banning anti-personnel mines - icrc

BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

THE OTTAWA TREATY EXPLAINED

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THE OTTAWA TREATY1 EXPLAINED

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) acts to help all victims

of war and internal violence, attempting to ensure implementation of

humanitarian rules restricting armed violence. The ICRC has called on all

States worldwide to adhere to the Ottawa treaty, which bans the production,

stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines.

For more information about mines and the Ottawa treaty, consult the ICRC

Web site at www.icrc.org

International Committee of the Red CrossMines-Arms Unit19 Avenue de la Paix1202 Geneva, SwitzerlandT +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57E-mail: [email protected]

© ICRC, 1998

1 The official title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction.

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THE OTTAWA TREATY 1 EXPLAINED

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

1. The landmine problem and progress towards a ban treaty 2

1.1 The need for a ban treaty 2

1.2 The existing law 3

1.3 The Ottawa process 4

2. The Ottawa treaty 5

2.1 What is an anti-personnel mine? 5

2.2 The elements of a comprehensive ban treaty 52.2.1 An end to use 62.2.2 A prohibition on development and production 62.2.3 A prohibition on stockpiling 62.2.4 A prohibition on transfer 62.2.5 Other prohibited activities 6

2.3 Addressing the problem: mine clearance and assistance to victims 72.3.1 Clearing mined areas 72.3.2 Assisting the victims 8

2.4 Entry into force 8

2.5 Ensuring compliance with the treaty 82.5.1 Reporting on implementation 82.5.2 Settling disputes 92.5.3 Resolving doubts about compliance 92.5.4 National efforts to prevent violations 92.5.5 Reviewing implementation of the treaty 102.5.6 Strengthening and updating the treaty 10

2.6 Reservations 10

2.7 Withdrawal 10

3. Beyond the Ottawa treaty 11

Annex I: Glossary of legal and technical terms 12

Annex II: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Minesand on Their Destruction 13

Annex III: List of Signatories as at 1 March 1999 21

The Ottawa treaty is part of the international responseto the humanitarian crisis caused by the globalproliferation of anti-personnel mines. Millions ofthese deadly weapons are already contaminatingmore than 70 countries, creating one of the mostserious man-made problems of our time. Their long-term impact upon individuals, communities, andentire societies is startling. Recognizing the serious-ness of the problem, countries from all regions ofthe world voluntarily came together in 1997 andnegotiated the Ottawa treaty, an international agree-ment comprehensively banning the development,production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines, and requiring their destruction. Thistreaty is an outstanding achievement because it marksthe first time that countries --- through internationalhumanitarian law --- have agreed to ban completely aweapon already in widespread use. In setting a clear

international standard against anti-personnel mines,the Ottawa treaty represents a decisive first step in thelong-term goal of addressing the scourge of land-mines and clearing the world of these horrificweapons.

This paper provides a brief overview of the landmineproblem, the ‘‘Ottawa process’’ and the content of theOttawa treaty. It is not intended to be a record of thenegotiating history or a commentary on the legalaspects or implications of the treaty. Rather, itpresents and explains the treaty’s major elementsand accomplishments. It has been written with thenon-specialist in mind and is therefore not overlyburdened with international legal terminology. Whereuse of such terminology has been unavoidable, thespecific word or phrase is underlined and is explainedin a glossary at the end. A copy of the treaty is alsoattached for information.

INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

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1.1 The need for a ban treaty

Landmines are powerful and unforgiving devices.Unlike other weapons of war, most of which must beaimed and fired, anti-personnel landmines are‘‘victim’’ actuated. That is, they are designed to bedetonated by a person stepping on or handling thedevice, or by disturbing a tripwire attached to it.2

Once emplaced, anti-personnel mines are indiscrimi-nate in their effects and, unless removed or deto-nated, long lasting. Even today, landmines laid duringthe SecondWorldWar continue to be discovered and,on occasion, to kill or wound, more than 50 yearsafter the end of the conflict. Landmines cannot‘‘distinguish’’ between the soldier and the civilian.They kill or maim a child playing football just asreadily as a soldier on patrol. Especially in post-conflict societies, it is most often the civilian goingabout his or her daily activities that is the unfortunatevictim.

While all war wounds are horrific, the injuries inflictedby anti-personnel mines are particularly severe. Theseweapons are designed to kill, or, more often, todisable permanently their victims. They are specifi-cally constructed to shatter limbs and lives beyondrepair. The detonation of a buried anti-personnel‘‘blast’’ mine rips off one or both legs of the victim anddrives soil, grass, gravel, metal, the plastic fragmentsof the mine casing, pieces of the shoe, and shatteredbone up into the muscles and lower parts of the body.Thus, in addition to the traumatic amputation of thelimb, there is a serious threat of secondary infection.As wounds such as these are not often seen by civiliandoctors, treating a mine-injured patient can be achallenge to the most competent surgeon.

If they survive a landmine blast, the victims typicallyrequire multiple operations and prolonged rehabili-tative treatment. Unfortunately, most mine accidentsoccur in countries with limited medical and rehabi-litative resources. Access to proper treatment and careis thus difficult or impossible. Moreover, transporta-tion to a medical facility immediately following anaccident is often arduous. In some countries it maytake victims between six and 24 hours to get to ahospital capable of treating them. Many die beforereaching any medical facility.

Following the provision of medical care, most minevictims will require extensive rehabilitative treatment.Not only must amputees be fitted with artificial limbs

to ensure mobility, but their loss of dignity and theirpsychological distress must also be addressed. Fewsurvivors have access to such long-term care andassistance programmes. Even if rehabilitated, manyvictims are disabled, cannot work or provide for theirfamilies, and are likely to suffer intense anxiety, withlittle hope of improving their situation.

In addition to the devastating impact on individuallives, mines also have severe social and economicconsequences, particularly for a country attempting torebuild after the end of an armed conflict. Thepresence of mines can leave large portions of thenational territory unusable. Farmland, grazing pas-tures and other food-producing areas may berendered inaccessible and, as a result, the ability ofa community to feed itself is impaired. Mined roadsand railways make the movement of persons andgoods, including the delivery of humanitarian aid,extremely difficult. Mine clearance, although essen-tial, is a slow, dangerous and expensive process.

Although international humanitarian law and tradi-tional military doctrine have set clear requirements forthe ‘‘responsible’’ use of anti-personnel mines, toooften these rules have not been implemented.Research conducted on behalf of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by military expertshas shown that in 26 conflicts since the beginning ofthe Second World War, anti-personnel mines haveonly rarely been deployed in accordance with theexisting legal and military requirements. Even well-trained professional armies have found it extremelydifficult to use mines correctly in combat situations.Furthermore, mines have increasingly been used aspart of a brutal and systematic war against civilians,especially in the bitter internal conflicts that havecome to characterize warfare in the late twentiethcentury.

It is these tragic realities which make the anti-personnel mine a particularly abhorrent weaponand which have led the ICRC and many otherorganizations and individuals to call for its prohibitionand stigmatization. The use of poison gas andexploding bullets has already been stigmatized andcondemned by the international community. Both areweapons of war that are considered as violating themost basic principles of humanity however andwhenever they are used. Now, with the adoption ofthe Ottawa treaty, anti-personnel mines will also be

1. THE LANDMINE PROBLEM AND PROGRESSTOWARDS A BAN TREATY

2 Anti-vehicle mines, on the other hand, are designed to be detonated by the weight of a vehicle. When left on roadways that are not used solely by militarypersonnel, they also take their toll on civilian lives and injuries. Anti-vehicle mines are discussed further below, see p. 6.


