University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.http://www.jstor.orgBangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath Author(s): Talukder Maniruzzaman Source:Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 119-129Published by:University of California PressStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643140Accessed: 12-08-2015 20:30 UTCYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH IN 1975: THE FALL OF THE MUJIB REGIME AND ITS AFTERMATH TalukderManiruzzaman As S. M. Lipset has emphasized,the way that a nation is born conditionsmuch of its later political development.Bangladesh was born througha bloody revolutionwhich spawned ideas that dis- rupted the pre-revolutionconsensus among the Bangladesh leaders about the adoption of parliamentarygovernment.The groups espous- ing the view that the salvation of the poverty-strikenmasses could be accomplishedonly througha social revolutionon the Chinese model acquired arms and ammunitionduring the liberationwar. Afterhav- ing recruitedcadres fromthe frustratedyoungMukti Bahini members, thesegroupsemergedas strongforceschallengingthe Sheikh MAujibur Rahman (Sheikh Mujib) governmentand questioning the suitability of the Westernparliamentarysystemas a catalystforradical economic reforms.Moreover,while Sheikh Mujib was able to rouse mass senti- mentfora nationalistrevolution,he proved unequal to the more chal- lengingtask of runningthe problem-riddennew state.As the polariza- tion betweenhis centristAwami League (AL)and the radical revolu- tionariesbecome more seriousby the end of 1974,1Sheikh Mujib gave up the facade of parliamentarygovernmentand resortedto the device of a one-partydictatorshipand totalitariancontrol.This touchedoffa chain of armycoups afterAugust 15, 1975,which in the ultimateana- lysisseem to have furthersharpenedthe ideological cleavagesin Bang- ladesh. The ConstitutionalCoup of January25, 1975: The Introductionof a PresidentialOne-partySystem The author learned fromauthoritativesources that the idea of a single-partysystemwas firstsold to Sheikh Fazlul HuqMoni (Sheikh 1 For a detailed study of the polarization of the Awami League and the radical parties,see T.Maniruzzaman,"Bangladesh: An UnfinishedRevolution?", The Jour- nal of Asian Studies, XXXIV:4,August 1975, pp. 891-911. 119 This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions120TALUKDER MANINUZZAMAN Mujib's nephewand Chairmanof theAwami Jubo [Youth] League) and to MionsoorAli (the Home Ministerin the Mujib cabinet) by the em- bassy of the most powerfulsocialiststate. The pressureof the radical opposition, constantprodding by Sheikh Fazlul HuqMoni(Sheikh Moni), Monsoor Ali and other pro-Moscowleaders,and Mujib's own proclivityfor total power and his desire to subordinatethe admini- strators(most of whom had been recruitedby Pakistan) to his party cadres,all propelled Mujib into the decision to introducea one-party system. On January25, 1975,on the initiativeof Sheikh Mujib and against the privatesentimentsof the majorityof the membersof parliament belongingto the Awami League, the Constitutionwas amended to pro- vide fora presidentialformof government.The Presidentwas author- ized to formone "National Party" and to suspend the activitiesof all politicalgroupsthat refusedto join the "new" party.The amendment furtherprovided that "Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation" would be the Presidentof the countryfor five years fromthe date of the constitutionalamendment. The constitutionalamendmentbill was passed withoutany reading and discussionin parliament,since the normalrulesof procedureof the House were suspended,and the whole processof amendmentwas com- pleted withinhalf an hour. Thus, as has been the case with many one- partystates,"the single-partypowerwas seized,not grantedby voters."- In his bid to outdo the slogan-mongeringof the revolutionaries,Sheikh Mujib dubbed his constitutionalcoup as a"Second Revolution" to bringabout "the democracyof the exploitingmasses."3 Sheikh Mujib announced on June 6 the constitutionof the Na- tional Party, called the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workersand Peoples' League or BKSAL)and nominatedthe membersof the Party'sExecutiveCommitteeand Cen- tral Committeeas well as the Executive Committeesof the fivewings of the BKSAL. Despite Sheikh Mujib's repeatedappeals to all political parties to join the BKSAL,the radical parties [i.e., the partyled by Serajul Alam Khan as well as its frontorganization,the Jatio Sanaj- trantricDal(JSD);the Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Party (East Bengal CommunistParty) whose leader Siraj Sikdar had been arrestedand killed in the firstweek of January1975; the Purbo Bangla Sammobadi Dal-Marxbadi-Leninbadi(East Bengal CommunistParty-Marxist-Lenin- ist); theEast Pakistan CommunistParty-Marxist-Leninist, and the Ban- gladesh Communist Party (Leninist)] abstained from joiningthe BKSAL. The pro-Moscowfactions,of course,hailed the formationof the BKSAL.But only a few of theirleaders were included in the party's 115-memberCentral Committee.The Supremebody of the BKSAL- 2 "Power to Mlujib's Private Army,"Far EasternEconomnicReview, 87:2, Janu- ary 10, 1975. 