UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Defense:

Overview and Implications

for Naval Planners

Naval War College

Non-Resident Seminar: Joint Maritime Operations

30-31 Jan 2012

CAPT Will Dossel, USN-ret.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PRESENTATION IS

UNCLASSIFIED

Please Keep the Discussion At That Level

All Material is drawn from public/open sources

Program Information is Drawn From MDA’s Public Website (www.mda.mil)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OVERVIEW

• Ballistic Missile Basics

• Essential Lexicon

• Threat

• BMD Fundamentals

• History/Background

• Doctrine & “Three Pillars”

• BMD Phases of Intercept

• BMD Elements

• BMD Planning and Execution

• BMDR

• Homeland Defense and PAA

• BMD Planning Lexicon

• BMD Ops in the Joint/Maritime

Environment

Break

• Discussion

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Part I

Ballistic Missile Basics

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Essential Ballistic Missile

Lexicon

Ballistic Missile Class Max. Range (km)

Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM <1000

Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRBM 1,000 – 3,000

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 3,000 – 5,500

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM >5,500

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Varies

Relevant International Conventions

MTCR

(Multi-lateral)

START Treaty

(Bi-lateral; US-RU)

INF Treaty

(Bi-lateral; US-RU)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile

Composition

Warhead/RV

Tankage:

Oxidizer &

Propellant

Airframe

Guidance

SIMPLE DESIGN:

SCUD variant

Motor

COMPLEX DESIGNS:

MIRV

PBV

MaRV

Multiple

Stages with

Separating

Warhead

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missiles:

Propellant Types

Solid Propellant Liquid Propellant

• Basically – combustion chamber tubes packed with a propellant that contains both fuel and oxidizer blended together uniformly. For example Shuttle SRBs:

• Oxidizer -- ammonium perchlorate (69.93%)

• Fuel – Powdered aluminum (16%)

• Catalyzer -- Iron oxidizer powder (0.07%)

• Remainder is an epoxy binder that also burns

• Shape of chamber controls burn via exposed propellant surface

• Advantages: Stable, storable; simple – enables mobility;

• Disadvantages: Low tolerance for error in manufacture, cannot shut down & restart

Propellant = Fuel + Oxidizer which produces Thrust

• Combines separately stored liquid

chemicals, a fuel and an oxidizer, to

produce thrust.

• May be either cryogenic or hypergolic:

• Cryogenic Propellant : very cold,

liquefied gases as fuel and oxidizer;

Typical uses: SLV

• Hypergolic Propellant: fuel and oxidizer

ignite on contact with each other. No

spark is needed.

• SCUD B/Shahab/No Dong: Inhibited

Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA)

(oxidizer) + Unsymmetrical

Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)(fuel)

• Advantages: highest energy per unit of

fuel mass, variable thrust, and a restart

capability

• Disadvantages: Complex storage/plumbing;

Precise injection metering; High capacity

pumps; Limited mobility and long term

storage; HIGHLY TOXIC (hypergolics)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missiles:

Basing Mode - Fixed Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed

or mobile bases

• Silo: Hardened, underground shelter for security

and protection from elements

• Not immune to attack, difficult for liquid

propellant missiles for long term storage

• Elevate to Launch: Semi-buried, better access to

service missile, useful when terrain does not

permit deeply buried facilities

• More vulnerable to attack

• Roll-out to Launch: Missiles stored in hard/deeply

buried facility, rolled out to pre-surveyed launch

pad for launch

• Missiles vulnerable until launch or returned to

facility; gives away intentions (aids opponent

I&W) and may lead to preemptive strike.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missiles:

