bartlett, j.; kreko, p. & hunyadi, b. (2013).. new political actors in europe: new opposition...

8/13/2019 Bartlett, J.; Kreko, P. & Hunyadi, B. (2013).. New political actors in Europe: New opposition movements in Hungary.

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The rise of populismin Europe can betraced through onlinebehaviour

NEW POLITICAL ACTORS IN

EUROPE: NEW OPPOSITION

MOVEMENTS IN HUNGARY

Jamie Bartlett

Pter KrekBulcsu Hunyadi


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NEW POLITICAL ACIN EUROPE: NEWOPPOSITION MOVEMIN HUNGARY

Jamie BartlettPter KrekBulcsu Hunyadi


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Contents

Acknowledgements

A note on terminology

Executive summary

1 Background

2 Findings

3 Methodology

Notes

References


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Acknowledgements

This paper would not have been possible wsupport of the Open Society Foundation Twhich we are very grateful. In particular, w

Andrej Nosko and Goran Buldioski for theand helpful feedback throughout.

This research is based primarily on anFacebook supporters of eight groups, whicopposition movements in Hungary. The renecessarily reflect the views of each movemPolitical Capital are independent think-tanundertaking innovative research in areas ofare not party political organisations. Our robjectively and accurately without normati

At Demos we would like to thank AleMiller, Louis Reynolds and Noelle Rumbathis project, and Ralph Scott and Susannah

paper through to publication with the usuaAt Political Capital we would like to

and Csaba Molnar.All errors and omissions are our own

Jamie BartlettPter KrekBulcsu HunyadiNovember 2013

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A note on terminolo

9

This study concerns the Facebook supportopposition movements in Hungary. It is baover 4,000 Facebook fans of these groups. them as new opposition movements, (or rimportant to note that often each group hadifferent responses. Where possible, we splto provide a clearer picture. Throughout ththis information within the context of broaand make comparisons to similar data on o

parties in Western Europe, as presented in New Face of Digital Populism andNew Politicadrawing such parallels, we are not claimingsurveyed for this work are populist movemas those in those reports. Rather, this comp

in understanding how as a new political movements are similar to, and differ from, parties that challenge the establishment. Tsurveyed here are often very different in naTh i i f l i


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Executive summary

11

New forms of communication from the Gpress to the first televised US presidential dan effect on politics. The internet is no difflong argued that mass communication throfacilitate collective action by bringing grousingle issues, lowering barriers to entry andmentally changing the nature of political mmedia is now at the forefront of this changeus live more of our social, professional and

Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and LinkedIn rapid transfer of peoples interactions, idenviews onto a new kind of public sphere, a vcommons. Europeans spend an average of online, and there are around 250 million F

in Europe.3

Inevitably, this is changing politics toand dynamism of social media platforms aland form social movements outside the exih l f kl d l h


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digital generation. The MacArthur Research Nand Participatory Politics found that 41 per ceAmericans engaged in at least one political acmedia during the last 12 months.5 This is partgiven that a growing number of people use so

source of breaking news. According to a Deceby the Pew Research Center, over 50 per cent about breaking news via social media rather tsources.6 Being part of a political social mediapeople to be part of the movement, to connecpeople across the country and stay up to dateown speed to interweave their political activsocial activities. Social media politics vary greissue campaigns to established political partywith strict control over content. But they sharidea of a direct, free and easy involvement, reg

information, and active participation from mehelp generate a sense of virtual belonging toonline group enhanced by the possibility of inwith like-minded people from all over the worof all shades increasingly recognise the poten

media to respond quickly to events and eveevents. With such low barriers to entry, recruiof people is relatively easy and can make movignore. Indeed, some analysts argue that the d

k d k

Executive summary


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organisation, especially modern technologIncreasingly, this anti-establishment sbubbling up to the surface. In Italy, Beppecomedian and blogger, ran a vehemently acampaign, selecting his candidates online a

any interviews to the Italian media, commuthrough his own blog: in the 2013 Italian gFive Star Movement became the largest posecuring around 25 per cent of the vote. InParty, which campaigns for greater direct drights secured 9 per cent of the vote in the election, managing to win seats in the statefirst time. Outside formal politics, the Indiin Spain and the Occupy movements in theEurope have grown into significant politicfive years.

Hungary has a large subterranean poa major impact on mainstream political parthere has been a proliferation of new oppbefore and after the 2010 parliamentary elesize, ideology, form, structure and their rel

politics. There is a broad spectrum, ranginparty (Two-Tailed Dog Party) through stud(Students Network) to parliamentary poliand the movement of the ex-PM Gordon B

h h b k f h l

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nature of these movements is that they are in they can emerge quickly but can decline quickmakes it difficult to understand and estimate Hungarian politics more generally.

Although the focus of this study is Hun

movements are emerging across Europe. It is mainstream political parties, analysts and acadeeper understanding of these movements, sorespond to the concerns of their supporters, dmight affect future policy and decision makinwhat opportunities there are to help encouraglegitimate political activism within the framewgovernance.

This study

The survey data presented in this report was ctargeting the fans of a number of Facebook gfollowers of eight of these new opposition moHungary between August and September 201full details). Facebook was selected because it

widespread and popular social media site in Hof these groups were shown an advert invitingparticipate in a survey and on clicking the advwere redirected to a survey that they were ask

h d d d

Executive summary


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network sites brings novel challenges. Becainnovative research method with both strenwe have included an in-depth discussion ofannex 1.