3 The author and one of his colleagues were the only two persons present in the visitors' gallery during the session of Parliament on January 25, 1975. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH121 the ExecutiveCommittee-consistedof SheikhMujib as Chairmanand 14 othermembers,all of whomwere close followersof Mujib and, with one exception,prominentleaders of the formerAwami League. The General Secretariesand a majorityof the membersof the Executive Committeesof the fivewingsof the partynominatedby Sheikh Mujib were allformerleaders of the ALand AL-affiliatedlabor, student, youth,peasant and women's organizations.An analysisof the compo- sition of the various committeesthus showed that BKSALwas in fact the Awami League under a differentname. The formationof the BKSAL was followedby otherauthoritarian measures.All newspaperswere broughtunder governmentalmanage- ment.Through a PresidentialOrdinance on June 21, 61 districtswere created by breakingup the existing 19 districts.On July 16, Sheikh Mujib announced the names of 61 governor-designateswho were to take over districtadministrationon September1, 1975. The governor- designateswere given special political trainingstartingJuly21 which was to continueuntil August 16. The plan was to place half a battalion of theJatioRakkhiBahini (the JRB or "National SecurityForce," with recruitsdrawn mainlyfromorganizationsaffiliatedwith the AL) under each governor,while thegovernorswere to be directlyunder the control of PresidentMujib. It was furtherplanned that the JRB units would be increasedannually so that by the end of 1980 the total strengthof whatwas in facta partymilitiawould be 130,000.One regimentof JRB would than be placed under the commandof each governor.4 The BKSAL Committeemembersand districtgovernor-designates were selected by Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh Moni, Abdur RabSarniabad (aMinister in Mujib'sCabinet, Mujib'sbrother-in-lawandSheikh Moni's father-in-law)-thehard-coreof the political elite since Sheikh Mujib's return to Bangladesh in January 1972. As time passed, the BKSALleaders began to equate the party with the state. It seemed obvious that the new systemof "copying the Soviet methodsbut re- jecting its ideology" was designed to suppresseveryvestigeof opposi- tion and perpetuatethe corruptrule of the "Sheikh MUjibTribe" in the "softest"statein the world. The Coup of August 15 - Sheikh Mujib's blueprint for total control had one lacuna. He completelyoverlooked the possible reaction ofthe regular armed forces(i.e., other than the JRB) to the new system.With his inflated ego and obsessionwith the leftists,he brushedaside the suggestionof the pro-Moscowleaders and Sheikh Moni to take some precautionary measuresagainsta possible armycoup. 4 TheJRB officerswere initially trained by Indian army officersin their head- quiartersat Savar near Dacca.Because of the growing anti-Indian sentimentwithin Bangladesh, however, the venue of training for the JRBofficerswaschanged to Dehra Dun-India'sSandhurst. Thefirstgroup of JRB officerswas flown to Dehra Dunin July 1974. Far Eastern Econom7zicReview, January 10, 1975. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions122TALUKDER MANINUZZAMAN The Bangladesh armed forceswere about 55,000 strong;of these, approximately28,000 (including 1100 officers)were repatriatesfrom Pakistanwhile the restconsistedof soldiersof what had been the East Bengal Regimentpriorto 1971 and selectedrecruitsfromthe guerrillas and sector-troopsof the Liberation Armyof 1971. For a number of reasons,most of the armypersonnelwere rabidly anti-Indian.Almost all membersof the armed forceswho had belonged to the Liberation Armyhad the feelingthat the Indian Army "just walked in Bangla- desh, when we had alreadyfinishedthe job," thus robbing the Libera- tion Armyof the gloryof liberatingBangladesh.The poorlyequipped armedforceswere also bitterabout the fact that