Basing Mode - Mobile Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or

mobile bases

• Rail: Permits dispersal across broad area; organic support;

deployment of “heavy” missiles

• Unique identifiers of train set, maintenance shelters a

weak point, costly infrastructure to build/maintain

• TEL/MEL: Most mobile of land-based modes, self-sufficient

for solid propellant missiles; easier for CCDD

• Limitations on size/weight of missile and supporting

road infrastructure/terrain

• SHIP-BASED: Asymmetric threat concept but on the

margins

• Vessel size/stability vs. sea state directly impacts ability

to successfully elevate, service, launch missile

• SLBM: Most survivable, assured 2nd strike. Employed by

US, Russia, with China and India in development

• Very expensive to develop, build and operate

• ALBM: Allows launch closer to threat territory decreasing

flight and warning times

• Limited by carrier aircraft size

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missiles Defined

• Guided only during boost phase

of flight

• Once powered flight is

complete, only gravity affects

remainder of trajectory

• Plus a little drag on reentry

• “Guided” has historically implied

a relatively gentle means of

controlling the state vector at

thrust termination (Vbo)

• To a static target

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missiles Defined:

Reality In reality, ballistic missiles are not “ballistic” . . . there are many ways to change trajectory

during and after boost

• Endo-atmospheric maneuvers

• Maneuvers in the atmosphere using aerodynamic surfaces on the booster or RV

• Used during boost, after boost or both

• Exo-atmospheric maneuvers

• Maneuvers outside the atmosphere using small liquid propellant thrusters or solid propellant motors

• Used after boost

• Generalized energy management system maneuvers

• Used on boosters that allow all stages to burn to depletion (i.e., solid fuel); missile pitches and yaws during boost phase to waste energy to control range

• Can result in a much less “gentle” guidance during boost phase

Complicates Missile Warning And BMD Missions

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Endo-Atmospheric

Maneuvers Booster Mounted

• Uses aerodynamic surfaces for lift

• Takes advantage of atmosphere and missile’s

velocity to “fly” further down range

• Can increase range by 100s of km over “basic”

ballistic missile

RV Mounted (MaRV)

• Ballistic missile performance and accuracy decrease

as ranges >500 km if payload remains attached to

booster

• Booster needs to be strengthened for re-entry

• Easier to separate payload after boost

• To make a MaRV, add moveable fins to separating

payload

• Then maneuver in atmosphere during re-entry to:

Avoid defenses; aero range extensions; add terminal

guidance maneuvers

• All at large ranges

MaRV

Booster

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Boost-Phase Maneuvering

Generalized Energy Management Steering

(GEMS)

• Many solid propellant missiles don’t shut

down to control range, instead their motors

burn to depletion

• Since thrust is constant, boosters pitch/yaw

during powered flight to “waste” energy as

required to make planned range.

• Examples: Trident I C4 SLBM and THAAD

• May be as simple as corkscrews or more

complex maneuvers

This is an example of

GEMS (THAAD launch)

…and this is not

(failed BULAVA SLBM launch)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Exo-Atmospheric

Maneuvers Post-Boost Vehicles (PBVs)

• Use a small (typically restartable liquid

propellant) upper stage motor

• Deploy MIRVs from a single booster

• Targets may be 100s of kms apart

• Deploy BMD countermeasures

• Correct boost phase errors during mid-

course flight

Inflatable decoy

for Minuteman III

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Threat

• Ballistic missile threat will continue to proliferate and grow in capacity and capability

• Increasingly seen as both an asymmetric threat and economical log-range/deep strike alternative to manned aircraft

• Threat countries are pursuing WMD warheads despite international sanctions and counter-proliferation efforts

• Future systems will incorporate active and passive countermeasures and a reduced logistical footprint

• Mobility and underground facilities will protect deployed missiles

• Growing mobile force using deception and denial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures which complicate I&W and counter-targeting

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Worldwide Ballistic Missile

Proliferation: 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Worldwide Ballistic Missile

Proliferation: 2009

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Threat:

North Korea • Nation “of the greatest concern” according to

2010 BMDR

• Nuclear ambitions + long-range missiles

• Nuclear tests Oct 2006 and May 2009

• Three attempted space launches, none

successful

• 1998, 2006, 2009

• 2006: Simultaneous with 6 x SRBM & MRBM

launches

• 2009: Closest to success; demonstrated

potential ICBM capabilities in 3-stage variant to

reach CONUS

• Mobile IRBM under development and may be

operational

• Extensive hardened/deeply buried supporting

infrastructure and garrisons complicate I&W

• “Serial proliferator” of nuclear and ballistic missile

technology and whole systems

Toksa SCUD

B/C

No Dong Musudan Musudan

ER

Taepo

Dong 2 120-

140 km

300-

500 km

1300 km 3000 – 4000 km (est) 15000 km

(3-stage)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Threat:

Iran • Active indigenous program 2nd only to China in

size/scope; nuclear program strongly condemned

in 2011 IAEA report

• Majority of inventory – liquid propellant SRBMs

• Mobile force supported by growing

hardened/deeply buried infrastructure

• Aggressive solid propellant effort

• Fateh-110 SRBM and Ashura MRBM

• Two ASBM development programs

• Recently demonstrated as part of naval

exercise

• Safir SLV – 2 successful on-orbit deliveries in

three attempts

• Knowledge and technology developed would

aid IR/ICBM program

• “Serial proliferator” – to other state and non-state

actors

Fateh-110 SCUD A/B/C

Shahab-3 Shahab-3

ER BM-25

Ashura/ Sejil

Safir (SLV)

200 km 300-

600 km 1300 km 2000 km 2500 km 2000 km

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Threat:

China • Largest, most active and diverse ballistic

missile program in the world

• Ballistic missile force developed and

deployed for range of missions from nuclear

deterrence to conventional precision strike

• Key part of A2/AD capabilities ICW large

ASCM/LACM force

• 2010 BMDR notes an imbalance of forces

across Taiwan Straits primarily because of

numbers of SRBM/MRBM deployed

• Est. 1,000 – 1200

• ASBM in development or early deployment

specifically to counter US CVBGs

• Non-signatory to MTCR but verbal pledge

to some provisions

Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM

Coverage. This map depicts

notional coverage based on

the range of land and sea

based missile systems,

including advanced SAMs that

China would likely employ in a

Taiwan conflict.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ballistic Missile Threat:

Other Notables • India: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons

• Active, indigenous program to build/deploy a range of ballistic

missiles

• Ranges cover all of Pakistan and eventually all of China

• Pakistan: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons

• Not nearly as extensive as India – requires significant

outside help

• Focused primarily on India

• Israel: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons (undeclared)

• SRBM to IRBM (Jericho II/III)

• Focused on Iran but able to range other regional threats

• Syria: Ballistic missiles & WMD program

• Primarily SRBM from Russia, North Korea and/or Iran

• Reports of sharing weapons and training with Hezbollah

• Russia: Treaty limited (INF) to weapons of 500km or less;

party to MTCR which limits transfer of technology,

materials, systems and knowledge

• Broad hints and statements since 2002 over possibly

breaking with INF Treaty

• Extensive use of SRBMs in Georgian conflict (2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Part II

BMD Fundamentals

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Timeline

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Doctrine

Guiding Pub: “Countering Air and Missile Threats” (JP 3-01, 5 Feb 2007)

BMD included under Counterair Mission:

“The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, to

counter the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining air superiority” (Chp 1)

Counterair mission consists of Offensive Counterair (OCA) and Defensive Counterair (DCA) missions.

Offensive Counterair: “The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by

destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive

action against an adversary”

As applied to BMD – Attack Operations to include “attacks on missile sites,…,command and control (and)

infrastructure”

Defensive Counterair: “(A)ll defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate

enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace” Includes active and passive measures

As applied to BMD:

Active Defense: “…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and

missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile

defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW), sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.”

Passive Defense: “…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air

and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning,

camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.”

Sometimes Referred To As “The Three Pillars of Missile Defense

UNDER RE-WRITE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD: Attack Operations

In Theory: Preferred method of countering missile threats by reducing level of threat defensive forces face; AO range

throughout enemy territory, are conducted at initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority.

