battle of the barricades, u.s. marines in the recapture of seoul - korean war … · 2011-07-10 ·...

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

BATTLE OF THEBARRICADES

U.S. Marines in theRecapture of Seoulby Colonel Joseph H. Alexander,

U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

About the Author

Colonel Joseph H.Alexander, USMC (Ret),

served 29 years on active dutyas an assault amphibian offi-cer, including two tours inVietnam and service as Chiefof Staff, 3d Marine Division.He is a distinguished graduateof the Naval War College andholds degrees in history andnational security from NorthCarolina, Jacksonville, and Georgetown Universities.

Colonel Alexander wrote the History and MuseumDivision’s World War II 50th anniversary commemora-tive pamphlets on Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.His books include A Fellowship of Valor: The BattleHistory of the U.S. Marines; Storm Landings: EpicAmphibious Battles of the Central Pacific; UtmostSavagery: The Three Days of Tarawa; Edson’s Raiders:The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in WW II; and (withLieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) Sea Soldiers inthe Cold War. As chief military historian for Lou RedaProductions he has appeared in 15 documentaries forThe History Channel and the Arts & EntertainmentNetwork, including a four-part mini-series on theKorean War, “Fire and Ice.”

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine CorpsHeritage Foundation.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (RET)

GENERAL EDITOR,


Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 190 00315 200

SourcesPrimary sources included the 1st

Marine Division Special Action Reportsfor 29 August-7 October 1950, the wardiaries of several ground and aviationunits, and Gen Oliver P. Smith’s officialletters and memoir concerning theSeoul/Wonsan campaigns. Of the offi-cial history series, U.S. MarineOperations in Korea, the volumes byLynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona(II: The Inchon-Seoul Operation[Washington, D.C., Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1955] and III: TheChosin Reservoir Campaign [Washing-ton, D.C., Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1957]), provide well-researched coverage of the recapture ofSeoul and the Wonsan, Kojo, and Majon-ni operations. Among the Marine CorpsOral History Collection, I found mostuseful the interviews with Gen RobertH. Barrow, Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., MajGen Raymond L. Murray, and LtColFrancis F. Parry. The interview with AdmJohn S. Thach, USN (Ret), in the U.S.Naval Institute’s Oral History Collection,was consulted. I also benefited fromdirect interviews with MajGen Norman J.Anderson, Gen Robert H. Barrow, for-mer SSgt Larry V. Brom, MGySgt OrvilleJones, LtGen Robert P. Keller, LtGenPhilip D. Shutler, and BGen Edwin H.Simmons. Contemporary quotations by

PFC Morgan Brainard and Lt Joseph R.Owen are from their autobiographicbooks, Brainard’s Then They Called forthe Marines (formerly Men in Low CutShoes [Todd & Honeywell, 1986]) andOwen’s Colder Than Hell: A MarineRifle Company at Chosin Reservoir(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

Two official monographs provedhelpful: LtCol Gary W. Parker and MajFrank M. Batha, A History of MarineObservation Squadron Six (Washington,D.C.: History and Museums Division,HQMC, 1982), and Curtis A. Utz, Assaultfrom the Sea: The Amphibious Landingat Inchon (Washington, D.C.: NavalHistorical Center, 1994), which alsoincludes the Seoul campaign.

Robert D. Heinl’s stirring Victory atHigh Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968) leadsthe list of recommended books. I alsosuggest Bevin Alexander, Korea: TheFirst War We Lost (New York:Hippocrene Books, 1986); Roy E.Appleman, South to the Naktong, Northto the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1961); Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: America in Korea (NewYork: Times Books, 1987); DavidDouglas Duncan’s superb photo essay,This is War! A Photo-Narrative in ThreeParts (New York: Harper & Brothers,1951); George F. Hofmann and Donn A.Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The

History of U.S. Armored Forces(Lexington: University of KentuckyPress, 1999); J. Robert Moskin, The U.S.Marine Corps Story, 3d ed. (Boston,Little Brown & Co., 1992); and RodPaschall, Witness to War: Korea (NewYork: Perigree Books, 1995). Specialthanks to LtCol Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR,for sharing advance copies of theSeoul/Wonsan chapters of his forthcom-ing biography of LtGen Lewis B.“Chesty” Puller.

I recommend these four vintage mag-azine essays: Nicholas A. Canzona, “DogCompany’s Charge,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings (Nov56); Ernest H. Giustiand Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine AirOver Inchon-Seoul,” Marine CorpsGazette, June 1952; Lynn Montross, “TheCapture of Seoul: Battle of theBarricades,” Marine Corps Gazette,August 1951; and Norman R. Stanford,“Road Junction,” Marine Corps Gazette,September 1951. For a more recentaccount, see Al Hemingway, “Marines’Battle for Seoul,” Military History,August 1996.

The author acknowledges MaryCraddock Hoffman who designed themap of the overall Inchon-Seoul area,and Col David Douglas Duncan, USMCR(Ret), for allowing the use of his histor-ical photographs of Seoul. Photographsby Frank Noel are used with permissionof the Associated Press/Wide WorldPhotos.

ate on the afternoonof 24 September1950, Captain RobertH. Barrow’s CompanyA, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines, secured the military crestof Hill 79 in the southwest corner ofSeoul, the enemy-occupied capitalof the Republic of South Korea.

This momentous day for Barrowand his men began with a nerve-wracking crossing of the Han Riverin open-hatched DUKWs, theubiquitous amphibious trucks ofWorld War II. Debarkation on thenorth shore had been followed byan unorthodox passage of lines“on the fly” of the regiment’s leadbattalion and the subsequent high-tempo attack on Hill 79. Now therifle company assumed defensivepositions on the objective, the mengazing in awe at the capital cityarrayed to their north and east,sprawling virtually to the horizon.Thousands of North KoreanPeoples’ Army (NKPA) troops laywaiting for them behind barricadesor among countless courtyards androoftops. Tens of thousands ofcivilians still clung to life in thebattered city. The Marines were avery long way from the barren

beaches of Tarawa or Peleliu.Even smoking Inchon, theiramphibious objective 10 days ear-lier seemed far distant. Seoulwould represent the largest objec-tive the Marines ever assailed.

Earlier that day Colonel Lewis B.“Chesty” Puller, commanding the1st Marines, issued a foldedAmerican flag to be raised on theregiment’s first objective within thecity limits. Barrow’s battalion com-mander gave him the honor as thepoint company in the assault. Thetime was right. Barrow’s menattached the national colors to apole and raised them proudly on arooftop on Hill 79. Life magazinephotographer David DouglasDuncan, himself a Marine combatveteran, captured the moment onfilm. The photograph provedunremarkable—Hill 79 was noMount Suribachi—but it reflectedan indelible moment in MarineCorps history. Seven weeks earli-er the 1st Marine Division was adivision in name only. This after-noon a rifle company from thathastily reconstituted division hadseized the first hill within occupiedSeoul while all three regimentsconverged inexorably on the capi-tal’s rambling perimeter.

Barrow’s flag-raising initiativeenraged the neighboring 5thMarines, still slugging its waythrough the last of the bitterlydefended ridges protecting thecity’s northwest approaches.Chang Dok Palace, the Republic ofKorea’s government center, laywithin the 5th Marines’ assignedzone. There, the 5th Marines

insisted, should be the rightfulplace for the triumphant flag-rais-ing. Barrow brushed aside thecomplaints. “Putting the flag on abamboo pole over a peasant’shouse on the edge of Seoul doesnot constitute retaking the city,” hesaid. Whether premature or ap-propriate, the flag raising on Hill79 was an exuberant boost tomorale at a good time. Chang DokPalace lay just two miles north ofBarrow’s current position, but get-ting there in force would take theMarines three more days ofextremely hard fighting.