the Indian Armytook away to India all the sophisticatedweapons and vehiclescapturedfrom the PakistanArmyforceswhen theysurrenderedin December 1971. The anti-Indiansentimenton the part of the armed forcesgrad- ually developed an anti-Mujib orientation.The yearly budget provi- sion forthe armed forceswas quite slimi.In successiveannual budgets since 1972, only about 13% of total expenditureswere allocated for defense.The armed forcesfurthercomplained that most of this mod- est allocationwas spenton buyingarms and ammunitionfor the JRB, whose patriotismwas suspectedby the regularforces.The plan to in- crease the strengthof the JRB fromabout 25,000 in 1975 to 130,000 in 1980, while recruitmentto the regular armed forceswas virtually stopped,aroused the hostilityof the latter to the Mujib government. The officersand soldiersrepatriatedfromWest Pakistan also resented the factthat theywere not paid a salary for the 18 months theyhad spent in "concentrationcamps" in Pakistan before being repatriated to Bangladesh.Sheikh Mujib furtheralienated the officersof the armed forcesby demotingand sackingseveralarmyofficerson the prompting of some AL leaders who had personal scoresto settlewith the officers concerned.Thus, in 1975, anyone talkingto the jawans(soldiers) and officerscould easily feel that, given resolute leadership,the armywas preparedat any momentto topple the Mujib government. The details of the bloody coup stagedin the earlyhoursof August 15 are well-knownin the political circlesof Dacca. Three dismissedof- ficersof the army in collaborationwith 90 to 30 majors and captains (all in theirlate twentiesor early thirties)of the two battalions (tank and artillery)of the armoredcorps of the Bangladesharmy,)supported by about 1400 soldiers,made simultaneousattackson the residencesof Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh Moni and Abdur Rab Sarniabad. Afterhaving eliminatedthe "Sheikhdynasty,"a smallrebel force occupied the radio stationat Dacca and announced the killing of Sheikh Mujib and the "fendof theera of tyranny." The remaining forcessurroundedthe JRB 5 TheBangladesh army had only 33 tanks, three of them left-oversof the Pak- istan armyand 30 Soviet-madetanks that had been bought fromEgypt. Theartillery had only some World War IItype heavy guns that were given to Bangladesh by In- dia in response to the demand by the Bangladesh governmentfor the return of the arms surrenderedby the Pakistan army and taken as "booty" to India by the Indian forcesafter December 16, 1971. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH123 headquarters.Lacking armor and artillery,the JRB surrendered.At 11 a.m., KhondokharMushtaq Ahmed, the Foreign Trade Ministerin the Mujib cabinet,told the nation over the radio that the armed forces had taken over,and that in responseto "historicnecessity"he had as- sumed the Presidentshipof the country. The news of the putsch that overthrewand killed Sheikh Mujib was firstbrokento the world by the State Departmentin Washington, quoting its Dacca Embassy.6Pakistanwas the firstcountryto recognize the Mushtaqgovernment,only afew hoursafterthe coup.7Saudi Arabia, which had withheldrecognitionof Bangladesh fornearlyfour years,recognizedthe new governmenton the day afterthe coup.8 Ac- cordingto one report,"Chinese and Indian forcesclashed in the wake of the August 15 coup. -.. China had re-inforcedits Sino-Indian bor- der garrisonson hearingthe news of the move against the Sheikh.... Themove paid off: the anti-Mujib forcesswiftlyconsolidated their grip on Bangladesh and Daccaand Peking establisheddiplomatic re- lations."9 Taheruddin Thakur, Minister of State, Informationand Broadcastingin the Mujib government,emerged as the second-most importantman in the post-coupMushtaq government.Thecircum- stancialevidence,thus,givessome credibilityto the thesisthat the Au- gust 15 coup was preplanned and that Mushtaq and Thakur had col- laboratedwith the disgruntledofficersof the armyto bring about the coup with the knowledgeand supportof certainforeignpowers. Post-coup Bangladesh The new governmentheaded by PresidentMushtaq retained ten of the eighteenMinistersand eightof the nine Ministersof stateof the Mujib government.There was no resistanceat all fromthe people. In the firstfewdays the situationat the top remainedfluid,with the ma- jors who led the coup stayingwithPresidentMushtaq at Banga Bhavan guarded by tanks,while the sullen seniorofficersremainedin the Can- tonment.The fearof an Indian intervention,however,had a sobering effecton both the leaders of the coup and senior officers,and negotia- tions went on between them. Inthe second week after the coup, a major reshufflingin the armytook place. Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, theDeputyChiefof Staff,replacedMajor-GeneralSafiullahas the Chief of Staffof the Army.Some of the seniorofficersand manyof the junior officerswere promoted.A revolutionarycouncil consistingof the five majors who had led the coup and senior officersof the defenseforces was formed.While the Mushtaq governmentcarried on the civil ad- ministration,the revolutionarycouncil devoted itself to the task of 6 See "Bangladesh's New Friends," New Statesman,August 22, 1975, p. 217. 7SeeThe Daily Ittefaq (Decca), August 16, 1975. Pakistan soon after donated $50 million worth of rice and cloth. 8SeeThe Bangladesh Times (Dacca),August 17, 1975. 9FarEastern Economic Review, October 31, 1975, p. 5. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions124TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN national security,recoveryof unauthorizedarms, ananti-corruption driveand the like. TheMushtaq governmentdropped the district reorganization scheme and ordered the retentionof the original 19 districtswith DeputyCommissionersas the head of the districtadministration.Pres- ident Mushtaq promulgatedordinances banning political parties,re- pealed the part of the constitutionwhich provided for one National party,and dissolvedthe BKSAL. Thirty-twopersons-six Ministersof the Mujib government,ten MP's (including TajuddinAhmed), four civil servants,one educationistand twelvebusinessmenwere arrested on chargesof misuseof power and corruptionunder the Maritial Law Regulations. OnOctober 3, President Mushtaq announced that the parliamentarysystemof governmentwould be restored,political activi- tieswould be revivedfromAugust 15, 1976 and generalelectionswould be held on February28, 1977. Coup of November 3 All theradical partiesin Bangladeshinitiallywelcomed the change of governmentand congratulatedthe "patrioticsection of the armed forces"which broughtabout the overthrowof the Mujib regime.They were particularlyjubilant over the Chinese recognitionof Bangladesh on August 31. But soon aftertheybegan to complain about the con- tinued detentionof political prisonersbelongingto the leftistparties. The JSD condemned the rightistorientationof the Mushtaq cabinet and called for the ousting of the civilian cabinet. Thepro-Mujib and pro-Moscowgroups were at firstcompletelybewildered and terrified by the killingof Sheikh Mujib, but soon began to work for a backlash in favorof Mujib. On October 16, when PresidentMushtaq met the membersof the National Assembly,the vast majorityof the members made blisteringattacks on the "murderersof Bangabandhu." Shortly thereafter,the pro-Mujib labor leaders fomentedlabor unrest in the AdamjeeJute Miills which ledto the killing of several workers b.y thie forceson duty. On October 23, leafletsblaming the Mushtaq govern- mentforthe killing of Sheikh Mujib and the workersin the Adamjee Jute Mills were distributedwidely in Dacca.Soon other leafletsfol- lowed demanding the punishmentof the "Killers of Sheikh Mujib" and the restorationof constitutionalgovernmentby the release of the arrestedBKSAL leaders. On November 3, several senior officersled by Brigadier Khaled Musharrafstageda second coup. In support of the new coup leaders,a processionconsistingmainly of leaders and studentsof pro-Moscow groups was taken out from the DaccaUniversitycampus to Sheikh Mujib's formerresidence to observe "Bangabandhu Memorial Day." The leadersof the November3 coup negotiatedwith PresidentMush- taq, and allowed a safe passage to Bangkok for the 15 militaryofficers This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH125 who were widelyknown to be connectedwith the August 15 coup.'0 BrigadierKhaled Musharrafwas promotedto the rank of Major-Gen- eral and appointed Chief of the ArmyStaffin place of Major-General Ziaur Rahman, who was reportedto have resignedearlier.The leaders of the November3 coup and theirsupporters,however,lost heartwhen the news spread in the eveningof November4 that the fourleaders of theBKSAL-TajuddinAhmed, SyedNazrulIslam,MonsoorAli and A. H.M. Kamruzzaman-were found dead in the Dacca Central Jail. However, on November 5, Khaled Musharrafand his associates forcedMushtaq to hand over the presidencyto the ChiefJusticeof the SupremeCourt,A. M. Sayem. "Sepoy Revolution" of November 7 In the meantimeleafletswere circulatedamong the jawans of the Armyat the Dacca Cantonmentby the JSD and Sammobadi Dalac- cusing Khaled Musharrafof