is struggling.

Europeans often don’t know who is crossing their borders : Are they refugees or economic migrants? Many of the people showing up are asylum seekers who claim the status of refugees—defined under a 1951 UN convention as someone who has fled his or her country because of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” But until such claims can be definitively evaluated—which can take months—these people are stuck in limbo, suspected of being economic migrants who have chosen to move for better job prospects. Making such judgments is tough, but the decisions matter: refugees are entitled to international protection in an asylum country, whereas economic migrants can be turned away. But what about those who fall in the gray zone? Are people who flee from a country plagued by persecution, discrimination, and also a crumbling economy asylum seekers or migrants? What about those who fled their countries for refugee reasons but continue on in search of better job prospects? Answers to such questions often boil down to a judgement call with grave implications for the person in question.

EU members can’t get on the same page : Complicating matters, EU member states are quarrelling amongst themselves about how to respond. In principle, the EU’s Dublin Regulation stipulates that entry-point states are responsible for housing migrants and examining their asylum applications. But this EU law has placed a heavy strain on Mediterranean nations like Italy and particularly Greece, whose protracted financial crisis has left it ill-equipped to handle a sudden influx of refugees. In what it thought was a constructive move, Germany has suspended the Dublin Regulation and will allow Syrian refugees to apply for asylum even if they first arrived in another country. Berlin has since called for the EU to redistribute asylum seekers amongst member states. The idea of a quota system gained support from European Commission President Jean Claude-Juncker and, recently, European Council President Donald Tusk. But other EU members, including the United Kingdom and Hungary, vehemently insist that immigration policies be decided by individual governments. On Thursday, Hungarian President Viktor Orban blamed Chancellor Angela Merkel for essentially “inviting” migrants to Europe, labeling the crisis a “German Problem.” Such finger-pointing bodes ill for a unified EU front.

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/09/03/us/ap-eu-europe-migrants-the-latest.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungary-train-station-migrant-crisis.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/09/03/us/ap-eu-europe-migrants-the-latest.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/world/europe/european-union-asks-member-countries-to-accept-quotas-of-migrants.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/germany-quota-system-eu-migrant-distribution

http://time.com/4015934/germany-syrian-refugees-asylum/

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF

http://www.unhcr.org/475fb0302.html

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx



Politicians are feeling the heat from right-wing blowback : The rise of right-wing political parties in numerous EU countries (Denmark, Sweden, and France, for example) has fueled popular anti-immigrant sentiments. Violence against refugees and migrants has spiked in Germany, where asylum seekers increased by 132 percent over the same period in 2014. The pressures of populist nationalism have made it more difficult for politicians at the inter-European level to agree on a unified response.

Regulatory incoherence : In 2013, the European Parliament endorsed a Common European Asylum System, which establishes procedures to ensure uniform treatment for all asylum applications. Unfortunately, EU countries have failed to implement and enforce these provisions with any consistency. Complicating matters, there is no agreed list of countries the EU considers to be in conflict, making it hard to determine whether a person is an asylum seeker or a migrant. Nor are there any collective EU centers for asylum seekers to get processed and fed. Each EU nation has its own ways of doing things, exacerbating the sense of regulatory chaos. Europe’s migrant crisis is only the latest and most acute manifestation of a broader international problem: failure to develop and implement common standards and procedures for handling migrant flows, especially in the wake of political and economic turmoil. This is partly inherent in the complexity and sensitivity of migration, compared to other global flows. Hoping to benefit from globalization, governments in recent decades have lowered barriers dramatically for most factors of production, including capital, goods, services, and ideas—and they have negotiated multiple rules to govern the world economy. But the international regulation of migration has lagged, globally and regionally, because the cross-border movement of people is inherently sensitive politically—touching on issues of sovereignty, security, employment, and (not least) national identity. The result is a regulatory vacuum.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/ceas-fact-sheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/europe/germany-migrants-attacks-asylum-seekers-backlash.html



Disadvantages


Social Services Good

Refugees will overwhelm Europe’s social service infrastructure

Scott Greer, September 24, 2015, Daily Caller, Illegal Immigrants Don’t Follow the Pope’s Golden Rule, http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/24/illegal-migrants-dont-follow-the-popes-golden-rule/ DOA: 9-25-15

While many of these immigrants came to Europe for employment, the struggling economies of the continent offers few opportunities for low-skilled migrants, and the new arrivals imperil existing social infrastructures. The lion’s share of camp dwellers, if allowed to stay, would go straight on government assistance — like most asylum seekers already living in the West. Out of the refugees residing in America, 91 percent of them are on some form of government assistance.