By the night of 19 SeptemberMajor General Oliver P. Smith,commanding the 1st MarineDivision, had grounds for caution.

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BATTLE OF THE BARRICADESU.S. Marines in the Recapture of Seoul

by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)

On the Cover: Bitter fighting,house-to-house, with every alleyway,every storefront window being adeadly hazard to the Marines recap-turing Seoul. Photo by David DouglasDuncanAt left: Lead elements of a Marinerifle squad pause by a captured NorthKorean barricade in Seoul to assignthe next objective. Photo by DavidDouglas Duncan

Capt Robert H. Barrow, commandingCompany A, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, pauses to raise the firstAmerican flag within the city limits ofSeoul on Hill 79.

Photo by David Douglas Duncan

Despite the impatient insistence onspeed of advance by the X Corpscommander, Major GeneralEdward S. “Ned” Almond, USA,Smith knew he led a two-regimentdivision against an unknownenemy defending an enormousurban center.

On one hand, the pace of theallied build-up encouraged Smith.

Two new Marine fighter squadronshad commenced flying into KimpoAirfield since the 5th Marines cap-tured it intact on the 18th, and theywould launch their first VoughtF4U Corsair strikes in support ofthe X Corps advance the morningof the 20th. The 32d InfantryRegiment of Major General DavidG. Barr’s 7th Infantry Division had

landed at Inchon and movedrapidly to cover the exposed rightflank of Smith’s approach to Seoul,south of Chesty Puller’s 1stMarines. The 7th Marines’ long,global journey to Inchon wasabout to end. Meanwhile, GeneralAlmond had strengthened Smith’slight division by attaching two bat-talions of the 1st Republic of Korea(ROK) Marine Regiment, green butspirited sea soldiers.

Against these positive develop-ments, O. P. Smith worried abouthis lack of a significant reserve, theabsence of bridging materialthroughout X Corps, the morning’srequirement to split his division onboth sides of a tidal river, and therealization that the landing forcewould henceforth pass beyond theeffective range of the guns of thefleet. He could also sense thatNorth Korean resistance was stiff-ening and the quality of the oppo-sition was improving. All signspointed to a major clash in theweek ahead.

Intelligence analysts on bothdivision and corps staffs had diffi-

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National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC348519

MajGen Oliver P. Smith, a veteran ofthe Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, andOkinawa campaigns in the Pacificduring World War II, commanded the1st Marine Division throughout theInchon-Seoul-Chosin campaigns.

culty defining an enemy order ofbattle after the Inchon landingbecause of the chaos the landingcreated in the headquarters of theNKPA in Pyongyang, the NorthKorean capital. Ignoring dozens oftelltale indicators, the NKPAseemed astonished that theCommander in Chief, Far East,General of the Army DouglasMacArthur, could have landed sucha large force amid Inchon’s narrowchannels and formidable mudflats.The Marines’ quick seizure of theport, Ascom City, and KimpoAirfield further disoriented theNorth Koreans.

By the night of the 19th-20th,however, the North Korean highcommand finally had major troopunits on the move to defend theSouth Korean capital. They turnedaround the untested 18th NKPADivision, bound from Seoul to thePusan Perimeter, and recalled aveteran regiment of the 9th NKPADivision from the southwest cor-ner of the Naktong River. Most ofthese troops would defend theindustrial suburb of Yongdungpo,directly south of the Han from cen-tral Seoul, against the 1st Marines.

On 20 September, whileLieutenant Colonel Raymond L.Murray led his 5th Marines acrossthe Han River, two significantenemy units reached Seoul fromassembly areas in North Korea toman the northwest defensesagainst this new American threatabove the Han. From Sariwoncame Colonel Pak Han Lin at thehead of his 78th IndependentInfantry Regiment, some 1,500-2,000 untested troops in threeinfantry battalions. From nearbyChorwon came Colonel Wol KiChan’s 25th NKPA Brigade, morethan 4,000 strong. Colonel Wolhad received “postgraduate” tacti-cal training in the Soviet Union andhad trained his green troops well.His newly formed brigade con-

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Principal Commanders,1st Marine Division, Seoul

1st Marine DivisionCommanding General: Major General Oliver P. SmithAssistant Division Commander: Brigadier General Edward A. CraigG-3: Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.

1st MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel Lewis B. Puller1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter3d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge

5th MarinesCommanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton 2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise3d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett

7th MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis 2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Thornton M. Hinkle (Wounded in Action-Evacuated, September 28)Major Webb D. Sawyer (from September 28)3d Battalion: Major Maurice E. Roach

11th MarinesCommanding Officer: Colonel James H. Brower 1st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood 2d Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman 3d Battalion: Major Francis F. Parry 4th Battalion: Major William McReynolds

Other Division UnitsCommanding Officer, 1st Shore Party Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Henry

P. CroweCommanding Officer, 1st Engineer Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel John H.

PartridgeCommanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Harry T.

MilneCommanding Officer, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel

Erwin F. Wann, Jr.Commanding Officer, VMO-6: Major Vincent J. GottschalkCommanding Officer, 1st Service Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel Charles L.

BanksCommanding Officer, 1st Ordnance Battalion: Major Lloyd O. WilliamsCommanding Officer, 1st Motor Transport Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel

Olin L. BeallCommanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion: Commander H. B. Johnson, Jr.,

USNCommanding Officer, 1st Signal Battalion: Major Robert L. Schreier Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company: Captain Kenneth J.

Houghton

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tained an unusual concentration ofcrew-served weapons, includingfour heavy weapons battalionsproviding a proliferation of anti-tank and antiaircraft guns, plusheavy machine guns. Wol led thetwo units west of town to preparelast-ditch defenses along the samejumbled ridges where the Japanesehad formerly conducted infantry-training exercises. General Smith’sintuition had been correct. HisNorth Korean enemy would short-ly change from delaying tactics tohard-nosed, stand-and-deliver de-fense to the death.

Two Rough Roads To Seoul

Few things could fazeLieutenant Colonel Murray, the 5thMarines’ commander, after hismonth-long experience as theEighth Army’s “Fire Brigade” in thePusan Perimeter, but preparing hisveteran regiment for an opposedcrossing of the Han River on 20September proved a daunting task.To begin with, Murray found his

command post crowded with high-ranking observers and correspon-dents. Each wondered howMurray would execute a crossingof such a broad river withoutheavy bridging material; all offeredfree advice. Murray abided thesekibitzers for awhile, then cast themout.

A second situation proved moretroublesome. While Murray feltconfident the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion could shuttle hisriflemen across in their trackedlanding vehicles (LVTs then, AAVsnow), and while he was reason-ably sure Lieutenant Colonel JohnH. Partridge, the division engineer,could ferry his attached tanksacross by using 50-foot pontoon

sections, he still knew nothing ofthe river—its current, shorelinegradients, exit points. Nor didMurray know anything of theenemy’s strength and capabilitiesin the vicinity of the abandonedferry site at Haengju. Mile-longHill 125 on the north bank domi-nated the crossing. Six years earli-er Murray had led his 2d Battalion,6th Marines, ashore at Saipanunder direct fire from Japaneseguns occupying the coastal hills,and he had no intention of repeat-ing that experience here.