being a paid agent of the Indian govern- ment, describingthe November 3 coup as an attemptby the Delhi- Moscow axis to reestablishtheir controlover Bangladesh, and urging the jawans to revoltagainst Khaled Musharraf.The JSD had already establishedsome cells of their militaryfront-the Biplobi Gono Ba- hini (RevolutionaryPeoples' Army)-in the army,and the jawans be- longing to this organizationtook the lead in organizing,at midnight of November6, a Sepoy (Soldiers') Revolution. Thejawans of Dacca Cantonmentin a body revoltedagainst Khaled Musharrafand his as- sociates. Khaled Musharrafwas killed while tryingto flee from the Cantonment.The jawans thenfreedZiaur Rahman who had been kept under house arrest.In the earlyhours of November7, the jawans came out in the cityon tanks,trucks,jeeps, and buses, firingblank shots in the air to celebratethe victoryof the "nationalist" forces.Thousands of people fromall strataof societygreetedthemwith wild jubilation and joined the jawans in shoutingslogans-"Bangladesh Zindabad," "General Zia Zindabad" and "Sepoy Revolution Zindabad." By the evening of November 7, things took amore organized shape. Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman was reinstalledas the Chief of Staffof the Bangladesharmy.Mushtaq in a radio broadcastpraised the "unparalleledrevolutionin defenceof independenceand sovereigntyof Bangladesh" and urged the continuationof JusticeSayem as "a non- political and non-partisan"Presidentof the country.PresidentSayem became the Chief Martial Law Administratorand the threeChiefs of Serviceswere appointed as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators. The new governmentdeclared that electionswould be held according to the schedule earlier announced by the Mushtaq government.Soon a nine-memberCouncil of Advisersto the President,consistingof the 10 All but one of these officerslater went to Libya. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions126TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators,three educationists, one formercivil servant,one doctorand one femalesocial worker,was set up. The advisersweregiven the rank of Ministersand the President allocated responsibilitiesforMinistriesand divisionsamong them. Crackdownon the JSD: Possiblybecause of the role of the JSD in or- ganizing the Sepoy Revolution,the Sayem governmentreleased M. A. Jalil and A. S. M. Abdur Raband some other JSD leaders who had been imprisonedduring the Mujib regime.The JSD leaders,however, called for an "uninterruptedrevolution"under the leadershipof the Biplobi Gono Bahini. Through leafletsand theircells in the army,the JSD leaders urgedjawans to formBiplobi Sainik Parishad (Association of RevolutionarySoldiers) units with a four-pointprogramof action: (1) removalof differencesbetweenofficersand jawans; (2) discontinua- tion of the use of jawans for privatehousehold worksby the officers; (3) the classificationof J.C.O.s co-operatingwith officersas anti-revolu- tionaryelements;and (4) non-surrenderof arms by the jawans until the above-mentioneddemands were met. TheJSD-sponsoredleaflets also chargedthat Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, who had been "freed" by the revolutionaryjawans, was being led in anti-revolutionarydirec- tions by "the rightistre-actionariesand pro-U.S.A. elements."These activitiesof theJSD instigatedthejawans to take action againstofficers, includingthekillingof severalin theDacca and Rangpur Cantonments. In a statement,the newlyfreedJSD leaders,M. A. Jalil and A. S. M. Abdur Rab, urgedthe formationof "revolutionarycouncils" among the jawans, industrialworkers,peasants and intellectualsto help the Bi- plobi Gono Bahini usherin a proletariatrevolution. Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, however,was able to restoredisci- pline among the bulk of the soldiers." Thegovernmentarrested 19 JSD leaders,includingM. A. Jalil, A. S. M. Abdur Rab, and Colonel Abu Taher (the Chief of the Biplobi Gono Bahini) on November23 and 24. Most of the districtJSD leaders were also reported to have been arrestedon thosetwo days.In a hard hittingspeech over the radio inthe early hours of November 25, Major-General Ziaur Rahman warned the "foreignagentsengaged in conspiracyagainstour indepen- dence."'12 All the otherradical partiesissued leafletsaccusingthe JSD leaders of being covertIndian agents and of destroyingthe Bangladesh front line of defenseby killing trainedarmyofficersand creatingdissension among the soldiers.The JSD leadersreplied thatBangladeshcould not be defendedby the poorlyequipped Bangladesharmed forces,but only throughthe revolutionaryunityof the oppressedclasses who formed 11 A tiny minorityof soldiers who joined Khaled Musharrafreportedlydeserted the army,taking along their arms. 12 SeeTheBangladesh Times, November 25, 1975. According to unconfirmed reports,the BiplobiGono Bahiniwith the help of their supporters inthe Army planned a coup on the night of November 24. But the coup bid was foiled and two dissident battalions were disarmed on November 24. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH127 95% of the people of the country.The JSD leaders assertedthat their partywas the truenationalistpartyof the proletariat,and chargedthat the other "so-called" revolutionaryparties had been behaving in the patternof various "pseudo revolutionary"parties of Russia who had accused Lenin of being a Germanagentbeforethe October Revolution of 1917. Themain targetof the radical parties' attack,Sirajul Alam Khan, the leader of the undergroundorgan of the JSD, and his under- ground cadres,however,escaped arrest. Trendsin BangladeshEconomy The economic condition of Bangladesh improvedsignificantlyin the year 1975 fromthe totallydismal picture that had prevailed in 1974. By January1975 the price of rice (the staple food in Bangladesh) had risenby 500% over the 1969-70 level. By Julythe price came down to 300%. FromJulyto Septemberthe price of rice fell by another37% and the cost of livingindex fell by 9%O.During the same period money supplydeclinedby 3.5% and bank depositsby 5.6%.13 Declining trends in the priceof rice,the costof livingindex, the moneysupplyand bank depositscontinuedin the monthsfollowingSeptember. Themost importantreason for the downward trend in the con- sumer-priceand cost-of-livingindices has been the good harvestin 1975 -ayear which was not marked by the vagaries of nature such as drought,floodsand cyclones.It was estimatedthata totalof 13.6 million tonsof foodgrains,including200,000tons of wheat,would be produced by the end of the year. As the yearlyrequirementof foodgrainsfor Bangladeshis about 12.8 million tons,therewill be a surplusof 800,000 tons. Besides, 1.3 tons of foodgrainshave already been received from abroad as aids, loans and grants,and another 700,000 tons are in the pipeline. Thus, the total surplusof food grainsin 1975 should be about 2.8 million tons.14The secondimportantreason forthe improvementin economicconditionsin 1975 was the variousfiscalmeasuresadopted by the governmentto check the run-awayinflationthat had plagued the Bangladesh economysince liberation.First,the governmentfromthe beginningof 1975 adopted a"credit squeeze" policy. Secondly, the governmentin April 1975 demonitized100-Taka notes and thus drove some "black money" out of circulation.Thirdly, the governmentre- duced customduties on certainessentialconsumergoods. Anotherfac- tor in the improvementof economic conditionsin Bangladesh was the reductionin the scale of smuggling. Here again the dernonitizationof 100-Taka notes destroyed,to some extent,the "black money" in the hands of the smugglerson both sides of the border.More importantly, since the August 15 coup, the smugglersin Bangladesh have lost the patronageof powerfulcirclesin the former Mujib government. 13 Thefigureswere supplied to the author by A. N. A. Rahim, Economic Ad- viser, Bangladesh Bank, Dacca. 14 The Daily Ittefaq, November 25, 1975.ffl This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions128TALUKDER MANINUZZAMAN Primarilybecause of the devaluationof the Taka as of May 17, ex- port earningsin the firstquarterof the 1975-76 financialyear rose by 24% over the figuresforthe same period in 1974-75. Productionin all industries,with the importantexceptionof the jute industry,went up significantlyin the last half of 1975 over the correspondingperiod in 1974. However,a self-reliantBangladeshis still a distantprospect.The trade deficitin 1975-76 is estimated at about 1000 million dollars, which has to be made up by foreignloans, grantsand aids. Thetotal commitmentof foreigneconomic assistance to Bangladesh for 1975 was about 1279.712million dollars (including 439.464 million dollars in food aid).15The newspaperreportsindicated that theseaid commit- mentswere maintained and that since the August 15 coup, freshaid commitmentsfor futureyearswere being successfullynegotiated. Foreign Relations: Living withIndia There has been a "new thrust"in the foreignpolicyof Bangladesh since the August 15 coup. It was widely known that, contraryto the declared policy of non-alignment,the Mujib governmentwas closely allied withDelhi