The final data set is broken down as s

Throughout the paper, we compare tanswers given to the same questions by thepublic and occasionally to the Facebook sunon-mainstream parties in Western EuropeDemos reports The New Face of Digital Populmovements in Europe including the JobbikPirate party, and the Five Star Movement ibelieve that the parties surveyed here are amovements. Rather, this comparison is useunderstanding how as a new political actof Facebook supporters of this new Hunga

compares to those we have found in other and parties that challenge the establishmen

Results

Supporters are a broad cross-section of age typically well educated

The supporters of new opposition movemework represented a broad cross-section of H

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Executive summary

of

Sizeof

Total

Total

Total

Final

Facebook

population

Facebook

sur

veys

survey

s

datase

t

groups

reached

linkclicks

sta

rted

completed

infull

66,000

2,211

428

291

347

8,800

421

303

231

271

74,000

2,621

756

478

616

144,000

4,205

1,310

933

1,099

17,174

1

113

88

110


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17

Key areas of concern are the economic situa

institutional trustWhen asked to list their top concerns, the e(31 per cent) and employment (20 per centfor respondents. Economic considerations important to them than they are to Jobbik

Jobbik supporters (the far-right oppositiongovernment), integration of the Roma (28 (26 per cent) were the key areas of concernnew opposition movements, by contrast, opeople included crime as one of their top tdents were also far more likely than the Hudistrust a wide range of political institutiontrust the justice system (compared with 53 Hungarians overall); only 5 per cent trust t(compared with 31 per cent of Hungarians per cent trust the national assembly (comp

overall). In relation to these issues, suppormovements score remarkably similarly to sof whom only 15 per cent trust the justice scent trust the government.

Unlike other right-wing populist movements

Jobbik supporters), there is great optimism

Union and other international institutions, lik

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Respondents see a crisis in democracy in Hunga

Only 7 per cent of respondents said they wereway democracy is developing in Hungary. Thcontrast to the Hungarian average. While verdeclare themselves to be very satisfied with decent), many more are satisfied (26 per cent)

This difference is not surprising since many opart of their appeal on opposition to the currepolitical establishment.

Pessimism about the future

On every measure, respondents were more pefuture than the Hungarian average. More thacent) felt their life in general would be worse (compared with 25 per cent of Hungarians ovfelt the economic situation of Hungary would

months time (compared with 34 per cent of Hoverall); and 40 per cent felt their household worse in 12 months time (compared with 30 pHungarians overall).

Supporters are more tolerant towards Roma tha

average, but concerns remain

There is an extremely high level of support am

Executive summary


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Supporters are motivated to vote and to tak

of political and social activitiesSupporters of these groups are significantlaverage Hungarian to get involved in a widworld political activities. Overall, 7 per cenformal members of political parties, with 4

most likely to join them (16 per cent). Thisthe national average in Hungary, where juscitizens are members of political parties.13Acent) of respondents would definitely votgeneral election held in Hungary, comparecent of Hungarians overall. As for other kiactivities, nearly half (49 per cent) of respoinvolved in an authorised demonstration, cper cent of the population overall. Two-thieither have or might take part in a boycott,per cent of Hungarians more generally. Hi

(even if not to this extent) is a feature of Jo

Official channels of media consumption are p

trusted, but the internet is viewed as a highly

Of particular note are differing levels of truways of accessing information. Only 7 per television and 19 per cent tend to trust the significantly lower figures than the nationa

19

E ti


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the most right-wing organisation. LMP suppolikely to trust the national institutions, includ(12 per cent); the most likely to be satisfied wdemocracy is developing in Hungary (20 per likely to place themselves at the centre of the

they scored an average of 5 on a 1 to 10 scale (and where 10 is very right). This compares to across all groups surveyed. This is an interestishows that the leftright division that these mto leave behind is so powerful that it remainedleading to the split of LMP as a parliamentary

ImplicationsThe groups surveyed for this project are indicsubterranean politics, increasingly visible in o

Europe, which tends to be characterised by a about existing political institutions, traditionademocracy and the future. However, they rempolitical and highly motivated: willing to votedemonstrate. Whether these groups come from

those surveyed here) or the right of the politicthese features appear to be consistent with thiprotest politics.

Indeed, in Hungary these participatoryd b f h d l

Executive summary

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potential: as in the case of LMP, which wasscandals after entering the parliament. Indseem to lose their power to change events wthe governmental politics, because of theirtowards politics and traditional forms of re

interesting example is the Five Star Movemwhen getting closer to the chance of becomforce after getting into the parliament has spositive reform in the Italian parliament. Isubterranean, apolitical political movemethe power they have after being elected.

Perhaps the biggest question is what movements (especially the more anti-partyhave on representative politics, and how anthey can mobilise young people. Power anappear to have negative connotations for th

supporters we surveyed: where power is ofremains the prevalent attitude, it is not cleamobilisation can be translated into movemrepresentative democracy and existing instand democratic. In fact, there is a risk that

could push people away from representativprovide justification for attempts (eg from Hungarian government) to redraw the conIndeed, at this moment, it is not clear how

b h

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Executive summary


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Mainstream parties would do well to take theseriously, understand what is driving the concrespond to the challenges they present, and loreconciling protest politics with systems of repdemocracy in new and radical ways. While it these movements can change representative pcan (at least temporarily) change the politicalMainstream politicians should reflect on theseconsider whether and how to incorporate sominto politics, if they want to remain mainstrea

Executive summary

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1 Background

23

Background and historyIn April 2010, Viktor Orbn, leader of the party, enjoyed a landslide victory in the Huparliamentary elections, gaining more than

votes and a two-thirds constitutional majorThe Hungarian left suffered a catastrophicSocialist party (MSZP), which had won th43 per cent of the votes, lost more than halgaining only 19 per cent, only slightly more

right party Jobbik. The collapse in supportcombination of factors, principally a loss o(following the infamous szd speech of PGyurcsany),15 corruption scandals and harsThe Socialist partys effort to sell austerity

policy to the public in 2010 was extremelyunpopular.The 2010 election result was underpin

crisis of confidence in the political system.

Background


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in particular became more open to the idea thsystem, based on the rotation of power betweFidesz and centre-left MSZP, needed to be repsettlement. This gave rise to new establishmenradical right anti-liberal party with anti-Semitsentiments, gained 17 per cent of the vote,17 anPolitika (LMP) or Politics Can Be Different)environmentalist human rights agenda, won 7votes in the first round of the election. These radically different on many measures, but thepolitical sentiments and ethos of civic or grass

worldview based on the narrative that the polbeen co-opted by a corrupt political and econ

Jobbik and LMP, despite having fundamentaregard themselves as civic. For them, citizens values and a united, good and clean commun

with corrupt, clientalist an d oligarchic politicelites. This, undoubtedly, entails self-organisaextent, which produces the same experience abuilt from the ground up.

Research by Andrea Szab and Tams K

there are two youth subcultures in Hungary, wcorrelate with these parties: the generation of(Kuruc.info is the popular, trendy, sarcastic nextreme right, which sometimes includes infla

d h h) h h bb k d

Background

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many respects but share a similar establishleft-wing world view. LMP (Politics Can Bprototype of such movements, but Dialogu(established by ex-LMP members), 4K!, thMilla and MKKP all belong to this categortrade union background, is somehow the oclub with a workers base.

Each organisation is summarised belorenewal and redefinition of politics, usuallyof existing representative democracy, a descivic voices in policy-making, and calls for

representation. Some of them (for examplea new type of political establishment basedpolitical principles and foundations.

Overview of movementsNegyedik Kztrsasg Prt (Fourth Republic

Originally a civic movement, the 4K!, or Fparty, defines itself as a left-wing patriotic Hungary. After a half-year-long process, ba

principles, the statutory congress of the newApril 2012.18 The organisation is led by Andname indicates, 4K! aims to re-establish a ncurrent being the third) by breaking with t

( )

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Background


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ownership.19

4K! defines itself as a political foestablished political elite in Hungary. It oppogoverning Fidesz party and the forces of the oincluding the Hungarian Socialist party, TogeDemocratic Coalition and other smaller partieexception of LMP), as a result of their formergovernment, their oligarchic operation and tneoliberal economic policies. 4K! offered elecLMP but the two could not agree on the prer4K! has recently launched a new slogan New2014, which commemorates the 500th annive

peasants revolt led by Gyrgy Dzsa against will take place in 2014.

At the time of this research, 4K! had 10,Facebook (likes) and 696 people talk about itsizable demographic of those who talk about

between 18 and 24.20

Magyar Ktfark Kutya Prt (Hungarian Two-Ta

Party, MKKP)

The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party is a satspoofs what it considered the irresponsible prestablished parties.21According to Gergely Kochairman of the organisation, a growth in MK

ac g ou d

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cuts, money without work, and a network ostop nowhere. In Szeged, in the middle of Plains, the party promised to build a spacemountain for winter sports. The partys mastencils, posters, internet videos and memehumorous, while providing stark criticism issues: corruption, development projects, psocial conditions, unemployment, consumevarious other topics.24

In 2010, MKKP, then officially registeDog Union, entered the political arena by

elections in Budapest and Szeged.25 Howefailed to collect the nomination slips neederun in the elections. The party plans to runparliamentary elections, but the court of juregistration of the party in September 2013

court, the partys name does not refer to thparty, and the goals of the party included itoo general.)26

The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Parton Facebook and 6,225 people were talking

page at the time of this research (the most being aged between 18 and 24).27

Background


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2014), and former members of parliament JzTakcs, Andrs Rnyi, Mtys Torsa, Szelim SGbor Bakos.

From 2010 to 2012, Milla played a centrbig rallies against the government, among theon important national celebration days such amemorial day of the 1848 Revolution, and 23 memorial day of the 1956 Revolution. While oincluding LMP with similar goals to Milla wemobilise crowds at these events, Milla and its organisations were able to bring tens of thous

Until October 2012, Milla defined itself non-political, anti-establishment organisationfrom all political parties. Milla criticised not oFidesz party but all parties and politicians thapre-2010 governments, including the MSZP, b

the current powerful position of the Fidesz paThis civic, non-party image has changeddemonstration on 23 October 2012. At that raMilla, former Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai speech in which he announced the foundation

Electoral Movement, which consisted of threeorganisations: the Homeland and Progress Fohimself), the Solidarity Movement (led by PMilla (led by Pter Juhsz). Since its shift into

ll h l d h l d l

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position in any party at once, and second, code which includes its expectations of polThe main activities of Milla include o

demonstrations and a permanent presence Milla maintains its own news portal,30 but the Milla Facebook page where memos, phare regularly posted.31 Posts are mainly aboreactions on them. Initial demonstrations rfreedom were later followed by anti-establigovernment demonstrations (eg the I do nrally on 23 October 2011). However, Milla

demonstrations as well, such as one about December 2011), one against the new const2011) and another in favour of the resignatPl Schmitt (on 21 April 2011).32 FurthermoPl Schmitts plagiarism scandal, Milla lau

elect an alternative president of the Repubdemonstration (on 23 October 2013) showeorganisation, however. Although Milla andthe extensive cooperation among oppositioevery left-wing political organisation was in

demonstration to deliver speeches. The ralend with speakers of different parties criticthe stage.

Milla had 111,996 followers on Facebolk b b k h

Background


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per cent of the votes, making LMP a parliameThe grassroots structure of the party results inleft and right side of the political spectrum anment parties. The key issues that the group cainclude sustainability, renewable energies, equlabour rights, combating poverty and democrshot to prominence with a series of provocativinside and outside parliament concerning coranomalies and local environmental problems.spectacular action was when members of the Lgroup chained themselves to the entrance of t

23 December, 2011.37Between the end of 2012 and the beginn

party underwent a crisis. Members became diquestion of cooperation with other oppositionEgytt, led by former caretaker Prime Ministe

After the party congress decision that LMP wopposition alliance, eight members of the paralong with some party members, left LMP anparty called Prbeszd Magyarorszgrt Prt Hungary Party).38After the split of the party,

itself in the centre between the governing Fidopposition parties that played a role in pre-20LMP claimed to keep equal distance from all blamed them for having been equally respons

l l l

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the Polish Solidarity Movement formed in to protect the rights of Polish workers: the became the symbol of the resistance againsregime. Szolidarits was formed as a civic mits leaders Pter Knya (a former army offi(a former firefighter who has already left thenvisaged a political role from the start. Szan end to the political division of Hungariaitself ready to represent the workers in a rad

In October 2012, Pter Knya, the lethat time, signed a cooperation agreement

representatives of Haza s Halads EgyesEgytt 2014. Half a year later Prbeszd Mnew party of ex-LMP members, also joined

As a member of Egytt 2014 movemerepresents the radical wing of the alliance,

street-based activities. One of the most speSzolidarits was a trade union march proteemployer-friendly new Law on Labour, whsome fire hydrants along their route througOctober 2011, activists toppled a mock stat

Viktor Orbn made of styrofoam. The perfwidespread public condemnation from supgovernment and even of the opposition.44

Szolidarits had 12,960 followers on l lk b h

Background


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The plus-one point stated that students shouuntil their demands are accepted by the goverHaHa defines itself as a group of self-or

The movements structure is based on grassroparticipatory democracy. The organisation coautonomous, local groups at various universitindependent from the official representation ocouncils). Having broadened its focus since itHaHa now acts to defend student rights and organisation of students. HaHa is an indepenthat keeps an equal distance from all political

not cooperate with any of them.In common with other movements, HaH

demonstrations to gain attention. It organiseddemonstration in June 2012, called the night education. However, HaHa became really ac

student demonstrations in the winter of 2012/organised student forums nationwide, held deoccupied a bridge and university building in time of writing, they are relatively inactive, pacriticism they received regarding their last dem

evictions in August 2013.49

They are very activFacebook is a key platform of the organisatioHaHa had 17,174 followers on Facebook

were talking about its page at the time of this d h h h l d

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general are in deep crisis.53

Besides more tydemands such as job protection, workers ropportunities and civil liberties, the enviroissue. The party is committed to sustainabland renewable energies. An important charcommitment to the change of government cooperation with some of the opposition pafter its foundation, PM joined the Egytt forming a party alliance called Egytt 20142013.)54 However, PM has been opposing aopposition parties such as MSZP and the D

Party (the party of former Prime Minister FPM has been getting considerable pu

provocative demonstrations and performanthe parliament. These tend to focus on corconcerning the governing party, anomalies

procurement, contradictions in the legislatcriticism of the tender procedure for tobactheir actions, for example, PM members ofbanners criticising government corruption parliaments plenary session.56

PM had 28,311 followers on Facebookwere talking about its page at the time of thpeople who most commonly discussed its pbetween 55 and 64.57

Background


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a member organisation but an allied one); finthe focus on public policy competence of the Progress Association. The main messages of tcontained in two documents: Moral and Ethicand the Cooperation Agreement.61 These docuthe party aims to solve various crises caused bgovernment. According to Egytt 2014, thesedomestic and foreign policy, the constitutionasystem and social values more generally. The reconstruct the countrys foreign relations andliberties and equal opportunities.

Originally, Egytt 2014 was established groups and be the main opponent to the govein the 2014 national elections. At the time of Efoundation, the former prime minister and leamovement, Gordon Bajnai, wanted to become

prime ministerial candidate. However, becauspublic support (the partys support among acparty preferences was between 4 per cent andOctober 2013), the chances for this seems to eforced by the new election system to cooperat

cooperation agreement with Hungarian Sociato run together in individual constituencies (wseparate party lists).

Egytt 2014 had 134,036 supporters on l lk b

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2 Findings

Left-wing Hungarian activists on FaThis chapter presents the socio-economic cage and gender data of the new oppositionfor this research.

Demographics

It is possible to identify the makeup oFacebook membership by age and gender u

(publicly available) advertising tool (see chUsing the same method it is also possible tdemographic information about the Facebgroups surveyed.

Across the country as a whole, Hungadisplay an even gender split (table 2). The this research also showed a fairly even splitand 47 per cent female. Interestingly, the golder than the typical Facebook user in Hu

d 6 ( d i h

Findings


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G ill Fi S M i ifi l

Table 2 Age and gender of Hungarian left-win

Fans (n=462,983); national statistics i

n=4,600,000)

Age Groups total (%) Male (%)

1624 21 (32.3) 13 (16.4)2534 21 (25.9) 12 (12.7)3544 19 (21.8) 10 (10)4554 14 (10.9) 7 (4.6)5564 16 (7.3) 6 (3.0)65+ 8 (3.3) 4 (1.7)All 100 (100) 53 (50)

Table 3 Highest educational attainment of res

national statistics in brackets63

T

Primary school 3Vocational school without graduation 7Secondary school 3Higher education 5I do not know 0I do not wish to answer 2No answer 1

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percentage of students (39 per cent), whileare the groups with the highest level of unecent). Unemployment rates are similar betw

the under 25 age groups (8 per cent and 6 However, the percentage of people who arhours per week is significantly higher amonper cent) than under 25 (14 per cent). Thissignificant part of the support base might btemporarily or part time. While equivalentGerman Pirate party (7 per cent), unemploslightly higher for supporters of the Jobbikand significantly higher for supporters of BSt M t ( t)

Table 4 The employment status of Hungari

Facebook fans (n=4,141); national s

Employed at least 30 hours per weekEmployed less than 30 hours per weekUnemployed Retired StudentI do not know I do not wish to answerNo answer

Findings


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Table 5 The proportion of respondents who a

of any political party (n=varied)

Yes (%) No (%)

(%)

Average across groups(n=4,003) 7 90Szolidaritas (n=236) 11 88PM (n=174) 11 89MKKP (n=579) 3 94Milla (n=1249) 3 86

LMP (n=333) 13 81Hallgatoi Halozat (n=106) 4 944K! (n=260) 16 82Egytt (n=1066) 8 88

the more formal structure of the Jobbik partythese movements.These groups are part of a number of ne

movement that use social media to arrange oftherefore asked respondents about the extentactivism over the past six months (table 6).

These results suggest that supporters ofsignificantly more likely than the average Huinvolved in a wide variety of types of real-wo

i i F l f d

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sign a petition, more than 86 per cent that take part in a boycott, and more than 56 pe

i h j i h i d ik

Table 6 The extent of political activism in the l

(n=varied); national statistics in bracke

Have Might Woudone do neve

(%) (%) do(%)

Signed a petition 65 (14.9) 21 (30.3) 8 (53(n=3478)

Joined a boycott 16 (2.0) 51 (17.0) 15 (79(n=3313)

Participated in authorised 49 (3.94) 29 (20.5) 12 (74demonstrations (n=3437)

Participated in 5 (0.4) 37 (5.4) 28 (9unauthorised strikes(n=3230)

Occupied buildings or 5 (0.3) 26 (3.2) 42 (9factories (n=3230)

Actively participated 22 44 14in a student movementor NGO (n=3271)

Findings


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likelihood to occupy building or factories (33

have or might do so, compared with only 26 pThese overall results obscure interestinggroups surveyed. Table 7 shows the responsesquestion asking whether respondents had sign

Szolidaritas, Hallgati Hlzat (StudenPM members seem to be the most active grouactivism, with 82 per cent, 80 per cent and 71 respectively, claiming that they have signed a

The same breakdown is available for a qh h h j i d ff

Table 7 The proportion of respondents who woul

split by group (n=varied)

Have Might Woulddone do never

(%) (%) do(%)

Szolidaritas (n=222) 82 10 4PM (n=160) 71 16 8MKKP (n=450) 53 27 14Milla (n=1146) 71 19 6LMP (n=274) 65 16 10

Hallgatoi Halozat (n=98) 80 12 104K! (n=225) 71 20 5Egytt (n=923) 55 26 12

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Sunday (table 9). This is far higher than th

measured in the overall internet user popuamong these groups are robust: over 90 peof Dialogue Hungary, Solidarity and TogeThe least likely to participate (63 per cent)the MKKP, which is not even an official paStudents Network, with one of the youngeno intention to run on the election in 2014lowest participation rate (70 per cent).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ratio of uh l h f ll f h

Table 8 The proportion of respondents who w

strike, split by group (n=varied)

Have Might Woudone do neve

(%) (%) do(%)

Szolidaritas (n=194) 9 46 15PM (n=146) 5 41 25MKKP (n=444) 6 32 33Milla (n=1056) 4 41 23LMP (n=226) 9 31 42

Hallgatoi Halozat (n=96) 16 43 174K! (n=222) 7 43 20Egytt (n=714) 6 40 40

Findings


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and 4k!, with more than third of them choosian option to vote. It is interesting to note thatMSZP is extremely low across the groups, whex-prime minister, the Democratic Coalition (has slightly better results.

We asked respondents which political pi h l l l i i ( )

Table 9 The proportion of respondents who woul

parliamentary elections this Sunday (n=v

You are You You Yousure you would probably surewould probably would wouvote (%) go to not vote not

vote (%) (%) to vo(%)

National average68 59 16 3 10Average (n=4017) 86 8 2 2Szolidaritas (n=231) 94 3 0 2

PM (n=174) 93 3 0 1MKKP (n=585) 63 18 5 6Milla (n=1249) 88 8 2 1LMP (n=333) 81 10 1 2Hallgatoi Halozat 70 19 5 6(n=106)4K! (n=263) 82 11 2 3

Egytt (n=1066) 93 4 1 1

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Table 10 The party respondents would vote for

parliamentary election this Sunday (n=

Fidesz MSZP Jobbik LMP DK E14-

Nationalaverage69 27 13 8 2 2 5Average 28 13 8 6 6 46(n=4006)Szolidaritas 4 7 1 2 13 71

(n=321)PM (n=174) 0 3 0 2 13 71MKKP 5 1 6 7 2 19(n=579)Milla 0 5 1 4 7 61(n=1249)LMP (n=333) 11 4 13 27 5 19

Hallgatoi 0 2 1 9 2 45Halozat (n=106)4K! (n=260) 1 3 3 16 5 17Egytt 6 4 6 1 9 56(GordonBajnai) (n=1066)

Table 11 The parties respondents voted for in tparliamentary elections

(n=4141)

Findings


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drawn comparisons with national averages baEurobarometer survey 2013 or the European Vin order to make more meaningful inferences.

Table 12 What respondents thought were the t

that Hungary faces; percentage in the

Total (%)

Economic situation 31 Unemployment 20 Education 10 Tax system 9 Integration of the Roma 8 Healthcare 8 Rising prices and inflation 4

Crime 3 Energy 1 Environment 1Pensions 3 Immigration 0 Housing problems 1 Terrorism 0

Foreign policy issues 1I do not know 0I do not wish to answer 0

45


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reform or legal reform is not included as ansurveys.

The predominance of economic concthe responses of supporters of Beppe Grillo

Movement in Italy. When asked to choose current issues, the vast majority of intervieweconomic situation (62 per cent) and unemcent) as their top concerns. Conversely, theissues were terrorism (15 per cent) and defeaffairs (13 per cent).

We asked respondents what they thouimmigration (table 13). Overall, respondenpro-immigration: 43 per cent thought that

i i f

Table 13 The views of respondents on wheth

problem for Hungary or bring oppo

(n=3561)

Immigrants are a problem for HungaryImmigrants bring opportunities for HungI do not knowI do not wish to answer

Findings


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Roma are the minority that is generally regardstrongest hostility by Hungarian society in ge

There are extremely high levels of suppoRoma groups have the right to attend non-RoHungary (table 14): 87 per cent agree with theis not a great deal of variation in the answers a

However, attitudes about the criminal disposipeople are more ambiguous. Across the groupthink that Roma have a criminal disposition tblood and a further 6 per cent either do nowish to answer.

Again, we can find that the followers of much more tolerant than the overall society, wthe respondents agreeing completely, for examchildren have the right to attend non-Roma ptheir education (compared with 39 per cent o

population overall) An even more important ponly 22 per cent of the followers of these grouwith the statement: a criminal disposition runthe Roma (table 15), in contrast to 59 per cenpopulation. This is an obvious dividing line bgroups and the supporters of Jobbik, who repintolerant section of society.

MKKP and LMP supporters seems to bfrom this block, with closest results to the ave

h l h f

47


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Table 14 The extent to which respondents agre

children have the right to attend non-R

for their education (n=varied)72

I fully I tend I tend I d

agree to to ag(%) agree disagree (%(%) (%)

National average 39 43 11 3Group average 61 26 6 5(n=3520)Szolidaritas (n=222) 63 26 5 3

PM (n=164) 69 24 1 0MKKP (n=456) 50 30 9 8Milla (n=1172) 71 23 2 1LMP (n=278) 50 31 7 7Hallgatoi Halozat 78 18 1 3(n=98)4K! (n=220) 61 30 5 1

Egytt (n=923) 56 24 10 6

Table 15 The extent to which respondents agre

disposition runs in the blood of the Ro

I fully I tend I tend I dagree to to ag(%) agree disagree (%

Findings


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Expectations for the futureWe asked respondents a series of questions abwhich they were optimistic or pessimistic abotheir personal lives and the future of Hungary

Generally, respondents tend to share petheir economic future both about their ownand the economy of Hungary. However, opin

enormously different from the national averagcent believe their own economic situation wilmonths; this figure is only slightly lower thanaverage of 16 per cent. Similarly, respondentsabout their own lives in general are broadly in

averages in Hungary. More marked, however,about Hungarys economic situation: only 9 prespondents believe it will be better in a year, per cent of the country overall.

In general, younger respondents tend to

about the future than the older ones. Only 3625s think their personal life will get worse in tcompared with half of supporters over 25. Ththe younger supporters can be found in Beppsupporters. Those under 30 years old are slighthan supporters over their 30s about the econtheir country (63 per cent against 68 per cent get worse) and the financial situation of their cent against 54 per cent). The same trend wasJ bbik F b k h h

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Table 16 Whether respondents thought that the

be better, worse or the same, when it c

Better Worse Same (%) (%) (%)

a Their life in general

National average 16 25 57Average 19 34 40Szolidaritas 9 48 32

PM 11 41 42MKKP 28 23 39Milla 13 36 43LMP 27 26 42Hallgatoi Halozat 21 26 454K! 21 29 41Egytt 15 31 35

b The economic situation in Hungary

National average 17 34 47Average 9 55 17Szolidaritas 3 81 12PM 2 71 26MKKP 25 62 10Milla 2 74 19LMP 15 46 33Hallgatoi Halozat 9 57 254K! 5 69 24E 9 69 15

Findings


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only 16 per cent think that things are going inas opposed to 22 per cent of respondents ove

Respondents to the survey are markedlyabout the direction of the European Union th

average (table 17). This is potentially explainethe relationship to the EU is starting to be a kdividing line, with pro-left parties and movemmore sympathy towards the EU, while Jobbikand Fidesz increasingly becoming a EuroscepOpposition movements in Hungary generallythe possible saviour of Hungarian democraccentralisation tendencies. Supporters of BeppGerman Pirate party share a similar concern a

f h h l d

Table 17 Extent to which respondents thought tha

were going in the right direction or in the

Hungary and the European Union (n=3,56

statistics in brackets75

Right Wrong Neither Dondirection direction (%) know(%) (%) (%)

Hungary 8 (21) 85 (54) 5 (23) 1 (2)The European 21 (28) 22 (33) 41 (31) 14 (8Union

51


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Movement), which suggests respondents cbe generally left of centre. This is not a surHowever, the results suggest there is some between the groups. For example, supportthemselves at exactly centre on the spectruwhile Szolidarits respondents averaged 3.

k d d b h

Table 18 Where respondents position themselv

spectrum76 (n=varied)

Party Left (%) Right (%)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Collated 12 8 17 16 18 5 3 2 1average (n=4141)Szolidaritas 29 8 16 16 17 2 3 1 0

(n=236)PM (n=174) 17 13 23 19 16 1 1 0 0MKKP (n=616) 3 2 9 11 21 9 7 4 2Milla (n=1288) 11 12 24 20 17 3 2 0 0LMP (n=347) 4 3 9 14 20 12 4 6 1Hallgatoi Halozat 7 9 14 20 16 12 2 1 0(n=110)4K! (n=271) 16 8 16 10 15 4 1 0 0

Egytt (n=1099) 16 6 17 14 17 3 3 2 2

Findings


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25s says they are not very or not at all satisfdemocracy; compared with 83 per cent for ovdissatisfaction with democracy is also apparensupporters of Beppe Grillo and the German Pwhom only 4 per cent and 20 per cent, respecwith democracy in their country. This also supof Mary Kaldor on subterranean politics, whi

Table 19 Whether respondents are very satisfied, r

very satisfied or not at all satisfied with tis developing in Hungary (n=varied)77

Very Satisfied Not very Not

satisfied (%) satisfied all(%) (%) satis(%)

National average 5 26 42 26Average (n=3603) 2 5 16 75Szolidaritas (n=224) 3 2 5 88PM (n=160) 0 1 14 84

MKKP (n=456) 3 8 24 62Milla (n=1185) 1 1 13 84LMP (n=285) 7 13 24 51Hallgatoi Halozat 0 1 23 74(n=98)4K! (n=228) 0 5 21 73Egytt (n=956) 5 7 13 75

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army are significantly less trusted, as is the only 29 per cent of respondents tend to trubiggest difference is the level of trust in gocent of respondents tend to trust the goverwith 48 per cent of the Hungarians overallnot to trust it.

Of particular note are the variances indifferent ways of accessing information. Ontrust the television and 19 per cent tend to significantly less than the national average per cent respectively. This can be explained

view that the media is controlled by the gov80 per cent of respondents say they trust thscore of any institution. This strongly suggare seeking out alternative sources of inforregard as official sources. These results m

among supporter of Beppe Grillo, of whomthe internet, while only 11 per cent trusted Unlike supporters of right-wing popu

as part of this series, respondents show higlarge international political institutions (ta72 per cent tend to trust the European Unitend to trust the United Nations. Similarlyof trust in NGOs, with 65 per cent of respotrust them.

Findings


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Table 20 The extent to which respondents trust ins

(n=varied)79

Tend Tendto not totrust trust(%) (%)

Hungary Hunga

Police (n=3437) 29 60 63 37Army (n=3437) 41 57 42 28

European Union 72 47 20 46(n=3437)Justice or the legal 35 53 55 43system (n=3437)Churches (n=3437) 19 51 72 37Trade unions (n=3437) 25 31 59 54Government (n=3437) 5 31 78 65Local government 18 75

(n=3437)Political parties (n=3396) 9 20 84 77Big companies (n=3396) 29 52 The internet (n=3437) 80 41 16 32TV (n=3396) 7 52 87 45The radio (n=3437) 13 47 77 47National parliament 6 29 82 68

(n=3437)SMEs (n=3354) 47 36 The UN (n=3396) 68 51 20 37The press (n=3437) 19 39 72 52NGOs (n=3437) 65 25

55


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average level of trust is 36 per cent, membeHallgati Hlzat are the most likely to tru45 per cent and 40 per cent feeling that motrusted respectively. Conversely, Egytt anthe least trusting, with 47 per cent and 48 prespectively stating that you cant be too ca

people, against an average of 42 per cent.


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M h d l

57


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3 Methodology

About the surveyThe methodology employed in the collectidata is set out in detail in The New Face of Dsection offers only a condensed discussion,

issues specific to this particular research pr

Participant recruitmentAs in The New Face of Digital Populism we deprincipally because the site is a popular mofor supporters of new opposition movementargeted survey adverts to people who wereand members of groups deemed related to

We targeted adverts directly at four of the Facebook advertising tool; for the other fo

contacted the Facebook page administratohost the advert on their page. The advertisfrom 13 August to 1 October 2013.

d d h

Methodology


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survey responses was produced. However, nohas so many responses. The n= value in each qhow many have responded. The non-responseeach question, which is to be borne in mind wthe results.

Data analysisWeights were employed to increase the externresults. To do this, we gathered background icomposition of the groups used to recruit par

Facebooks advertising tool (which is freely avto access), or requesting the relevant data fromadministrators of each of the Facebook groupassigned each participant a score value on theprevalence of their demographic profile (in thgender). Analysis then employed simple descrpresenting the total occurrence for each respothe weighted data set.

Using coded datasets as a starting pointsurvey response was tagged with a demographidentify age and gender, where a = {0,1,2} 0

male, 2 = female and b = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6}, whe1624, 2 = 2534, 3 = 3544, 4 = 4554, 5 = 55purposes of this analysis, no distinction was ml h bl k d h h

59


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counts were based on these weightings, incnot distinguish between survey groups. Pivcreated for each question and group of respstructure of headings of 0,1,2,3 etc, dependoptions there were for each question, and tof how many people chose each option. Th

formed the basis for all subsequent analyse

LimitationsAlthough our use of weights allowed us to

of population representativeness by correcor gender related bias, it is possible that otTherefore care must be taken when interprit is with the following caveats that our find

Care must be taken when consideringviews of the offline groups. It cannot be awho are members of the online group do noffline group, so our findings cannot be clainto the views and activities of the broader Likewise, our findings cannot be claimed tofficial views of the group or its leadershi

represented in this way.Furthermore, the use of social networ

a well-known technical and methodologicah f lf l f

Methodology


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addressed to sensitive issues. In our sample, rresponse to questions on political protest werEurobarometer recorded significantly lower lenon-response.

Notes

61


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Notes

1 J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, The NewPopulism, London: Demos, 2011; J Bartlett eActors in Europe: Beppe Grillo and the M5S, L

2 T Postmes and S Brunsting, Collective act

internet: mass communication and online mScience Computer Review 20, no 3, 2002, pp The mobile civil society: social movementcommunication networks, in M Castells etCommunication and Society, Cambridge MA

3 G2, eCultures Europe, 2012, www.g2-eculNov 2013).

4 AI Alberici and P Milesi, The influence of

psychosocial predictors of collective actionCommunity & Applied Social Psychology 23, ispp 37388.

Notes


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8 Global Civil Society, Subterranean politics in

www.gcsknowledgebase.org/europe/ (accesse

9 In some cases (e.g. Milla, Prbeszd MagyaroSzolidarits) when we could not target the sugroups directly, we asked the editors of this p

survey on their Facebook page.

10 Bartlett et al, The New Face of Digital Populism.

11 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013, 3 Ju

12 We have targeted Gordon Bajnais Facebook directly targetable with Facebook ads (unlikeof E14-PM).

13 I van Biezen, P Mair and T Poguntke, GoingThe decline of party membership in contempEuropean Journal of Political Research 51, 2012, www.astrid.eu/il-siste/Studiric/Van-BiezePoguntke_Europ-Journ_Pol-Research_1_20Nov 2013).

14 European Commission, Standard Eurobaromethttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archivesht ( d 6 N 20 3) E C

63


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17 J Bartlett et al,Populism in Europe: Hungary

2012.

18 Negyedik Kztrsasg, A Prtalaktsi Folhttp://negyedikkoztarsasag.hu/tortenet (a

19 Negyedik Kztrsasg, The Party ProgramRepublic Movement, nd, http://negyedikkprogram-english (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

20 Facebook, 4K! Negyedik Kztrsasg,

https://www.facebook.com/NegyedikKozt(accessed 6 Nov 2013).

21 It is similar to the Official Monster RavingGreat Britain. See www.omrlp.com/ (acces

22 M Dunai, Two-tailed dog livens up Hunga2010, www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/20dog-idUSTRE67J20Z20100820 (accessed

23 See poster shown at http://mkkp.hu/kisma

Nov 2013).

24 Ketfarkukutya, MKKP Megapolitikus vetl 22 S 2013 htt // kk h / d

Notes


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27 Facebook, Magyar Ktfark Kutya Part, 24

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Magyar-KC3%BA-Kutya-Part/14792493292?fref=ts (acce

28 Facebook, One Million for the Freedom of Pabout, 2013, nd, https://www.facebook.com/

(accessed 7 Nov 2013).

29 A Milla tovbblp, 26 Feb 2013, http://nemtblog.hu/2013/02/26/a_milla_tovabblep (accN Mt, Nem lesz szatellit a Millbl, 26 Fe

http://nol.hu/belfold/vezetot_es_iranyt_val(accessed 7 Nov 2013).

30 See www.minimumplusz.hu/ (accessed 7 Nov

31 Facebook, Egymillian a magyar sajtszabad2013, https://www.facebook.com/sajtoszabad(accessed 7 Nov 2013); Facebook, One Millioof Press in Hungary.

32 Facebook, One Million for the Freedom of P

33 P Andrs, A ht dnt?s, 9 Mar 2012, http://ablog.hu/ (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

65


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37 Tiltakoznak, LMP-s kpvisel?k lncoltk m

bejrataihoz, 23 Dec 2011, www.bumm.sk/kepviselok-lancoltak-magukat-a-parlament(accessed 7 Nov 2013).

38 Szakad az LMP tbben elhagyjk a prt

2013, www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2013/01/27/16LMP__tobben_elhagyjak_a_partot.aspx2013).

39 Facebook, Lehet ms a politika! Politics

Oct 2013, https://www.facebook.com/lehe7 Nov 2013).

40 See www.szolidaritas.org/ (accessed 7 Nov

41 A Magyar Szolidarits Mozgalom politikawww.szolidaritas.org/files/1/a_magyar_sz_politikai_nyilatkozata_javitott_120131_v2013).

42 Egytt, Egyttm?kdsi megllapods al

www.egyutt2014.hu/galeria_2012_oktobeegyuttmukodesi_megallapodas_alairasa.h2013).

S lid b l f l lkk l [S

Notes


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46 Szolidarts a bolgr egyetemfoglalkkal [S

Bulgarian occupiers of universities], Hallgat2013, http://hallgatoihalozat.blog.hu/ (access

47 Hungarian students demonstrate against newhigher education, European Students Union

www.esu-online.org/news/article/hungaryhooNov 2013).

48 A Hallgati Hlzat s frum 5+1 pontja, 10 http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20121210_hallgatoi_

hallgatoi_halozat_es_forum_5_1_pontja (a2013).

49 A devizahitelek miatt tntetett Egytt a HaHCosport, hvg.hu, 16 Aug 2013, http://hvg.hu_A_devizahitelek_miatt_tuntetett_egyutt_amandiner&utm_medium=link&utm_campaig201310 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

50 Facebook, Hallgati Hlzat, 24 Oct 2013,https://www.facebook.com/hallgatoi.halozat

Nov 2013).

51 Megalakult Jvork j prtja: jn a PrbeszP t F b t h /b lf ld/

S i ll d d

67


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54 Szvetsgi megllapods, pm, nd,

http://parbeszedmagyarorszagert.hu/szove(accessed 7 Nov 2013).

55 N Mt, Tntet?k vertek strat a Sndor-pNpszabagdsg Online, 27 Jun 2013, http:/

tuntetok_vertek_satrat_a_sandor-palotanNov 2013).

56 H Mrk, A Prbeszd Magyarorszgrt j2013, http://444.hu/2013/06/11/a-parbesze

ujabb-akcioja/ (accessed 7 Nov 2013); Facegyszsgen, 29 Jul 2013, https://www.facset/?set=a.536809343035100.1073741831.1093 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

57 Facebook, Prbeszd Magyarorszgrt, 2https://www.facebook.com/parbeszedmag(accessed 7 Nov 2013).

58 Egytt, Megalakult az Egytt, 2014 Mozgwww.egyutt2014.hu/az_egyutt_2014-rol_

az_egyutt_2014_mozgalom.html (accesse

59 j, tmeneti nvvel jegyeztk be Bajnai phtt //h h /itth / 6 8 B j

62 F b k E tt 2014 M l 24 O t 2

Notes


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62 Facebook, Egytt 2014 Mozgalom , 24 Oct 2

https://www.facebook.com/egyutt2014?fref=t2013).

63 Population aged 15 years and over by highest attainment, 2011 Census, see www.ksh.hu/nep

tablak/demografia/04_02_02_10.xls (HungStatistical Office) (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

64 Bartlett et al,New Political Actors in Europe.

65

Eurostat, Harmonised unemployment rate byhttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.dage=en&pcode=teilm020 (accessed 7 Nov 201Central Statistical Office, Number of employor full-time and sex (1998), www.ksh.hu/doxstadat_annual/i_qlf008.html (accessed 7 N

66 van Biezen et al, Going, going... gone?

67 National statistics used are from the European2008, Q55. The question was: Now Id like y

card. Im going to read out some different foraction that people can take, and Id like you tone, whether you have actually done any of th

i ht d it ld d i

70 Derex Attitude radicals in Hungary in i

69


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70 Derex, Attitude radicals in Hungary in i

Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Indexwww.riskandforecast.com/post/in-depth-anradicals-in-hungary-in-international-contex7 Nov 2013).

71 P Kreko et al, The roots of radicalism andon the far right, Trki, 2013.

72 Representative Omnibus survey by Trki, Ainterviews.

73 Ibid.

74 European Commission, What are your expto come...?,Eurobarometer, May 2013, httppublic_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm

nationID=22,&startdate=2013.05&enddate=Nov 2013).

75 Ibid.

76 Italian public in brackets, taken from Euro2008, Q57.

77 E C i i Wh t

80 National statistics taken from European V

Notes


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80 National statistics taken from European V

Q7, which asked whether most people cancant be too careful in dealing with people

81 Bartlett et al, The New Face of Digital Populis

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71


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Across Europe, there has been rapid growth of left-wing,anti-capitalist social and political movements that criticisethe establishment and use social media to organise andcommunicate their message. Beppe Grillos Five StarMovement, the Pirate Party in Germany and the Occupymovement are examples that have employed the mediumto grow rapidly and create a significant political and


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social impact yet often outside and invisible tomainstream politics.

Hungary has seen a proliferation of these subterraneanpolitical movements before and after the 2010 parliamentaryelections. They vary in size, ideology, form, structure andtheir relationship with party politics, and include a sarcasticjoke party, student organisations, parliamentary politicalparties and a movement led by the former Prime Minister. All

of these groups echo some distrust of established parties andparty politics and claim to be committed to newer,participatory forms of decision making.

This report presents the results of a survey of over 4,000Facebook fans of eight of these new opposition movements inHungary. It includes data on who they are and what theythink. It also compares these views with other similar partiesin Western Europe, the Hungarian general public and

supporters of Jobbik. This report is the eighth in a series ofcountry specific briefings about the online support ofpopulist parties across Europe.

Jamie Bartlett is Director of the Centre for the Analysis ofSocial Media at Demos. Pter Krek is Director of thePolitical Capital Institute in Hungary. Hunyadi Bulcs is anAnalyst at the Political Capital Institute.

ISBN 978-1-909037-45-8 10

Demos 2013

bartlett, j.; kreko, p. & hunyadi, b. (2013).. new political actors in europe: new opposition...

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