Murray asked General Smith toassign Captain Kenneth R.Houghton’s division Reconnais-sance Company to the crossingoperation. Murray wanted an

North Korean Order Of Battle:Seoul/Wonsan Campaign

Defending the Northwest Approaches (Hill 296 Complex and beyond):

25th Brigade: Colonel Wol Ki Chan78th Independent Infantry Regiment: Colonel Pak Han Lin Seoul City Regiment

Defending Yongdungpo:

Elements of 3d Regiment, 9th DivisionElements of 18th and 87th Divisions

Defending Seoul:

Surviving components of the above forces17th Rifle Division43d Tank Regiment19th Antiaircraft Regiment513th Artillery Regiment10th Railroad Regiment

Defending Uijongbu:

31st Regiment, 31st Division75th Independent Regiment

Opposing 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at Kojo:

10th Regiment, 5th Division: Colonel Cho Il Kwon

Opposing 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Majon-ni:

Elements of 15th Division: Major General Pak Sun CholLtCol Raymond L. Murray, a tallTexan who had earned a Silver Staron Guadalcanal, a second Silver Staron Tawara, and a Navy Cross onSaipan, commanded the 5th Marines.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5850

advance party of reconnaissanceMarines to swim the Han after darkon 19 September, stealthily deter-mine any enemy presence, andthen signal the remainder of thecompany to cross in LVTs. Murraythen expected the company to

man a defensive perimeter tocover the predawn crossing ofLieutenant Colonel Robert D.Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Taplett considered the plan tooambitious. The ReconnaissanceCompany had the heart, he

believed, but not the numbers (127strong) to cover the sprawling highground along the river. No oneknew anything in advance aboutthe possibility of enemy presencein strength along the far bank.Taplett quietly ordered his staff todraw up contingency plans for thecrossing.

The North Koreans had notignored the former ferry site.Aware that the Marines would like-ly cross the Han soon, the NKPAdeployed an infantry battalion inthe underbrush along Hill 125.Their camouflage disciplineproved excellent. The Marines didnot detect their presence through-out the afternoon and evening ofthe 19th.

After dark, Captain Houghtonled 14 swimmers across the 400-yard-wide river. An ill-timedartillery mission set fire to a housein Haengju village, exposing the

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Marine Corps amphibian tractors and DUKWs ferry troops across the Han River after the assault waves. Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

Mary Craddock Hoffman

men in their final approach to thenorth bank. Technical SergeantErnest L. Defazio complained theblaze “lit up the place like aChristmas tree,” but nothingstirred. Houghton dispatched fourmen to check for signs of theenemy on Hill 125, then sent anexultant but premature message toMurray: “The Marines have landedand the situation is well in hand.”Houghton also radioed his execu-tive officer to launch the balanceof the company in its nine LVTs.

So far, so good. But few soundsattract more attention on a quietnight than the sudden revving upof nine pairs of Cadillac V-8Amtrac engines. The noiseseemed enough to wake the dead,and abruptly the NKPA battalionon Hill 125 opened a vicious fireagainst the approaching LVTs andHoughton’s small group, now dan-gerously backlit by the burningbuilding.

Second Lieutenant Philip D.Shutler commanded the secondplatoon of the ReconnaissanceCompany, his men dividedbetween two LVTs that nosed intothe river in column. Young as hewas, Shutler had already been in

tight spots. He had spent themonth of August making nightraids from USS Horace A. Bass(APD 124) in the Sea of Japanagainst the North Korean coastline,his Marines teamed withUnderwater Demolition Team 1.Crossing the Han was a dissimilar

experience, he later recounted.“Amphibian tractors were hardlystealthy vehicles,” Shutler recalled.“We received enemy fire as soon asthe vehicles entered the water.You could hear machine gunrounds plinking against thearmored cab. Mortar rounds, pos-sibly from our own ‘four-deuce’tubes, were exploding in the river.”

In the chaos some LVTs becamestuck in the mud near the farshore, others veered away.Captain Houghton sprang into theriver to rally the vehicles towardthe landing site. Mortar roundslanded in the water near him; theconcussion from one near missknocked him out.

Lieutenant Shutler could seenone of this from the crowdedtroop compartment of his lurchingLVT. He scrambled topside, dis-covered to his horror that the vehi-cle had turned upstream, broad-side to the NKPA gunners on Hill125. He whacked the driver,

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An LVT-3C of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion takes off from the south bankof the Han with a load of American and Korean Marines, while Marine engi-neers prepare a pontoon bridge to carry equipment.

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

jumped into the waist-deep water,and attempted to guide the vehicledirectly ashore. He saw no sign ofthe advance swimmers.

At this point someone passedthe word to abort the mission andreturn to the south bank. FiveLVTs returned, leaving four stuckin the mud along the far shore.One of these contained CaptainHoughton’s unconscious body.Other Marines were missing.Shutler found one of his troopshad died of wounds in the con-fused melee. The crossing hadfailed.

When Technical Sergeant ErnieDeFazio discovered his captainmissing he promptly led a swim-mer team back across the river.They rescued Houghton and hisradio operator, retrieved two of thestuck vehicles and restored morethan a bit of the company’s honor.

But the night was nearly spent,the enemy occupied the crossingsite in considerable strength, andevery VIP in the theater—includingGeneral Douglas MacArthur—hadannounced their intentions ofobserving the morning crossing.As assistant division commander,Brigadier General Edward A. Craigfrankly observed: “The eyes of theworld were upon us. It wouldhave looked bad for the Marines,of all people, to reach a river andnot be able to cross.”

The 5th Marines calmly decidedto approach the crossing as anamphibious assault mission—tight-ly coordinated preliminary fires onthe objective, an intermediate andfinal objective assigned, and troopsorganized into boat teams config-ured to each LVT. Taplett’s 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, would leadthe landing in assault waves, fol-lowed by Lieutenant ColonelHarold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, to expand the beachhead;the entire regiment with itsattached tank company to cross

before dark. Marine Corsairswould arrive soon after sunrise topound Hill 125 and scorch theSeoul-Kaesong highway to dis-courage any NKPA reinforcements.

Only a veteran force like the 5thMarines could have made suchlast-minute adaptations and passedthe word to all hands in theremaining minutes before dawn.Taplett’s original skepticism aboutthe Reconnaissance Company’sability to hold an opposed bridge-head had served 3d Battalion, 5thMarines well; the battalion hadalready prepared worst-case alter-native plans. By the time GeneralAlmond, Vice Admiral Arthur D.Struble, USN (Commander,Seventh Fleet), and LieutenantGeneral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,USMC (Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Pacific) arrivedthey found Lieutenant ColonelMurray as unflappable as ever andthe crossing well underway.Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M.Wood’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,pounded the far bank with 105mmhowitzers; Murray’s own 81mmand 4.2-inch mortars joined thechorus. Taplett’s first wave of sixLVTs chugged resolutely on linetowards the far bank.

At this point the NKPA battalionon Hill 125 opened a disciplinedfire on the LVTs, scoring more than200 hits on the vehicles as theytrundled ashore. Fortunately theirone antitank gun proved less accu-rate than their small arms fire.Taplett pressed on. His LVTs dis-charged Captain Robert A.McMullen’s Company I, thenpulled away for the return transit.McMullen quickly deployed hisplatoons up the open slopes of Hill125 in a double envelopment. Thefighting became point-blank anddeadly.

With most NKPA gunners nowtaking aim at McMullen’s Marines,the remaining companies of 3d

Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed theriver with relative ease. CorporalLarry V. Brom, a Company Hsquad leader, worried more aboutthe claustrophobia his men experi-enced in their LVT’s cramped troopcompartment than “the occasionalsplat of bullets against the armorplate.” Company H’s LVTs lurchedout of the river and continuedrolling north, crossing the railroadand highway to secure distant Hill51. Corporal Brom led his men ina mad dash up the rise as soon asthe rear ramp dropped, vastlyrelieved to discover the crest unde-fended.

By contrast, Company I had itshands full taking Hill 125. Thelower approaches contained scantcover. Well-sited NKPA gunnersscythed down Captain McMullen’sexposed 60mm mortar section andtwo sections of light machine guns.