In Practice: Not very successful where ballistic missile forces are concerned:

• Operation CROSSBOW (Dec 43 – Jun 44): Allied bombing campaign against V-1 and V-2

• >25,000 sorties with > 36,000 tons of bombs dropped against production and support facilities including fixed launch pads

• Net result – V-1 strikes continued and V-2 strikes began against London summer ’44

• Operation DESERT STORM (1991): Dedicated A-10 & SOF assigned to seek/destroy SCUD MEL/TEL

• 1/3 of the 2,000 daily sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting

• Net result – SOF team captured, 0 MEL/TEL struck, launches continued against Israel and single largest US casualty

event of DS was via SCUD strike

Major challenges to AO: ROE and real-time, actionable intelligence.

“…to prevent the launch of enemy . . . missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting

infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”

Peenemunde V-2 test site

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD: Passive Defense

• Passive BMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection

and targeting of friendly assets and thereby minimizing the potential effects of

adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack.

• Passive measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment,

deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.

• Treaties and export control regimes may also be considered a form of

passive defense

“…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile missile

threats against friendly forces and assets.”

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD: Active Defense

• Active BMD includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic

warfare sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.

• Missile defense is defined as “defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles,

or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.”

• Integration of systems enables defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that

increase the probability for success.

• AMD assets normally provide overlapping coverage, however, not all anti-air DCA assets have

organic capability against BM; likewise, not all anti-BM DCA have anti-air and CM defense

capabilities.

• Offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations use many of the same sensors, weapons,

and command and control systems.

“…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missile threats

against friendly forces and assets.”

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD: Intercept Phases

Boost Phase

Mid-Course

Phase

Terminal

Phase

Vbo

Apogee

(times for ICBM flight ( >10,000 km from launch site)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD By Flight Phase:

Boost • In theory – most vulnerable part of flight

• Missile thrusting to gain acceleration

• Highly visible exhaust plume aids

detection/tracking

• 3-5 minutes travel in Earth’s Atmosphere

• Damage to aerodynamic surfaces or

airframe breach may induce fatal

aerodynamic loads

• Challenges

• Compressed launch notification to

intercept timeline/sensor challenges

• BMOA may be geographically too far to

successfully complete endo-atmospheric

intercept

• Countermeasures (hardening, counter-

intercept platform defenses, GSM, TTP)

All Active Boost Phase Intercept Programs are Proof of Concept Only

Note: As of Dec 2011,

ALTB to be mothballed

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD By Flight Phase:

Ascent

Boost Phase + Ascent Phase = “Early Intercept”

ASCENT PHASE: begins right after the missile’s

powered flight and ends just prior to apogee. Benefits

include:

• Earlier intercept in the battle space

• Optimizes a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic to defeat threat

before countermeasure deployment

• Enables debris mitigation

• Reduces number of interceptors required to defeat a

raid of threat missiles

• Reduces loading on remainder of BMDS architecture

by not eliminating need to track and kill a threat

reentry vehicle and associated objects,

• Reduces costs of maintaining significant number of

expensive interceptors to destroy advanced

countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missile’s

flight

• Places a premium on early launch detection and

tracking, emphasis on launch/engage on remote and

need for longer-range interceptors

• Mostly PPT and paper CONOPS – if funded, capability

won’t be fielded until late this decade/early 2020’s

• Significant technical, engineering, C2 and fiscal

challenges

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD By Flight Phase:

Midcourse • Offers longest decision space over course of

flight – up to 20 to 30 min for ICBMs

• Missile coasting to apogee

• Exoatmospheric intercept

• Debris mitigation for WMD

• Challenges

• Detection/tracking:

• Non-thrusting cold body presents IR

detection/tracking challenges;

• Radar affected by horizon and position relative

to flight path

• Discrimination: warhead(s) obscured by debris

cloud and/or deployed PENAIDS

• PBV maneuvering, MiRV

• Salvage fusing effects

• Nuclear weapons effects from an offensive

warhead fuzed to detonate when attacked

Majority Of Current BMD Effort Focused In This Area

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD By Flight Phase:

Terminal • Missile re-enters atmosphere

• Atmosphere acts as a screen to strip away debris cloud/PENAIDS

• Challenges:

• RV free-falling at extremely high speeds (+22,500 KPH for ICBM RVs)

• High-g maneuvering by MaRVs

• Limited engagement space owing to speeds, fuzing and warhead altitude detonation or dispersion of submunitions

• Lower tier engagements must deal with debris mitigation from upper tier intercepts

Most Demanding Environment On BMD

Systems And Supporting C2 And C4I

Infrastructures

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMDS: System of Sensors

and Shooters The Ballistic Missile Defense

System is an integrated,

“layered” architecture that

provides multiple opportunities to

destroy missiles and their warheads

before they can reach their targets.

The system’s architecture includes:

• Networked sensors and

ground- and sea-based radars

for target detection and tracking;

• Ground- and sea-based

interceptor missiles for

destroying a ballistic missile

using either the force of a direct

collision, called “hit-to-kill”

technology, or an explosive blast

fragmentation warhead;

• A Command, Control, Battle

Management, and

Communications Network

providing the warfighter with the

needed links between the

sensors and interceptor missiles.

The BMDS Is Designed To Counter Ballistic Missiles Of All Ranges

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ground-Based:

Midcourse Defense • GMD: “Engage and destroy limited intermediate- and

long-range ballistic missile threats in the midcourse battle space to protect the United States”

• Elements:

• Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): Three-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle)

• Ground Systems: Includes redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a complex communications network for planning, directing and controlling GMD element

• Current Configuration:

• GBIs: emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A total of 30 interceptors were deployed at the end of 2010.

• Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking and threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-in-control interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska (49th MD Battalion) and Colorado Springs, Colorado (100th MDBE)

• GND C2 via GMD communications network, a secure data and voice communications system using both SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul communications.

Cue & track

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ground-Based: Terminal

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a globally

transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and

destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere

during their final, or terminal, phase of flight.

• Land-based, capable of shooting down a ballistic missile

inside and just outside the atmosphere w/hit-to-kill

technology.

• Procurement: First two Batteries fielded at Fort Bliss, TX.

Total hardware for Battery #1 & #2 include:

• 6 Launchers, 2 Fire Control & Communications

components, 2 AN/TPY-2 Radars, and 48 Interceptors.

Delivery of first production interceptors began in March

2011. Batteries 3 and 4 on contract March 2011 with

delivery and fielding to start in 2013.

• Dec 2011: Agreement to sell battery to UAE

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): Operational and

fielded by the U.S. Army.

• Procurement: The Army is responsible for production and

further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended

Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains

responsible for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and

PAC-3 interoperability and integration efforts.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Sea-Based BMD:

Aegis BMD • Aegis BMD: Describes the entire program of sea-based

BMD but primarily focused on the mid-course intercept of

SRBMs, MRBMs some IRBMs and in latter versions, a

limited capability against certain ICBMs

• Modifications and upgrades to the Aegis Weapons

System (sensors, hardware and software – currently

ver. 3.6.1) and the SM-3 BLK 1A interceptor.

• 24 Deployed/forward-based CG/DDGs currently

configured (includes one developmental ship, USS

LAKE ERIE)

• Missions:

• Aegis LRS&T: Forward deployed Long Range

Surveillance & Tracking support to GMD for Homeland

Defense

• Aegis BMD: Exo-atmospheric, mid-course intercept

and endo-atmospheric, terminal intercept

• First Aegis BMD Patrol (EUCOM AOR): 2011

• Aegis Ashore: Shore-based program to support PAA

derived from the Aegis BMD ship-based program, using

the SM-3 BLK IIA and a land-based only version for

long-range intercept of ICBMs.

FY

11

FY

12

FY

13

FY

14

FY

15

FY

16

FY

17

FY

18

FY

19

FY

20

BMD-cap.

