bangladesh an unfinished revolution

Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?Author(s): Talukder ManiruzzamanReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Aug., 1975), pp. 891-911Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2054506 .Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:25

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VOL. XXXIV, No. 4 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES AUGUST 1975

Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?

TALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN

R EVOLUTIONARY mass upheaval generally weakens the people's respect for authority, law, and discipline; and it brings in its wake social, economic, and

political disorders, facilitating the establishment of an authoritarian regime. The French Revolution was based on the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity; but the destruction of the old social and political fabric, and the failure to institutionalize the new ideas, led Frenchmen to search for "the man of genius destined at once to carry on and to abolish the revolution." The Russian Revolution of IgI7 was also followed by several years of civil war, which led to the establishment of the ruthless totalitarian regime of Stalin, itself reminiscent of the Thermidorian Reaction. In Algeria, Cuba, China, and North Vietnam, successful mass armed revolutions have been consolidated only because of their one-party dictatorships.

In Bangladesh, the nationalist revolution is also foundering. Groups that were united by the war against Pakistan are now splintered along personal and ideological lines; and the Awami League itself is full of factions. Even the ideology of Mujibba'd ("Mujibism") cannot keep the factions together, although the senior members of the government will not vie openly with one another as long as Mujib is alive. The appearance of stability given b!y the Awami League's overwhelming victory in the I973 elections is belied by the need for repressive special powers and the establishment of the Rakhi Bahini, the government-armed vigilantes who oppose anyone not supporting the Awami League or its associated parties. What are the forces that will shape the politics of Bangladesh in the near future? Will there be stability; will the oft-proclaimed goals of nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy be achieved? The bulk of this essay presents details that will allow the reader to assess Bengali politics for himself. A few remarks on the author's own views are appended.'

Historical Background2 The jubilation experienced by the people of Bangladesh at the formal surrender

of the Pakistan forces to the Indian Army on December I6, Ig7I was tempered by fear of a bitter power struggle among the many leaders of the revolution-guerillas, communists, and Awami League workers. However, the prospect of a prolonged period of anarchy in Bangladesh was relieved by the rapid return of Sheikh Mujibur

Talukder Maniruzzaman was Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Rajshahi University at the time he wrote this article. He is now Professor of Political Science at Dacca Univer- sity. Much of the material contained here is not available from other sources. The Editors are grate- ful to the author for permission to edit and abridge his original manuscript, and to Susan Hadden for carrying out this task.

1 In the present version of this paper, the author's

evaluation of the current political situation is presented only in the concluding section. Biographi- cal notes on prominent politicians are given in the Appendix.

2 For a detailed discussion of the Bangladesh revolution of I97I, see T. Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh" in P. R. Brass and M. F. Franda (eds.), Radical Politics in South Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, I973), pp. 223-277.

891

892 TALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN

Rahman-known as the Father of the Nation-from his prison in West Pakistan on January io, I972.3 In an impressive show of loyalty, the various guerrilla units of the Mukti Bahini (the Liberation Army) surrendered arms at ceremonies throughout Bangladesh within the ten-day limit set by Sheikh Mujib. It was, of course,-widely suspected that a large portion of their arms and ammunition had been kept back by the many guerrilla groups. But the support of the nation clearly belonged to the Awami League government under Mujib. Most of the popular guerrilla leaders. were loyal to him; moreover, the legend of Sheikh Mujib, his. charismatic. appeal, and his hypnotic hold over the masses were enormous assets for the government. The extent of Mujib's success in establishing his authority all over Bangladesh is indicated by the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the country by March I2, I 972.

On the day following his arrival in Dacca, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman-as Presi- dent of Bangladesh-promulgated a Provisional Constitutional Order providing for a parliamentary form of government in Bangladesh. He then stepped down from the office of president. Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury, a former judge of the Dacca High Court and Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University, became the new President. A twelve-member cabinet, which included the five. members of the exile government in Calcutta, was sworn in on the same day, with Mujib as Prime Minister.4

Bangladesh required a formal constitution; and Sheikh Mujib acted quickly to facilitate the framing of one. Presidential Order 22 was promulgated on March 23; it provided for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly made up of the members formerly elected to the National Assembly of Pakistan and to the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan in the elections held in I970. The Constituent Assembly enacted the Constitution only seven months later.6

The Constitution provides for a unitary parliamentary government for Bang- ladesh. Its preamble declares that "the high ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism which inspired our heroic people to dedicate themselves to, and to sacrifice their lives in, the national liberation struggle, shall be the fundamental principles of the Constitution." The Constitution attempts to facilitate the transition to socialism through parliamentary democracy. For example, it affirms the right to hold private property subject to restrictions imposed by law, and. allows for nationalization and requisitioning of property, which cannot be challenged in a court of law.6

3Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested on the night of 25 March 1971. He was taken to West Pakistan and kept in detention in a solitary prison cell in a district town. Later he was tried by a special military court for "waging war against the Pakistan Government and other treasonable activities' and given the death sentence. The sentence was approved by General Yahya Khan, as Chief Martial Law Administrator; but before the sentence could be carried out, General Yahya was replaced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President and Chief Mar- tial Law Administrator of Pakistan. Bhutto re- leased Sheikh Mujib and sent him to London by a special plane; from there he flew to Bangladesh via India. See the proceedings of the press conference of Sheikh Mujib in London on 8 January I972, published in the Morning News (Dacca), 9 January 1972.

4The Cabinet was later expanded to 23 members. Of these, 8 were in their early 5o's, 13 in their 40's, and one in his 30's in age. The oldest Minister, and the only Hindu in the Cabinet, was 70. The group consisted of 13 lawyers, 4 business- men, 3 professional politicians, a college professor, a landholder, and a former Pakistan Army officer. One was a relative of Sheikh Mujib. All but four of the Ministers were associated with the Awami League since the I950's. Biographical sketches of the Ministers were published in The Bangladesh Observer and other daily newspapers of Dacca on 20 and 29 January and I4 and I5 April I972.

5 For a detailed discussion of the constitution- making in Bangladesh, see A. F. Huq, "Constitu- tion-Making in Bangladesh," Pacific Afairs, Vol. 46 (I, I973), pp. 59-76.

6 Section I of Article 42 in Part III.

BANGLADESH: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION? 893

Part II of the Constitution deals with the Fundamental Principles of State Policy, and Part III with Fundamental Rights. Part II states that the basic responsibility of the state is to obtain food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, jobs, and social security for its citizens through planned growth. No law that is expressly declared by Parliament to implement this basic responsibility can be declared unconstitutional simply because it conflicts with the fundamental rights listed in Part III.7 Thus the needs of the individual are subordinated to those of the state. As Tajuddin Ahmed- now Finance Minister-told the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution provides the mechanism by which the Parliament, democratically elected by a politically conscious people, can determine priorities on the basis of the objective conditions obtaining in the country at a particular phase and implement them consistent with socialism and the wishes of the people.8

The new Constitution went into effect on December i6, I972. General elections were called for March 7, I973. As can be seen in Table I, the Awami League-the party of independence-won the elections overwhelmingly.9 Its manifesto had said that it would regard the elections as a referendum on the four fundamental principles of state policy-nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism-endorsed by the party, and that an Awami League victory would be taken as a mandate fo,r Mujib to build the new state on the basis of those principles. (The platforms of the other parties are discussed in detail below.) Because of Mujib's appeal, his vigorous cam- paigning in all the towns and cities of Bangladesh, and the Awami League's asso-

TABLE I-RESULTS OF THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN BANGLADESH:

MARCH 7, 1973a

Number of Number of Percentage of Seats Seats Votes

Name of the Party Contested Won Secured

Awami League 300 292 73.17

National Awami Party (pro-Moscow) 223 8.59

Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party) 236 1 6.48

National Awami Party (Bhashani) 169 - 5.42

Independent and Others 159 6 6.34

1087 299b 100 a The number of seats won and percentage of votes secured by each party were counted from the constituency-

wise results published in The Bangladesh Observer, 8, 9, 10, 11 March 1973. b The election in one constituency was postponed, due to the death of one of the candidates. This seat was

later won by an AL candidate.

