batch2 evidence case digest

Evidence2nd batch case digests|2015- 2016

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1. KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTTG.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: NO.

The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”___________

NOTES:– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12

years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

2. Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, February 9, 2012

R E S O L U T I O N(Re Application by Petitioners of a TRO)

I. THE FACTS

Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUE

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

III. THE RULING

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits: xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

3. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]

FACTS: Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line.

HELD: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.

4. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CAG.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla


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Facts: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

5. Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995 “Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.

In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the confrontation.Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES.

The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."

In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an offense.

The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

7. UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORP v. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. 126619; December 20, 2006Ponente: J. Tinga

FACTS:

The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City arising from Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects covered by agreements they entered into with each other.

Upon Uniwide’s motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and Titan’s open court manifestation agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. Titan’s complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC. Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which was later amended and re-amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The agreements between Titan and Uniwide are briefly described below.

PROJECT 1.

The first agreement (Project 1) was a written “Construction Contract” entered into by Titan and Uniwide sometime in May 1991 whereby Titan undertook to construct Uniwide’s Warehouse Club and Administration Building in Libis, Quezon City .

PROJECT 2.

Sometime in July 1992, Titan and Uniwide entered into the second agreement (Project 2) whereby the former agreed to construct an additional floor and to renovate the latter’s warehouse located at the EDSA Central Market Area in Mandaluyong City.

PROJECT 3.

The parties executed the third agreement (Project 3) in May 1992. In a written “Construction Contract,” Titan undertook to construct the Uniwide Sales Department Store Building in Kalookan City.

Uniwide asserted in its petition that: (a) it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional works in Project 1 and Project 3; (b) it is not liable to pay the Value-Added Tax (VAT) for Project 1; (c) it is entitled to liquidated damages for the delay incurred in constructing Project 1 and Project 3; and


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(d) it should not have been found liable for deficiencies in the defectively constructed Project 2.

An Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a chairman and two members was created in accordance with the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration. It conducted a preliminary conference with the parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) which was signed by the parties. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection, hearings, and received the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits which were subject to cross-examination.

On 17 April 1995, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision, the decretal portion of which is as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

On Project 1 – Libis:

[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for the claims made by [Titan] on this Project.

Project 2 – Edsa Central:

[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this project, the same being for the account of the [Titan]. On the other hand, [Titan] is absolved of any liability on the counterclaim for defective construction of this project.

[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P6,301,075.77 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 19 December 1992 until the date of payment.

On Project 3 – Kalookan:

[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P5,158,364.63 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 08 September 1993 until the date of payment.

[Uniwide] is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project, in such amount as may be computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be paid directly thereto. The BIR is hereby notified that [Uniwide] Sales Realty and Resources Corporation has assumed responsibility and is held liable for VAT payment on this project. This accordingly exempts Claimant Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation from this obligation.

Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration of the 17 April 1995 decision which was denied by the CIAC in its Resolution dated 6 July 1995. Uniwide accordingly filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which rendered the assailed decision on 21 February 1996. Uniwide’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution dated 30 September 1996.Hence, Uniwide comes to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether the award given by CIAC is final

HELD:

As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal. This rule, however admits of certain exceptions.

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.

8. YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national residing in Caloocan City, died leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Aida Sy-Gonzales, with other respondents, filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. In said petition they alleged among others that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; and they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him.

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee and the other petitioners who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.

After hearing, the probate court, held in favor of the petitioners-oppositors.

However, on appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court. CA declared the children in both petitioners and respondents as acknowledged natural children since; petitioners were unable to prove the legality of the Chinese marriage as valid to the laws of China and respondent’s parents lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee have been proven proven to be valid in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China.

Ruling:

NO.

Petitioners presented as evidence; the testimony of the Yao Kee (narrating the marriage custom of China during her time), the testimony of her younger brother (as witness to the wedding ceremony) and several documents wherein Sy Kiat indicated his status as married and the name of his spouse as Yao Kee.

These evidences may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact". The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia.This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours . Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.