Ships 23 28 32 36 38 41 42 43 43 43

SM-3

Inventory 111 129 155 201

263

+TBD

341

+TBD

428

+TBD

500

+TBD 513 515

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Sea-Based BMD:

Ship Mods

NFIC-CA has critical role in IAMD (cruise- and TBM) mission

The caveat: These plans all depend on outcome of major program cuts

and revisions DoD-wide

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Sea-Based BMD: SBT

Sea-based Terminal: Provides a

sea-based, endo-atmospheric

intercept capability for a limited

threat set.

• Initially comprised of 72 modified SM-

2 Blk IV deployed on BMD configured

ships with the Aegis BMD 3.6.1

system.

• Blast frag warhead, not HTK

• Increasingly capable versions of SBT

will be fielded beginning with

Increment I SBT (IOC 2014) which

uses the SM-6 with BMD 5.0 and

Increment II SBT (IOC 2018) which will

debut with BMD 5.1

SBT: Sea-Based Terminal Kill vs. SRBMs

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Part III

BMD Planning and

Execution

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Navy BMD Pedigree

October 2007:

A Cooperative

Strategy for

21st Century

Seapower

National guidance and policy:

DOD/JCS guidance:

Navy guidance:

22 July 1999:

National Missile

Defense Act of

1999

(Public Law 106-

38)

16 Dec 2002:

NSPD-23 -

National Policy

on Ballistic

Missile

Defense

March 2006:

NSS – “Field

BMD to protect

US from rogue

states”

17 Sept 2009: “Field

more of most

capable theater MD

systems to protect

our forces and

those of allies.”

June 2008:

NDS – “Missile

defenses can

defend against

attack should

deterrence

fail”

MDA

CHARTER

January

2002 –

MDA

Charter

15 March 2007 –

Missile Defense

Executive Board

(MDEB)

Established

15 Dec 2008 –

NAVY BOD

Membership

Memo

Navy

Strategic

Guidance PR-11

Classified

Naval

Operating

Concept

(NOC)

Guide/Influence

Sept 2009: CNO Guidance

2010 – “Issue NOC that

links CS21 to operations

and force structure with

guidance from QDR 10

and BMDR 10”

Fleet

TACPRO

TACMEMOs

“…preventing

wars is as

important as

winning wars.”

• Deterrence

• Sea Control

• Power Projection

• Forward Presence

• HA/DR

• Maritime Security

CS-21

Core

Capabilities

Guide/Influence

• Limit Regional Conflict

• Deter major Power War

• Win our nation’s Wars

• Homeland defense

• Cooperative Relationships

• Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions

CS-21

Strategic

Imperatives

DIRECTS

2010 2012

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The Ballistic Missile

Defense Review (BMDR) The BMDR - Congressionally mandated and guided by Presidential directive, released in Feb 2010 for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive review of US BMD policies, strategies, plans and programs.

Established Policy Priorities:

1. U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

2. U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to US forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.

5. US BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.

6. US will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.

“This review. . . will result in an enhanced defense of

the United States and its forces, allies, and partners

from the danger of ballistic missiles wherever and

whenever they threaten us.”

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Defense of the Homeland

“The United States will…”

• Maintain readiness…develop capabilities at

Fort Greely, AK (FGA) and Vandenberg AFB,

CA (VAFB)

• Complete the 2nd field of 14 silos at FGA as a

hedge

• Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve

cueing for missiles launched at the US from

Iran or elsewhere in Middle East

• Invest in further development of the SM-3 for

future land-based use as ICBM threat matures

• Increase investments in sensors and early-

intercept kill systems to defeat

countermeasures

• Pursue new enhancements…and other

hedging strategies including continued

development of a two-staged ground-based

interceptor

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Phased Adaptive Approach

“A key objective (for regional defense) is to leverage recent successes in regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low risk.”