7 Articles 42 and 47. 8 See the Constituent Assembly Debates, 30

October I972, published in The Bangladesh Ob- server, 31 October 1972.

9 According to the Election Commission, of the total 33,787,638 registered voters, nearly 55 percent voted in the elections held on 7 March I973.


ciation with the nationalist movement, the party's victory was really a foregone conclusion. One foreign journalist wrote, "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would have won handsomely even if the election had been conducted -by the United Nations and supervised by the Red Cross."

But the legitimacy of the electoral mandate was compromised by some zealous Awami League workers who resorted to strong-arm methods and false ballots, in their desire to win all of the seats. In some of the closely contested constituencies, the prospective opposition candidates were kidnapped by AL workers before they could file their nomination papers. In several constituencies in Barisal, Tangail, and Chittagong, where oppostion candidates were leading during the voting, the count- ing of ballots was suddenly halted while the ballot boxes were stuffed with fake papers and AL candidates were declared elected under the watchful eyes of AL volunteers.10

The elections did not bring about any major changes in the executive or the legislature. Two-thirds of the members of the Jatio Sangsad (Parliament) elected on March 7 were former members of the Constituent Assembly. Parliament also re- elected Justice Choudhury as President, unopposed. One new Cabinet Member was designated, and the reportedly pro-western Dr. Kamal Hussain-who had been responsible for selecting the British pattern for the new Constitution-was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He replaced Abdus Samad-known to be partial to the socialist bloc-who in turn was given the portfolio of Agriculture. In October, fourteen additional State Ministers were appointed, with the same sorts of professional backgrounds as the Cabinet."

A number of accomplishments can be attributed to the Awami League regime, all of which helped to restore stability to the polity and the economy. First, a Con- stitution was framed within nine months of independence, and free elections were held six months later. In the economic sphere, a large-scale famine was avoided in 1972 and 1973, and the ten million people who had migrated to India during the occupation were rehabilitated, with the help of the massive relief operations of the UNROB and other international agencies.'2

Communications were restored 'by repairing about 300 railway bridges and 274 road bridges and six airports damaged during the war; Chittagong harbor was cleared of mines and wrecks, with the help of ii Russian warships. The textile, jute, and sugar industries were nationalized, along with banks and insurance companies;

10 See, for example, Walter Schwarz, "How Bangladesh Lost its Political Virginity," Guardian (London), reprinted in The Wave (Dacca), 3I March I973; Sirajul Hossain Khan, "Electoral De- mocracy Buried," Holiday (Dacca), I8 March I 973.

1 Nine were in their 40's, and 5 in their 30's; all had been long associated with the AL. Seven were lawyers, 2 journalists, 2 college professors, one a doctor, and one a landholder.

12 As of 3I December I973, Bangladesh had received food assistance worth I73 million dollars and multilateral aid worth 350 million dollars through UNROB and other international agencies. In addition, friendly countries provided a total of 85o million dollars as grants and credits during the same period. The credits and grants assistance, in-

cluding UNROB operations, was possibly the high- est ever received by any underdeveloped country during such a short period in recent times. [The countries that provided credit and grants included the U. S., West Germany, Denmark, the U. K., India, U.S.S.R., Australia, Canada, Belgium, Nether- lands, East Germany, Hungary, and others.] Among these countries, the United States topped the list by offering I32 million dollars as grants on a bilateral basis. This does not include the assistance rendered by the U. S. through UNROB. The figures of foreign assistance, grants and credits were re- leased by the Bangladesh Planning Commission and published in The Bangladesh Observer, 26 March 1974.


and landholdings were limited to ioo bighas (i bigha 1/3 acre) per family.13 However, the appearance of stability given by elections, the Cabinet reappoint-

ments, and economic achievements hid a political reality that is best understood as civil war. Discontent is widespread, due to the three-to-four hundred percent rise in the prices of all essential consumer goods, the decline in production in the nationalized industries, and large-scale smuggling of foodgrains and jute to India. Corruption and the growth of a class of noveaux riches among the Awami League workers who receive government patronage have completed the sense of disillusion- ment.

Violence is rampant. The newspapers carry daily reports of secret killings, "suicides," hijackings, dacoities, and mob lynchings. According to government figures, between January 1972 and June I973, there were 2035 secret killings, 337 kidnappings, I90 rapes, and 49o7 dacoities, and another 4925 persons lost their lives at the hands of "miscreants." In a five-month period in 1973, sixty police stations were looted for arms. Finally, in the course of the twelve-day elections to the Union Councils in December 1973, about a score of people-including some candidates- were killed, about ioo others were injured, and the elections had to be postponed in some five hundred centers."4 The problems in the economy and the general lawless- ness are being exploited by a number of opposition parties, which hold that the Awami League represents only the first part of a two-stage revolution. It is the second revolution that these parties are trying to hasten.

The Left Opposition Parties

The opposition in Bangladesh consists of a large number of splintered parties, running the gamut from the right to the left. The Islamic nationalist parties-including the Jama'at-i-Islami, the several factions of the Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Nizam-i-Islam, and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam-were at first held to be collaborators with the Pakistanis and were therefore banned. Later, however, amnesty was declared for members of these parties; and an attempt has been made by their leaders to found a new, secular party of the right. Mujib's pardon of 195 Pakistani war prisoners has created a climate conducive to the growth of such a party.

Of the other parties that contested in the First General Elections, the pro-Moscow National Awami Party follows the lead of the Awami League in almost every particular. The NAP (Bhashani) is distinguished by its more aggressively anti- Indian, anti-Russian, and anti-American stands. This makes it suitable for infiltration by more extreme parties. The Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party) is a true party of the left, although, it does attempt to work for the revolution through existing parliamentary institutions.

However, this list does not even begin to include the many underground parties and their front organizations. The revolutionary parties are characterized by ideological and personal incompatibilities, so that no less than eight groups of importance

13 Mustafa Sarwar, "Why you should vote for Awami League," in the special supplement on "Election and the Awami League," The Bangladesh Observer, 3 March I973.

'14 For these figures, see The Bangladesh Observer,

7 July I973; the statement of the State Minister for Information and Broadcasting in Parliament, 28 January I974, reported in Banglar Bani (Dacca), 29 January I974; and The Ittfaq (Dacca), I De- cember I 973.


can be distinguished. This chaotic scene is compounded by the existence of various alliances between factions of different parties, and the formation of student, labor, peasant, and other supporting groups for several of the parties. In addition, the Awami League itself contains a number of dissidents who want to cooperate with some of the opposition parties.

Dissidence within the Awami League (AL.) was initially a major source of opposition in Bangladesh politics. Since the early I960's, some members of the AL student wing, the Students' League, had been arguing for an independent socialist Bang- ladesh and for armed rebellion against West Pakistan. This group-under the leadership of Serajul Alam Khan, A. S. M. Abdur Rab, and Sahjahan Siraj-continued agitating for a people's movement, after the elections of 1970; it took the lead in declaring Bangladesh to be independent, after Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly on March I, 1971. Rab first raised the flag of independent Bangladesh under the famous banyan tree on the Dacca University campus on March 2; and on the following day, Siraj read a proclamation of independence in the presence of a gathering that included Sheikh Mujib.15 The group continued to pressure Mujib to declare Bangladesh independent, and to stop negotiating with Yahya Khan because this was thwarting the popular will to revolt.16 During the liberation struggle, Rab, Siraj, and S. A. Khan were high-ranking members of the Mujib Bahini (a section of the Mukti Bahini especially loyal to Mujib); but they were not at all enthusiastic about the personal cult developing around him, preferring instead that he lead a revolutionary government devoted to the rule of peasants and workers.