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10. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK vs COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000

Facts:

BPI had an income refundable amount from the BIR for the years 1988 and 1989, and such amount will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. However, on 1990, it still suffered business losses, thus, it did not used the refundable amount as tax credits but instead filed for a tax refund. CIR denied the tax refund for failing to submit its 1990 return which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. BPI calls the attention of the court that the court of Tax appeals on a decision it rendered on CTA case no 4897 involving its claim for refund for the year 1990 held that “ petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990”. However, CTA urges this court not to take judicial notice of the said case.

Issue:

WON CTA can take judicial notice of the previous case?

Held:

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases , even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge."

However, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts MAY take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, CTA do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision. Thus, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of the previous case.

11. 8. Atienza vs. Board of Medicine &Sioson, GR No. 177407, Feb. 9, 2011

Facts:1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.

2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.

3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of Editha’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.

5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal offer of exhibits, alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the evidence is relevant or not.

7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence

Held:No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, “it is the

safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with Editha’s medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in courtwithout great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits “because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building” and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.

14. Elayda vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Amelia C. Elayda filed a case against spouses Pedro and Leonora Roxas for recovery of loans amounting to P90,000 plus interests. The loans having been secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on commission. The spouses admitted that they indeed contracted said loans but they have all been paid in full. They even contended that the total payments have exceeded the total obligations due to the usurious interest. Trial commenced. Elayda presented her testimonial and documentary proofs for recovery of P90,000.00 plus interest. The Roxas spouses in their turn, adduced evidence that the total payment made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00. To counteract that evidence, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000 . 00 (as was stated in her complaint ). The spouses objected on the ground that it was contrary to the judicial admissions in plaintiff s complaint and was being presented after conclusion of the trial.The RTC agreed with the spouses (rejected the statement) and rendered judgment ordering Elayda to reimburse the spouses the excess of P90k since the entire interest obligation was void for being usurious.

Elayda filed a MR but the court did not reconsider. She went to the CA but failed again. Hence, this petition before the SC.

Issue: W/N the proffered statement should be admitted as evidence.


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Ruling: No, it cannot be admitted.

The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . ." That doctrine, by the way, has since been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964, Section 2, Rule 129 of which reads as follows:

Judicial admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.

Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake."

Besides, if it be true that the total loan liability of the Roxases was not P90,000.00 only, but P186,000.00 (or P187,600.00), it is quite surprising that Elayda's evidence-in-chief, as plaintiff, was directed to proving an obligation of only P90,000.00. Even more surprising is the fact that in her complaint Elayda only alleged the sum of P90,000.00 as the indebtedness of the Roxases to her. The evidence of an indebtedness in excess of P90,000.00 would therefore appear to be a mere afterthought, difficult to accept at face value.

15. GARDNER VS. CA, 131 SCRA 585 (1984) Facts:

This case involves 5 transfers of real property.Petitioner Ruby Gardner ( married to an American Frank Gardner Jr.) was the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural

land situated at Calamba, Laguna. On November 27, 1961, the GARDNERS and the spouses Ariosto C. SANTOS and Cirila Serrano (the SANTOSES) entered

into an agreement for the subdivision of the two parcels, with the SANTOSES binding themselves to advance to the GARDNERS the amount of P93,000.00 in installments. For the protection of both parties they executed the following documents all on the same date and referring to the same parcels of land: (1) Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the SANTOSES (the First Transfer, considering the nature of the document); (2) Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement; and (3) Supplemental Agreement (Exhibits "C", "D" and "E", Ibid.). Despite the "sale,", the GARDNERS were still denominated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and in the Supplemental Agreement as "owners" and Ariosto SANTOS merely as "broker". It appears from the evidence that the sale to the SANTOSES was one "in trust" for the protection of the SANTOSES who had obligated themselves to give cash advances to the GARDNERS from time to time.

Unknown to the GARDNERS, on June 10, 1964, the SANTOSES transferred Lot No. 1426-New to Jose Cuenca, married to Amanda Relova (the JOSE CUENCAS) (Exhibit "H", Ibid.), and on June 15, 1964, Lot No. 4748-New to Juan Cuenca, married to Soledad Advincula (the JUAN CUENCAS). Titles were then transferred to their name.

