The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 22 | Number 2 | Article ID 4979 | Nov 15, 2016

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Base Dependency and Okinawa’s Prospects: Behind the Myths

A Conversation with Maedomari Hiromori

Professor of Economics and Environmental Policy

Okinawa International University

John Junkerman

Film Director, Okinawa: The Afterburn

John Junkerman (JJ): I want to hear yourthoughts about the history and policies that liebehind the present situation of the US bases onOkinawa, but first, could you tell us what youthought of our film? You watched the Japaneseversion, Okinawa: Urizun no Ame, and weincluded an interview with you in the Americanversion.

Maedomari Hiromori (MH): As a journalist, Iwas impressed by how the reality of the Battleof Okinawa and postwar history emerge fromthe patient accumulation of eyewitnessaccounts. The testimony of the Americanveterans of the Battle of Okinawa gave me anew awareness. When we talk of war, weusually see it in terms of “enemies and allies,”but in fact there are no enemies or allies. Thisfilm forcefully expresses how soldiers on bothsides are the victims of war. The Americansoldiers were equally terrified of combat,suffered casualties, lost many lives, and wereleft with deep spiritual wounds. How dosoldiers and civilians experience armedconflict? And after the war ends, peoplecontinue to suffer the consequences. Once yourspirit has been damaged, it is difficult to

recover. As former Okinawa governor OtaMasahide says in the film, “The Battle ofOkinawa never ended. It continues today.” Thatleft a strong impression.

JJ: The English title of the film is “Okinawa:The Afterburn.” “Afterburn” is not a commonEnglish expression, but one of its meanings isthat a burn continues to deepen after the flameis ext inguished. As a psychologica lphenomenon, the damage from a traumacontinues to deepen until the source of thattrauma is resolved.

MH: That captures it well. It’s a very good title.

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Okinawa: Island of Bases, Forgotten Island

JJ: The US military started building bases onOkinawa while the Pacific War was still beingfought, in preparation for the invasion ofmainland Japan. But after the war, when theywere no longer necessary for that purpose, theUS retained and expanded the bases.

MH: The American bases were built inpreparation for the invasion of the mainland, onland that the US occupied during the Battle ofOkinawa. After the war, these became strategicbases used as a staging area and airbase forbombing attacks during the wars in Korea andVietnam. And the bases remain today a militarystronghold in the global American strategicposture. After the San Francisco Peace Treatycame into effect in 1952, Okinawa wasseparated from the mainland and continuedunder occupation. Japan’s non-nuclear policiesdid not apply, so the US was able to placenuclear missiles in Okinawa and reinforce theisland’s strategic role. During the 1950s, stronganti-base movements in mainland Japan forcedthe closing of numerous bases, which werethen moved to Okinawa, including Marinebases in Gifu and Yamanashi prefectures.

Okinawa’s geographic position at the center ofEast Asia also led to its use as the “keystone ofthe Pacific,” where the US based strategicbombers. Under the US-Japan Security Treaty,Japan was required to provide land and

facilities for US military forces, which it did bymaintaining the bases on Okinawa. As long asthe bases remained in Okinawa, the US wassatisfied. So the bases have been retained inorder to strike this kind of political balance.

JJ: The US has a sense of privileged status inOkinawa, while Japan has reinforced this statusthrough discriminatory treatment of Okinawa.

MH: Another consideration that is often raisedis the “deterrent effect” of the US-JapanSecurity Treaty. According to this view, thestationing of 24 Osprey aircraft at the Marineairbase in Okinawa beginning in October 2012should have strengthened deterrence.However, the US military presence in Japanand Okinawa has had no deterrent effectagainst Chinese claims on the Senkaku Islands.Rather, Chinese assertiveness has onlyincreased in recent years. What this means isthat military force does not serve as a deterrentin territorial disputes, and it is incapable ofdelivering drastic solutions. The Senkakuproblem is a typical demonstration of theselimitations. In the face of this, why does Japancontinue to have such high expectations ofmilitary force?