The other group of the Students' League-led by Nur-e-Alam Siddiqui, then President of the League-advocated transition to socialism through parliamentary means under Mujibism. Although both groups were at first loyal to Sheikh Mujib (and he tried to reconcile them), eventually he chose to support the Siddiqui group. At the same time that he was inaugurating the annual conference of the Students' League under Siddiqui at the Ramna Race Course, the Rab-Siraj group was holding its annual conference at the Paltan Maidan, proclaiming a classless society and com- mitment to armed struggle to change the status quo.17

The split in the AL student front was soon followed by a split in the AL labor front, and also in the AL-affiliated Association of Freedom Fighters (Mukti Juddha Sangsad). The Jatio Mukti-Juddha Sangram Parishad was formed in support of the rebel student group; and soon a peasant front was established as well, under the leadership of Khandoker Malek and Ahsanul Haq. Finally, on October 31, 1972 a new party was set up, with A.S.M. Abdur Rab and Major M. A. Jalil as joint convenors. They were elected General Secretary and President, respectively, of the new party, which called itself the Jatio Samajtanitrik Dal (JSD). Jalil, who was on leave from the Pakistan Army when the crackdown took place in March 1971, organized resistance against the military in several districts and was chief of one of the guerilla sectors. After liberation, he was arrested by the Awami League, reportedly for his attempt to resist the transfer of arms left by Pakistan to Indian forces. He is

15 This banyan tree was destroyed by the Paki- stan Army on the night of 25 March I97I. A new sapling was implanted in the same place by Sen- ator Edward Kennedy, when he visited Bangladesh soon after liberation.

16 See Ghoshona Patra (Manifesto), Bangladesh Chatra (Students) League, published by Moham- mad Ekramul Huq-Publicity Secretary, Bangladesh Chatra League, July I972, pp. 9-IO.

17 See Holiday (Dacca), 23 July I 972.


the only leader of the JSD who was not a leader of the Workers' League or the Students' League of the AL; at 38, he is among the older JSD leaders.

The JSD, which believes that the Bangladesh liberation war was stopped just as it was about to become a real people's war, opposes the nationalist leadership, who it says represent only 8 percent of the people but own 85 percent of the national wealth.'8 It considers itself to be the supporting force (or mass front) of a "correct" proletarian organization-the Bangladesh Communist League. The BCL is an underground party led by the former Student League leader, Sarajul Alam Khan. He managed to get most of his followers trained in guerilla warfare during the independence war, and has since worked behind the scenes to bring about the splits in the Awami League groups that led to the formation of the JSD. The BCL publishes a daily newspaper, Gonokantha (Voice of the People), which is edited by a well- known radical poet, Al-Mahmud.

The platform of the BCL deals with the same questions as most of the other revolutionary parties, for which it will serve as an example. The platform was made public as the annual report of the Bangladesh Chatra League, which is the student front of the BCL.'9 As do the documents of other Bangladesh communist groups, the report analyzes the political situation in terms of its inherent contradictions, and then puts forward the strategies by which the revolution will end the contradictions. The BCL sees three stages in the struggle for socialism, of which the first two were achieved by the end of the 1971 liberation war. Remaining, however, is the third stage, in which the contradiction between the ruling elite-the Awami League and other agents of imperialism-and the proletariat will be resolved by a violent revolution. Parliamentary politics is seen as a means of perpetuating the rule of the ex- ploiting classes, including feudal elements, intermediaries, and the rising middle class. Before the second revolution, the people will be exploited from the outside as well, since the Awami League is willing to allow Bangladesh to again be made subject to imperialism-especially by the United States, in the form of foreign aid, but also by Russia, and by India, through an exploitative economic relationship exempli- fied by the establishment of the headquarters of the Indo-Bangladesh Jute Exporting Corporation in Delhi rather than in Dacca.

The BCL hopes that at a certain stage, China will come to sympathize with its revolution, but it resists following any communist international line. There is a friendly tenor in its attitude toward pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Parties. It is attempting to expand its membership, and is supposed to have recruited most of the company commanders of the Mukti Bahini, and the district and subdivisional commanders of the Mujib Bahini. The members are being formed into cells, joined by an underground newspaper, Lal Ishtehar (Red Bulletin).

The JSD, BCL, and Jatio Sramik League (the JSD's labor front) jointly called for a general strike on January 20, I974 to protest American, Indian, and Soviet influence on the Bangladesh economy and polity; to call for higher wages for teachers and industrial workers; and to seek redress of inequities in Bangladesh society-

18 See Preface, Ghoshona Patra, Bangladesh Chatra League, I972; Ghoshona Patra, latio Samajtantrik Dal, published by Sultanuddin Ahmad-Publicity Secretary, Jatio Samajtantrik Dal, January I973, pp. 7-I I, I 4; "Political Resolution adopted in the Na- tional Convention of the Jatio Sramik League" held

on i6 January 1974, published in Gonokantha (Dacca), i8 January 1974.

'19 See A. F. M. Mahbubul Huq, Barshik Kario- biborini, 1972-73 (Annual Report, I972-73) published by Central Committee, Bangladesh Chatra League, I973, pp. I, 4, 6, 7.


corruption, the Special Powers Act, and the giving of permits primarily to Awami League workers. The government tried to prevent the strike by imposing a ban on meetings of the JSD and affiliated organizations, but the ban was violated almost everywhere in the country. A second call for a general strike on February 8 was a complete success. The JSD also threatened a ghe-rao if its 29-point demands were no,t accepted by the government by March r420; and on March 17, the Home Minister found himself confined to his house by the JSD. The gherao was broken by a police firing, which killed three and injured eighteen, and by the arrest of 40 other demon- strators.21 Within a few days, another several hundred JSD workers throughout Bangladesh were arrested; JSD offices were sacked and burned; and the office of Gonokantha was sacked, preventing its publication for a fortnight. Although Majo,r Jalil, Abdur Rab, and other officers of the JSD were arrested, the underground leaders -including Serajul Alam Khan-escaped and have been intensifying the activities of the BC.L.22

Another radical opposition party is the Bangladesher Communist Party-Leninbadi (the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Leninist--BCP(L)). This party originated with four of the five groups of pro-Chinese communists that made up the Somonnoy (con- sultative) Committee formed in Calcutta during the period of liberation: i) The Coordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries; 2) East Pakistan Com- munist Party (Marxist-Leninist)-EPCP(M-L), led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam; 3) some Communists of Khulna, led by Drs. Maroof Hossain and Sayeddur Dahar; and 4) some Communists led by Nasim Ali Khan. The leaders of these groups thought that the existence of so many communist parties in East Pakistan had pre- vented the left from playing the leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh, and they issued a call for unification to complete their country's "truncated revolution."23 In order to achieve this goal, they formed a new party, the BCP(L).

The BCP(L) adopted the strategy of working partly as an open organization and partly as a secret party. The open section of the party is led by Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam, Nasim Ali Khan, and others. The BCP(L) has also formed a student front (the Bangladesh Biplobi Chatra Union-Revolutionary Students' Union), and a labor front (the Bangla Sramik Federation-Bengal Labor Federation); and some of its members are working through the National Awami Party (Bhashani group) and its peasant organization, as well. The names of the leaders of the underground

20 See the text of the 29-point charter of demands issued by JSD published in Gonokantha, 9 January 1974-

21 See The Bangladesh Obsevrer, I8 March I974. According to the JSD press release on the night of 17 March, 300 JSD leaders and workers, including 45 women, were wounded by a police lathi-charge and firing opened by the Rakhi Bahini on the oc- casion of peaceful gher ao of the Home Minister's residence. The number of persons arrested is given as 250. See, Banglar Bani, i8 March 1974.

22 See the Special Report in Banglar Bani, I April '974.

23 See Ekti Monolithic Communist Par ty Gore Tulttn (Build up One Monolithic Communist

Party), published by Bangladesh Communist San- ghati Kendra (Solidarity Center of Bangladesh Com- munists), February 1972 (EPCP(M-L), led by Amal Sen andl Nazrul Islam, formned this Center soon after liberation.); Party Gorar Sangramn (Strug- gle to Build a Party), published by Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, April I972; Bangladesher Communistra Oikkobadha Hotlon (Communists of Bangladesh Unite), published by Communist Karmi Sanga (Communist Workers' Association), Novenmber 1972 (The Com- munists of Khulna, led by Dr. Maroof Hossain and Dr. Sayeddur Dahar, formed the Communist Work- ers' Association.).


sector of the party are not known, but it is said to have established cells in three- fourths of Bangladesh's districts.24

The ideology of the BCP(L) has much in common with that of the BCL. Both believe that the revolution in Bangladesh is unfinished because the bourgeoisie were able to assume leadership of the nationalist struggle, that Russian communism is revisionist and Russia's intentions in Bangladesh imperialistic, and that India is also a potential imperialist power. However, the BCP(L) opposes violence such as that used by the Naxalites in India, whom it considers anti-Leninist because they are so undisciplined.25 The BCP(L) does not have a mass front such as the JSD, and its student and labor fronts are weak; so it has not had the appeal of the Communist League.

Despite the fact that the BCP(L) was formed in order to unify the left, it is experiencing conflict within its own ranks, as well as with those factions of the East Bengal Communist Party and East Pakistan Communist Party that did not choose to unite with the other groups in the first place. Within the BCP(L), there is dissension between those who choose to work within the National Awami Party (Bhashani) and its peasant organization, and those who feel this is consorting with the enemy. The conflict between the communists who work in the NAP(B) and the non-communist members has also paralyzed the working of that party. In the council meeting of February 1974, the two groups clashed and Bhashani was forced to postpone the session and to dissolve the Central Committee.26 (Both factions then agreed to ask Bhashani to appoint members to the Central Committee.)

The fifth group that had belonged to the original Somonnoy Committee, but did not join the BCP(L), was the East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), led by Deven Sikdar and Abdul Bashar. Although they agreed with the manifesto of the BCP(L) on most important points, there were a few differences of emphasis. For example, the Sikdar-Bashar group saw the oppression of Bangladesh by West Pakistan as more direct, the present position of India as more dominant within the country, and the Chinese Communist Party as more a potential leader of Bangladesh's struggles than do the BCP(L) members.27 The Sikdar-Bashar group-now called the Banglar Communist Party (Communist Party of Bengal, BCP)-also has an open and an underground section, a student front, and a labor front; it regards par-

24 Interview with Nasim Ali Khan on 2I Feb- ruary 1974.

25 See Ghoshona (Manifesto), Bangladesher Com- munist Party (Leninbadi), published by Comrade Amal Sen-Secretary BCP(L), 1972, pp. 11-12,

25-33, 34-5, and 38-44; also Bangladesher Com- munist Party Leninbadir Ahban (Appeal of the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Leninist), published by Comrade Amal Sen-General Secretary, Central Committee, BCP(L), February I974.

26 See "Who will win in NAP," Holiday, I7 February I974.

27 For the arguments and counter-arguments on these issues put forward by the BCP (Leninist) and the BCP, see Banglar Communist Partir Abedon (Appeal to the Communist Party of Bengal), pub- lishedI by Solidarity Centre of Bangladesh Com-

munists (n.d.); Biplobi Party Gore Tulun (Build up a Revolutionary Party), published by BCP, Jan- uary 1972; "Banglar Communist Partir Bartaman Rajnitik Sanghatanik Karjobali" (Present Political and Organizational Works of the Communist Party of Bengal) in Mukti Shapath (Liberation Vow), Vol. I (I, 1972), pp. 3-6; "China Veto Proyog Prashange" (About the Chinese use of the Veto), ibid. Vol. I (5, I972), pp. I2-I3. Mukti Shapath is the organ of the open branch of the BCP. Also see, Banglar Communist Partir Nirbachani Gho- shlona (Election Manifesto of the Communist Party of Bengal), published by Deven Sikdar and Abdul Bashar, February I973; and "Bangladesher Marx- badier Oikko Proshange" (On the Unity of the Marxists of Bangladesh), Murkti Shapath, Vol. I

(2, 1972), p. 4.


ticipation in parliamentary politics as a strategy rather than a matter of basic principle. The leadership of the BCP comes from peasant and working-class families and is without much formal education; this is in stark contrast to the BCP(L) leaders, who are generally upper-class and university-educated. It is these differences in background and attitudes of leaders and cadres that differentiate the two parties, not their minor ideological incompatibilities.

The Bangladesh Communist League, the BCP(L), and the BCP have adopted the tactics of working through both party cells and mass front organizations. How- ever, there are four more revolutionary parties that work only through their underground cells and underground armed fronts. Of these, two are factions of a group that joined the Somonnoy Committee-the East Pakistan Communist Party; one is a faction of the East Bengal Communist Party from which Sikdar and Bashar split to form the BCP, and one is apparently quite separate in its origins from any of these.

The latter is the Sarbohara Party (Purba Bangla Sarbohara Party, East Bengal Communist Party), which grew out of the East Bengal Workers' Movement and is led by Siraj Sikdar, an engineer. The leadership of the Sarbohara Party is generally university-educated, which may account in part for the fact that the party has been the most prolific of all Bangladesh's revolutionary parties in publishing party litera- ture. In addition to Lal Jhadna (Red Flag) and Sangbad Bulletin (News Bulletin), the party regularly publishes the proceedings of the meetings of its Central Com- mittee and numerous other pamphlets-mostly written by Sikdar himself. The widespread availability of these pamphlets indicates the efficiency of the Sarbohara Party's communications network.

The Sarbohara Party agrees with the others that the Bangladesh Revolution was stopped too soon, with the Awami League serving as a puppet government of India, which has plundered East Bengal28 and has maintained its military presence there through arming, training, and even clothing the vigilante group-the Rakhi Bahini. Russian and American imperialism are also seen as threats. Thus even the nationalist revolution has not been completed; the JSD is held to be making a Trotskyist error in trying to complete the socialist revolution before the nationalist one.29 However,

28 The Sarbohara Party theoreticians use the name East Bengal instead of Bangladesh. Bang- ladesh, in its literary connotation, means the land of Bengalis and thus includes West Bengal. Sarbo- hara leaders argue that East Bengalis-within their own territory and with their own language, &o- nomic and social system, and distinctive culture- have evolved historically as a distinct nation different from other nationalities of the Indian sub- continent. So, their land should be called East Bengal rather than Bangladesh. See Purbo Banglar Ashomapto Jatio Gonotantrik Biplob Somponno Korar Kormosuchi (Program to Complete the Un- finished National Democratic Revolution of East Bengal), published by Central Committee, Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Party (n.d.), pp. 1-3.

29 Some of the recent publications of the Sarbo- hara Party are: Siraj Sikdar, Samaitantra Shreni Sangram 0 Samajik Biplob Prasange (On Socialism, Class Struggle, and Social Revolution); Bibhinna

Akritir Songsodhonbad Prashange Keokti Rochona (A Few Articles on the Various Kinds of Revolu- tion); Bibhinna Dhormabolombi Jatigo to Ebong Bhashabhashi lonogoner lonno Purbo Bangla Sarbo- hara Partir Kormosuchi (The Program of the East Bengal Sarbohara Party Regarding the Various Reli- gious, National, and Linguistic Minorities); Purbo Banglar latio Mukti Fronter Ghoshona Patra 0 Kor- mosuchi (Manifesto and Program of the East Bengal National Liberation Front); Purbo Banglar Antorik- bhabe Sarbohara Biplobider Moddhe Oikko Protistha Sam parke Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Partir I No. Bibriti (Number I Statement of the Sarbohara Party Regarding the Establishment of Unity Among the Sincere Communist Revolutionaries of East Bengal); Purbo Banglar Sarbohara Partir Prothom Jatio Congresse Prodhotta Report (Report Presented to the First National Congress of the East Bengal Sarbohara Party); Bortoman Paristhiti Prosange Koekti Dalil (Some Documents Regarding the


the bourgeois leadership of the Awami League cannot be truly nationalist, as they draw their support from imperialist powers and semi-feudal countries; only the party of the proletariat can pursue the revolution correctly. In order to accomplish the revolution, the Sarbohara Party has formed a National Liberation Front including peasants, workers, and oppressed linguistic and national minorities-including Biharis and members of the Chakma and Santal tribes.