The situation improved dramati-cally with the appearance over-head of four Corsairs fromLieutenant Colonel Walter E.Lischeid’s Marine Fighter Squadron214 (VMF-214). The Black Sheeppilots launched at 0551 from theescort carrier USS Sicily (CVE 118)in the Yellow Sea, southwest ofInchon, arriving over the river justin time to even the odds againstCompany I’s arduous assault witha series of ear-splitting rocket andnapalm attacks against the NorthKoreans defending the highground. McMullen spurred hismen forward, upward amid thebedlam. Their difficult doubleenvelopment converged on thecrest, culminating in a vicious flur-ry of hand-to-hand combat. Anabrupt silence followed, brokenonly by the Marines gasping forbreath.

Taking Hill 125 cost Company I43 casualties; it inflicted at least200 upon the enemy. It had beena beautifully executed tacticalassault, highlighted by the high-

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speed, low-level strikes of theCorsairs. General Almond, observ-ing this conflict from barely 500yards away, admitted it was “oneof the finest small-unit actions I’veever witnessed.”

The forcible taking of Hill 125meant the remainder of the 5thMarines could cross the river unim-peded. By the time GeneralMacArthur arrived the crossingseemed routine. “You’ve done aperfect job,” he told LieutenantColonel Murray, unaware of theall-night flail that preceded theperfection. Murray by then had hiseye on the main objective, and hepointed upstream to the convolut-ed ridges that protected theapproaches to Seoul from thenorthwest, the regimental route ofadvance. “They’ll all evaporatevery shortly,” MacArthur assuredMurray.

At a glance from long distance itseemed that the Supreme AlliedCommander might have beenright. Only eight miles separatedHill 125 at the Haengju crossingsite from downtown Seoul.Murray’s advance elements cov-ered half that distance on the after-noon of the 20th, raising false

hopes. Then NKPA resistance stiff-ened abruptly. It would take the5th Marines a full week of desper-ate fighting to advance the finalfour miles into Seoul.

The 20th of September alsobegan very early for Chesty Puller’s1st Marines on their final approachto Yongdungpo. The 87th NKPARegiment launched two predawnspoiling attacks against bothflanks. The southern attack, led byfive T-34 tanks, posed the greatestthreat. The veteran NKPA troopsendeavored to repeat their high-speed, straight-down-the-highwayarmored tactics that had provenwildly successful in the initial inva-sion, but their tanks had now losttheir invulnerability. The armoredcolumn barreled blindly into alethal L-shaped ambush set byLieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter’s 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. Short-rangefire from Marine 3.5-inch bazookasknocked out the first two enemytanks; a storm of direct and indi-rect fire cut down the supportinginfantry, killing 300 men. The sur-viving North Koreans withdrew totheir prepared defenses withinYongdungpo.

Puller pressed the advance, his

2d Battalion still astride theInchon-Seoul highway, the 1stBattalion attacking through thehilly countryside below the Han.Sutter’s lop-sided success inthwarting the NKPA tank attackpleased Puller, but the initial viewof sprawling Yongdungpo from hisobservation post brought forthPuller’s trademark scowl. Theprospect of forcing a crossing ofthe high-banked Kalchon Canal,then fighting door-to-door throughthis large industrial suburb did notappeal to the veteran jungle fight-er. When General Almond ap-peared from observing Murray’sriver crossing, Puller asked him forauthorization to employ unrestrict-ed firepower in taking the city.The corps commander agreed.Puller unleashed two battalions ofsupporting artillery (LieutenantColonel Merritt Adelman’s 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, in directsupport, and Major WilliamMcReynolds’ 4th Battalion, 11thMarines, in general support) plusair strikes by Marine Corsairs. TheSicily-based Black Sheep followedtheir early-morning assistance tothe 5th Marines with two dozensorties against Yongdungpo, drop-ping 500-pound bombs and straf-ing with 20mm cannon and rock-ets. The city began to burn.

The 1st Marines commenced itsmain assault on Yongdungpo at0630 the next morning. NeitherSutter’s 2d Battalion or LieutenantColonel Jack Hawkins’ 1stBattalion could sustain much head-way. Crossing the Kalchon waslike crossing a medieval castlemoat; clambering over the dikeswas akin to “going over the top” inthe trenches of World War I.Sutter’s outfit in particular tookheavy casualties. The division’sSpecial Action Report recorded theloss of 17 officers and 200 men bythe 2d Battalion along the canal-like river by 21 September.

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A409336

Advancing Marines examine the smoking ruin of a North Korean T-34 tankrecently destroyed in an ambush.

Puller committed elements ofLieutenant Colonel Thomas L.Ridge’s 3d Battalion in the center,but a half dozen NKPA Maximheavy machine guns took a grimtoll of every attempt to cross thewater gate sector of the Kalchon.

Ridge ordered Major Edwin H.Simmons, his Weapons Companycommander, to suppress the fire.With his 81mm mortars temporari-ly out of ammunition and no

artillery support immediately avail-able, Simmons chose his BrowningM1917A1 watercooled .30-caliberheavy machine guns for the mis-sion. Proven veterans of the WorldWar, the heavy Brownings wereunsurpassed in providing rock-steady, sustained fire at a rate of450-600 rounds per minute.Simmons massed these weaponswith their barrels “just clearing thetop of the dike.” A fierce duel

ensued—”heavies against heav-ies”—at an interval no greater thanhalf a football field. The exchangewas deafening, but Simmons’ stur-dy Brownings prevailed, allowing3d Battalion, 1st Marines, to crossthe Kalchon intact.

The Kalchon proved a barrier tothe entire regiment on 21September—with one memorableexception. While the battle ragedon both sides—and shortly beforeMajor Simmons’ machine gunduel—Captain Robert H. Barrow,the future 27th Commandant, ledhis Company A, 1st Marines,through a rice field towards anuncommonly quiet sector of theYongdungpo defenses. The NorthKoreans may have vacated thissector in order to more effectivelycontest the adjacent water gatefronting the 3d Battalion, an obvi-ous crossing site. Barrow, howev-er, expected to be hit at anymoment. Simmons watched ap-provingly as Company A, 1stMarines, advanced past his imme-diate left flank, each platoon online. “They were beautifullydeployed,” said Simmons. “Asthey came through the dry ricepaddy I thought of the Marinescoming through the wheat fields atBelleau Wood in 1918.”

Private First Class MorganBrainard of Barrow’s company,though apprehensive about thespooky quiet, experienced similarthoughts as he crossed through thewaist-high rice stalks. As he laterdescribed the advance:

Somewhere off to our left,beyond the road and out ofsight, beyond a line of treeswe could hear the rattle ofrifle and machine gun firewhere Baker Company wasgoing in . . . . To our immedi-ate front, however, there wasnothing but silence, as wecontinued to move forward

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through the field in perfectorder. It was a classic-typeinfantry advance . . . but mymind kept racing back towardthe stories I had read as a boyof the Marines attackingthrough the wheat fields of

Belleau Wood . . . and I ex-pected our peaceful scenewould be shattered in a simi-lar manner at any moment.

Captain Barrow acknowledgedhis serendipity. “We just happened

to experience one of those rarefortunes of war . . . a momentaryopportunity.”

“We passed over the top of thedike quickly, slithered down theother side,” recalled Brainard,“then inexplicably and stupidlystopped facing a stream [theKalchon]. I mean the whole linestopped.” The company gunnerysergeant quickly ended their hesi-tation: “Get in that goddamnedwater!”

Company A found itself enteringthe main street of Yongdungpototally unopposed. “It was eerie,”said Barrow. “We simply slitheredinto town undetected.”