Upon learning of the Transfer of the properties to the CUENCAS, petitioner 'Ruby GARDNER, caused the inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 2, 1965. Her affidavit stated among others: 1. that for the protection of the Santos for his interest in the sum of 93,000, she would transfer the her titles in trust. 2. In the Subdivision Joint Agreement and Supplemental agreement, Ariosto Santos was only a broker.

On October 19, 1966 and November 4, 1966, the JUAN CUENCAS and the JOSE CUENCAS, respectively, transferred the lots to Michael C. VERROYA (Exhibits "P" & Ibid.) an office assistant of Ariosto SANTOS (the Third transfer). Titles were issued in VERROYA's name with the adverse Claim carried over.On March 29, 1967, VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina, which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles.On June 29, 1967, VERROYA ARROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent Deogracias Natividad, married to Juanita Sanchez (the NATIVIDADS) (Exhibits "V", "V-4", Ibid.) (the Fourth Transfer).

On September 30, 1967, the NATIVIDADS transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista and Encarnacion de los Santos (the BAUTISTAS) (Exhibits "14", "15" [Natividad], "JJ-2", Ibid.) (the Fifth Transfer). No titles were issued to the BAUTISTAS.

It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the NATIVIDADS (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the GARDNERS continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, or over a span of approximately six years, the GARDNERS continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties.

Aggrieved by the series of transfers, the GARDNERS filed suit on July 8, 1969 for "Declaration of Nullity, Rescission and Damages" against the Five Transferees, including the mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina, before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I (Civil Case No. B-774), praying for the declaration of nullity of all the Five Transfers and the cancellation of all titles issued pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated, fictitious, and without consideration.

In their Answer, the SANTOSES claimed, in brief, that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties were to be considered as the investment of the GARDNERS in the subdivision venture and that in the event that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots to the GARDNERS upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to them; and that the deed of sale was to be registered for the protection of the SANTOSES considering the moneys that the latter would be advancing.

Of the eight answering defendants, only respondent Deogracias NATIVIDAD testified on his behalf. Defendant Ariosto SANTOS merely adopted as his own evidence the declaration he had given as an adverse witness. The JOSE CUENCAS and the JUAN CUENCAS neither presented any testimonial evidence but just adopted the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS. Defendants Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima, the mortgagees, submitted their case after the genuineness of the deed of mortgage executed in their favor by VERROYA was admitted by the parties.

The trial ruled in favor of the GArdners and declared null and void the 5 transfers. This was affirmed in toto by CA. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondents Natividads, CA reversed its decision and declared as valid the sale of the land to them as well as the titles issued pursuant thereto.

Issues:

1.) W/N the 5 tranfers of title are valid.

2.)Whether or not the testimonies of Santos in the witness stand could prevail over the allegations in Santos’ answer.

Ruling:

The First Transfer in favor of the SANTOSES was "indubitably established" to have been without consideration and is, therefore, void and inexistent. 14 That sale was executed merely as a means of protection to the SANTOSES for their promised cash advances to the GARDNERS in one year in the sum of P93,000.00. Added to this is the admission against his own interest by Ariosto SANTOS that the GARDNERS did not receive from him any consideration, 15 thereby corroborating the declarations of the GARDNERS. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit "D") and the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit "E") eloquently express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the GARDNERS and the SANTOSES was for a subdivision and not a sale transaction.

The evidence also establishes that the Second Transfer to the CUENCAS was fictitious and simulated for not having been supported with any consideration. By his own admission, Ariosto SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS, who are his "compadres", the disputed properties, together with others that he owned, merely to conceal his ownership and "to protect them from persons who had filed suits against him and were running after the properties registered in his name." It was SANTOS who had caused the execution of those deeds of sale (Exhibits "H" & "I") and had them notarized by his own counsel.