Because Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides by India, the Sarbohara theoreticians are convinced that no outside help will be available for the revolution, that the Liberation Front will have to d'epend on its own resources. So it has launched a "liberation war," procuring funds and arms forcibly from pro-government sources. The National Awami Party (Bhashani) is supporting Sikdar's efforts in this respect.30 The party appears to have recovered from its heavy losses of fighters to both the Pakistan Army and the Mujib Bahini; and it claims responsibility for most of the police station lootings, bank robberies, and river dacoities perpetrated since liberation. It also claims to have taken the lives of several Awami League workers, smugglers, betrayers of party secrets, and some Hindus who were said to be still oppressing Muslims. The guerilla units lie low during the winter and are most active during the rainy season, when government troops are at the greatest disadvantage.

The Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist-Leninist) is another underground revolutionary party, more commonly known as the Sammobadi Dal. It is led by Mohammad Toaha and Sukhendu Dastidar, who brought about the split in the original East Pakistan Communist Party in i968 and formed its pro-Peking wing.31 Toaha collected a number of red guerillas to fight both the Pakistan Army and the Mukti Bahini, but these were decimated by the opposing forces and were unable to set up their projected People's Democratic Republic of Bangladesh. After independence, their newspaper-Gono Shactti (People's Strength)-began to subscribe to the common theory that Bangladesh had not really been liberated but was headed by a puppet government responsible to India and thus indirectly to Moscow. Like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal regards the Rakhi Bahini as essentially an Indian army in Bangladesh, receiving arms and ammunition from the Indian government and taking direct aid from Indian armed forces to suppress rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other areas in March I972. Also like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal has formed a national liberation front under its direction, and a guerilla force recruited from among frustrated freedom fighters. Their main activities center in the districts of Rajshahi, Pabna, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur, and Noakhali.32

Some of the differences among the parties can be seen from the ways in which they criticize each other. The Sammobadi Dal criticizes the BCP(L) and the BCP for

Present Situation); Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Partir Bijoy Anibarjo (The Triumph of the East Bengal Sarbohara Party is Inevitable). See also Gonojudhar Patobhumi (Background of Peoples' War) (published by Iqbal Ahmad, October 1973); and Siraj Sikdar, Somajiantra Shreni Songram 0 Samaiik Biplob Proshange (On Socialism, Class-struggle, and Socialist Revolution), (n.p., n.d.), pp. 9-I2.

30Maulana Bhashanir Bibriti (Maulana Bha- shani's Statement), 2 December I973 (n.p.).

31 For a detailed discussion of the I966 EPCP

split between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking leftists, and the later growth of several factions among the pro-Peking leftists, see Maniruzzaman, op. cit.

32 See Ptorbo Banglar Paristhitir Upor Purbo Bangla Sammobadi Dal (Marxbadi-Leninbadir) Dvitio latio Congress Grihito Siddhanta (Resolu- tions Reached at the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of East- Bengal [Marxist- Leninist] Concerning the Situation in East Bengal), I7 January I973 (n.p.), pp. 2-5; and Gono Shakti, Vol. II (4, 5, & 8, 1973).


their stands on imperialism, since the latter two parties have supposedly given their support to the Awami League by saying that it was "dependent" on India rather than terming it a "puppet government." The Sarbohara Party is dismissed as a mere terrorist group, misled by the upstart Sikdar into seeing the most important contradiction as that between East Bengal and India rather than between socialist and anti- socialist forces. For this reason, the Sammobadi Dal thinks that the Sarbohara Party might be acting as a counter-revolutionary terrorist force, patronized by the U.S.33 in its attempt to oust Delhi and Moscow from Bangladesh. Similarly, the JSD, which is regarded as a mere falling out over patronage among junior AL members, is thought to be supported by India as a counterweight to keep Mujib's puppet government under strict control.34

While most of the members of the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist- Leninist) formed the Sammobadi Dal under Toaha and Dastidar, a small section under Abdul Haq retained the old name of the party and a separate organization. This group is the most extreme in its interpretation of the liberation struggle; it does not recognize the existence of Bangladesh at all, preferring to see the war for independence as an expansionist move by India, and the country now as a colony of India. The EPCP(M-L) has therefore launched its own people's war against the counterrevolutionary forces, to resurrect East Pakistan.35 However, because of its continued use of the name "East Pakistan," it has been the subject of the strongest government action, and most of its cadres have been killed or jailed. Abdul Haq remains at large.

The East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)-EBCP(M-L)-is the last of the underground parties. It is itself split into three groups, one of which- the group led by Sikdar and Bashar-joined the Somonnoy Committee to form the BCL. A second group, led by Matin and Alauddin, saw the liberation struggle as a fight between two "bourgeois dogs," and adopted the line of killing all the class enemies-from the Pakistan Army through feudal landlords to the Mukti Bahini. This group then came under heavy attack by the Mukti Bahini after December i6, 1971; and it fled from Pabna to Attrai, which was at that time under the control of Ohidur Rahman. He was persuaded to admit the error of supporting the Mukti Bahini, and his group was recruited to the EBCP(M-L). Their terrorist activities led to reprisals by the government; in a series of hard-fought battles, both Matin and Ohidur Rahman were ca-ptured. Alauddin, who escaped, is continuing publication of Purbo Bangla (East Bengal), the party's newspaper.

The EBCP(M-L) theoreticians' analysis of Bangladesh's political situation is similar to that of the Sammobadi Dal; but the former put more emphasis on the contradiction between peasants and feudal elements, claiming nationalism cannot be achieved

33 See Bortoman Paristhite Purba Banglar Sam- mabadi Dal (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) Ki Chai (What does the Communist Party [Marxist-Leninist] Want in the Present Situation?), October I973 (n.p.); "Ek Bhuiphor Biplobi Samparke" (On an Upstart Revolutionary), Gono Shakti, Vol. II (2, 1973), PP. 4-28.

34 See "Jasod" (JSD), Gono Shakti, Vol. II (4 and 5, I973), pp. 6-32.

35 See the editorial "Shashastra Jatio Biplobi Juddher Parichalak-Ispath Kadin Sramik Srenir

Biplobi Partike Gore Tulun" (Build up the Steel- like Revolutionary Party of the Workers-the Leader of Armed National Revolutionary War) in Jono Juddho [Peoples' War], No. 7 (I973), p. 7. Juno Juddho-the underground paper of the EPCP(M-L)-is edited by Abdul Haq. Also see Shashastra latio Biplobi luddhoke Egie Neey Chalun (Take Forward the Armed National Libera- tion War), published by the EPCP(M-L), 24 De- cember 1972.


without a class struggle as well.36 They also seek collaboration with the revolutionaries in India, especially the Naxalites, who are distrusted by the other revolutionary parties of Bangladesh. The EBCP(M-L) is active in Attrai, and in parts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Pabna, and Kushtia Districts.

The left revolutionary parties of Bangladesh are all agreed that the war for independence left the revolution unfinished. Some believe that the next step must be class war; others think that even the nationalist phase is not complete while the Awami League government allows the economy of Bangladesh to be dominated by India, Russia, and/or the United States. However, the ideological differences among them do not explain the large number of parties, nor why the BCL's attempt to unify the revolutionary left was so unsuccessful. Some important differences of style and emphasis can be traced to the class origins of the members or their levels of education. Most of the factionalism appears to be the result of personal animosities, desire for personal aggrandizement, or of accidents of geography or history in the groups' encounters with the Pakistan Army and the Mukti Bahini. The radical parties themselves are not worried about the existence of several communist organizations, however, citing the case of Russia before 1917, when dozens of communist parties co- existed. The party led by Lenin with the correct revolutionary theory ultimately led the revolution to fruition. Just so will the party in Bangladesh espousing the correct theory take command during the revolution and overcome all the other parties.