And that’s no no meager cost for taxpayers to bear.Germany is set to take in 800,000 migrants this year. The average cost for taking in each individual migrant is estimated to be $14,500. That’s an $11.6 billion dollar bill foisted onto German taxpayers.Along with the large costs to taxpayers and lack of economic feasibility in accepting these migrants, they also bring crime and terror elements. Some of the high profile cases involving these migrants include an elderly couple brutally murdered in Sicily, a woman beheaded in a Swedish IKEA store and a seven-year-old girl raped in Germany.

http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/24/illegal-migrants-dont-follow-the-popes-golden-rule/


Backlash

Allowing in more refugees could produce a substantial nativist backlash


Albert Goldson, a global risk consultant and former U.S. intelligence officer, predicts violence as Europeans and immigrants collide over jobs, public resources, and cultural issues. "Some type of backlash will occur,” Goldson said. “It could get quite ugly in terms, in confrontations with local law enforcement as well as citizens due to incredible frustrations and not being able to get just the basics in terms of a better life.”

He estimates that there are already 800,000 immigrants in Europe, where natives will increasingly feel like they are accepting too many refugees. “Even the most liberal-minded European will feel like it’s an invasion,” Goldson said. “It will give the right wing a boost and will be a big issue in the next elections in Europe.” Goldson drew a comparison between Israel’s problems and what could take place in Europe if the refugees end up gathering in the ghettos where joblessness and frustration take root. Many European countries have criticized Israel for not getting the Palestinians out of ghettos but they could face the same difficulties after the migrant surge. “They have sacrificed their lives to get to Europe, and they are not going back to failed states,” Goldson said, likening the refugees to Europeans who came to the New World centuries ago. “They have no exit strategy.”

Racist backlash against refuges in Europe

Daniel Blei, 9-4-15, historian, Foreign Policy, The Banality of History, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/04/the-banality-of-history-germany-migrants-neo-nazis/ DOA: 9-22-15

In June, a map surfaced on the Internet, displaying the address of every refugee center and asylum shelter in Germany under the title “No Refugee Center in My Backyard.” Google took down the map, but only after a spate of violence, including the torching of an empty shelter in the Bavarian town of Reichertshofen. On a Berlin commuter train 10 days ago, neo-Nazis shouted “Heil Hitler” while urinating on two children traveling with their mother. The previous weekend in Heidenau, a town of 16,000 in the hills south of Dresden, German police battled hundreds of men hurtling stones and bottles outside an asylum shelter. In the medieval city of Meissen, famous for its porcelain, neo-Nazi arsonists struck an apartment building, newly renovated by the city to house refugees. Last week, on the western outskirts of Berlin, in Nauen in Brandenburg, arsonists burned a refugee center to the ground. On Friday, in Heppenheim near Frankfurt, a refugee shelter caught fire, leaving five people injured. In Witten, a university town in North Rhine-Westphalia, a mosque was set ablaze, the latest in a series of arson attacks on mosques. On Aug. 10, Heinrich Schmitz, a columnist for the online magazine The European and a member of the initiative #HeimeOhneHass, or “Homes Without Hate,” which supports refugees and asylum-seekers, published a “Declaration of Surrender,” announcing his retirement from political writing, facing a barrage of threats against him and his family.





All of Europe is facing a refugee crisis, but only in Germany, which has one of the continent’s most hospitable policies for refugees and asylum-seekers, does right-wing violence feel like an existential threat. The spate of attacks and bubbling up of hatred have prompted national soul-searching, raising questions about the nation and national belonging that haven’t come up since the 1990s, in reunification’s wake. Some Germans are stepping up to help tens of thousands of refugees entering the country, invoking a moral obligation to act. But xenophobic violence continues, and some see in asylum-seekers a socioeconomic threat. A national debate has emerged: Are we fremdenfeindlich (xenophobic) or fremdenfreundlich (foreigner-friendly)?

Massive racist backlash against immigrants and refugees in Germany


In June, a map surfaced on the Internet, displaying the address of every refugee center and asylum shelter in Germany under the title “No Refugee Center in My Backyard.” Google took down the map, but only after a spate of violence, including the torching of an empty shelter in the Bavarian town of Reichertshofen. On a Berlin commuter train 10 days ago, neo-Nazis shouted “Heil Hitler” while urinating on two children traveling with their mother. The previous weekend in Heidenau, a town of 16,000 in the hills south of Dresden, German police battled hundreds of men hurtling stones and bottles outside an asylum shelter. In the medieval city of Meissen, famous for its porcelain, neo-Nazi arsonists struck an apartment building, newly renovated by the city to house refugees. Last week, on the western outskirts of Berlin, in Nauen in Brandenburg, arsonists burned a refugee center to the ground. On Friday, in Heppenheim near Frankfurt, a refugee shelter caught fire, leaving five people injured. In Witten, a university town in North Rhine-Westphalia, a mosque was set ablaze, the latest in a series of arson attacks on mosques. On Aug. 10, Heinrich Schmitz, a columnist for the online magazine The European and a member of the initiative #HeimeOhneHass, or “Homes Without Hate,” which supports refugees and asylum-seekers, published a “Declaration of Surrender,” announcing his retirement from political writing, facing a barrage of threats against him and his family. All of Europe is facing a refugee crisis, but only in Germany, which has one of the continent’s most hospitable policies for refugees and asylum-seekers, does right-wing violence feel like an existential threat. The spate of attacks and bubbling up of hatred have prompted national soul-searching, raising questions about the nation and national belonging that haven’t come up since the 1990s, in reunification’s wake. Some Germans are stepping up to help tens of thousands of refugees entering the country, invoking a moral obligation to act. But xenophobic violence continues, and some see in asylum-seekers a socioeconomic threat. A national debate has emerged: Are we fremdenfeindlich (xenophobic)

or fremdenfreundlich (foreigner-friendly)?

Substantial right-wing backlash developing in Germany

AL Jazeera, September 27, 2015, Germany faces far-right radicalization over refugees, https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/germany-faces-far-radicalisation-over-refugees-160011622--spt.html DOA: 9-27-15

Germany's domestic intelligence chief warned on Sunday of a radicalisation of right-wing groups amid a record influx of migrants, including refugees, as xenophobic rallies and clashes shook several towns at the weekend. "What we're seeing in connection with the refugee crisis is a mobilisation on the street of right-wing extremists, but also of some left-wing extremists" who oppose them, said Hans-Georg Maassen on Deutschlandfunk public radio. Maassen spoke as Germany expects up to one million migrants this year, and after protests against refugee homes and clashes with police again rocked several towns at the weekend, mostly in the former communist East Germany.

https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/germany-faces-far-radicalisation-over-refugees-160011622--spt.html

https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/germany-faces-far-radicalisation-over-refugees-160011622--spt.html

http://www.dw.com/de/quadriga-fl%C3%BCchtlingskrise-hier-hilfe-dort-hass-2015-09-03/e-18645897-9801

http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rechte-hassbuerger-und-meinungsfreiheit-eine-kapitulationserklaerung/12167486.html

http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/witten/brandanschlag-auf-fluechtlingsunterkunft-in-witten-bommerholz-id11054003.html

http://www.dw.com/en/five-injured-when-refugee-shelter-in-heppenheim-near-frankfurt-catches-fire/a-18693005

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/07/germany-refugees-asylum-seekers-arson-violence-unlwecome/




Terrorism

Refugees could be terrorists


U.S. lawmakers immediately expressed concerns about the potential influx. The Islamic State group (ISIS) and other terrorist organizations "have made it abundantly clear that they will use the refugee crisis to try to enter the United States. Now the Obama administration wants to bring in an additional 10,000 Syrians without a concrete and foolproof plan to ensure that terrorists won't be able to enter the country," said U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, and U.S. Rep. Bob Goodlatte, R-Va. "The administration has essentially given the American people a 'trust me.' That isn't good enough," according to a statement from the lawmakers, who head the congressional judiciary committees.




European Politics Links

Taking more refugees risks unseating liberal European politicians

Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a visiting professor at Brandeis University's Heller School. His latest book is Debtors' Prison: The Politics of Austerity Versus Possibility, Co-founder and co-edittor, American Prospect, September 9, 2015, Huffington Post, Refugee Blues, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/post_10092_b_8097064.html DOA: 9-22-15

High unemployment in the prolonged aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis only increased local resistance. Really bad austerity policy has made an immigration crisis into a political catastrophe. Germany's stance on the refugees is relatively liberal, but its relentless pursuit of austerity has made the crisis worse.

This rightwing nativist upsurge has undermined social democratic politics in Europe's most tolerant and advanced societies. Large numbers of local working class voters, frightened of unemployment, have turned to nationalist parties -- fragmenting parliamentary systems and making it impossible for social democrat or labor parties to lead stable majority governments.

Rightwing populist parties have been surging in the most progressive nations of Europe. In Denmark, Norway and Finland, where center-right coalitions now govern, the rightwing anti-immigrant parties are now the second largest.

Unlike some other populist parties, the Danish variant is strongly pro-welfare state. It just thinks the welfare state should be reserved for Danes.

This puts Danish Social Democrats in a quandary. They are losing working class voters to the People's Party, and my interviews with party leaders suggest that Social Democrats are split down the middle. Some want to ostracize the populists as unacceptable toxic. Others look at the relentless parliamentary arithmetic, and conclude that their only chance of returning to power is some kind of alliance with the People's Party on issues where they agree. For now the People's Party is supporting the center-right government, which is more anti-immigrant than the Social Democrats.

Elsewhere in Europe, center-left leaders are hiding. Traditionally, as humanists, they are pro-immigrant and pro-refugee. But in practice, they are losing their working class base to racists. And there are only so many people that a small nation can admit.

This reality makes the stance of the Swedish government all the more ennobling. Sometimes, leadership is about appealing to the best in people. Without that leadership, racists succeed in appealing to the worst.

No political support in Europe for an effective solution





The growing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers fleeing turmoil in Africa and the Middle East poses complex challenges for European policymakers still grappling with weak economic growth and fractured national politics. Europe, according to a 2014 report from the International Organization for Migration, is currently the most dangerous destination for irregular migration in the world, and the Mediterranean Sea the world’s most dangerous border crossing. To date, the European Union's collective response to its growing migrant crisis has been ad hoc and, critics charge, more focused on securing the bloc's borders than on protecting the rights of migrants and refugees. With nationalist parties ascendant in many member states and concerns about Islamic terrorism looming large across the continent, it remains unclear if political headwinds will facilitate a new climate of immigration reform.

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/FatalJourneys_CountingtheUncounted.pdf

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/eu-s-fractured-politics-is-biggest-2015-risk-eurasia-group-says

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/eu-s-fractured-politics-is-biggest-2015-risk-eurasia-group-says


Czech Politics Links

Whatever party is more anti-immigrant will do better in the election

Martin Ehl is a journalist for Hospodářské noviny, a Czech daily, September 25, 2015, Understanding Central Europe’s Opposition to Refugees, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404 DOA: 9-25-15

The official position of the Czech government is that a quota system to redistribute refugees within the EU will not work because the Czech Republic is not a country in which refugees would like to stay so they will leave for Germany. As consequence, Germany would then seal its border with the Czech Republic anyway.

There is also a supporting argument that the quota system as a permanent mechanism that would allow the European Commission to distribute refugees according to certain economic indicators, would be breach of national sovereignty.

The problem for Czech politicians is their inability to explain these arguments to their partners in Europe. To a big extent, this is caused by politicians’ lack of knowledge about how EU politics work and their poor language skills. (This has become an issue. During a meeting of EU interior ministers on September 22, Milan Chovanec, the Czech interior minister, was sitting alone when the others chatted because he is not able to speak any language but Czech.) Furthermore, the Czech government hasn’t put on the table any alternative plan for dealing with the refugees.

On this topic, there is unique unity among the relevant political parties in Prague. Nobody wants to allow foreigners in, and the issue is starting to become a kind of political game: whichever party does the most to refuse the refugees will win the country’s next parliamentary election, due in 2017.

There is also a general feeling in Czech society that citizens should fear anything connected to Islam. That sentiment is driven by populist politicians, led by President Miloš Zeman.

Attacking refugees has strengthened Orban politically

László Kontler is a professor of history and pro-rector at the Central European University in Budapest, September 25, 2015, Understanding Central Europe’s Opposition to Refugees, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404 DOA: 9-25-15

There can be no denying the fact that the Hungarian government was under an obligation to deal with the influx of migrants in conformity with the relevant EU regulations. However, Budapest made very little (if any) effort to facilitate this process. It has done a great deal to turn the images of crowds of indigent and aggressive foreigners swarming the country’s public spaces—pictures already conjured up in the government’s propaganda before the real outbreak of the crisis—into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The crisis has also brought to surface another Hungary: that of civic organizations with activists and volunteers. Contrary to representations by government spokespersons and government-friendly media, these are not starry-eyed liberal idealists who are simply trying to soothe their consciences while blind to the possible risks and threats posed by the migration phenomenon. They are individuals motivated by compassion and solidarity who regularly participate in other forms of humanitarian help and who have prevented the refugee crisis from becoming a humanitarian catastrophe.

http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404



At the same time, the Hungarian government’s strategy has so far worked. The majority of its targets—sympathizers lost to the Far Right—seem to have been reconquered, and after a decline in the fall and winter of 2014–2015, the popularity of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his conservative Fidesz party has climbed back to where it had been before.

Anti-refugees sentiment on Slovakia politically popular

Andrea Bilá is a project manager for the fight against discrimination, racism, and xenophobia at the Open Society Foundation in Bratislava, September 25, 2015, Understanding Central Europe’s Opposition to Refugees, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61404 DOA: 9-25-15

The reasons for the Slovak government’s stance toward the refugee crisis are mostly political. In the context of Slovakia’s upcoming parliamentary election, due by March 2016, and of significantly radicalized Slovak public opinion, the ruling center-left Smer-SD party seems to consider any condemnation of xenophobia or Islamophobia politically risky, as it could be perceived as a de facto concession to the EU’s common migration policy.

In June 2015, 6,000 people took to the streets of Bratislava for a rally against national quotas for migrants. In a country where discontent seldom takes the form of street protest, this is of some significance. Indeed, refugees have become the most debated topic and one of the major worries for the Slovak population. And no wonder. Economically underprivileged people living in the southern and eastern regions of Slovakia, who already feel abandoned by the central government, perceive refugees as an economic and security threat.

There are voices that oppose the government’s line. After 71 refugees were found dead in a truck close to the Slovak-Austrian border in August, several public personalities including Slovak President Andrej Kiska launched an initiative called Plea for Humanity, urging the government to draft an action plan for the crisis.

But it now seems clear that the Slovak government is using its populist and simplistic rhetoric, which consists of labeling the refugees at times as potential terrorists, at times as economic migrants, to manipulate public opinion.

Instead of presenting the quota system as a temporary solution, which would certainly lead to growing support for nationalists and radicals, Bratislava uses the momentum created by this issue to flex its muscles in Brussels and thus build its political capital.

In the meantime, issues like corruption scandals, economic discontent, and public frustration with the political establishment, which made front-page news only weeks ago, are slowly sinking into oblivion.

http://www.vyzvakludskosti.sk/en/


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/fissures-in-eu-deepen-from-strain-of-migrant-influx-and-greek-debt.html



Sovereignty

States’ rights to control admission of non-citizens protected by sovereignty


The movement of people between states, whether refugees or ‘migrants’, takes place in a context in which sovereignty remains important, and specifically that aspect of sovereign competence which entitles the state to exercise prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and to decide who among non-citizens shall be allowed to enter and remain, and who shall be refused admission and required or compelled to leave. Like every sovereign power, this competence must be exercised within and according to law, and the state’s right to control the admission of non-citizens is subject to certain well-defined exceptions in favour of those in search of refuge, among others. Moreover, the state which seeks to exercise migration controls outside its territory, for example, through the physical interception, ‘interdiction’, and return of asylum seekers and forced migrants, may also be liable for actions which breach those of its international obligations which apply extra-territorially (Goodwin-Gill 2011; Moreno Lax 2011, 2012).1

No international conventions define asylum and it is up to states to apply it

Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, August 2014, Professor Guy S. Goodwin Gill was formerly Professor of Asylum Law at the University of Amsterdam, served as a Legal Adviser in the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 1976-1988, and was President of the Media Appeals Board of Kosovo from 2000-2003. He is the Founding Editor of the International Journal of Refugee Law and has written extensively on refugees, migration, international organizations, elections, democratization, and child soldiers. Recent publications include The Limits of Transnational Law, (CUP 2010), with Hélène Lambert, eds., The Refugee in International Law, (OUP, 2007), 3rd edn. with Jane McAdam; Free and Fair Elections, (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2nd edn., 2006); Brownlie’s Documents on Human Rights, (OUP, 2010), 6th edn., with the late Sir Ian Brownlie, QC, eds; and introductory notes to various treaties and instruments on refugees, statelessness and asylum for the ‘Historic Archives’ section of the UN











Audio-Visual Library of International Law. He practises as a Barrister from Blackstone Chambers, London, The International Handbook of Refugee Protectionhttp://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021 DOA: 9-25-15

No international instrument defines ‘asylum’. Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights simply says that ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.’ Article 1 of the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum notes that ‘Asylum granted by a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...shall be respected by all other States.’ But it is for ‘the State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum’ (Goodwin-Gill 2012).

Neither instrument creates any binding obligations for states. Indeed, both texts suggest a considerable margin of appreciation with respect to who is granted asylum and what exactly this means. In practice, however, states’ freedom of action is significantly influenced by ‘external’ constraints, which follow from an internationally recognized refugee definition, the application of the principle of non-refoulement, and the overall impact of human rights law. Regional instruments and doctrine have also had an important impact on the ‘asylum question’. Again, the 1969 OAU Convention was among the first to give a measure of normative content to the discretionary competence of states to grant asylum (Article II).17 Within the EU, the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights declares expressly that ‘the right to asylum shall be guaranteed...’, and that no one may be removed to a state where he or she faces a serious risk of the death penalty, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Articles 18, 19). The Qualification Directive provides in turn that member states ‘shall grant’ refugee status to those who satisfy the relevant criteria (Article 13; see also Article 8 of the Temporary Protection Directive) (Gil-Bazo 2008).

States are not obligated to left refugees resettle locally


Local integration, that is, residence and acceptance into the local community where the refugee first arrives, is the practical realization of asylum. States may be bound to the refugee definition and bound to observe the principle of non-refoulement, but they retain discretion as to whether to allow a refugee to settle locally; this point was underlined by the UNHCR Executive Committee in its 2005 Conclusion on local integration,20 although with little if any regard or reference to states’ other obligations under international law which govern the treatment of non-nationals on state territory.













States are obliged to provide assistance to refugees


States have also agreed to provide certain facilities to refugees, including administrative assistance (Article 25); identity papers (Article 27), and travel documents (Article 28); the grant of permission to transfer assets (Article 30); and the facilitation of naturalization (Article 34).

African, Latin American, and European conventions and laws all prohibit the return of refugees and call for protections


In addition to measures adopted at the universal level, the international legal protection of refugees and forced migrants benefits from regional arrangements and instruments which, in turn, may be refugee specific or oriented more generally to the protection of human rights.

In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) adopted the Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Sharpe 2012).10 Article I(1) incorporates the 1951












Convention definition, but paragraph (2) adds an approach more immediately reflecting the social and political realities of contemporary refugee movements. Also to be accepted as refugees are those compelled to flee owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order. In 1984, 10 Central American States adopted a similar approach in the (non-binding) Cartagena Declaration,11 recognizing in addition flight from generalized violence, internal conflicts, and massive violation of human rights. Two years later, in the extradition case of Soering v United Kingdom,12 the European Court of Human Rights laid the essential foundations for protection from removal under the European Convention. In this first judgment in what is now a long and consistent body of jurisprudence, the court ruled that it would be a breach of the Convention to remove an individual to another state in which there were substantial grounds to believe that he or she would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Later judgments have confirmed the applicability of this principle without exception, for example, in ‘security’ or criminal cases,13 and in the context also of extra-territorial interception operations.14

This human rights jurisprudence contributed substantially to ‘legislative’ developments within the European Union. These include the adoption of the 2001 Directive on Temporary Protection,15 applicable to ‘displaced persons’ unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin, for example, because of armed conflict, endemic violence, or systematic or generalized violence, and whether or not they are Convention refugees; (p. 42) and the 2004 Qualification Directive, which besides providing for recognition of Convention refugees, now also calls for ‘subsidiary protection’ in the case of those who would face a real risk of serious harm if returned to their country of origin (McAdam 2007).16