The Third Transfer in favor of VERROYA was similarly without consideration and, therefore, void ab initio. The evidence on record shows that Ariosto SANTOS himself caused the execution of the deeds of sale (Exhibits "P" & "Q") in favor of VERROYA, who is SANTOS' office manager in his brokerage business. The only purpose of the transfer was to enable VERROYA to secure for SANTOS a loan with the Veterans Bank so much so that when the documents of sale were signed by the CUENCAS in their respective houses in favor of VERROYA, the latter was not even present.

On equal footing is the Fourth Transfer from VERROYA VERROYA to private respondents NATIVIDADS. It was SANTOS who had caused the preparation of the deed of sale in favor of the NATIVIDADS after sensing that VERROYA was not inclined to return the title to the properties. Deogracias NATIVIDAD was SANTOS' close and trusted I 6 compadre who agreed to put the titles in his (NATIVIDAD's) name because of the pending cases against SANTOS. The amount of P 80,000.00 stated in the document of sale was not actually paid by the NATIVIDADS to VERROYA, according to SANTOS' own testimony. The latter further declared that VERROYA was only coerced to sign the deeds (Exhibits "V" & ("V-4") after he was boxed by NATIVIDAD in SANTOS' office at the Escolta.

The Fifth Transfer to the BAUTISTAS partook of the same nature a simulated and fictitious transaction, for being without consideration, as shown by the evidence. They too, were declared in default and made no attempt to answer or dispute the allegations in the Complaint against them.

The mortgage of the properties by VERROYA in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima was executed after the inscription of the adverse claim on the titles so that they can neither be considered as innocent mortgagees for value.

As concluded in the original Decision of respondent Court, all Five Transfers starting from that of the SANTOSES down to the NATIVIDADS, were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were, therefore, void ab initio and inexistent. The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings and in his declarations in open Court differed win not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent Court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As Ariosto SANTOS himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate Court), dated April 24, 1980 and December 24, 1980, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and its Decision of January 11, 1979 affirming in toto the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. B-774, is hereby reinstated. Costs against private respondents.

16. ATILLO III VS. CA, 266 SCRA 596, 1997

FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, vs. CA, AMANCOR, INC. and MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents. G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997

FACTS: Amancor, Inc. , a corporation then owned and controlled by Atillo III , contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with MBTC, secured by real estate properties owned by the Atillo III. Before the said loan could be paid, Atillo III entered into a MOA with Lhuillier whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, Atillo III and LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%.


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To support the business operations of AMANCOR, Atillo III and LHUILLLER executed another MoA by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As an addendum to the foregoing, a Supplemental MoA was entered into by the Atillo III and LHUILLIER. Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental MoA which provides as follows:

4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-

payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate.

Pursuant to this stipulation, Atillo III assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with MBTC. After offsetting the amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that Atillo III had with AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to Atillo III was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay Atillo III, the latter filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against AMANCOR and LHUILLLER.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Atillo III, ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount of P199,888.89 with interest.

LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor.

ISSUE: When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has personal liability in a certain transaction, may a court rule

against such an admission despite clear indications that it was not affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise?

(Atillo III claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that:

3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.

xxx xxx xxx

3.14. Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to the personal agreement

between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned.)

RULING: Atillo III’s contention is without merit.

1. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.

For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the admission "out of context", then the one making the admission may show that he made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.

This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear ." That is the reason for the modifier "such".

(Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner. Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer asserted the following:

3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and par. 4 of the actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C), Lhuillier did not engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to release the property to plaintiff. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in the aforesaid par. 4 of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate."

3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier . . . only agreed, for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre-terminated corporate loans with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancor's finances, for said corporation to pay interest at prevailing bank rate. . . .

Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the issues to be resolved by the trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. Moreover, as correctly observed by respondent court, if petitioner really believed that the liability was incurred by LHULLLIER in his personal capacity, then he should not have offset his accounts with those of AMANCOR's. The foregoing act

of petitioner is a clear indication that he recognized AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the obligor.)

2. Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:

The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and in his declarations in open court differed will not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.

4. The foregoing pronouncement is based on factual findings of the lower court which were upheld by the respondent court, and which are thus, conclusive upon us pursuant to the well established rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on the record, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.

17. Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners, vs.PLUS BUILDERS, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006

FACTS: Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of the construction and sale of the houses in the subdivision owned and developed by Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., in Cavite City

Spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327,491.95.

Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter.

Petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking, prompting respondent’s counsel to send them a demand letter. Then petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three installments. Again, Plus Builders’ counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but Binaraos refused to pay.

A complaint for a sum of money was filed against petitioners.

MTC ordered thru its decision that the Sps. Binarao should pay. They appealed to RTC. RTC affirmed in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer, did not deny respondent’s allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P 65,571.22.

Sps. Binarao appealed to CA. CA affirmed in toto RTC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ADMITTED ABSOLUTELY IN THEIR ANSWER THEIR LIABILITY UNDER THE PROPOSED PAYMENT PLAN

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."


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A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.

Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondent’s complaint. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00; (b) they still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself6 and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no amount of rationalization can offset it.

18. CONSTANTINO G. SY v. JUDGE CARLOS C. FERNANDO, MTCC, BRANCH 2, MANDAUE CITY First Division, [A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1652-MTJ. April 3, 2006]

In a verified complaint, Constantino G. Sy charges Judge Carlos C. Fernando, MTCC, Mandaue City, with grave partiality or bias, gross ignorance of the law/rules and dereliction of duty. The complaint stemmed from a Civil Case No.3825 for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. An amended complaint was later filed, seeking TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory Injunction.

Sy alleges that he was not given a fair chance to prove the necessity of the ancillary remedy prayed for, as the judge "brushed aside" the injunctive relief sought on the pretext that "only in matters of life and death are courts allowed to issue the same," a condition, which complainant claims to be not found in the Rules. He took exception to the denial of his "impromptu motion and prayer for an ocular inspection" by the judge. For these reasons, he accuses the judge of "unbridled bias and mental dishonesty," which amounts to gross ignorance of the rules, as well as dereliction of duty.

For his part, Judge clarifies that the civil case had already been decided in favor of complainant, and the decision had already become final, and had been executed and satisfied. He claims that he cannot be held administratively liable even assuming that his decision was erroneous considering that complainant failed to impute to him fraud, dishonesty or corruption in the performance of his judicial functions. Consequently, he filed a motion to cite complainant and counsel in contempt of court for misleading the Court.

EVALUATION: The complaint should be dismissed.

The complaint is premised on the denial by the judge of the prayer for a TRO or preliminary injunction in the amended complaint in Civil Case #3825. A perusal of the records, however, revealed that complainant opted not to pursue this ancillary remedy by filing a second amended complaint without reiterating the same remedy therein. Consequently, he is deemed to have abandoned his prayer therefor, taking into consideration the provision of Section 8, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings. - An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.

By abandoning his prayer for injunctive relief, complainant has no factual or legal basis to question the inaction of the respondent judge on his earlier plea for such relief as well as the motion for ocular inspection, the latter being intertwined with the ancillary remedy sought for.

That Civil Case No. 3825 was decided in favor of complainant belies the allegation of partiality against the judge. Nonetheless, whatever error that may have been committed, if any, can only be viewed as an error of judgment because complainant failed to prove any act constituting bad faith, malice or corrupt practice on the part of the judge. Inquiry into the administrative liability of the respondent judge may only be commenced after the judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate court had already spoken with finality. The rationale for this is that disciplinary proceedings against judges are not contemporary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for judicial remedies. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies and the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against judges concerned, whether civil, administrative, or criminal in nature.

As to the motion to cite complainant and his counsel in contempt of court for misleading the Court, a perusal of the complaint shows that indeed the second amended complaint was never mentioned therein. However, respondent judge failed to establish that complainant, through counsel, deliberately withheld such information in order to mislead the Court.

It must be stressed that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are ordinarily not subject to disciplinary action. A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any official act, no matter how erroneous, as long as he or she acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his or her judgment. There is no such evidence of ill motive on the part of Judge Fernando in this case.