The 87th NKPA Regiment, des-perately attempting to patchtogether a defense in depth, hadaccidentally left this criticalapproach unguarded, and Barrowtook full advantage of the opening.His 200-man company flowedrapidly into the heart of the city,sweeping up surprised bands of

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A column of M-26 Pershings and a bulldozer-configured M-4 Sherman advancetowards Yongdungpo. The threat comes from the right flank, and firing hasalready been vigorous, judging from the spent 90mm shell casings alongside theroad.

the enemy in the process. Before dark they had cut the city

in two. Barrow selected a sausage-shaped dike, 30 feet high and 150yards long, as the place to make astand for the night. “We immedi-ately recognized that we had avaluable piece of real estate,” hesaid. From the dike his Marinescould interdict the intersection ofthe highways from Inchon andKimpo.

Through this intersection at onepoint marched a large formation ofunsuspecting NKPA infantry,singing political songs as they hur-ried to reinforce Yongdungpo’s

northwestern defenses. Barrow’sinterlocking machine guns and60mm mortars cut down many andscattered the rest.

As darkness fell, LieutenantColonel Hawkins knew Barrowhad executed a major penetration,but he could not reinforce thisunexpected success. Barrow andCompany A would be on theirown—which was fine withBarrow. “We felt strong,” he said.“We were not ‘The Lost Company.’”“What followed,” observed histori-an Jon T. Hoffman, “wouldbecome one of the great small-unitepics in the history of the Corps, to

rank with Hunt’s Point and Pope’sRidge [at Peleliu].”

The NKPA attacked Company Ashortly after dark with five Soviet-built T-34 tanks. The rattle androar of their tracks as theyapproached almost unnerved Pri-vate First Class Morgan Brainard.“The squeaking and engine hum-ming was drawing much closer,and as I crouched in my hole, I feltthe ice-like shiver of pure fear.”The tanks reached the intersection,then proceeded in column along aroad parallel and extremely closeto the Marines’ positions dug intothe side of the dike. The leadvehicle appeared enormous toBrainard: “In the moonlight Icould see its turret with the longgun on it slowly circling back andforth, like some prehistoric, steel-backed monster sniffing for prey. Ipressed tightly against the side ofmy hole, and waited for the flashand fire of its gun.”

The tanks made five deliberatepasses along that parallel track, fir-ing their 85mm guns directly intothe crowded dike from an ungodlyshort range of 25 yards. This wasa terrifying experience for theMarines on the receiving end, butthe dike’s soft sand absorbed thebase-detonated, armor-piercingshells, and there were few casual-ties. Meanwhile, Barrow’s 3.5-inchrocket launcher teams stung thetanks repeatedly. “One of themost courageous acts that I everwitnessed was those brave youngMarines with the 3.5s,” he said.The first bazooka round CorporalFrancis Devine ever fired in angerblasted a T-34 turret off its ring.Other gunners knocked out a sec-ond tank and damaged two more.The attached heavy machine gunsection kept the vehicles buttonedup and peppered their visionblocks and periscopes. The sur-viving vehicles withdrew in disar-ray.

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Navy surgeon and corpsmen attached to the 1st Marine Division treat a badlyinjured two-year-old boy on the outskirts of Seoul.


The enemy tanks may havebeen more successful had infantryaccompanied them, but the NKPAriflemen did not appear until 0100.Four separate ground assaults fol-lowed, each beaten back by disci-plined fire. “I expected to have alot of promiscuous firing,” saidBarrow, but “my people didn’t losetheir fire discipline and go bananasand shoot randomly.”

The enemy assembly area wasso close to the Marines’ defensiveposition that they could hear thevoice of the local commander,unmistakably haranguing histroops into launching anotherattack. Corporal Billy D. Webb, anOklahoma reservist “with fire in hiseye,” decided to even the odds.Slipping out of his foxhole—“forGod’s sake don’t shoot me when Icome back!”—Webb dashedthrough the adjoining maze ofbuildings, spotted an extremelyanimated officer trying to rally histroops for yet another attack, tookcareful aim, and shot him dead.Webb escaped in the resultant con-fusion, and the night assaults

ceased before the Marines ran outof ammunition.

At dawn, Barrow counted 210dead North Koreans around hisbeleaguered dike. “Yongdungpodid for A Company,” said Barrow,“what no other thing could havedone in terms of unifying it andgiving it its own spirit, a spirit thatsaid ‘We can do anything.’”

If Barrow’s company had “slith-ered” into Yongdungpo on the21st, it was now the turn of the87th NKPA Regiment, having failedto oust the Marines throughout thenight, to slither out of town thenext morning. Barrow hadskinned the cat, helping Pullercapture a very difficult intermedi-ate objective in two days of fight-ing. The road to Seoul for the 1stMarines now lay open, once the5th Marines could advance east-ward enough to cover their tacticalcrossing of the Han.

Back at Inchon, now well to thewest of Puller’s regiment atYongdungpo, the offloading offresh troops and combat cargocontinued around the clock. By

D+6, 21 September, 50,000 troopshad landed, including ColonelHomer L. Litzenberg, Jr.’s 7thMarines, supported by LieutenantColonel Francis F. Parry’s 3dBattalion, 11th Marines, a 105mmhowitzer outfit.

The 7th Marines initiallyassumed security duties in theInchon vicinity. General O. P.Smith critically needed them forthe recapture of Seoul, but thenewly formed outfit first required aday or two to shake itself downfrom the long deployment by sea.This did not take long. LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, for exam-ple, had conducted field firingfrom the fantail of their attacktransport each day enroute. “Wefired machine guns, rifles, mortars,and bullets, rocket launchers, andthrew hand grenades at everypiece of trash, orange crates, orwhatever the ship’s crew wouldtoss overboard for us,” said Davis.Within 48 hours the regimentmoved out tactically, crossed theHan River, and began its own pathtowards Seoul’s northern suburbs,somewhat northwest of the routeof the 5th Marines. On the thirdday Parry’s gunners fired their firstrounds down range.

By the fortunes of war, the 5thMarines would pay the stiffestprice of admission to enter Seoul.General MacArthur’s beguilingassurance to Lieutenant ColonelMurray that the hills guarding thenorthwestern approaches to thecapital “would all evaporate”proved famously false. The regi-ment would suffer a casualty ratemore reflective of its recent historyat Peleliu and Okinawa than theKorean peninsula.

Part of the difficulty came fromthe convoluted terrain, a sprawlingseries of hill masses, ridges, anddraws extending from theKaesong-Seoul highway in the

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Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC348715

Elements of the 5th Marines advance through a burning village after crossing theHan River. The days of high mobility ended as the Marines reached the enemymain line of resistance in the high ridges on the outskirts of Seoul.

north to the Han River in thesouth. “As an exercise in mapreading,” observed Marine histori-an Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,“this ground is confusing anddeceptive; for the tactician, it is anightmare.” Massive Hill 296 dom-inated the landscape; indeed,many of the other numbered peaksand knobs were in reality onlyprotuberances of the hill’s bonyfingers extending to the Han andeastward into downtown Seoulitself. Confusingly, there werethree Hill 105s in this complex (justas there had been three Hill 362s atIwo Jima). Regimental plannersnicknamed them for their linearsequence—Hills 105 North, Center,and South. All three would proveprickly objectives to seize andhold.

The North Koreans found thejumbled terrain around the Hill 296complex to be ideal defensive

ground. The fact that the Japanesehad long used the same ridges fortactical training meant the preexist-ing availability of firing positions,command posts, and observationsites. Colonel Wol Ki Chanreached this preferred ground withhis 25th NKPA Brigade andColonel Pak Han Lin’s 78thIndependent Infantry Regiment justin time. Had the North Koreansbeen held up one more day pass-ing through Seoul, the Marinesmight have seized Hill 296 and allof its deadly fingers with hardly afight.