From the Okinawan perspective, military affairsand their rationale have shifted over time,while the military presence has continued. Ineconomic terms, the main industry in Okinawabefore the war was agriculture, but farmlandwas seized for the US bases, and the populationwas forced to depend on the bases foremployment. Further, where Japan enjoyed afavorable fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to theUS dollar until 1971, US-administered Okinawaused the B yen, valued at 120 to the dollar. Thisput export-oriented producers at an extremedisadvantage, and resulted in a structuraldependence on the base economy. These werereally criminal economic policies, in my view.

JJ: But the bases did employ large numbers ofpeople in the 1950s, so people cite this as aboost to the Okinawan economy.

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MH: Farmers who lost their land to the baseshad no choice but to work on those bases.While Okinawan civilians were kept indetention camps after the war, bases wereconstructed, so when they were released andreturned to their villages, they had no homes.They had no land, no fields. At the end of thewar, more than half of the main island ofOkinawa was confiscated by the US military;(the bases were later consolidated, but theystill occupy 18 percent of the main island).When the occupation of Japan ended in 1952,residents began to demand the return of theirland, and the military countered with a plan tobuy the occupied land with a one-time payment[in place of the rents then being paid]. A fierceopposition movement erupted. “We’ll never sellour land to the military,” they declared. Despitebeing exhausted and impoverished by the war,Okinawan people at that time mounted a strongopposition to the bases, and prevented theirland from coming under the permanent controlof the military.

JJ: That was the beginning of the firstShimagurumi Toso (“island-wide struggle”),which continued through the 1950s. We’re nowin the midst of the second Shimagurumi Toso,the campaign to close the US Marine Corpsbases, in particular. It can be said that the anti-base movement originated with economic andsocial causes. There was also pacifistopposition to the military use of their land, butthe two motives were deeply intertwined.

MH: Okinawa International University openedin 1972 , the “revers ion year” whenadministration of Okinawa was returned fromthe US military to Japan. What did the people ofthe city of Ginowan expect to come frombuilding a university? Of course, they expectedit to boost economic development, but I’veheard that there was also a strong expectationthat “law and order would improve if auniversity comes.” The number of crimescommitted by American soldiers in Okinawabefore reversion was astounding. This was

during the Vietnam War and the Korean Warbefore that, so, to the Americans, it waswartime. There was fear that soldiers wouldlose their fighting spirit if they were severelyrestricted, so a certain degree of behavior wastolerated. That “certain degree” translated intoa tragedy for Okinawa. In the early postwar,the American journalist Frank Gibney wrote amagazine story, “Okinawa: Forgotten Island,”that reported on the cruel and overbearingoccupation policies of the American military ingreat detail.

JJ: “Forgotten Island” appeared in Timemagazine in 1949. Despite the heavy militarypresence in Okinawa, the American public paidlittle attention and the military operatedwithout much oversight. That was already truethen, and 67 years later, the same can still besaid about Okinawa. In fact, the Battle ofOkinawa is sometimes referred to as “theforgotten battle,” since it is not widelyrecognized among Americans. The US sufferedmore casualties in Okinawa than in any otherbattle of the Pacific War, but the Battle ofNormandy is much better known. This lack ofawareness is related to the current conditionsthat Okinawa faces.

MH: Today, as in the past, Okinawa is an islandthat is absent from memory and awareness.More than being “forgotten,” it may be a casethat was never “remembered” in the first place.

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The Transition to Economic Bases, and aNew Form of Security

MH: My specialization is the analysis of baseeconomics and military economics. In mylectures and essays, I stress that it is importantto make a shift from “military bases” to“economic bases.” I believe the problem of thereturn of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma isa fake problem. I get criticized for saying this,but what I mean is that it is a low priority froman economic standpoint. The risk from trainingthere, the noise, accidents, and crime makeFutenma an extremely dangerous base that I’dlike to see eliminated as soon as possible.However, in terms of economic rationality andpost-return economic effect, the return ofKadena airbase would have a larger and moreimportant impact than Futenma. If Kadena isreturned, it could be put to use immediately,but that’s not true of Futenma.

