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8/2/2019 BANSC-RE-2010-187-Defendants Objection of Plaintiffs Motion to Lift Stay and Motion for Summary Judgment

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STATE OF MAINE COUNTY OF PENOBSCOT

CIVIL SUPERIOR DISTRICT COURT

Defendants Objection To Plaintiff’s Motion To Lift Stay And Motion For Final Judgment

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TD BANK N.A. f/k/a FIRST

MASSACHUSETTS BANK N.A.

Plaintiff,

v.

TWILA A. BUTLER f/k/a WOLF

AND

CHARLTON A. BUTLER JR. pro se

Defendant

and

Defendant-Intervenor .

Case No.: BANSC-RE-2010-187

Judge:

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO LIFT

STAY AND MOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT WITH

INCORPORATED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, DECLARATORY

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW.

[PROPOSED ORDER]

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

[Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion and Defendant’s

Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts Motion toDisqualify Opposing Counsel Defendants Objection to

Plaintiff’s Witnesses, Affidavits and Exhibits, Sworn

Affidavit of Defendant Twila A. Butler f/k/a Wolf,

Defendant’s Motion For Compensation For Time Spent Preparing Submissions in the Defense of Their Home From

Plaintiff’s Fraudulent Foreclosure Attempt with

Incorporated Motion to Strike, Memorandum of Law and

Supporting Exhibits On Objection To Plaint iff’s Motion ForLift of Stay And Motion For Summary Judgment On

Defendant’s objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Lift Stay and

Motion For Summary Judgment on Motion for Sanctions,

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. [Proposed Order Granting

Defendants Motion]

Date of Hearing: _________

Time of Hearing: _________

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO LIFT STAY AND FINAL AND

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH INCORPORATED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS,

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW.

[PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION]

TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NOW, come, Defendants TWILA A. BUTLER f/k/a WOLF AND CHARLTON A. BUTLER JR.

Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor with objection to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Lifting of






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Stay and Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants do not owe this debt, Defendant

Homeowner T. Butler f/k/a Wolf, did not sign any agreement even close to this most

egregious act of false testimony and lie, and particularly, this, agreement currently in

issue at bar.

1. Twila A. Butler, f/k/a Wolf, as sworn to, asserted to and declared to be the truth, in

her affidavit, concurrently filed with this motion. Defendant Twila A. Butler will again in

case anyone missed it state for the record that she; Twila A. Butler f/k/a Wolf, DID NOT

SIGN FOR THIS LOAN. SHE DID NOT AGREE TO THIS LOAN; SHE IN NO WAY, LEGALLY

OR OTHERWISE, IS, OR CAN BE, MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS LOAN.

2. There was never a time, in which, Defendant T Butler, was told of, nor disclosed to;

nor counseled about the facts of the loan currently considered in default and pursued as a

fraudulent foreclosure. As dictated by an imaginary mortgage and promissory note. This

fact and more will be shown by evidentiary proofs and fact, as was the requirement at the

time and, currently is, still, required under TILA, the U.C.C. and RESPA as well other

applicable State and Federal law. Plaintiff’s, have committed; and continue to be allowed,

to commit, multiple criminal acts in violation of the FDCPA. This in addition to TILA and

RESPA violations.

3. A Stay has been rightfully and correctly granted, Defendants Exhibits “A”.

4. Defendants point out to opposing counsel [that] this and sua sponte, ex parte, and

such actions, are antithetical to Defendants interest and if made would be outside of

Defendants presence and just plain unfair; we do all remember what fair is….don’t we?

Besides, sua sponte, exparte, and any reversible error, period, is and/or are, what rule 60

is for anyway.






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5. Rule 60, among many reasons, would include this matter in the event of reversible

error granting a lift of stay and subsequent granting of Plaintiffs motion for final and

summary judgment.

6. Defendants point out to the court that Defendants have made demand for a jury trial

since, the inception of this matter with their responses to opposing counsel, and reiterate

that demand at this time.

7. This action is being brought and maliciously pursued by a debt collector well aware

of, as well their counsel, its lack of legal basis for complaint.

8. The debt is not a consumer debt.

9. Plaintiffs, in addition, being informed that Defendants never made this loan, are

aware that it is not a consumer debt as well, and that, consumers, dispute the validity of

said debt.

10. Plaintiffs have made no attempt; but for the; ‘by rote’ recitation of that required to

semantically qualify, as to having initiated a foreclosure action, but is neither colorable

nor valid past that point.

11. Plaintiff’s, have attempted, to criminally take Defendants property, nevertheless,

through fraudulent conveyance, by way of multiple acts; of fraud upon the court,

fraudulent filings with the Penobscot County Registry of Deeds, depriving the city of their

funds on numerous and uncountable transactions unknown but to Plaintiffs. Additionally

Plaintiffs have sought, through relaxed local rules of discovery, to further circumvent the

law, deprive Defendants of their constitutional rights and to further defraud this court

and for all intents and purposes, no offense to this court and your honor, Plaintiffs are

calling this court an idiot.






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12. Defendants file concurrently their motion to order discovery through the court from

this point on in addition to their motion for sanctions and for legal action for Plaintiffs

and counsel’s egregious illegal actions to date.

Plaintiff’s entire complaint should be stricken, in this action, and permanent injunctive

and declaratory relief granted, due to;

A: there is no debt owed to Plaintiffs and

B: the egregious and malicious acts of Plaintiffs and counsel, for, the

perpetrating of foreclosure fraud, extortion, and tortuous conduct as well

their multiple acts of fraud upon the court.

C. Plaintiffs and their counsel are nothing more than vexatious litigants raping

the courts, states and counties of fees and resources; while, simultaneously

doing the same to Defendants.

D. No matter what the outcome, opposing counsel expects to be paid and will

be paid by their clients. Even if Defendants prevail they have borne the weight

and cost of litigation for a fight they didn’t start and against a person who gets

paid no matter what. Defendants bear the entire expense of dispute.

E. This matter, no insult to this court, is more suited and in fact a Federal Case

as the answer here, in a Federal Adjudication on such a pervasive Nationwide

RICO Enterprise level display of colorable action, by these Plaintiffs and their

co-conspirators across America, as witnessed in countless courts across the

country begs the old saw, “if it walks like a duck….. must be a duck”.

F. As the result of this case at bar would reflect the very reason for the current

action in the Maine Legislature; and their expectation of a resolution, to, any

problems, here in Maine, due to predatory servicing and fraudulent






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foreclosures, with the enactment of HP 128, LD 145 - An Act to Protect

Homeowners Subject to Foreclosure by Requiring the Foreclosing Entity to

Provide the Court with Original Documents. Pricelessly makes apparent to all

but the morally blind, and a matter of law already, even more apparent to

those visually challenged in their moral turpitude.

13. Counsel, for Plaintiffs, is covered by the FDCPA as observed by their FDCPA

declarat ion Defendants Exhibits “B” “C” “D” “E” “F” and “G”.

14. If their arguments, for arguments sake alone, are true, then, Plaintiffs and counsel,

have admitted being covered by the act and would have to fit within a narrow statutoryset of constructed and interpreted guidelines; of which opposing counsel and Plaintiffs

have failed to adhere to; neither in spirit nor in letter nor with the requisite “good faith

and fair dealings”.

15. Counsel for the Plaintiff’s, debt collector declaration, is, prima facie, an open and

honest admission, regarding the unsecured nature of this fraudulent loan and

corresponding debt, and truly Plaintiff’s and counsel’s, only, honest statement to date. As

such the following is true, unarguably so, in regards to Plaintiffs and counsel.

-ARGUMENT-

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND PREEMPTION

16. In 1977, Congress moved to protect the rights of the individual from abusive

collection practices. Specifically, Congress found that “[a]busive debt collection practices

contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of

jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C.A. §1692(a).

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001692---a000-.html








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17. Furthermore, it decided that current laws, of the day, were woefully inadequate in

protecting the rights of the consumer. Thus, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”) was adopted in 15 U.S.C.A. §1692. The legislative history supports the

contention that a debtor has standing to complain of violations of the Act, regardless of

whether a valid debt exists.

18. During the debate of this bill the chairman of the subcommittee reported “(t)hat

every individual, whether or not he owes the debt, has a right to be treated in a

reasonable and civil manner.” Baker v. G. C. Services Corporation, 677 F.2d 775, 777

(9thCir. 1982). The Act, however, was “not intended to shield … consumers from the

embarrassment and inconvenience which are the natural consequences of debt

collection.” Dalton v. FMA Enterprises, Inc., 953 F.Supp. 1525, 1531 (Dist. Ct. M.D. Fla.

1997); citing Higgins v. Capitol Credit Services, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 1128, 1135 (D.Del. 1991)

(cite omitted).

19. Finally, the FDCPA does state that it preempts any state law which is inconsistent

with the mandates of the Act itself. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692n. But that any state law that gives

more protection than what is afforded by the Act is allowed.

SCOPE OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

20. 15 U.S.C.A. §1692a specifically states that the FDCPA only applies to a consumer

debt .15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 “Congressional findings and declaration of purpose” sets out a

relatively narrow definition and statement of purpose. Specifically it states:

(e) Purposes; it is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt

collection practices, by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors,

who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices, are not

competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to

protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=1692n&url=/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sup_01_15_10_41_20_V.html

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001692---n000-.html





http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001692---n000-.html







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Thus, Congress’s intent was to limit abusive behavior from debt collectors attempting to

collect a consumer debt. A consumer debt arises out of a transaction in which the money,

property, insurance or services are primarily personal, family, or household purposes.

Thus, an entity collecting any business debt or other commercial debt is not subject to the

FDCPA.

21. A “debt collector” does not include the creditor or a creditor’s employees.

1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a (6), specifically states that the term “debt collector” does

not include; (A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the

creditor, collecting debts for such creditor.”

22. Thus, a creditor and its employees are not debt collectors under the meaning of the

FDCPA and the actions alleged in the Plaintiff’s Complaint do not violate the FDCPA. Case

law is well settled on this issue. In Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., 326

F.Supp.2d 709 (E.D. Va. 2003), the Court succinctly stated, “creditors are not liable under

the FDCPA” for communications with the debtor. Citing Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756

F.2d 1197 (5thCir. 1985); See Also Ray v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 187 F.Supp.2d

719 (W.D. Ky. 2001).

23. Plaintiffs, and their counsel, are debt collectors demonstrable by their freely given,

open and clear declaration, but;

24. By statute, and Plaintiff’s instant suit declarations and assertions, declare counsel

assert and contend, under penalty of perjury, to be employees of and acting in their

employer, TD Bank N.A’s, name. (Herein attached Defendant’s Exhibit “H”)

25. The FDCPA does not encompass mortgage servicers.

26. Many of an, attorneys’ clients, today, are simply servicers for a “pool” of mortgages

that have been securitized. The servicer, frequently; anymore is more often, than not,








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many times over, and is the case with TD Bank Servicing Department here, and is not the

actual creditor. Instead they are simply, and more and more often, criminals, of a RICO

criminal enterprise, displaying such by attempting to collect a debt, not owed them; in the

creditors, name, illegally while using the wire and mail services.