Colonels Wol and Pak deployedat least 6,000 troops into the hillcomplex. While yet to be tested inbattle, the combined force wasboth well-led and well-trained.Wol’s brigade also contained anabundance of heavy weaponsunits. Their crews spent the 20thand 21st digging in their weapons

and registering their fire along theMarines’ likely avenues ofapproach. Additional troops inodd-lot specialty organizationsreinforced Wol during the battle forthe hills, increasing his total forceto nearly 10,000 men. The 5thMarines, even reinforced by theirattachments and the ROK Marinebattalion, could not match thosenumbers.

The 5th Marines had foughtagainst highly experienced NKPAregiments in the Pusan Perimeter,units whose officers and non-com-missioned officers had years ofcombat experience in China. TheNorth Koreans they now facedlacked that background but madeup for it with tenacity and fire-power, including well-served high-velocity 76mm guns and 120mmheavy mortars. “Their mortar firewas very accurate,” said veterancompany commander Captain

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Francis I. “Ike” Fenton, Jr. “Theycould really drop it in your lap.”

Lieutenant Colonel RaymondMurray began the 22d ofSeptember with three of his fourbattalions on line: Taplett’s 3dBattalion on the left, facing themain crest of Hill 296; Major Ko’s1st ROK Marine Battalion in thecenter, facing an exposed slopetowards its objective, Hill 56; andLieutenant Colonel George R.Newton’s 1st Battalion on the right,aimed towards Hill 105-South.Lieutenant Colonel Harold S.Roise’s 2d Battalion remained inreserve.

The battle for the hills got off toa bad start for Murray. During thenight a North Korean shell explod-ed in his command post, causingmany casualties. Murray survived

with a small cut, but LieutenantColonel Lawrence C. Hays, hisexecutive officer and fellowTarawa veteran (1st Battalion, 8thMarines commanding officer atRed Beach Two), was badly hitand required emergency evacua-tion.

Murray nevertheless kicked offhis regimental attack at 0700 onthe 22d as planned. Taplett’s 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, clawed itsway steadily towards the steepcrest of Hill 296, shaking off plung-ing fire from Communist positionsnorth of the Kaesong Highway (the7th Marines would not drawabreast to clear these positionsalong the left flank for anotherthree days). Taplett’s Marinesmaintained a steady rate ofadvance, the most promising of the

week, halting only to resist compa-ny-sized counterattacks that boiledout of the draws and defiles alongthe shoulders of the hill mass.

Company H, 5th Marines,reached the hill’s geographic crestby the end of the day. CorporalLarry Brom’s platoon commanderdirected him to deploy his squadin a defensive sector along a groveof pine trees, and Brom supervisedhis men as they dug night posi-tions and selected interlockingfields of fire. Satisfied with theirpreparations, he took off his packand unfolded his e-tool (entrench-ing tool) to dig his own hole forthe night. The squad had beenuncommonly fortunate, Bromreflected, having lost only one manto enemy fire throughout the fight-ing along the Naktong, at Wolmi-

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Capt Francis I. “Ike” Fenton, Jr., commanding Company B,1st Battalion, 5th Marines, experienced unremitting fire

taking and holding Hill 105-South just outside the city lim-its.


15

do Island, and the advance east ofInchon. Here on Hill 296 theirluck abruptly soured. A NorthKorean sniper shot Brom throughthe foot just after he knelt tounsling his pack. More firesprayed the ridge crest. A gray-headed Korean “papa-san” scur-ried to Brom’s side, scooped himup, and carried him piggybackdown the reverse slope underintermittent fire to the battalion aidstation. Brom gave him a freshpack of cigarettes, all he possessedat the time. The old man bowed ingratitude, then returned back upthe hill. For Corporal Brom, a two-year veteran of the 5th Marines, thewar was over.

The incident of a Marine squadleader being picked off from longrange at dusk by a North Koreansniper signified two developments.The NKPA had deployed front-linetroops west of Seoul. Secondly,although the Marines had seizedthe crest of Hill 296, the NorthKoreans occupied defenses indepth throughout its massive fin-gers descending to the east andsouth.

The situation south of 3dBattalion, 5th Marines’ advancevalidated these serious develop-ments. On the 22d, the KoreanMarine battalion encountered afurious fire from masked guns inevery adjoining declivity each timeit mounted an attack. Its objectivewas deceptive. Captain Fenton,operating on the Koreans’ rightflank, described Hill 56 as “a veryinsignificant looking low ridge thatextended from 296 to 105-South.”But the Koreans were advancingfrom low ground, through ricefields, exposed every step of theway to unrelenting artillery andmortar fire.

Murray directed LieutenantColonel Ransom M. Wood’s sup-porting 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,to give the Koreans priority of

fires. He also asked General Smithfor more air support. This wasforthcoming—the 1st Marines weremopping up Yongdungpo and the7th Marines were not yet engaged.Major Arnold A. Lund led hisDeath Rattlers of VMF-323 off theescort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE116), which the aviators lovinglynicknamed “The Bing-Ding,” in 42sorties in support of the 5thMarines, the heaviest operationalrate since D-Day at Inchon.Lieutenant Colonel Norman J.Anderson, the airborne tactical aircontroller for Marine AircraftGroup 33 (MAG-33), directed thestrikes, then led one himself, aspectacular direct hit on Hill 72 (bynow “Nellie’s Tit” to the 5thMarines) that knocked out one ofColonel Wol’s few tanks.Additional air strikes came fromthe newly arrived, Kimpo-basedLancers of VMF-212, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Richard W.Wyczawski and Lieutenant ColonelMax J. Volcansek, Jr.’s night-fight-ing Tigers of VMF(N)-542.

This was spectacular close airsupport—unerringly directed anddelivered—and many NorthKoreans met their deaths from theskies, but their withering crossfirenever ceased. The Korean Marineswere literally stopped in theirtracks. The advance of Newton’s1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on theright flank fared better, but only inrelative terms. Attacking across2,000 yards of open terrain costCompanies A and C dearly. TheMarines found that one particularlydeadly NKPA outpost contained aU.S. Browning .50-caliber heavymachine gun, captured during thefirst week of the war. Company Alost its last two officer platooncommanders in the assault. Thecost was endemic with the 5thMarines. Seventeen of the regi-ment’s original 18 platoon com-manders had been killed or

wounded in the first 50 days ofcombat in Korea, along with five ofthe six company commanders.Experienced non-commissionedofficers took command of the pla-toons in Company A and contin-ued the attack on Hill 105-South.

Captain “Ike” Fenton ledCompany B through Company Alate in the day, then, leaning into afurious barrage from 1st Battalion,11th Marines, joined Company C’sdash for the crest of 105-South. Itwas a hollow victory. The battal-ion had suffered more than 40casualties, and the enemy hadmysteriously disappeared—“therewere no bodies, not even any car-tridge cases lying around,” report-ed Fenton. Only later would theMarines discover the existence of alarge cave on the hill’s reverseslope, now a sanctuary for the for-mer defenders, living and dead. Inthe meantime, punishing fire fromthe hills to the northeast began torake the Marines exposed on thecrest. As Heinl described Hill 105-South:

[The hill] was no vacationspot. Before the sun set,enemy heavy machine gunsbegan to scythe back andforth over the hilltop, whileantitank guns, accurate as asniper’s rifle and a lot dead-lier, flash-banged in withhigh-velocity rounds that leftno time for a man to duck.

This was an unwelcome devel-opment to Fenton, who had lostonly one killed and six woundedin his assault on the hill. Now,despite digging new foxholesalong the military crest, his menwould suffer stiff casualties fromtheir hostile neighbors. “We werepinned down by day and counter-attacked by night,” he said. Tomake matters worse, the KoreanMarines’ lack of progress left 1st

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“Ibelieve the modern ‘Marine Air-Ground Team’truly takes its departure from the crucible of theKorean War,” reflected retired Lieutenant

General Robert P. Keller, USMC, in a recent interview.Keller took command of the VMF-214 Black Sheep afterNorth Korean antiaircraft gunners shot down LieutenantColonel Walter E. Lischeid over Seoul on 25 September1950. Comparing this experience with his World War IIservice as a fighter pilot and squadron commander inthe northern Solomons, Keller pointed to the emergenceof close air support in the Korean War—”by Marines, forMarines”—as the principal difference. While groundMarines had enjoyed Marine air support at Peleliu, IwoJima, and Okinawa, it was never delivered more close-ly, nor more responsively than that provided by the F4-U Corsairs of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing throughoutthe final four months of 1950, from the Pusan Perimeterthrough Inchon-Seoul to the Chosin Reservoir.