• Near-term capabilities

• Increase procurement of proven systems (SM-3, THAAD, An/TPY-2)

• Improve already developed technology

• “Aegis Ashore” – 2015 epoch: land-based Aegis BMD weapons system including land-based SM-3 variant

• SM-3 BLK IB, BLK IIA, BLK IIB/NGAM

• Develop/deploy enhanced C2BMC

• Long-term Capabilities

• Develop SM-3 BLK IIA/IIB with higher Vbo and divert, providing greater regional coverage

• BLK IIB will have some early-intercept capability against long-range missiles

• “Engage on remote” – enables interceptor engageability at greater ranges using off-board sensors

• Develop persistent overhead sensors to detect/ track large raid sizes over entire trajectories from space

“Ballistic missile defenses help support U.S. security

commitments to allies and partners. They provide

reassurance that the United States will stand by those

commitments despite the growth in the military

potential of regional adversaries.”

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAA Implemented: Europe

Sep 2009 decision followed SECDEF/JCS recommendation to revise Sept 2007 deployment plan

• Phase 1 (2011): Existing missile defense systems

deployed to defend against short- and medium-range

ballistic missiles.

• Protection of portions of southern Europe with sea-

based BMD supported by new TPY-2 site in Turkey

• Phase 2 (2015): Fielding enhanced capabilities -- SM-3

Block IB and additional sensors.

• Phase 2 will include land-based SM-3s in southern

Europe expanding coverage to additional NATO allies.

• Phase 3 (2018): Coverage against medium- and

intermediate-range threats improved with 2nd land-

based SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, and

deployment of SM-3 BLK IIA

• Extends coverage to all NATO allies in Europe.

• Phase 4 (2020): adds capability against a potential

ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United

States.

• Deploys SM-3 BLK IIB/NGAM will be available.

2009 Concept

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD:

International Participation

Per the BMDR, international cooperation is focused on:

• Development and deployment of joint and/or complementary capabilities

• Technological and industrial cooperation

Current Initiatives:

• Europe: implement PAA in a NATO context

• East Asia and Middle East: strengthen cooperative relationships in bilateral frameworks

• Arrow development program w/Israel

• THAAD sale to UAE

• Renew cooperation with Russia

• Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with China

“The U.S. is committed to working intensively with

allies and partners…”

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Planning Lexicon

• Defended Area (DA): Defended area is the portion of the territory protected against long-range missile

attacks;

• Critical Asset List (CAL): A list compiled by the JFC w/input from components of assets requiring theater

level protection

• Organized by phase of operations and prioritized

• Defended Asset List (DAL): a list of those assets on the CAL that receive theater level asset protection.

• Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active air defense or appropriate

passive measures if that is all that is available.

• Launch Area Denied (LAD): Refers to the collection of threat countries from which the DA is protected;

• Probability of Engagement Success (Pes): The probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed,

derived from the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and

hit-to-kill;

• Raid size breakpoint: The maximum number of warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single

engagement. This metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Planning Lexicon

Point Defense

(PAC 3)

Area Defense

(Aegis BMD/THAAD)

Launch Area Denied

Critical Asset List

DEFENDED AREA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD & Joint Doctrine for

C2 Architecture • The JFACC / Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is the

supported commander for Counter-Air operations to include

BMD – The JFMCC has a supporting role (JP 3-01)

• In mature theaters, the JFC will normally designate the JFACC

as the AADC and Airspace Control Authority (JP 3-01)

• Decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint

operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature

of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and

the associated comfort level of the CDR. (JP 1)

• BMD engagement timelines may dictate that engagement

authority be held by the ship’s CO for optimal employment

of BMD-capable ships

• Strategic considerations may drive engagement authority to be

held at the highest level in some situations (JP 1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Navy C2 Architecture

Planning Factors

Multi-mission Ships Are Most Effectively Controlled By Maritime Commander

• JFMCC is the persistent maritime IAMD planning and execution command echelon

• IAMD ships are multi-mission platforms that are most effectively controlled by a Maritime

Commander

• A Maritime Commander will retain OPCON / TACON of multi-mission ships

• Provides most effective asset management for AADC

• Maximizes warfighting capacity and capability across all component commanders

• Optimizes logistics support

• Ensures asset protection and safety of navigation

• When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the

AADC for optimum employment of multi-mission ships

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Integrated Air & Missile

Defense C2 JFC / JTF

JFACC

AADC

CTF IAMD

DAADC

AAMDC

Land-based

Sensors and

Shooters

CRC

RADC

Airborne

Sensors and

Shooters

Maritime

Sensors and

Shooters

RADC RADC

ADAFCO

JFLCC TAAMDCOORD

JFMCC

Supporting

OPCON / TACON

Lines of Coordination

Engagement Authority

• JFMCC is a supporting commander to JFACC/AADC for IAMD

• Navy retains OPCON and TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships

• When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC

for optimum employment of multi-mission ships

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IAMD C2 Vision:

The Reality

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TF Integrated Air & Missile

Defense

CTF IAMD is JFMCC’s Tactical Execution Agent for IAMD

•JFMCC conducts operations at the Operational level from the

Maritime Operations Center (MOC)

•Commander, Task Force Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TF

IAMD) is the JFMCC’s tactical execution agent for the air and missile

defense mission

•CTF IAMD may serve as the RADC for the maritime BMD fight

• In most cases, CTF IAMD would reside at the MOC where the

supporting integrated planning and C2 resides

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

What This Means For The

Joint Community • Joint Force Commanders have a consistent

path to maritime IAMD capability in every

theater

• Optimized maritime contribution to theater-

level plans and operations

• Supports JP 3-01 for IAMD C2

• Identifies maritime node to support

JFACC / AADC development and

execution of the Area Air Defense Plan

• CTF IAMD plans for maritime IAMD

• CTF IAMD, when designated as RADC

plan, coordinate, and execute

engagements

The Path to Maritime IAMD Capability is Through the JFMCC

Joint Force Commander

Theater IAMD C2 Elements

ACC MCC LCC

NORTHCOM 1st AF USFF

263rd

AAMDC

SOUTHCOM 12th AF C4F N/A

EUCOM 3rd AF C6F 357th

AMDD

CENTCOM 9th AF C5F 32nd

AAMDC

PACOM 13th AF C7F 94th

AAMDC

USFK 7th AF C7F 94th

AAMDC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Challenges

Countermeasures

• PENAIDS: Chaff, decoys

• Terminal maneuvers

• Multiple warheads/HGV

• Salvage fuzing

Debris

• Upper stages, separation debris,

“chuffing,” other intercepts

Adversary TTP

• Attack BMD system

• Trajectory shaping/depressed trajectories

• Raids

• Mass launches/Timed arrival

Positional

• Location of sensors/shooters relative to

BMOA

Geo-political

• Host-nation concerns/issues

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BREAK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Discussion

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD Discussion

Situation: Intention to launch

“scientific research satellite” • Declares launch window and

booster drop zones/keep out areas

• Does not reveal configuration/details

of payload

• Intel has determined payload is a

RORSAT & weighs 3,800 kg, of

which 1,250 kg are made up by a

nuclear reactor and the disposal

stage. These two components are

5.3 m long. The reactor core

consists of 37 cylindrical fuel

elements with 31.1 kg of highly

enriched (90%) uranium-235

embedded in a beryllium casing

and cooled by liquid sodium

potassium.

• Projected orbital insertion track

passes just north of Hawaii

• Two previous attempts have failed –

one 4 seconds after launch and the

most recent when the third stage

failed to ignite and missile fell in the

broad ocean area. Range Fans And Locations Are For Demonstration Only And Do Not

Represent Actual Systems, Capabilities or Plans

SLV CONOPS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Backups

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BMD: Tracking and Cueing

(Earth center)

Full Covariance: Space track report transmitted by a BMD

platform:

Vx

Vy

Vz

Position: X-Y-Z Cartesian

coordinate system w/origin @

Earth center

Velocity: Along X, Y & Z axes.

Predicts future BM position.

Area Of Uncertainty (AOU)

Aegis Track Covariance

Full covariance provides a more reliable AOU around

the current and future positions of the space track,

enabling construction of a search pattern that efficiently

utilizes sensor resources by limiting the search only to

the most probable area of the sky