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considered as a weapon which carries a level ofhumanitarian costs that far outweighs their limitedmilitary value.

1.2 The existing law

In 1990, the ICRC and other humanitarian organiza-tions began to document a dramatically high numberof civilian mine casualties. Many of the victims werewounded during periods when no fighting was takingplace or after the end of hostilities. Subsequently, theICRC, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societiesand the International Campaign to Ban Landmines(ICBL) --- an international coalition of non-govern-mental organizations --- began efforts to raise aware-ness about the devastating effects of these weaponsand press for an end to their use. During the yearsleading up to the conclusion of the Ottawa treaty in1997, these efforts were the dominant force inmobilizing public opinion, stimulating military andpolitical debate, and ensuring that the plight of thevictims and communities living under the threat oflandmines was not forgotten.

The use of anti-personnel landmines is restricted byinternational law, specifically international humani-tarian law, which contains several general rulesapplicable to these weapons. Two of the mostimportant provisions are derived from the customaryrules of warfare and are consequently binding on allsides in every situation of armed conflict:

a) Parties to a conflict must always distinguishbetween civilians and combatants, and civiliansmust not be attacked. In accordance with thisprinciple, any weapon that is inherently indis-criminate must never be used.

b) It is prohibited to use weapons which are ‘‘of anature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessarysuffering’’. This means that any weapon designedto cause more injury than required to take asoldier ‘‘out of action’’ (i.e. one intended to inflictgratuitous suffering), even when directed solelyagainst combatants, is unlawful and must not beused.

In addition to these general customary rules, moredetailed provisions specific to anti-personnel minesare contained in various international agreements.Prior to the conclusion of the Ottawa treaty, theprincipal agreement governing the use of landmines

was the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conven-tional Weapons (CCW).3 Protocol II of this treatyspecifically regulates mines, booby-traps and otherdevices. Since this is an international legal agreement,as opposed to international customary law, it appliesonly to those countries which agree to be bound by itsterms.

As the civilian impact of landmines grew moreapparent, it became evident that existing provisionsof the CCW were too weak and were not beingadequately followed in many of the recent conflictswhere mines were being used. Following a formalrequest by France in 1993, governments agreed tomeet and review the treaty and, in particular, tostrengthen the provisions of Protocol II dealing withanti-personnel mines. Following two years of meet-ings of government experts in Geneva, the ReviewConference of the CCW opened in Vienna inSeptember 1995. Hopes were high that substantialand meaningful prohibitions and restrictions onlandmines would be agreed by the governmentstaking part in the negotiations. However, although theConference successfully adopted a new protocolbanning the use and transfer of blinding laserweapons, talks to prohibit or strictly limit theproduction, transfer and use of anti-personnel minesbecame deadlocked and the conference was ad-journed without any new limitations being placed onthese weapons.

The Review Conference was reconvened in Genevafor two sessions in 1996. Although this time changesto the mines protocol were agreed upon, the ICRC,the ICBL and many governments considered theresults disappointing and inadequate. The provisionsdrafted were extremely complex and many doubtedwhether they would or even could be effectivelyimplemented in most situations of armed conflict.Few believed that the amended protocol would besufficient to stem the proliferation of the weapon andconsequently to reduce the number of civilian land-mine casualties. At the closing session of the ReviewConference, the Canadian government announced itsintention to invite pro-ban countries and interestedorganizations and agencies to attend a conferencelater in the year convened to develop strategies aimedat effectively ending the affliction caused by land-mines. The scene was set for the beginning of whatwould be termed the ‘‘Ottawa process’’.

3 The full title is the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to BeExcessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.


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1.3 The Ottawa process

The Canadian-sponsored strategy conference, To-wards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, tookplace in Ottawa in October 1996 with the activesupport of 50 governments, the ICRC, the ICBL andthe United Nations. On 5 October 1996, the con-ference adopted the Ottawa Declaration, whichcommitted the participants to carrying out a plan ofaction intended to increase resources for mineclearance and victim assistance and to working toensure that a ban treaty was concluded at the earliestpossible date. At the closing of this Conference, theCanadian government once again seized the initiativeby inviting all governments to come to Ottawa inDecember 1997 to sign a treaty prohibiting theproduction, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines. The ‘‘Ottawa process’’ had beenofficially launched.

International support for a ban on landminescontinued to build. In December 1996, the UNGeneral Assembly passed Resolution 51/45S, whichcalled upon all countries to conclude a new interna-tional agreement totally prohibiting anti-personnelmines ‘‘as soon as possible’’. A total of 157 countriesvoted in favour of this resolution, none opposed it,and only 10 abstained from the voting. To support theOttawa process, the Austrian government prepared adraft text of the ban treaty and circulated it tointerested governments and organizations. This draft,which was subsequently revised a number of times,was the basis of the ban treaty concluded in Oslo inSeptember 1997.

International discussion on the draft text began inVienna in February 1997 at a meeting hosted by theAustrian government. In its address to the meeting,the ICRC called for a comprehensive ban treaty basedon an unambiguous definition of an anti-personnelmine. In April 1997, the German government hosted aspecial meeting to discuss possible verificationmeasures to be included in a total ban treaty. Viewswere divided between those who stressed the centralimportance of establishing a humanitarian norm

against anti-personnel mines and others who con-sidered effective verification mechanisms to beessential to the success of the treaty.

The formal follow-up to the 1996 Ottawa conferencetook place in Brussels from 24-27 June 1997. TheBrussels International Conference for a Global Ban onAnti-Personnel Mines was attended by representa-tives of 154 countries. It was the largest gathering ofgovernments to date for a conference devotedspecifically to the issue of landmines. On the closingday, 97 governments signed the Brussels Declaration,launching formal negotiations on a comprehensivelandmine ban treaty, greater international coopera-tion and assistance for mine clearance and thedestruction of all stockpiled and cleared anti-person-nel mines. The Declaration called for the conveningof a diplomatic conference in Oslo to negotiate such atreaty on the basis of the draft prepared by theAustrian government.

In accordance with the Brussels Declaration, whichby now had been signed by 107 countries, formaltreaty negotiations took place from 1 to 18 September1997 at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on anInternational Total Ban on Anti-Personnel LandMines, hosted by the Norwegian government.Ninety-one countries took part in the negotiations asfull participants and 38 countries were present asobservers, as were the ICRC, the ICBL and the UN.

The Oslo Diplomatic Conference proved to be atremendous success. Propelled by its South AfricanChairman, Ambassador Jakob Selebi, on 18 Septem-ber the Conference solemnly adopted the Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Productionand Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on theirDestruction --- the ‘‘Ottawa treaty’’. The treaty wasopened for signature at a ceremony on 3 and 4 De-cember 1997, when representatives from a total of121 countries signed it on behalf of their govern-ments. It came into force on 1 March 1999, the fastestentry into force ever for a multilateral arms-relatedtreaty. An overview of the content of the treaty is setout in the pages that follow.


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While the security of those living in mine-contami-nated regions will remain threatened until the minesare destroyed or removed from the ground, endingthe use of anti-personnel mines is central to efforts tospare future generations from the horror of theseweapons. The Ottawa treaty is an important steptowards this goal because it establishes a compre-hensive ban on the devices. That is, it not onlyprohibits the use of anti-personnel landmines in allsituations, it also forbids their development, produc-tion, stockpiling, and transfer. In addition, it requiresthe destruction of such mines, whether held instockpiles or already emplaced in the ground.

2.1 What is an anti-personnel mine?

The Ottawa treaty only prohibits anti-personnelmines. A distinction is therefore made in the treatybetween mines designed to kill or injure people ---anti-personnel mines --- and those designed to destroytanks or vehicles --- anti-vehicle mines, also com-monly referred to as anti-tank mines. Anti-personnelmines are generally small devices, containing be-tween 10 g and 250 g of explosive substance, that willdetonate under 0.5 kg to 50 kg of pressure. Anti-vehicle mines, on the other hand, are larger than anti-personnel mines, containing between 2 kg and 9 kg ofexplosive, and are normally activated by 100-300 kgof pressure. Generally, the large amount ofpressure needed to activate anti-vehicle mines,combined with the fact that they are used in smallernumbers and are easier to locate, has made them lessof a threat to the civilian population. However, inmany areas anti-vehicle mines placed on roadwaysused by civilians still pose a serious threat to thecivilian population.

The definition of an anti-personnel mine laid down inthe Ottawa treaty (see Art. 2, paras 1 and 2) covers all‘‘person’’-activated mines irrespective of whether theyare placed in the ground in marked minefields orremotely delivered over large areas. It also includesso-called ‘‘smart’’ anti-personnel mines---mines whichhave the capacity to self-destruct or self-deactivate(i.e. mines that are programmed to automaticallyexplode or become inert after a set period of time).

However, owing to recent developments in landminetechnology, the traditional distinction between anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines is becomingblurred. Several types of mines have been developedwhich can be considered to have a ‘‘dual purpose’’.

That is, they are designed to be detonated by bothpeople and vehicles. The treaty prohibits any dual-purpose mine or any anti-vehicle mine if one of itsfunctions is to be detonated by a person. The soleexception to this is an anti-vehicle mine equippedwith an anti-handling device. An anti-handling deviceis a mechanism attached to the mine which causes themine to explode when a person attempts to remove,disturb or tamper with it.4 These mechanisms areincreasingly being fitted to anti-vehicle mines toprevent their removal or clearance and are aparticular danger to soldiers and deminers.

The definition of an anti-personnel mine contained inthe Ottawa treaty is significantly stronger than theformulation found in amended Protocol II to theCCW. The Protocol defines an anti-personnel mine as‘‘a mine primarily designed to be exploded by thepresence, proximity or contact of a person and thatwill incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons’’(emphasis added). The use here of the word‘‘primarily’’ is one of the Protocol’s significant weak-nesses. It creates a major ambiguity in the definition,which could thus be interpreted as excluding ‘‘dual-purpose’’ munitions even if one of the purposes is toserve as an anti-personnel mine. The absence of theword ‘‘primarily’’ in the Ottawa treaty definitionremoves this undesirable ambiguity. The new defini-tion is indeed an important accomplishment of theOttawa process: a clear definition of the weaponbeing prohibited is the foundation of a comprehen-sive ban treaty.

Although not within the ambit of the Ottawa treaty, allanti-vehicle mines capable of detonation only byvehicles or tanks are nonetheless covered by the rulesestablished by customary law and Protocol II to the1980 CCW. Governments must ensure that suchmines, especially when remotely delivered andequipped with anti-handling devices, are usedresponsibly in accordance with international humani-tarian law and established military doctrine.

2.2 The elements of a comprehensive ban treaty

The Ottawa treaty is unique because it seeks toeliminate the anti-personnel mine as a weapon fromthe arsenal of fighting forces. In order to achieve thisgoal, the treaty identifies and prohibits a wide rangeof activities, specifically the development, produc-tion, stockpiling, transfer and use of the weapon. Thiscomprehensive approach is a welcome innovation in

2. THE OTTAWA TREATY

4 Art. 2, para. 3, of the Ottawa treaty defines an anti-handling device as ‘‘a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placedunder the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine’’.


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international humanitarian law. Specifically, the treatyprovides that:

Each State Party undertakes never under anycircumstances:

(a) to use anti-personnel mines;

(b) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire,stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone,directly or indirectly, anti-personnel land-mines;

(c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way,anyone to engage in any activity prohib-ited to a State Party under this Convention(see Art. 1, para. 1).

Each of these elements is briefly explained below.

2.2.1 An end to use

Each country adhering to the Ottawa treaty obligesitself ‘‘never, under any circumstances’’ (empha-sis added) to use anti-personnel landmines. Thisincludes all situations of armed conflict --- whetherbetween countries (international armed conflict) or acivil conflict (internal armed conflict) --- as well astroubles of a lesser intensity commonly referred to asinternal unrest or civil disturbances. All offensive anddefensive usage is prohibited. Moreover, any resort tothe weapon during peacetime is also proscribed. Acountry cannot deploy anti-personnel mines to fortifyits borders as a means of preventing unwantedpersons from entering its territory or to protectimportant military or other installations. In ratifyingthe Ottawa treaty, a country accepts that mines are nolonger a legitimate weapon to be used either inpeacetime or in time of war. There are no exceptionsto this rule.

2.2.2 A prohibition on development and production

The Ottawa treaty prohibits the development andproduction of anti-personnel mines (see Art. 1, para. 1(b)). A country cannot manufacture the devices, norcan it initiate any projects intended to improve currentmodels, develop new models, or generate any suchweapons in the future.

2.2.3 A prohibition on stockpiling

In addition to prohibiting the development, produc-tion and use of anti-personnel mines, the Ottawatreaty precludes a country from stockpiling them (seeArt. 1, para. 1 (b)). A country is not allowed topurchase, procure, or otherwise obtain the devices.

Furthermore, any existing stocks must be destroyedwithin four years of the date on which the treatyenters into force for a given country (see Art. 4). Statesrequiring assistance in order to ensure the destructionof anti-personnel mines within the specified timeperiod may apply to other States Parties to the treatyfor such assistance (see Art. 6).

However, a country is permitted to retain or transfer alimited quantity of mines for training in mine-detection, mine-clearance, and mine-destructiontechniques. The number of mines kept shall notexceed the minimum number absolutely necessaryfor such purposes (see Art. 3, para. 1). At the time ofthe adoption of the treaty in Oslo, a number ofgovernments declared they would retain no morethan a few thousand mines.

2.2.4 A prohibition on transfer

The final component of the comprehensive banestablished by the Ottawa treaty is a prohibition ontransferring anti-personnel mines. A country is notallowed, in any way or under any circumstances, totransfer anti-personnel mines either directly orindirectly. According to the treaty, the term ‘‘ ‘transfer’involves, in addition to the physical movement ofanti-personnel mines into or from national territory,the transfer of title to and control over the mines, butdoes not involve the transfer of territory containingemplaced anti-personnel mines’’ (see Art. 2, para. 4).

The prohibition on transfer covers import and exportas well as transfer of ownership of mines. In order tofacilitate mine detection, destruction and clearance,there are, however, a small number of narrowexceptions to this prohibition. First, countries arepermitted to transfer anti-personnel mines for thepurpose of destruction. Second, they may transfer thelimited number of mines allowed to be retained fortraining purposes. Any other exchange of anti-personnel mines beyond these exceptions is forbid-den. As the definition above makes clear, the transferof territory containing anti-personnel mines does notconstitute a ‘‘transfer’’ of those mines for the purposesof the treaty.

2.2.5 Other prohibited activities

In addition to the prohibitions discussed above, eachcountry agrees never under any circumstances toassist, encourage or induce anyone, whether or notthey are bound by the treaty, to engage in anyprohibited activity. This reinforces the effectiveness of


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the treaty’s comprehensive ban on anti-personnelmines.

2.3 Addressing the problem:mine clearance and assistance to victims

By proscribing the production, stockpiling, transferand use of anti-personnel mines, the Ottawa treatytakes an important step in preventing the futuredeployment of these weapons. Yet, until the millionsof anti-personnel mines already in the ground arecleared and destroyed, these devices will continue topose a serious threat to populations in many regionsof the world.

2.3.1 Clearing mined areas

The Ottawa treaty obliges each State Party to clear allanti-personnel mines already in the ground within aperiod of 10 years following its entry into force for thatcountry. Specifically, the State must destroy all anti-personnel mines in ‘‘mined areas’’ under its jurisdic-tion or control. This covers not only a country’s ownterritory but also territory which it may be occupying.The treaty defines a mined area as:

an area which is dangerous due to thepresence or suspected presence of mines (seeArt. 2, para. 5).

This includes all territory known to contain mines,such as minefields, which are defined areas wherethese weapons have been systematically laid in suchplaces as national borders and tracts around militaryinstallations. It also includes all other public or privateland known or believed to contain the devices. Amine may travel long distances owing to floods or themovement of desert sands. It is irrelevant how themines came to be in a particular area, and a countryassumes responsibility for clearance whether themines were laid by its own military units or by otherforces.

An area is considered to be ‘‘mined’’ if it is thought tocontain either anti-personnel or anti-vehicle/anti-tankmines. Since anti-personnel mines are often used toprevent the removal or deactivation of anti-vehiclemines, if an area is suspected of containing anti-vehicle mines it will often also contain anti-personnelmines. If this is found to be the case, all anti-personnelmines in the area must be destroyed. There is noobligation in the Ottawa treaty to remove or destroythe anti-vehicle mines. However, they remain regu-lated by the relevant provisions of Protocol II to theCCW, which require that as soon as possible after thecessation of active hostilities all mined areas be either

cleared, or marked, fenced and monitored to ensurethe effective exclusion of civilians.

The treaty recognizes that some mine-affectedcountries may not be in a position to clear anddestroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under theirjurisdiction or control within 10 years. Such countriesmay therefore request that the other States Partiesaccord them an extension period of up to 10 years(see Art. 5, para. 3). Requests are to be made at ameeting or review conference of the States Parties andthe decision to grant or reject a request for additionaltime is to be made by a majority of those countriespresent and voting (see Art. 5, para. 5). An extensionperiod may be granted more than once. This offers anopportunity for States requiring assistance to presenttheir case and to seek appropriate help, whether interms of financing, human resources or technical aid,in their mine-clearance efforts. This opportunity isreinforced by the obligation on States able to do so toprovide international cooperation and assistance formine clearance (see Art. 6).

Pending the clearance of mined areas and irrespectiveof any extension granted, each country ‘‘shall makeevery effort’’ to identify all areas under its controlknown or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines.Once an area has been identified as possiblycontaining such weapons, action must be taken toensure that civilians are prevented from entering it.The perimeter must be marked, monitored andprotected, by fencing or other means. The methodchosen must ensure the effective exclusion ofcivilians. A country has a responsibility not only toclose off the area, but also to make certain that thebarriers remain in good condition and do notdeteriorate, become damaged, or otherwise disinte-grate. The protections put up are to remain in placeuntil all of the anti-personnel mines have beendestroyed. In marking an area, certain minimumstandards set out in the amended version of ProtocolII of the CCW must be met. These standards includebut are not limited to the following:

--- signs should be used to mark mined areas andshould be placed at a distance sufficient to ensuretheir visibility at any point by a civilian approach-ing the areas;

--- the marking should be of a distinct and durablecharacter;

--- all feasible steps should be taken to ensure thatthe means used to establish the perimeter of a


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mined area are not removed, concealed ordestroyed.

2.3.2 Assisting the victims

Regrettably, for thousands of men, women andchildren killed or injured by mines, the Ottawa treatycomes too late. The mine-injured, especially ampu-tees, face a difficult future in many countries. They areoften ostracized by a community unable to shoulderthe burden of caring for them, and they are distressedby their own inability to contribute effectively toimproving the conditions of life of their family andsociety. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges nowfacing the international community with respect tomines is how adequately to address the needs of themine-injured in general, and specifically amputees,who form a significant percentage of the war-wounded.

Recognizing this challenge, the treaty calls upon allcountries able to help to do their utmost to ensure thecare, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims.A specific role in this process is accorded to theInternational Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement:

Each State Party in a position to do so shallprovide assistance for the care and rehabilita-tion, and social and economic reintegration,of mine victims and for mine awarenessprograms. Such assistance may be provided,inter alia, through the United Nations system,international, regional or national organiza-tions or institutions, the International Com-mittee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross andRed Crescent societies and their InternationalFederation, non-governmental organizations,or on a bilateral basis (see Art. 6, para. 3).

The ICRC, for its part, will continue to work with itspartners to improve the assistance rendered to allwar-wounded people and particularly mine victims,who both need and deserve a lifetime of care andassistance.5

2.4 Entry into force

The Ottawa treaty entered into force, that is, becamebinding international law, on 1 March 1999. For that tohappen, 40 States had to deposit an instrument ofratification with the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations as notification of their consent to be bound bythe treaty. The 40th ratification was submitted by

Burkina Faso in September 1998 and, in accordancewith Article 17, the treaty entered into force sixmonths later and will apply indefinitely.

States which have the treaty signed but not yetsubmitted an instrument of ratification to the UNSecretary-General are not bound by its provisions. AState’s signature is not of itself enough to bind thesignatory to respect all of its provisions. Signing atreaty does, however, signal the intention to adhereformally at a later date (through ratification, approvalor acceptance) and international law requires that asignatory must not do anything that undermines the‘‘object and purpose’’ of the treaty. The two-stageprocess of signature followed by formal adherence isintended, for instance, to allow national parliamentsor legislatures to debate the treaty and its implicationsfor the country before a final decision is madewhether or not to become bound by its provisions.

Following its entry into force on 1 March, the Ottawatreaty is no longer open for signature. Nonetheless,countries which have not signed it may still formallyadhere to it by a one stage process called accession.Any State may accede directly to the treaty in place ofsignature and ratification, thereby binding itself torespect its provisions.

2.5 Ensuring compliance with the treaty

Regrettably, even formal adherence to a treaty inforce is not always enough to guarantee that all of itsprovisions will be fully respected. For this reason, theOttawa treaty provides for a number of mechanismsto promote implementation and resolve disputes.These include a requirement for each country toreport regularly on action taken to implement theobligations laid down in the treaty: a duty tocooperate in settling disputes; legal, administrativeand other measures to be taken nationally to preventviolations; and regular meetings to review theeffectiveness of the treaty and its implementation(see Arts 7 to 13).

2.5.1 Reporting on implementation

In order to promote openness and confidence that thetreaty is being implemented, each country adhering toit must provide the UN Secretary-General with anannual report concerning the action it has taken tocomply with its provisions (see Art. 7). This reportmust include the following information:

5 For an overview describing the medical and rehabilitative needs of mine victims and the difficulties in providing care, see Assistance for victims of anti-personnel mines: needs, constraints and strategy, ICRC, Geneva, 1997.


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. the total number and the types of anti-personnelmines it has stockpiled;

. the progress of its mine-destruction programmes,including the total number and the types of minesdestroyed;

. the total number and the types of mines kept fortraining purposes;

. the technical characteristics of each type of mineit has produced in the past;

. the location of all mined areas under its jurisdic-tion or control; information on the type, quantityand age of the mines laid there (to the extentknown); and the measures taken to warn thecivilian population;

. the national measures, such as legislation oradministrative regulations, taken to prevent andsuppress violations of the treaty.

The first report must be submitted as soon aspracticable, but no later than 180 days after the dateon which a country becomes a State Party to thetreaty.

2.5.2 Settling disputes

Furthermore, countries are encouraged to consult andcooperate with each other in order to settle anydisputes which may arise (see Art. 10, para. 1). Inaddition to issues of compliance, any disputesconcerning the application or interpretation of thetreaty may also be brought before the meeting ofStates Parties. A country participating in the meetingcan offer its services to mediate or States Parties mayrecommend ways to resolve the disagreement (seeArt. 10, para. 2).

2.5.3 Resolving doubts about compliance

Another mechanism established by the Ottawa treatyto promote confidence in its implementation is anenquiry process to be used in the event that a StateParty is suspected by another State Party of havingfailed to respect the provisions of the treaty (seeArt. 8). The process begins with a ‘‘request forclarification’’, which is passed on to the countryunder suspicion through the UN Secretary-General.Once the request has been received, that country has28 days within which to respond to the allegation (seeArt. 8, para. 2).

If no response is received within that time period, or ifthe response is deemed unsatisfactory, the issue maybe presented to the next meeting of States Parties. If,however, the issue is considered urgent, a ‘‘specialmeeting of States Parties’’ may be convened to

consider the matter (see Art. 8, paras 3 and 5). Inboth instances, the countries attending the meetingwill examine the information submitted and decideby a majority vote if further action is necessary (seeArt. 8, para. 6).

If additional information is required, a fact-findingmission may be sent to the country (see Art. 8,para. 8). The fact-finding team will consist of up tonine experts whose task is to collect informationdirectly related to the allegation. Its members areappointed by the UN Secretary-General and drawnfrom a pool of previously submitted names. Thecountry that is the object of the inquiry is consulted onthe selection of the experts. The nationals of thecountry requesting the fact-finding mission or anycountry directly affected by it cannot participate in themission (see Art. 8, paras 9 and 10).

The country under examination is obliged to accom-modate the fact-finding mission and ensure that it isgiven the opportunity to speak with all persons andvisit all areas relevant to the inquiry (see Art. 8,paras 11 to 14). Such access, however, may be subjectto arrangements made by the country to protect itsnational security, the safety of fact-finding personnel,and the proprietary and constitutional rights of itscitizens. Unless otherwise agreed, the fact-findingmission will not remain in the country for more than14 days nor stay at any particular site for more thanseven days (see Art. 8, para. 15).

The fact-finding mission reports the information it hasgathered to the UN Secretary-General who willforward it to the meeting, or special meeting of StatesParties (see Art. 8, para. 17). After reviewing thereport, countries may suggest ways to resolve theissues. In extreme cases this could include referringthe matter to the UN Security Council or adoptingother enforcement measures provided for by the UNCharter. Any decision taken at this stage is made byconsensus or, if that is not possible, by a two-thirdsmajority of the countries present and voting (seeArt. 8, para. 20).

2.5.4 National efforts to prevent violations

A State Party must do all it can to prevent and put anend to violations of the treaty on territory over whichit has jurisdiction or control, or by persons over whomit has jurisdiction or control (i.e. not only its owncitizens but also those of other countries present on itsterritory) (see Art. 9). It is also required to adoptnational laws or enact other administrative orregulatory measures to prevent and punish prohibited


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activities. Such action should, where appropriate,include criminal penalties for violation.

2.5.5 Reviewing implementation of the treaty

The treaty also provides for a series of regularmeetings of States Parties that will enable thecountries concerned to discuss its implementation.There are four types of meetings referred to in thetreaty: meetings of the States Parties (see Art. 11),special meetings of the States Parties (see Art. 8),review conferences (see Art. 12) and amendmentconferences (see Art. 13). In summary, the meetingof States Parties is convened to review the status ofthe treaty’s application and implementation. Such ameeting will be held annually for, at least, the first fouryears after the treaty enters into force. There,countries can raise issues concerning implementationof the treaty and try to resolve any disputes on itsinterpretation. As outlined above in the section on‘‘Resolving doubts about compliance’’, the specialmeeting of States Parties is an extraordinarymeasure to examine a specific concern about possiblenon-compliance. Five years after the treaty’s entryinto force, probably around the year 2004, a fullreview conference will be held. In addition toproviding a forum to discuss treaty implementation, itmay also determine how often meetings of StatesParties will be held in the future. Further reviewconferences may be convened at the request of anyState Party at intervals of, at a minimum, five years(see Art. 12, para. 1).

2.5.6 Strengthening and updating the treaty

Although the Ottawa treaty is a very strong legalinstrument, certain refinements may in future need tobe made. To ensure that the treaty can be adapted toaddress a changing world situation and evolvingtechnologies, there is a specific provision for itsamendment at any time after it enters into force (seeArt. 13). Proposals for amendments may be submittedby any State Party. They must be sent to the UNSecretary-General, who will circulate them to all theStates Parties. These countries must, within 30 days,indicate if they support discussing the proposalsfurther. If a majority of countries respond favourably,

the Secretary-General will convene an AmendmentConference to which all States Parties will be invited.

At the amendment conference, the proposed amend-ments will be discussed and voted upon, and thenadopted if approved by at least two-thirds of theStates Parties present and voting. However, supportfor the proposals at the conference is not enough forthem to become binding on the States Parties.Following the conference, countries must inform theUN Secretary-General that they agree to be bound bythe amendments, which only come into effect once amajority of State Parties have made this notificationand then only for those States (see Art. 13, para. 5).Once in force, the amendments do not apply to anycountry that has not ratified them. Nonetheless, theseStates will remain bound by the original text.

2.6 Reservations

No reservations are possible to any of the treaty’sprovisions (see Art. 19). This means that at themoment of signature or subsequent adherence, agovernment is not entitled to make a unilateraldeclaration that it will not respect one or more ofthese provisions. In the negotiations, it was felt thatthe option of making reservations would inevitablycreate confusion and frustrate the object and purposeof the treaty, which is to impose a total ban on anti-personnel mines. Prohibitions on reservations areunusual in international humanitarian law, althoughthey are included in some arms-control agreements.

2.7 Withdrawal

As is the case with many other international legalagreements, a country is permitted to withdraw fromthe Ottawa treaty. To do so, it must give notice of itswithdrawal to the UN Secretary-General, other StatesParties and the UN Security Council. However, thewithdrawal does not take effect until six months aftersuch notice is received. If, however, at the end of thissix-month period the country is involved in an armedconflict, the withdrawal is not effective until after theend of the armed conflict. Without a prohibition onwithdrawal during armed conflicts, the treaty’sprotections would risk expiring just at the momentthey are most needed (i.e. in wartime).


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While the negotiation of the Ottawa treaty is anhistoric landmark in the battle against the scourge oflandmines, a tremendous amount of work remains tobe done before the threat of these weapons and theirappalling humanitarian consequences are effectivelytackled. Countries must be encouraged (1) to adhereto the treaty and implement its provisions, and (2) toincrease their support for mine-clearance and victim-assistance programmes. As has been seen, the Ottawatreaty requires a State Party to undertake a wide rangeof activities. Among other things, the country mustensure that anti-personnel mines are no longer usedas weapons by its armed forces, end the developmentand production of these devices, destroy any stock-piles, and identify, mark, and clear mined areas. Inmany countries, implementing these obligations willrequire significant technical, legal and financialassistance.

On 9 December, the UN General Assembly adoptedResolution 52/38A, which urged all States to sign andratify the Convention and to contribute towards its fullrealization and effective implementation.

Although countries from all regions of the worldsupported the Ottawa process, some of the world’smajor landmine producers, exporters and users didnot actively participate in the negotiation of theOttawa treaty and have not yet signed it. Every effortmust be made to encourage these countries to joinranks with the rest of the international community andprohibit anti-personnel landmines so that the Ottawatreaty is universally respected in the near future.

The Ottawa treaty is only one of the essentialmeasures needed to address the landmine contami-nation problem. Vast numbers of people continueto live in mine-affected areas under daily threat fromthese weapons. Most landmine victims continue tohave unmet medical, rehabilitative, social, andeconomic needs which must be dealt with effectively.Landmines are a man-made epidemic. Similarly,the solutions to this epidemic lie in our ownhands. The Ottawa treaty is an important step, butonly a first one.

3. BEYOND THE OTTAWA TREATY


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Accession --- A one-step process for becoming boundby a treaty for countries that have not signed it beforeit enters into force. Once a treaty is in force, Statesmay only ‘‘accede’’ to it and do not need to sign.

Adherence --- A general term meaning that a countryhas followed the necessary procedure in order to binditself to a treaty.

Entry into force --- The point in time when a treatybecomes legally binding on a particular State. TheOttawa treaty will enter into force six months after 40countries have formally consented to be bound by it.At that time the treaty will become legally bindingonly for those 40 countries. For countries adhering ata later date, the treaty will enter into force six monthsafter formal consent has been given.

International humanitarian law --- The body ofinternational law governing armed conflict. It includesrules on the conduct of hostilities and related issueswhich may arise, such as the protection of prisonersof war and civilians not involved in the fighting. Thislaw derives from customary practices and interna-tional treaties. Traditionally, it was referred to as the‘‘law of war’’ or the ‘‘international law of armedconflict’’.

Parties to a conflict --- The opposing sides in anarmed conflict. They can include the armed forces of

a country, guerrilla forces, or other organized armedgroups participating in the hostilities.

Ratification, acceptance, or approval --- Formalconsent to be bound by a treaty following signature.In the case of the Ottawa treaty, a country mustdeposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance orapproval with the depositary of the treaty, which isthe UN Secretary-General.

Self-deactivatingmine --- A mine designed to renderitself inert after a certain time period, normally byexhaustion of the battery connected to its fuse.

Self-destructing mine --- A mine designed to blowitself up after a specific time period.

Signature --- Once a treaty has been negotiated andthe final draft adopted, it is open for signature to thosecountries involved in the negotiations. Generally,signature does not bind the country to the treaty, butonly indicates that it approves of the final text, agreesnot to do anything to undermine the purpose of thetreaty, and intends formally to accept its provisions inthe future. Formal consent to be bound by the treatyfollowing signature is referred to as ratification,acceptance or approval.

State Party --- A country for which a treaty hasformally entered into force.

ANNEX IGLOSSARY OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL TERMS


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Preamble

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering andcasualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that killor maim hundreds of people every week, mostlyinnocent and defenceless civilians and especiallychildren, obstruct economic development and recon-struction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees andinternally displaced persons, and have other severeconsequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contributein an efficient and coordinated manner to face thechallenge of removing anti-personnel mines placedthroughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance forthe care and rehabilitation, including the social andeconomic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mineswould also be an important confidence-buildingmeasure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibi-tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Trapsand Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996,annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons Which May Be Deemed to Be ExcessivelyInjurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and callingfor the early ratification of this Protocol by all Stateswhich have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General AssemblyResolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging allStates to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use,stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnellandmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over thepast years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aimingat prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use,stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnelmines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furtheringthe principles of humanity as evidenced by the call fora total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizingthe efforts to that end undertaken by the InternationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the Interna-tional Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerousother non-governmental organizations around theworld,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urgingthe international community to negotiate an interna-tional and legally binding agreement prohibiting theuse, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adher-ence of all States to this Convention, and determinedto work strenuously towards the promotion of itsuniversalization in all relevant fora including, interalia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarma-ment, regional organizations, and groupings, andreview conferences of the Convention on Prohibitionsor Restrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons Which May Be Deemed to Be ExcessivelyInjurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of internationalhumanitarian law that the right of the parties to anarmed conflict to choose methods or means ofwarfare is not unlimited, on the principle thatprohibits the employment in armed conflicts ofweapons, projectiles and materials and methods ofwarfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury orunnecessary suffering and on the principle that adistinction must be made between civilians andcombatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under anycircumstances:(a) To use anti-personnel mines;

(b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directlyor indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

(c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way,anyone to engage in any activity prohibited toa State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensurethe destruction of all anti-personnel mines inaccordance with the provisions of this Conven-tion.

Article 2Definitions

1. ‘‘Anti-personnel mine’’ means a mine designed tobe exploded by the presence, proximity orcontact of a person and that will incapacitate,

ANNEX II18 September 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION ANDTRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

13

injure or kill one or more persons. Minesdesigned to be detonated by the presence,proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed toa person, that are equipped with anti-handlingdevices, are not considered anti-personnel minesas a result of being so equipped.

2. ‘‘Mine’’ means a munition designed to be placedunder, on or near the ground or other surfacearea and to be exploded by the presence,proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. ‘‘Anti-handling device’’ means a device intendedto protect a mine and which is part of, linked to,attached to or placed under the mine and whichactivates when an attempt is made to tamper withor otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. ‘‘Transfer’’ involves, in addition to the physicalmovement of anti-personnel mines into or fromnational territory, the transfer of title to andcontrol over the mines, but does not involve thetransfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. ‘‘Mined area’’ means an area which is dangerousdue to the presence or suspected presence ofmines.

Article 3Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations underArticle 1, the retention or transfer of a number ofanti-personnel mines for the development of andtraining in mine detection, mine clearance, ormine destruction techniques is permitted. Theamount of such mines shall not exceed theminimum number absolutely necessary for theabove-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for thepurpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Partyundertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of allstockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses,or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon aspossible but not later than four years after the entryinto force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensurethe destruction of all anti-personnel mines inmined areas under its jurisdiction or control, assoon as possible but not later than ten years afterthe entry into force of this Convention for thatState Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identifyall areas under its jurisdiction or control in whichanti-personnel mines are known or suspected tobe emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possiblethat all anti-personnel mines in mined areasunder its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing orother means, to ensure the effective exclusion ofcivilians, until all anti-personnel mines containedtherein have been destroyed. The marking shallat least be to the standards set out in the Protocolon Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofMines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, asamended on 3 May 1996, annexed to theConvention on Prohibitions or Restrictions onthe Use of Certain Conventional Weapons WhichMay Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or toHave Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable todestroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 withinthat time period, it may submit a request to aMeeting of the States Parties or a ReviewConference for an extension of the deadline forcompleting the destruction of such anti-personnelmines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

(a) The duration of the proposed extension;

(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for theproposed extension, including:

(i) The preparation and status of work con-ducted under national demining programs;

(ii) The financial and technical means avail-able to the State Party for the destruction ofall the anti-personnel mines; and

(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability ofthe State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

(c) The humanitarian, social, economic, andenvironmental implications of the extension;and

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(d) Any other information relevant to the requestfor the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the ReviewConference shall, taking into consideration thefactors contained in paragraph 4, assess therequest and decide by a majority of votes ofStates Parties present and voting whether to grantthe request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon thesubmission of a new request in accordance withparagraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requestinga further extension period a State Party shallsubmit relevant additional information on whathas been undertaken in the previous extensionperiod pursuant to this Article.

Article 6International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Conventioneach State Party has the right to seek and receiveassistance, where feasible, from other StatesParties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shallhave the right to participate in the fullest possibleexchange of equipment, material and scientificand technological information concerning theimplementation of this Convention. The StatesParties shall not impose undue restrictions on theprovision of mine clearance equipment andrelated technological information for humanitar-ian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shallprovide assistance for the care and rehabilitation,and social and economic reintegration, of minevictims and for mine awareness programs. Suchassistance may be provided, inter alia, throughthe United Nations system, international, regionalor national organizations or institutions, theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, na-tional Red Cross and Red Crescent societies andtheir International Federation, non-governmentalorganizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shallprovide assistance for mine clearance and relatedactivities. Such assistance may be provided, interalia, through the United Nations system, interna-tional or regional organizations or institutions,non-governmental organizations or institutions,or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to theUnited Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assis-

tance in Mine Clearance, or other regional fundsthat deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shallprovide assistance for the destruction of stock-piled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide informa-tion to the database on mine clearance estab-lished within the United Nations system,especially information concerning various meansand technologies of mine clearance, and lists ofexperts, expert agencies or national points ofcontact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations,regional organizations, other States Parties orother competent intergovernmental or non-gov-ernmental fora to assist their authorities in theelaboration of a national demining program todetermine, inter alia:

(a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnelmine problem;

(b) The financial, technological and human re-sources that are required for the implementa-tion of the program;

(c) The estimated number of years necessary todestroy all anti-personnel mines in minedareas under the jurisdiction or control of theconcerned State Party;

(d) Mine awareness activities to reduce theincidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

(e) Assistance to mine victims;

(f) The relationship between the Government ofthe concerned State Party and the relevantgovernmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in theimplementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistanceunder the provisions of this Article shall cooperatewith a view to ensuring the full and promptimplementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon aspracticable, and in any event not later than 180days after the entry into force of this Conventionfor that State Party on:(a) The national implementation measures re-

ferred to in Article 9;

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(b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnelmines owned or possessed by it, or under itsjurisdiction or control, to include a breakdownof the type, quantity and, if possible, lotnumbers of each type of anti-personnel minestockpiled;

(c) To the extent possible, the location of allmined areas that contain, or are suspected tocontain, anti-personnel mines under its juris-diction or control, to include as much detailas possible regarding the type and quantity ofeach type of anti-personnel mine in eachmined area and when they were emplaced;

(d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lotnumbers of all anti-personnel mines retainedor transferred for the development of andtraining in mine detection, mine clearance ormine destruction techniques, or transferred forthe purpose of destruction, as well as theinstitutions authorized by a State Party toretain or transfer anti-personnel mines, inaccordance with Article 3;

(e) The status of programs for the conversion orde-commissioning of anti-personnel mineproduction facilities;

(f) The status of programs for the destruction ofanti-personnel mines in accordance withArticles 4 and 5, including details of themethods which will be used in destruction,the location of all destruction sites and theapplicable safety and environmental stand-ards to be observed;

(g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnelmines destroyed after the entry into force ofthis Convention for that State Party, to includea breakdown of the quantity of each type ofanti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordancewith Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with,if possible, the lot numbers of each type ofanti-personnel mine in the case of destructionin accordance with Article 4;

(h) The technical characteristics of each type ofanti-personnel mine produced, to the extentknown, and those currently owned or pos-sessed by a State Party, giving, where reason-ably possible, such categories of informationas may facilitate identification and clearanceof anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, thisinformation shall include the dimensions,

fusing, explosive content, metallic content,colour photographs and other informationwhich may facilitate mine clearance; and

(i) The measures taken to provide an immediateand effective warning to the population inrelation to all areas identified under paragraph2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with thisArticle shall be updated by the States Partiesannually, covering the last calendar year, andreported to the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shalltransmit all such reports received to the StatesParties.

Article 8Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperatewith each other regarding the implementation ofthe provisions of this Convention, and to worktogether in a spirit of cooperation to facilitatecompliance by States Parties with their obliga-tions under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify andseek to resolve questions relating to compliancewith the provisions of this Convention by anotherState Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request forClarification of that matter to that State Party. Sucha request shall be accompanied by all appropriateinformation. Each State Party shall refrain fromunfounded Requests for Clarification, care beingtaken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives aRequest for Clarification shall provide, through theSecretary-General of the United Nations, within 28days to the requesting State Party all informationwhich would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive aresponse through the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations within that time period, or deemsthe response to the Request for Clarification to beunsatisfactory, it may submit the matter throughthe Secretary-General of the United Nations to thenext Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit thesubmission, accompanied by all appropriateinformation pertaining to the Request for Clari-fication, to all States Parties. All such informationshall be presented to the requested State Partywhich shall have the right to respond.

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4. Pending the convening of any meeting of theStates Parties, any of the States Parties concernedmay request the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations to exercise his or her good offices tofacilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose throughthe Secretary-General of the United Nations theconvening of a Special Meeting of the StatesParties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereuponcommunicate this proposal and all informationsubmitted by the States Parties concerned, to allStates Parties with a request that they indicatewhether they favour a Special Meeting of theStates Parties, for the purpose of considering thematter. In the event that within 14 days from thedate of such communication, at least one-third ofthe States Parties favours such a Special Meeting,the Secretary-General of the United Nations shallconvene this Special Meeting of the States Partieswithin a further 14 days. A quorum for thisMeeting shall consist of a majority of StatesParties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties, as the case may be,shall first determine whether to consider thematter further, taking into account all informationsubmitted by the States Parties concerned. TheMeeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties shall make everyeffort to reach a decision by consensus. If despiteall efforts to that end no agreement has beenreached, it shall take this decision by a majority ofStates Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with theMeeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment ofits review of the matter, including any fact-findingmissions that are authorized in accordance withparagraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting ofthe States Parties or the Special Meeting of theStates Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mis-sion and decide on its mandate by a majority ofStates Parties present and voting. At any time therequested State Party may invite a fact-findingmission to its territory. Such a mission shall takeplace without a decision by a Meeting of theStates Parties or a Special Meeting of the StatesParties to authorize such a mission. The mission,consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and

approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and10, may collect additional information on the spotor in other places directly related to the allegedcompliance issue under the jurisdiction or controlof the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallprepare and update a list of the names, nation-alities and other relevant data of qualified expertsprovided by States Parties and communicate it toall States Parties. Any expert included on this listshall be regarded as designated for all fact-findingmissions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate infact-finding missions on the territory or any otherplace under the jurisdiction or control of theobjecting State Party, if the non-acceptance wasdeclared prior to the appointment of the expert tosuch missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of theStates Parties or a Special Meeting of the StatesParties, the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations shall, after consultations with the re-quested State Party, appoint the members of themission, including its leader. Nationals of StatesParties requesting the fact-finding mission ordirectly affected by it shall not be appointed tothe mission. The members of the fact-findingmission shall enjoy privileges and immunitiesunder Article VI of the Convention on thePrivileges and Immunities of the United Nations,adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of thefact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory ofthe requested State Party at the earliest opportu-nity. The requested State Party shall take thenecessary administrative measures to receive,transport and accommodate the mission, andshall be responsible for ensuring the security ofthe mission to the maximum extent possiblewhile they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of therequested State Party, the fact-finding missionmay bring into the territory of the requested StateParty the necessary equipment which shall beused exclusively for gathering information on thealleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, themission will advise the requested State Party ofthe equipment that it intends to utilize in thecourse of its fact-finding mission.

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13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts toensure that the fact-finding mission is given theopportunity to speak with all relevant personswho may be able to provide information relatedto the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access forthe fact-finding mission to all areas and installa-tions under its control where facts relevant to thecompliance issue could be expected to becollected. This shall be subject to any arrange-ments that the requested State Party considersnecessary for:

(a) The protection of sensitive equipment, infor-mation and areas;

(b) The protection of any constitutional obliga-tions the requested State Party may have withregard to proprietary rights, searches andseizures, or other constitutional rights; or

(c) The physical protection and safety of themembers of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes sucharrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort todemonstrate through alternative means its compli-ance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in theterritory of the State Party concerned for no morethan 14 days, and at any particular site no morethan seven days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and notrelated to the subject matter of the fact-findingmission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through theSecretary-General of the United Nations, to theMeeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties the results of itsfindings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties shall consider allrelevant information, including the report sub-mitted by the fact-finding mission, and mayrequest the requested State Party to take meas-ures to address the compliance issue within aspecified period of time. The requested StateParty shall report on all measures taken inresponse to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties may suggest to theStates Parties concerned ways and means tofurther clarify or resolve the matter under

consideration, including the initiation of appro-priate procedures in conformity with interna-tional law. In circumstances where the issue athand is determined to be due to circumstancesbeyond the control of the requested State Party,the Meeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties may recommendappropriate measures, including the use ofcooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the SpecialMeeting of the States Parties shall make everyeffort to reach its decisions referred to inparagraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwiseby a two-thirds majority of States Parties presentand voting.

Article 9National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal,administrative and other measures, including theimposition of penal sanctions, to prevent andsuppress any activity prohibited to a State Party underthis Convention undertaken by persons or on territoryunder its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperatewith each other to settle any dispute that mayarise with regard to the application or theinterpretation of this Convention. Each State Partymay bring any such dispute before the Meeting ofthe States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contributeto the settlement of the dispute by whatevermeans it deems appropriate, including offering itsgood offices, calling upon the States parties to adispute to start the settlement procedure of theirchoice and recommending a time-limit for anyagreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisionsof this Convention on facilitation and clarificationof compliance.

Article 11Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order toconsider any matter with regard to the applicationor implementation of this Convention, including:

(a) The operation and status of this Convention;

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(b) Matters arising from the reports submittedunder the provisions of this Convention;

(c) International cooperation and assistance inaccordance with Article 6;

(d) The development of technologies to clearanti-personnel mines;

(e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8;and

(f) Decisions relating to submissions of StatesParties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall beconvened by the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations within one year after the entry into forceof this Convention. The subsequent meetingsshall be convened by the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations annually until the first ReviewConference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, theSecretary-General of the United Nations shallconvene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well asthe United Nations, other relevant internationalorganizations or institutions, regional organiza-tions, the International Committee of the RedCross and relevant non-governmental organiza-tions may be invited to attend these meetings asobservers in accordance with the agreed Rules ofProcedure.

Article 12Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by theSecretary-General of the United Nations fiveyears after the entry into force of this Convention.Further Review Conferences shall be convenedby the Secretary-General of the United Nations ifso requested by one or more States Parties,provided that the interval between ReviewConferences shall in no case be less than fiveyears. All States Parties to this Convention shall beinvited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

(a) To review the operation and status of thisConvention;

(b) To consider the need for and the intervalbetween further Meetings of the StatesParties referred to in paragraph 2 ofArticle 11;

(c) To take decisions on submissions of StatesParties as provided for in Article 5; and

(d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final reportconclusions related to the implementationof this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well asthe United Nations, other relevant internationalorganizations or institutions, regional organiza-tions, the International Committee of the RedCross and relevant non-governmental organiza-tions may be invited to attend each ReviewConference as observers in accordance with theagreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of thisConvention any State Party may propose amend-ments to this Convention. Any proposal for anamendment shall be communicated to theDepositary, who shall circulate it to all StatesParties and shall seek their views on whether anAmendment Conference should be convened toconsider the proposal. If a majority of the StatesParties notify the Depositary no later than 30 daysafter its circulation that they support furtherconsideration of the proposal, the Depositaryshall convene an Amendment Conference towhich all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well asthe United Nations, other relevant internationalorganizations or institutions, regional organiza-tions, the International Committee of the RedCross and relevant non-governmental organiza-tions may be invited to attend each AmendmentConference as observers in accordance with theagreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be heldimmediately following a Meeting of the StatesParties or a Review Conference unless a majorityof the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall beadopted by a majority of two-thirds of the StatesParties present and voting at the AmendmentConference. The Depositary shall communicateany amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter intoforce for all States Parties to this Conventionwhich have accepted it, upon the deposit with theDepositary of instruments of acceptance by amajority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter

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into force for any remaining State Party on thedate of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, theSpecial Meetings of the States Parties, the ReviewConferences and the Amendment Conferencesshall be borne by the States Parties and States notparties to this Convention participating therein, inaccordance with the United Nations scale ofassessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and thecosts of any fact-finding mission shall be borne bythe States Parties in accordance with the UnitedNations scale of assessment adjusted appropri-ately.

Article 15Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18September 1997, shall be open for signature atOttawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the UnitedNations Headquarters in New York from 5 December1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, accep-tance or approval of the Signatories.

2. It shall be open for accession by any State whichhas not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, ap-proval or accession shall be deposited with theDepositary.

Article 17Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the firstday of the sixth month after the month in whichthe 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance,approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State which deposits its instrument ofratification, acceptance, approval or accessionafter the date of the deposit of the 40th instrumentof ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,this Convention shall enter into force on the firstday of the sixth month after the date on which

that State has deposited its instrument of ratifica-tion, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification,acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it willapply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of thisConvention pending its entry into force.

Article 19Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject toreservations.

Article 20Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its nationalsovereignty, have the right to withdraw from thisConvention. It shall give notice of such with-drawal to all other States Parties, to the Deposi-tary and to the United Nations Security Council.Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a fullexplanation of the reasons motivating this with-drawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six monthsafter the receipt of the instrument of withdrawalby the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry ofthat six-month period, the withdrawing StateParty is engaged in an armed conflict, thewithdrawal shall not take effect before the endof the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from thisConvention shall not in any way affect the dutyof States to continue fulfilling the obligationsassumed under any relevant rules of internationallaw.

Article 21Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is herebydesignated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic,Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish textsare equally authentic, shall be deposited with theSecretary-General of the United Nations.

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Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua andBarbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin,Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad,Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Coted’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia,Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See,Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland,Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho,Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,

Malawi , Malays ia , Maldives , Mal i , Mal ta ,Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Norway,Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania,Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, SolomonIslands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname,Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay,Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX IIIList of Signatories as at 1 March 1999 *

* An additional two States (Equatorial Guinea and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) acceded directly to the Convention without first signing it.


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MISSIONThe International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independentorganization whose exclusively humanitarianmission is to protect the lives and dignityof victims of war and internal violence andto provide them with assistance. It directsand coordinates the international relief activitiesconducted by the Movement in situationsof conflict. It also endeavours to preventsuffering by promoting and strengtheninghumanitarian law and universal humanitarianprinciples. Established in 1863, the ICRC isat the origin of the International Red Crossand Red Crescent Movement.

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