Major General Norman J. Anderson credited the suc-cess of this air support coordination to the hard workperformed by Marine air and ground officers in the shortinterwar period. “The Marine Corps, having learnedvaluable lessons late in World War II, went to extremesin the late ‘40s to school its air and ground officerstogether and to structure its deployments as air-groundteams under a single command,” he said. “This new

structure served us well, then and ever since, beginningwith the air-ground composition of the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade.”

Of the four Marine fighter squadrons and two nightfighter squadrons supporting the 1st Marine Divisionduring the 33-day period from 7 September to 9October, the Death Rattlers of VMF-323, commanded byMajor Arnold A. Lund, saw more days in action and flewthe most combat sorties (784, according to the officialMarine Corps history of the Seoul campaign). Therecord comes with a bittersweet irony. The squadronhad been in the process of a mandated deactivationwhen the war erupted, its pilots reassigned, its planestransferred for preservation. Saved at the last momentfrom the draconian cutbacks of the TrumanAdministration, the Death Rattlers reassembled in recordtime. During the Seoul campaign they launched fromthe escort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) in the Sea ofJapan on missions ranging from reconnaissance to pro-paganda leaflet drops, but their most frequent missionby an order of magnitude was close air support.

The Black Sheep pilots of VMF-214 flew off the escortcarrier Sicily (CVE 118), commanded by the legendarynaval aviator Captain John S. Thach, USN, a World WarII ace who in 1941 invented the “Thach Weave” tocounter the Japanese Zero’s technical superiority over

Marine Close Air Supportin the Recapture Of Seoul

Photo Courtesy of LtCol Leo J. Ihli, USMC (Ret)

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the F4F Wildcats. Thach became an enthusiastic advo-cate of Marine close air support. “It’s like havingartillery right over your shoulder!” he said. During theSeoul Campaign, Thach would often leave the bridge toattend the Black Sheep post-mission debriefings. “Theytook their work seriously. They really were the top prosin the business, I think, in the whole world. I hadtremendous admiration for them.”

So did the commanding general of the 1st MarineDivision. “The effectiveness of the Marine air-groundteam and close air support doctrine were reaffirmedwith outstanding success,” wrote Major General Oliver P.Smith after the liberation of Seoul.

For the troops on the ground, struggling to prevailagainst a well-armed enemy they could rarely see in theopen, the firepower delivered by their fellow Marinesoverhead seemed awesome. Lieutenant Joseph R.Owen, the mortar platoon commander in Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, described his first experiencewith a close air strike during the battalion’s battle for aridge south of Uijongbu:

The first of the gull-winged, dark blue Corsairspeeled from the circle and dove at the whitesmoke. Red tracers from its guns poured from theforward edges of the wings. The plane leveled offonly yards above the ridgeline. We could see thepilot in the cockpit and the big, white MarineCorps emblem on the fuselage. . . . Then the [next]plane came in, this one dropping a pod of napalm.The black, coffin-shaped canister hit the ground,skipped a few feet above the surface, and explod-ed into a wall of flame that extended the length ofthe North Koreans’ position. Two hundred yardsbelow, we felt the shock of its explosion and awave of searing heat.

While equally appreciative of the aviators’ precisionand valor, veteran infantry officer Captain Francis I.“Ike” Fenton, Jr., commanding Company B, 1st Battalion,5th Marines, suggested even deadlier aerial firepowerthat could uproot North Koreans who took shelter incaves or railroad tunnels, as the 5th Marines experiencedin the extended battle for Hill 105-South. “The close airsupport in Korea by the Marine Corps was outstanding,”Fenton said. “However, I would like to see Marine avia-tion come up with a rocket with a napalm head. Thisrocket would be great for getting into tunnels, or intocaves....The Koreans showed great fear for firebombs....I believe a big rocket, maybe a Tiny Tim, thatcould carry a fairly good quantity of napalm, would bean excellent weapon.”

Major General Field Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wingalso provided close air support to the 7th InfantryDivision, the other major component in X Corps during

the Seoul campaign. Superbly assisted by MarineCaptain Charles E. Crew’s Far East Detachment, Air andNaval Gunfire Liaison Company, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 1,024 sorties insupport of the Army division in 57 days without a singlecasualty to front-line friendly troops, despite bombingand strafing runs as close as 200 yards. BrigadierGeneral Homer W. Kiefer, USA, commanding the 7thDivision’s artillery, wrote an appreciative letter to theCommandant, stating: “The Marine system of control, inmy estimation, approaches the ideal, and I firmly believethat a similar system should be adopted as standard forArmy Divisions.”

The Korean War as a whole would advance militaryaviation fully into the Jet Age, and soon the U.S. AirForce would wage epic air-to-air battles between its F-86 Sabers and the Soviet-built (and often Soviet-flown)MIG-15 fighters. Eventually the Marines would intro-duce in the skies over Korea their own jet fighter, theGrumman F9F-2 Panther, well armed for both air-to-airand air-to-ground missions. It was also the dawn of theHelicopter Age, and VMO-6 made military aviation his-tory when it deployed to Pusan with the 1st MarineBrigade in August 1950 with four Sikorsky HO3S-1 heli-copters.

By contrast the propeller-driven Corsair was nowconsidered old and slow, hampered by a light payloadcapacity and too small a fuel tank. Landing the high-rise“U-birds” on the pitching deck of an escort carrierremained “adventurous,” especially with the ship steam-ing westerly into a setting sun. “That bright red ballseemed to be sitting right on the fan-tail,” General Kellerrecalled, “and it was difficult to make out the LandingSignal Officer, his signals, or even the deck.” GeneralAnderson cited another common hazard when trying toland an F4U into a setting sun: “The Corsair frequentlymanaged to splatter the windshield with oil!”

Yet the Corsair in good hands proved highly reliableand durable for its age and the operating conditions.The hard-working maintenance crews of VMF-214somehow averaged 95 percent availability of the BlackSheep Corsairs throughout the Pusan-Inchon-Seoul cam-paigns. And in the absence of a jet-propelled enemy airthreat during those two months, the Corsair proved aninvaluable contributor to the allied victories.

Certainly the ground Marines fighting towards Seoulor Uijongbu in the autumn of 1950 were very comfort-able with the presence overhead of their protectiveCorsair, their familiar old “bent-wing widow-maker,” theattack aircraft the Japanese in the previous war alleged-ly nicknamed “The Whistling Death.” There is no recordof what nickname the North Koreans may have used,but judging from the ever-increasing intensity of theirground fire the moment the F4Us swept into view, it wasprobable the Corsairs held their highest respect, as well.

Battalion, 5th Marines’ left flankfully exposed. Newton had to peela company back to the startingposition, and the day ended onthat sour note.

Lieutenant Colonel Murrayordered the Korean Marines toresume their assault on Hill 56 themorning of 23 September, but tryas they might the ROK troops werestopped cold by heavy fire. Noone then realized that Colonel Wolhad established his main line ofresistance along the low ridge that

passed through Hill 56. Theinsignificant-looking rise wouldbecome known as Smith’s Ridgethe following day.

