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Meinong's Hume Studies: Part I: Meinong's NominalismAuthor(s): Kenneth BarberSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Jun., 1970), pp. 550-567Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105634Accessed: 02/02/2009 10:33

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MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES *

Part I: Meinong's Nominalism

Meinong's two Humne Studies, 1 undertaken at the suggestion of his teacher, Franz Brentano, present a critical investigation of the British empiricists with respect to the issue of nominalism and the status of relations. The Studies are historical; Meinong offers an interpretation of controversial texts and traces the influence of the earlier empiricists upon the later. But they are also critical since Meinong attempts solutions to the problems besetting Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Although these Studies have received little critical attention they yield a fair indication of Meinong's early ontology and therefore are of metaphysical as well as historical interest.2 This paper attempts to assess the merit of the ontology expounded in the Studies and consequently the historical material will be considered primarily insofar as it concerns or is, needed to, understand Meinong's own views. The first part of the paper deals with Meinong's discussion of the nominalism-realism issue; the second discusses his anal- yses of relations and, in particular, the relations of equality and similarity which provide the key to, his solution to the nominalism-realism issue. Before engaging Meinong's arguments it will be profitable to articulate the philosophical issue at stake and to indicate Meinong's own views. This will establish the connection between the two Hume Studies and, consequently, between the two parts of the paper.

Consider a visual field containing two spots of the same shade of red. One question (though not the only one) philosophers have asked about

* Research for this essay was partly conducted during the tenure of a Research Fellowship awarded by the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for Summer, 1968. A second part is to be printed in a later issue.

I Meinong, Alexius, "Hume Studien. I. Zur Geschichte, und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus. II. Zur Relationstheorie," Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 87 (1877), 185-260; 101 (1882), 573-750.

2 For a detailed and intensive study, to which I am indebted, of Meinong's later views, see Bergmann, Gustav, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967.See also an earlier sutdy by Findlay, J. N., Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, Oxford, 1963.

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this situation is: How does one account for both spots being the same shade of red? The question is ontological; one is asking for an analysis in terms of categorical features, which features account for the two spots both being the same shade of red. That is, in order for the sentence, "the two spots are the same shade of red," to be ture, there must be some entity or entities in the spots corresponding to, the terms in the sentence such that they ground the truth of the sentence. This entity, or these entities, are of a kind, or kinds, i.e., they exhibit certain categorical features. The ontological analysis, or account, of the two spots being the same shade of red specifies these features. No entities are discovered in the process; one only makes clear the kind or kinds of entities involved. Meinong discusses three possible answers to the question. Two are rejected; one he accepts. I shall first sketch t~he three answers without attending to his arguments; the criticism of his discussion will occupy us later.

(1) The first view, extreme nominalism (EN), claims that there is nothing in the spots which grounds the truth of the sentence. "Red" is used in describing both spots, but there is no distinct entity or entities in them which would correspond to the word; hence, there is nothing to categorize. Extreme nominalism is no more than a rejection of the problem and, as such, is clearly absurd for it grounds neither the truth of the sentence nor the application, of the word "red" to the spots. Meinong rejects this alternative.

(2) The second view, realism (R), maintains that there is a single entity grounding the truth of the sentence present in both spots. This entity (red) is a universal, although not in the Platonic sense for, con- trary to Platonism, the entity is claimed to be a constituent of each spot. This claim rests on the fact that we perceive red as a constitutent of both spots, or, equivalently, the claim is phenomenologically based on the fact that the color of the one spot is, indistinguishable from the color of the other. In other words, the, argument for this alternative is not dialectical, but instead is based on what is claimed to be an accurate description of what is presented.

(3) The third view, moderate nominalism (MN), holds that there are two numerically distinct entities, one in each spot, which ground the truth of the sentence. There is a quality (a shade of red) in each spot but the qualities in each spot, though both the same shade of red, are yet distinct from one another. If the phenomenological claim at the core of R is correct then the claim that there are two, entities, one in each spot, grounding the application of "red" cannot be phenomenologically based. Rather, dialectical arguments must be offered in support of this position. (This, we shall see, is Meinong's ploy.) One need not engage in a detailed

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criticism of this alternative in order to note that those opting for it soon encounter a difficulty: If there really are two distinct entities, one in each spot, why does "red" apply to both? Or, equivalently, what is there about each entity which justifies the application of the word to both? It appears that one is forced to admit that the color of each spot is complex. One constituent of the complex is needed to account for its color being numerically distinct from that of the other spot; another constituent is needed to account for both colors being red. This; gambit, however, leads immediately to the following dilemma: If the constituent of the one color which accounts for its being the same color as the color of the other spot is numerically identical with the corresponding constituent of the latter, then the original move is unwarranted and unnecessary. For if the constituents of the two colors, by virtue of which they are both red, are numerically the same, then why could not the color of the one spot itself be numerically identical with that of the other? On the other hand, if this possibility is disallowed, then the problem arises once more at the level of the constituents of the colors; hence the constituents of the two colors which account for their both being the same shade of red are themselves complex, and, so on. The resulting infinite regress, is surely a disagreeable consequence of this alternative.

The solution proposed by Meinong (among others) is to place a relation of equality between the two numerically distinct colors. This preserves the numerical distinctness of the two colors and at the same time accounts for their both being the same color; they are both red because they jointly exemplify the equality relation. Needless to say, this view needs more discussion. The rest of this paper is in fact an expo- sition and criticism of Meinong's version of it. Meinong's solution, then, is a variant of MN; his first Hume-Studien propounds an MN doctrine of perfect particulars while the second analyzes relations, including those of similarity and equality which are needed to answer the most obvious objection against perfect particulars.

1. Meinong's Nominalism

Meinong does not fully articulate an ontology in the first Hume Study, nor would one expect him to do so given the largely historical nature of this monograph. Thus it is no surprise that much of what he says about the objects of presentation is sketchy and that his analysis of mind is even more vapid. Nevertheless, certain ontological distinctions do emerge in the context of the historical discussion, and these distinctions are crucial for properly evaluating Meinong's. own philosophical claims.

Meinong's two fundamental distinctions are between (1) simple and

MEINONG's HUME STUDIES 553

complex and (2) concept and object. Because they are so fundamental it is difficult to talk separately about either. I shall attempt to, do so by discussing the former in detail before turning to the latter. This procedure has two justifications: (A) The distinctions overlap, for both concepts and objects are complexes composed of simples. Hence, one can discuss the simple/complex distinction without specifying whether the complexes themselves and the entities in them are concepts or objects and without examining the status of either. (B) While Meinong says a great deal about the first distinction, he says little about the second. Nor need he, in view of (A), say much about the second distinction in order to discuss the first. And the first distinction is, as it happens, for his purpose as well as mine, the heart of the matter.

(Presented) things are complex; a simple is an entity which is a part of some complex.3 This claim no empiricist, including Meinong, wished to deny. But the desire to maintain a distinction and the ability to secure it dialectically are two things and not one. 4 For the distinction to be dialectically secure one must specify a sense of part which meets the following three conditions: (1) The simple is distinct from the complex of which it is a part; i.e., the simple and the complex are numerically different. (2) The simple is inseparable from the complex, i.e., in order not to violate the principle of exemplification, a simple does not and cannot exist without being a member of some complex. (3) We may know simples as well as complexes.

The difficulties encountered in trying to satisfy (3), which is an epis- temological condition or requirement, led Hume in effect to deny that conditions (1) and (2) could be met. Meinong therefore focuses on (3) as the key which, if found,. will make it possible to satisfy (1) and (2). His crucial move is to distinguish between being presented with and being aware of. For he agrees with Berkeley and Hume that one is only presented with complexes. Hence, if to be aware of something were simply to be presented with it, then it would follow that one could only be aware of complexes. Meinong's gambit is to claim that while being presented with a complex one can focus attention on a part of that com- plex. The ability to do this does not require any peculiarly metaphysical talent; it is a feature of ordinary experience. Or so, at least, we are told:

3 "Thing" and "entity" are here used neutrally with respect to the distinction between concepts and objects. This is part of the strategy just explained. Nor, there- fore, does "presented thing" (Vorstellung) in this context mean more than "thing."

4 Berkeley and Hume wished to maintain this distinction, although the latter found it very difficult to do so.

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One may doubt whether he can ignore metaphysical or logical parts. But then he can have no such doubt concerning physical parts. No one doubts that he notices in very different ways the several impressions which are presented simultaneously to the eye or ear. But if one asks someone who has never engaged in philosophical speculation how he could miss this or that which he undoubtedly had before his eyes, he will simply say that he attended to somee- thing different.. .5 Attention belongs to those facts of mental life for whose explanation psychology has yet done little at all. But we are nevertheless all well enough acquainted with it through inner experience, well enough for the problem of abstraction to be considered as solved as soon as it has been reduced to the phenomena of attention....6

At first glance it appears that Meinong has secured his objective. Having distinguished between being presented with and being aware of, he seems to have grounded the distinction commonsensically. But note that the example, which in the context is ad hominem against Berkeley, only secures the ability to be aware of, or to abstract, physical, i.e., spatial partsJ.7 Meinong, however, proceeds to make a stronger claim which is not supported by the example:

... while considering an individual it lies in our power to concentrate atten- tion on some characteristic to such an extent that we can ignore the other attributes.8

Surely the relation between an individual and one of its characteristics is not that of one physical (or spatial) whole to, one of its parts;, nor, of course, like that of one such part to another. One cannot speak of the color of a table as being below its shape, as one can say of its legs that they are below its top. Rather, it would appear that this is a case of what he calls (being a) logical or metaphysical part. If so!, then he has not grounded in ordinary experience what he calls "abstraction." He appears to realize that. His use of "ignore" makes it even more implau- sible that abstraction could ever be grounded in ordinary experience. For one can grant that we may concentrate attention on some one charac- teristic (of an object) without granting that while so doing we ignore (do not perceive?) all others. Meinong could have avoided the difficulties caused by the introduction of the alleged ability to ignore if he had been

5 H.S.I., p. 196. The translations are the author's. 6 H.S.I., p. 198. 7 Nor of course does Berkeley himself want to deny the possibility of abstrac-

tion in the case of spatial parts. See his Principles of Human Knowledge, Intro., sect. 10. Despite Berkeley's avowal, Meinong's discussion does contain telling points against Berkeley. See H.S.I., pp. 194-196.

9 H.S.I., p. 198.

MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES 555

willing to rest his case on a passage in Berkeley which he employs, 9 namely, Berkeley's claim that we can consider a simple characteristic of an individual. In other words, one can distinguish, and Meinong could have distinguished, between being presented with and being aware of by using the commonsensical distinction between what one is presented with and what one considers or attends to.

But what is perhaps more interesting, one can also find a plausible explanation of why he so easily slides from spatial to metaphysical or logical parts, a move which, as we have seen, create the difficulty. To do this one must discover what he takes to be the simple con- stituents pisked out by attention. This can be accomplished by examining Meinong's answer to the question: Can a simple be a constituent of more than one complex? On this point he is fortunately very clear.

Two arguments he presents, one linguistic, one dialectical, contain and explain his answer. Preliminary to either is an account of what he means by "identical": With respect to, complexes, we say that two com- plexes are identical even when they do not contain the same (i.e., literally one and the same) constituents.'0 For example, the chair I now see is identical with the chair I saw yesterday even though containing different spatial determinations. With respect to simple attributes, however, to say that two are identical is to say they are literally one and not two. With this in mind, Meinong's first argument is directed against Mill's claim that exactly equal attributes are identical." This claim is allegedly sup- ported by our speaking of two objects having the same size the same color, etc., where "same" is taken to be synonymous with "identical" in the second sense. Meinong first observes that we just as often speak of equal size, equal color, etc. Hence, he then argues, since "equal" does not have the same meaning as "identical," the conventions involved in speaking about color, etc., are ambiguous and can therefore not be used to establish by an appeal to linguistic usage that one and the same attribute can be a member of several complexes.'2 This argument is of relatively little importance for it is wholly negative; the fact of ambiguous linguistic conventions shows that no analysis of attributes, including Meinong's, can be established through such an appeal.

Meinong's second argument is contained in the following passage:

Suppose we have two congruent triangles, A and B. Is the triangularity of A identical with the triangularity of B? That is, is the triangularity of A the triangularity of B? No one will deny that A can persist even if B is annihilated,

9 Principles, Intro., sect. 22. See also H.S.I., pp. 196-197. 10 H.S.l., pp. 205-206. 11 The reference is to Logic, b.1, Ch. II, sect. 4. 12 H.S.I., p. 205.

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just as it will not be challenged that the attribute cleaves to its object, persists with it, but also vanishes with it. Hence, if B no longer exists, then the trian- gularity of B does not exist either, while A and the triangularity of A continue to exist undisturbed. But now, according to Mill, the triangularity of A is the triangularity of B. Hence, this self-same triangularity both does and does not exist which no one will be inclined to consider possible.13

What clearer proof could there be that Meinong has an MN ontology? The triangularity of A is numerically distinct from the triangularity of B; the triangularity of each is a perfect particular. But even though the claim itself is clear, the argument purporting, to establish it is. less so. Meinong's three assertions concerning the relation between an, attribute and its object do not in the least prove what they are intended to prove. That an attribute cleaves to its object is, true of one means that the attribute does not exist independently of being related to some object; the claim that it vanishes. with its object follows from nothing and is only a dogmatic assertion of the doctrine of perfect particulars.

The latter half of the passage fares no better. Here Meinong argues that if two objects, have (one and) the same attribute, and if one object (and consequently its attributes) is destroyed, the attribute which is shared by the other object must also be destroyed. The key to! this argu- ment lies in what he means by an attribute being destroyed, for one can give two quite different senses to the notion of destruction. (1) What is created and destroyed is, literally the attribute. (2) What is created and destroyed is the fact that the attribute stands in a relation to this object. Considering the second sense of "destroy," one sees that with it the argument collapses. If the destruction of an attribute means~ that it no longer stands in a relation, to this object,, then such destruction does not preclude the possibility of its. continuing to exist and to stand in a relation to some other object. Triangularity, for instance, may be related to both A and B; but its ceasing to be related to B entails, nothing con- cerning its continuing to exist and being related to A.

With the first sense, on the other hand, the argument stands'. If by the destruction of an object is, meant the literal destruction of all its attributes,, it would of course follow that none of its attribute could be related to any object. That is, by the destruction, of this object, one does not mean that the constituents (attributes) of the object are no longer so related to one another as to form this object, but that the attributes are literally destroyed. The difficulty in so reading Meinong's argument is that it suggests that one may speak of an attribute as, coming to be or ceasing to be independently of its standing in a relation to any object.

13 H.S.I., p. 206.

MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES 557

This one may consistently do only if he holds that there are separated universals. It is not consistent with Meinong's claim, made here and elsewhere,'4 that an attribute cleaves to its object or, equivalently, that there are no separated universals.

Both interpretations of "destroy" render it difficult to capture the force of Meinong's argument. One is therefore led to search for an intellectual motive which might have misled him into thinking that it was stronger than it is. A clue is; contained in our earlier discussion where it was noticed that Meinong shifts all too easily from physical parts to logical or metaphysical ones. The shift, though striking to us, gains plausibility for him on the assumption that he. assimilates the relation between an object and, one of its attribute to) that between an object and one of its physical (spatial) parts. Nor is that all. The same assumption also lends initial plausibility to his dialectical argument for perfect particulars.

Consider two tables which, for some odd reason, have a leg in com- mon. This leg is a constituent of two different complexes in the sense that it stands in spatial relations to the other elements of two complexes in a way which makes it a spatial (and physical) part of both these com- plexes. If, therefore,. one of the tables is destroyed, then obviously the common leg is also destroyed. That is., if two "overlapping" objects share a common spatial part, then one cannot destroy one of the two objects without also destroying that spatial part of the other. The argument thus construed obviously uses "destruction" in the first or literal sense. Again, this is consistent with our interpretation.

The plausibility thus gained is not an unmixed blessing. The spatial metaphor, taken seriously, may well incline one to a doctrine of perfect particulars. Unfortunately, though, or even ironically, it also! makes all argument against separated universals specious. The best one can say, therefore, is that the doctrine of perfect particulars which Meinong held at that time fed upon the identification of logical and spatial parts, with- out claiming that he explicitly and effectively supported it by appealing to this identification. Rather, it would seem that neither the analysis of attributes nor that of their relation to objects occupied his attention at that time.

Evidence that he did not then fully understand the perfect particulars doctrine he espoused may also be, found in his remarks on the problem of individuation. To see that, consider that if one analyzes an ordinary object into a bundle of perfect particulars, the problem of individuation is already solved. Or, even more strongly, it never arises. For there is

14 See, for example, H.S.I., pp. 191-192, where he agrees with Berkeley's polemic against Lockean abstraction.

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no problem unless one assumes that the two, objects in question share literally the same simple, nonrelational properties. In this case, there must be some further entities to account for the two' objects being numerically different. Upon an MN analysis, however, no two objects literially share any properties. Meinong thus had a very simple means for disposing of the problem. Yet the text leaves no doubt that he did not use this means. That alone, I submit, is rather compelling evidence that he failed to, appreciate fully the import of his own analysis of attributes.

In discussing the problem of individuation, Meinong rejects one tradi- tional solution, accepts another. The solution he rejects maintains that in each object there is a substance in which its several qualities inhere. These substances account for each object being numerically distinct from every other, and, being continuants, also for an, object remaining the same through time while undergoing qualitative change. He does not explicitly discuss either the various meanings which can be given to "substance" or the various uses to' which the doctrine can. be put. Nor does he explicitly reject the substance doctrine. Yet he leaves no doubt that he will have none of it. On the several occasions he mentions sub- stance, he does so disparagingly, referring to the doctrine as a meta- physical theory of dubious merit.15 More importantly, when speaking of what we are acquainted with, he explicitly denies that substances are objects of acquaintance:

The cooncretum includes; nothing but the complex of characteristics which by virtue of the nature of the object all at once intrudes upon the senses.... 3

Clearly, and quite traditionally, substances are not presented; the object of acquaintance is a bundle of qualities. Equally clearly, it is his "empiri- cism" which commits him to the rejection of anything thus "hidden." Meinong, we saw, thinks that he has a problem of individuation. Now we see that he rejects substances. Thus he can of course not use them as individuators. The entities he casts for this role are those he calls place determinations (Ortsbestimmungen) and time determinations! (Zeit- bestimmungen).17 Each complex which is a physical object contains a space and atime datum (quality); if it is a psychical object, then it con- tains a time datum. In either case the datum or pair of data is unique to "its" complex and thus accounts for that complex being numerically distinct from every other. Notice, though, that in the spirit of Meinong's

15 See, for example, H.S.I., pp. 193-194, 204. 16 H.S.I., p. 203. 17 For the fullest discussion of this point, see H.S.II. pp. 619-622.

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antisubstantialism, "object" in the last two sentences stands for what would more accurately be called a (temporal) cross section of a (con- tinuant) physical or psychical object. The distinction is crucial. The "object" in a temporal cross section is not what we would ordinarily call an object, although it is an individual since it does contain an in- dividuator. The ordinary object, the continuant, for Meinong is a series of individuals which are contiguous in space and time. Thus the con- tinuant is reconstructed since there is nothing which literally "continues" or "endures" through the whole series.18 Meinong's discussion of indi- viduation, as we shall soon see, suffers from not explicitly distinguishing between the individual within a temporal cross section and the recon- structed continuant.

With respect to physical objects in a temporal cross section, he claims that the spatial datum in it individuates the object. That he claims this is clear; his defense of the claim is not. The question he actually dis- cusses is how many objects can fall under, or correspond to, a given concrete idea. The search is thus for some constituent of the idea (not: of the object!) which will assure that only one object can fall under it. Having identified as this constituent (of the idea) the idea of the space datum, he then worries about the "status" of the fact that the space datum individuates. This worry is both confused and confusing. Consider, for example, the following passage:

The still pending dispute among psychologists whether one can see different colors at one and the same place at the same time shows at least that such an hypothesis is not absurd. The law of the impenetrability of bodies is not analytic. And if it is not contradictory that different objects could at the same time occupy the same place, then it is hard to see why these objects should lose their different individualities if they otherwise by chance agreed in every respect. This distinction is naturally not of practical significance; for if the law of impenetrability does not have mathematical certainty, it yet has in any case physical certainty.19

The question raised in this passage is one and one only: Is it analytic or synthetic that places individuate? Or, equivalently, is it analytic or synthetic that only one object falls under an idea containing an idea of a place datum? That identifies the "status" alternative involved: Ts a certain proposition analytic or synthetic? The difficulty, as I will show,

18 Evidence for this claim is provided by his discussion of identity. See H.S.II., pp. 707-713.

19 H.S.I., p. 202. Meinong gives the following footnote to support the psycholo- gists' claim: Helmholtz, Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (Karsten's, Allgemeine Encyklopddie der Physik, Vol. IX), Leipzig, Sect. 20, p. 273 ff.

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is not that Meinong gives the wrong answer, but rather that the whole worry about the alternative is confused.

As he argues, it is not analytic that places individuate because the negation of the law of the impenetrability of bodies, which he (mis- takenly) holds to be the ground for the individuating role of places,. is not itself analytic. But notice that, when making the argument in the above passage, he begins by talking about two colors occupying the same place and then shifts to talking about two objects occupying the same place. Thus he puts two different propositions in the same boat. Two colors cannot be in the same place. This is one. Two objects cannot be in the same place. This, is the second. Since the first is. not analytic, neither is the second. This is the gist of his argument. The reason it fails is that if one takes seriously the suggestion that places individuate, then one cannot talk about two (momentary) objects occuping the same place. An object, to be an object (individual) must contain an indi- viduator, which, in this world, is a space datum. The latter is what makes the individual an individual. Hence, it is literally unintelligible to suggest that two objects have the same space datum, for the very meaning of "two" in this context requires that there be two space data. The sup- position that two colors are at the same place, on the other hand, is false but at least intelligible. It is false because of the synthetic a priori truth about our world that no two colors are ever at the same place. It is intelligible, however, because "two" does have meaning in, this con- text; two colors are two, not because they are attached to different space data, but because they are qualitatively distinguishable. Hence, Meinong errs in treating the question of two colors being at the same place and the question of two objects being at the same place as if they were ques- tions on the same level.

There may, however, be a reason for his taking the claim that two objects cannot occupy the same place to be synthetic a priori. By focusing the question in terms of ideas and the objects which correspond to them, he is led to overlook an ambiguity in the notion of an object. The idea of an object may be either that of a (momentary) entity in. the same temporal cross section as the idea, or it may be that of a continuant which is simultaneous with "its" idea in one temporal cross section. What we just saw is, that if one is considering the temporal cross section in isolation from all other cross sections (of the continuant), then the very notion of two "objects" occupying the same place is unintelligible unless places do not individuate. If, however, the ideas are of con- tinuants, then one may draw upon the orbit feature of such objects and speak of two objects (continuants) whose orbits intersect in this single temporal cross section, thus raising the possibility of two continuants

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having one and the same momentary individual in their respective his- tories at some moment. What Meinong might then be, taken to suggest (or, rather, if I am right, all he; could mean) is that we might possibly want to work with a notion of "continuant" so constituted (defined) that there could be two of them even if in some temporal cross section, there were literally only one (momentary) object that would, in a familiar sense, be counted as a constituent of both. In this sense, the proposition that no two continuants ever have the same momentary individual at some temporal cross section may reasonably be taken to be synthetic a prior and hence the same kind of of claim as the statement that no two colors are ever at the same place.

But to pursue this suggestion in this context is to fuse together the problem of reconstructing a serviceable notion of the continuant on the one hand and the problem of individuation on the other. This fusion is misleading; for, obviously, the reconstruction of the continuant depends upon having first solved the problem of individuation within a single temporal cross section, since the continuant, upon the view he professes, is merely a series of (momentary) complexes tracing a space-time pattern through consecutive temporal cross sections.

Furthermore, his discussion of the supposition that two objects could be in the same place assumes that it is litrally one and the same place quality which in this case is a member of two complexes. About this assumption one need only say that Meinong is ignoring the fact that his qualities are perfect particulars and therefore the place qualities in each would not be literally the same. The assumption that the place quality is literally the same in each object of course makes the place quality something radically different from other qualities. This, however, should not surprise, for there are compelling motivational reasons for separating the space-time qualities from other qualities: (1) Such "qualities" are really individuators, i.e., structurally, they are particulars. (2) Meinong does not face up to the problem of how it is that we are acquainted with such "qualities." Such structural particulars are obviously unlike other qualities in that the former are not at all recognizable. This, we see, supports the assumption that a space-time quality is only in one object; if two instances of such a quality were in two objects, we could not recognize them in themselves to be instances, of the same quality. (3) The claim that space-time qualities are unique fits with our earlier diagnosis of the connection between perfect particulars and the metaphor of spatial part, since the space quality, if anything, would be a common spatial part of two objects in the case where two, objects were at the same place; hence, it would literally be a part of two objects in. the way in which one and the same leg is a part of two tables in our previous example.

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Consider next what Meinong says about individuating psychical objects. His remarks are brief and very puzzling:

That all concrete ideas are in fact also individual must be clear to everyone who considers that each concrete idea of a psychical or physical object con- tains a completely determinate time datum, or a space and a time datum, respectively, and that in neither of the two cases can a plurality of objects be admitted, although the reason which forbids this hypothesis is not completely similar in the two cases. In, the first case, the contrary claim involves a con- tradiction for the word identity signifies, if anything, the relation of one psychical phenomenon to another psychical phenomenon which agrees with it in all determinations, including time.20 ... The doata of time ... thus point unambiguously to a single individual.2'

There is clearly a tension in this passage. On the one hand, we are, told that the data of time individuate, that such a datum excludes a plurality of objects and thus points, unambiguously to a single individual. On. the other hand, we are told that two psychical objects which agree in all their determinations, including time, are identical, i.e., that they are two objects which are qualitatively equal. The identity of complexes doles thus not signify literal sameness; two complexes are identical even though numerically different. (See above, p. 8.) The tension, then, is this: Is the equality of time determinations a condition for identity or for numerical sameness? Meinong, it appears, is asserting both.

Tlhe interesting point, however, is not that the passage is confused, but rather that one can structurally explain the source of the confusion. This requires that one clearly articulate the relation between ideas, and objects. Then it will be seen that, coupled with his doctrine of perfect particulars, Meinong's confusion leads quite naturally, even though dis- astrously, to the impasse in the above passage.

Consider two psychical objects, T and B, which are both at some point of time, T1. Since they are at T1, both A and B contain temporal data as constituents. But T1 itself cannot be the temporal constituent of both A and B, even though they are, as one says, both at T1, since upon his analysis temporal qualities, like all other qualities, are perfect particulars. Hence, the temporal quality in A must be distinct from that in B. Let this be indicated by further indices. Call t l the temporal quality in A; t12, that in B. The first index indicates that both qualities are "instances" of To; the second, that they are numerically distinct. T1 itself, we see, is not really a temporal quality, but rather is the class of all the ta qualities.

20 H.S.I., p. 202. 2I H.S.I., p. 203.

MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES 563

Now consider two concrete ideas of A and B. Refer to them, respect tively, as X and B. Since A contains t1l, X must contain A. Likewise, B must contain AW. So far so good. But now what about T? This, one can see, creates a problem, for even if T1 is only a fiction,, there must in some sense be a T1 since I can have an idea of some particular tem- poral quality such that all objects containing a temporal perfect particu- lar which is an "instance" of that quality fall under the idea. This fact must be accounted for even if T1, the class, has no ontological status.

But what then is To? The answer is simple and not at all surprig. T1 is obviously an abstract idea. An abstract idea is an idea which is the result of abstraction. To abstract is simply to focus attention on a "part" of what is presented. Furthermore, the content of an abstract idea (in this case, simply T1) "coincides .. with that part of the respec- tive concrete complex idea which is picked out by attention." 22 By saying that the content coincides with part of a concrete complex idea, Meinong identifies the content with the object. Hence, there is really no distinction between the idea and what the idea is about.23 But, and here is the crucial point, since Ti is not a constituent of any object, it is also not a constituent of any idea. In other words, T1 is really C or, if not A, then some C Thus T11 is forced to play a double role. On the one hand, it is the idea of A, on the other, it represents any of the perfect particulars, tl i.

Since C1 does play a double role, it is easy to see how one might become confused about the status of time; and, in particular, it is easy to see how Meinong is confused in the above passage. When he says that equality of time determinations is a condition for identity, he is thinking of C71 as A, so that two identical psychical objects may fall under the idea of which it is a "part." On the other hand, when he: says that the temporal determination points unambiguously to a single individual, he is thinking of w77 as ?I,. Since only one psychical object will contain t1o, a concrete idea containing A1d will of course have; only one object falling under it.

Once these distinctions are made, nlot only does the source of the confusion become intelligible, but also one can see how little time has to do with the individuation of psychical objects. For even in the case where the presence of a time determtiation indicates the individuality of the psychical object, it is clearly not the time determination per se which individuates but rather the fact that such a determination is a

22 H.S.I., p. 199. 23 Meinong is also interpreted this way by Findlay and Hicks. See Findlay,

Metnong's Theory of Objects and Values, pp. 28, 32, and Hicks, G. Dawes, "The Philosophical Researches of Meinong (I.)," Mind, 1922, pp. 1-30.

564 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

perfect particular. Once this is seen, it is clear that time is of no, more importance for individuation than any other quality since any quality, i.e., perfect particular, will serve equally well to solve the problem of individuation.

Meinong's discussion of individuation, we see, contains difficulties in the case of psychical as well as in that of physical objects. These diffi- culties, as well as those pointed out in his discussion, of perfect particu- lars, are in large part due to the brevity of his ontological analysis. That makes the attempt to resolve them textually futile. Some of these diffi- culties will occupy us later. For the time being this discussion of the issues related to what I called the simple-complex distinction will do. I turn next to his second fundamental distinction, that between concept and object.

There are two questions to be asked about concepts and objects: (1) What is their status? (2) What is the relation between concepts and objects? About the second question Meinong says a great deal and what he says is, in fact, crucial to his resolution of some of the empiricists' terminological, if not ontological, difficulties. About the, first question, however, he says very little, and even that only obliquely. Because of this brevity, what he says about the status of concepts and objects can be examined quickly. I shall therefore first do that and then turn to the more fruitful question of the relation between concepts and objects.

The choice of the words "concept" (Begriff) and "object" (Gegenstand) is at best somewhat arbitrary and at worst not very helpful. "Concept," for example, is used synonymously with "idea" (Idee, also sometimes, Vorstellung).24 This shows that the choice is arbitrary. To see that it is not very helpful, consider that while concepts and ideas, are clearly psychical entities, "object," as we have seen, is used both for psychical and physical entities.

Nevertheless, a close reading of the text does uncover a sharp dis- tinction between psychical objects (concepts and ideas) and physical objects. In the second Hume Study we are told that psychical phenomena are the only direct data; that is, we are directly acquainted only with psychical objects. This, he claims, is an uncontroversial point upon which both realist and idealist agree; their disagreement supposedly lies only in how they utilize these data.25 The idealist presumably holds that there are only psychical phenomena and that what we call physical objects are merely constructions made out of them. The realist, on the other hand,

24 See H.S.I., pp. 188, 20 1-202, for selected examples of the interchangeability of these terms.

25 H.S.HI., p. 609.

MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES 565

would presumably maintain that in addition to psychical objects there are also physical ones with which we are acquainted indirectly (if at all).

Meinong appears to be a realist, although it is clear that in this study he wishes to ignore the metaphysical issues every articulate realist must eventually face. Evidence for his realism is, for instance, in his, assertion that physical objects are, after all, the proper objects of knowledge.26 But even though our knowledge is not chiefly of ideas but of their objects, it is true that concrete ideas are to be considered the founda- tions of knowledge. 27 And since he is in these studies primarily con- cerned with the foundations of knowledge, he feels that he can at least for the time being ignore the difficult question about the proper objects of our knowledge. Yet, in spite of this reluctance, he does at one point make a telling admission, namely, that one can abstract only from ideas but not from the real qualities of things. 28 Since for him abstraction is only focusing attention on the constituents of what is presented, the claim that we cannot abstract from the real qualities of things entails that on his view we are not presented with such qualities. Thus he is forced into representationalism. But even if this is correct, even if physi- cal objects are unpresented, represented entities, such representationalism plays no crucial role in the Hume Studies, since the emphasis is not on the proper objects of knowledge but, rather, on psychical phenomena. And with respect to psychical entities, there is, as we saw, really no dis- tinction between concepts and objects since, at this stage in his thinking, he identifies the content of a concept with its object. This is the core of his brief remarks on the status of concepts and objects.

The second question concerns the relation between concepts and ob- jects. This, is really a question about the relation between what he calls the content (Inhalt) and extension (Umfang) of a concept, since the object(s) falling under a concept (or idea) is really the extension of the concept. His contribution in discussing this relation lies in giving a precise meaning to four terms which were often used ambiguously. 29

These four terms are: abstract, concrete, general, particular. His sugges, tion is this: all four terms pick out classes of concepts. The first two, "abstract" and "concrete," do, so in virtue of the content of the concept; the latter two, "general" and "particular," in virtue of its, extension. The classes as one might expect, overlap. I state first the conditions under

26 H.S.II., p. 610. 27 Ibid. 28 H.S.I., pp. 193-194. 29 This contribution has not been overlooked. Since Hicks, op. cit., and Robert-

son, George Croom, "Critical Notice of Hume-Studien I," Mind 3 (1878), 386-389.

566 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

which a concept belongs to one of the four classes, then the relations among the latter.

Concrete concepts: A concrete concept is a complex which includes all of the characteristics which are presented with an object on a given occasion. It need not include all of the characteristics that the, object is known to have, but only those which are at that time presented. Most importantly, the space-time characteristics are included.30

Abstract concepts: An abstract concept is either a simple or a com- plex which is the result of abstraction, i.e., the result of focusing atten- tion on some of the characteristics of an object which is presented.3'

Particular concepts: A concept is particular if only one object can fall under it. The conditions required for a concept to be particular have already been discussed under the heading of individuation.

General concepts: A concept under which several objects can fall is a general concept; how many actually fall under it is of course not deter- mined by the concept.

With respect to the various overlappings which may obtain between these classes, it is obvious that two are immediately excluded by the above definitions. A concept cannot be both abstract and concrete, nor can it be both particular and general. The above definitions then leave us with four possible combinations: concrete-particular, concrete-general, abstract-general, and abstract-particular.

All concrete concepts are particular. Since the concrete idea includes the space-time qualities, only one object can fall under such a concept.

No concrete concepts are general. Again, the presence of the splace- time data excludes the possibility of several objects corresponding to one concrete idea.

Some, but not all, particular concepts are concrete. That is, some abstract concepts are also particular. For example, what is expressed by a definite description is abstract, but only one object can answer to it.32 Or, one may abstract the space-time datum itself, creating the abstract idea of an object at this time and place, under which only one object can fall.

All general concepts are abstract. If an idea is to be general it must not include the space-time datum; hence, it is abstract. The converse, however, does not hold. Some abstract ideas are in fact particular.

This is merely the skeleton of Meinong's division. But its details are clearly stated in the text. So there is no need to reproduce them here.

30 H.S.I., p. 203. 31 H.S.I., p. 200. 32 H.S.I., p. 207.

MEINONG'S HUME STUDIES 567

Nor shall I bother with the details of the lengthy analysis in, which he exposes the terminological confusions of various authors, although some of the distinctions he makes on this occasion are put to good use in his criticism of the empiricists.33

KENNETH BARBER. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO.

33 His brief criticism of Locke is a good example of the usefulness of his dis- tinctions. Locke, he argues, makes the general idea of a triangle contain incom- patible elements because he fails to distinguish between the content and extension of such an idea, therefore putting properties relevant objects of thoe latter ino the former.