and Moscow. The recognitionof the post-coupMush- taq governmentby Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and particularlyChina;16 completeabsence of any referenceto Indian aid in the liberationwar in foreignpolicy statementsby formerpresidentMushtaq and Presi- dent Sayem; the decision by Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and China to exchangediplomaticenvoysat the ambassadorlevel-all these clearlyindicate that Bangladesh wants to come out fromunder the "domination" by the Indo-Sovietaxis. New Delhi, however,made no secretof its disapprovalof the first coup of August 15 and its welcomeof the second coup of November3; nor is it disguisingits anxieties over the November 7 coup.17 That India can fomentdisorderand subversionwithinBangladesh has been a constantconcern to the Bangladesh governmentand people. There have been reportsthat New Delhi has been helping pro-Mujib and pro-Sovietforces(who had crossedthe border into India afterthe Au- gust 15 coup) in making preparations for launching anotherguerrilla war in Bangladesh.Kader Siddiqui, a toughguerrillaleader of the 1971 liberationstruggle,is reportedto have occupied four border posts in Mymensingh districtwith the help of Indianartillery.Siddiqui is reportedto have sent messagesto pro-Mujib groups in Daccathat he would "liberate" Bangladesh by December 1975. It is, however,quite unlikely that the people would give spontaneous and unstintedsup- 15 Figures supplied by USAIDoffice,Dacca.Eighty percent of the foreigneco- nomic assistance to Bangladesh was committedby internationalaid agencies and the Bangladesh AidClub.Theremaining 20%wasfrom MiddleEastern Countries, Eastern Countries and the Socialist Bloc. 16 China also contractedto import 14,000 tons of raw jute from Bangladesh. 17 The Bulletin (Sidney), November 22, 1975, p. 45. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsBANGLADESH129 port to pro-Indianguerrillasthis time as theydid in 1971. The wide- spread anti-Indianfeelingin Bangladeshis likelyto preventIndia from takingdirectmilitaryaction in Bangladesh,but at the same time the compulsionsof geographywill have amoderatinginfluenceonthe Bangladesh government,which will seek to avoid overt hostilityto- wards India.18 To sum up, at the end of 1975 Bangladeshenteredinto a period of greateruncertaintythan was the case under the Mujib regime.With the removalof the charismaticleadershipof Sheikh Mujib, conflicting political forcesare takingdefiniteshape. There is the likelihood of a coalition betweenthe formerIslamic partiesand the right-wingof the formerAL. The pro-Mujib and pro-Moscowgroups are also likely to work togetherto seek the covertsupport of India to capture power. The pro-Chineseradical parties other than the JSD are likely to sup- port the presentgovernmentled by nationalist army officersfor the time being,while the JSD will probably follow a 'go it alone' policy. Except for the rightists,all the other groups possess arms and would not hesitate to use these to capture power if the opportunityshould arise. Thepost-coupgovernmentshave been tryingto recover these undergroundarms.If thisprogramfails,freeelectionscan not be held and a civiliangovernmentcan not be restored.19It is probable that the presentmilitarygovernmentwill continueto be harassedby insurgent groups backed by India and by the guerrillaoperationsof the Biplobi Gono Bahini. Moreover,the stabilityof the presentmilitaryregimeit- self mightbe affectedby the personal ambitionsof senior officersand factionalismin the armed forcesbetween the "repatriates"and "free- dom fighters." 18 Thereportsthat a "live grenade" was found in the Indian High Commission officeand, afew days later, that the Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh was wounded led to fairlystrongverbal reactions in New Delhi. There was some appre- hension in Bangladesh that these indidents would beused to justify overt Indian intervention.But to date (mid-December 1975), New Delhi would seem to be playing a waiting game to see if a relationshipthat protectsIndia's basic interestin this area can be established with the new Bangladesh regime. 19 Since the August 15 coup, the governmenthas arrested about 6,000 persons possessing illegalarms andrecovered hugequantities of sophisticated arms and ammunition. Thedrive against unauthorized arms continues. TALUKDERMANIRUZZAMANis Professorof Political Science of the University of Dacca, Bangladesh. This content downloaded from 84.255.189.149 on Wed, 12 Aug 2015 20:30:06 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions