THB WILDER HousE SERIES IN POLITICS, HISTORY,

AND CULTURE

The Wilder House Series is published in association with the Wilder House Board of Editors and the University of Chicago. A complete list of titles appears at the end of this book.

David Lairin, Editor

George Steinmetz, Assistant Editor

Editorial Board: Leora Auslander Prasenjlt Ouara Ina Katwelson William Sewell 'l1letb Skocpol Su11an Stokes

Bandits and Bureaucrats

The Ottoman Route to State Centralization

KAREN BARKEY

Cornell University Press

Ithaca and London

..

.. " ..

0 .. .. 0

\1. c 0

" •

V' c::l

~ ' I i ! I '

I I I I I

I Introduction

T HE POWER Of THE WBSl'BilN EUROPBAN STATB developec throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at the ex· pensc: of established local forces and institutions, provoking var·

ious movements of opposition. Does this experience provide an exhaus· rive theory of a uniform global process? State making did often occw within the context of warfare between power holders interested in the ex· pansion and consolidation of territory. To build armies for war, state makers needed to take resources from the population. Many times, oner· ous exaaions and loss of administrative autonomy gave rise: to fierce op· position, forcing the srate to coerce and control more intensely. This partem was pervasive, at least in western Europe, though with consider· able variation. And because: the western state is often considered the

( model for state fonnation~holars tend to view this path of contested centralization and bureaucratization as the only possible direaion for the development of the state. Analysts frequendy assume that the fonna· tion of the strong and effective European state was the outcome of one well~established route of development, often provoking opposition, espe· dally peasant rebellion. Other patterns arc dismissed as anomalies, quaint variations, or indications of deficiencies on the part of other cultures and societies.

The western model does not exhaust all possible fonns of state central· ization, however. Analysis of the: Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth cen­tury dc:monstr:ues that state dc:vdopmem was neither unidirectional nor without variation. The power of the state: necessarily grew not only at the expense of societal groups but also because the state incorporated or le­gitimized these gmups and linkc:d dlem to itself. Both traditional elites

ftANniTI ANIJ 8UUAUCliA11

and verlout todaJ clcnxnu arl•lng from different aotlal nruauR:t were incorporatC'd, avoiding much of the conttttatioo uaumed In the Euro­pean model of state making. Ocapilc aignifkam state con10Udadon and centralization, the Ottoman Empire did nOt experience the large·scale op­position and class confUct suffered by many western states. Even the per· vasivc banditry was less often crushed by force than it was managed by widespread bar:g!ining. This interaction between state and society signals the differences i n the outcomes of varying processes of state development.

ln the Ottoman Empire there were no peasant or elite revolts. Even the bandits- who were seen as the majo r threat of the state- were used by the central authorities to consolidate their power. The state manipulated internal forces to its advantage, largely avoiding the disruptive contesta· tions endemic in western Europe. The Icings of Europe negoriated with elites but quickly took affront at challenges from outside the traditional order, reaching easily for the sword of state. The Ottoman sultans saw such innovative challenges instead as opportunities for bargaining, ini· tially reaching into the state's revenues, distributing patronage to buy off or channel newly emerging opposition. Only later did the sultans resort to force. European challengers were broken; Ottoman challengers were first "house-broken."

In the seventeenth century, both Ottoman and wesre.rn European state development resulted in strongly centralized authority, though in many ways the routes to this end ran in opposite directions. Most European states, especially France, moved from a more feudal pattern, based on in· direct control by the nobmty, to a more centralized pattern of direct state

\

control by state-appointed officials. The Ottoman state started with a centralized pattern of direct control through appointed officials, then went through an interim period of mixed center-periphery control, and ended up dcvelopin~ system o f indirect control through local nOtables) Both states were attem pting to consolidate their control over society and thereby redirect most of the resources toward the state. But the more feu­dal, corporate nature of European society differed from the centralized, prebendal Ottoman society. As a result, the European and Ottoman states had to pursue different styles of centraJiz.ation.

The: Ottoman state bargained and used banditry to consolidate its po· sition and to maintain its predominance over society. In this book, r focus on three: aspects in the process of developing state-society relations, com­paring the western European case of state development with the Ottoman version of a similar political process. To begin, I explore how and why

,,.,.,.,.. aimUar CONOildadon procea~et of w rfare, t&U!ion, and •dmiD.IItl"'tlw liJIPONdon led to tuch dJfferlng outcomeJ in European and Ottoman abte development. Second, I analyze the: alternative paths of devtlopmc-ut <X Ottoman aociety and the rise of banditry. Finally, I demonstrate how the state turned its relations with the bandits from potential confront ll don to incorporation, as a prominent example of the Onoman route rtl atatc c.omolidarion.

States are never able to advance their own aims and strengthen du~lr· hold over the population without opposition. Everywhere, societal groups resent the incursion of the state, the billeting o f annics, and thc­imposition of bureaucracy. CaltraJization threatens the interett1 nr groups with entrenched local claims. Among them, traditional elirea, nu~ ~ and locaJ magnates of various sorts represent the most likely grourc ro express these local interests. To prune local authority, administration, and control in taxation, in military matters, and in public security- the domains of the noble/magnate class- state makers manipulate traditional atructures, capturing rights, privileges, and responsibilities within the central administration. For example, the French monarchy's selling of government offices weakened noble authority by enabling the state to rely on members of the bourgeoisie for administration. Abolishing offices, de• predating the significance of locaJ administration, and changing the ten• ure of officeholders were mechanisms used to curtail local authority.

ln the establishment of a unified, direct, and relatively homogencou1 rule over a certain territory, state makers have to establish fonnaJ srruc' rural differentiation and an administration loyal to the center and staffed by officials independent of kinship, tribal, and other class or cultund groups. Representatives of the center arc sent to the periphery and slowly overcome the rule of regional institutions and elites. For example, In Prance, although the mtnullmts were nOt a group specifically assigned 10

the task of centralization, o nce their utility was discovered they we:~ trained to direct and coordinate military and financial adminisrnuive tasks. 1 A similar process ensued in England when local magnates' amt lords' authority was replaced by thar of appointed governors and justi a

1Pc:rry Anderson. LiN¥41 Dfthe A_,lllist St.u (London. 1979). p. 96. The irttnuiMIJ, moR.ly drawn from the: Mllims 1M ~theraon: cduatcd lawycn-bc:loogc:d m the Mltlau 1M rvbe. The office of intendancy could 110( be bought and sold.

&NOll ANU 8UIUIA\1tliATit

of the peace. Perez Zagorln tells of"thc e~pansion of the gentry through the rise of f"Gmilies, the: more than doubling of dte titular peerage from 1603 to 1641, and the general increase of honors and tides'' as indicators of this process.2

State making re~uires not only the centralization of administrative ju­risdiction but also~e demilitarization of regional power holders) States must acquire their own military, independent of elites. In England, the Tudor dynasry successfuJJy demilitarized great lords by "eliminating their great personal bands of anned retainers, razing their fortresses, tamjng their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of disputes, and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. "3 In a sim­ilar fashion, Richelieu and Louis XIII successfully destroyed noble strongholds, denouncing and censuring dueling and the usc of ftrearms, thereby debilitating the toughest opponents of centralization. In both England and France such tactics secured for the state a monopoly of legitimate violence.

European states that extracted resources from the ruraJ population aJso experienced wid~rcad rc!_<?lts against their actions. Statc.'l that engaged in wars required cash to staff their armies and feed their soldiers. When states penetrated sociery with the intention of extracting resources and re­shaping srrucrures of control to reroute surplus directly to the state, with­out the help of intermediaries, rebeJiions took the form of antitax, antistate revolts, often seriously threatening the state. As Charles Tilly el­oquently describes it, such exactions interfered with peasant life: "War­making and statemaking placed demands on land, labor, capital, and commodities that were already coll\llUtted: grain earmarked for the local poor or next year's seed, manpower required for a farm's operation, sav­ings promised for a dowry.,. Especially when intervention took away sur­plus from both me cultivating and noncuJtivating classes, pruning away the autonomy of regional nobles and corporate associations, elites and peasants formed alliances against the srate.5 SmaJI-scale revolts forced

1Pcrcz Zagorin , Rt bt:ls IUIII R.JJers, (JO(>-t66o (Cambridge, 1981), 1 :74- ?S·

3Charlcs Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Org;anizcd Crime," in Bri111Ji"'J the StiUe BMit In, cd. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rucschcmcycr, and 1ll«<ll Skocpol (Cambridge, 198S), p. 174 .

4 Charlcs Tilly, As SoAo4lgy Mem Hisrory (New York, 1981), p. 1.11. 5Charlcs Tilly, Com:iMI, o.pitlll, IUIIJ EIITIIf'UJn St41ts, AD ~1.990 (Oxford, 1990), p. 100.

For similar argumcnu , scx Roland MoU$nicr, ~Recherches sur lcs soulhcmcnts populai rcs en France avant Ia Fronde," Rnw 11'/tisroin lffDikrne a am~ s ( 1958) : 81- UJ, sec also "The Fronde, .. in Prtamllitimv fl{ Revolwtilm ;, Ellriy MDfkrn Ewrope, cd. R. Fomer and }. Greene (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 131- 59, and Puu1111t Uprisi"'/1 in tht Snmtemth-Cmtw.ry

stares to make concessions, In the proc.c:aa l'C81taplng forms of control and coercion. Titose movements that widened led w civil wara, great (l(lpular uprisings, secession, and great power inrcrvenrion. The Bngliah Civil War, the French Fronde, the revolts in Naples, and rlte French adW'nnart in CataJonia arc all inddents where the state was seriously d1rcatcned tt

Apart from regionally based rural rebellions, there was also lcX'llllud banditry across Europe. Femand Braude! writes, "Behind banditry, rl.lll terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual aid of lords," an indication thtt the nobiliry was attempting to disrupt state making through sud1 innn• vative means. 7 Though European banditry never reached seve:~ propor tions during the seventeenth century, it did have an effect on srarc: poll IC'II, France had imprinted on its collective memory the rampage that foUow~tl the Hundred Years' War, and as a result it never demobilized soldien In sufficient magnitude to induce banditry. Instead Europe found a brilliant solution to the problem of demobilization: mercenary annies from abroa\t were hired to fight wars and then discharged outside the borders after tho war. Mercenary armies were convenient, and their services were chca_pet in the long run since they were paid only during warrimc.11 Although some of the troops still plundered as they were demobilized, the relatt.U problems never reached large proportions. 9

Most centralizing states carry out their activities along general patkn\J of territorial consolidation, taxation, centralization, and burcaucrnrl7A• tion, but mcy differ along the dimension of implementation. The rype o(

p,_, RMsTiiJ, IUIIJ Chi-, trans. Brian Pearce (New York, 1970). Tbc following tuet and llrticlcs provide ample information on these rebellions: Yves-Marie Bcm, Rel>olt IUUII("' DINIWm ;, Ellrly M611eNt E11rope (New York, 1987); Zagorin, R.ebtls IUfli .RJJen; William 6r\ltt• ein, "CCass Conflict and Oass Collaboration in Regional Rebellions, r..soo-1700," Thtqr1 ,,g Sot.iay 14 (1985): # S- 68; William Brustcin and Margam Levi, "The Geography of ~I· lion: Rulers, Rebels, and Regioos, rsoo to 1700," T'-'7 IUIIJ S«iety 16 (191!7) : ~tJ1 C. S. L. Davies, "Lcs rivoltes populain:s en Anglcrcrre, tS00- 1700," AnNks: ~In, 111 ciitts, Q~ 2-+ (1969): 1-f.~6o.

6Llgorin, R.ebtls IUIIJ R.Nlm, 1:]6- 3?· 1-filly concurs with this idea in As~ Mtm Himlry, pp. 1.- 3, where he describe. Lhc

adventures of the three noble broth.ers of Brittany, the Guillcris, who bcc:unc the R(lbln Hoods of the early scvcnrecmh century despite rhc faa char no one is entirely stm they 81~ to the poor. ~o hire mercenaries, rhe stAte would ha~ to enter into a coru:racr with a wrulottierr • tyle

military entrepreneur who would provide the anny and pay rhe soldiers before the war lu Europe, famoU$ mercenary annics existed and states triC'd to contract with them; Fran«, fbr example, hired Swiss, Irish. Gcnnan, and Scottish merccnuics. John Olilds, A,.,.its aHII WM.fim ;, E111'f1/¥, 1~1719 (New YOC'k, 1981), pp. 7- 8; sec also Tilly, Com:itm, CAp/till, ,.,,; ElmJf'UJII SeMn, pp. 8o-8t.

17illy, Com:itm, o.piul, atui EwroptiUI Stares, pp. 8~.

BAMDITt tufb RUaMAUCliA'tt

mnrallr.adnn .net d~ ~ and •fm\8dt whh which t~ate mwn lm· plcmc:n1 thclr'polhlcal asenc.b, dcpendt on the naNrc ot'thc orpnlr.arion and the retoutee nrucrure of the eocial environment In whkh they at· tempt coroolidation. The mca.na of C()fl~C)l_idar~ arc shaped. according 10

the organization, auronomy and resources of dafTerenr 80C1al clwes. In more agrarian settings, states must deal with nobles and cultivating rural classes; in more commercialized settings, state makers must maneuver among merchant capital, guilds, and city organizations. Accor~g to ~js distinction, Tj!}y acknowledges<ihree broad types o!' st~te fo~ano~ wat.h some internal variations. The first route, cocrcaon-tntenstve, emerge., when states, short of cash, set upon the landCdji<)p\ilataons and apprc· hmd their surplus in the fonn of increased taxation. As examples, TilJy describes Russia and Brandenburg Prussia in their phases of tribute col· lcction. The second route, the capital-intensi~ne, occurs when rulers operating within a capital-rich environment rum to the merchant cl~ses for their resourcc:s. In a bargain struck between state makers and caparal­ists, resources arc exchanged for p~n. FinaUy, an intennedia~c mode, "capit~ ~on,~ occurred·~ F~ce and England,.exemph· fying rulers' use of both coercaon and capttal. The routes takat m France and England can be further specified. According to Michael Mann, states in medieval Europe were weak and set within what he characterizes as an "acephalous federation of a multiplicity of power networks" and a variety of social groupings, which exercised varying degrees of local autonomy. When states sought greater centralization, they grew dependent on pop­ulations for crucial resources, and were forced to develop symbiotic rela­tions with their people. Depending on the form of resources available, two different types ofEuropean states emerged: in the absence of capital, the French state mobilized its population into a centralized military and developed a bureaucratic administration. In contraSt, the English sta~e de­veloped through the use of capital, rather than coerced manpower, mto a constitutional state. 1 1

Within each mode of European state making, variation occurred ac­cording to state decisions regarding how best .to man~ge. its interests .and maintain control over groups at the same: ttmc. Wtthin the coeraon­intensivc mode, for example, Tilly noteS variations among countries ac· cording to the extent of the nobility's ability to main privileges. In Poland and Hungary, the nobility was extremely powerful and managed

IOJbid., P· JO. . . "Michacl Mann, Till s-rta I[S«iill P-. Vol. 1: A H-.., I{Ptllllt'f fr- tiN~

,_AD. 1760 (Cambridge, 1916).

,,.~

' to w•rd uff the •t•u:'a lncurwlon, whcrne In Ru •l• and S\\1\'lltn tt•t~ maktrt were more succtufltl at flllly transfc)nnins llll~ Jncorrnr•tlnt' the nobility into their a~ervicc . 12 Similarly, Tilly dlscwse. varlatltMll In the rwo other types, Str'e$sing that differences exist bctw«n alk:h u~ as Britain, France, Prussia, and Spain which might otherwi~te lle' tatrtrt riz.cd together. They do share ovcraJI similarities in the usc of cocrd«ut tt 1

cnuh provincial estates, and in the usc of capital to ensure retOUI'\.tl fnf

military aims, bUI with different tendencies to move in one:: direct on UJ

tnodtc:r. Pursuing Mann's distinction, Prance more reAdily tunlcd tu "~' crcion, whereas England more often proceeded along the capitol·inrcnalv approach.

Tilly's and M:mn's analyses bring to bear an enormous amount of hi I tory to explain the variations observed on the European continent. 'l'ht result is a continuum from coercion to capital-intensive rnode11. Scxl11l structures vary along stricdy agrarian or mercantile mode&, or their COni

binarion, with classes and states entering into conflict o r alliancc:a. 11w conflict or alliance outcome is different in each alternative. DifTcr'C)n~;c• that exist in the responses ro centralization arc important no r o nly in their own right but also because they further shape the state as well as chart I course: fo.r future state action. For example, if state makers are able to I'CI•

cruit the nobility into their extractive operations, rebellions assume an an tifcudal, antinobility character, diverted from direct challenges to th state. Whether the state recruits the nobility or not depends very much on the original structure of land exploitation. In the commercialized area• ot France, the state recruited the nobility to help exploit the peasantry. Tit nobility was forced ro collaborate with the state in cfforrs to rax md rnu• bilizc armies fTom within the rural classes. A similar entente dcveloptd between the Prussian and Russian states and their respective noble cluiC ,

States arc not always able to find allies among the nobility o r peasant•• During the seventeenth century,~•uifeudal. rebellion was le~:J common than antistate rcbellion).vaged bY class alhances. In cases hkc thc:ac, 1

landed nobility and a peasantry, both suffering from incursion by tho state, ally to contest the intrusions. The French, Spanish, and E.ogll•h crowns experienced antistate revolts in numerous regions; France led In the number and intensity of these movements. The state's other altc"'a rive, that of allying itself with the peasantry at the cxpellS(' of the nobility, also exists. But only where there arc strong antagonisms between tb peasantry and the nobility arc state makers able to force a wedge bctwc:tn

1loJ"illy, ~. c.piual. ANI E.llrllfl"'l Stlllt:S, PP· IJ,.......J.

I 8ANbnl ANn lhJIIUIAUC:aA111

thac twu wuure. In the I'I"C:X'CU, they ~lnforcc chr anaduncnt ()(the ptmntry tn the na~ and ttn'ngthcn the rural community, u ln Bur­(JUildy In the late ecventccnth and early eighteenth cc:nrurlcs. "

This type of state development through varying fonns of contesfation ~1as been rah::n as the: model of state dc:vdopmc:nt since ir began occurrins m many areas of western Europe: about 1500. Internal connicts often in· eluded coercion and deal making with landowners, members of the: ~­~ares, and m~rchants with capital- the groups most likely tO be involved m state making because they possessed economic and political resources. The Eur:opean states then dealt .with peasants, landlords, and a rising bourgeoasae, often through coercaon. Response to societal resistance re­quired accumulation of bigger and better military organizations. Overall

I claims Tilly, "'the history of Eur:opean state formation runs generally u~

I ~ard toward greater accumulanon and concentration, but it runs across Jagged peaks and profound va1Jeys."14

The process of increasing concentration of capital or coercion has bcc:n accepted by most sociologists and historians as the general theoretical case for ~ta.te making. AJJ other his~rical cases have been seen as insignificant dt.-vaataons(rh~ ~an Emptre, howevcr, despite fairly similar attempts at ~tate consolidation and centralization, did not undergo antifeudal or anwtate rural revolts. Of potential challenges, only ~try became a generalized phenomenon evoking a state responsc>Thi;-rcsponse was a process different from the European traditions of coercion and capitaJ; state m~ng by ."public>' co-optation, incorporation, and bargaining.

Bandnry provaded a fundamentaJly new context within which the Ot­toman state proceeded with some of its most important functions, terri­torial consolidation and administrative control. ln most of western Europe, the task of state consolidation was carried out through a process that mixed ~ntcmational war making, taxation, and co-optation of capital and landed tnterests, as the peculiarities of each region demanded. In the ~man Empire, stat~ making- a process of continuous making and re­making- took on a different format: it was the outcome of negotiation and battle with internal bandit/mercenary troops, a process in rum shaped by international pressures. ~e centrality of stare-bandit relations in the Ottoman Empire su~ts

thi're.lative lack of peasan~ or dire chall~n~ such as rocked EuroP9 The tradrtaonal groups drawn anto state making an Europe were not much in-

,,.,.,.. " YOived in the Ottoman proccat. O!foman ~aaantt, who wcrc •• ~ 1co.t by nate ccntraliurion as their European c:ounterpam, <Were not rcbrl lloua; on the comrary, they sou hr to leave the land rather than flght fm it)Thc:y sought to adapt to the r p g t round alremativc rncanJ uf survival, transfomling themselve.<t anew with more fluid idc:mltlca. un " with the encouragement of state institutions. Simil:uly, the landhulllln classes did not get involwd in rcbcllion against the stare:. They comlnnC'\t their attemptS at collecting rewards from within the state apparatm Rtflft than in opposition to it.

The lack of traditional class opposition to state making, and tho cJcvd• opment of pervasive banditry and state bargaining with bandlt/mcrctmary trOOps, presents a different context of state formation rhat needs to he lln alyzcd and categorized in its own right. The Ottoman ca.~ is noc ju tan interesting anomaly to ~explained away; the peculiar nature of such mu flia can ~ explained with the same variables that have been used tn un derstand variation in western Europe. The difference lies in a new rontCJlC ~f state making that derives from careful anaJysis of state-society inu:nu: nons and developments. I adopt a highly interactive: an~is of llt)(lal ltructur: and sta ion that <:harts our how various structures lllllte state actton and how state bchavtor restructures society, and I diJrovcr In the process an alternative mode of centralization that is different frum, ~t compara~le ~· those of western Euro~. The difference: lies in the pc u Uar combmaoon of two factors that make up state-society relations ln th Ottoman Empire: the ~~aure and the particular S!)'le of state etn ~on of Ottoman leadership. The patrl.IDQnial nature of the Orto· man state, the: resulting prebendal structure of state-society relations, and the unique decisions the state took at partiruJar historical juncture• n • plain the divergence of the Ottoman case. I suggest that a similar patten\ is evident in (i'iussia and China,) which together with the Otromana ufler a distina model of state making through bargained incorporation r:arher than contestation.

Social structure and state action arc the fundamental componenta of most studies of state formation.@xial structure defines the groun< n which states attempt to centralize. Tilly undertakes the analysis of 50Cill structural variation for western Europe, where he carefully distingul.hc among different social classes, their relations, organization, and resourctJ to identify alternative modes of state centralization. Yet the assumption 11 that state-society relations are structured in quite similar fashion in n1t»t

of western Euro~. This assumption needs, however, to be modified when one leaves the confines of western Euro~ to other locales where nett

110elcty relatioN did nfiC' emerge: frufn the: 8anlC IIOtt of hl1rurkal drtum· nanc~. or wJthjn rhe aame culw_ral context. A full theory of Jta~ centraJization and ru~l opposition mun atarr by incorporating wider va· ricties of structural arrangements.

At the same time, variation in styles of centralization have m be ac· counted for. Again, in Tilly's work different periods of European history have engendered different styles of state: centralization. The first two of importance to this work arc thea_>awmoniil, w ere "conquerors Silllilu tribute much mo re than they sought the stable contrOl of the: popuJation and resources within the territories they overran,,and brolcer41Je, where the bounded territory became the object of war and war was conducted by mercenaries from abroad . 15 In both these types of ruJc, the geopolitical and sociaJ struauraJ conditions necessitated certain styles of action by the state, which acted on behaJf of its interests based on its readings of soci­etaJ forces. In this perspective, as well as in most of the western Euro­pean-oriented literature of state formation, the state is accepted as an actor. 16 This implies variation in the level of state autono my as well as in the state's responses. The goals of the various states are quite strikingly the same; their need to centralize, consolidate territory, fend off interna­tional enemies, and gain the quiescence of internal forces canJlO( be de­bated. Yet the manner in which they go about defending these goals depends on their particular interaction with societal classes, how they think they can manipuJate them, and how they can aJter the relations among classes in society. States are then actors that take into account the particular structure of society, their relationship of domination with this society, and the demands of the particular context. The decision-making process of the state is better informed by the more minute details and the nature of the structured relations and inequalities that exist in society. It is the two together, the particular nature of the sociaJ interaction and the manner in which the state sorts through and manipulates this structure, that matters.

151bid., p. 19. 16Hc:rc: I follow Tilly and ochers in thinking and representing the: monarchs, rulers, and

sultans as the: state., tha-cby reducing a nlOI'c: complex sc:t of rcbtioo.s within the ruling ap­pararus to basically one: single: outcOme., interest, or goal. And I adopt a Wdxrian definition of the: state where a compulsory political organization with a territorial base i.s a state iruofar as its adminisrrarion maintains its cla.im to the monopoly of the legitimate U11C of force. Max Weber, B-, IUIII S«iay: ,A,. Otltlitu ofl~tterprrti'IJC ~ c:d. Guenther Roc:h and Oaus Wimch (Berkeley, 19'11). In the contcn of the Ottoman Empire., the state has noc been well defined. I do noc engage in much debate: about what the Onoman state wa.s. Rather, I focw on the administrative decision making of this organization and pay attcmion ro the sultan and the members of his imperial c:ouncil.

·n,c eamc luuc• of eocla.l euu""t\l~ and narc action C'M be uk'tt m t'•· plain how the Ottoman nate: wu able to deter IO(ic:tal gn>upt fMtn ~ bcllion. Why dJd Ottoman peaaante not cngase in ~bcllioue k'tlvlty un their own or in alliance with orhc:r groupa' Srare centralizadon In thl' (.)1•

roman Empire, as eiJcwhere, proceeded at the expense of dlffc:rem da• 1

with elites and peasanta as direcdy affected by the state aaioo h In H\1• rope. To clarify the lack of rural rebelliom in d1c Ottoman Bmplrt', Wf

must focus on the social strucrure of society, and on the specific poUdtl uf the state that affected society, for bodl had a role in inhibiting collcn w action. It was not onJy the social strucrural arrangements of Otroman .... ciety, the traditional relations of power and explo itatio n, but al10 the w•y the: state made use of these arrangements and respond«t to critc:a chat made it apparently impossible for the peasants ro ally in rebellion.

The pu.uJe of '1:he missing rebellions to Ottoman rule" can be 110lwd with a comparative eye on France. Looking carefully at French hiJtory during the period of consolidation - which Tilly tenns .. brokcn~sc/' mainly because of deals made with capitalists- o ne realizes that l'llOtt •n• tistate rebellions are in fact conducted by peasants in aHiancc with the no bility, who have been deeply hurt by centralization. Furthennore, that alliances occur where strong patrOn-client ties and organized community relations coincide with taxation and pruning of regional authority by the stare. France combined a social structure favorable to rebellion wid' 1

centralizing state that infuriated bodl peasantry and nobility, facilitatlnl' their aJliance.

11K Ottoman Empire displays a different set of circumstances. Durln1 the same period of state consolidation,<ihc Ottoman Empire comblnat 1

~irnoniaJ system of rule with a brokerage style of centrali1..ation .~ the one hand; accorrung to esta6ttshcd patrimmuat rUfc, rc Ilion againn tho state was contrellc:d and kept under check. On the other nand, a broker­age style of bargaining helped the state pursue its consolidatio n function• in the periphery. Accordinglr,hlven patrimoniaJ ruJe, rotatio n of ate• appointed nfficials hindered ~ng patron<lient tiesJonly to be intjll~l · fied by the Jack ofloca.J village-based organization and cooperation.~tatc: attion aJso hindered elite cooperation by selectively promoting mcrnbea"'l of each category of cli~ting winners and losers within well-defined groups. [Collective action was hardly a possible avenue for Ottoman classes: peasants were not organized, elites were split within their ranu, and peasants and elites had no preexisting basis for alliancc)\11 the while:, state interest in extracting rents and tributes continued.

A brokerage style of bargaining was necessitated by new social forma• tions: bandit armies or pools of former mercenaries. These alternarivc

ll

"rtht,l•" were lal)tly created and fueled by the •tate. In rapotw co nne COOJOiidat ion and the tOCiocoonomic dletraa of the ecvenrecmh century, pcaaanta pursued altcmativc rnocb of eurvivaJ, rcquirins a uanafunna· don of their Identities. A variety of arate institutions helped in the pro· cess. In the 1\ard·hit rural regions of the empire, un landless males became: vagrants; from vagrants, they became soldiers when the state of­fered them livelihood through enrollment in the relatively new musketeer armies, mobilizing and demobilizing them according to the needs ~f war· fare. Participatio n in war&re meant organizing around anny uruts, ac· quiring muskets, and ean1ing daily ~ages. Demobilizatio~ meant l~_ing daily wages while keeping organizataon and muskets. W1th demobaliza· tion, they changed identities o nce more from soldiers in the sultan's anny to mercenaries available for hire. Under the best conditions, they were quickly remobilized by the state before they turned to banditry. Most of· ten, however, thc:y~ to the villages as ~ts, burglars, or uncm· ployed mercenaries looking for oxen, grain, or cash to steal, fields to plunder, or women to rape. Bandits also contributed to the lack of rebel­lious activity in rural regions. At the extreme, thc:y reprc:scnted an alter· native form of employment for the young, the restless, the rebellion· prone. And distinct from this, bandits ~ere the hc::lping hands. of anyone wishing to repress the peasantry: small-tunc tax collectors, reg1onal mag· nates, state officials, and the state itself aU used bandits when needed. As mercenaries ready for hire, bandits provided the retinues for control, CO·

ercion, and repression) The: rise of banditry, then, forced the state into new formats of consol·

idation. As the Ottoman state mobilized and demobilized mercenary annies without immediate attention to the consequences, banditry be­came a widespread phenomenon. Once banditry developed, the: state both used it and was drawn into negotiations with its leaders. Banditry also became a potential agent in the hands of many regional officials, wh~ the brigands to superess the ~.ao~)lt is ex:aaJy this siruation that the state manipulated to further legm rruzc Its role m the eyes of the people. Ir used peasant complaints and danan~ that the state r~rore order m ~e provinces to damp down on any regaonal officer perce1Vssf as threaterung and to reinforce its image of the protector of the people~easant demands and state responses became the main legitimizing literature for Ottoman rule, with the state gaining loyalty by crushing, often enough, the same bandits it had employed. The resuJting state legitimation was dissemi· nated through many fonns, from state orders to popular rescripts, liter· ature, and folk stories)Pttoman sultans sent central officials to handle the

IJ

dilturbanca and, when n«c .. ary, they empowered dtc pcaunu y to f'"' tM h~eJf. Although not a prd'crrcd solution, the peasantry wa1 ant1C'tl when dle menace of local officials inrcnsiflcd. 'This measure unlntcntlun ally added more potential bandits m the pool, since protection n.eant 111rm ing and organi1.ing dtose men in the village who were not at11vrly inVt>lvcd in cultivation. Bur this in tum required and justified furd\cr c:tn traUzlng intervention, achieved almost regardless of whether b11ndlt8 wcr 1

employed, crushed, or bod\. Clearly, the: relations between the state and bandits varied signlflc"ntly

from region to region. In regions relatively cl~ to rhe scat of powtt, r cc:sscs o flocaJ militarization were more easily remedied by force. In morr rcmoce reg!Qns far from state control, banditry bea me a rel:nively or ~· niud phenomenon which, although not directly threatening m rhc IU\tc, willy·nilly involved it in a process of negotiation. The type and amount ,., negotiation was heavily influenced by geopolitical contingencies. ' mall• sale banditry was often used as a rationalization for further policing and control, but ir also led to more organized banditry, which ll\K'U:«<td In forcing the state to bargain, co-opt, or fight, and therefore ronsolldat • Bandits forced the state to negotiate; yet the Ottoman state held strongly to the principle of .negotiation try inclusio n, presenting itself as the 110lc center for rewards and privileges. It therefore developed a style of ccn·

tion that emphasized bargaining and at least temporary incorJ~I'I ·

tion. Examining nearly a cenrury of bandit unrest in Anatolia sugse.ta 1 view of state: development that explores the nature and intensity or tht militarized banditry that occurred and discovers the ways banditry C'On• tributed to the processes of state consolidation and centralization.

This fonn of state development was dearly distinct from the wcutrn models. It was, however, closer to the Russian and Chinese experien c U nate centralization, where some of the characteristics of strong ecnrraJ states engaged in a continual process of centralization were also evident. Por the Russian Empire, centralization and incorporation have usually been discussed in rwo distinct contexts: the incorporation of the EUI'\)•

pc-an lands, for which military d iplomatic means were employed; and In· corporation of the eastern lands, where regions were lured into hecomJnM part of the empire. 17 Yet even the European consoljdation was different

17Marc RadT. "Panems of Russian Imperial Policy roward the N:nionaliuca," ln StwiH NlltitmMity ~. cd. Edward Allworth (New Yock, 1971), pp. u - 41; David 1>. l.o~hln, ~ Petencn. and John W. Slocum. "Language and the State: Russi~ and 1h( Sovkl

f'tum the• pautnu oblcrY«<In tht Welt. 'J'hc nl()llt lma)(lrtant futun: of the P. lan fl.mplrc Wll me CR<IIti()Cl of I tcrvicc ~Uty OUt ofteml· Independent landlords, tNnefurming a potcntiilly dccentralir.«t empire inro a atrong central entity, resanbUng prebendal rule In that it lacked &trong independent feudaJ lord.~ and intermediate bodies more common in the WeNt. The service nobility, which was relatively open ro newcom­ers, established a tradition of incorporation into the state cUte that the state then couJd usc as its bargaining rool. 18

The Russian pattern of state formation through bargaining is best demonstrated in the history of Cossack incorporation. The Russian state was able to absorb and transform the Cossack elites by co-opting them into the Russian gentry. This was accompUshed through a process quite similar to that of the Onomans. The Cossacks, a frontier people buffering Muscovy from the Tatars, developed a depot for vagrant peasants, ban­dits, and mercenaries. Through dealings that continued for more than a century, the Cossacks were incorporated into the Russian state.(fhe key to their incorporation, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire, was the perceptio n of the Russian state as the center of favors and rewards for the members of an elite. 19 The resuJt was the transformation of the Cossack captain into the Russian gentryman, with an increasing differentiation within Cossack ranks because not everyone benefited directly from this incorporatio, But the differentiation within Cossack ranks rcsuJted from a more western process. Russian centralization and bureaucratization un­der continuous warfare on western frontiers in the mid-seventeenth cen­tury engendered peasant discontent, flight, and migration of large numbers of Russian peasants into Cossack territory, where they fueled re­bellions such as those of Raz.in and Pugac.hev. 20 A3 Cossack social struc­ture differentiated, rwo processes occurred simultaneously: on the one hand, the upper inhabitants of the Don, or " House-owning Cossacks," were being incorporated through government incentives and services, and the lower inhabitants of the Don, or "the Naked Ones," were being in­corporated through rebelUon and defeat in their opposition to the crown.

Union in Compararivc PCT5pca:ivc," in~ TIKwrtiaiJ/y .-,, Snia N~: Hist4ry """~;,.the Stwly ofrlN USSR, cd. Alennckr J. Motyl (New York, 199'1), p. 137·

18Mousnicr, PtRSIUd Uprisi9, pp. 16~-~. 19Brucc W. Mmning, .. lbc Emergcna: of a Military· Administ:rativc Elite in the Don

Cossack Land, 170ll-l8}6," in RNlf'iiUI Off~: The Bwrrt~lll:rtllirAliMt of RMWI" S«Uty fr- fiN Sevmtemih w tiN 'T'wnltiah Cmtat')l cd. Walter McKenzie Pinmcr and Don KArl Rowney (Oupcl Hill, N.C., 1911<>), pp. IJO- JJ.

10Paul Avrich, RIISfiA" Rebtls, 161»-tloo (New York, 1971).

•• Juat within one rcgMx-1, then, we ICt mixed mOdca or l'Cnm.llutklll ttilt emanate from diJTcmu aoctal Jtrucruru, dlfl'crent 1odal 8f'OUI,.• and thtlt pettdvtd lntcruta.

0\lna i.e pel'hape the empire: that ahara most clolely with t~ 0tftlmat1

l!mpirc a hiatory of banditry and state-society interac:tiona mediated hy btnditry and miljrarization in a variety of fashions. In the 800«nth and Kvetttct"nth cenruries, the strong Chinese state encountered movcmcrm In which peuants and bandits seem to have aaed in concert agaltut "ate CONJOiidarlon. Especially those bandits who were organiud alon8 rnlll tary lines were incorporated inro the state's defense system. lneorpot·at lon into the Chinese army both contained rural disruption and added annl ro rhe Olincsc forces, much as was the case in the Ottoman Empire. I .Atrr in the mid-seventeenth century, however, the Chinese state started ~lntc iu abiljty to incorporate these bandits, who acquh-ed leadership and can ro threaten the center. In 1635 there were at least thirteen bandit e,hlcf representing seventy-two bands intent on breaking up China into their own areas of ruJe. The breakup did n<X occur, though from then on the history of struggle between local militarization and the state went hatKI h\ hand with centralization. Numerous revolts combined militarized ban dits, loCal miUtia captains, and bandit chieftains whose actions dcvck>f"-d u an encnsion of everyday forms of competition and struggle for I'CI•

sources. Elizabeth Perry demonstrates well, through the study of the Nlcn and the Red Spears in Late Imperial OUna and the Repubtican period, how the particular symbiosis of the environment, social structuro and ttate action developed these different rural formats which allied in rcbtl lion and confronted the state. Predatory or protective in their aJm1, rooted in village-level organizations, these bandits tunled to challenp tJ state, fighting both its various impositions and as foreign intcrvenrion.JI <lUna experienced more revolts, but the local forms of militarization and banditry were comparable to the more incorporated groups in the Otm man Empire.

The history of Chinese state making, with its fits and starts, is sugga tive. Local militarization, banditry, and rebellion in China were element• of a complex and varying process of state consolidaqon. Prasenjit Duar• describes this process as .. involutionary," in that the abiljty of the state' t()

l 1E1izabcth J. Perry, Rdlds w ~;, Nttrllt em-, 114/-IHJ (Stanford, 11'10) Philip A. Kuhn, R.dldliM wIts BlltlffiG ilt LMe I,.,m.. CJmu&: Milit~U'iuuitm Mfll $ltllll Slrllmn't, 1796-116f (Cambridge, Mas.s., 1910).

16

rawlncreaMI while lr. !<K'II ronrn>l d«~u~d.u Stare makJn(J J•nxccdcd with puwlna tUrmoil un tht' luaJ 1~1, mu~ u wat evicknt during d~f· femll rcriod1 In the tmoman P.mp1rc and an Runia. In a.ll thru, soc•al l truaurt threw up local milit1lnts which the state had to Incorporate to

enlldifY Itt conrrol. What· looked li~ rum1oil was parr of rhe process of

state making. When compared to Europe, the Ottoman, Russian, and Chinese state.~

were much mo re encompassing of societal clements. For our purposes, state develo pment in the Ottoman Empire demonstrates many of the pat­terns briefly explored in Russian and Chinese history, only more dis­tinctly and intensely. In many ways, it resembles what Duara cal~ involuntary: the Ottoman state increased its control over ~oman ~·­ety by leaps and bounds, and not in all realms at the same nme.<As SOCiety

appeared chaotic under the spell of banditry, the state found wa~ to in­corporate bandits and increase its sphere of control. At the same tune, as it devised methods of increasing taxation, it let intermediaries exercise au­tho rity until it could sap their power for g~. It m~uged. and ~layed off different groups, responding to and curta~hng thear orbit of anfluence while keeping all groups dependent on the state. A state-centered culture was embedded in the structure of society by state action, with everyone from elites to bandits dependent on state-servicing patronage.)

Ottoman development between •sso and t6so occurred through differ­ent processes, with different groups entering into neg~ations with the state, and therefore different channels and deals emergmg. Even when some of the traditional groups were in interaction with the state, the out­come was flO( traditional. For example, when the state responded to the needs of the peasantry, it took action that led to low-level militarization of the countryside, fueling the phenomenon of banditry and ther~o': cre­ating new negotiating parmers. Or, for example, the reorgaruzataon ~f provincial assignments, which a.t first si~ht seems. cc:>mpa.rable tO France an the use of central officials to handle reg~onal adminastratton , turned o ut to be quite different in style and outcome. The proa:ss ~ntailed phas~ng out the smallest land unjts and their landholders, achaevang larger uruts, and entrusting them tO men from the center. This was not the same ~s elim­inating all the powerful intermediaries in the process of tax collemon and administration. In the Ottoman context, under certain condit ions the pol­icy led to~ snowballing increase of intermediaries. Moreover, in a most

llpruc:njit Duara. C.Utwrr, Pftltf', 111111 the St1111: RMrwl NWJh Chi-, 19(»-IHl (Stanford,

•938), P· n

'"""""" .. ,, unc:nnvrntional manner, whrn large handh am1lc11 •cardns roving arom"l lhe L'\"""tryahk, tht Ottoman state lilt down ar the bargaining tahlc with lhem)Bargainlng between bandits and the nate, again, would t«nt 111

enomaly In the wc:atcm European model of ata~ centralization. Y rt tile' imptntlve was the same: n ates have IU..bttiK.onl)' milltarxpowc:r In thdr tcrrltury. The Ottoman state struck bargains with the bandlts, who wtn• noc as threatening to the state: as were the regional power holdcn of J1rant'c. The bandits represented alternative centers of militarization tltiAI wtrc dealt with in the old patrimonial style, through inj;orporat on end reward.

1bc peculiarities of the Ottoman case arc not peculiaritic." after all; th m letion in state building we observe primarily in the Ottoman and other aimilar cases emerges from wider variation in state-sociery rclalinm than we see in the European. Social strucrure and state action cxerr d 1

a»mplcx impaa on state-society relations which shaped modes of ccntrol t.Ation. Variations in social strucrure (feudal versus prebendal, as the rur rent example) and variation in stare action need to be scrutinized for the fUrther develo pment of models of state centralization. Embelkllng thc:to IWO variables into a state-society format means a pronlise of careful at~ l8ntion to the manner in which the distina aspects of social srrucnu'C and ci ltate aaion interaa with each other- how state aaion is dcttmlin(!\1 by uru~ral constraints as well as how state: action attempts ro alter and lhape societal formats.

This book develops the literature on state centralization and social lftOYCf'llCflts. I argue that the process of state development is diverse and lhat this diversity is contingent on the specific nature of social srrucrurta and the realm of possible actions on the part of the state. States develo p lftd centralize essentially by entering into conflict, negotiation, and a • commodation within the existing configuration of forces in society. I therefore spend time disentangling the specifics of the established rcla· tiomhip between the state and society in the Ottoman Empire to den\• onatrate the manner in which this created alternative paths of action fur lhe Ottoman state which were not available to other western European ltates. These theoretical concerns lead us to scrutinize Ottoman hisrory

carefully. I make: two historical claims that o riginate: in theoretical deh:lfes on

ltltc formation and collective aaion. First I claim to illuminate an ero o f Onoman history that has been largely negleacd as a transitional- and therefore unsettled and unknown- period. Second, I contend that the:

I

•• IN\IItUllll '"'P nuiUIAOOaATI

hltwry <'LOnoman ban{litty hat co~ away rmm romantJc rnodclt of .. prlmftivt ~bdUon.,~ a more realistic repramtarion of who lheiC brigands really we~. Between the strong, ccntnlizcd cmpi~ able to threaten Europe at the doors of Vienna and the weak, decentralized "sick man of Euro~ preparing to be chopped up by a superior Europe, the intermediary period tends to be ignored. Yet this period is crucial because it enlightens comparison to both the "rise" and the "decline" of the em­pire. Analysis of this period demonstrates that SOfT\e of the state's practices during its strength were not necessarily the best practices fur effective long-tenn rule. It also suggests that the decline, which is supposed to have lasted for centuries, was not really a decline. The history of the seven­teenth century shows that state rulers were testing practices of rule, adapting to the society, and attempting to consolidate and centralize their power at the same time. They learned from their mistakes; they elimi­nated some practices while consolidating others. They by no means gave up; rather, they adapted to a new world order quite weU. Variation did not represent wc:akness. In the process, state development went through the "jagged peaks and profOund valleys" Tilly so apdy describes, yet with a d.ifferent centralized outcome.

It is not inadvertent that I have chosen this period of Ottoman history to address state strength and consolidation. The early periods of state for­mation would have provided an easier context. I chose the time when

I most European states were also consolidatingGneir stories were different because they encountered entrenched inten:sts and rebellions that threat· ened the very foundation of their existence. The Ottoman Empire also en­countet'cd resistance, but a resistance that demanded to be incorporated and was willing to be ind"Udea m the system5The rebelS of the Ottoman scvmtccnth century were ! tatus-sccking rebels. They desired positions in the Ottoman administration . Since the Ottoman rulers did nOt feel as threatened by such internal fOrces, th chose to res nd to them on a temporary, deal-based fashion, setti the dcvdopmerrt of me Otwotan state off on a difkrent route. Ncverthe!ess, it was not a weak state, unable to an e opposanon. The· Ottoman state was very much aware of the weakness that could result from overexpansion and sheer size. It was

.Aorced to devise a more flexible approach to governance, compensating / <--ror some of its natural geopolitical flaws. Flexibility meant strength, noc

weakness) Related to the issue of state strength is that of ~ar develo ment.

Reflection on processes of state formation also suggests that s-rite devel­opment is rarely unilincar or unifunn. In fact. the increasing number of

,,.,...,., ,, ctaae 1tudiea on wcarcm atare ((')nNdon dcl'nOflltratc that the prtkUI !. much lea glorious than wcttcm Europcanitu have made it out to he. In the watcm experience, stare formation is pcrc:clvcd as a atrusslc: bc:twNn state and society, yet it is mo~ or leN an evolutionary proccaa In whk.h the state gains increasing strength. More generally, however, It Ia aptmt't• that is often srallcd, halted, and reactivated according to both intcma tional and internal political conditions. Different societies have dlfftrc"nl societal formats, and the interactive processes betwem the nate and thf formats presc:nt variations on the process of nate formation . Some ~I· cries may be incorporated smoothly, others may pose serious thrcau nJ states, leading to near revolutionary outcomes. To this theoretical dcbift'1

the Ottoman case has much to add. The Ottoman state expericncc:d ICYCt t setbacks during centralization, necessitating regrouping and rechlnkJntc

The question of state breakdown, unfortunately, continues to be a 10tt

spot in the history of seventeenth-century Ottoman history and lllal)'i I e. Although historians have become aware of the deleterious eff«tt of dct cline theory, itS effects still linger. More recendy, socio logist Jack Onld srone has joined the historians in arguing for numerous breakdowN uf the Ottoman state. Eager to extend comparative sociology to the rda tively unexplored shores of the Middle East (and righdy so), Goldarone forces Ottoman history of the early ~ntcenth century into his modfl. The result is a misreading of the period that attributes key devdopmcnt ro only weakJy related variables. To say that the Ottoman Empi~ e•~ rienced setbacks is noc to say that it experienced breakdown. The exUtrJM: of contending fOrces in society does not necessarily mean state brak down; and it does not necessarily mean total loss of control on the part of the government. We need to analyze the type: of contention and the IU

lutions to this contention before we can make generalizations about the breakdown of the state. 23

States break down, for Goldstone, when they lose their effcctivencu ur are hampered by clite competition and revolt, as wcU as by popuJar nwolr and violence. A major goal of this book is to show that the Ottoman atttc instead effectively regulated social classes to contain their possible rcbcJ. lion. I demonstrate that elites w~ not rebellious against the state. They

u Gold.stonc links population shifts in early modem Eurasia to state breakdown. He 1r guc:s dut the: dcsnbilizing effect o( population growth leads to the: breakdown n( 1111~ In stirutions dtat arc too rigjd to adapt to change. His analysis of demographic changa 1re only marginal to our interests. Yet as this book shows I do not agree with either the lntnpma tion o( thc: Ottoman irutitutions as too rigjd or thc: analysis o( the C>ttonu.n k\'Cnt ~lit century as a time o( periodic state bn:akdown. Sex J:ack A. Goldstone, RnolwriM llltll lt.l bdliM;,. the &my MDtlenl WorlJ (Bcrlcdcy, 1991).

~nlllncd wmpctltlve within and Kroq ch(ir ttnb, pavlns hem aub· Jeered ro intt'rue manipuJation by the state. Slmilarly,4!!,erc were no pop· ular revoirs; the banditry that spread acroas the counttyaldc wu a by· product of state making and war making and waN absorbed into the fabric of the state. Where the culture of seeking state office and sharing in state power is very strong, contention can take me fonn of conservative and state-reinforcing ap~~ls for incorporation, no t ro be confused with chal­lenges to state rule)'ockeying for positions within the state apparatus takes different fonns according to the position and statuS of the con­tender. Whereas for those within the system there are a variety of ways of improving their statuS, those outside the system have ro seck confronta­tion. Therefore, mere may be moments in state development when alter­native social forces force the state to the bargaining table and the state and society arc competing within the same primary domain, that of the usc of physical force. These are the forces of those outside, entering through confrontation and later deal making. The state is, however, stiJl a viable aaor that onJy strengthens itself through constructing the right deal. 24

I also distinguish this phase from that of multiple sovereignty in which the "government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, compcrin~, muruaJly exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct politics." 5 In such cases, the state is be· ing challenged by contenders who want to capture the government; it is a revolutionary situation. A state-society confrontation instead implies that the state and other groups arc competing for access to resources, taxation, and control and arc using similar means- yet the authority of the state is not directly chaJJcnged. There are no demands for oven:hrowing the state. This is, I contend, a situation that easily arises exactly during periods of consolidation because they arc prime times of conflict, bargaining, and accommodation. Accordingly, I usc state-society confrontation to denote times when the state is forced to bargain with both societaJ elites and pop­ular groups.

Understanding the nature of state consolidation also helps to correct a misinterpretation of a series of bandit uprisings during this period of the Ottoman Empire. Where6ost sdl.glars sec these uprisings as the result of the deteriorating economic conditions and state violence, I describe

l+Jne state that n:cmerga after the breakdown, according to Goldstone, is a different one. Yet he gives no reason to think of the Ottoman state in different tcnns after the scv­cntccnth century; RnoiNtiorl IUUI Rebclliorl, p. 10 .

namla Tilly, F,_ MolliliultiM tl) Rno/NIWM (Reading, Mass., 1978), p. 191.

illm •• mtN't' uf a by·prodlKt oi auk ccntra.llr.aclon. u l'olknY n Jh k .._.bawm, mott tc:holart l\pvc: ~n banditry t:hroush romantic: I~•*• - lfiUcd thAt llanditl an: rural n:bcla in ICII'Ch OfwayJ to help th(' fM'Il•

My I deAlrlbc the tame bandits as the n:aJ malefactors of rural ICk.ltty hurt the rural community in acvc:nJ waya: they inhibited lr. P"""

tlal f()f rollec:tivc action; thc:y plundered its ~rccs and AnJvely ,,.,, 1

~ In hs coc:rcion by local power holders. esc agents or the kk.•l ltn'"lmcn could ncx have been benevolent. andits were ncirhcr nc ,., Nrily lle)r often enemies of the state. By demonstrating the nrighn, Jhr Went, and the consequent demise of these bandit groups in rural ·key, J "'*"' a less romantic image of the bandits. Ln doing so, I outline pnt

of rural revolt, clarifying the distinction between class-based muw """' that threaten the structural arrangement in society and a bamthry lhlc attempts to benefit from the existing structural arrangemcmt In 1n dlly, The bandits, in me final analysis, have no reason for the d" trutt lun II thute structures of inequality from which they benefit.

There are r-hrec particularly relevant features of the Orrom;an ~~c:vrn tllmth cxntury: the lack of class-based collective action on the pare of the peutntry, the development of a pool of bandit mercenaries, and the um· IDUdarion of the state through state-bandit bargaining. All three wtl'f

jlllt ol an ongoing process of state consolidation and centrali7.ariun, 11 procas unlike that in western Europe. Ultimately, these features can I aplaincd through the interaction between the state and the peculiar or Jlftiurion of societaJ groups.

In the first part of the book I scrutinize the cawal connection betwtt'l\ •ce ecntral.iution and rural rebellions. In this context, I show how both the nature of state-society relation.~ in the more patrimonial structure uf' the Otroman state and the decisions made by the state during the: pro«a• vi centralization hindered rural rebellions. In Chapter 1 I deacribc tt Onoman social structure and the nature of state-society rclatioru 11 "" llbliahcd by the key research of Ottoman observers and historians. l aJ..-, pruvide a context for the early seventtenth-century world system and th lftltral conditions of economic and demographic change that con11titutcd .. crisis. Chapters 3 and+ investigate why Ottoman peasants did not rrbd tn rcaponsc to the increasing conditions of centralization and warfare, In

MAntoo Blok. The Mttfol uf• Sidlilm Villlf8e, t~t96Q: A Stwiy o[Vidmt l 'tlllllllt JJifhY ,..,., (Prospect Heights, Lll. , 197+), mab:s a similar argument to explain the dcvrk)!)OI(OI "''the Sicilian Malia when a centralizing state was Wlable to eradicate d1e ed~tlng k~al lltl worb of power, therefore leaving room for landlords to recruit d1c turure maf1001l , who Ill tum wm able 10 ronnulate alternative social ocgani:utiotu.

Chaprer J I focus nn the cmdJrlons that led the reglooal eUtca tO cumpc· tition, division, and lnablUty to coordinate colkctlvc rupocuea againn the state. In Chapter 4 I analyze the inability of peasants tO engage in col· Jective action- their inability to ally with other affc:ct:cd regional classca and their own internal o rganizational obstacles. In each of these chapters I consider a mcdJcy of social strucrura.l constraints in light of specific state action, giving each variable interactive weight. This analysis demonstrates that the specific nature of the social structural arrangc:mcnts and the im­plementation of state policies inhibited class-based J'llOVernCnts.

In the second section of the book I investigate the causal connections among state action, patrimonial societal relations, and banditry. In this conrc.xt, I show how both the nature of state-society relations in the more patrimonial structure of the Ottoman state and the decisions made by the state during the process of centralization led to the rise and development of banditry. Chapter s demonstrates that banditry did not pose a serious threat to the state; o n the contrary, it was a by-product of state policies and was quickly appropriated by the state for purposes of state consoli· dation and peripheral control. I also differentiate the bandits from other rural classes; bandits had multiple, fluid identities (ex-peasants, landJess vagrants, students, soldiers, mercenaries, bandits). The process by which they became part of a collectivity with horizontal ties presumes that the linkages of each individual to his own reference group were cut. Therefore I argue that banditry was an artificial social construction and it did not represent a threat to the state in the traditional sense since it did not at· tempt to destroy the social structure; it simply wanted to derive as much utility from it as possible. The bandits manipulated the interstices of the system; they had no proclaimed ally or enemy and no significant ideology.

In Chapter 6 I show how bandit collectivities were formed and how the state used its own creations for state consolidation. This chapter recounts the history of state-bandit bargains and the manner in which the state ci· ther co-opted bandits into the system and consolidated a region or fought them through internal warfare and consolidated through their defeat. In each situation, I analyzed state decisions for their geopolitical content. Fi­nally, Chapter 7 tics together the analysis in a theoretical conclusion.

Embedded in these statements is one general conclusion: the Ottoman Empire was not seriously challenged in the manner of the European states, where class-based collective action (of a single class or a coalition of classes) occurred and directly challenged the system of rule. In Europe, especially in France, a demarcated social structure with clearly defined classes with strong positions, identities, and interests meant that chal-

...,._ tu the etate an)8C fi'OO\ within the: catabllahed Unea of comn1unica· riDn &nd channela of Interaction betwetn narc and aodc:ty. In d)C Onuman Empire, rhc Inability of groups to organize along class lines and challcnsc the state from more or less simple intc:rcst·ba&ed princlpiC3 of al~·tive action resulted in the Ottoman state's noc being seriously chal· lin~ by 10eictal forces. Therefore, the necessary social reorganization dkt nut come until much later, when elites finally had enough regional pcwwr haaes to slowly secede from the center. Ottoman disintegration was ft01 the result of a sudden and tumultuo us breakdown; it was the rcsuJt of 1 pnKttl of chipping away at the edges- a slo w and in fact nonrevolu· donary process o f decentralization. In the lo ng run, it left the core aware f1l Itt c:xp<>$cd and stripped center. " Revolution from above" then ensued "- or<kr to salvage what was left of this gargantuan edifice.

2 The Context of the

Seventeenth Century

B Y THB BEGINNING Of THS SBVI!NTBBNTH CBNTUllY, Ottoman state and society mixed features from the ClassicaJ Age and ad­aptations to recent world systemic changes. On the one haRd, the

foundations of state-society relations and the structure of Ottoman rule at

the center and in the provinces shifted as a series o f adjustments brought about certain relaxations of control and a certain fluidity that allowed movement in and out of otherwise closed units. At the same time, the state adhered to the ideals of centralization while redefining the ways it might be achieved. On the other hand, the legacy of the sixteenth century throughout Eurasia resulted i~e crisis of the seventeenth century: the Ottoman Empire experienced an unsettling demographic transition; it en­dured fluctuations in the monetary system; it labored under the effects of the price revolution; and, final ly, it watched the West emerge as a stron­ger adversary than bcfor9 Both stare and society adapted to reinvent con­dujrs of transformation: the state adapted its institutional mechanisms to cope with these changes within the realm of Ottom~ dogma. ~th cen­tral and regional institutio ns were restructured to tmprovc domg what states do best: extract resources, o rganiu armies, and spread tentacles of control over society. Society responded in different ways, either fully en­gaging the state or disengaging from the .state in search o f al~er:native so­lutions. It is in this context of adaptatton to both the exJstmg set of arrangements and the international context of change that the Ottoman state undertook various actions vis-a-vis elites, peasants, and bandits. It is therefore important to study the structure of state-society relations in the Ottoman Classical Age as well as the context of the changing world sys­tem. It is even more important to understand the new world system since

tJIIUIIJy affeCted Europe and Aale. Nevertheless. the raulr• of the trw• llnnattcw partially triggered by thae changea were very diffcrtnt in

IWO 1Ctting1.

The Legacy of the Cluakal Age

MMIIYt emf.il"C8 uf dlc Ottoman type often alternated dangerously llf ~ creat ng nrict rules and letting environmental variation~, local 8eftdanil. tnd precedents establish the pattern 'l rule. Or better ytt ,

'pdons of such empires present ~pe~ve!yQ_~ag~ o~ orientaJ del· f1J111m or arrcsted.i'atrimonial evolunon wtth httle tnstttutJOnal dcve,lop· ,... ~ r.he srarc. !'Reality fell short of bodl enremes. N~ hard and fall '* dictata how to run an empire; often a structure lent ttself to manlp ~by individuals who occupied its various administrative levels, All

•n hlatorians have studied these struaures with little atrcntion W ..... , nexlbility, interpreting each and every instance of deviation as a par· dcular clUe. This is very much how the Classical Age has been reprucnr«t ., many contemporary and modem scholars. 2

.

11tc pateSt achievement of the 9ttomans ~ the tt~ of ~ Clau lcaJ wu building an empire wi~ bureaucranc adrnirustratton that U •

tiiMIIDd beyond the immediate patrimonial reatm)rhis empire was able ro p.m effectively a vast expanse of territory, with diverse communirka -.unatcd by local power holders not overly eager to surrender their prlv·

, Jn this attempt at consolidation and control, the Ottomans created ftiWtary and administrative structure that was able to infiltrate the rc·

... areas of the empire. More important, they engineered a system In whkh th~cgiance of members of the military and administrative appa· M\llel was practically unchallen~ The state made these men for lu own purJX*S and rewarded them through its own channels, tying thclr Whood, rewards, and status to itself through methods of divide and "*· This was partly the reason for the long-lasting success o f the state; Mn u economic and military ills hit them, officials looked for rcwtrdl lam the state and tried to advance within the state apparatus rather than challenge it.

IJuunne Hoeber Rudolph, "Presidential Address: State Ponnarion in AJia- Prolepnc ,... to a Comparative Smdy," /Dflnflli tf Asilm Shuiia 46 (1917):7)1- 46.

~exception ro this failing Is tha~ of Halil ln~tk, w~ Ottoman hisrorr h•• bee-n ~ u an instirutional history yet w1th outstanding detcctKlll and undcralandma ci hnw .... INcitutions change and adapt to diffc:rmt circumstaooc.s. Sec lnalc•k.. The 0,._.,. Blff , , 1lf CJMsiatl Aat, 1Jf»-16ilo (New York., 1973) .

AI the Ottomttu developed, a complex compact b(tWttn atatc and *,. dety graduaJiy incorporated aJI potentially auronomou~ dJrcs and orga· nizations inro the state. This appropriation set the stage for the pccuUar route of the Onoman centralization throughout the: sixteenth and ~n· rcenth centuries. The story of the Ottoman Empire an be rold as that of the transformation from a rather small house of nomadic conquest inro an established house of rule relying on strong patrimonial guidelines. Our ing this aansformation, which lasted approximately from the fourteenth ro the sixteenth century, the Ottoman house of rule managed to shape a variety of internal forces to irs own will, sometimes by offering deals, sometimes by forcing migration, and at other times through sheer coer­cion. Whatever the means employed, the end result was to tie all potential regional elites and potential corporate entities strictly and solcly to the state witho ut allowing them the freedom of autonomous organization.

That the Ottoman Empire achieved fairly uniform centralization is all d1e more remarkable given regional diversity and varying geopolitical pressures. Control over the periphery always requires more energy and re­sources than managing core regions of an empire. Overextension there­fore usually produces some form of indirect rule in the faraway provinces. The core of the: empire. the Balbns and Anatoli~ had more or less uni­form administrative arrangements for land tenure~ taxation, and other fis· cal policies whereas the rest of the empire, the periphery, experienced indirect rule. The oudying areas of the: empire thus enjoyed some degree of autonomy in the mixture of pre-Ottoman with Ottoman practices. Forms of land tenure and taxation were adaptations of various practices derived from regional and central sources. Consequendy, the borderlands revealed different state-society arrangements: groups behaved according to the dictates of this new blend of institutions, even though they were securely bound to the central state: appararus.

Although different state-society arrangements preserved social control in diverse regions, a general principle of rule was applied througho ut, which rendered ;ven indirect rule more controlling than it would other­wise have bee~tate control was exerted through ties from the periphery to the center, segmenting elites and common people, all of whom were responsive to the center but not to each other. Relations with the ~ntcr were strong, while those among groups and communities were w~this weakness was maintained by such practices as rotation of regional offi"'. Sociopolitical and economic links of patronage and trade alJ extended from the periphery to the central state. Because links within the periphery were weak, ~ial disorganization became the pattern in Ottoman prov-

anc.. $crif M1rdin, who tw well dcmonuratcd me lack of eqr~te en· Jilkt ir\ Ottoman ~ delcribel auch l tate·crt'atcd diffi.aJcncaa •• lWrina hindered the development of autonomous bodies. 1 Acc:ordingJy, h 61 noccaaary not just to deacribc iNtiturions and groups in society but a1lo ., explain the manner in which the srare manipulated them and crcarro dUI\uc and fluid identities.

The question of state action has often been confused with that of in· 11ndonality. I clearly provide the Ottoman state with agency, but I do not wpc that aJI state practices were deliberately or accurately calcuJated by ttatc officials to achieve increased control. Often, various narrativea of Male action exist simultaneously because many diverse events rhat may o r lillY not ·be causally conneaed occur all at once. Nevertheless, what gets daolcn as the actual narrative of state aaion is that which seems mosr I'll· donal for gaining stare goals and imputes perfect intentionality to state 1CtrJ11, That is because it is easier to relate evenrs in a temporally and caus· elly c:onnccted fashion and attribute straightforward intentio ns tO indi­vkluall. But to those actually carrying out actions, events often look as if they have been pieced together in quite an ad hoc fashion.

The state that emerged was to maintain a strong pa~al· ~ratic fonn with a specifically Near Eastern and Islamic cultural ,~neaning. Each of these aspects- the patrimonial and the bureaucratic­hid an enormous influence on how society was shaped.The patrimonial :: centered around the household and the rule of the sultan, who, as

head of the: household, presided over the: dynasty (his family ), the: rul· .... class constituted of his slaves, his flock (the people}, and the territory al me empire as his "dynastic patrimony .... The bureaucratic aspect meant lhc extension of specialized means of bureaucratic administration, which ~ early and extended beyond the limited rc:a1m of the household. The ideological came to the aid of the geopolitical aspects in the fonn of ehc ideal of~ whereby the realm oflslam was to be expanded through Holy War. e contribution of each of these aspects was enhanced and united in the: larger political scheme: the general understanding of "~ tap of justice within a circle of equity."

It is this cognition of the circle of equity contextualized into the .-rrimonial-bureaucratic state with lslamk and Near Eastern overtones chat l think constituted the political culture of the OttOman empire. The

'$crif Mardin, "Power, CiviJ Society and Cultur~ in the Onom:Ul Empi~." C~w llttMiill ill SMay 111111 H isttwy II ( •969): 169. ~Findley, BrmMI&f"lllic Rlfor'M i11 tht 0"-'t B,.,wt: The SubliiN Ptwtt, 1719-111»

(Princeton, 198<>), p. 1·

general undenrandin~ wa1 dtat iuf cc provided t!tc:. major oountetb.Jancc: to absolute autho_iliy. Accordingly, thts circle had d t e_~tlona: "a st:are requires a ~K>vercign authority to enforce rational and Holy Law; to

have ~uthority a sovereign must exercise power; to have power and control one: ncxds a large anny; to have an anny one nccd.s wealth; to have wealth from taxes one needs a prosperous people; to have a prosperous subjca population one must have just laws justly enforced; to have laws enforced one needs a state; to have a state one needs a sovereign authority . ..cs Halil lnalnk swns up the implications of this well: "Justice, in this theory of state, means the prorea:ion of subjects against abuse from the represen­tatives of authority and in particuJar against illegal taxation. To ensure this protea:ion was the sovereign's most important duty. The fundamental aim of this policy was to maintain and strengthen the power and authority of the sovereign, since royal authority was regarded as the: cornerstone: of the whole social structurc:."7

The propositions of this theory of governance define the: tc:nns of the compaa between state and society. Although the state was supreme, re­spondi~ to the needs of societal groups remained important to its well­being.(!lle state propagated the: ideals of the: circle of justice, including the guarantee of state proreaion, at every opportunity, in every mani­festo, and in countless symbolic actio~ To comprehend the mechanics of this rule we need to consider the form and content of the Ottoman state. 8

Centralization in the Ottoman Empire from the time of Mehmcd II {I+SJ- 8.!), the chief architect of central control, meant both a centralization program- a strong state and stringent control of the periphery- and thc establishment of rules and regulations by which the consolidation was to be maintained. In the process, from the time: of Mehrncd II to that of Silleyman, the state was transformed to iodude a more encompassing and bureaucratic notion of itsdf. The period of Mebmcd II was the embodi­ment of a "centralist program which inevitably called for a strong tr~­sury: eliminating potential rivals to the throne from within the Ottoman famHy through fratricide: if needed, enforcing Ottoman superio rity over other Turkish principalities in Anatolia, curbing the power of 'old fami·

5Comcll Fleischer, ".Royal Authoriry, l)ynastic Cyclism, and ' Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixtcc.nth-Cenrury Ottoman Letters,ft j1111nllll of AsiM Mill A.frium Sh#lia 11, 008. H (191J):l01.

6Joel Shinder, "Early Onncnan Administration in the Wilderness: Some Limits un Com­parisoo,'" lt~terMI:ioruU Jrn~mAI of Milltlk Ecst~n~ Strulia 9 (1978): +99·

r lnalc1k., TIN On-11 E"'J1frr, p. 66. 81 canll()( prac:nt the Ottoman nate in all iu complexiry, institutions, and procesliCS of

rule in this chapter. I discuss only those in.stirutiom and m«lunisms that arc ITlOit relevant ro the argumcnrs of this book.

Ua' whkh couJd grow Jnro •n arlecocracy, c.rablt.hing the courtJy cti· qucttc and lifcatylc of an ablolutc monarch, creating an ad.mJnlnrativc: ltn.Kturc hued primarily on •uls, 111igning b/ troops a larger role In warfare, and most conspiruously, conquering Constantinoplc.-.9 Mattlp­ulations ranged from incorporation through marriage m incorporation through coercion. 10 Ar the: same: time. Mehmed the Conqueror for the first time: in Ottoman history proclaimed law codes tlur established more flnnly the: regulations and statutes concerning government and the pco­pJc. These decrees based on sulranic law (lumur~) and traditional regula· tions (IJrf) did not refer to an were di ercnt from the religio!!!. lslamjc law (""r'iar). They established the rule of the sultan and the role of the: state in this process of rule. ultanic codes devc!Qped and established the wer of the state even more forcefully during_ the reign of SOieyman

·the M 'ficent also as "the Law · vcr." Throughout this peri<xJ the codification of provincial regulations was one of the main ways of in· corporation and centralization. Sultan Si.ileyman, the consoJjdaror par c~­

cellence, ruled "for forty-six years with justice, and took special can: to nurture the men of religion, poets, bureaucrats (ehl-i luUmJ}, and military men who were the primary supporters ofthe state." 11 It is in faa during the reign of Si.iJcyman that the concept of the state gained larger signifi­cance, becoming more than the sultan himself or even the individuals who staffed the bureaucracy. The state was transformed into an institution governed by the sultan's household and an extensive bureaucracy, where intricate negotiations, decision making, and politicking became: rhe rule rather than the exception. 12

9Cemal Kafadar, "When Coins Turned inro Dropri of Dew and Bankers Bcc.ame Robben ofShadow1: 'The BoundariaofOttoma.n Ec:onomic lm;agination at the End of the Sixtecllth Century." Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1916, p. 51.

10 AJ Rhoads Murphey explains, marriage became a common prxt:Kr for cnsunng the aJiegiarKr of nan:-levd cmrral as well as provincial leaders who were dcc:mcJ to be crlK'ial 10 the sultan's rule: "'The maJJc:ability of these top-kvd burcaucrar1 was guanmecd by the bonds o( filial obligation imposed through marriage 10 princesses of the royal line." The practice was instirutionalizcd by the reign ofSOicyman f (1p.o-66), and the mo5t importaJll grand viziers of the time were abo the IIOOS-in-law (MIMM) of the SOYtrcigns. Sec Murphey, "The Historical Setting." in TIN lt~titute Lifo ofMI OttrMum Stlllltlf!IMI, Mtklt Alnwtl PluiNt (IJU-.166%) (New York, 1991), p. 31. Murphey also an:riburcs the center-provincial marrla~ lies to the need for centralization and ncutraliz.ing potentially quarrelsome clements. 'l'hGK nurriagcs established kinship ties bctwcc.n the important families of the provinces, and th<' central government provided the means to co-optation, wealth, and power.

"Fleischer. "Royal Authoriry, Dynastic Cyclism," p. :m . 1>Jlaat the Ottoman sun: rnc:wa1 from a patrimonial to a more r.atlonal·burcaucrttl~

srruc:tUrc has been demonsmted by lnalc•k at various times; see Halil lnalclc., "''amanh Hulrukuna Giri4: "'rfl·Sultanf Hukuk vc Fatih'in Kanunlan," in OmufPUt 1"'/N'rllltwl'+fll, Topllnfl PI E,_i (Istanbul, 199~), pp. Jll)-+1 . He further discusses the implications uf suc.:h

JO BANilrrl AHD RVUAUOMT8

During expansion and conso1idarion It was neceasary for the state ro weave together the various populations of nomads, peasants, tnerchants, and artisans into a common entity and purpose- that of contributing to the welfare of state and society. Conquest a1so introduced to the Otto­mans the previously autonomous and powerfu11ocaJ power holders, who had to be integrated into the system and convinced to relinquish at least part of their revenue to the new state. With the conquest of the Balkans and then the Arab lands, new cultural and religious groups had to be in­corporated, settled, and respected in their different identities, inducing them to contribute to the we1fare of the empire. The ruling class was to

realize these nc:c:ds in their function as warriors and administrators. The ruling class described by Inalcak, "called~ literally the (military' , in­clud[ing] those to whom the Sultan haddClegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namdy officers of the court and the army, civil servants, and ulmuJ,"13 was the class created by the state for the purposes of the state and would remain faithful to the sultan since they depended on him for their privileges. The mlteri class was to be dif­ferentiated from the retiJII, "comprising all Muslim and non-Muslim sub­jects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government" and who were specifically excluded: "it was a fundamental rule of the Empire to exclude its subjects fro(Jl the r,!Y~ Q(Jh~ 'milir.acy'. Only those among them who were aaual fighters on the frontiers and those who had entered the ulmul class after a regular course of srudy in a religious sem­inary could obtain the sultan's diploma and thus become members of the 'military' class." 14

The mlteri class, 15 endowed with the sole right to bear anns and tore­ceive revenues and land grants, was also the embodiment of the sultan's

a tr111Ufonnatlon from a Webcrian paspcctiV1: in arguing that the bureaucncy dcve.lopcd iu own intem.al solidarity, justifying its actions u being for the good of both relig ion and the state. See Halillnalak, "Commcna on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the Otto­man Polity,"~ &pen;,. Nuw flutene Sl'llllies 1 (tim): 6J- 6+.

131nalak., .. The Nature ofTnditional Society: Turkey," in PolitiullM!Nierniurim ;,. flf/NUI •lUi ~ cd. Robert Ward and Dan.kwan Rosrow (Princaon, 196+), p. 44.

1'4Jbid. This socictal distinction and its implicatioN have been described by Shinder, who discusses the different theories of the state regarding the Ottoman Empite. He rcprcscnts the political difTctcntiation used by Lybycr and Windt V1:f'SW the more sociocull'IJr.ll model u( lnalak and lttkowitt in which the differentiation is more cbbor;atc, while still maintain­ing the primary ruling dass- subj«t dus dichocomy. See Shinder, "Early Ottoman Admin· i~tration in the WiJdcmas," pp . .w-so 1.

15Hcrc I usc the term "dus" carefully sina: debares ha\11: bcl.aborcd this point. 1be IJSUri was dearly a class in the economic sense because of its particular position in the producti\11:

••

1baolmc: powc:r~lttwugh abeolucc: royal aurhority belonged to tbe eultan unly, this autho rltt was exercised in his name ~is class of men who were his own creatlon, his slave-servants.-The cala£e thar acted as the cen· tral headquarters of dle state housed dlC8C slave-servants, mined and cd· ucated thenl in the Ottoman cusroms, and channeled them into the ntllitary or administrative routes according to their skills)'n the proces11, lhc sultan assured that the mlteri would be loyal to him and help him pro­te<.t his absolute rule. Wars and slave markets gave way to the more stan· dardiud thvfirme as me source of slaves. Here, under local supervision

4:hristian villagers were to surrender all their male children between the ages of eight and rwenty, who were brought to Istanbul where their ~anization, began. 16 [n the words of one author, "So pcrfecrly did me Palace School mold aliens of widdy divergent race and creed to the Tutk.ish type, and so thoroughgoing was the eroccss of assimilation, that there are on record few instances of rebels and renegades among officials educated within its walls."17 Muslim subjects were excluded from d1is procc.-.s because it was believed that they would abuse their posicion, whereas _Christians who were given a chance to rise in an alien sys~ would become zealous at the task of maintaining it. 18 Moreover, ir scxms that, as in most other Islamic empires, an attempt was made not to disturb agriculture by pulling the peasanrry into th<! army and to usc in their stead

ii£Par.ltu5 of Ottoman socic1y, and it did reproduce itself within that position. Pard y heca.u.e or its origins and partly because o( the strength of the Ottoman sra te, the IUkm wu noc autonomous.

16lnalc•k. TIN OmMum £-.pin, p. 78. 17Barnem: Miller, quoc:cd in Mctin Kunt, "Ethnic Regional (Cins) Solidarity in rh¢

Scvmtccnth-Ccntury Ottoman Establishment," /11~ fl*nud fJ[ MWI/e Easttr1t !itNII• ia s (1974)::13+· There is, however, a certain amount of coniJOV1:f'Sy around the iuue of whether the tlnfiNW was the main cause of the loyalty of the sla\11:-scrvant.s in the Otmtnlll Empire. Some of the conrrovcray regards whether these men cut o tT their conncctic'Nll rc> their original lands and families or kept an inttteat in the future of their homeland. Whcrcaa H . A. R. B. G ibb and Harold Bowen argue that these children wen: ttxally cut o fT from thch parents and their regions, Albert Howe Lybyu disagn!cs and defends the thesis that at lea•t some of them might ha\11: kept their initial associations and their belief in Christianity. See G ibb and Bowen, lsl4Mi& S«iay lllfll the Wm (Oxfocd, 19f7) , 1:+3, and Lybycr. The GIIM'tt• 111mt tfthe On- E""J1in m tht Tmu ofS.ua- tht Mltjptifimtt (Cambridge, Mass., 1913), pp. 68-69. Kunt in "Ethnic Regional (C ins) Sol.idarity," added ro this litm~ture by demon· strating that, when these slave-servants reached positions of power and privilege, they Ire· qucndy reestablished contaa with their area of origin, c:vcn spoke the language and wore rhc gari;l of their o riginal homeland. This demonstrates that they kept M>me loyalty m rhcir homeland, but it does not demonstrate that they wen: thereby not loyal tx> the 4ultan.

lMfnalo k, The 0 ,.,_, fMI'in, p. 78.

I -

slaves who themselves were Jess mvol~d in the ccononuc: produt.'taon pro­cess of the empire. 19

From early times, the Ottomans maintained the mlteri class by blending a meritocratic system with sultanic favoritism to enhance the position of descendants or reward preferred clients. Max Weber emphasized the more discretionary aspect of rule in the patrimonial system: "'The ruler's favor or disfavor, grants and confiscations, continuously create new wealth and destroy it again.''20 Ottoman historians, on the other hand, have prajsed the system for its favoring of upward mobility based on talent and ability. As the polity moved away &om patrimonialism, merit or professional net· works and solidarity gained importance as determinants of starus.1 1 In fact, although there is no doubt that the better skilled were given a chance, it is noc entirely correct to conceive of the Ottoman system as mcritocratic. In the workings of the tinpnM, the system of merit was es· tablished and continued throughout one's career. ln the central as well as the provincial system, those who did well were rewarded with better po· sitions and more opportunities for the acquisition of wealth and status. This was the perception of many travelers in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century especially. For example, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq at· tests to this in his Turkish letters. But, especially at the palace, positioning and important connections also helped tremendously to get oneself no· ticod. In times when patrons quickly fell in and out of favor, it became important ro manipulate connections even more carefuJJy. Metin Kunt demonstrates thls well in his story of the Dcrv~ Mehmod Pasha, who ended up as a successful grand vizier. Dcrvi~ Pasha not only established ties with his superiors and his patrons; in fact, he made his first move by establishing ties with a man with whom he shared a patron. The impor­tance of this tic was that thjs man had just been appointed to a state po­sition. Dervi~ Pasha's acumen, then, was in his ability to connect with another client of the same patron, then appointed to a state position.12

1~ were noc cxdudcd trom these xt:ivirics either-. Slaves were wed in trade and in large agricultural enterprises. It was usually freed slaves who participated in rr.ade and be· came commercial agents in long-disran« trade. In the: case of agriculture, slave labor was used when regularions about the:,.,.,_ forbade their we: on large estates (pftlih) . Sec lnllla k, ~Servile Labour in rhc Ottoman Empire," in The M11NIIII Effuts of the /s/Jurlic IUUI jlllkD­Chrinilm Worllh: The EIISt E11.1Ut P4tttnt, cd. Abraham Asher, Tibor Halasi·Kun, and Rcla K. Kiraly (New York., 1979), pp. 1J- Jl.

10Max Weber, E-y aNI S«iety: A" 0 Ntlille ofl,.ttrf'"ri•v S«id~ cd. Gucmhcr Roth and Claus Winich (Berkeley, •918), 1:1099.

11Stanford 1. Shaw, Hintw'J of the On-- E"'JH" aJUI MIJI/ern 1ilf'Uy (Cambridge, 1976), and Lybycr, The Gtmn~Mnlt of the On-- Ewrpirr.

11Metin Kum, "'Oc:rvit Mdvncd P:14a. Vczir and Entrepreneur: A Study m Ottoman

TIK Krvant cUte was charac:t~r~ ttcr lack. of 1\ltODQJllJ~ Thla aJavc•serva.nt system that provided the sultan his military and admininra· tiYC instrwnents- a ccntraJ janissary army, ocher central troops, all bu· reaucraric officials, and the members of the imperial council- alto prevented independent policy and action. The stare-created artribures nf thls slave-servant system ensured that the ruling class could nor develop an autonomous identity and institution outside rhe srate itself. Membcrshir in the RSUri was allowed according to established criteria. ·n,esc were then individuals who were sustained through state interaction and ac· quirod their status through the state. Having no independent basis of power o r wealth of their own, they remained subservient and, as Carter Fandley apdy argues, their post in life was much different from their Eu· ropcan counn::rpam in both medieval and modem times, Accordingly, no cnrporate institutions such as were common in Europe were: ever to de· veJop in the Ottoman Empire. 23

The Jack of a corporate body- which I here confine to the elites- man· ifcsted itself in the difficUlties of acquiring power. wealth. a.ud...statud..iJ1· dependently &om the state and in the numerous checks and counterchcckR on each official's discretionary power. For example, accumulation of wealth and status did not confer political power on individuals; only the state conferred political power. On rare occasions, members of the ruling class acquired wealth and power as it was bestowed by the ruler. l-4 Fur thennore, the praaice of confa.<K:ation (musiJIUmJ) guaranteed tlu t no in· dividual would accumulate a fortune that could rum him inro a potential contender. 25 lmportant central and regional positions were held in check by other equally important and centrally assigned positions. Even the: grand vizier, who was "the absolute deputy in the exercise of his I the sui· tan's] poHticaJ and executive authority" and the foremost military com· mander, did nor exercise unchecked power. Besides the men of religion, the head of the finance department and the leader of the janissary corps were positions used to check the power of the grand vizier. 26 This centNI system thus included within itself individuals whose self-interestcxl in·

Polirica.I-Economic 'Theory and Practice," 7\lnial 9 ( •m): 197- 11+. U f indlcy, B14rtiiiU7fllic JVfonrt ;,. the On-- Ewrpirt, PP· 14- IJ. 141bid., p. 1$. 1"The practice of confiscation has been explained by R.ifaat Abou-ci-H~aj, M'J'he Ottuman

Valr and Plll/a Householcb, 1611)-170) : A Preliminary Report," jtNnuJ oft II~ A~" Uri mtal S«iay 94 (1974 ): 446, n. J6, and by Gilles Vcirutein, "Trbor public er lbrmncs prlv~• dans l'cmpire ottOman (milieu XV!•-d&ur XJX• sieclcs)," Ann lin p mtlts tJ'lrwtks IJmtiot (t979), p. IU .

161nalak., The On-- E,.,, pp. 9S-96.

•• sriJ\CU were hcJd in check, but nate inttrat• were gaven Au rcln within the governing body of the Imperial council. This system of rule utendcd into provincial government, where it was replicated on a smaller scale. At the same time, under the confmcs of this system, a cohesive whole waa maintained at the level of the imperial council. The concept of rule through consultation (~11ven) bowld togcther the sultan, members of d1e state (uJrll-emr), and religious leaders in an attempt to reach coherent, state-level decisions.l7

Among the most important institution of the patrimonial system of rule was the janissary army, a standing infantry corps maintained by the treasury until it was abolished by the state. As Weber argued for patri­monial systems in general, the Ottoman sultan maintained an anny paid for by him, at his command, and which could be used against society it· sdf. The janissary corps was the typical patrimonial institution ensuring the sultan's safety. It funaioned as his private army, independent of the subjects of the realm, and joined the sultan at his side in war.28 The jan­issaric:s were not the only ccntraJ anny. Other central troops, such as the Six Cavalry Divisions making up the ~ military division, also bred and maintained at the center, were the sultan's servile elites. ln many ways, the central army was devised to Protect the sultan's housc:bpld and offset provincial power holders, whether fTorn various older established dynasties or from tribesmen swept in by invasions. 29

Yet the state-janissary relationship was not an untroubled one. As the sultans imposed their will on these military men, the changing means of warfare gave the janissaries more bargaining power vis-a-vis the state. Control of the janissaries, because of their location at the seat of power and their quick-to-challenge nature, could be difficult. One of the main challenges occurred mainly because anny-state relations interfe.red with the fiscal side of ccntral.iz.ation. For example, Mehmed II, who under­stood dearly the demands of centralization and the necessity of a solid fascal policy- which would reinfortt his ability to pay this army- was also forced to debase the currency (Mfe) at his accession to the throne and later during his reign on a routine basis. This was done with the under­standing that such policies were detrimental to the janissaries and that they were likely to fight them. 30 As a result of the hardship experienced,

17Murphey, .. lbc Historical Setting," p. M · lliWebcr, £-,111111 SKiay, :1:101$- 19. 29Shinder, "Early Ottoman Administration in the Wi.ldemeas," p. Jl+. aoKafadar explains this very wdl in his work. He argues that a strong tn:asury meant that

the sultan could be inc:lqlendcnt because he could use his tn:asury tO maintain hiJ main

~ janluarlc:a 1rruck a ~!Jain 1Yith Beyuld II nor to dcba the coinoge 11 hll ac:ccaaion to the t ronc.31>

The nrugglc between the sultan :and his immedJare parrimonil.l anny rckAndled during the reign of Murad Ill (1S7+- 9S), in rs89, when the members of rhc •llf"'ndu anny revolted against the policies of the main ftlcaJ architect of the sultan, his friend and companion the governor· acencral ( beylerbeyi) of Rumelia, Mehmcd Pasha, The new sultan's t'Cntral· lr.adon policies combined with the hardships of war on the I ran ian bord~r and d1c subsequent debasement of the coinage all acted to trigger the rc­w)Jt. The rebels demanded Mehmc:d Pasha's head and warned the ~ultan 10 lCCt'Ck to their demands, bur the revolt subsided quickly and contem­J'(Wiry narrators affirm that the sultan was never really threatened. The rebels had simply condemned the concept of two powerful men ar rhe c:en · tcr. The soldiers did not alter their allegiance to the center; they opposed the notion of two centers. 32 Over rime the bargaining power of rhe cc:nt~J anny steadily increased, until finally the sultan's realization of its in· c:rcaiCd autonomy and power led to the janissarics' demise.33 Yet it is fair 10 say that, during the period under srudy here, their size grew to d1e det­riment of other troops, especially as the European wars required more and more firepower. 34 The csnr:ral. anny celc:.b.Et<!9 ~ he,y_day, and the state made sure it glowed in this brilliance.

If the central army was the penn anent patrimonial arm of the ruJer, the ~jncjaJ ann~ composed of a mixrure of~ military power:_ ~olden nc;()f.porated at the time of the conquest and others sent out fTom the cen·

ter, was the representative of the Ottomans' glory in the provinces. ln re­lations between center and periphery, the central anny rivaled the regional

anny, che janissaries. Yet this very fiSCal policy of the state could 110( be maintained unleu It hurt rhe janissaries directly, since it manr the debasement of the U(e as a regular measure Q( filling up the treasury. Kafad:u ugues that Mchmcd II made UK of rccoinage and de· buetncnt as a regular component of his fJSCal policy. 5« Kaf.ldat, .. When Coms Tumed inm ~of Dc:w," pp. Jl-j4.

• Ibid., P· B· 11Kafadar uses the poem o( a rebel to indicatr this controVm~y: "Can rwo k.Jngs ra1 '"

nne palace~ Or in one home reside rwo lions~ In short, accept either him or us, n lord! Two IUltiN cannot employ so many sbva." Ibid., p. UJ, n. 119.

' 'The dcst:ruction of the janissaries occurred in 1816 during d~e reign of Mahmud 11. But evm earlier Sclim III had been abk to bypass the janisllaries by C~Uting a new .1mly, the ,iu~tf., alliA, to replace these seditious military elmKnts with increasing say in guvc:mment affairs. See Stanford Shaw and Ezd Kural Shaw, Histl!ry of the Ott~Muu~ E•pm tUUJ Mollrrn 'ntr*e)l Vol. 1.

_.Whereas the corps counted 10,000 men in 1+30, by the end of the scvemeenrh cemury ir counted nearly S+,OOO men. The cavalry, on the odler hand, declined in siu and tmpor tan« in this last century. lnak1k, The On-n EMpin, p. 83.

annics, the central bureaucracy countered the regional, and within the: clif. ferent administrative ~gions of the empire military, adminisy_uive, and policing functions were disputed by different power holders(l"hesc rival· ries and djsputcs were designed to pit iliffcrent groups against each other in competition for state rewards, that is, to majntiin a atatt:Wntrollcd contest jn s<XiSY)Each of these confrontations, of the state with its own uruts and of intrasocic:tal uruts, enhanced the autonomy of the state.

Provincial officials at all levels were rotated to prevent the establish­ment of any privileged hol.l.Sc: away from e center. ln this system-which Weber tenns prebendal- 35 the land did not belong to the cavalrymen or the governors; it belonged to the state, wruch admirustered it carefully. [n

t,S28, about 87 percent of the land was ~~J.Min).36 Brief tenure in office, facilitated by state ownership of land, was certainly an cffi:ctive mechanism of central control. 37 Generally, provincial officials were as­signed to a ~erent location every three years to prevent them from ac­quiring clients loyal to themselves and, by implication, disloyal to the sultan. Thus the system revented the establishment of any legal rdati(!n between the landholder and the land. Yet, by allowing the sons of land­hOlders ro get iand grants (often in ~gions other than their fathers'), this class was able to reproduce: itself in some fashion.

The cavaJry army, the essence of the Ottoman provincial system, con­sisted of prebendal land (nmm-) holders and their retinues. The bJU!f sy~-

• tern was based on the allocation of land to members of the cavaJry in V' ~~ for service in the provincial army. The exchange was simple: the

state allocated a specified plot ofland comprising a cerrajn number of vii· lages to the cavalryman, who collected the taxes from its peasantry, en· surcd his livelihood, and rajscd a retinue for war. The tunar holder therefore had to prepare for battle and admiruster the villages under his jurisdiction. 38 Successful warriors were rewarded by larger domajns. ln addjtion to war making, the state assigned the tasks of rural administra­tion, security, and policing to provincial officials.

The ?War holders made u~ class with the proviso that it existed and rc:majned functional as inilividuils who saw their fortunes tied to the state that manipulated their tenure arrangcments)Jn this sense, to borrow a

35Wcbcr, E~ tuM S«:ia)) :1:1077- 79• 361naktk., The On- EMpiw, p. 110.

" Weber abo c:mphasiza this point in his diJcwsion o( patnmorual ruk and Jhc control o( potential conrcndcn to power; sec£-, iUM S«:ia)) :z.:1on

38lnala.k, TIH 0~ E,.,m, p. 1ol.

tmll from Marx, they remained • dus-ln·itaclf. 39 In temu of thclr own lnb:rcst as a class, the nnur holden were not wdl positioned, alnct thty "' were formally linked to the stare and not to Other nmar holden. lndlvld uaJ fOrtunes were entirely contingent on r.he State: individual mctnMf'l were rewarded for prowess at war, were dismissed, rotated. or even l'dt out of the system. The system as such worked because rewards kept the officials content. In other words, the logic of the system was preacntc:d In tcnns uf the acquisition of larger domajns; d1e more succc:ssful the war• dor, the larger his domajn. Tunar holders were thus induced to upirc to larger domajns and _eerceived the rotation ~tem as merirocratlc rather than controllin . As lrene lkJdkeanu-Stei err and others have made clear, this wor~ especially well when the empire was expanding and U• mar holde.rs were ready to move for better and more land. 40 Bur this dr aunstance was to change in the mid-seventeenth cenrury.

The larger provincial system replicated the h.mar along different lcvrl•. 'The provincial army was put together by a district official (n4M,f), dajmcd by dte ilistrict governor (slmUUthey.), and went to war under dlc command of the governor-general (beylnWyl). Each of these officiala wu granted revenues from land and taxes in accordance with rank and accom• plishment. The govcmor;g~, who held the military command of U\t troops, convened a provincial council that largely mirrored the central one. He met regularly with the legal, financial, and administrative func tionaries of the provinces. With the help of his two ttmar officials, he lld· vised the central state on nmar appointments, providing a ccrtiflcart (tezi.en) {;?,.f.£rving soldiers or ~porting those deserving or punishment. 4 e was naturally provided with enough autonomy to ad vise the ccn state on local condjtions and men deserving promotion, but this status did not translate into any independent initiative, bccaute both hiS treasurer and his judge were cen~appointees whose loyalty IUld interests were also directed to the state.!> Similar arrangements were made regarding the lower-levcl officials subordinated to the govcmor-

•91 refer here to the distinction betwttn a dass· in-itxlf and a dass-fur-iuclf. rhe kOOC\IJ rcptcscuting Jhc class that is able to act in its own intttcsrs.

40lrtnc Bcldicc.tnu-Stcinhcrr, "Loi aur Ia transmission du nmar (1SJ6)," n.mt. ll (19?9):71-10 :1.

4 1 For information on the function of Jhc ~ sec lbnhim Mttin Kunr, 7lH SrJt•'t StrMM3: The Tnuu.for-tiM of~ ~ ~MIJII, m&-1610 (New York., 1981), pp. 26-19; lnakdt, The Orr- E,.,m, p. 117; Douglas Howani, "The Ortom~ T- Syt tern and Irs Tra.nsfonnation, 1561-1~,. Ph.D. dias., lndi~a UniYCrSity, 11)17, pp. U - IJ.

4~yorg Klldy-Nagy, uXVI. YOzytJda OsmaniJ lmparatorlu&unda Mcrka.i YOnci lmJn Batlla Sonmbn." Tlll"ih A~ IJeraisi 1 (1969): ...o-ss.

general. The district govemors who admlniatcn:d the original unit~t of rule, the siUUIIIts, 43 also recommended inctividuals for the granting and ctismissal of tJmars and formed the link between the state and the stmadt as well as among units.44

The provinces were also administered and controlled by judges, part of the larger literati (ilmiye) class whom lnalok defines as "a privileged group~hosc status and hierarchy"'~~ based on the level of certified knowledge in the Islamic sciences.'>. hierarchically organized, semiau­tonomous bu~aucratic apparatus under the control of the sultan, this group bestoWed unique judicial authority on its members. At its top was the 1eyh-iiL-islam, the most prominent and powerful member of the ulema, followed by the chief justice of Rumclia and Anatolia. These: men were in rum followed by various ranks of judges (luubs) ranging from the judge of Istanbul to the small-town judges resident across the empire. The kadts assigned to regional ~.2 were to employ law only for the administrative purposes of the state. Wesc representatives of the sultan practi~ in the provinces according to secular (ilulun) and rcligi~ ([,erillt:) taw:)n ac­cordance with the traditional rule of patrimonialism, "'ttoman law at­tached great importance to precedent and gave wide discretionary powers to the judges, whose decrees (fomum) frequently instruct simply to act in ~cordance with the law that is customarily applied.'"'7 This was also quite

<:different from legal practice in western Europe, where ration~ law devel­oped. independent of ~e administrative purposes of the state . .,

Judges were administrators and adjudicators; they also managed to in­tegrate various dissimilar forces in Ottoman society. As Madeline Zilfi maintains, "In these [judges] and in the strength of their ideological ties to the official center, the ulema of the hierarchy, lay the guarantee that Ottoman society would preserve not only its Sunni identity but its cen-

43 Kunt, TIH SNitlm'J StriWJfl:l, p. '•· il1csc: arc !he units for which provincial rules and regulations were drawn up. The: cadastral surveys were also conduaed for each unit separately.

44Kunt, The SNittut 'I Ser1W11t:s, pp. Z3-~5 . 4SJnalca.k., "The R~~Ut~~MF RegiSters of the K lllllllllter of Rumeli as Preserved in !he lstlln·

bul Miifnlliik Archives," Tllniul w (1988): ~.SI-7J.

~is is not ro say dut the Islamic religious establishment was iruignific.mt. Overall it "represented !he grcarcst power within dle state independent of the grandvwer," as well as forming an organized religious hierarchy fulfilling rdigious and civil duties of administra· tion. At the rop, the teyh-ill·isltutf intcrprcrcd religious law (Jtriat) and only slowly managed ro increase hil power Jlllitbilt !he govcmrncnt. Not only did he gain and maintain jurisdiction of the religious and legal csubliJhmenr, he also fOught fur mdepcndcncc from state offkials, espcciaUy the grand vwer. lnalak, TIH 0,__ li.mpm, p. 96.

47 Kunt, TIH SNitiUI'J Seri'MtS, pp. 7+- ?S·

iritt and lcgalltarlan character aJ wel1.'1tl ntis network of trained lshamJc K'holart helped counter the independent and heterodox religiOWI force~ in the hinterland. Judges and other mc.rnbers of the ulema repf'Qtntcd a dis· rinct alternative tO Sufi orders, which attracted the people, directing them toWard heterodox belief :and sometimes oppositional politics. The ~ or· <kn- somc of which were heterodox in bcJjef- were probably the most potentially org:anizcd force in society and were neutralized by the state ai· rhcr through co-optation of their leadership or through the countcrforcc: of the Sunni religious establishment. 49 Another important integrative (unction of the judge was the intermediary position he could assume in the interaction between peasant and landholder, settling disputes to serve the interests of regional stability. Because both landholder and judge were •rare officials, d:tis intermediary position integrating the peasant directly into the realm of the state made for tension between the sultan's servants. 'nlcir relationship was envenomed by the fact tha~e state gave both the military·administrative and the religious-administative authorities~ lappin~wen; often the tunar holder or his deputies exercised their pc­'ftil au rity without regard to the judge, 50 thereby increa..~ing the: amount of diffuseness and '?~io~ in..tb~~rossing the Li~e be­tween the two parallel admimstratJons, as when JUdges became dtstriet governors or governor-generals, potential~ increased the competition and tension between regional power holders. 1

The relationship between the govenunent and the judges was nor im~ mune to conflict either, since tension between these: was also es rabli11hed ln the practice of rotation and d:te dependence of these: officials on the state for their positions, rewards, and interim pay when they were out of office. Although the main argument for the establishmenr of a rotation system among the ulema seems to have been the drastic increase in the number of judges, the practice seems to have started early enough ro also be seen as a regulation system. Data from the appointment registers dem·

411Madcl.inc Zilfi, TIH PIJJitia of Piny: TIH On-. Ut-;, tbt PostcliusiciU A.tft (1~ tltJo) . Srudics in Middle Eastern History 8 (Minneapolis, •988), p. l6. ·~ Bdcta.shis as wdJ as !he Mcvlevis were tied ro the sratc. 1lw: Bdtrashis were incor·

porated as the chaplains of !he janissarics and the Mevlevis "acquired the right to gird t Sultan with a holy sword upon his accession." Ira. M. Lapidus, A Histwy of Isi11Mit S«ietUJ (Cambridge, 1913), p. 326. lnaletk makes a similar argument about the incorporation nf 1he different heterodox ordcn into the political center.

SOOibb and Bowen refer to r:tW problem as well. They argue that the result was the cr"C arion of "a series of conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions." IslAMic S«iety lUll/ tlH Wrst, a:12a.

51 Ibid., 1:117-18.

oNrrat( that Lud~hlp was limited , a fucd pc.rlocJ of ~nure. 'J'hc re• script of 1$91 ii\M It Clear: ·x new Cirididarc(M;;JM/;i) shall not be appointed before he conlpletcs rhrce years (of waiting) .... The cadis [judges J of small towns shall be in possession of rhdr post for rwo fuJI years. nSl 1\s lnaJok concludes from the registers, the duration of judge· ship at a post kq>t decreasing; it went from three years to two and then ro twenty months, and by the eighteenth century the period had been re· duccd to eighteen months.53 Rotation as it applied to judges had a det· rimental effect on both the judges and their constituencies, because judges who held their positions for a specified period of tenure were practically taken off the payroll by being put out of off"ace for a certain period of time before reentering the system. The period out of office was seen as one duri~g which the judge ":'ould be able to ~o.rk wi'9 h~s mentor, increas· ing htS knowledge to qualify for a better pos1t1on. 5Qs m the case of oth(r provincial officials, rotation was assigned a meritocratic meaning, making it palatable to those who endured its hardships. And hardships were com· mon, since when the judge relocated he remained unable to draw income in the fonn of court dues, and the lifestyle and the requirements of cere· monial attendance in Istanbul were quite cosdy. To make financial sur· vival possible, j~ss resorted to bribery,_expl~t~tio!!_, and ~~pulation of the rural population to gain e:xtn income before they went on rotation)

The patrimonial state perfonned its task of elite control and shuffling so that elites were constrained by their lack of autonomy, and their de· pcndcnce on the state for office, awards, and status and brought into a seemingly natural competition which Weber saw as detennined by the "quasi-jurisdiaionaJ limitation of the powers of office.,.,ss How could similar control of potential societal organizations such as cities, guilds, village, and tribal associations be maintained?

The most important organizational aspect of the Ottoman Empire, as Mardin claims, was the absence of"civil society. »56 The state was able to incorporate a variety of groups- whether ocrupational, religious, or eth· nic- inro its do main, bypassing the intenncdiate structures that gave so-

/ ciety an independent existence. The absence of private propc!:!J is one of the crucial aspects of this relatiomhip. Such intermediate struct:urcs as "corporate bodies with autonomous jurisdiction . . . formed the institu·

51Jnalc1k, "11lc R~~r.~ Registers," p. :1.61. 53 Ibid. 541bid., PP· l61- 6j . 115Webcr, ~ lllfll S«iny, ~:10~9. 66Mardin, "Power, Civil Society," p. :1.64.

....

btw nfdvU tcXIcry In the Wen."11" In gc~nl, the llrctc:ncc o(many ••lttoM doel ncx •lsnal civll JOdety elmer; often when made asaocl·

«JI' pcuutt communal association• are formed, they desire to 10lvt *ily problems of production, distribution, and trade. Acc.ordJngly, Gnd up fonering localism. On the other hand, when thae usocia ~'OfTte larger than the local concerns, they come under the scrutiny

lht •care and run the danger of being captured by it. Civil society be arrived at from the right balance of associations, nerwork.'l uf

~-Kk:ln that contain the state as well as constrain it. This was never the in the Ottoman Empire. Civil society did grow in western Europe, one of the most important developments to come out of this institu·

buc In Europe was the rdativdy srrW~er ~~o~!!& town~ t!Jat ....,.~~''-'' · ...2!:!.. the rise of the es.!:.... e components ofth~

narratiVe are different. In dtc Ottoman lands, the stare s.!:!!>j~gate~ economic aaivi to polit·

.UIIDIIWS:D!JQflS. It strongly regulated economic aaivity, controrle and ~~~~..!c~it~ic:l:=!s~, ~created them and restricted their associational, com·

and politiCal aaivitics. 59 In return, i!..£.romise9 control of trade: transportation, and security in the hinterland. The main rcason11 regulibon ranged from the enrichment of the treasury to the pro·

of the citi9, _especially of Istanbul, the scat of power. It was th( lstanb~at forced the state to o rganiu production and di&·

•• ,., into a vast integrated economic system that encompassed the cmpire.60

Canrrol of the cities and merchants and regulation of the price mech· (Mrl!) were the center's main channel to ensure that the people

fed and the elite content. The elites in panicular were of concern to Rate because they received f LXed incomes and were therefore dc:pcn· on stability in the market. As Cemal Kafadar explains, the ""rh was

1 haphazard institution of irrational state price control; rather, ir was

''lb6d. "ANd. S« Wc:bcr, ~ IINI S«icty; Daniel OUrot, "The IWc: of the West,., A~

Rnint so (•98+): 111-95; Reinhard lkndix, NlflriMt·Bt~iUii"B 11N1 C.itiutultip •m). I am :also indebc:cd to Naomi 0\:azan for this understanding of civil society.

...... lardi,n. "Power, Civi.l Society,'" p. :1.64-. lnalctlt explains that this was in accord.ancc: with -IUOUU:DLC:u~pug, whcrt the state would be actively involved in building and revi·

rowns, and villages, as the historian al·Tabari described and rationaliu:d fur IM111nkls. This was because: the authorities believed that the welfare of state and society deJ!endcnt on the cl05C regulation of economic and agriculrural activity. 'Jbcsc woul1l !be people and fill the treasury. Sec lnalc1k, The OttoMIUI B,m, p. 140.

llfbld., p. I+S·

/

a carefully devised systan based on extensive data coJiectcd about the market and its movement. Furthermore, the evolution of the&C regula· tions from the time of the e2rly conquerors to the rigorous establishment of law codes on market supervision ( ihtirllh lumunn~Uffe~m) by Mclunai I J and then Bcyazid II was part of centralization.61 Since before markt con· 0'01 markts had to be created, especially in newly established cities, e ides of forcible t were at the core of this state need. Mehmed the Conqueror is famous for his forced settlements of minorities into Istanbul to stimulate trade and commerce in his new capital.

The ~ was the economic institution most likly to capture auton­omy for itself. H . A. R. B. Gibb and Harold Bowen, looking for similar associational and corporate identities as in Europe, argue that guilds in the Ottoman Empire were fairly organized. Remnants of the more pow­erful thirteenth· and fourteenth-century Anatolian city professional soci· eties, which developed out of a tradition of Islam and specific codes and ethics (fotu'IVIJHJ), were incorporated into the government realm of author­ity with centralization. On whose: initiative were the Ottoman guilds formed, that of merchants and craftsmen or of the state? Opinions vary. While Mardin, Ira Lapidus, and Gabriel Baer argue that guilds were not formed at the initiative of their members, Inalak describes the guilds as similar to western ones and contends that they were formed in a similar fashion. In the Ottoman Empire, the strong Islamic tradition of hislm, which affirmed the concern of the ruler for his people, meant that mer­chants and anisans would not be allowed to maximize their profirs.62

Most occupational groupings in the Ottoman cities were organized into "corporateJ~xiies to enforce economic discipline and facilitate admini· srration.J16t:._Thcsc bodies had the authori ty to execute the important in· rernal affairs of the guilds, while for cnernal business they were under the obligation to comply by the strong rules and regulations established by the state and traditional practic¥irlnl was a long-established tradition that gave the s tate the: power to interfere in the market mechanism and redirect it for the supposed good of society. There is therefore littic doubt that the guilds were in fact less than autonomous organizations within society. They might have started with greater autonomy and have lost it with the centralization of the state.64

" 1 Kafadar, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew," pp. u&-14. ~is is not accepted by al l scholars; ace: La.pidus, A History D{ ls/Jmdt S«uraa, p. no. 401 lbid. On the question of INN, Barkan and lnalc1k differ. M(nak•k. in fact, acknowledges thai guilds Iocr the aurooomy they once had. See Tht Or

,_ E,m, and "Capital Fonnarion in the Otroman Empi~." }1111rul II{~ Histtlry V) (1969): 97- 140.

"'"~'-- , ,..., .......... .. .. . 71iw c-u. tf• ~·c...., +J

. Rdlgioua and ethnic minorities were other ~eparatc groupt with poren~ naf auronomy, at leur in their internal affairs. Bspccialty In the major cit· io, J~, Grecb, and Armenians had been estabtiahc:d u communities, with mttmal j urisdiction of !!!sir affai and had managed to order their n:latmhips w'liJl the outside world through both meir leaders and a ~ ria of local arrangements. 65 Yet, again, they were never given autonomy fhr more than internal issues of community government. And even then new re$Circh suggests that the: government kpt a dose eye on the internal lqJal affairs of the communities, so much so that we sec in the court records that minorities made extensive usc of the Muslim courts.66 AI· t~gh ~ ~~mmunities ~ to be independenr decision-making uruts, thetr decistons were all mternal and flO( relevant to the organ.ttation of aociery, to production in society, or to the: potential interaction between classes. They were decisions regarding internal religious administrat ion, c:ommunity maintenance, election of leaders, and the patterned interac· tion with the stare. They did not affea any other group in society.

Gibb and Bowen refer to other institutions related to rural and tribal organization and argue for the autonomy and community organization of these as well. There are a few key difficulties with this representation. On the one hand, the Ottoman state no doubt attempted to incorporate the periphery as it was conquered and to establish its domination over these territories. On the other hand, it did so by incorporating or sending elites to administer for them, relying on an intricate venical chain of command that ended with the rural producer. In the process, it tied, through a dis~ tant loose association, every unit to a center, and every center to a slightly larger central unit. The end result of this chain of association and surren­dering of surplus to the state was the extreme isolation of the individual

65 Aron Rodrigue shows how lhlt relationship worked. The degrc:c of corporate auton omy thac: grotlfl' h.ld as well u me boundaries of their rdationship with the state have btttl the subject of an interesting ooniTOYCI'I)' among h.istorians. Some ~ argued mr J formtl, ~ and ~ ~ted fet\lp with each minority group IOOning an integrated and ooheaive ~unrty, ~ ,;&,. See ~anal Karpat, "MiUea and Nationality: The Rocx.a of me lncongrwry of Naoon and State tn the Post--<>noman En., • in C1tri1titMs -~~ ;, 1111 Dt!-- &.pin, ed. Bcnjan_Un Bnude and Bernard Lewis (New York. 1911), 1:141-69; ~w. H~ ll{tlN .an-a E"'ff"l. Odlen have a~ that there was no 11rict system by which mll10C1ty afhirs were rcgula1cd; nther, u Rodrrguc puts it, these w~ .. a series of local ar> rangemcms" cwcrsecn by the state authorities; Rodrigue, Fmttllj~, Tt.rtish jtrflf: The AI lUma lsrallite. Utti~ ~ tM Plllitia 11{/~.~ m ~ tl6o-IPS (Bioomlrlgton, 1990), p. VJ. For the or1gmaJ debate, a« BcnJanun Bnude, "Foundation Mydu of the MUI#t System," in ChriJtilms •"" Jews ill rbe Ot,_ E"'firt, ed. Bnude and Lewis, 1 :09- aa.

66R.odrigue, Fmtdl jnPS, n.rti1h /,.,, p. :1.9. He also cites many other pieces of work In the lirerarure that anesr to lhlt point. This is also corroborated by the cue study 1 have coo· duacd of the Manisa COW1 records, which indicatt heavy rdiancc of minorities on the Mus lim court, not only in intafa.ith issues but abo in the internal afhi11 of their community.

community, which was more bound by vertical than horizontal ties. Re· search has demonstrated that, even if village councils existed, rural orga· nizacion was sorely lacking. 67

To conclude, Ottoman state-society relations made the state's interests predominant and determined how society was organized. Traditional so­cial structures were preserved insofar as they did not interfere with the sultan's rule and were incorporated and reshaped when they exhibited po· tentially autonomous strength. The central state apparams dealt with peripheral contention in typical patrimonial fashion, through incorpora· cion. The center was omnipotent; it was protected by a central patrimonial army of lo yal slaves and it ruled the periphery through a prebendal corps of regional state officials, who if not similarly loyal were at least securely tied ro the state through their social and economic interests. The center also gained its strength through its accepted flexibility, its ability to adapt to the various geopolitical va.riacions it encountered. It was on this system of control and flexibility that the crisis of the seventeenth century was su­perimposed., and it is the central apparatus of this system that imple­mented changes in order ro readjust its systep1 of rule. lt is important, then, to examine th~anges the wo rld system underw~ during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the impact on Ottoman state-society relations.

The Ottoman Empire in Context

By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had asserted its place in history; the reign of Siileyman the Magnificent had ensured the fear and respect of other kingdoms. The Ottomans were a force robe reck· oned with, and no majo r European power was about ro deny or challenge this politically. Rather, internal developments in Europe, mainly eco­nomic and technological, altered the international stage ro challenge Ottoman boldness and strength. Two sets of questions need analysis here :

l firs!,. 'the SOl._!rce of th~"lans2~~ and of their image of infalli· Ollity; ~con e n_aturc q[ the changes that contact with the western world ihd·t particular crisis initiated in the realm of the Ottomans. Ma-

67For arguments aboul fonnal organization and infonnal association and control in the Ottoman society, set: Gibb and Bowc:n,/~ Society. 1:1s9. For the lack of rural organization set: lnalak, .. K()y, KOyl!l vc lmpararorluk," V. Milktlertm&n 1'rh*iye Sosytll ..e TktisM 1imhi K~, Teblljler (Ankara, 1990), pp. 1- n ; Karc:n Barkey, "Rebclliow Alliances: 'fht State and Peasant Unn:st in Early Scvc.ntecnth·Ccnrury France and the Ottoman Empire," A~~~~~r­ium ~ Iteview J6 (1991) :~71s. and "Tile Uses of Court Rccocds in the Rccon· srruaion of Village: Nct:works: A Comparative Perspective," /Httrutiortlll ft111"""' of ~ S«ioooaY J2 (1991): 196- 216.

•rial abounds on the glory of rhc early cent\lrles, but dlC:~ iJ a severe dearth of anaJyaJt ~garding the crisis of chc late sixtc:cnth and early IICV·

C'llffttlth ccnrurica. lr should also be pointed our rhar in popuJar under· •tandlngs the crisis of the sevente-enth century caused the decline of the Onoman Empire after the SOieyrnanic period. J argue two points: that \ we do not really know the cxrc:nr o f the damage caused by the cri11is, and mat the Ottoman state did not deteriorate so severely as to justify talk of dtdinc.

The success of Sultan SiileY!!lan ( as2o- 66) in in~rnational and domes~ de arenas was based on his ability ro 6alance the conception of a grand empire abroad with stability and cohesion at home. This he achieved through campaigns against East and West begun at his accession ro the lhrone and through reforms meant ro strengthen the legal systcm.l\ll From the conquest of Bclgrade in t~zr to the n~us w_~~i!Jl W~ Hutlgar· r luu .!fld ,R~ians ro the J!laritime wars in the Mediterranean, the Otto· mans incorporated new areas into the empire, areas that were both popolitically essential and economically lucrative. The geopolitical in· •riner of control and consolidation took precedence, however. For exam· pic, one of the new sultan's first goals was ro conquer Rhoda;, whose knights were considered a men ace to the control of the Eastern Mediter­ranean and a roadblock on the way ro the newly conquered coloniC~J uf Bgypr and Syria.69 The wars with Hungary and Iran were to some extent wan of expansion, but even mo re they were wars of consolidation. In an lttanpt to consolidate his hold over the conquered rerritor ie.'i of the West, SU.leyman promoted discord in European lands, for example, by supporr· ., Uta the Protestant movements in France and Germany. 70

By the end of Siileyman)s reign, the Ottoman Empire had reached the 1 comfortable geographic limits of expansion. 7 1 Thereafter, conquest and incorporation seemed to level ofT, as the ability of armies ro reach the frontiers in good time diminished. An example is provided by the failure

6tAmong his nwnerous campaigns in the West, we c:an ci1e the: conquest of Belgrade In usa, Rhodes in IS:U, the battle at Mohacs againsl Hunga.ry in I.Pb, and the two indec:lsiw ~gns waged aga.insl Vienna in IS29 and 1.132. Conflia with Hungary was to be: taken up lata' by means of naval warfare in ISJ+. followed by naval warfart against Venice. 'The rttt u( die reign is similarly filled with wars ar the westcm front . Ag:ai.nst the East, Solcymllll un· dertook two major ofknsivca: in •s.* Tabriz and then Baghdad were consolidated; a second, later campaign lastc:d long and remained unfruitful.

illy, J. Parry, '1'hc Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent, •s:zo-66," in A History of rht em...., E,_,;re torno, ed. M. A. Coc>k (Cambrid~, 1980), pp. 79-So.

70Halillnak1k.. .. State and Ideology undtt Sultan S!llcyman 1," in TbeMidllk RIUt aHd rill WMu Uf'lller the o~, Ewtpirr: E.rs.ys tm &;q,q,y tmA Society (BioominKtun, IIWJ), PP• 70- 94.

118c:mard Lewis, The Bmn:Bmt:e of MDIIern Tintty (Oxford, 101.1). p. 2-t ·

of the P~rsian campaigru SUleyman undcrtOOic l'OWard the rnd of 1\ls reign. By the time armies reached the front, the campaign sea80n wa& aJ. most over and the annies were decimated. Nevertheless, during the: late sixteenth century the: Ottoman Empire fought wars successively on two fronts, on bodl the Safavid and the Habsburg borders- with Iran from 1579 to 1590 and with the Habsburgs from 1593 to 16<>6. The wars with Iran condnued into the seventeenth century, on a full scale from 1588 to 1610 and on a smaller scale (expeditions to Erivan and Tabriz) from 1634- to 1638. Each sultan who came to the throne attempted a conquest or two in the East as well as advances in the West. During the second half of the sixteenth century, gains were interspersed with losses; the conquest of Cy­prus ( 1570) was immediately followed by the losses of the Ottoman fleer at I...e 3!l~J.S1l) .

Ottoman internal policy related and intimately resembled international potiq. So.Jcyman carefully carried out a program of consotidation and centralization, establishing rules and regulations for the government. From the development of a sophisticated registration and taxation appa­ratus to its elaborate bookkeeping techniques, the Ottoman state put to­

gether a strong centralist bureaucracy under Suleyman's rulc.72 Central­ization and bureaucratization went hand in hand to extend the: reach of ditfe.rent departments into the Ottoman rcaJm. The: financ.e department provides a good example ofbureaucratization whereby the finances of the

~ver:nment ~w to be ?pcra~ ~a hierarchy of s~aricd scd..bes work­mg m funsonally diffcrcnttated groups according to regularized procedures. "/In a further exhibit of development, the financial institu­tion became highly flexible and adapted to the changing conditiOns of the empire.

Together with centralization, absolute patrimonial rule became en­trenched with a blend of justice and authori . Resistance to the: sultan was rarely tolerated, and high-ranking officials were often dismissed for dissenting opinions. Furthennore, under the centralist policies of the time, resistance from various groups was put down and rebellions were contained. 74 Despite: the: occasional harshness of imperial rule, Silleyman

n lbid., pp. }4--)5. 7~Linda T. Darling, "Adapmions in Administration: The Ottoman Fiscal Sys1cm,ft in Po­

litieM B-U:t fl{ tiN 0,_,, SllfoJ!iJ, MUJ Mf18hM EMfWct, cd. Tosun Ancanll , Ashraf Ghani, and David Ludden. Forthcoming.

741 am referring here ro the I'CYOit of Canberdi ai·Gau..ali. the governor of Damascus, who tried to liberate the newly conquered territory of Syria and restore the Mamluk kingdom in

k~uin:d dw: repurarion for being the molt just among Onoman aultam. Thl. was e.xempliftcd by the various edicts he sent to local authoritica cur· rtWng their power and ensuring the: fair treatment of dlC pcuantry. 78

Abo, his ruJe allowed some provincial officials to remain In office for long ptriods of tenure, thereby decreasing exploitation of the pcuantry. In lhort, the succe.~s of SUicyman's reign within Ottoman society was due mainly ro hi~ ability to control officials as well as tum them into lo~ members of the Ottoman elite while preserving the policy of tuWtt· UtUM~et, that isL of r~traint in taxation and exploitation. 76

Whereas the: SUieymanic era was the most rigorous time of consolida· don, it was also the: time when a certain flexibility in the system of rule became obvious as Silleyman himself tampered with the rules to adapt tu lnrc.mational and local geopolitical circumstances. Strains of variow kinda, exigencies on the part of viral segments of the ruling apparatUS, had bc:c.n present throughout the reign of So.Jeyman. The system, however, ad­ju.rtd to incorporate them. For example, already during Siileyman's rime: the tamar system had started to Jose its original constituc:ncy. People from our.idc the: corps (emebis) were infiltrating the system and obtaining ap· pointments. During the Persian campaign of 153+- 35, when peasantll fOught in the war and were accorded ttmars as reward, Silleyman assented and granted them an c:xemption. Later, however, he: repealed this order end banned peasants from the tunar corps. 77 The reason may have bc:en rhat too many peasants were leaving their land to join the wars, gaining wnars, and enhancing their starus. What was good for the: pcasantry­lhe opportunity for upward mobitity-endcd up being detrimental to so­ciety; dc:population and decreased production ensued because peasants were the main producers. As a result, the experiment with moving the: pcuantry in and out of the military was halted, dc:monstrating that the eyatcm was not as rigid as doomsday pamphleteers described it.

The pamphleteers, who represent a major source of infonnation for the tixtcenth and seventeenth centuries, were disheartened by the flexibility of the Ottoman system of rule. In their observations, they made two bask

IJI'1· Around the same rime, from 1$10 10 1,Sll, rcvolu of l?hs U$0Ciatcd with Thrcocn;ut no· mack wc::rc suppn:sscd by SOlcyman's forces. Sec Shaw, HistDry oftiH Ommum Elftplrr, r:8?-tl•

711nakt.k, in "St11tc and Ideology," p. 75, mentions a 1511 order 10 bdu in the pruvitll'<'S -recl(ying the coun fees to be CX~K.Tcd from the population.

76lbid., '70-94.

" Julius Kaldy· Nagy, "The 'Strangers' (Emtbikr) in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Mil leary Organization," in Bawm tiH Dtmlll1e IUtll tiH c.-.u: A Olkdiorl fl{ l'lf(Jm, cd Gyorgy Kara (Budapest, 1987), p. 161.

ltAHnm AND lhiiiiAUOilATt

I minakc:s: Firat, they referred to the SUicymanic m u one In whkh all segments of the society wo rked perfct:tly and the word of the law dominated; 78 this is incorroct since many analyses of the period demon· strate the system's flexibmry and its manipulation of the code in order to

I maintain the health of society. Second~ they attributed aJI problems o f the seventeenth century ro the internal changes of rule- the lack of strong leaders, the corruption and unpredictability they themselves were experi· encing in their careers. Advice literature- the genre with which these pampbJcteers became: identified- located decline in the major political, economic, and military transformations of the empire. The sultan's de­creasing interest in state affairs, irregular and unmeritocratic appoint­ment of grand viziers, reduced effectiveness of the army, and ad hoc measures to fill the treasury were identified as the majo r causes of decline. Every major institution of the empire was described as being in a state of disrepair. 79 The focus on the internal rather than the international crisis demonstrates the shortsightedness of some of these bureaucrats and pamphleteers.80 Ncverthdc:ss, the internal predicament the Ottomans faced was a product of the seventeenth-century crisis, which was omni· present across Eurasia, and of the changes in economic and military rela­tions betwc:cn West and East.

The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century

There seems to be some agreement on the topic of a general crisis that struck the Asian and European continents in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. But although the crisis has been well docwnented in its manifestations, irs causes have remained a focus of contention. It is often disputed which among these changes were the most crucial: the de­mographic and economi~ o r the political? The demographic changes

78Sec, for example, K~i Bey, Riutk, ed. Zuhuri Dam~man (Istanbul, t~). 79Bemard Lewis, "'ttoman Observers of Ottoman Decline," I~ Stwlia 1 (t962): 71-

17. ln this anicle Lewis outlines two of tbc major treatises of the time, the Asttfiuuru of the Grand Vcz..ir Ultfi Pasha and the: R.isaU of J<o9 Bey, as well as an ca.uy tided "The Rule of Artion for the RecrifJCUion of Dcfecu" by Katip <:cJebi.

IIOJb.is is corrobor.ued by Kllfadar's analysis, which danonstrates that the pamphleteers concmtrattd, for example, on nate· induced devaluations of the: currency, c:spc:cially during the: times of acca;sion, rather than on the price revolution, which was by far the lnOC"C serious phenomenon. The price revolution was induced from the outside:, whereas the periodic de­valuatio6s by the state at the: accession of the: sultan to the throne wen: internal m«hanisnu of filling up the treasury. Sex " When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew," p. no.

... ~ inau.e ~the ~lati9n In Europe and Alia nardng In the Mtly lfOOI and lcvelins OtrOrify at the bcginnjng of rhe ~eventccnth «n· IUry. The ec:onornlc change. in thc.te arcu ~rc rriggt'red by incmaca in JNa durin&. the sa_!ne period. Further, in Europe, the demUe of political liiiiiri.auoo•, the loss of powt'r of major rulers, and popular revoirs of var· klul forma have been incorporated into the crisis framework. ~ existence of some sort of crisis has been documented for the

Onuman Empire as well. The data on demographic :and economic ...... in the Ottoman Empire arc sc:uce; only rttendy have regional ••Ua been filled in and greater accuracy gained. [n the Ottoman Em· ~Jin, u In the western worl~ the population in the sixteenth century 111m1 to have doubled. If we take Orner Barkan's figures for the em pi~ Itt whole, we have a population of 30 million people.81 The economic lnd poUticaJ dimensions of this crisis arc not as dear cut, although rh~ ftlltlld iuues stand out: monetary fluctuations, the price revolution, and liaR economic policy. The relationship between these issues as wdl as ~I' ~o'Umulative effect has to be analyzed. •I

One of the first issues scholars connected to state action was that of the r 11 • •'

Ide-ranging fllOflttary fluctuations in the empire. From all accounts, Pfv t ' '

fluctuations began with the: infl~U; of $ilvcr from the ~c:w World, tfouaht in by the increasing number of traders who entered the Turkish IIndt to buy goods. The influx of silver is said to have affected the Otto· ...-n ~, pushing it into a course of WlCCrtainty. The structure of Otro­

c:ommercial equilibrium was further affected because the cash that -la'C~ the empire usually did not stay put, instead moving on tO Persia -.outth the silk trade and from there to India to pay for spices and

The continual debasement of the ak~e has been seen in Jbe con· of this lack of structural equilibrium. According to Bar~e Ot·

Empire, caught up in the current of a great internati~inflation, er6ed 1ndfectuaJly ro counter its difficulties with devaluation. DevaJua­teon, however, led to even greater dislocation of prices, an d'e empire .., dragged from one financial crisis to another, unable to move against

110mcr L. Barkan, "ENai .ur Ia donn6:l statiariques da ~tra de: rccxncc:mem d:w ...... re Ottoman au XV' et xvt• si«ks," )wnflfll{tbe ~ lllfll Sot:illl Hi~M? l{thl OfiMI (19f7):9-)6. Fcmand BraudcJ has Amilatly ruearchc:d the population growth o( the: 0noman Empire in the sixteenl:h century. He has rome up with a smalla total of u-16 IIIIMIIon, which he secaru to think fits bc:tta with the whole of the Wc::sttm Mediterranean. .. TIN M~- 111111 thl M~ Wlrit U. the A.Jt I{ Philip II (New York. 1071), t: ....

UCcmaJ Kafadar, "Lc:s troUbles IUO!lCtanu de: b fm du XVI• sieck et Ia prise ck C04l ·

edmcc onomane du d«lin," A11uks: ~. I«iids, ~ 1 (1991): }11- 400.

JO 8ANDITI .Ufn 8UUAUOILA11

the strong current that hdd It!•• Bur Haim Gerber aptly dcmonnrares that this debasement was no more than the state's response to lowered treasury rcscrvcs and the impending need to pay soldiers. Purdlermore, he shows that debasement was basica.lly irrelevant to international tnde, un· dermining explanations that have thrown all these factors together. 84

Why was the treasury experiencing lowered reserves?85 There arc many answers, most noc fully satisfactory. Were taxes being collected ade­quately? Both Goldstone and Gerber have suggested that the state was un­able to collea taxes as well as it did in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They have, however, no data to show this to be the case. 86

Linda Darling's research suggests that at least for most of the scventccmh ccnrury the fanance department adjusted rather rapidly to devise alternate ways of increasing tax revenues. 87 Other arguments have been made about the amount of taxes and dues that did n<X see the state treasury and were instead skimmed by regional officials~ especially governor-generals. 88

(

\

More important were the 11'l0rletary setbaclcs resulting from changing in­ternational trade routes and the decreased role of the Ottoman state in the appropriation of trading benefits, which, as Gilles Vcinstein reminds us,

t' hurt the treasury substantially. The use of the Cape route fo r trade harmed the finances of Syria and Egypt,~rovinces that figured prominendy in the revenues of the Ottoman state. Added to these explanations is the im­pact of ceWi rebellions, which made it impossible for tax collectors to send cash back to Istanbul.

Geopolitica.l reasons arc amo~ the most important for the state's in­ability to increase its revenues. <{he chan&!!g '!_aturc of warfare at a time of increased wars of consolidation and territorial unity devastated the

"Barkan. .. The Price: Rc:Yolution of~ Sixttcndl Century: A Turning Potnc in the £co. nomic H istory of~ Ncar East," lfll~jfMrNiflj'MWIU &ut:tnJSIW#16 (am): t+.

14Haim Gerber, "The Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire:,"/~ flj'the &:tmDMit IUUi S«:MJ Himlry flj'the OrinJt 3.5 (1911): JOI-3.4.

as-nus is dcmonsm~ by Barkan's f~gUtc:S. Whereas me am/-a budget rc:conkd a sur­plus o( ?1,JS4.ll+ ~ the ajl&/11 budget showed l.071,967 ~· By ~ end of~ lc:\'m·

tc:cndl century, budgetary ddkiu would become drastic, amounting ro as much as +S.OOO ~cs. Barkan, "'The Price: Revolution," p. 17. FOf dc:tai lcd analyses of these budgets, .!IClC Bar· kan, "<nmanb impararorlugu bO~crinc dair nodar," /~ Q,WnJitai llt#IM P.Jdiltai M&QffiMII 17 (a9Sri6): 19J-n+-~. "'The Monetary System of the Ottoman Em.pirc:," p. UJ; Jack Goldstone, Rn-

oiJ~t»tr Mit RtMiiM ;, tlN &rly MOiknl WorU (Bcrk.clcy, 1991), pp. }66-6?. 11Darling, "Adaptations in Administration," pp. 1- )6.

"Gerbc:r, "'fhc Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire," p. 1.1) •

..,Gilles Vcinnein, "TiisOf public c:t fommc:s pri\Us," p. au . Sec abo Barkan, "The Price Revolution," pp. r ll; Mu.mh Akdag_ TI1tt Hlllbltm Dm~ ~ ~ K•'8111J (Ankara, 19?9).

1t1n: muury. The: Onoman nare engaged In many ware d1at did not aJ. wwye lead to conqU«ts and hence ro booty and Ianda and people ro to.) Thac campaigN drew valuable: rcaourcea from the atare, the people, and lhc land. Jn the war with Iran, the aratc was obliged to apend the Income o.- adjac:cnt provinces such as Aleppo, Oiyarbckir, and Erzurum, pmv­lnca that normally contributed significant amounu to the central rruaury.90 Also, new techniques of warfare devised by the enemy required lhcir imitation in the empire. Whereas Eurof??!!S were ~vj,ng ~a_!d hu1d gun der wea ns ~ !'l~t~, the Ottomans still held on to

r ma ca _ry arrnll.. !Jiiln, and simply added some ~m~~ts of M;liJ1Cl~cq(iiwLii·pppedpc with firearms. When the Ottomans lost thear abahty to filht effectively against their European enemy, now equipped with fire· anna, they revamped their armies and their manner of fighting . The rc­IUiting composition of the armies required more cash, putting more and mon: strain on the treasury.

The pric.c: revolution is a second issue that has drawn the attention ofall maJor echolars of the Ottoman Empire. This price hike that accompanied monetary fluctuations has been interpreted in various ways. The devd· opmeot of European industry and commcrcc no doubt had an important 6rnpaa on the Ottoman economy. But the price revolution, which affected Ali& as well as Europe, was also related to some extent to the increasing amount of money in circubtion.9 1 New interpretations have streSsed the relationship between population growth, inelasticity of agriculture, and a rnu.ltant increase in prices, especially for wheat.92 Whether because of the l ~ impact o r because of demographic factors, the economy of the late JSOOS started experiencing a price increase that leveled off only toward dae middle of the seventeenth century. Mustafa Akdat presents data that MUtt to the fact that by t6o9 wheat and sheep prices had risen to twenty dmct their price in rszo. The prices of doth and other commodities like GO increased at least fivefold during the same pcriod.93 Barkan empha· aba the development of the "North Adantic economy, as the major

WICIBarbn, "The Price: Revolution," pp. tl-19. ••'This point has bc:cn argued by numerous x:hobn for watem EUJ'O!X and by Barkan

and lnalak fOf ~Ottoman Empire; 5CC Barkan, "The Price Revolution," pp. aa.-a l i lnaktll. ~Ottoman Decline: and Its Effects upon~ Rc:aya.," in~flj'the &.lUtts, C-"""111 al ~:~"'the I~ s.J!., ~.Jtmtu, UCLA, a~, cd. li: Rim• IMium and S. Vryonis (1hc Hague, am), pp. 348-+9· l..eala Erdc:r and Surc:aya Fa.roqha make e llim.llar argument in "Population RUe and Fall in Anatolia, auo-a6~." MUU/k lilllltmt ,.,_IS (am): JU- +s. ~. Rnfllll'iM ,. R.dltiJiM, pp. )60-63..

"Ak.dlt. Ti1i Htllmtm Dirl~ ~ Diluffl~ KIIJ'6M, p. +6J.

I

..

causal Unbge in the price revolution, 96 whereas a more monetarlat view was proposed by lnalctk, who connectS the influx of silver ro the mech· an ism of inflation.115 Kafadar, on the other hand, argues that ~ Ottoman Empire was ready for an inflationary push because of population growth, urbanization, expansion of commerce, and the increased moneterization of the empire. It seems that most of the factors cited above~pulation growth, foreign merchants' practices, and the influx of silve~had dire consequences for Ottoman state and society. If the state had to alter irs taxation practices to increase the amount of revenue flowing to the trea­sury, or debase the ak~e and thereby risk the wrath of the saJaried em­ployees of the state, society in irs various groupings also paid a price. Most groups, except merchants, were severely hurt by the price increases, and peasants were hurt by the new tax collection practices and by the in­stitution of tax fanning.96

A third source of discussion in this debate is the role of the state. Here

(

the argument is that the economic crisis that afflicted the Ottoman lands would probably have taken quite a different tum had the Ottoman state been able to relax irs economic regulations. The crux of the problem was that Ottoman rulers were used to regulating the economy in o rder to

maximize their revenues, to protect those classes of elites with ftXed in-comes, and ro fulfill the needs of the internal markets. Various measures of filling the treasury were common: devaluation of the currency, taxation of the productive classes, and assessments from the trading of goods within the boundaries of the empire.97

As Europe developed, it encroached on the Ottoman Empire, forcing changes to which the state-controlled economy was unable to respond. Both Murat <;:azalc~ and Mehmet Gen~ attribute the ensuing economic

l !f<>ubles of the Ottomans to the mercantilisrt]. of Euro as o to the ,e?licies of fiscalism and provisionism of _!!tc:_~man ~~Jre. <;:iZak~ has documented the increasing imports into the Ottoman Empire of silk

94Barkan, "'The Price Revolution," pp. J-13. 951nalc:ak, "Impact of the Annales School on 0ttomm Studies and New Findings," RnieJr>

I (1918): 69-96. 96Kafadar, "Les troubles monetaircs," p. )89. 9 7lnalalt and others have pointed out the: importance of the: trade routes for the Ottoman

treasury; from the silk exchanges that occurred in Bursa to the spice trade in Egypt, the Ottomans gathered riches from the customs duties. Sec lnalcak, "lhe Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy," in Stwlia m the E~Himlryll{tiNMillllk BIUt, ed. M. A. Cook (London, 1970), pp. W?-18, "Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant," in The ~ Ewpire: Omtp;at, Qra1111iutiorl, IUUI &:rm-y (London, 1918), pp. IJl- 47, and "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire."

ind woolen clOth, which caused a decline In local production as the aaJa ol'nw matc:rlaJ. in~~asc:d .98 In the words ofGcn~, "At. a consequence of ~ l)IIIC!" of provasaonism the Ottoman nate: manipulated only with the Upot'tlltlon and usually did not interfere with importation. When the: Milt did interfere with importation it was usuaHy to encourage its vol­ume, wlth fiscaJist considerations."99 Similarly, Benjamin Braude has doc­umented the;. decline pf Salonic_a~~ do.th indu.suy. He too attributes these changes partly to the Ottoman state's lack. of interest in rmngmjr pqUcy. 11M: Ottomans, he argues, were F.lr more interested in the: military aspects olttate building and ignored the economic aspects that would h:avc Jed lhcm tO protect their merchants and offer them incentives. He deplores lhf lack of an Ottoman protectionist policy becau.'iC it led ro the demise of many industrial centers. 100

The Ottoman Empire at the tum of the seventeenth century, then, w:as hit by the effects of two related phenomena, and the state took action ro Incorporate and deal with these changes. In Europe, the crisis revived the luropean economy, altered the means of warfare, and renewed the cCJm· ftliancnt to encroach on lands conquered by the Turks. In the Or.roman llmpire, the results were mixed. This crisis did noc necessarily mean de-11nc~ ~owcver. ~e crisi~ was mana~d. The Ottoman srate readapted to CIDndmons of crasts, fmding aJremattve ways of drawing surplus from its IOdecy and in the process, sometimes, controlling and consolidating even ~ than before. The internal economic and military constraints of the Onnm~ system of rule sc:~ in mocion a series of internal state responses

different from those m Europe. The bureaucracy in its divers<: of· adapted to maintain tax flows by altering fuccd taxation to a more

U llllri•hl,. basis, changing the emphasis on certain taxes, exploiting cash fl\'enuc, and changing tax collectors. State officials devised these mea·

by paying careful attention to the state's partirular relationship with class in soci.cty while maintaining intemal control and centralized ad·

IUnlstration. State-related and military goals were never forsaken for eco - J IDmic and commercial reorganization. Rather, the state tried to centraliu: lnd control each class by manipulating irs own peculiar tie to that class. In

•Murat c;:~a, "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Srudy in Ottoman In· ~•110'14!1Xdtnc. I$S0-16S~," Jwnllll tfE~ Himlry 40 (198<>): m- so. Also sec <;:1zakt;a,

of the M1ddlc East mto the European World·Ec:onomy," Revinl 8 ( l98s): •t-n . ...,.Is qU<Xation, from an unpublished manuscript. Is prin~ in <;:1z.ak~a, "Incorpvratiun .t lbr Middle East," p. 170.

IOO~>--' . 8 ud " I . al Co . . and .,...,Jalllln ra. e. ntcmar.on mpcotJOn Domestic Cloth in tl~ Otwman ...,.rc, IS00- 16.SO: A Srudy in Undcvtlopmcnt," Revinl :.l (1979): +37-SI.

l the process, it altered the determining conditions prevalent for me pro­vincial elites by keeping them dependent on the state and by drasrlcaJly increasing their intraclass competition and struggle. The sevcmeenth ccn· rury left the provincial elites more divided than ever, incorporating within their ranks winners and losers. The combined effect of elite struggles and increased state exploitation left the peasantry at a similar loss regarding their interests. Their already isolated and fragmented communities were unevenly populated, and their weak ties to the landholders were further severed. Where they stayed, peasants acquired new landlords, unwilling to

'

relieve their plight. Finally, as banditry emerged from the fetters of the rural communities with the generous hdp of the state, state makers used it to further regain strength and emerge aloft Ottoman society.

3 Ottoman Regional Elites:

Divided but Loyal

M OST OP TH B CLASSIC EUROPEAN LITBRATUllB on state GOO·

solidation concentrates primarily on the relationship between the state and societal elites. Elite discontent and elite strug·

r:, or intraeUte competition, have been the overarching themes. 1 In rope, the state's ccntraliz.ing efforts resulted in the opposition of dil·

pded elites. In France, those elites who perceived themselves as losing ._., privileges used their alliances with the peasantry to fight against an lgl'a8ive and intrusive state. In other cases, as in England, a crown UO·

.a.le to regulate internal struggles and external commercial pressures wu Wer incapacitated by elite competition. In both these cases, the elites -.re Initially independent and autonomous, and their loss of privilegea lhmugh political and commercial causes turned them against the crown. The history of European state formation is notable for the prominent rotc II cJitc struggles against the state, with elites determined to stop short thJa newly emerging center of power.

Unlikt western European elites, Ottoman prebendal elites were unable ID oppose the state seriously. Even though the state precipitated internal tampetition within their ranks and aggravated the conditions of their live· IMJod, because of their initial dependence and loyalty they continued to

lUrch for solutions from within the state. Ottoman elites in the early sev·

1Qarles Tilly, The Omtmtiolls Frmdl (Cambridge, •936); William Brusrein, "Qau ('.(ln· fila ..-.d O ass Collaboration in Regional Rcbdlions, asoo-1700," Theory IUfll ~ 14 (ltiJ): ++S'-{18; Richard J...adunann, "Elite Conflict and Stare Fonnation in 16lh and 17th t.murr England and Prance," AIIU'ri&4" ~ R.nUw S+ (a989): 141-61.; Ruland Mouln•~. " Rcchcrchcs sur Jcs soulh-cmcnrs populaircs en Prance avanr Ia Fronde," RnJ,, ,..,_,..,.'" et amtmeptw'lliru s (a98s): Bt- IIJ.

55

188 8ANOrrl AND 8UJUlAOOMT

men, ran off with yolmS boy• and virgin gjrla, and ltole mor~ than 50,000 ~

sheep, goats, hoiacs, and good camcls, and took the storca of barley, wheat, oil, honey, and other commodities; then they captured more than JOO men, torturing them night and day. 110

The torrures intensified as peasants were unable: to pay d1c troops rhc amounts they wanted. Also, many of these bandits/soldkrs wo uld invtldc an area and go through it village: by village:, demanding taxes (stltbA" ~). 111 The retinues of Ottoman officials also served to change d1c: ru raJ scene. These men, who were hired as personal retinues, often aaed rn help their retainer in the colleaion of taXes and in the various cxaaiut\j and to serve as personal bodyguards. 112 One: can assume that these body guards made sure the taxes were paid and the extras pocketed. Legal and

illegal, such men made it impossible for the peasantry to resist. Even when the leadership tried to contro l their retinues, especially after rebd leaders obtained legitimate positio ns, it was difficult to restrain men whu were accustomed to looting . The rise of banditry should definitely he added to the reasons peasants were unable to engage in coUeaive action.

1101 have wed the trarulation provided by Griswold, TIN Gnlfl AIUIIOlie11 /Ubdlioll , p. 4 9 . 111 lbid. 1 uhroqhi, ~Runa.l Society," Pf· 1. P· IJ+.

6 State-Bandit Relations:

A Blueprint for State Centralization

A Political Invitation: May r6o6

A List of Matters Concerning the Slavc Canbolade>glu Ali Pasha:

This slavc petitions that if he is appointed to the position of the beylcrbey of Aleppo he: will undertake to go with s,ooo mc:n to the: campaign called for the: coming spring Likewise, if by the: favor of the: sultan he is given, with the: aforc:mcntionc:d province:, a vc:z.iratc, thc:n he: promises to take: 10,000 mc:n to the campaign

Beyond this, if he is bestowed with (several words missing) and some: of hi~ adherents [words missing) and to some: of his men the: offices of miiteftrriiA and PfJ'Uf and division chief is proffered thc:n he promises to bring twc:my I thousand? J courageous mc:n to the imperial campaign and will sacrific~ heart and soul to whatc:vcr duty he is entrusted

Li.kc his father and grandfather, if he: is assigned as administrator of th~ Turkoman tribes of Aleppo, he: undertakes to send 200 camel units 1 H e: rc· quests] the office ofbeylc:rbey in Mara~ [be given ) ro Haydar Bey, the fonn~r bey of Aintab on the condition of participating in the: campaign with 1,000 men

I He: requests] the s~mt'Ait of Hama I be given) to Ebu Zcyd Bey on the: con· dition of participating with soo mc:n in the: campaign [He requests J the: san­CIU of Maarra [be given) to his [Canboladoglu's) uncle's son Mc:hnlcd Bey,

t89

l iX) BANDIT!! AND 8UJUlAUCM18

along whh the: rights of tax fanning on dtc condition of panldparlng wlrh soo men in the campaign

He requcsrs the st~nc/U of Uzcyir [be given 1 to HUsc:yn Pa$a<>glu Ali Bey on the condition of participating with .soo men in the campaign 1 I lc ~ucm J the Sllnak of Malatya [be given I to Ocrvi~ P~a. the fonncr bey of Samsad, on the condition of participating in the: campaign with a.soo men ...

On the delivery of 110 camel units and rhc promised possession (cattle? 1 the chieftainship of the Turkomans of Aleppo should be given to the "'iiteJtrrilttf Dcrv~ And he [Canboladoglu I requcsrs that of the great ficfholde.rs, six he: made "'iiteftrriJuu, fourteen be made fJivtqa and soo be given the basic rank of division officer•

By the end of his letter, Canboladoglu Ali Pasha had promised more chan 16,000 men to fight the upcoming wars on the eastern front and de­manded fourteen hig h-level administrative positions in the east for him­self and a variety of his regional officials. The fulfillment of these demand11

/ would have been tantamount to handing over control of the eastern flatlk of the empire.

This letter warrants special attention because it did not propose a sim pie military deal between a state leader and his general. Rather, this war; a deal berweert:_odd partners: the sultan of the Ottoman Empire and one of the most infamous bandjts of the peri~e letter was written by Canboladoglu AJi Pasha and sent to Su.ltan.AhmcdJ, who inscribed in his own hand on the upper left-hand comer of the letter: "This goes too far, is it possible to give d1is much?"2 Clearly, the question was posed at the imperial council, where the various ministers and digrutaries discussed the appropriateness of the deal. Thereafter, the o rders of the period indkare the demands that were fulfilled by the state. Most important, hisrory demonstrated that Canboladoglu Ali Pasha, at least for a while, was suc­cessfuJ at becoming the legitimate representative of the Ottoman govern­ment in Aleppo, having negotiated for himself the tide of governor­general in September 1606. Yet by December 16o7 Canbolad was defeated in banle by the sly grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha and lost his posi· cion, his army, and his wealth. What is most remarkable about this cpi ·

1 Lettcr from Ali Emiri Ta.sniti d<x ument 616, Istanbul Archives; tnnSiaaion fro m William J. Griswold, The Grtlll Amuii/U,, Rtbtlliorl, tooo-tozo/IJ9t- t6u (Berlin, 1981),

Pf'· J.+O--+J· 11bid., p. lAW!. We know 1Ton1 Ali Emiri Tasnifi documents +56, +51, and +59 dm SOt"nC of

these demands were granted.

ttl

sodc is Me' thla rew:nal of fortune but that the sultan should haw: resort«! to dea.l making with a declared bandh rebel in the Orsr place.

Deal making between the: $Ultan and bandiu suggests a process of con­solidatjon for me stare that is not immediately apparent. It might in f:aa be interpreted incorrectly: the inscription by Ahmed I indicated at least a moment of weakness, a hesitancy over how much of a price could be: paid to a criminal. Yet, given war on the western frontiers and the campa.ign being prepared for the eastern frontier, some type of arrangement was necc::ssary. Bandits had to be prevented from sabotaging war efforts and instead encouraged to guarantee and provide extra soldiers at dte front . A consideration of the final outcome revc:als even more subterfuge on the part of the state; the arrangement with Canboladoglu Ali Pasha became part of a policy by which the grand vizier accorded himself more time in preparation for war against the bandit. Contrary to apparent weakness, t/ the state aaivdy bargained, co-opted when necessary, and annihjlated po· tential contenders as swifdy as it could. ~ patrimonjal regime that ensured undivided contro l by either c:limi­

nating potential rivals or securing loyalty by incorporation inro the household had to develo p a strong tendency for deal making and brok.er­age)Both the elimination of rivals and the incorporation of potential ri­vals were important political activities of the Ottoman state. But when the tradition of sending young princes away for srudy and training (often as provincial governors) was ended, and the practice of fratricide was stopped at least for a time, it became more important to adopt co­optation as a mechanism of control. The head of the patrimonial house­hold and his immcd..iate entourage would then benefit by co-opting dissent into the system, as weiJ as by increasing their power by gaining new allies. Rhoads Murphey dearly links the need of the administration in the seventeenth century to thCS(: changes in Ottoman traditions. He ar­gues that another important way to increase state allies was through mar· riag,~. In his words, «the malleability of thCS(: top-level bureaucrats-:;s guaranteed by the bonds offiljal obligation imposed through marriage m princesses of the royal Hne. , 3 The practice was extended to regional offi­cials and prominent families who were co-opted through marriages. Even more daring was the proposed marriage alliance between a rebel govcr· nor, I~ir Mustafa Pasha, and the daughter of Sultan Ibrahim I. As Evliyu c;elebi asserted when he told the story of these marriages, they were nor

"This type of marriage alliance was regularized by the reign ofSUicyman me Magnificem (asw-66), Rhoads Murphey, " llw: Hisrorical Setting," in TIN [,titutt Lifr D{ "" Ott-n sw-, Mda AhMul Pll.sJNI (IJU-ldu), trans. R. Dankoff (New York, 1991), p. 11.

BANDlTS AND BUREAUCRATS

really for financial resources. They were political, enhancing the power and cqmrol of the state in a particuJar region and laWlching significan1 c:lrecrs in Ottoman administration.•

Political motives were reinforced by cuJrural represc:ntations4tate in· corporation came with a wealth of ~bolism; the state offered its cliena appropriate CS,lSlOJ:!ial acCQutum~nts\The symbols of belonging to the state circle were flaWlted as rewards for those inside and as messages fO

outsiders that being on the inside was preferable. Even those once labelld the: worst enemies of the state could later be treated to the best of ()no. man panache. Both Canboladoglu Ali and Abaza Mehmed ended mar days at the Sublime Porte and as guests of the sultan were treated on pill with his closest advisers. Symbolic incorporation came with material lar­gesse, both available as extremes of reward only from the state's authorlt1 and coffers.

In this chapter, I deal with one of the most important forms ofpolliti1:6 bargaining in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire: the practice bargaining with bandit chiefs. During the seventeenth century the man state made ample use of political deal making and co-optation u way to incorporate the claims of bandit chiefs at the helm of large

1 of mercenary ttoops. I argue here that these concessions ro banditS nOt signs of great weaknes~esc deals wc:re instead calculated to balllftll1 international and internal pressures so that the Ottomans did not haw

simultaneously confront warfare on three fronts. ~~~~;,· ~~~!:~ arions were: among the most important reasons for cccc:>ruoollt<Janon

argains and incorporation\ This interpretation goes against the • many historical narratives ' well as the more traditional sociological uf primitive rebels. Historians of the Ottoman seventeenth century emphasized the decline banditry signaled, focusing on periods of rively weak stare leadership and largely ignoring the periods of 001111111• dation that followed state-bandit confrontations. 5 A& a result, IUUilvtll hllvc described the state as weak and in decline, experiencing ffto.r~Uij•

41bid., p. ~­~Narratives by comcmpe>rarics and later scholars, SciAniki, T~ar Kldbl, Nllme.

l'~ev~ strcaaed the dangers of the n:bcla and the weakncas of the stare. Jotq>h von Hal-~ Ulst,;, illl't"'pi" OttDrMr~, trans. M. l>ocha (P•rls, 184+), who bates a lot of em dlCIC contemporary authors, prcacnts a similar view. 'Jlw:rc is a!JQ il tet of rlaflJ and ccm1ulat and dlplooutic: pci'IOilnc:l who delcribed the imminent end by ll88randldng the bandit pmblem. Certainly It wu In the lnterc&t of the'<! tar lei to exasger\\tc the doom of an a:!'J'irc that waa once dn:adtd by Europcw. C!Umplt, Othan Burian, TIH /Vp(lrl I( ttn., 71Hnl B~ A,.,_ If tW S .... (Anlu,., 1931).

State-Ban4it &Jationr 193

breakdowns, and the bandits as authentic threats to the survival of the state. At the same time, arguments made in the "primitive: rebel" litera­rurc, as well as in broader writings on peasant~anat t rdattons, have de­scribed banditry as a form of rebellion against the state in response to

exploitation, poverty, and state contro l. On this reading, primitive rebels did not confront the state in search of bene.fits within the established structure but instead presumably fought as a form of social prote.~t.6

Scholars of both the Ottoman Empire and primitive rebellion describe bandits as threats to the state. In my view, these bandits were more often used as part of a process of state consolidation. Where others sc:c state weakness, I see state strength.

The nearly hundred years under investigation provides a variety of stories of bandits, all of whom exhibit a roughly similar life cycle closely determined by state manipulation. In general, banditry, which was a by­produa of a process of centralization and control in the provinces, ac- 1 quired dimensions that became threatening to society until it was absorbed into the process of consolidation. The state then claimed victory in the subordination of its former clients. This is not to say that bandits were not at times dangerous to the state; they could become so because they controlled large numbers of mercenaries. The reason they did not become a truly serious threat was that the state never broke down and bandits made no serious attempt to destroy it. There were no real oppor­tunities for these bandits to direct their aaion into an effective campaign against the statc,7 a state that was relatively sttong and capable of deflect-Ing any threat to its existence. Instead, the bandits were incorporated into the state. At the same time, the fear of banditry was also used to ratio- .; nalizc: more conttol and more consolidation of territory. There were few bandit leaders whose actions could constitute a threat of serious conse­{]Ucnces to the Ottoman government. More often than not, the rhetoric of tear and lawlessness was used to legitimize increased state interference.

fn terms of state centraljzarion, the single most important phenomenon nf the time was the existence of ~ast pools of mercenary armies ready for

lt-fl~e inu:rprcrarion of rebellion as social protest against poverty and oppre5$ion is best 111111k by llobsbawm in PriMiliPe &bcls (New York, 1959) and in Bllllllil1 (New York, 1969).

"rhl. 11tgun~11 Is In line with Theda Skocpol's in StRia lfllll S«iRR RIJIOiutiofts: A CoM· J'l'rtlllllt AMIJIU ~ Frtt~n«, RIU1i4, tt'UI ChinR (Cambridge, 1979), where she identifies the: ht\'aWown of the mtc as the initial strucrural change that opens opportunities for rcvolu­lkHalry action. Revolution.' du not happen in arrong stateS. Similarly, many others in the lltttlll\trc: haw pointed this out for almmr all major revolutionary upheavals. Sc:e Eric R. W1llr.Jluu,,., kt~tn ~tiN "i'mf1J#h (',m~J~r' (New Yock, 107J) as llll excellent example of this ••I!Cint\IU,

I

10<4- llANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS

hire by locaJ or national power holders. Control of thc:sc: me.nxnary armict gave the local power holders the bargaining chips with which they could

f n:quesr positions from the state. Since the ability to conduct war at .in· rcmationaJ frontiers depended o n me control of pools of mercenartcs, gaining annies from bandits either through political bargaining or inter· nal warfare: was an essential task of the state in its efforts to consotidaiC territory and thereby strengthen its geopotiticaJ position. Both the tc·

l cruitrnc:nt and the annihilation of bandit annic:s depended o n me natuft and region of international conffict( When there was internatio nal war­fire, the state mosdy chose to recruit armies, and when peace was estab­lished the state chose to contain banditry.~e events recounted in thil chapter were not similar to the peasant rebcltions encountered by Euro­pean states, and the bargains were not sirrular to those between E state makers and merchants an<lb rs. The main transactions in this pee riod of Ottoman history were between the state and a set of merccnaryl bandit armies whose leaders achieved occasional ~gi_!!macy. Ottoman state centratization proceeded along different Lines. A str0ft1 a.nd. centralized state emerged out of negotiation and battle with intcmll mercenaries, a process in part shaped by international pressures.

Although much of the political bargaining and warfare for consolidlt rion remains quite sirrular, there wc:rc: ~hrec: different formats of s bandit relations in the period under consideration. This period

· fUrther be aJvi Cd into two maJor i&9 ts of&ifldit:acrivi~ •J22-•.6.';;'u;Fi 16~3-48, periods that were preceded by important battles on the c or western fronts and succeeded by periods of renewed state control in • upccts of state rule. Each of these twenty-year intervals saw more or a.. constant small-scale rural banditry of the sort that remained in karla ports and a few large-scale- Anatolian in scope-bandit movcmena organized groups that attracted direct state intervention. This di~:tinm•l

is important because the presence of connant bandit activity by time bandits in localities constituted the fuel for the rhetoric of the :md convinced local communities that preemptive and protective on th~ part of their government wa$ neces.'iary. Yet large-scale state tions and consolidation were a response to the larger, more oe~nnM;U'w.f. , but also more isolated and unusual bandit activities. It should also ~ that there is litrle comparison between the damage caused by the kxal d1e Anato lian rebels. I deal nl()fltly with the larger rebel groups while vlding some contrast with the local groups.

'The proceSI of interaction with rebels on dle Ottoman scene from to 1611 rcprcacnts the archetypal form of state consolidation via

Srllle·B4Mit Rellltitms 195

making with bandits. In this category, rebels were co-opted or crushed according to state needs; they were co-opted to be sent away from batde when perceived to be a tiability to the Ottoman armies or co-opted when their manpower became necessary for prolonged mWtary campaigns. ~ach of the bandit leaders demanded state positions and incorporation mto the Ottoman bureaucracy. As was the case with the Ottoman elites, bandit leaders perceived success as high-ranking positio~ in the Ottoman provincial administration and strove for incorporation. Their "rebellions" were therefore maneuvers for mobility within the system, not opposition to the system) Accordingly, the Ottoman state made usc of these bandits for consotidation, reinforcing its hold over its servitors, eliminating po­tential contenders, and appointing trusted and powerful men to positions uf importance in the provinces.

Not all bandits, however, fit this model. Although the process of in­teraction with another type of bandit rebel was quite similar to the first group in terms Of bargaining and warfare, the aims of crus ~CQn<ltype 2 • were closer to secc:ssipn from the empire. Only one bandit leader, in northern Syria, CanboladogJu Ali Pasha, used his control of a relatively "" wcll-defmed and wealthy territory tE_ attempt a re~lliQil. Even his aspi-rations to secession, however, were ambivalent, since they were also mixed with demands for high office in the Ottoman system and, more impor-rant, seem to have been instigated by foreign powers. The suppression of rhjs particular rebel meant the reincorporation of no rthern Syria and the rtll~rtion of Ottoman control and administration over the lands. Finally, a third type of bandit activity under consideration spans the JXriod r623 to 3. 1648 and shows essentially no significant d.iffc:rc:ncc from the first except fur the titicizatiQ!!. of Qandits' rhctorjc. Neither bandit organizational

fhrmar nor le:adcrship was much al~cred. Again, no significant politiciza. - J lion of banditry occurred; what did occur was that the bandit leaders lc~amcd to capitalize o n internal state problems and used them as rebel· llous rhetoric. Yet, when state officials offered the rebels state positions, they took them. ln each of these cases, then, with slight variation, the IIAme process of consolidation through bargaining and warfare with htnd.it/mercenary rebels occurred .

Consolidation through Deal Making with Bandits

l"h period •no- t6SO in Ottoman history is infamQus in classic studies as IHIC In whtc e empire was plasued by inren\al strife and bandit vio·

~~~· -c .... · ,

196 BANDITS AND BuRRAUCRATS

lencc. A by-product of Ottoman actions, banditry hurt most the popula­tions of villages and towns and forced the state to reconsider some of its intemational aspirations, weighing these against internaJ civil disorder to reconcile the competing demands of intemaJ and external consolidation. Two periods of bandit activity, lS90- l611 and t623- +3, bear a remarkable resemblance to each other. Throughout the century, there was a nearly

/stable pool of vagrants and mercenari~vailablc for hire. Leaders and fol · lowers emerged from these pools, demonstrating striking similarities in

both constituent.)' and goals. Those who continued on to pillage and rape were branded ~i.8

f o r most bandits there was no reason to confront the state other than the fact that it represented "the most promising power domain,"9 the lll(>St obvious center to whkh claims had to be directed. Most bandit lead·

1 e~, it is important to note, had no real claim RtJainst the state; they had been officiaJs of the state in one capacity or anodler, either in the se.rvicc of a governor Or as a steward (/tethiisiA) or deputy 11eutenant-governor (Mil• test/tim), and they wanted new and better positions. This is corroborated by the fact that, once these rebels acquired positions as governor or governor-general, they did not go about declaring independence, coinina their own money, sending ambassadors to other countries, or engaging in orher activities that would indicate the formation of a new state. All the

\

narratives of the period make this clear. 10 It was instead the possibility they perceived of gaining more and carving out a greater domain that made banditry and opposition to the state appealing. To receive lucrative and powerful positions in the state administration, most of these n:bell used ties to their own patrons in the government. In acquiring larger do­mains, their goaJ was not independence from the Ottoman stare; rather, ~cy were interested in domains to tax, as functionaries of the stue\l'hc

privilege to tax was not, ho wever, essential; when these cclaJis w<f nac have a territorial base, they just plundered. Either way, the bandit leaden

wl11c1C wa$ great vuicty in the siz.c and importance of groups who acquired the Iebei "«11111 " 11\c smallest groups ranged from lO- tS to so- 100 men. 11~e larger groups indudM 11 lwt 1,000 sd~NutlllmUI tr'OOfl' involved at any point in time:. T~ar KAtibi Abd<UbdU, Vt • .,.U T.rnhi]ot. SOicymaniye EAd Efmdi no. llJI , folio 73, tells us that KarayUK1, one o(dlt firat Important rebels, gathered ;at lc;ut JO,ooo men.

qellubcth 1. l)crry, R,llds IUI6 Rtvolw~ ;,. N,-rh ChiHIII, ti4/-JHS (Stanford, t!IIO)t

P· ' ' ' '0Scc Mt.~~r.Ua AJWag, " Kara·ywcl," JsiMMA~ (lllanhul, lc;~SS ): HY- +J; WUU. Orltwokt, "Ojillall," 6~ f[IU.. (Lddcn, 1981); and Grilwold, TIH Orr.tA,..._ Rt..UIM.

197

needed to provide resources for their mercenaries as their basis for claims to .pow~.r.n Furthermore, these leaders, often commanders of mercenary untts (bOI~-biJf'), were m~ caught up in the competition fo r the pool of mcrcenan cs; the larger thear share, the greater their potentiaJ revenue and the stronge~ their bar~ning positio~ vis-a-vis the state:. Often, then, at the leadership level banditry was monv:ued by personal greed, aspirations of ~we~, and the ability to forge alliances that would enhance persona.! donunatJon over Jar~er retinues. ln this sense, in fact, they differed little from the court-a~~mted governors a~d other officials who engaged in the same competttton to enhance thetr pcrsonaJ armies. 11 In fact, the Porte treated them as such and applied a variant of the rotation policy to them.

In most cases these mercenary leaders never became a serious threat to the state because of their inability to ally; they were scattered, and they betrayed each other for temporary benefits. ln fact, William Griswold as­serts that "no ce/IJJi ever united with another for more than a short time " • and then only as a matter of convenience."12 While the leaden of smaJicr bands tended to look for friends with whom to associate and share the loot, the l~r bands were strictJy hierarchically organized, not aJiowing for much aUtancc between chieftains. 13 Griswold and others aJso add that there waslrio llnlfying. ideology. to .the cc::lali n:bellion~• The correspon· dencc between chaeftatns never mdicates any urgency to act in concert for SOI1lC: dcscri~ insur~ionary objective. As I have argued in previous I chapters,~lS lack of tdeology and co~n ~litical goal is the result of the J>eculiar na~y ~ •. which assembled a variety of groups and peoples m one maJor tnstatution, albeit temporarily~

Although banditry evokes images of impetuous and reckless violence rather than ca~~ planning and organization, cdalis managed to exhibit "?th charactenstacs, largely because they o rganized in response to being ha~cx.l by the state. These mc:rcenary troops were arranged in companies With a company. leader to supervise and direct thc.ir participation and wc:re often mob1lizcd and demobilized by the anny after a war or dis-

11Sce Ol~ptC:I1 J and}. 11Criswold TIH Grau A---'· D.J..JJ:-• --·-----.P· f1· "Vum, Kw~ Mwrrul ~ V~ Tllrihi, ~Oicymaniyc, £sad Efendi no. n)O, folio ab,

lhr cxamP.Ic~ <bcn~s the alliances bctwe:cn rebnvcly leu dangcrow ch.ie:fs such as Deli Pilr· t tln, ~tmu,..,glu, and K.Oee Mahmud. Deli PilrsUn and K&c Mahmud actcld togrthc:r in the ptllllc of an important JMss. riftliJt in lnc-&0. ''Crls~, Til~ Crrtt~ AHIIIUIJIM RtlldlitM, p. S7. See abo Mustafa Akdag Twrt Hlll!umt

/Hrl,. ""~ K11'8M (Ankara, 19'1J). '

IQ8 BANDITS AND 8URBAUCRATS

pc~d after the death of a governor. 15 Halil lnalak describes the procc· dure for their enrollment into the army:

The sultan sent an order to the local authorities and a special commi.ssioner was appointed to supervise the whole operation and to lotd the assembled troops to their destination. 'The sultan also sent standards, as many as the numlx:r of the companies to lx: fonncd Under each standard a blllllk, i.e., a w mpany of fifty or sometimes of one hundred sU.11a., would lx: assembled,

.; Til<: moment a standard was taken bad the biiliUt IJ1ldO' it was considered co be legally dissolved and, from then on, their activities as a group were hdd to lx: illegal. lkforc the enrollment started, the local authorities chose !he biilfli ·bllfU1 the heads of the biillllts to lx: set up, and then a bllf biilil•-Hp, a t.>t>mmandcr over them .... Each seltiNm received a "bonus" (Whtif) ro pre­pare himself for the expedition and also his salary in advance for the montha he was going to serve. All this was to lx: distributed through the bllf ~ Imp, and the biilillt·lnlfu. They were real masters and organizers of these 1101-dicrs, comparable to the ~ of medieval Europe. 16

./ When the companies dissolved, they remained organized around their IHJliUt-bap and therefore kept their units intact. Observant contcmporarill of rhe bandit campaigns tell w very little about the larger organizatiM ol many units, since they assume correctly that bandits emulated the st

armies in their modw operandi. This is only to be expected, since die training and assembling was carried out by high-ranking military ~ manders. Therefore:, the encounters between the state armies and bandit annies were between k;ogwn mtjtics, with similar organizational and 1110'

ticill knowledge. Each period of banditry began with 1oc?J J!lciden r:s (for example, II

1 western Anatolia) and then continued with the rebellion of much IUJIII'I•·4

more threatening bands which engaged the state in armed battle. over, throughout the period, the smaller bands and the local banditry officeholders coexisted with the larger bandit companies. The IUJif bands were not regional; they covered vast ~erritory. One bandit that of Deli Hasan, fo r example, moved from Sepc:dlO no rth to

Tok.at, Amasya, <;orum, and west to Ankara, then KOtahya in we.1t11118 Anatolia and just south to Afyonkarahisar, defeating Ottoman arnlia

1'Scc lfllllllna.ktk. "Military and FiK:al Tnruf01'111l1tion in the Ottonlllll Bm('l~, 1100," Ardl,.,, Qtt,..,.ictl,. 6 ( t91o): :a&J- m .

U1tlalll lnalctk, "n~ Soclu-PoUflcal Eff«u o( the Oiffuaion ol Pin:•amu In the Bur," In WMI 'ft~ tW1 S«<lf1 U. dH MiiiiiU Ban, ed. V. J. rarry and M. B. Vapp liclft, nm ). p. :a.oo.

State-Bandit ReiP.tums 199

to crush them. Many of these bandits exto rted m<mgr f!'Qm the cities they stopped at . Some city dwellers chose to bargain with rebels and offer them large amounts of money to save their city from ransacking. 17 There is a rather typical chronicle of statc-bandjt interaction that fits most of the cases from the first to the second period. I prc:scnt the more general fea­rures of this history and then the individual cases with their variations.

To tell the story of state centralization in relation to banditry is not sim­

ple: ~e ~ is ~~en blur~ .by ~c fluidity ~f th\ boundaries between leg1ttmate and lllegtnmatc pos1t1ons m the provmcC§)From high-ran.lcing officials such as governors to lower-ranking agents and tax collectors, many state officials oscillated between legitimate taxation and unlawful exactions, breaking the law several times during their tenure:. They were, as a rcsuJt.;(cmoved from their posts and reinstated several times, making ~t difficuJ~ ~para~e the legitimate ~tate officials from the illegitimate:} lbroughout thts penod of Ottoman htstory, all sorts of local and region£ officials resorted to illegal exactions and excessive oppressio n of the peas­antry with rhc help of the seltbanlsan&R armies they assembled . Govern­ment officials therefore often confro nted in petitions parallel complaints regarding legitimate and illegitimate officers. 18 We sho uld analyze ban· ditry and its centralizing consequences in this light of1gcneral provincial t·2!!f~n, where the declining landholding classes, vagrant peasants, bandits, and local power ho lders were all struggling to hold on ro what they had and o ften evolved into rapaciow and dangerous groups)

Many famous bandits fltSt emerged as relatively unimportant leade.rs when violence erupted after looting by their mercenary troops. Usually, they were leaders of companies in the service of a provincial official or demobilized by an anny. Once a group acquired some shape as a celali h:lnd , new leaders emerged from among the ranks to replace older, dc­fc:lted, o r co-opted ones. As the plunder of villages and rowns continued,

11Griswold uses a document published by Akdag attesting to rhc fact that the rroops of l>ch Hu;a.n extorted Bo,ooo kurUf from rhc people of Ankara. Griswold abo gives w ;a,n idea of the ar~t this extortion n:prcscnrs: 9,600,000 ~ u compared ro 20J..97J,74+ ~c. rhc ltltal cxpendirun: for t1x- Ottoman state in the first half o( 16o7. Sec Griswold, TIN Gruu AHMI!Iilllf RtiHUW, p . .151, n. 69.

••AJW"8 gives perhaps d'IC best examples ofhigh·levcl officials' plunderings. In rhc spring elf' ICIOO, d'IC govcmor-gencral of Sivu sent a letter to rhc govcmmcm arguing that the vizier Mchn'ICt Pasha, who had been dispatched to fight the cclali Karayazscr, was more a bandit th•n hls supposed Cl'ICnsy. A1 Altdag explains, then: was little difference between these rwo ltllllmandcrs, fin« they both led annia uf mcn:cnarics who were often fed through looting· ~c 'Hili lllllkl"'" Dirii4 llf Dtli:.m/i4 Klf'IJ""· pp. \90- 0J. Other examplcs abound of gov: rrnun, kadra, 111ld clChcr oflkials lkllllll\dlng the tu paymema o( rhclr pte\lc:.ccsM>rs and in· Jll,tlna mll(h laraer nun.• than Cllllcd fbr.

• t • • " 4 I 1l \t... I ~ '.;.~• .. ..-. • . ~.gi- ~ • .J, I ' 'J :t

wo BANDITS AND Bulli!.AUCRATS

the bad fortune of d1e region was reported by local governors or kadls to me authorities, and the state responded by ordering relatively less impor· tanr military commanders (CeiRJi sen:Um) to w1dertake police aa.ion. These first attempts at suppression wen: ran:ly successful at cradicatins

'I banditry in Anatolia. Another measure simultaneously undertaken by.tl\e state was the appointment of viziers to unruly regions. Mustafa N:uma writes o f the eastern provinces: " Indeed, it was considered of the utmoSt

1mportancc, by the government of Constantinople, that a vezir should be appointed to each of the eastern provinces, in order to check and subdue any spirit of rebellion which might arise, and which, in fact, seems to haw been very generally the case with them all." 19 When lo wer-ranking offi· cials o r special viziers failed, divide-and-conquer taaics wen: also tried: the mercenaries were provoked to act against rebellious religious student~ in the hope that each wo uld subdue or exhaust the other. Uncharactcrit­rically, the suhtes were even ordered to arm themselves to fight lhc handits, 20 a mistake the state surely came to regret. Later in the procCII, rhe state dispatched larger armies or offered bandit leaders positions ill the provincial government, thereby co-opting them into the Ottoman 1)'1"

rem. The result of these ~ar~ns was to establish the lead~rs.rup of dll mercenaries in legitimate posttaons, where they could admiruster prov­inces, tax the population, and respond as loyal members of the OttomiA administration to calls to battJc. Many a bandit was lured into the

' lege of Ottoman administration, especially when the position was oftietaf, with a robe of honor thrown in to impress. Co-optation cvcnwally came the mcchaJlj;; of pacification par excellence, especially favored grand viziers o n campaign with few military ~urces to squan~r. the other hand, celali troOps were less susceptible ro the temptations forded by legitimate roles and often returned to a life of depredation one infraction; looting rather than collecting taxes proved to be a Aifr .... t~~~:

habit to break. When these depredations were accompanied by an unwillingnc:o

participate in Ottoman campaigns, the fare of the now-legitimate nors was scaled. During the reign of Ahmed I in particular, state

1 aimed to disernpower all fonnc:r bandits who had acquired positiON our disciplining their unruly fo llowers; by war o r by conciliation, or br combination of the rwo, all-out war was declared on rhc recalcitranf

1~afinn (rom Charles Praaer'a U'll\llatlon m 11w AII.INils I{ tit# n.rtilh H,... to till f{tlll c;lwiltUM 8"' (London, sip), 1:101.

~Akdal. 'J'fWt H_.,,.,.l»{~, DiUuJai~ K•p•, p. 4 0}.

State-Btmdit ReiJuions 1.01

dits, leading ro their ultimate annihilatio n. After the defeat of the cclalis, d1c state claimed supremacy and undertook to control its provinces and its people, even those from fa raway villages, towns, and cities. To buttress this image further, after each victory the grand viziers usual ly reordered refugees back to their ho mesteads and vouched for their safety. They also redesigned central administrative tasks, increased provincial controls, and consolidated the hold of the state across center and periphery. After all,

! most cclali unrest centered in Anatolia, the heartland of the empire\ and recuperation required not so much territorial consolidation of a periphery as reestablishment of administration. This was accomplished by appoint­ing new officials, trusted men who would remain loyal to the state. The same general episode can be followed with slight variations for each celali.

Although the basic pattern of state-bandit relations was repeated again and again, the sites of confrontatio n between the Ottomans and European neighbors in the west and Persian neighbors in the cast changed fTc. quently. More so than internal problems, battles on the fro ntiers, and oc­casional ly successful attempts by foreign neighbors to reconquer territory, occupied the sultans' and grand viziers' attention. The reign of Siileyman rhe Magnificent had set a standard of grandeur and prestige that was nor repeated . After his reign some major conquests were accomplished, and rhe rest of the sixteenth century and a large part of the seventeenth were spent battling on the two major fronts, often with great logistical diffi. ' lulry and meager success. Still, despite the shorter reigns of the later suJ. tans, their youth, and their numerous grand viziers, the state actively engaged in the consolidation of its tcrriro ries.21

The many~ ~rs-waged during the ~ri2Q !S9:Q~I-wcre ,. '-. nod1ing bur wars of consolidation in which each power challenged one major buffer zone, ranging from the Caucasus to Kurdistan to Azarbaijan (1579- 90 and 1588- 1611). At the other end of the empire, after the defeat of the Ottomans at Lepanto ( 1571 ), Christian powers at the western borders were emboldened and looking for ways to exercise their superiority. It was unly at the conclusion of the Persian war of 1579- 90 that the Ottomans were able to engage in a 13-year war J.t1?1- a6o6) that continued into the \..1-t ~1

111 refer hue ru the numerous gnnd viticrs who were a.ppointcd during rhc:sc two pc­t kKl~. Son~ wc:n: even ~ppoirucd, dismissed, and reappointed withln the same: year. For ex· •mpk, t~ period IJ90- J611 Wln diro<1ed by three sul rans, Murad Ill , Mdunal Ill , and Ahnl«l l, but upcri(occd twenty changes of grand villicr. Although the periOd 16aJ....,., was 1llrecrCll by only twn sulr:uu, Mur..d IV and Ibrahim, nlUTlerous MliM sultans. teyh·lil is/imu, ~IW jmnl11ary lt4111 inrcrfemJ anJ often allied in romplieiry ro rule Jhc mtc. During l'hU 11·

~ 1r pcrlnd, thantteA of groan<~ vclkr occurred founttn rimct.

(

~Ol. 8ANDlTS AND BUREAUCRATS

reigns of rwo new sultans. 22 When peace was signed berween Austria and rhe Ottomans in r6o6 (Treaty of Sitva Torok), the Ottoman forces had to regroup quickly to prepare for the eastern front as well as face varioua pockets of rebellion by bandit chiefs. Although it is impossible to argue rhat the Ottoman state was still entertaining imperialist dreams, it wu forcefully defending its territories and conducting wars to maintain and consotidate the territorial gains of earlier sultans. Warfare:, thc:n, was an inevitable aspect of the state's consolidation functions.

Despite the numerous changes and the young age of sultans in the pc• riod r62.3- 4-8, warfare at the rwo borders continued. Osman II confronted the f50iiSh forces only to ensure: that the old borders were maintained be­fore turning to the internal reforms he had planned for his administratioo. 'Inc incompetence of Mustafa at internal as well as international atTain brought the members of the govc:mmc:nt together in their resolve: to bri .. Murad IV to the: throne:. Murad's tenure: began with the fall of ~sndld. orchestrated by the cunning Shah Abbas, who took advantage of the ine tcrnal disorders in the: Ottoman lands to seize: territory. Numerous rempts at the reconquest of Baghdad were muddled by the acrivitiea bandits until, nearly single·handed.Jy, Murad TV consolidated his J>OWWt reestablished order, and tried to push at the eastern frontiers once apia, Ultimately the strength of the eastern campaign prevailed: territory reincluded into the Ottoman realms(a new treaty was signed confi the: Ottoman borders, and the destructive: border raids and were: contained (1638-39~3

Consolidation through war and the further development of :att1'1'li111Ma

rration were accomplished during the tenure: of three sultans and dMif grand viziers. Despite the general notion that this was a time of ~~lUI• when intrigues were: many and various untrained favorites meddled in affairs of government, the overall rc:suJt of these activities was far grim for the state. On the: contrary, this was~!!· ~.gl!!!:2['J!t!~!!!!!!JI rive reform. with decisive modifications in such areas as ot' the o ld Ottoman legislative code and the development of a new more comprehensive code that accommodated changing times. Thll :also<( time when rhe state forcefuJiy tapped into the: empirc:1s rtt4•• and ~oplc:s so as to include them in military and adrninismuivc rions_)This inclusion and txnerration was a crucial component of state consolidation. Ahmed I and his grand vizier Nasul1 Pasha hav.:

nstanford J, Shaw. HIIUirJ I{IIH (),.,.._ £,.,.,., •1111 Mlllllnf 1'-""' (<Aimbr~ 1:11)- l+o

111bid.

St11te-BIUIIIU ReU#ions 2.03

credited with rhe most innovative use of mc:rccnaries, the creation of selt­b"" and Stme~J units, by which regular state troops were strengthened. While these nc:w. armies were: compo.~ of Turks, Kurds, and other peo­ple from Anato1ra, other troops were drawn by enslaving people from Abkhazia, Circassia, and other regions in the Caucasus. 24 This increased heterogeneity of the military and regional administration brought to­

gether groups that would have otherwise remained isolated. Common service provided the new glue of the Ottoman state in this period.

Bargains and Force, IS90- J6n

Mehmcd III and Ahmed I both had strong grand viziers who were: often able to cond~ warfare: at the borders and return to the capital to put down the upnsmgs of troops. That the men of the imperial council took pa~ in in~~gues did not hinder ~overnment officials from making appro­pnatc dc:os1ons. Most coups against the key decision makers and warriors in .the government remained unsuccessful and control was quickly rc:­dauned, as for example was the experience: of Grand Vizier Yerni~ Hasan Pasha in r6oz- 3. Other coups were: more successful, such as that organized by Dcrvif Pasha against Lala Mehmed Pasha in r6os- 6. But it ~mai~s £:Ur to say that most of the: grand viziers who came to power dur­mg thiS nme were: consolidators, like Yc:miKi Hasan Pasha, Yavuz Ali Pa­sha, Lala Mehm~ Pasha, Dcrvif Pasha, and finally in r6o6 the famously shrewd grand Vtzler, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, who received his nickname Ku_yucu from his practice of stacking the bodies of rebels into wdls. The famous rebels Karaywo Abdiilhalim. Deli Hasan, Tavil Hali~ Kalendero­Siu, Yusuf Pasha, and Musli c;a~ were: all active during the tenure of these grand viziers. The grand viziers made decisions on their own, under the sultans' o rders, or within the: imperial council, to pursue:, co-opt, or Ignore: the rebels. The following is their story.

Almost every account of the cc:lalis stans with a description of me: bat­tle at Mc:zO-Kc:rc:suc:s and Grand Vizier <;agalazade Sinan Pasha's move: to di11miss those nmar holders who were: either missing or had fled during 1hc war. ;zs Several historians have argued that the deserters were: the main l.'tmsritucots of d1c: major bandit revolts that followed, attributing origin

,.Murphey, "'nle Hinotlcal Setting," p. n . 11111t order W&J ro ~ and euattc all thoee &ipahu who were 0()( pracnt ar the

Iilii ~etll. Pot more dml~ ll'C 0\:apur ' ·

BANDITS AND BUREAUC RATS

and cause m the rebellions. The deserters were expelled from me army and took their revenge by fighting me empire, irs people, and its govem· mcnr. The deserters of me battle of Mez6-Keresztes are not important for lhis particular reason, but ramer because !heir desertion signals a new pe· riod of stare consolidation in Ottoman history. They are important be· cause dtey provoke~ important policy decision on me part of the stare co start recovering the land grants of some o lder tunar holders who hid accumulated large estates through regular additions. At me same t imo, some deserters were also soldiers of different ranks (janissaries, cavalry• men, paid halberdicrs, police officers, frontier soldiers) who earned larpr salaries. 26 Their dismissal provided state officials the possibility of savina resource.-; to reward new and fresh blood better able to fight wars~ is no doubt that this event set lose many discontented cavalrymen, who took to roaming the Anatolian plains. Scholars have suggested thlt Karayaztet Abdulhalim drew his manpower from these deserters, but turns out to be only partially correct.27 Mosdy, however, the deserters Mc7i)-Kcresztes were zcamet holders with large incomes and may been leaders close to Karayaztct, while his troops were mtt.dc,r-r-lht!atril• ;

so ldiers who tormed bandit companies in the provinces. 28

K~aztct himself was a musketeer who ha.d risen through the ranb become a company leader (bolult-bap).29 Dunng the three years from to 1602, Karayaztct's arnties lived off the peasantry of Anatolia and organized in military units, while their leaders behaved like European COlli 4iotticri. When engaged in war on the western front, the Ottomans a c()mmander to halt Karayaztct's actions. In a dramatic move, the man commander joined the rebel forces- unfortunately for him, sill('C hf

1"Whcrc:as .Akdag gives an excellent analysis of the action of dtc grand vi:tier, Ori-Mtl •li•missc."S it by uying that it was a quick and premature: decision. Sec: .Akda~ TlilrA> H • ._.IU IJ/rlllt w Dfhn1lilt Ktni!Jtm, pp. m - 76, and Griswold, The Grrlll AIUUolu"' PJlttUitllf,

J 70nc c~n ~ thi~ in the sundud histories of the period as well :u in ~ ti)C.1:ial&• ~t·~mutu nf rhe cchal i.~. FCir ~ few examples, ~c M. A. Cook, ed., A Hiftqry IJ{tht li1npirr to 17}11 (01mbricJgc:, 1976}, pp. 11.9- JO, and Shaw, Himwy of the Ottom~U~ Ml'l. Sill! AL&O GRISWOLD, The GrrmAnt~tolitm Rtbtllitm, pp. 10 - 11. Alutag, however, nne (T/Jrt HAIIttnm Dirlilt w Dilunlilt K•"Btm· p. J8r) to investigate thi~ claim, and lw th~t !iOnic uf the ltllliws Karay:wc• relied on were sipahis.

n A further cunfusiun here: might come front the fal1' that during the eel ali period d aimlntc ro be 8ipahis dc:~~Ccndcd on villages and demanded taxes. Court em s of lng pca8oUltt tell us ab<Jut these imposrors. Sec abo Akdag, 'l'IMt HlllkiHIH Dlrlillw K "ir!1111, p. 400.

ru~ular K&tlbl AlxJOIItiklir, Vtlt~t,Yii Ttn-ih~, folio 7J. Naimot, T~trih·i NIIJIM 1&11 4/11166- 67), ua~a.

State-Ba-ndit Relationr

was soon double-crossed by Karayaztet. 30 When the Ottoman statesmen after great deliberation, determined that me rebel leader would C..'OSt the~ too much in time and soldiers, especially when the western campaign was fuJI-blown, they decided to bargain with him. Karayaztct was offered the .../ beylilt of Ayintab, and later the sanuUt.beyligi of Amasya, in the hope that he would settle into a peaceful position (1600).31 He was later tran..~fcrred to

<;orum. In both cases, the state actively tried to secure Karayaztct an of­ficial position, giving him and his men an area to tax and to Live off. But me ~nk-and-file mercenaries under Karayaztcl continued their regular I lootmg, also extracting numerous illegal taxes in addition to legal ones. After the Ottoman army had won several victories in Europe and the lhrcat of the Wallachian rebellion of Prince Michael me Brave had been suppressed, the decision was made to launch an army against the cdalis of north-central Anatolia. 32 The new commander of the Ottoman army chased the rebels soum and east, decimating them in an ambush. The re-sult of the defeat was me splintering of the remaining celali forces into many groups and the flight of Karayaztct north to the Canik mountains where he died a short while later. Throughout his career as a bandit chiei KarayaztCt remained apolitical, despite rumors to the contrary. 33

Selaniki, a contemporaneous chronicler of Karayaztct and the only celali leader he wrote about in his treatise, TRrih-i Seldnilti, alleges that KarayaztCJ declared himself to be a descendant of dtc shah and sent around decrees bearing his tugra- (imperial signature). None of the other contem­P?raries of Sd aniki repeat this information. Naima, writing later, pro­Vtdes a s~ort text of what he cal ls an order (hUitm) by Karayaztct dtat tlcdares vtctory over the Ottomans in the region and td ls of his contro l <~vcr .the r~gion . He also claims to have sent our an imperial order, thus hkcmng h1msdf to a sultan. 34 Since it is most likely that Nairna took his information from Selaniki, we need to question the original source. Akdag doubts Selaniki's claims on the basis that all the o rders and corr<:­llpundence written by KarayaztcJ simply bear his signature. Also, none of the accounts of the men involved with Karayaztct make a similar claim re-

"~~Must~lit Rfendi Sdinilti, TRrih·i SdAnilt~ ed. Mclunct l~irli (Istanbul, 1989), ~:&17, and H!(l- }7• Soc alsc.> Griswold, The GrrRt A1UUOiitm &hdJW,, pp. 1.8- JO.

AI Alutag, "Kar.aymcr," p. *'i Mus[';lfa Nuri J>asha, NetRyic ui-V.m-t, cd. N. c;:agaray (Ankant, 1979), 1- 1.:184.

uOriswoiJ , '11~e GrrRI AHIIIolum RtheUwn, p. 36. f or the depredations of the cclalis in Ama•ya and <;orum, Kc .Akdag, Trlti HRiltm1n Dmilt J>e Diiunl~ KR"'Jim, pp. J8?-IJ8.

;~Scltnlkl, 1irrih·i .'itiAttilti, p. am Altdag, "Karay:urct," p. *~· 4Naimll, 'f'llrih·i NtUM#, r:J-+6- +7·

106 BANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS

garlling the political ambitio ns of this bandit chief. Also, William J. Gris· wold, who has survqed aJI the foreign sources and the diplomatic a>rrcspondence of the period, does not report such intentions regarding Karay32.1c1. This is quite: telling, since as was the case with Canboladoglu, Europeans wouJd have been the first to notice such secessionist plans and would have tried to use them to their advantage. I rend to agree with the latter interpretatio ns, since the actions of KaraY32JCI, unJike those of the more political rebel Canboladoglu, do not suggest any political ambition. Karayazaca's words remained the expression of a proud rebel and were never translated into deeds.

Deli H asan, Karayazaa 's brocher, allegedJy rebelled to avenge his brcxh· c:r'~ loss tO the Ottoman army, but he was willing to come forward to de· mand a deal with the state, drawing on his conneaions within the nate apparatus. Deli H asan's rebellion came at a time when Grand Vi%.icr Y emi~i Hasan Pasha was at the Austrian front with most of the effective anny, but also at a time when the stare was undergoing elite struggla. with different military factions pulling different key stare officials inco conflia . Among the issues displeasing the members of the: Six Cavalry Di· vis ions was the faa dun janissaries were able: to establish themselves in the provinces and increase their power and income, while inadequate outaid• crs were running the palace affairs and the: suJtan refused to go to war. Moreover, anoc:hc:r important complaint was that celalis were acquirin& position.'i of importance in the provincial government. These central sta• cavalrymen declared most governors and provincial dignitaries to be sim• ilarly corrupt; they named the rebels Ddi Hasan, Tavil Halil, and Kill Sa_id and equated them to the governors of Erzurum, Gusab Nc:fer Pasha. and Savas, Ahmed Pasha, who engaged in similar pillage of me countryside. 35 When the claims cuJminatcd in the: vilifying of the: grand vizier, he returned from the: front to take matters into his own handt. calmed rhe various military faaions, made deals with the: cc:Jalis., and thea pl"()(eeded to d ispose: of the: unruJy sipahis. (!t wos at this moment of internal struggles that Ddi Hasan sent hM deputy ~ahverdi to Istanbul to solicit a pardon and request a provindll post.)lking the right moment, his contact at the: paJacc: was able to cue 1 dc1ll fur him for the governorship of Bosnia and, according to Naima, lht

1 government sent thi5 bandit "a drum, a nag, and a robe of ho no r,,. AtW Deli H aaan managed to get 4o00 of his men admitted into rhc Six Cavaby

StRU·Btmdit R.e~Rtion.s 1.07

Divisions, he gathered his troops and went to Bosnia. 36 Joseph von Hammcr-Purgstall, who described this army as a curious bunch of sol· diers with long hair, amuJc:rs, talismans, and other strange effects, believed that the Ottomans were interested in sending Deli Hasan to fight the in· ftdc:ls at the western front.37 Like his brother, Deli Hasan was also not interested in any position that would lead to autonomy from the empire. He wanted a legitimate post in the Ottoman establishment. His crusted allies and vice-chiefs were not even interested in that; all they were inter· ~ ~ in~ l<?<?t, gathered in the old-fashioned way, as they had p;;iCti'Ced at 10 eastern Anatolia, especially Savas and Tokat. 38

The mercenaries of Deli H asan fought in Esuk and in Pest against the i. ~r.isti3'_15. Despite their ~artkipation in.war, cc:laJi troops simultaneously ' disttngUJshcd themselves 10 the: plundenng of Ottoman territory. While: , 1

his troops were plundering, it is said that Deli H asan was corresponding with Venice and the: pope, offering to seJI territory for goJd.39 When this was discovered, Deli Hasan fled to Belgrade and was later killed in rt>o+. Deli H asan's demise was also conneaed with events of 16o3- 4o, whereby the new suJtan, Ahmed I, was confronted with the revival of the eastern campaign just as he ascended the throne:. Batdc:s were raging in both cast and west, while Deli Hasan's usefulness in the western front ier had out· lived itself and the Ottoman armies had to confro nt Shah Abbas's viola-tions of his agreements with the Ottoman Empire:. AJJ this gready diminished the usefulness o f this bandit-governor; orders followed to ex· ecut:e him.

The: arrogance with which T~, a third bandit leader, rejected the offer o f the provinces of Aleppo, ~atolia, and Savas- nearly all of Anatolja- lc:avc:s no doubt that: rhc:sc: rebels lacked political motives. Given a chance to control such a Large territory, Tavil Halil showed no interest and later was assigned to the: beylerbeyligi of Baghdad, with rwc:Jvc: uf his key men receiving different s~itfis. 40 Feeling besieged from

<16Hammcr, Hist«rt tk l'mf/Mr Ot'tfiMMI, :~: )07. '17lbid. ~I _refer _here to the faa dur 30fTlC of_ the vice-chiefs of Ocl.i Hasan rd'uscd the military

!adnumsmnve ~rs offered by the souc m order to continue locxing; JCC Edmund Schiltz., "An Armeno-Kipchalt Documcnr of 1640 &om Lvov and hs Bactground in Armenia and the Oil&3pon," in Bmwnt tiM Da.U. 111111 tiM CIIMCIUIU: A QlkaiM t(hpm Qmar,ille OrimRIJ ,'IMIIUI 1M the History of tiN Plfl/lks t(Cnttml lmll S4*tWif·&alter11 H11rvpt, cd. GyOrgy Ka.n (Budapat, 1987), p • .&JJ.

"'1. II. U~fllh, OsMa/1 Tllrihi (AnUra, IOIJ), J· I:IO:l. Sec also Griswold, TIM Gn.s A~tlllllia RddlitM, pp . ._. ..... $ .

.OOrilwold, '1111 Gtwu A~~~~tllia Rtlltll~, p. 11·

BANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS

all sides at his accession, Ahmed 1 had decided with his imperial councU on a conciliatory policy with the bandits. After the defeat of the Ott<>m111 turces against Tavil, Ahmed I decided to go on campaign against the c:cJe. lis himself but retraced his steps back to the capital quickly. The dea.l thlt Sufu Sinan Pasha (the rcmporary governo r in Istanbul) had arranged~ ing Ahmed 's absence for Tavil, which he had luckily refused, was far CQO

generous and Ahmed promptly dismissed the governor from o ffice.41 Af. ter this incident, Ahmed resolved to pursue his policy of incorporatt._ and conciliatio n with the celalis, hoping ro induce them ro become ao,.l Ottoman governors and incorporate their annies inro his. In fact, he hill tumsdf made deals with bandits during his campaign; several hundred f/ these bandit-musketeers received pardons and were quickly fonncd Ottoman army units. As more: cdalis jo ined the Ottoman system, wold argues, "ceuui leaders moved both socially and politically from lim Turkish peasants to loyal Otto man mlteri, their followers filling ranks of the sultan, manning the siege machines ro fight against the sian and the Habsburg enemies, and partaking of the perquisites of ruling Otromans.',.2

Kalenderoglu, probably o ne of the most organized bandits of the ear period, is famous for having sent a letter to his fellow bandit, Musli v~. coaxing him into jo in his forces: .. If we win over Kuyucu (the vizier J, then we will have the Ottomans give up everything cast of l~.e:., Ana tulia J; if we do not win we will be content being the hcroca fnlk songs!""3 Although the content of this letter seems to show an rercst an seceMion, Kalendcroglu never rook action in that direction.

./ had one of the lo ngest histories of negotiations with the Ottoman by the time he became important, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, having pea e with the Habsburgs (Sitva Torok, 1606), had declared :1 seem , o ur w;ar against the cclalis.

41 lbkl , p. J.+. Th«C seems robe some disagreement in the litcrarurc regardlna dM manJ for thctc: thr« regions. While Griswold aueru mar it was Sofu Sinan Puha ·~uga.l rhe Ileal for Tavil, P~evi argues that Tavil first ukcd for these regioN and when Sofu came up with the deal, he did noc aruwer the o~rturcs by the arcarc . N1lma thllt Tavil wrote a letter to the government (probably inquiring about a pcll'liticKI), hue Sufu Sinan l'uha arranged the deal ill<'luding thcac regions. What is ('Cftain Ia chat Ahmed I fuund out the cktaib of the deal he dismiS8Cd the pro-tem gowroor. S<c ·n,rlh·l l)t(M (laranbul, 193<>), s:JJ+. S« abo Naima. Tllrih·i N.UU, r:.ns- u .

410riJJWI,d, '/'IN c;nlll A~uli#n RtiHII'-, I'· ,6. .-M, G. Uluc;ray, XYII. A11r* StwNIM,'IM BtltiJtlljj , fi.Jk H~trtltltltrl (htanbnl,

p. 17. I hll~ rrarulatctl nuhcr frttly frtltu hisrcrr. Nalma pruvldcs • alis htly dltl'crcot 11at d~ lcmr.

Around thjs time, Grand Vizier Dervi§ Pasha had begun a period of c~~~j~tion; he aimed .to. direct all forces to the east (altho ug h the: grand vw cr himself was not w1llmg to go to war) to fight the Persians and con­tinued the sultan's poJjcy of conciliating the ceJalis in order to acquire mc:rccnacies for the front. 44 One of his first actions in power was to ~nd troops to the Persian front to recover Aur~jan, which had rc:ccndy been lost to Shah Abbas. The troops departed willy-nilly, they were unpre­pared, and their appointed commander, Ferhad Pasha, who knew this well, ex:pc;cted ~e failure that was to befall them. There were also plans to send amues agamst the rebels after the: wars, especially after a successful conclusion at the western front . While plotting war with external cne- ~ mies, during his few months of tenure as grand vizier Dervi~ Pasha rook the ~CCC:S~ary steps to a~ply pressure on his internal enemies, those groups and mdiv~duals potentially threatening to the state. Dervi~ Pasha identi­fied the VItal problems of the empire: fiscal imbalance, administrative .in­efficiency, and the inordinate power of certain central and regional o fficials. He vowed to go after each of these. He: secured new sources of timds for the state, altered the corrupt administrative practices of the bu­reaucracy, and tightened the: control over the various political and mer­C:Ultile cJjtes whose r:,wer and wealth were crucial to the renewed 11rrcn~ of the s_rate. 4 F_o r example, he instiruted a new tax, the balcony tax, aamed at tax:mg the nch who could afford balconies on their houses. 46

After Dervi~ Pasha was executed o n charges of 1~-majeste, the new grand vizier, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, continued centralization and control In the center while also taking advantage of continued preparations for the eastern campaign. More than anything, he: used these preparations ro rric;k the ban<~:its, draw them into the supposed war effort, and destroy them as they Integrated themselves into the army. Conciliation had be­rome ~. JlQt a policy. And Kuyucu went o n an unprecedented c:ffori

1

ro eradicate: banditry. Convinced that these mercenary troops should not

44AI i• seen in the next S«tion, this is when Canbolad Ali Pasha fCflt the famous List of Maucn dted ar the beginning of the chapter.

••t •m aw~rc of the ronrrovcrsy that crisu regarding the actions of this grand vizier. h is 1l ar rhat Narma. for example, who liked the grand vizier Lala Mehmc:d Pasha, was noc • llClUI ttl 11100ep1 any of Dervlf's actions; sec Tllrih·i Nllilu, r:u1- 49. Pe~cvi, Tllrih-i Pqni, l lla+-21, lllmilarly descr!bc~ Dcr~i~ Pasha as a man who like a an:W: could bite anyone in his

llllh anJ saw no good tn h111 actrons. Howc~r. Hammer and Griswold, who gather their llfommlon from • ~riety of soun:a, present a more balanced accounr and present some of

I hi' crmnllutk>n pohdu of d~la grand vizier in a posirive light. Sec Hammer, Himlirt iU l.,,.,m OtfMMI, 2:~1s; Ortawold, 7'1H GrtJU AlfMI!Iill" IUIJtUitm, pp. 16o- 6t . Sec aJso tl11rlau, T"' Rlflwl lj'ull., pp. af- *1· ~rbwol~ '/'W (ifYIU ANriOUJUe RtiHU;, p. aso.

llO BANDITS AND 8UIU!AUCllATS

even lx incorporated into the Ottoman anny, he proceeded to wipe them our. By the end of the decade, just before Kuyucu died, the Ottoman staoc had managed to control its internal troublemakers, established peace in ia provinces, and demonstrated forcefully that dissent was an unacceptable gamble.

After a preliminary battJe between the Ottoman forces and Kalendero­gtu, Ottoman armies were ordered toward the more important bandic. Canbolad Ali Pasha, whose: activities were deemed more serious dwl those ofKaJendc:roglu. Yet, to keep the latter occupied and unable to join other rebels, especially Canbolad, Kuyucu Murad Pasha resolved to aMr him a post and proposed a governorship in January 16<>7. By March hi had offered Kalenderoglu a second governorship, but since the celali ~ tinued his rampage, the grand vizier retracted his offer soon afrerWifdt When the grand vizier was ready to attack Canbolad, he wrott ro d.iffatllt bandits and offered them appointments. 47 Among these was Kalendc:ro­gtu, who was presented with a new position for the third time- the ince of Ankara, which he had trouble taking control of because and residents opposed rum vchemcndy and asked for Ottoman ..... -~ • •

j help to keep him away. His mercenaries' reputation for looc:ing waa rhar the inhabitants of Ankara gave wo,ooo ducats ro buy them While other celalis joined Kalenderog.lu ro fight Ankara's feisty resider .... Ottom:m squadrons arrived ro help bur were quickly defeated by mercenaries. Kalenderoglu was ro spread more fear as he continued on Rursa, the ancient capital, and then toward Istanbul. 48

This was the first rime the government felt threatened from so ncarlft With Kuyucu still engaged in battJe in the east against the bandit holad, state officials took special measures. Kalenderoglu, on the hand, must nor have had much more in mind than intimidating the and pushing Ahmed I into offering him another position in the Ot1•• administration. In lstanbul, however, the provincial militia (il 40,000 urban citizens, and small numbers of troops were called in to teet Bursa, lstanbuJ, and the surroundings. 49 These efforts produced success, as only 6,ooo men returned, but Kalender<>glu changed hie

4'1nc account ol thi. conaponden« varie3. Some say rhar bandit~ wrote tu him 10 join hb campaign. S« Vu1n, K,- Mt~I'YUI ~ V...tult 1ltrrihj, fOlio ,b. Par railed cxpc:Mition of Klllcndcroalu's exploits, a« l~lar KAtibi AhdOibdlr, .,,..,_ ltfyt1 loliol u1~7a.

••~cvi, Ttm.ft.i l't(#'l'i, 1: Hl- l+; llammcr, Hlmlin til I',.., ~ t:~1 'T'twill· l N.U.. aao-ta.

490 rilwuld, 7'W CM.M Auulllllf RtMIIM, pp. •lo- tJ.

StRie-Bandit Rela:Wns 2 11

crary and shifted to the south to set up his winter camp. As he was leav- ~ ing, he did nor neglect to ask fo r a position from Ahmed 1- just in case the government wanted to reward him! Before the final showdown, when the grand vizier was finally able to overtake Kalcnderoglu, he eliminated aJI the rebel's potential allies; each received a post and was sent away. Tavil Halil received the siUWdt of Bodrum, Muslu Ql~ became governor of l~cl , and others were dispatched to various positions. Kalenderoglu joined

./ the shah of Persia after his defeat, setting off a diplomatic tangle between the two countries.

With Canbolad Ali Pasha and Kalendc:rogtu defeated, Kuyucu Murad Pasha proc«ded to the business of retracting the: offices he had so gen­erously offered: Tavil Halil simplified matters by being murdered by one of his own men. Kuyucu ordered his trusted officer, Zillftkar Pasha, to entice the bandit Muslu va~ ro his camp and have him murdered. He himself wrote a letter ro the bandit Yusuf Pasha, inviting him ro his side to help in the preparations fo r the eastern campaign. He caJled him "my son," made him d1e rax collector ( muhiUJJ) of the JR,Jellk of Saruhan, and I caprured the rebel's imagination: "My son, I have heard of some of your virrues and high talents, which I es~em very much. Although you have such a considerable number of men under you, yet no rumor of any in­justice practiced b>Jou is any where heard. The reverse of injustice in you must be the case." Yusufwas convinced to jo in, only to be beheaded in Kuyucu's tent. And so it wenr for most of Anatolia's celali leaders; they were able to bargain with the government when they pushed the limits of a state engaged in wars on two fronts, or when they had ro be kept away from the battJeground, or when the state employed a ruse only to con­front them later.

J t is difficult to characterize any one of these celalis as major contenders for the Ottoman throne. They were able military men strongly supporred by cruciaJ seltbRnls1111CR groups and some factions in the Ottoman state. Their actions were most successful when they were able to mobilize great numbers of seltbans (which they couJd do only with the promise of loot, ~inc:e it is doubtful they could ever pay them), and when the Ottoman 11 r:arc: was unable or unwiJiing ro direct its resources and its anny against the rebels. On the other hand, as this analysis shows, they were at the mercy of the Ottoman state, which was able ro control, contain, and co· np1 rhcsc men through its power and patronage. The: practical detenni-

~0Naima pruv!dcl the tc:at of the: lcncr rhat aua ts ro the ruse: of rhc grand vizier, Stt

Prucr, A,,,.,.u I{ the 'lilrltish £,pan, p. Jlh. Sec abo Hammer, Histom u 11mepirt On-M~, au~; <lrlawold, 11H c;,, A"lll_u., Rt.lldliM, p. :aoo.

211 BANDITS AND 8 URBAUCRATS

nant of state action was the perceived balance betwc:cn the international cunccms and the internal issues that propelled the decision-making appa· rarus of the: state to attack or to bargain with these rebels. In each case, the policy of small-scale warfare with an imperial anny was u ied. When thia policy failed, o r when the external pressures were deemed more c~· quenrial, the state endeavored to co-opt the celali leaders into the system: for Karayaz.tct, the positions at Amasya and <;orum, for Oc:li Hasan, Bosnia and TemC4var, for '9vil HatH, Baghdad, and for Kalenderot~u, the region of Ankara were ~I tcme<;>rary P!,izcs en route to later defett through tougher state acti<>rP

That these deals were part of a larger plan to control, take advantage of, and later discard the: rebels was apparent in the choices of destination of rhc cdalis. Governorships were handed out not o nly to reduce the dan8cr ro the state but also to benefit from such temporary deals. In the four. teenth century, insofar as possiblc:,<(he state sent captured rebels to chc border regions- in the belief that the harsh conditions obtaining in araa of expansion and constant warfare would constitute enough punishment for any rebel )In the seventeenth century, the practice of sending banctia to the frontier regions continued, especially when these were batde· grounds with the Austrians or Persians. The state clearly wanted to ben· efit from extra armies in this region. Oc:li Hasan, for example, brouaht with him 10,000 troops to the western front.51 The engineers of this pol• icy did not seem to think about the long-term consequences of Nda policies- and there were probably none-since they believed that afRr international conflicts they would return to settle scores with the bandia

Institutionalization of this policy occurred at different levels. Makiftl deals with rebels to bolster the army became standard practice. Bcxh cen­tral state officials and battlefield commanders of the Ottoman army struck their own deals to increase their forces. This was especially cruc when the pool of mercenaries became extremely valuable to an imperNII anny faced with two war zones. When ~galazadc Sinan Pasha wu • pointed to the eastern front, he managed to gather an army of ,.o.OOO men. His i bility to muster such an anny while many forcc:s were enptllil in dtc west was partially due to his ability to incorporate the troopt ofthl c:elali Ka~ Ahmed Pasha in return for the beyler#Hylilt of ~ddu.12

Viewed from the provincial towns and villages, state action wae ca.­rial for the continued welf.m: of the empire. Throughout these bandit

••orlawold, TIN Grr111 A~ R.1HIU., p. ++· " lbki., pp. 10 1- a.

St11te-BIUUUt R.elRtitm.s 11}

skirmishes, emboldened locaJ officials had takc:n the law into their own hands and themselves be:~ to plunder and loot. At the JocaJ levcl, then, the larger cases of band1try had encouraged increased lawlessness. sa Thercfo~e, to the depredations caused by the larger armies of rebels in each re~n had ~ be added the smaller local evmts that brought peasants to the ~rink ?f dtsaster. Heaps oflOCil reports were amassing at the doors .,..,... of the ~mper.tal palace demanding the sultan's response. Without a stren­uous camprugn of local control, great dislocations would threaten the land, agriculture, the people, and therefore the state as well. It was in the int~res~ of the government to i~prcss the Joe~ with the vigor of the actJo~ at was capable of undertaking . At the local level, this attempt ~ establiSh_ calm ~d scc~ity was partly instituted by annihilating noto· ~~o~ bandns and t~ardy controlling and collecting anns foJJow. mg mtcrnal wars. Sancc the state had often anncd local militia to defend themselves, .th~ collection .sce~ed contradictory. Y ct it had two pur­poses: to elurunate potential vwlence and to provide the public with the sense that the state was back in control and therefore in no need of local help.

The cdali who represented some variation from the more common fonn, Canboladoglu Ali Pasha, did confront the state head o n with what seemed to be: close to the makings of a contending state apparatus. His appearance, however, coincided with one of the decisive moments of the Ahmed I administration, where a collection of powerfuJ viz.iers and com­mand~rs were w~l o~ their way to integrating their power. These men c~nstttuted a factton m the Ottoman administration, yet it was the win­mng ~ne . And they had resolved to eliminate pottntial threats to intc:mal secun ty. Although Grand Vizier Oc:rvi~ Pasha was at the head of this fac­tio~, ~t was Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the famous enemy of the rebels, who an~uhtlate~ a large part of the celali troops. Ahmed I had especiaUy ap­pomted this latter to become the grand vizier, asking him personally to concentrate his ~fforts first in Anatolia to defeat Canboladoglu, then the (~ther rebels Taval, Kalcnderoglu, and Kara Said. Finally, after the destruc­tiOn of rebel forces, Kuyucu Murad was to continue on to the Persian

13M any docwncncs a.n~t to ~ in tht ~ten o( tllo« yars. For example, in one rc· 8iOn of western Anatolia (Hamid), Orner lky and his steward, roaming tht countryside whh 600 moun~cd liOidicn, were exacting illc~ rax~ (UIIM.) from tht peasantry, rich and 1100r. In the rcg100 of Antalya, Arslan lky and has 400 men were collecting betwcc:n 1oo and 900 k.urut from 1hc villagcn, ncaling and lUlling along tht way.~. 7Ji1i Hllllblm. DirlM "'~ Klf'f/llll'> pp. ~J. mentions &imilar cases. Ul~ay. ~·-1?.!~ p. 100, prt-aenta nwncroua doc:wnc1lU that arrest to the greed and destruction engendered by all lcvd.e of otfklab taking ll.lvam• of thc coofuaior;l pr«ipltatcd by the cdalis.

114 BANDITS AND 8UR.BAUCRATS

fron t, fight the principal enemy of the: Ottomans, the shah of Iran, and regain the terrirory lost in previous battJc:s. 54 This vizier, who had been .1ppointcd specifically to the: task of subjugating rebels, operated by means of ruse, lies, and subterfuge.

There is no doubt that the Ottoman state rook the: case of Canbola·

~u b li p~h. ~more seriously than it did adler cc:lali depredations. Can· I( ladoglu was located in northern Svria, a geopoliticaJly, ethnically, and

economically separate: and potentially secessionist area. What made: these regional advantages more critical was that not only the Ottomans but abo Huropcans kept close watch over northern Syria. In fact, in this case a reading o f the foreign interests in the region reveals how much of the

( struggle of the: celali leader was tied to the provocation of the European~. especially Grand Duke Ferdinand, who coveted Cyprus and northern Syria as stepping stones to an alliance with the shah of Persia and the: final llcstrucrion of Ottoman forces. 55 European aspirations to control north· ern Syria and its vicinity led them to send many intermediaries in search of alliances with key local power holders who would be wimng to anta&• nni1.c the Ottomans. The economic wealth and importance of the area AI

an c:ntrep6t made these political ambitions even more compelling. Despite this regional potential, the movement ofCanbolad never became fully tcpo arationisr. From all indications, in t6o6 it looked as if Canbolad<>glu AU Pa11ha was ready for the implementation of what would be the first ma~ secession from the empire. A few years later, the dream and its major ini• riacor were: dead.

The: Canbolad family had control of the region from Kilis to Aleppo for

j ar least a generation and had the opportunity to construct strong loctl patronage tics. This area was far from Ottoman central contrOl. In fact, II 1.-~re than 30 days' march from IstanbuDAs a result, from its conqUCJf it{ ~e Qrly sixteenth cc:nrury this region had presented special p~l~ which the: state had decided to deal with by delegating authoriry.~not

/ was divided between multiple: power holders and different cia.~ In • dcty, m aking it difficuJt for any o ne: group to emerge} The Ottomaru Cftt "·o uragc:d groups such as tribal chiefs, janissaries, and local notable~ 10 partic:ip:uc in rhc rule of no rthern Syria. 56 Short tenure in office for CCftf trally nppointc:d regional officialt~ was alsC> c:mp oyedas a usc 1l mcc""

A+fup.;ular KAribi AlxJUikadjr, Vtk~tyil 'lilriiJiyt. folios 1.)03, b. uoriswold, Tht Grr111 A,,tolum R.tbtllion, pp. 11.+- 11,. &41Jbid., I'· oo.

StRte-Bandit &IRtionr

nism of control. 57 During the long wars with Persia, a nearby border region, the Ottoman state diverted irs attc:ntioin away from northern ~ Syria and allowed one major family, the Canbolads, to take contro l.

Northern Syria represented the: intersection of many diverse ethnic groups, including Kurds, Arabs, and Turcoman tribesmen. In this diver­sity there was always an element of disdain for the llnprme process (the:

~~ le~y .of children) 5~at had cstabl~shc:d " infidcls" in leadership po­smons Within the state. Aleppo and Its surroundings were also quite wealthy. Accc:ss to the control of the provinces of northern Syria meant a rich tax base from agriculture as well as from trade:. It was situated o n scveraJ trade routes, and local merchants benefited handsomely from this privileged position. 59

Canboladoglu Ali assumed the leadership of the region after the: death of his uncle: Canboladoglu HUsc:yin and his foreign interests were: increas­ingly becoming prominent after the: battle of Lepanto.60 He consolidat<.-d his position by aJJying with power holders to the south of Syria as well as with cclali leaders to the immediate north.61 He fiarther took action to

~bstruct the: ~oads. ~ Mecca :u'd -~edina, hoi~ sites of prime importance to the sultans politacal presttgc:.~The potc:nttal for contention between Canbo~dogJu and th~ Ottoman state: ~came a reality when, in May 16o6, / the Synan leader dccaded to usc all av:ulablc: means for bargaining to se­cure: his position. In a letter to Ahmed I, he requested the beylerbeylilt of

57Griswold, Tht Grufl A!lllldilm Rt~ p. 1$6, n. r, quotes Withers, "Through pcr­

advcnlW'C they be mauold I &om M#lr.NI III,W, tO be dijmissed J again, before dlq be scar« warm in mar places."

"It is noc easy ro discuss me cduUc factor. Although we know that ethnic diffcrcnccs exisTed, ~ can only speculate about their innucoo:. Paflaps further rcsarch into Arab sources might indicate more.

5'7hc w .a;rums of~is area indicate irs wealth. In the early scvcnreauh century, thew rcrums of Kilis were emma~ ro be threc·quuter million ~cs and of Aleppo 1.8 million u~ .. 'J'hac f~ :U: quite significant when rornpared ro most of Anatolia. See Ayn-i Ali Efendr, K•-m·l AI-r o- tier HiilAul-yi Mt:Uifli,.; Defttr-i o;.,., (Istanbul, 1919).

60Can~u Hibcyin h.ld been executed by <;agaluadc:, the commander of the army at the: astern front. for a ddaycd arrival at the scene of battle. Walazade's words were fatal : "Yuu were givm We: vilayct of Aleppo oo condition th:u )'00 would reach and unite with the ~m'y punctually. How is it that you arrived like this Rjter we returned? Why did you noc ~each w when the enemy atTacked w ?" Griswold, T?' Gnlll AIUrlolilut Rebtllitm, p. to8. The mterat or Europeans wa., aroused after Lepanto, Sln<X the: Onoman navy's defeat height· ened Europe's hopes of suc:ccu against dle Turkish enemy.

61 He is .aid to ha~ allied with Tavil from Baghdad and Ma'annglu Pahrcddin from IIOUt!Km Syria. 1-Je al8n tried to ally with Kalendc:rc>AJu, Kara Said, and Ccm4id from west­ern and central Anarolia.

111Vurn, K~f1WN MN""' l'N• V11jarr T11rihi, fulio 7b.

8ANDrt'S AND BURBAUCRATS

Aleppo in rerum for much needed miliury reinforcements for the PcntiM frunt. In this letter (presented at the opening of this chapter) Canlx*o doglu offered ro,ooo soldiers in return for this position, which wallld transform him immediately into the most powerful man in the ~ furthermore, to consolidate h.is power around the periphery of northaa Syria, Canbolad made further demands, including s/UIUUts for his coato rnanders and police and gcndanne positions for h.is other men, each time offering more soldiers for the imperial army. In the process, he rnrnmtNI•

nearly 6o,ooo men to the Ottoman army.63 By securing offices for mandcrs and other officials loyal to him, Canbolad was obviously rrytiW ro guarantee his own security by cstabHsh.ing a protective zone aroufti himself and creating his own patronage tics. Despite Ahmed Ps retail• that Canbolad was demanding a little too much, the Ottoman sta~

It' ' tified him as the governor-general of AJeppo in September r6o6.64

new governor then proceeded to engage in deliberations with the lhlll Jlersia and the grand duke o f Tuscany.

To the Ottoman administration, the indicators of potent.ial regional sc:nr with political implications were dear in northern Syria. Not only rhis a remote and distinct territory with Canbolad in the highcet position, there were aJso strong indications of maneuvers toward niw:l administrative and miliury authority. Organization in the istration districts and in the governor-general's jurisdiction was nor in the Ottoman Empire. In faa, every governor-general held hia council and developed his own administrative structure, which ita ted that of the imperial council. But contemporaries of Ca~nb<>l*ltJI• describe more than a reguJar administration; they argue that he

/ own money, had prayers read in his name, and called himself "1'M and Protector of the Kingdom of Syria," all the while building hia Griswold, who had surveyed the Europc:an sources and cOtuular ,.... .... argues that despite their keen interest and their previou.'i involvement ropearu ar this stage stayed put and refrained from interfcrenc~ ctw1a. not to jeopardize their relationship with the Ottomans. Ne~rthc:lae, were all eager to control this territory, although the ThscaJOs were rhe

&I<Jri!IWc.td, 1"1H Grt•t ANtlllllu! RtiHIIilm, pp. J.+O-.+a, 4141bfd., W ui- JO, .. Ibid., p. 1.11. Sec abo Hammer, H._, ill ,,_,.., Ot,.,., J:JJI-19• II.,..

arsucd that the anny o1 <Anboladotlu wu wcmbkd &Ml men from varied and rqlooa, but that when they sacnrrcd wldcr hit mmmand they were &lvm elmll.r to thll ot the Ottoman army.

l17

ones to openly su~po~t C:anbolad<>glu's claims. 66 The~ was, then, by the end of .•6o6 eve.ry rndJcatton that Canbolad was looking for the first op­porrunrty to rebel and secede from the empire. ~i~ realization motivated Grand Vizie.r !._u~cu Murad Pasha, who

mobrhzcd for a camp~ign. to the cast with the eclared aim of fighting Shah Abbas but the disgwsed one of securing northern Syria. Peace with the Habsburgs had been signed (November t6o6), and there was no rca­son. to wait. He dispatch~d. his ~st men to positions of priority in the rcgro~al and cen~ adm~~strat~on of the empire, thereby ensuring the sc:cunty and effcmve adminrstratron of all functions of the Ottoman lands ' h' L-- C'. 67 . 10 IS ai,JlK;nce •rom the center. It was also tmporrant to strike fast, since Canboladoglu had not yet had time to benefit from all his alliances and ro cash in on the deals he had made. Kuyucu Murad Pasha marched toward n~r~em Syria, eliminating cdalis on dle way with a variety of tricks: dnvrng away KaleodcrogJu by offering him a good deal with the SllncU of Ankara,

68 entrap~ing ~~r bandit, Scrradctz.ade Ahmed Bey, with of-fers of Konya, while d.iscard.in£ the heads of Ahmed Bey's men into wells prepared for this grisly usc. After many more subterfuges Murad Pasha's and Canbolad's armies met at Oru~ Ovast to the north of Alc:ppo, where the mercenary army was decimated. lr is said that Kuyucu Murad ., Pasha had w,ooo heads of mercenaries piled in front of h.is rent. 70 With Canbolad~Ju defeated, Kuyucu continued to fight the rest of the mer­u:nary arrrues and supposcdJy had up to too,ooo men beheaded. Among t1lcsc were at least forty-eight bandit chiefs whose: heads were sent to 18tonbul. 7 1

This battle ended a major era in the history of the Ottoman Empire since. the vio~e.ncc of K~~ Murad showed the sute's capacity for re~ ~rcsston . Polmc~ barga.mmg and co-optation were used to stop territo­r!~ from be~nung the domains of strong, independent, and militarily alert men. This had always been the policy of the Ottoman Empire; yet,

lt8 BANDITS AND BUR.BAUC RATS

when rotation was not sufficient, the state resorted to force to maima,in I its traditional goal. How important this was to the stare is reiterated by

the story of Kuyucu, who summoned a perfeaJy legitimate but increaa· i11gly powerful commander and vizier, Nasuh Pasha, and scolded him on d1e ever-increasing size of his personal retinue.n When the stare mustered eno ug h military strengdl, it moved to consolidate by eradicating rebel leadership.

for aJI its increasing reliance o n force, the state's harshest measures were rC~~Crved fo r u.sc only against Canboladoglu. This was precisely becaUIC

/ the rebellio n of the Syrian governor was considered a direct threat to dw consolidatio n of the state. The relative magnitude of this threat becoma~ obviou.CJ when compared to the activities of other bandits: while l1lOit

bandits cr iss-crossed Anatolia in search of booty, Canboladoglu remained in his region, deliberately manning his districts with troops an~ more Im­portant, enjoying the backing o f European powers. Yet like the first sc:t c/ m<wcments building a power base very much depended on the ability 10

mobilize mercenary companies and direct them into contentiou.'l action, ·me mo re: ceremonial and theatrical aspect of state consolidation kJcbd

in with C'.anbolad's defeat. The rebel was brought to the palace when: hi stayed with the young Sultan Ahmed I, consulting as well as repcndnt His sons were placed in the harem school, provided with an allowanc., and thereby given the chance to become the sultan's servants in the futun. Q nbolad was treated as part of the state. It is said that he explained to cht sulran that his earlier actions were the result of bad advice: and that lw would prove worthy of the sultan's trust. He was subsequently JCnt 10 Temqv:ar as governor, only to be strangled later at the: jrders of Kuyucu Murad ~a. His ultimate fate should not blind us to~e signHicancc ~ his rehabilitation. The: willingness of Sultan Ahmed to consult and ac:ccpe Canbolad, by far the most threatening of the cclalis, is indkative of rhl

j nlCS age: the state intended fOr potential lawbreakers: the government route wa~ always open\rhe early t600s set this pattern, which WaA m be emulated throughout ((c century. The second period of uprisings dlf'ffrel only slightly. Hc:rc political rhetoric was added to the scenario. The haft. dh11 of the second period presc:nted political reasons for thdr Kbcllion; rhcy learned to use political events for their goal~. which remained 1lw 11amc: looc o r taxes.

' l llamme1, H111DI" iU J•,.,p;,., OttorM,., :.:m - s.; ('.(<ar, OMM~n/1 'lllrlhi'IMI.t,. ,. 199.

St~~te-BIIndit ReiRtions 219

Immediately after Kuyucu's success, the challenge: of further centraliza­tion was confronted. As this internal war was considered a majo r victory against bandits, the natural progression was me establishment of o rder and peace in the provinces. Because the population o f the province:.~ had either migrated to me major walled cities, especially to Istanbul, or had escaped to mountain hideouts, o ne of the first o rders of business was to command the people to return to their villages and revive cultivation of the land. Kuyucu convinced the sultan to issue a decree o rdering people ro leave Istanbul. In the imperial o rders requiring the repopulation of Anatolia, threats were used to guarantee compliance. 73 Once the popula­tio n of Anatolia, the real victims of this era, were: dealt with, Kuyucu rumed his attention to the regional bureaucracy, replaced many governors and lower-level bureaucratic officials, and continued to eliminate bandits as they were dc:tected. At the same time:, he required a complete evalua­t~on of empire's a~nistra~~e apf

4ararus : detailed studies of its institu·

t tons, legal, finanoaJ, and mslttary. Thorough and conservative, Kuyucu was able to rcsctde the Anatolians, reshuffie provincial governors and governor-generals, and conduct two short campaigns against Persia in an attempt to reclaim some o f the territo ry lost in prior years. He was stiU at war when he died in 16 11 and was replaced by Nasuh Pasha, the man who was to make peace with the Persians.

Unfortunatdy, although a page in the cclali ho rrors had been turned ~ith Kuyucu, the local pillage continu~ since it was practically impos­stblc to exhaust the sources o f celalis and pottntiaJ celalis in every locality. The process by which mc:rcenaries emerged and were drawn into armies continued to feed more rnc:n into the system. And as long as a complete

n Hrand D. Andreasyan I'«<Unts me diffiCUlties enrountcmt by his Anncnian compa­lriocs ~ ~ artcmpted ~o journey.~. He~ artats to me fact mat me grand vizier who. had .U\Sugared this acnon was walhng ro negonatc 10mc: ru cxanprions for tho.fc rc­~~mg Sine~ he ~ they ~ould face hardships; "Cdaailmkn K~an Anadolu Halhnm Gcn Gondcr1lmcsl, 10 /nuil HMh UD" f•'tlll,. A~a (Ankara, 1976), pp. +.!-sJ.

7•/u 10 be~~ ~Y. w~lu came out of this c:wluation. I wed, for example, tbe

surveys of Ayn-• Ali IUJPIUfltH Al-1 a-- tkr H~ MAIIIffi,..j Deft,...; o;,_ (Essay on che Duties and Ranks ot: thc: Scrvanr:a of~ H~ ~Osman), concemcxt with the govern­ment and the: ~nny, saJanes and wage systems; Ru.Je-1 lu~Wr-i a-- (EsJay on me Soldiers nfOsman), describing chc: organization and condition of me janissary guards; KtUU11NI Os­m~~~~iye (Ottoman Law), explaining the tradi1ionaJ criminal law, the status, and the rues of 1hc ~lc of the empire: and. K.,,, ., Ma/1-1 M~~tr (11lc: Fin~iaJ Law of Egypt ), with me ""l' l:anauoo 0~ ~gypt'· financial ~ystan. nlcK were all COil\m15sioned during Kuyucu's ten­ure u gnand Vllllcr. Sec Shaw, HISillr'J qfthe 0 "-'t s,m, 1:190-91; Griswold, The Gmu AltMOIU." RtiNUiM, pp. aov- ao.

:no 8AND11'S AND 8URRAUCRATS

reorganization of me empire failed to occur, th~ cclalis would remain •'&· nificant at the local level, if not at a larger scale.

The Politicized Rhetoric of Bargaining, 162.3-1648

The second period of political movements came about after a few yean vi imerruption in the ability of the state to respond to cri.scs of AnatoiMI origin. This interruption was the result of different poHtical faaions t. ing come head to head to the extent that, for the first time in the hialafJ of the empire, they were able to determine which sultan was to rult. AI the death of Ahmed I in 1617, his brother, Mustafa I, came to poww supported by K6sern Sultan. the wife of Ahmed I, and her allks. 8ua year later another f.laion, that of chief eunuch Mustafa Aga, brollllll• Osman II ro the throne on the claim that Mustafa I was insane. So 0.11111 c~me to power not roo long after the death of Ahmed (, the sultan rogcther with Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad had demonstrated Stn:QII 1nd the ability ro deal with internal Anatolian disturbances, banditry, chaos. Kuyucu had first incorporated the bandit chiefs into the anny. mg them to participate in the upcoming wars, and then had their cut ofT. Partly as a result of his capable and effective entourage:, ,.. ... ....__ had become a strong leader who practiced centralized control and hid blc achievements to show for it. Osman II promised to be even more cwful than his father, but he did not last long. In r6:u he was rc:n~­from office by the janissarics and sipahis and was later murdered. And though this was the first time in Ottoman history that a sultan Wll

moved from office and assassinated, this event did not s~(y breakdown of the state that some scholars have attached to it. It Wll ~lmple coup, where internal factions of the state and the state army. apprehension of chis sultan's policies, cooperated in an attempt to su:tde him to alter his plans; when the gathering turned into a mob, tinou11 w ldiers took liberties they had never taken before. The aulran murdc.rcd, and d\e fool Mustafa I was restored to the throne for ana­yeu.

111e policies of Osman II, who was quite young ( l+-t8 durina reign), distingui8h d1cmsclves :ts methods of strong cc:nrnal ronrrol; were poUdt:a of consolidation at the center effected to purge dcmcn~~

"The only rul thrnt to the Houec ol' Osman wu in 1617-11, wflm lhcrc WM I brlna In a •ulran ftom nutaldc the line oi'Ounan.

Sttae-Bmu#t Relmions :UI

might oppose the throne-potentiaJ disrupters, and espcciaJly the army. The janissaries as well as the central cavalry units had already demon­strated their aptitude for palace intrigue. Por Osman II, the campaign in Poland confirmed me degree to which the janissaries had departed from their original ideals, and he understood well that given their emergence as a local force they would help bring about the decentralization of the em­pire. The importance of the janissaries was undeniable; they had grown from u,ooo in the I+WS to +e,ooo in the r6ws. They were active in the trade and administration of cities and towns alJ across the empire and were intermarrying into the local notable class. 76 Trying to control them, Osman II developed poor relations with this central army, which, accord­ing to the traditional blueprint, was his army. It should be remembered that sultans were careful to keep the janissaries happy; they gave them ini­tial gifts, the "accession tax,, and were careful not to introduce debased coins at their accession. Osman II crossed the army, circulating rumors that he was going ro disband it to replace it with a 1\irkmen army of Ana­tolian origin ramer than that of slave origin. The military was only one of the elite groups Osman II planned to handle harshly. Another important group he intended to taclde was the bureaucracy. Starting with the re­stricted powers of the ftyh-fll-isllull, the ulema suffered political and eco­nomic losses. Osman II cut off their benefices (arpRldt), forcing the uJema class into dependence on the crown; he restricted their privileges and tried ro control the activities in the palace. Within a few mo nths, me en­tire military and bureaucratic appararus felt that a shrinkage of their power was imminent.

When rumors spread that the suJtan was embarking o n a pilgrimage as a subterfuge to go to Anatolia and form a new army based on Turkish peasants, the janissaries lost their calm. With me support of the bureau­cracy, they assembled to protest against the sultan and hjs supporters, but soon enough, through the macrunations of their leadershjp, they forced the sultan to forgo his plans, and execute his closest allies; finally, still not satisfied, they deposed the young suJtan, killing him a short time later.77

A survey of the contemporary sources shows no indication of a premed­itated revolt against Osman II, especially not one with the intent to dc­po.~ him. The rally of the army started as a routine event. ln fact, as

76lnak1~ "Military and PUal Ttansfonnation," p. 199. 171~~~ r.tJt.i Pl(ni, s:m-lo; N:aima, T..W.i N.-, 1:us- 11; Hammer, Himlm lk

I',.W, em..-, a:J7 ?9i U~l'fllt, ~' 711Ni, J· t:r,.....J. Sex abo lnaktlt, "Fisal and Military Tnuufonnarioo," p. m .

121. BANDITS AND BuREAUCRATS

Hammer also seons to indicate, when Mwtafa I was found and Jibe,.._, from his captivity, it became dear to the janissaries that they could claim him as their leader and depose the sultan. As a result, Osman II, a suJna with high potential, was silenced forever. A few years later, Murad IV at­tempted the same kind of centralization policies, assembled an emergency imperial council meeting to alter the course of Ottoman history, and )W earned the respect of the household.

During the transition that followed the coup against Osman II, a IIIW wave of rebellion shook Anatolia. Internal squabbles had no doubt ~ itatcd the state; Mwrafa was unable to rule and the state was losina II-i gitimacy. The transition to Murad IV was a shift to a very auh:ll who still needed strong allies in the imperial council to rule cttiectil'¥111• Yet the state had not disintegrated during the coup against Osman. tolian bandits, however, had embarked on a similar campaign ofdJA1r..-1t. ing state and local governance. Again, there were two waves ofth.cac: activities; the more trivial, smaller-scale banditry that remained IOC:ali• causing damage essentially to a rural population, and the larger and significant movements that blazed across Anatolia., cawing desolation challenging the state for better placement in the Ottoman system.

The assassination of Osman II provided the unique opportunity 10 lit icizc: these rebel demands and couch them in tcnns that could be ccived as threatening to the state. The rebels' actions had ctt"lmt1•n~lrl'21twt

serious intentions against the Ottoman state, but this time the had acquired a more sophisticated rhetoric that evoked sociopolirictl equalities and issues of contention. For example, they focused on differences between armies- the central anny of the janissaries and centr•d cavalry units and the regional army composed of seltbtm and groups. These two groups had been at odds with each other since the tier struggles for the throne and yet, during the reigns of Sclim II Murad Ill, peasants had been asked to join the janissarics. This wu natural outcome of the changes in the nmar system and the new rcqMIIIk mc:nts for war on the part of the Europeans. The rift between the parties increased when seltbtu~ leaders came to occupy comfortable tioos in the state administration. The positive aspects of this ooi1C1r_._ creasing numbers of mwket-bearing soldiers in the anny and •1r•'ft!• .... •

numbers of vagrant peasants in Anatolia- wc:rc offset by the P'lha,rrul ..

boundaries between different types of amUcs and the opening channel of advancement from regionaJ to cemral positions which increucd competirion. Abaza Mchmcd Paaha was a ulaJI who UICd 1truggle between annics to his advantage.

Statt-B4ntlit RelatWns 21.3

Abaza Mehrncd Pasha, who had been a loyal officer of the Ottoman state protected by his patron, the two-time grand vizier HaiH Pasha, de­dared his opposition to the state for allowing the janissaries to dictate Osman ll's murder. 78 His stated political aims, however, do not appear to be entirely his. There is some evidence that K&em Sultan privately in­vited Abaza Mehrned to fight those who murdered Osman I I. Rumors also circulated to the effect that Abaza was persuaded to revolt by some 1eyh d aiming to have had visions of Abaza in high office. Abaza was of mi~cd ba~ound. Al~ough he had been the treasurer of Canboladoglu ~~~ Pas~a. the protc:ctton of HaJil Pasha had turned him inco a Joyal of­llctal. Ftrst the sword bearer of H aJil Pasha, then admiral, later provincial governor ofMaf:4, and finalJy the governor-general ofErzururn,80 he had proved not only loyal but also competent at serving the state and the peo­ple. His ability to mobilize: selthtm and SAfUII depended on his ability to exploit the rivalry between janissary and selthtln, as well as on traditional lnoting, which no doubt was one of the main goals of these mercenary troops. Abaza Mehrned made his reputation fighting against and often murdering janissary officials who plundered villages and exacted high t.ues and fces.81

Abaza Mchmed was declared a cclaJi when infighting in the fortress of Enururn between his men and the janissaries led to vio lence between the rwo groups. Bl When Abaza threw the janissaries out of Enurum, he was l"onsidercd a cdalj and was o rdered to SJVas, where he went, taking with 1 0 ~

11m 15,000 men ready to fight. The chaos at the center did no doubt motivate certain loc:d governors to join Abaza when he appealed to them to jnin his fight. Others might have been forced into jo ining through vi-

'"He: claimed ro h:avc corresponded with Osm;an II abour the: plans reg:arding the: j:anis· •a~~~~- At _least ~ sources oorroborarc: this: see H:u~r. Hisroirr tk l'mtftirr Otumufn, ''14; c;c:rm Yedtin, "nlr* Hllllt H•rtltaleri I'C D1vrimhr (lsr;anbul., 194), p. WJ.

NNaima, 1ilrih-i NIJi-. 1:1.40- +t.

I<Oibid., 1.:108; Hammer, Hinoirr tk l'mqnrr 0"-"• 1:3&4. Mll lrand 0 . Andrcasyan, "Ainu Mchmc:d Pasha. "lsrtUJbNI u,.ivmilm &lelfiyru FMilllm

l imJJ f'Hraisi n (1961): I JI- )4.

u Abua i.~ suppo5«1 to h;~vc bttn quire: cruel ro janissvics whom he had c:xccutcd. Nainu, Tttnlt-i N'"'-, 1:+1o-11, recounts that when a nwt denied that he was a j:anissary AhOUA would have him lower his trousers so thar he couJd see whether his shiru and cal~ h~ll che c:har.actcristic sigru of wearing the: j:anissary rrousc:rs.

AAMany of thCK men wc:rc reassembled from the troops of the previous set of celali lead· Crt, ll:Cenlly defeated by the: Ottoman sratc armies. "fhey wc:re therefore: the men of Kar~yUJCI , Canboladoglu, Kalc:ndc:rotlu, Tavil Halil, and so forrh. They were ready ro con· lfll'S.atc: under a new rommandc:r and avenge: the massacre of their leaders and thei r fcJJow lll'htcn by Grl&lld Vb.iu Ku}"Ku Muoo Pasha; see f fammer, HistWr tk 1't1ffl"rr Ott_,, I . ••v.

U+ BANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS

olcnce. Three campaigns were direaed against Abaza Mehmcd, aiCer which he was temporarily reinstated in Erzurum. Each campaign Wtl more substantial than its predecessor, with men of reputation appojn..a to fight and several attanpts at deal making. The second campaign. a example, in April r62+, was direacd by the grand vizier c;erkc:z Mchmld Pasha, the janissary Aga, and the governor-generals of Anatolia and K.,.. man. Mter a defeat the bandit leader was ready to deal. More import ... it took a short time for him to spring back on his feet, since his patton the palace quickly carne to the rescue and offered tum a compromillei fighting against the Persians in return for a pardo n. After the failure these measures, finally, the new grand vizier Hiisrcv Pasha was able • condua a successful campaign against him and Abaza surrendered,"

lr is interesting that, despite Abaza's defeat, the grand vizier dlOII confer upon him robes of honor in order to transform him into 1

Ottoman servant. Furthennore, the grand vizier enlisted 6oO of An-r.

men into the order of armorers ( cebm). 85 These actions dernonsttaat zeal with which the stare officers wanted to get rid of the celali Again, promoting these bandits, incorporating them, making sure rhey felt honored was worth the effort since incorporation meant and artnics. Abaza was then assigned to Bosnia, where he ~{Pin mished with janissaries. 86 Later on, after fighting campaigns in dx Ab:aza became close to Sultan Murad IV and stayed in Istanbul. Ytt was executed when the sultan final ly started to condua his own idation poljcies. It is again an interesting faa that Abaza, the bandit was buried with ceremony and pomp next to Kuyucu Murad Paaha. grand vizier who had spent his last years purging cclalis from 1\JliiQ••

These actions were largely ceremonial; but they emphasized to me tial contenders that the route within government se.rvice was ~ rive in power and prestige. It also reminded them that conr:endon nc:vc:r rewarding, even though in the short r:crm some stare polkic:J rl litica.l bargaining may have inspired some to become bandir1.

Probably Abaza Mehmed's greatest achicvcmcm was ro wm hit Mnal le:adel'llhip and rebellion into a political program for the SRrtat who followed him. By capitalizing on the rivalry within tht man military, he was able to gather large armies and threaten the Ahaza can be Ukcncd to the cc:lali leaders of the early seventeenth

141bkl., 1 l+l6. ... bid. MJbld., •:+~71 Nalm .. 'l'ltril•l N,.,., ,:~\16. • 7Nalma, 1'llftlll N.-, J:a96- 10t, ut-1'·

Stllle-Btmdit &lations us

in trying to earn a better position through the system rather than through secession. Again, there was no attempt at secession from the empire; rather, there were numerous bids to create better and better positions for the bandit chief himself. The attention Abaza received from the palace set the pattern for a series of movements in the later seventeenth century, all of which capitalized on the janissary-mercenary rivalry in the Ottoman military. The political rhetoric had bcc()(JX successful, despite the failure of its initiator, Abaza Mehmcd Pasha.

During this second period of activities, any low-level officials who l'Ould formulate an issue that was related to internal developments in the empire did so. With the new ability to politicize the rhetoric of banditry, banditry itself became more widespread among petty officials . In the western Anatolian peninsula, many such bandits sprang up, declaring some kind of issue with the state while spending their time and energies looting. Cenneroglu declared himself to be tamar holder fighting for the rights of the class of tamar holders. The tamar holders were in decline and state policies had been geared toward the elimination of small land ten­ures in favor of larger ones. Ccnnetoglu chose thjs specific issue, hoping that he would appeal to the large numbers of dispossessed cavalrymen and thereby acquire the power to make demands on the state. Yet from Bursa 10 Saruhan ro Izmir, nwne.rous tamar holders wrote the state complaining about the depredations caused by this bandit; for, despite his rhetoric for the amar holders, he was highly successful at robbing them. 88 Dyas Pasha, .another low-levcl official in western Anatolia, raised his selthtm army be­fore even developing a cause to fight for. He later provided a rnisunder­staoding with the grand vizier HU.srev Pasha as the grounds for bandit ac.:tivitics. Karahaydaroglu, wanted to avenge the death of his father­killed by state officials- when he joined other cdalis in the mountains. GOrcO Abdunnebi, yet another banclit, used a tax issue ro gather about •s,ooo seltbtJn and SIU"'CA mercenaries and march toward Istanbul. 89

The: small-scale banditry of these local officials remains interesting in the nature of their interaction with the Ottoman Porte. The activities of lhe&c bandit chiefs help confirm two hypotheses of the general argument. On the o ne hand, the faa that they emulated the political rhetoric of their flrtdccessors attests to the learning and the imitation effect of banclitry, l'ltrlpping it further from intcrprerations such as primitive rebels fighting lnjunicc: and deprivation. & befit the times in which they operated as

RtUht\._y, ~·~~~~ 1Ji~l4, pp. u- J6. Sec abo Ooffinan, IU~~w Mill tiH LntuuW w...u, IJ1(;-18J (Scaltk, 1090), PP· 16- JO. wui~•Y· s..,.,•• Bt~~Jyt~J•. PP· ,......,,

u6 BANDITS AND 8URBAUCRATS

bandit chiefs, these local brigands declared relevant political issues ~~t they claimed to resolve by their banditry. Each one of these men pohtt· cizcd these issues in their negotiations with the state. Yet mostly they op­erated through patrons in the state administration who they ho~d ~ould oroker deals for them. Over time, they remained loyal to their pnmary objc~'tive of loot and positions within the state:. On the: other hand, their specific dealings with the state atrc:st to the: importance: ac~ordc:d t~ deal making by state makers. These considerably less consequential band~t~, lo­cated far from the significant fi'ontic:rs, were not offered state: posauons. Karahaydaroglu, for example, considered himself important enough to

ask for appointment as sancaltbeyi twice during his career as a rebel bandit chief, only to be finnly rebuked by the: grand viz.ic:r.

90 ~ temporary and Jc:c.:eptive as these state dc:aJs were, they were made spanngly as part of I careful strategy of state consolidation.

By the time Abaza had become close: to Sultan Murad IV, an~ loc:>lc.ed aa if he would give: up banditry altogether, the: central corps of s1pahts were again in revolt, asking fo r the heads. ~fall the: prime le~d~rs of the: sta~: rhc: grand vizier Hafiz Pasha, the rc:lig10us leader, the rruntster of finance, chc aga of the janissaries, and many othc:': (1632) . AJthou~h the sultan first gave in to the demands of these: rcbclhous ~asses, causmg ~e death C)f his grand vizier and other trusted men, he qwckly changed has counc nf action and had the main instigator arrested and beheaded. In the af. rcrmath of this movement from among the central troops of the anny, Murad IV resolved to undertake a strong campaign of consolidation :and c.:untrol of the empire. With that aim, he rather hasti ly convened a meet• ing of the imperial divan under an emergency regulatio~ . . . llH~ ayalt diWJm was the first herculean effort a~ consohd~n~n sance SU·

leyman the Magnificent. Murad IV convened has grand vazaer, the 1f111· IJI islnm, the high judges of Anarolia and Rumdia, the ulema, ~c: 48111 the of janissarics, and other important dignitaries in May 1632., JUSt a kw mo nths after the revolt of the sipahis. Mter having assured himself of the loyalty of these men, he: addressed ea~h of rhc sc:~ments .of t~e military and hurcaucracy of the empire, confronrmg t~CJ_ll wath th~1r cra~s, accutlnJ rhc:m of unruliness and corruption, and gavmg them little tame to defend rhemsclvcs. Many were executed. Janissarie.s were followed by sipahia. who were fo llowed by corrupt judges, and every group wos urged IV rurgc: its ranks of the rcbd liou.'l and dishonest. Whar the state could nc• occo1nplish, c:srccially in the provinces, the peuple were ~tsked to oo nl\

IIOIIalll hukik. "t-laydtr-t~ht Mchmcd," Rruydllpttlill ll{ lsi.M (Lckkn, 1\169).

Statt-Bamiit Re/4tions 227

their own. Therefore, as was true of his predecessors, Murad IV ordered the people's justice to prevail for the last part of d1c cleanup; popular mass action occurred as the state proclaimed a general call to arms (ntjir-i 'am) . MaJefacrors, sipahi, janissary, and mercenary were eliminatcd.91 All this activity was followed by an internal campaign of consolidation and rc­torm. Relying on the surveys and reports of the previous decades, Murad TV undertook an inspection of existing institutions. In the reform tl1at ensued, some institutions were abolished, while others were revived only after their makeup and constituencies were massively altered. For ex­ample, as was previously discussed in relation to the umar system, this tenure institution was maintained yet was reorganized by the governors in charge of regional consolidation. In this particular case, reorganization and consolidation meant that officials with no clear and direct benefit to the state were replaced by new men, often referred to as upstarts. Finally, all kinds of restrictions were formulated in order to k.eep the moral values of the country on the right track. Murad IV believed that safety and order could be maintained only if the: people upheld strong moral values, re­fraining fTom alcohol, smok.ing, and other vices. He therefore proclaimed these to be prohibited and sent spies to inspect towns and cities.92

Both the victories of Ahmed Ps grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha and of Murad IV brought about periods of lull in cc:lali activity. Both the grand vizier and later the suJtan had succeeded at destroying celali leaders and numerous mercenaries. Yet the conditions that led to the: emergence of these movements were never eliminated. The system by which gover­nors and governor-generals yearned for large armies to increase: their power and prestige did not change; as we saw with Murad IV as well, ~ultans still issued decrees o rdering the people to arm themselves; state utlicials still recruited from mercenary pools and contracted with their leadership for campaigns, and at every level the state still encouraged low­level militarization of the countryside. As it battled the mercenaries, it also created more. This is not to say that state makers were not aware of rhc dangers of militarization; they experienced irs consequences daily. Yet, 1111 long as mercenaries were of utility to the state's most significam func­tion of warfare, the process was to be tolerated. And reform and reorga­nization were to be attempt~'<! to alleviate n rucruraJ tensions for a while.

ug BANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS

We can therefore see Murad's attempt at the reorganization of the nmar as :l hand-aid rather than a reaJ cure.

Another reason for the continuation of th~ policies, which inevitably ended up in mercenary pools, was that they were not that due~te~ing af. tcr all. T he mercenaries and other vagrant armed men up to thts tunc en· rcrcd the services of provincial officials who were officers of the state. llowever large their retinues became, they remained in the service of the \tare and searched for upward mobility through the state. The seven• tecnth ccnrury proved that the state was able to consolidate its power lJUitc rapidly through negotiation and war with these governors, be they legitimate o r illegitimate. They remained ~art of the stare app~rar;us. And when they venrured outside, they were qutckly co-opted back tnstde. 1bc danger to the state was to come only when loc~ notabl.cs (ayam) with no direct allegiance to the state started accumulatmg armtes and men. 10cy llid not belong to the state and were not easily drawn into it. ~hercf~, when they gained control oflocaJ militias and rransformed them anro t~ar retinues, they became more dangerous. They were locally rooted. Unlib :narc officials they did not rotate positions, and they established "local al· lcgiances and srrong patron-client ties. They became the real agents of de· centralization. For most of the seventeenth century, however, the Ottoman state achieved central domination and remained in control ofica officers. It was o nly a deviant by-product of the system that some oft~ men chat were incorporated through negotiation happened to be bandau.

7 Conclusion

A LTHOUG H BXPLANATIONS OP STATB FORMATION vary accord· i~g to discipline and thcoreti~a l o udook, they aU tend to c:mpha­sazc o ne master process denved from the western experience.

Socio logists, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists generally perceive the western trajectory as the course of action through which states centralize, allowing for litde variation. They have taken dte western model of state development and enshrined it into a perspective of the J world. In this view, state formation was carried out through struggle be· tween state and society, with the state increasingly achieving contro l over I a contentious, rebellious society. ln the process, the stare increased its strength- building its military and bureaucratic-administrative capacities and penetrating society to dominate it . This process originated from the I state's need for territorial consolidation, achieved through war with the necessary resources drawn from the population. Where resources were drawn from d1e rural sector, populations rebelled, especially in the form uf interclass alliances. Where cities were prcdomjnant, deaJs were made with urban capital holders.

This explanation is based on and docs characterize the western patterns of state formation in the early modem period. Yet preoccupation with the ~csrem model of state formation docs not allow for adequate s rudy of the dtvcrgencc offered by non-western societies. History demonstrates that the non-western processes of state formation had different trajectories with varied results. These states did not uniformly undergo rebellions, n.11d they certainly did not always become strong states with dominant cunrrol over their societies. Given the inabili ty to explain this variation with d'c: predominant model of state formatio n, how can we better ac-