27. The FDCPA also specifically exempts a servicer. 15 U.S.C.A.§1692a(6)(F) states that

“any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be

owed or due another to the extent such activity … (iii) concerns a debt which was not in

default at the time it was obtained by such person.”(Camden National Bank N.A. Servicing

bought this debt in default and is precluded from making claim, for many reasons, but

particularly here, against homeowner from whom serving was moved for cause, from

Graystone Solutions Inc. for cause consisting of the “predatory Servicing” action of their

employees (homeowners were un-notified, as well all the other things they were not

notified of and good reason you can’t notify someone of moving a loan that they don’t

know they have the way it is setup now, as required) Defendants Exhibits Combination

Multiple Page Exhibit [“I-1” – “I-45” ]

28. This provision specifically applies to servicing agents and has been upheld as long as

the loan was not in default when it was transferred to the servicing agent to service.

29. This is why Maine State Housing Authority is allowing TD Bank to call them a party in

interest. They are legally ineligible for payment or compensation, for their servicers

actions, in fact they are entitled to any return at all. This is a clear example of the

fraudulent and predatory actions of TD Bank Servicing as exampled by their counterpart

at MSHA Graystone Mortgage Solutions Inc. but instead counsel sought to *slip* this past

the court doing exactly the opposite of the direct on point instruction of CLE instructor;

on “MAINE FORECLOSURE LAW”, and Perkins Thompson Attorney Stephanie A. Williams.

Defendants Exhibit “J “








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30. Plaintiffs ARE the servicing arm, department, and/or subsidiary, of TD Bank N.A. TD

Ameritrade, TD Bank US Holdings N.A., Toronto-Dominion Bank.

31. The Loan is not in default, nor could it ever be in default according to the meager

discovery provided by Plaintiff’s counsel, that is tantamount to denying Defendants their

right to discovery. Discovery that could be characterized, and so is characterized, as

UNRESPONSIVE, on Plaintiffs part, would seem to indicate, as best Defendants can make

out looking past the redacting pen that, after closing, TD Bank Servicing Department was

retained as the servicer. Nothing says uncooperative like a redacting pen. Exhibit “K”

herein attached.

32. Defendant’s love all the redaction, but, have no fear the information of these loans

conversion to bonds is indicated on the top of the first sheet opposing counsel sent, in

what they termed interrogatories, in an attempt to circumvent the law and otherwise

refuse Defendants, discovery, the courts have repeatedly stated is the Defendants right to

know and the DUTY of servicers and their counsel to provide.

33. But since no chain of title evidence or assignment history, or any other such required

evidence, other than the original assignments made at closing which are insufficient to

demonstrate a lawful assignment or true sale to the trust they are in and for which

counsel truly represents. In fact that would make it a straight one shot sale made directly

to the trust of which MSHA and TD Bank, in this case, are acting as Trustees.

34. This is insufficient for the creation of a Trust, as designed in this case to evade taxes so

as to create a REMIC that passes on the tax liability to the client and to be bankruptcy

remote, which is the whole idea in a REMIC and the only reason to do so. These trusts

were designed this way so, when the music stopped there was sure to be a few left sitting

and therefore in-blank allows for the shadow banking system, overnight loans off and on

the books near Q1-Q4 and reporting time, then back on the books after, repo-105’s, as

Lehman Brothers referred to them, quarterly reports sold back to themselves from their






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subsidiaries in England, in Lehman’s Case, so as to appear more solvent and reap more

bonuses that did not exist and should not have been paid. Afterwards it was back to

cooking the books. With the fallout from the bubble allowing, they thought, anyone to

robo-sign and fabricate their way to profits and land ownership.

Problem is that others were fabricating this loan from the beginning and they, Plaintiffs

had no clue they were fabricating redundantly a fabrication already. When this bubble

burst, those who really created this crisis with malice and intent thought they would walk

away with all the money and all the land?

Besides tax evasion and avoiding paying anyone at all; would anyone, do the things donehere and across America, and so obviously, fraudulently entered these frauds into the

permanent land records here in the Penobscot County Registry of Deeds as a final insult

to the county and the state from the Banks and in land recorders offices nationwide,

because they could and because the system is gamed. No one, it would appear, has

wanted to say anything, as, everyone has a mortgage and a pension and no one,

Defendants guess, wanted to rock the fraudulent boat.

35. One can only assume that by repeating himself, despite having been provided proof

positive to the contraire and having been made aware that Defendant; T Butler, did not

make this loan, therefore any claim of a lack of material fact, on motion to lift stay; as

much as the original and now reworked piece of instant claim crap, plaintiff’s counsel,

filed the first time. This, would, prelude any claim of a lack of material fact and in and of

its self alone would deny Plaintiffs their Motion for Summary Judgment.

36. The claim, therefore of a lack of material fact, would be both, disingenuous and a bold

face lie…, I believe under penalty of perjury. Opposing counsel is indirectly, but just as

viably and colorable as directly; as any District Attorney would agree, enough

circumstantial evidence is called a conviction, stating that he has verified the facts of his

case, as his assertions state, directly, by affidavit and by motion, and therein certifying,






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under penalty of perjury, and failing to provide, as will soon be illegal under soon to be

enacted under Maine Law HP 128, LD 145 - An Act to Protect Homeowners Subject to

Foreclosure by Requiring the Foreclosing Entity to Provide the Court with Original

Documents, will make it illegal for Plaintiffs, for current and any future foreclosures, to

not have or provide the documents and the information; Defendants, have asked for from

the beginning.

37. Having quite a long time, almost 2 years to find what they need, and Plaintiffs are no

closer to proving up their claims to the court, that the facts, counsel claims, as good as

stating directly, is the truth and he has personally vetted, with due diligence, his claims

tan the day Defendants first challenged them and therefore would be, in fact a lie.

38. After almost two years has yet to provide any proof of, opposing counsels,

questionable at best; and that’s being charitable, facts, other, than a certified copy of a

copy of a copy of a mortgage and promissory note and an affidavit of some unknown,

faceless, Defendants personally feel, cretin, who, seems quite willing to swear about what

she can absolutely, positively testify to, and [that] being in total, completely, fully,

absolutely nothing of any evidentiary value or otherwise, to the matter at hand.

39. “ The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not

formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most

intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt,

what is laid before him.” --Leo Tolstoy, 1897

40. Once again Defendant homeowners repeat; they did not make this loan, Plaintiffs’

and counsel, first, in the beginning, at closing, committed fraud of multiple flavors, and

then, continued in additional multiple acts of fraud to submit said as frauds upon the

court, being entered as legal binding contracts in default and worth of the courts

intervention and remedy.






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41. Additionally Plaintiffs submitted these same forged, or otherwise fabricated,

fraudulent documents, into evidence through Maine’s “Relaxed” discovery rule, as well as

having had them entered, into the official records for the County of Penobscot, of the State

of Maine with the Penobscot County Registry of Deeds.

42. Plaintiffs additionally refuse to comply with discovery, in any meaningful way, or to

provide information of the/and/or/any, supposed, owner; because they can’t.

43. As Defendants have repeatedly stated, this, loan was never, ever, under any

circumstances, but, those of common law fraud, of multiple flavors, at any time a loan,

made by Defendant homeowners, as stated in writing, Defendant homeowner’s denial of this loan package.(herein attached Defendants Exhibits “L” “M” “N”)

44. The FDCPA does encompass an attorney performing a foreclosure regarding

collateralized consumer debt.

45. The Fourth Circuit in Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373 (4thCirc.

2006) clarified that a foreclosure firm is attempting to collect a debt, even though the

foreclosure file was in rem and they were attempting to foreclose on a deed of trust. The

debtor filed suit against the law firm that had filed the foreclosure action alleging, several,

violations of the FDCPA.

46. Specifically the debtor alleged that the law firm failed to verify the debt, even though

she had requested verification in writing; the law firm continued its, collection, efforts

even though the debt had been contested and the firm communicated with the debtor

even though she was represented by counsel. Id. at 375.

47. The law firm filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it was not acting in connection

with a “debt” and that it was not a “debt collector” within the definition of the statute. Id.

Specifically, the law firm argued that it was a substitute trustee for a deed of trust and

that it was acting as the trustee, therefore, it was not a “debt collector”.






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48. However, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the law firm was attempting to collect a debt

and that it did fall under the definition of a debt collector. Specifically, the Court stated

that “[s]ince a foreclosure is a method of collecting a debt by acquiring and selling

secured property to satisfy a debt, those who engage in such foreclosures are included

within the definition of debt collectors if they otherwise fit the statutory definition.” Id. at

379, citing Shapiro &Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1992). Further, the Court

stated that while not every law firm filing foreclosure actions may fall under the FDCPA, it

is well-established that the Act applies to Lawyers “who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-

debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.” Id. at 379, citing

Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (1995).

49. While this decision simply clarifies a split within the Fourth Circuit, it is the

overwhelmingly majority view throughout the Circuits and it is the most recent decision

to discuss how, more particularly, when, a law firm, performing foreclosures, should

consider itself to be a debt collector.

50. As this case isn’t one for an a attorney collecting a consumer debt attached to real

property, unless of course they are debt collectors and TD Bank is lying as well as their

counsel Perkins Thompson attorneys (named and unnamed)

51. Plaintiff’s and their counsel are not attorneys collecting on a consumer debt of

which said debt was derived through a loan acquired by accessing, by said loan, the

equity in a consumers home, thereby encumbering/attachment [mortgage] for the benefit

of consumers’ debt the property of consumer, by definition as noted on the fraudulent

HUD-1 settlement sheets. This 17,880.00 dollar loan was supposedly the first of three

loans. As facts support; if you have an argument for TWO, HUD-1 settlement sheets you

definitely have a NEED for THREE.

UNDERSTANDING THE ACTIONS PERMITTED OR RESTRICTED BY THE ACT.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-367.ZS.html

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-367.ZS.html






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52. Communication with the Debtor

53. An attorneys’ initial communication with the debtor must include a notice that the

attorney is a debt collector attempting to collect a debt.

54. Generally, in government speak means do it this way, this warning, or “mini-

Miranda” is listed at the beginning of any letter demanding the debt, any pleading that is

sent, and any other document that is mailed to the debtor.

55. It must be placed, conspicuously, your document and be written in such a way so as

the “least sophisticated consumer” would understand it. You also must state that they are

entitled to dispute the debt and that they must do so in writing within thirty (30) days of

receipt of the document. Normally, the mini-Miranda will state the following:

“THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY

INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. UNLESS

YOU, WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS DOCUMENT, DISPUTE THE

VALIDITY OF THE DEBT, OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, THIS FIRM WILL

ASSUME THAT THE DEBT IS VALID. IF, YOU, NOTIFY, ME, IN WRITING,

WITHIN THE ABOVE 30 DAY PERIOD, THAT THE DEBT, OR ANY PORTION

THEREOF, IS DISPUTED, I WILL OBTAIN VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT AND

A COPY OF SUCH VERIFICATION WILL BE MAILED TO YOU BY THIS FIRM.

IF YOU SO REQUEST WITHIN THE ABOVE 30 DAY PERIOD, THIS FIRM WILL

INFORM YOU OF THE IDENTITY OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF

DIFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR.”

56. Any subsequent communication with the debtor should also include a statement to

the effect that:






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“THIS COMMUNICATION IS FROM A DEBT COLECTOR AND ANY

INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE CAN BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF

COLLECTING THAT DEBT”

57. Finally, an attorneys’ communication with the debtor may not take place during odd

hours, typically 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. are acceptable hours.

58. An attorney may not communicate with the debtor if counsel knows they are

represented by counsel, all communication from an attorney or from their client must

cease.

59. And third, an attorney may not contact the debtor at their place of employment

particularly if attorney knows or should reasonably know that the employer prohibits

such communication.

60. Further, the Second and Seventh Circuit also have adopted safe harbor language to

add the validation notice:

“THIS ADVICE PERTAINS TO YOUR DEALINGS WITH ME AS A DEBT

COLLECTOR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE COURT,

AND IN PARTICULAR IT DOES NOT CHANGE THE TIME AT WHICH YOU

MUST ANSWER THE COMPLAINT. THE SUMMONS IS A COMMAND FROM

THE COURT, NOT FROM ME, AND YOU MUST FOLLOW ITS INSTRUCTIONS

EVEN IF YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OR AMOUNT OF THE DEBT. THE

ADVICE IN THIS LETTER ALSO DOES NOT AFFECT MY RELATIONS WITH

THE COURT. AS A LAWYER, I MAY FILE PAPERS IN THE SUIT ACCORDING

TO THE COURT’S RULES AND THE JUDGE’S INSTRUCTIONS.”






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61. Telephonic Communication.

62. If the debtor contacts via telephone and [the] attorney is not sure that they, the

debtor, has received another form of communication from the attorney or their office, it is

safest to proceed to tell them that “I work for a debt collector and any information we

discuss over the phone can be used for the purposes of collecting that debt.” While there

is no requirement to warn the debtor, the attorney must assume that they have not

received any prior warnings.

63. Harassment or Abuse prohibited.

64. A debt collector may not harass or abuse a debtor. More specifically a debt collector

may not:

65. The use or threat of the use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical

person, reputation, or property of any person.

66. The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of

which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

67. The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a

consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681aill or

1681b ill of this title.

68. The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

69. Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation

repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called

number.

70. Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls

without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001692---b000-.html

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00001692---b000-.html






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71. While an attorneys’ client may use some coercion in attempting to collect the debt,

an attorney may not proceed with anything that is intended to harass or abuse the debtor.

72. The safest way to avoid any of these practices is to communicate with the debtor via

written materials and make sure they, the debtor, understand that, you, the attorney, in

question, are a debt collector attempting to collect a debt.

73. Defendants were not aware of the debt collector status of Attorneys from Perkins

Thompson and were not legally made aware of such or properly noticed of this fact as

statutorily defined.

74. 15 U.S.C.A. §1692f “Unfair Practices”

75. 15 U.S.C.A. §1692f , lists, the “unfair practices,” that cannot be used to attempt to

collect a debt. Specifically this section states:

76. A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to

collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following

conduct is a violation of this section:

77. The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense

incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the

agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

78. The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment

instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of

the debt collector’s intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less

than three business days prior to such deposit.

79. The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated

payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.

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80. Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated

payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

81. Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of

the true purpose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to,

collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

82. Taking or threatening to take any non-judicial action to effect dispossession or

disablement of property if

83. there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through

an enforceable security interest;

84. there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

85. the, property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.

86. Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

87. Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any

envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram,

except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate

that he is in the debt collection business.

-CONCLUSION-

88. There is no, legally secured, security instrument on which to base Plaintiffs instant

claim for foreclosure by order for a lifting of stay and an order granting final and

summary judgment.

89. Plaintiffs bear no cognizable res.






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90. Plaintiffs by way of counsel have submitted materially altered and/or forged and/or

counterfeited documents in this matter therein and thereby are and have

committing/committed a fraud upon the court and attempting such on Defendants

Exhibits “L” “M” “N” “O” and “P” herein attached. Plaintiffs, as well their co-conspirators;

the city of Bangor, stole every bit of equity, the City of Bangor, who arbitrarily in co-

conspiratorial unilateral action rewrote the terms of Defendants alleged contract with the

city agreement in an effort to hide the facts of this case. In addition the alterations of that

contract makes this loan negatively amortizing and thus Plaintiffs and their co-

conspirators stole every single ounce of equity from this home at sale and then for the

future with the Cities unilateral move making Mrs. Butler a renter with the obligations of

taxes, insurance and upkeep.

91. Therefore, by definition, and physical material facts there are material matters of

substance, on which to base an adversarial action at the very least, let alone a simple,

instant case for foreclosure, such as this of Plaintiff’s and their’ counsel.

92. Therefore an order for final summary judgment would be statutorily counter

indicative and would statutorily be without the binding effect of law if then so ordered.

93. Appeal would be instant for the full effect of any and all legal remedies available to

Defendants.

94. Defendants are currently finishing their class complaint and their attorneys

certification for class action against Plaintiffs and their counsel and other people, such as

Barry Cohen of Cohen & Cohen LLP, Attorneys previously associated with this matter, for

common law fraud, Fraud in the inducement, and factum amongst the many crimes civil

and otherwise of Plaintiffs their’ attorneys and all previously participating people in this

fraud upon the court and Defendants.






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95. As, well several tort claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty to name

but a few of the actionable charges and claims in equity Defendants have levied at

Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel.

96. Furthermore, as this being the case, all aforementioned, then a fraud upon the court

charge would redundant in statement and left but with action.

97. Defendant’s visual graphic displays; explaining, their points, as succinctly as possible.

Defendants Exhibits “Q” and “R”

98. “…It Does Not Require A Majority To Prevail But Rather An Irate and Tireless Minority Keen

To Set Brush Fires In People’s Minds.” Samuel Adams.

99. In, the words of my ancestor “Mininutis vasis vitutus consistit perfecta victoriae suae

actiones subtilis.” Pierce Butler, Founding father, Signer of The Constitution of the United

States, Creator of the Electoral College and Co-creator and designer of the American

Judicial System.

100. “You must be the change you want to see in the world” Mahatma Ghandi.

101. “ Any and all, realistic, effective change; starts, with an honest, assessment of one’s self and

with one’s own reflection in the mirror. To change what, one, has only imagined, to, be reality, [is] to

change nothing at all.” Charlton A Butler Jr.

102. “Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,” Nudd v. Burrows, 91

U.S.

103. “Fraud vitiates everything,” Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210.

104. “Fraud vitiates the most solemn of contracts, documents and even judgments,” U.S. v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61.






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-PRAYER-

Therefore, Defendants pray this honorable court order permanent injunctive and

declaratory relief. Plaintiff’s entire complaint; being one long continuous fraud upon the

court, in this action, and should, for that fraud, for just this one fraudulent action alone,

provide, for relief, as Defendants make prayer for.

Defendants humbly pray this honorable for sanctions, permanent injunctive and

declaratory relief sanctions and, any, and all other relief deemed appropriate by this

honorable court for these most egregious and criminal actions against Defendants. In the

alternative Defendants demand a Jury Trial all while preserving Defendants right to

counsel Gideon and Lassiter aside, all Federal claims and any and all rights that must be

claimed or risk being waived for a lack of preservation named and unnamed.

Defendants would humbly remind this court that the law is not about BEING right it is

about having the right answer and doing the right thing. Until we heal what illness, aches,

the human soul, this, and all other courts, I am afraid, will be subject to the,

understandable, attitude, of the public, as being the source of a lack of justice for all but

the very wealthy with what is fast becoming obvious colorable intent on both sides the

judicial bench. Plaintiffs actions, as well, the bench, across America..

We can change that today your honor with the right and correct adjudication of this

matter and Therefore an order granting Permanent Injunction from Plaintiffs and their






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counsel attempting any and all further actions against Defendants, Declaratory relief,

relating to the unscrupulous nature of Plaintiffs and Counsel, and Sanctions for those

actions.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of Febuary 2012.

__________________________________________________________

Twila A. Butler f/k/a Wolf Defendant pro se

__________________________________________________________

Charlton A. Butler Jr. Defendant-Intervenor pro se