19. DBP vs. CA

FACTS:

-Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from DBP for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land(Infanta, Quezon). Subsequently, Canadalla procured another loan in the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel(Quezon).

-Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, compounded by devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her store by fire, Canadalla failed to comply with her obligations to the DBP. Subsequently, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which emerged as the only bidder. Subsequently, she assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, Rosalinda A. Canadalla-Go.

-Go offered to redeem the properties for P526,882.40. In response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1,814,700.58 representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996(Under its 1986 Revised Chapter, the redemption price must be based on its total claim). When Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the subject properties.

-G o f i l e d w i t h t h e R T C a S u p p l e m e n t a l C o m p l a i n t f o r t h e “ E x e r c i s e o f R i g h t o f R e d e m p t i o n a n d D e t e r m i n a t i o n o f R e d e m p t i o n P r i c e , N u l l i f i c a t i o n o f C o n s o l i d a t i o n , A n n u l m e n t o f T i t l e s , w i t h D a m a g e s , P l u s I n j u n c t i o n a n d T e m p o r a r y R e s t r a i n i n g O r d e r . ”

- G o f i l e d a R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n b y A d v e r s e P a r t y . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e D B P f i l e d i t s C o m m e n t .

Go’s a rguments :

G o o b j e c t e d t o t h e C o m m e n t r e a s o n i n g t h a t i t w a s n o t u n d e r o a t h a s r e q u i r e d b y S e c t i o n 2 , R u l e 2 6 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , a n d t h a t i t f a i l e d t o s t a t e t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n o r d e n i a l o f m a t t e r s f o r w h i c h a n a d m i s s i o n w a s r e q u e s t e d .

DBP’s a rguments :

D B P m a n i f e s t e d t h a t , f i r s t , t h e s t a t e m e n t s , a l l e g a t i o n s , a n d d o c u m e n t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a m e a s t h o s e i n t h e S u p p l e m e n t a l C o m p l a i n t ; s e c o n d , t h e y h a d a l r e a d y b e e n e i t h e r s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n i e d o r a d m i t t e d b y t h e D B P i n i t s A n s w e r ; a n d t h i r d , t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e n i a l o r a d m i s s i o n h a d a l r e a d y b e e n s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h e r e i n .

R T C a n d C A r u l e d i n f a v o r o f G o .

I SSUE : W h e t h e r D B P ’ s f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y w i t h s e c t i o n 2 6 a m o u n t e d t o i t h a v i n g i m p l i e d l y a d m i t t e d t h e m a t t e r s s o u g h t t o b e a d m i t t e d i n t h e R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n .

RUL ING:

I n f a v o r o f D B P .

I n d e e d , a s p o i n t e d o u t b y t h e D B P , t h e m a t t e r s s t a t e d i n G o ’ s R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n a r e t h e s a m e a s t h o s e a l l e g e d i n h e r S u p p l e m e n t a l C o m p l a i n t . B e s i d e s , t h e y h a d a l r e a d y b e e n e i t h e r s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n i e d o r a d m i t t e d i n D B P ’ s A n s w e r t o t h e S u p p l e m e n t a l C o m p l a i n t . T o r e q u i r e t h e D B P t o a d m i t t h e s e m a t t e r s u n d e r R u l e 2 6 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t w o u l d b e p o i n t l e s s a n d s u p e r f l u o u s .

W e h a v e h e l d i n P o v . C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t h a t “ [ a ] p a r t y s h o u l d n o t b e c o m p e l l e d t o a d m i t m a t t e r s o f f a c t a l r e a d y a d m i t t e d b y h i s p l e a d i n g a n d … t o m a k e a s e c o n d d e n i a l o f t h o s e a l r e a d y d e n i e d i n h i s a n s w e r t o t h e c o m p l a i n t . ” T h e P o d o c t r i n e w a s b r o u g h t a s t e p f u r t h e r i n C o n c r e t e A g g r e g a t e s C o . v . C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , w h e r e w e r u l e d t h a t i f t h e f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t a r e t h e v e r y s a m e a l l e g a t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h e r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n a n d h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n i e d o r o t h e r w i s e d e a l t w i t h i n t h e a n s w e r , a r e s p o n s e t o t h e r e q u e s t i s n o l o n g e r r e q u i r e d . H e n c e , t h e D B P d i d n o t e v e n h a v e t o f i l e i t s C o m m e n t o n G o ’ s R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n , w h i c h m e r e l y r e p r o d u c e d t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n h e r c o m p l a i n t . D B P ’ s A n s w e r i t s e l f c o n t r o v e r t s t h e a v e r m e n t s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t a n d t h o s e r e c o p i e d i n t h e r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n .

