Barnes and Bloor “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge”

In broad outlines, Barnes and Bloor (B&B) argue that:(1) The arguments against relativism fail.(2) The rationalist alternatives to relativism are unscientific.(3) So, if scientific understanding of knowledge is desirable, then relativism is

necessary. PreliminariesLet’s get clearer about Barnes and Bloor’s main thesis:

If scientific understanding of knowledge is desirable, then relativism is necessary.a. Any understanding of knowledge must answer the question “How does S

know that p?” where S is a person and p some true, declarative sentence.i. Ex. How did Einstein know that e= mc2? How do I know that

2+2=4?b. Traditionally, philosophical understanding of knowledge answered this

question by citing S’s reasons for believing that p.i. Ex. KK knows that 2+2=4 because he knows that 1+1+1+1=4 and

that 1+1 = 2, so if 2+2 4, then 1+1 2.c. In contrast, scientific understanding of knowledge answers this question

by citing S’s causes for believing that p, using the resources of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history.

i. Ex. KK knows that 2+2=4, because he was taught that 2+2=4 in America in the early 1980’s, late 20th and early 21st century Americans authorize arithmetic claims of this sort, he has the kind of cognitive and neural structure that can process this kind of information, humans incapable of simple addition were more likely to die before passing on their genes, etc.

Let’s also get clear about what’s at stake in being a relativist.Relativism consists of: (22)

d. The observation that beliefs on a certain topic varye. The conviction that which of these beliefs is found in a given context,

depends on, or is relative to, the circumstance of the users.f. The equivalence postulate: “All beliefs are on a par with one another with

respect to the causes of their credibility.” (23)i. Regardless of its truth or falsity, rationality or irrationality,

scientific understanding demands that we ask questions such as, “Is a belief part of the routine cognitive and technical competences handed down from generation to generation? Is it enjoined by the authorities of the society? Is it transmitted by established institutions of socialization or supported by accepted agencies of social control? Is it bound up with patterns of vested interest? Does it have a role in furthering shared goals, whether political, technical, or both? What are the practical and immediate

consequences of particular judgments that are made with respect to the belief? (23)

Barnes and Bloor note that several historical, sociological, and anthropological studies have proceeded “without concern for the epistemological status of the cases being addressed.” (23)

Objection: They originally stated that scientific understanding of knowledge required relativism. This would mean that there is no instance of scientific understanding of knowledge in which rational and irrational beliefs have the different causes. The examples simply show that there are some cases in which rational and irrational beliefs are explained by appeal to the same causes. Thus, it defends the much weaker claim that it is possible to have a scientific understanding of knowledge and be a relativist.

The arguments against relativismII.Those who object to relativism object to the equivalence postulate, typically asserting that rational beliefs should be explained by the reasons people had for adopting them, while irrational beliefs should be explained in terms of psychological and social causes that biased the agent.

Ex. If I believe that there is a laptop computer in front of me, then we typically will cite my reason for believing this—e.g., I see a laptop computer in front of me, and that I have good vision, etc. However, we explain weird superstitions, mythologies, etc. of past generations by answering the kinds of questions B&B mentioned above—e.g., citing historical causes for their beliefs—people believed in witches because it was a way of maintaining social order particularly with respect to independent-minded women who might challenge that social order.

The Self-Defeating ObjectionThese same critics of relativism typically argue that relativism is self-defeating because if ‘true’ and ‘false’ are relative to one’s culture, then what becomes of the following claim?

(R) The truth and falsity of all claims is relative to a culture.(1) Either (R) is true or it is false.(2) If (R) is true, then since most cultures do not tolerate this kind of relativism, (R) is false.(3) If (R) is false, then some claims are not relative to a culture, so (R) is false.(4) Thus (R) is false.

B&B rebut this argument with the following what I like to call the Bookkeeping ArgumentImagine two tribes T1 and T2 with different beliefs and different standards of evaluating beliefs. A member of T1 confronts the beliefs of T2, and using T1’s standards of evaluations, decides that he prefers T1’s beliefs to T2’s. Similarly, the relativist prefers his beliefs to the rationalist’s on the basis of his own, relativistic standards of evaluation. More generally, we can see this as attacking the cogency of (2).

(2’) If (R) is true, then (R) is true for at least one culture—let’s call it the R-culture.

(a) By the R-culture’s lights, the other cultures are wrong for denying (R), but for all other cultures, it would be perfectly okay to claim that (R) is false.

However, for this to work, (R) must be reconstrued:(R’) A claim p is true at time t if and only if there exists a culture at t that believes that p.

As a result there is no “inherently rational belief” only “locally accepted beliefs”

They then make the stronger claim that because “there are no context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality…rationally and irrational held beliefs [do not make] up distinct and qualitatively different classes of thing.” (27-8)

Objection: The issue isn’t about whether or not rational and irrational are different kinds of things, it’s about whether they should be explained the same way. An analogy: a working car engine and a non-working car engine are not different classes of things, but explaining why one works and the other doesn’t requires appealing to different causes, e.g., I put sugar in the gas tank…Thus the rationalist might claim that just as we appeal to general principles of mechanics in explaining a functioning engine and contingent factors when explaining a malfunctioning engine, we might appeal to general principles of rationality when explaining correct beliefs and appeal to local, contingent factors when explaining incorrect beliefs.

The Credibility versus Validity ArgumentIII.B&B then try to debunk the claim that the credibility of a belief that they wish to explain, has nothing to do with the validity that is the typical locus of philosophical analysis. Here credibility means the causes whereby a certain belief was adopted, and validity, the reasons upon which it ought to have been adopted.

B&B note that what counts as a “good reason” is one of the “more contingent and more socially variable” concepts. (28)

Objection: It’s hard to see how this doesn’t beg all of the important questions. Where the relativist will say that there are certain contexts in which a person offers reasons for a belief that are bad by our standards, they were good by her standards. In response, the rationalist will claim that they are just flat-out bad reasons and the person’s standards are also bad for permitting this as a good reason.

IV.B&B acknowledge this objection, noting that the rationalist may object that the argument in part III “only applies to what are taken to be reasons, rather than what to what really are reasons.” B&B reply to it by noting that this would force an untenable division between validity and credibility:

(1) Suppose someone in tribe T1 is evaluating the beliefs of a person in tribe T2.

(2) For the T1 member, the “objective criteria” by which he judges the truth/falsity of T2’s beliefs will be those prescribed by T1, i.e., those he takes to be good reasons.

Objection: But someone could mistake what are good reasons, and thus wrongly attribute a false belief to the T2-member.

The rationalist alternatives to relativismThe empiricist alternativeV.However, the anti-relativist might object that there appear to be certain kinds of claims—paradigmatically those formed on the basis of direct observation—that don’t appear to be socially contingent.

B&B counter with the following arguments:The disciplinary division of labor argument (DDL):

(1) Direct observation and negotiating one’s environment are abilities shared with non-human species, and are typically studied by biologists and psychologists.

(2) Sociologists take these abilities for granted.(3) But (almost) every discipline takes something for granted.(4) Thus, the ability to directly observe and navigate through an environment doesn’t

undermine the sociology of knowledge.

The Insufficiency of Psychology to Sociology Argument (IPS)(1) Even if the sociologist takes these kinds of abilities for granted, the psychological

story about perception does not address the sociological questions about perception, namely why do certain patterns of perception get instituted and others neglected or dismissed?

a. Here they highlight an analogy between a map and a individual organism’s knowledge of a terrain. (32)

(2) Thus, the ability to directly observe and navigate through an environment doesn’t undermine the sociology of knowledge.

The No-Help to Rationalism Argument (NHR)(1) Going back to the equivalence principle, the chief complaint by rationalists was

that it conflated reasons and causes.(2) However, the leading accounts of perceptual knowledge are causal.(3) While these accounts can happily co-exist with sociology of knowledge, they

contradict rationalism.VISociology of knowledge doesn’t exclude the causal interactions that other sciences find, it simply argues that over and above the causal transactions between an individual and his/her environment, there will also be social interactions that play a prominent role in explaining differences of opinion and the establishment of knowledge-claims. (see the IPS argument in Section V)

The Bridgehead Alternative

VIIAnother criticism of relativism is that there must be a core of true beliefs and patterns of inferences that are true of all men if cross-cultural communication and understanding is to be possible.

This is based on certain arguments in the philosophy of language by Quine and Davidson. Essentially, they point to the fact that when we are confronted with a culture with a hitherto untranslated language (called “radical translation”), we will go about translating and interpreting their utterances by making their utterances minimize contradiction, square with basic patterns of inference, refer to observable objects when consistently prompted by those objects, etc. These shared meanings are considered the “rational bridgehead” by which intercultural communication and understanding is possible.

In this case, members of the rational bridgehead will be ‘simply rational’ and culturally divergent beliefs will be explained by the local circumstances of the culture.

However, B&B counter:(1) The Bridgehead argument works only if translation is the only means of learning

the meanings of utterances.(2) However, infants learn language without translation, so translation is not the only

way of learning the meanings of utterances.(3) Furthermore, there is a social element to infant language acquisition—the

socialization of the infant by his/her parents.a. The same occurs with anthropologists learning meanings.

VIIIB&B focus on the more specific part of the Bridgehead argument that there are simple forms of inference that are culturally invariant. For example, the following inference, called modus ponens, appears fairly indispensable:

PIf P then Q So P.

However, why would this be a pervasive form of inference? B&B argue the following:(1) If modus ponens must be justified on purely rationalist grounds, the justification

must not appeal to modus ponens on pain of an infinite regress or circular reasoning.

a. Nor will it do to simply justify modus ponens on the basis of the meanings of “if … then” since we can stipulate meanings of words that will allow us to infer anything from anything (tonk)

(2) On the other hand, if we seek the causal origins of modus ponens’ pervasiveness, no such logical challenges arise.

IXB&B develop point (2) in the previous section in further detail. Furthermore, while the pervasiveness of patterns of inference like modus ponens clearly owe quite a bit to certain

commonalities of brain structure, the existence of multiple logics compatible with our brain structure means that there will still need to be social explanations as to why one system of logic is more liable to be adopted than another.