Government Response to the Left Despite its overwhelming victory at the polls, it is clear that the Awami League

faces sharp challenges from the left. It also feared the Islamic nationalist parties, banning them shortly after independence and setting up special tribunals to try "collaborators." About 40,000 people were arrested under a special order allowing suspected collaborators to be arrested without a warrant. H-owever, because of the strong pressure from the left revolutionaries, the Awami League decided to co-opt the Islamic nationalists; on November 30, I9.73, a general amnesty was granted to collaborators, with the exception of those who were charged with murder, rape, or arson.37 The leaders of the Islamic parties have prepared a draft constitution for a new party based on secularism and the welfare state. The recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan and the granting of clemency to I95 Pakistani war prisoners have further improved conditions for the right.

The government has also co-opted the less radical (pro-Moscow) left, in its attempt to widen its base of support. After the split in the EPCP in I968, the pro- Moscow group had sought a coalition with other parties, as the pro-Soviet section of the National Awami Party had done in the general elections of 1970. During and after the liberation struggle, these groups gave full support to the AL, confining their criticism of it to comments about its corruption and favoritism. However, on January I, I973, a march on the American Center in Dacca, to protest the bombing of North Vietnam, was organized by moderately left parties and affiliates. The march was broken up by a police firing that killed two. The pro-Moscow camp then opened

36 See Editorial, Purbo Bangla, Vol. IV (2, I973), pp. 2-3; and Sadhan Karmokar (probably a pseud- onym of one of the leaders of the EBCP(M-L), "Bharater Biplobi Sangrame Chiner Nirobata: 'Ke

Kon Drishtithe Dhekhe'" (China's Silence on the Revolutionary Struggle in India: "Who Sees From What Angle") in Ibid., pp. 6-8.

37 Bangladesh Observer, I December I973.


a campaign vilifying the government, which led the government to have the offices of the NAP and the Students' Union attacked. Moni Singh, President of the Central Committee of the Bangladesh Communist Party (Moscow), apologized to the government. Finally, in October, the beleaguered AL formed the People's Unity Front (GOJ, for Gono Oikkay Jote) with the NAP and the BCP (Moscow); representation on the Central Committee is in proportions of II:5:3. Similar tripartite com- mittees were formed at the district and subdivisional levels. The main aim of the GOJ is to fight the radical parties, which they describe as "miscreants," "anti-state elements," and (ironically) "agents of foreign powers who are not reconciled to the independence of Bangladesh."38

Of course, the left revolutionaries have not been co-opted along with the Islamic nationalists or the pro-Moscow leftists. Shortly after his inauguration as Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujib warned publicly that "Naxalites" would be shot dead. A number of special ordinances to facilitate the war against the left have been promulgated by Mujib or passed by the Jatio Sangsad (Parliament). These include the following: I) Establishment of special tribunals exclusively to try offences such as concealing, storing, possession of, use of, or membership in organizations for acquiring arms and ammunition or explosive substances. Incitement to interfere with the law or administration of the law is also cause for prosecution. 2) Arrest without warrant on sus picion of having committed the above offences. 3) Removal of any government officer-including police-from service, without stated reason and without right of appeal. 4) Exemption of the above laws from unconstitutionality. 5) Ex- tension of the permitted period between sittings of the Jatio Sangsad from 6o to I20 days, during which the President may promulgate laws. 6) Giving the President power to declare a Proclamation of Emergency when the security or economic life of Bangladesh or any part thereof is threatened by external war or internal dis- turbance. During this Emergency, fundamental rights remain suspended and are not enforceable in any court.39 7) Enabling the officers of the Rakhi Bahini to arrest or search without warrant or cause, with no appeal against these actions. 8) Empower- ing the government to suspend the activities of associations-including unions and political parties-for a period not exceeding six months, if their activities are "prejudicial to the national interest." 9) Detention of a person to prevent him from committing any "prejudicial act." io) No actions taken under the Special Powers Act of I974 (covering provisions 8 and 9. above), or puirporting to have been so taken, are subject to prosecution or question in any court.40

38 See Banglar Bani, I5 October I973; and the report of the meeting of the Central Committee of the GOJ in Bangladesh Observer, 23 October I973. Also see Banglar Bani, 2i November I973 and 24 March I974; and Gonokantha, I3 December I973.

39 The fundamental rights-defined in Articles 36, 37, 39, 40, and 42-include the following as "subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest": freedoms of movement, assembly, association, speech and expression, press, profession, and rights to property. For these laws, see proceedings of the Jatio Sangsad published in the Bangladesh Observer, I9 July I973.

40 See the Bangladesh Observer, 29 and 30 Jan- uary, 2 and 6 February I974 for proceedings of

the Jatio Sangsad concerning these laws. (Italics added.) On December 24, I973 Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury resigned from the office of President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Immediately thereafter, he was appointed Special Representative of Bangladesh. The official version of the resigna- tion was that Justice Choudhury wanted to be more active in service to the nation than was possible as the "dignified head" of the state. (See Bang- ladesh Observer, 25 December I973.) However, the opposition newspapers stated (and informed Awami League circles later confirmed to this author) that Justice Choudhury had been unhappy about the strong-arm methods used by the Awami League- affiliated Students' League in the Students' Union


As if these were not enough, the government has raised a special security force, the Jatio Rakhi Bahini, generally known as the Rakhi Bahini. Its recruits come mainly from former members of the Mujib Bahini, the Mukti Bahini, and other organizations affiliated to the Awami League. By the middle of 1972, the Home Department had recruited about Io,ooo men to the force. Its budget has risen from Taka 74.4 million in 1972-3 to Taka I50 million in 1973-4.41 The officers of the Rakhi Bahini are trained in India; and the organization ousts anyone not completely accepting the Awami League government. Mujib has also threatened to arm other branches of the AL-including the Youth League, Students' League, and Workers' League-to fight the "armed anti-state miscreants."

Using its special powers and the Rakhi Bahini, the government has been attempting to comb out all "extremists and miscreants." In July I973, about 200 ultra- leftists were arrested and a large store of arms recovered in an operation against the Sammobadi Dal and the EBCP(M-L) in Rajshahi District; again in December a government operation resulted in killing over ioo communists. Gonokantha reported that 500 workers were killed in Sirajganj; and the JSD asserts that the AL has killed about 6o,ooo and arrested about 86,ooo in the two years since liberation.42 The AL claims, on its side, to have wiped out armed miscreants from half of Bangladesh's i8 districts; and it says that most of the victims of killings reported are actually AL workers.43 Reports of violence continue to appear daily in the press.

Clearly, the government has not been able to meet the challenge of the revolutionary leftists, either with special powers or with violence; and a state of near civil war obtains in Bangladesh. As in most of the former colonial countries, the solution has been to offer a makeshift ideology centered around one nationalist leader (e.g., Tito, Nasser, or Nkrumah). In Bangladesh, of course, the leader is Mujib; and the ideology is Mujibism. First formulated by Mujib's nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, during the liberation war, Mujibbad reached its peak in the 687-page volume by Khandokar Mohammad Ilias, a former leftist of the Moscow persuasion.44

According to this interpretation, Mujibism is a progressive ideology that can bring socialism to Bangladesh without further bloodshed. Unlike fascism, Bengali nationalism is a democratic and anti-imperialist force, which has already destroyed class cleavages and religious communalism. Since Bengalis fought for democracy and self-representation against Pakistan, they prefer to obtain socialism gradually

elections in Dacca University, and promulgation of Presidential Orders and enactment of various "special powers Acts" that negate the principle of due process of law. Since the government did not pay any heed to his advice on these matters, President Choudhury resigned. See Gonokantha, 25 Decem- ber I973; Holiday, 30 December I973. As provided by the constitution, Muhammadullah-the Speaker of the latio Sangsad-became the Acting President and in January I974 was formally elected President unopposed. Muhammadullah, 52, educated in Cal- cutta and Dacca Universities, is a trained lawyer. One of the closest associates of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Muhammadullah was Office Secretary of the East Pakistan Awami League from I953 to I97I.

41 The allocation for the Bangladesli Rifles, a

border-security force, was only Taka 8o million in the budget for I973-74. (See Gonokantha, 30 June I973.)

42 The Bangladesh Observer, I9 July I973; and Gonokantha, I9 and 26 December I973.

43Bangladesh Observer, 9 February I974. 44 See Banglar Bani, Io and I6 May; 4 June;

Io, I6, and I7 July; 2, 20, 24, and 30 August; I2, 23, 27, and 30 September; and 6 October I972.

Also Bangladesh Awami Leagtuer Nirbachani Ishte- har (Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League), published by Sardar Amjad Hossain- Publicity Secretary, Bangladesh Awami League, I973, p. 6; and Khandokar Mohammad Ilias, Mujibbad (Mujibism), Dacca: National Publications, I972.


through their elected representatives. This ideology offers little that is new, especially to the intelligentsia. Nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy have long been part of the Congress platform in India. On the other hand, the majority of intellectuals see Mujibbad as a personality-cult and an anti-socialist ideology. The Awami League leaders themselves have gradually become less enthusiastic about Mujibbad and have been taking a less ideological approach to the nation's many problems.

The weakness of Mujibism as an ideology is reflected in the factionalism of the Awami League. In the parliamentary party of the AL, Tajuddin Ahmed (the Minister of Finance) leads a group that opposes accepting aid from the "imperialist nations," although its anti-Americanism is contradicted by a generally pro-Indian and pro-Soviet stance. The group believes that the present mixed economy should be abandoned in favor of a pure socialist one, since the nationalization of industries and foreign trade without the nationalization of the distribution system has created economic uncertainty and inflation. Another parliamentary group, under Syed Nazrul Islam (Minister for Industries) and Khandoker Mustaq Ahmad (Minister for Foreign Trade and Commerce) is less anti-American and is willing to accept foreign aid as well as to continue the mixed economy.

Despite these differences, the senior Cabinet members are still bound by loyalty to Mujib and by their common experiences in the liberation movement. The divisions among the younger party members is more serious, as for example the split in the Students' League that led to the establishment of the JSD. Another cleavage has occurred within the Awami League Working Committee, which is made up almost exclusively of men in their thirties, since the older party leaders are in the Cabinet. Abdur Razzak (Organizing Secretary of the Awami League) and Tofael Ahmad (Political Secretary to the Prime Minister) lead one faction, with a large following in the Students' League affiliate of the AL; the other is led by Mujib's nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, who founded the rival Jubo (Youth) League. In March I974, the Razzak-Ahmad group launched a campaign against the "corrupt elements and exploiters of society," referring to Moni and his associates in the Jubo League. Tensions between the two groups resulted in the killing of seven students on the Dacca University campus in April I974, and the subsequent closing of the university for two months. Incidents at Rajshahi and Chittagong Universities also resulted in their closing.95

In addition to the intellectual hollowness of Mujibism, and the factionalism within the party, the Awami League has been able neither to steady the economy nor to effect any real steps towards socialism. The government has nationalized 85 percent of Bangladesh's industries and est-ablished its control over go percent of the country's foreign trade; but the distribution of both locally-produced and imported goods is carried on by licensed "dealers." Most of these licensees are AL workers rather than professional traders; they sell their permits to professional merchants at very high prices.46 In addition, about sixty thousand houses abandoned by non-

45 For an account of this split, see Ittefaq, 31 March and I April 1974. For the university incidents, see Banglar Bani April 6, 1974; and Holiday, April 7, 1974.

46See the reports published in the pro-government Banglar Bani, 30 September and Ia2 November

1973, 3 January and 3 March 1974. According to A. H. M. Kamruzzaman, the Commerce Minister, of the total 25,000 import permit holders, about I5,ooo are "fake" importers. See Gonokantha, 3 January 1974. Most of the permits for opening indenting firms have also been given to AL work-


Bengalis have been appropriated by the Awami League.47 In the nationalized industries, about 8o percent of the administrators are either Awami League members who lack knowledge of economic management, or former factory owners who have become League supporters. The result is the growth of a class of conspicuous nouveaux riches, living off the economy rather than investing in it, and having the controlling influence in the AL. Pakistan's 22 families have become Bangladesh's 2200. Such people can hardly provide the leadership for a socialist transformation of the Bengali economy.48

As the party of nationalism, the AL drew into its fold all those who sought an independent Bangladesh. During the liberation war, no effort was made to train the freedom fighters in socialist ideology; the leadership relied upon Mujib's charisma to maintain unity after the war ended. As an ideology, Mujibism was unrewarding; and AL workers have had to be enticed with perquisites such as licenses and houses. This, in turn, has created dissatisfaction even among former AL supporters, who are now fragmented, and has provided fuel for revolutionary arguments. The violent suppression of opponents of the regime, and the extraordinary powers the government has granted itself to effect this suppression have further alienated many ordinary Bengali citizens.

In sum, Bangladesh's independence movement unleashed forces of revolution that were not content with mere independence. Within two years of the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate nation, there has been a polarization of politics-with the AL and its pro-Moscow and rightist supporters on the one hand, and the several open and underground communist parties on the other. Although the left parties are themselves highly fragmented, they all agree that Bengal's revolution is presently incomplete; and all are training armed guerrillas to sabotage communications, kill AL workers and other enemies of revolution, and finally to take over from the AL government. The failure of the economy to revive, the ostentatious living of the AL licensees, the repressive laws, and the general arming of any apparently pro- government citizens-all serve to increase the revolutionary potential of the society, a potential that the various communist parties have been able to exploit.

What then are the prospects for Bangladesh, and who will win the struggle between the centrist and the revolutionary forces? The economy is unlikely to turn around soon enough to help the Awami League. Foreign aid has virtually ceased, although the First Five-Year Plan (1973-78) counts on about 39 percent of its total outlay coming from outside aid.49 The performance of the nationalized industries

ers and sympathizers. The "easy money" made by these "fake" traders is spent either in ostentatious living or transferred to foreign banks. It is primarily because of this fact, and the large-scale smuggling of relief goods to India, that the pump- ing of massive foreign aid (about 200 million dollars in cash and kind) into Bangladesh during the first two years of independence failed to revitalize the Bangladesh economy.

47 See Gonokantha, I June I973. 48 See Presidential Address of Dr. Mazharul Huq,

in the first annual session of Bangladesh Arthoniti Samiti (Bangladesh Economic Association), I974 (published by Bangladesh Economic Association), pp. 5-6. For an example of opposition comment,

see Nirbachani Ishtehdr (Election Manifesto), Na- tional Awami Party (Bhashani), published by Qazi Jafar Ahmad, 1973, p. 3. The Manifesto dubs the Awami League Lut Pat Samiti (Association of Looters).

49 Ed. note: Since this article was written, a consortium to aid Bangladesh has been formed inside the World Bank. The consortium is to include three oil-producing nations. In addition, in order to improve the climate for foreign aid and investment, Mujib has assured that aid funds will not be squandered corruptly; more concretely, he has raised the ceiling for private-sector investment from $3 to 4 million. He has also declared a moratorium on nationalization of industries for 15


is poor;50 and about 75 percent of the small industries are no longer functioning because of the difficulty in acquiring oil and other essential materials.5' The majority of the people will thus be likely to offer their support to the revolutionaries. Similarly, Mujib's ability to hold the country together by force of personality will dwindle as time goes on. He cannot completely disassociate himself from the corrupt AL workers nor from the seemingly gratuitous violence of the Rakhi Bahini and other armed groups.

Although the total strength of the army is only about 5o,ooo; of the police 40,ooo; the Bangladesh Rifles 20,000; and the Rakhi Bahini also about 20,000 (in a country of some 75 million), without the critical support of these forces the revolutionaries are unlikely to fully succeed. The various armed government forces are still loyal to Mujib and the AL government; but the revolutionaries argue that it is only a matter of time until they remember their peasant origins and cast their lot with the left. The behavior of the armed groups is one of the greatest incalculables of Bang- ladesh's political future. Another unknown is how India would react to left-wing successes, since under the 25-Year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace (signed March I972), India is supposed to help Bangladesh to guard her "peace, stability, and security."

Overall, it seems safe to say that the Bangladesh revolution of I97I is not going to be the last that the country will see. Blood will continue to flow in a de facto civil war. The government will have to make some accommodation to demands for economic stability and political freedom. The result will surely be different from the kind of society that is sought by the present generation of leaders. However, all her citizens do believe that someday Bangladesh will once again become the land of their dreams-Sonar Bangla, "Golden Bengal."

Postscript (February 1975)

The final version of this article was prepared in April I974. The developments in Bangladesh since that time have been in the line indicated in the last section of the paper. The economic crisis in Bangladesh was aggravated by the "worst floods in our history" in July and August 1974, resulting in "near famine" situation and causing death, according to official estimate, to 27,500 persons. The underground revolutionaries intensified their activities in the latter half of I974. The daily newspapers reported over ioo engagements between the Government forces and armed extremists. The Prime Minister, in his broadcast to the nation on the eve of Victory Day (December i6, commemorating the Pakistan Army's surrender on that date in 1971), stated that 3000 Awami League leaders and workers-including four M.P.s- had been killed by the terrorists. "In view of the grave situation created by hostile elements acting in collusion with the collaborators of Pakistan Army, extremists and enemy agents in the pay of foreign powers," (as the Home Ministry spokesman put it) on December 28, 1974, the government proclaimed a State of Emergency in Bangladesh and suspended-for an indefinite period-all fundamental rights con-

years, and has allowed for liberal repatriation of profits and salaries for foreign companies. See Kasturi Rangan in the New York Times, i8 Octo- ber I974.

50 Syed Nazrul Islam, Minister for Industries, told Parliament that the total loss suffered by the

nationalized industries in the first year after independence was Taka 322.4 million. See The Bangla- des/h Observel;, 23 June I973.

51 Ed. note: This figure supplied by editor from New York Times, I8 October I974.


ferred by the Constitution. The new year 1975 began in Bangladesh with the news that Siraj Sikdar-the leader of the Sarbohara Party-had been arrested, and had been killed while escaping from police custody. On January 25, on the initiative of the Prime Minister and reportedly against the private feelings of the majority of M.P.s belonging to the AL, the Constitution was amended to provide for a presidential form of government; and the President was authorized to form one National Party and suspend the activities of all political groups opposed to joining the pro- posed National Party. The amendment further provided that "Bangabandhu, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation" would be the President of the country for five years from the date of this Constitutional amendment. In his last peroration in Parliament, soon after the passing of the amendment bill and shortly before his taking oath as the new President, Bangabandhu expressed his determination to completely wipe out the "anti-state elements, terrorists, hoarders, and smugglers." In his bid to outdo the slogan-mongering of the revolutionaries, Bangabandhu dubbed the constitutional coup his "second revolution" to bring about the "democracy of the exploited masses." In spite of the constitutional changes, and the arrest and killing of Siraj Sikdar, the activities of the revolutionaries have not stopped. While the last of the opposition dailies, Gonokantha, has been banned, a weekly sympathetic to the revolutionaries commented that as Sheikh Mujib's movement for autonomy acted as a catalyst for the emergence of Bangladesh, his movement to usher in "the democracy of the exploited masses" might ultimately lead to the establishment of the "dictator- ship of the proletariat."

Appendix: Biographies of Party Personalities

i. Awami League (AL) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Party head. Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Leader of the war

for independence, even from his cell in West Pakistan. often referred to as Bangabandhu ("friend of Bengal"). [Ed. note: now President of Bangladesh.]

Tajuddin Ahmed. Minister of Finance. Leader of pro-Indian, anti-American group, which seeks a completely socialist economy.

Syed Nazrul Islam. Minister for Industries. Leader of the more pro-West group, which accepts the mixed economy.

Khandoker Mustaq Ahmad. Minister for Foreign Trade and Commerce. Leader, with Nazrul Islam, of pro-U.S. wing.

Abdur Razzak. Organizing Secretary of the AL. Leader of one Students' League group. Tofael Ahmad. Political Secretary to the Prime Minister. Co-leader with Razzak. Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni. Mujib's nephew. Expounder of Mujibism. Leader of dissident

wing of Students' League, and founder of Jubo (Youth) League. Nur-E-Alam Siddiqui. President of AL Students' League. Abdul Quddus Makhan. General Secretary, Dacca University Central Students' Union. Abdul Mannan. General Secretary, Lal Bahini-the AL volunteer corps.

2. Bangladesh Communist League, JSD, and affiliated fronts Serajul Alam Khan. Leader of BCL. Former General Secretary of Students' League (AL),

and early leader of movement for independent Bangladesh. A.S.M. Abdur Rab. Former leader of AL Students' League. Vice-President, Dacca Uni-


versity Central Students' Union in I97I. First to raise the flag of independent Bangla- desh. JSD member.

Swapan Kumar Choudhury. Former AL Students' League member. First to raise the issue of independent Bangladesh at a League meeting.

Sahjahan Siraj. Former AL Students' League leader, now JSD member. Nurul Ambia. Former President of AL Students' League. Joined Rab-Siraj group, now

JSD leader. Mohammed Shahjahan. Former AL labor leader, brought his workers to JSD. Ruhul Amin Bhuyian. Former AL labor leader, now JSD. Khondokher Abdul Malek. President of peasant front of the JSD, the Jatio Krishak League. Ahsanul Haq. General Secretary, Jatio Krishak League. Major M. A. Jalil. Former Major, Pakistan Army. President and co-founder of JSD. Al-Mahmud. Radical poet. Editor of Gonokantha, the newspaper of the BCL. A. F. M. Mahbubul Haq. General Secretary of the BCL, I972-3.

Momtaz Begum. Lady Secretary, JSD. Meshbahuddin Ahmed. Acting Secretary, Sramik League (workers' froint).

3. Banglar Communist Party (BCP)

Deven Sikdar. Former member of East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) who split from this group and from Somonnoy Committee's founding of BCP(L).

Abdul Bashar. Co-leader with Sikdar.

4. Bangladesher Communist Party-Leninbadi (BCP(L))

Amal Sen. Former leader of East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), now open leader of BCP(L). In his late 50's.

Nazrul Islam. Former student leader, now in his 30's. Affiliated earlier with EPCP(M-L). Now open leader of BCP(L).

Dr. Maroof Hossain. Communist leader from Khulna, led his group into the Somonnoy Committee. Formerly of the Communist Workers' Association.

Dr. Sayyedur Dahar. Leader with Hossain. Nasim Ali Khan. Leader of the above-ground BCP(L). Hyder Akbar Khan (Rono). Above-ground leader. Mastafa Jamal. Above-ground leader. Qazi Zafar Ahmad. Leader in BCP(L). Also working through the NAP (Bhashani)

and its peasant organization. Rashad Khan Menon. Colleague of Ahmad. Abdul Mannan Bhuyian. Colleague of Ahmad.

5. Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Party (East Bengal Communist Party-Sarbohara Party)

Siraj Sikdar. Leader, founder, and theorist. [Ed. note: killed by police. See postscript to this article.]

6. Purbo Bang/a Sammobadi Dal (Marxbadi-Leninbadi). (Communist Party of East Bengal-the Saimmobadi Dal)

Mohammad Toaha. Engineer of the I968 split in the East Pakistan Communist Party forming EPCP(M-L). Founder of underground Sammobadi Dal.

Sukhendu Dastidar. Leader with Toaha.

7. EPCP(M-L)

Abdul Haq. Colleague of Toaha, acts as leader of separate party.


8. Purbo Bang/a Communist Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) (East Bengal Communist Party -EBCP(M-L))

Matin. Former colleague of Sikdar and Bashar, but did not flee to India. Opiposed both Pakistan and AL from outset. Imprisoned.

Alauddin. Tipu Biswas. Ohidur Rahman. Also former EBCP member (colleague of Sikdar). Formed Attrai (Raj-

shahi) Communist Party and supported liberation war, but later recanted and helped Matin and colleagues escape the Rakhi Bahini. Imprisoned.

9. Other Moni Singh. Leader of the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Moscow. Muzzafar Ahmad. Leader of the National Awami Party. Maulana Bhashani. Leader of the NAP (Bhashani).