E v e n a s s u m i n g t h a t a r e p l y t o t h e r e q u e s t i s n e e d e d , i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e D B P f i l e d i t s C o m m e n t e i t h e r a d m i t t i n g o r s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n y i n g a g a i n t h e m a t t e r s s o u g h t t o b e a d m i t t e d a n d s t a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s t h e r e f o r . T h a t t h e C o m m e n t w a s n o t u n d e r o a t h i s n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e , b u t m e r e l y a f o r m a l , d e f e c t w h i c h c a n b e e x c u s e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f j u s t i c e c o n f o r m a b l y t o t h e w e l l - e n t r e n c h e d d o c t r i n e t h a t a l l p l e a d i n g s s h o u l d b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d a s t o d o s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . T h e f i l i n g o f s u c h C o m m e n t s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h R u l e 2 6 . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e D B P c a n n o t b e d e e m e d t o h a v e


8

i m p l i e d l y a d m i t t e d t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n f o r t h e m e r e r e a s o n t h a t i t s C o m m e n t w a s n o t u n d e r o a t h .

M o r e o v e r , s o m e o f t h e m a t t e r s s o u g h t t o b e a d m i t t e d i n t h e R e q u e s t f o r A d m i s s i o n w e r e m a t t e r s o f l a w o r o p i n i o n s . U n d e r S e c t i o n 1 o f R u l e 2 6 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , t h e s c o p e o f m a t t e r s t h a t a p a r t y m a y r e q u e s t t h e a d v e r s a r y t o a d m i t a r e ( 1 ) t h e g e n u i n e n e s s o f a n y m a t e r i a l a n d r e l e v a n t d o c u m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n a n d e x h i b i t e d w i t h t h e r e q u e s t ; a n d ( 2 ) t h e t r u t h o f a n y m a t e r i a l a n d r e l e v a n t m a t t e r o f f a c t s e t f o r t h i n t h e r e q u e s t . T h e r u l e a u t h o r i z i n g a p a r t y t o c a l l o n t h e o t h e r p a r t y t o m a k e a n a d m i s s i o n i m p l i e s t h e m a k i n g o f d e m a n d s f o r a d m i s s i o n o f r e l e v a n t a n d m a t e r i a l m a t t e r s o f f a c t s – a n d n o t f o r a d m i s s i o n o f m a t t e r s o f l a w , c o n c l u s i o n s , o r o p i n i o n s .

A t t h e t i m e G o m a d e u s e o f d i s c o v e r y p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r R u l e 2 6 , t h e g o v e r n i n g r u l e b e f o r e i t s a m e n d m e n t t o o k e f f e c t o n 1 J u l y 1 9 9 7 r e a d : “ O b j e c t i o n s o n t h e g r o u n d o f i r r e l e v a n c y o r i m p r o p r i e t y o f t h e m a t t e r r e q u e s t e d s h a l l b e p r o m p t l y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t f o r r e s o l u t i o n . ” P e t i t i o n e r D B P ’ s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i m p r o p r i e t y o f s o m e o f t h e m a t t e r s r e q u e s t e d w a s p r o m p t l y m a d e a s e a r l y a s t h e f i l i n g o f i t s c o m m e n t o n t h e r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n . D B P ’ s c o m m e n t c o n s i s t e n t l y a v e r r e d t h a t i t h a d a l r e a d y d e a l t w i t h t h e m a t t e r s i n q u e s t i o n i n i t s a n s w e r , e i t h e r a d m i t t i n g o r s p e c i f i c a l l y d e n y i n g t h e m .

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