JJ: Why is that?

MH: Because Futenma doesn’t have a clearzone [under the approach to its runway], whichmakes it unsuited for use as an airport. IfJapanese aviation laws were applied, Futenmacould not be used as an airport. To use it, theland would have to be cleared, undergo anenvironmental cleanup, and a reuse plan wouldhave to be developed with the consent of thosewho own the land. It would require greatexpenditures and a long period of time toprepare it for reuse. But Kadena has two 4,000-meter runways and twice the amount of land asNarita International Airport, 1.5 times as muchfunctional space. It is one of the largestairports in Japan, as well as in all of Asia. Itcould be used tomorrow if it were returnedtoday. It is estimated that civilian use ofKadena could create economic activity worthone trillion yen (US $10 billion) annually.

JJ: But the US will never return Kadena.

MH: Everyone thinks they won’t. Because it’sthe “spoils of war,” paid for with Americanblood. But that doesn’t mean anything to thepeople of Okinawa. Priority should be given tohow our own island, our own land can best beused to contribute to economic development.There are two runways at Kadena. We couldbegin by allowing civilian aircraft to use one ofthem, that is, “military-civilian joint use” of thebase. For example, the US Misawa airbase [innorthern Japan] is a joint use base; and MCASIwakuni, jointly used by the Marines and theJapanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, hasbeen used since 2013 by All Nippon Airways aswell. Both of those airfields have only onerunway. Kadena has two. In 2013, the airfieldhad 60,000 takeoffs and landings; in 2014, thenumber was 45,000. Naha International Airporthas one runway, with 150,000 flights yearly. SoKadena is vastly underutilized, with theexpenses for its operations paid by Japanesetaxpayers. People might counter that it’srequired in case of a crisis, but the joint-useNaha airport is available in a crisis, as are all ofthe airports on Okinawa’s outlying islands. Instrategic terms, there’s simply no reason thatKadena needs to be reserved for exclusivemilitary use during peacetime.

JJ: Does the US military resist reasonableproposals like this because the Kadena airbasewould be heavily used if another war broke out

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in Asia? At the peak of the Vietnam War, theysay that aircraft were taking off from Kadena atthe rate of one every three minutes. Do supplybases such as Camp Kinzer continue to occupymuch more land than is necessary because theymight be needed to fight a major war?

MH: The question is, how long will theycontinue to make these preparations?Humanity has come a long way into the modernage and gained a great deal of knowledge.There are lessons to learn from the history ofrepeated wars. Why do we continue to dependon military force? The major industrializedcountries need to look back at the history ofpast wars and learn those lessons. How longwill we continue to pay massive sums of moneyfor bases that are devoted to killing? Today, 70years after the war, the military-industrialcomplex that troubled President Eisenhower somuch still controls the American economy andcreates a nation that cannot exist withoutcontinuing to fight wars. How can the US freeitself from its dependence on military industry,from the military-dependent economy? In fact,Okinawa’s efforts to extricate itself from thebase- and military-economy can provide aformula for dealing with the same problemsthat plague the American economy. ChangingOkinawa from a military base to an economicbase is also a way of contributing to the Asianeconomy and the world economy. I believe thiswill be an opportunity to create a new form ofsecurity.

Two Myths about Okinawa

MH: I am often asked, “How can Okinawamanage without the bases?” But the Americanbases now only contribute about 5% of the totalOkinawan economy, ¥200 billion (about $2billion) out of a total of ¥4 trillion (about $40billion). The world as whole has entered an eraof national security that is no longer dependenton the military or military bases. The EuropeanUnion is an example. There are no wars now inEurope. With the advent of the EU, a

community of shared fate has been created,and no one stands to gain from fighting a warin that region. Rather, the losses would beheavy. We can create an Asian Union (AU). Ifwe create an AU community of shared fate,conflict and war in the region would lose theirmeaning. Therein lies the importance ofeliminating the base economy. Military basesdo not create wealth. They only create threat,destruction, and killing.

JJ: That’s certainly true.

MH: I want to point out how uneconomical thebases are. For example, the economic effect ofthe Futenma airbase is about ¥24 million($240,000) per hectare. Just outside the fencearound the base, in the city of Ginowan, thatfigure is more than ¥80 million ($800,000) perhectare. The civilian economy is already nearlyfour times as productive. It leaves you with theimpression that, within the fences, there isundeveloped land that has been left behind bythe progress of time. There has long beenopposition to the bases because of base-relatedaccidents, pollution, and crime, but now thereis a conspicuous gap between the bases and theoutside economy, and people have begun to saythat the bases should be eliminated foreconomic reasons.

JJ: Over the last decade or so, you and othershave been making the case that the basescontribute far less to Okinawa than is usuallyassumed. Nonetheless, two myths persist, thatthe removal of the bases will damage theOkinawan economy, and that it will jeopardizepeace in Japan and Okinawa.

MH: One aspect of the problem is the gapbetween those who benefit from the bases andthose who are victimized by them. These aretwo distinct groups. Those who own land insidethe fences receive annual payments of rent(paid by the Japanese government). There are43,228 owners of military-use property, and thetotal annual rent payment is about ¥83 billion($830 million). This income averages ¥2 million

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($20,000) per landowner annually; this amountis the same as the average annual income inOkinawa. Also, there are 8,800 people whowork on the bases, and there are companiesthat profit from base-related business. Thesepeople do not advocate the elimination of thebases. Given that context, how do you breakthe spell of the base economy? It’s not an easytask.

JJ: What do you think is the best way to getpeople with divergent interests to understandthe importance of divesting Okinawa of thebases?

MH: The private sector economy in Okinawahas now become very powerful, and theuneconomical nature of the military bases hasbecome conspicuously visible. In areas wherebase land has been returned, such as Chatan(in central Okinawa) or Naha’s new city centerand the Kanagusuku district, the reuse of thisland has increased economic benefits 10 timesand even 100 times that of their prior militaryuse. It may be bad news to those who want tokeep the bases and impose them on Okinawa,but there has not been a single instance offailure in the reuse of returned military land inOkinawa. There is a parcel in West Futenmathat is slated for return, and the plan is to buildone of Asia’s leading medical treatment centersthere. If the vast expanse of the US base land isreturned, that holds the potential for therealization of an array of Asian dreams.

JJ: Okinawa holds great significance, not onlydomestically for Japan, but for Asia as a whole.

MH: Former Defense Minister MorimotoSatoshi sparked controversy when he saidsomething to the effect that “There is nostrategic reason to have the bases in Okinawa;they are kept there for political reasons.” Thedevelopment of missiles and nuclear weaponshas eliminated the geographical advantage thatOkinawa offered militarily. But Okinawa’sgeographical advantage has drawn theattention of private-sector companies from

China, Malaysia, Singapore and elsewhere, andthey are developing plans to use Okinawa as anairfreight hub for the distribution of goods andas a base for the tourism industry. So there arevoices being raised saying that “It’s a waste tokeep Kadena airport for exclusive military use,”and “Let’s do business that’s more profitable.”

Making Okinawa an economic base would alsocontribute to American national security. Thisis not limited to Kadena. The Navy Hospitalcould become a center for disaster relief, andthe mi l i tary ports , warehouses, andmaintenance facilities could all become basesfor economic activities. If that were to happen,the American presence in Asia would be deeplyappreciated.

JJ: There are great possibilities in that regard.

MH: In discussions of military security,“economic security” tends to get short shrift. Inthe resolution of military conflicts, there arewinners and losers. But in economic security,win-win relationships take priority. Economicscan create winners without producing losers.I’d like to see us move into an era of win-wineconomic security.

Removing the Bases from Okinawa is aPrescription for America

JJ: What do you think the near-term futureholds for Okinawa?

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MH: The time to reassess the American basesin Okinawa has arrived. The US has agreed toreturn five bases located south of Kadena ifJapan builds the new base in Henoko. Thisincludes the military port in Naha, Camp Kinzer(the Makiminato logistics area), Futenmaairbase, Camp Zukeran, and Camp Kuwae,along with a small Army oil storage facility (so,to be precise, that’s six bases). These are nolonger needed, so they will be returned, theysay. But if they admitted outright that theydon’t need them, they’d get nothing inexchange, so they made the return of the fivebases contingent on Japan building the newbase in Henoko. But if you look closely at theagreement, they’re demanding replacementfacilities for all five bases.

JJ: So it’s a “return” in name only.

MH: They’ll return bases they’ve used for 70years and are now decrepit, and replace thenwith cutting-edge new facilities. They’re tyingall this to the return of the Futenma base, withthe Japanese government bearing all of thecost. That’s very adept negotiation by the US atthe expense of Japan and Okinawa. The newbase at Henoko will function as a military port,it will have maintenance facilities and providelogistics (storage and supply) functions, inaddition to the airfield. Nearby is the Henokoammunition depot [now part of Camp Schwab],where the US stored nuclear missiles in thepast. This full-spectrum, cutting-edge facilitywill be delivered into US hands at no cost. TheUS feints the “return of Futenma,” and theJapanese government falls for it. Otherfunctions will be moved to other bases, wherenew facilities will be built. For the most part,the Japanese people, who will pay most of thecost through their taxes, say “Why doesOkinawa resist this?” and support the move andthe new facility. No one seems to notice thecontradictions.

Are the US bases, including the new base inHenoko, really necessary, are they performing

a useful role? Why isn’t this thoroughlyexamined? It’s astounding. Okinawa is aimingto build an economy that will function withoutthe American bases. If we are successful, thiswill provide a prescription for the Americaneconomy, which is heavily addicted to militaryspending, to extract itself from the militarybase economy. Witnessing Okinawa free itselffrom dependence on the bases, Americans willbecome aware of the spell they are under intheir own base-dependent economy. ThenOkinawa will become “the unforgettable island”in the eyes of the Americans. That’s what Ithink.

JJ: Ha-ha, “the unforgettable island.” I like that.Thank you for your many valuable insights.

MAEDOMARI Hiromari

After finishing graduate school at MeijiUniversity, Maedomari began work as areporter at Ryukyu Shimpo in Okinawa in 1984.He worked in a number of bureaus beforejoining the editorial committee in 1998.Beginning that year, he taught part-time atuniversities in Okinawa and Kyushu, whileserving as chief editorial writer and in otherpositions at the newspaper. He became afulltime professor at Okinawa InternationalUniversity in 2011. He is the author of manybooks, including Motto shiritai! Honto noOkinawa (I Want to Know More! The RealOkinawa); Kensho Chii Kyotei: Nichi-Bei

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fubyodo no genryu (Examining the Status ofForces Agreement: The Source of Inequalitybetween Japan and the US); and Honto waKenpo yori taisetsu na Nichi-Bei Chii Kyotei

Nyumon (Introduction to the US-Japan Statusof Forces Agreement: Actually More Importantthan the Constitution).

John Junkerman is a documentary filmmaker and Asia-Pacific Journal contributing editorbased in Tokyo. His new film, Okinawa: The Afterburn, is the first comprehensive film of theBattle of Okinawa and the island’s postwar. It won the Mainichi Film Prize for bestdocumentary and was named #1 on Kinema Jumpo’s Best Ten. The English-language versionof the film is now available from First Run Features here.