Murray committed his reserve,ordering Lieutenant Colonel Roiseto pass through the Koreans with2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and con-tinue the attack. Roise deployedCaptain Uel D. Peters’ Company Fon the right and First Lieutenant H.J. “Hog Jaw” Smith’s Company Don the left. Hugging the terrainand advancing by squad rushes,

both companies were able in timeto approach the higher groundwith acceptable casualties, yetboth suffered heavily in the close-in fighting that followed. This tookthe balance of the afternoon.

George Newton’s 1st Battalion,5th Marines, had all it could handlethat day and night just maintainingits exposed forward position onHill 105-South. In two days spentclinging to the hill’s fire-sweptcrest, Companies B and C suffered24 casualties. “All these men werehit in their foxholes,” said CaptainFenton. “There was no way tokeep the enemy from deliveringplunging fire right in on top of us.”

Robert Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, also had its hands fullthroughout the 23d in repellingNKPA counterattacks against thecrest of Hill 296 and trying toestablish fire superiority against theenemy on a half-dozen circlinghills. Clearly visible at one of theseCommunist strongpoints was a tall,fair-skinned officer with a charmedlife, “Fireproof Phil.” He may havebeen a Soviet military advisor, butwhoever he was, Fireproof Philexhibited unflagging disdain forMarine marksmanship. When rifle-men, mortarmen, and artillerymenfailed to knock him down, Taplettordered up an M-26 Pershing tank.Sniping at Phil with a 90mm gunproved equally futile. The mandodged every round and keptexhorting his gunners to return fireuntil darkness shrouded the scene.The Marines never saw him again.

The 2d Battalion held Hill 56throughout the night, but only byits collective fingernails. Theassault companies were scatteredand vulnerable. Lieutenant Colo-nel Max Volcansek’s faithful nightfighters circling overhead helpedeven the odds, but Marine artilleryprovided the greatest assistance.Wood’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,fired all night long, illuminating the

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scorched battlefield and interdict-ing potential NKPA assembly areas.“I can’t say enough about theartillery support we received thatnight,” said Second LieutenantTilton A. Anderson, whose platoonhad been reduced to seven men inthe afternoon’s fighting. “It wasmagnificent.”

Major General Almond, the XCorps commander, grew impatientwith the 1st Marine Division’s slowprogress north of the Han.Pressured by MacArthur to recap-ture Seoul by the third-monthanniversary of the invasion, andmindful that the North Koreanswould be fortifying the capital to agreater extent each day, Almondurged O. P. Smith to deploy the 1stMarines well beyond Yongdungpoto attack Seoul from the southeast.Almond’s operations officer reflect-ed his commander’s impatience,saying: “The Marines were exas-peratingly deliberate at a timewhen rapid maneuver was impera-tive.”

Smith disagreed. Seizing Inchonagainst rear-echelon troops hadbeen a relative cakewalk. Thingshad changed. The tenacity andfirepower of the North Koreansbattling the 5th Marines remindedSmith more of the Japanese atPeleliu or Okinawa. Seizing Seoulwould therefore not be quick andeasy, Smith argued, and the lastthing he wanted was to wage thatbattle with his major componentsdivided by the Han and attackingtowards each other. Almondacquiesced to this logic, but healso decided to bring in ColonelCharles E. Beauchamp’s 32dInfantry of the Army’s 7th InfantryDivision to attack the city from thesoutheast. Seoul would no longerbe the sole province of the 1stMarine Division. Smith agreed tomove Puller’s 1st Marines acrossthe Han the next morning, thenloan the 1st Amphibian Tractor

Battalion to X Corps to transportthe 32d Infantry and the 17th ROKRegiment across the tidal river thefollowing day.

Smith knew that Almond on hisdaily visits to the front-line regi-ments had taken to giving opera-tional orders directly to Murray andChesty Puller. In a heated privatesession, Smith asked Almond toknock it off. “If you’ll give yourorders to me,” Smith said icily, “I’llsee that they are carried out.”Neither of Almond’s division com-manders, however, would success-fully cure the commanding generalof his impetuosity.

General Smith directed Puller tomake his crossing slightly west ofYongdungpo, turn right, enter thecity along the north bank, thenexecute a difficult pivot move-ment, wheeling the regimentnorth. Smith planned for Murray’s5th Marines to fight their way intothe northwest sector of the city

while Litzenberg’s 7th Marinessealed off the NKPA access routesalong the entire northern bound-ary. It was an ambitious and com-plicated plan. But the first order ofbusiness remained the destructionof the 25th NKPA Brigade in thefortified barrier ridges to the north-west.

The battle for these ridgesreached its climax on 24September. The day broke with alow-lying mist, as Companies Dand F arrayed themselves for theassault. Artillery preparationsbegan at 0610. Company Fjumped off 20 minutes later, seizedthe eastern end of the troublesomerailroad tunnel, paused to allow aCorsair strike by the Lancers ofVMF-212 (who would establish a1st Marine Aircraft Wing record of46 sorties this date), then dashedacross the low ground to capturethe heavily fortified eastern finger.This represented an encouraging

19

Sketch by John DeGrasse

The 5th Marines learned tank-infantry coordination under intense pressure inthe Pusan Perimeter. Here, attacking North Korean positions along the ridgesoutside Seoul, a fire team keeps up with its assigned Pershing tank.

start, but Company F was spent,having suffered more than a hun-dred casualties around the southedge of Hill 56 in the past 24hours. Among the dead wasCorporal Welden D. Harris, whohad killed three North Korean sol-diers in hand-to-hand fighting andbeen twice wounded the daybefore. Company F had given itsall. Now it was all up to “Hog Jaw”Smith and Company D.

The recapture of Seoul wouldobviously require a team effort—Marines and Army, ground forcesand air squadrons. But the keys toSeoul’s access really came fromtwo Marine rifle companies,Captain Robert Barrow’s CompanyA, 1st Marines, at Yongdungpoduring 21-22 September, andCaptain H. J. Smith’s Company D,2d Battalion, 5th Marines, duringthe 23d-24th.

Company D faced the greaterchallenge. Captain Smith had toattack about 750 yards to the

northeast across an open saddle,seize an extremely well-defendedknoll, and continue beyond alongan increasingly wooded ridge.This contested real estate becameSmith’s Ridge. Easily a thousandNKPA troops defended this terrain,well covered by the same sharp-shooting gunners who had beenmaking life so miserable for the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, on Hill 105-South.

Smith began the day with agood-sized rifle company, but themission required a battalion.Lieutenant Colonel Roise—whowould join the ranks of thewounded this day but refuse evac-uation—withheld Captain SamuelJaskilka’s Company E to exploitSmith’s expected breakthroughand roll up the last hills to the east.

Captain Smith sensed what hefaced and relied heavily on sup-porting arms, adding to theartillery fire missions and air strikeshis own machine guns, mortars,

and rocket launchers. Twice hepunched ahead; twice he had towithdraw with heavy casualties.Nor did a flank attack succeed. An11-man squad worked east thenattacked north. The North Koreansshot them down to a man.Abruptly Smith’s company wasdown to 44 Marines, including the60mm mortar section, now out ofammunition and doubling as rifle-men.

By this time, the 11th Marineshad been bombarding the ridge-lines and reverse slopes of theobjective for more than 24 hours.Ten Marine Corsairs from theDeath Rattlers had rotated on sta-tion since sunrise, bombing, straf-ing, and dropping napalm canis-ters along the objective. YetColonel Wol’s antiaircraft gunnershad taken a toll: five of theCorsairs received extensive dam-age. Smith knew he was down tohis final opportunity.

Smith called for a four-plane fir-ing run, asking that the fourthCorsair execute a low but dummypass to keep the enemy in theirholes until the last possiblemoment. Major Lund’s Corsairpilots flew this mission beautifully.As the third plane roared overheadSmith leapt to his feet screaming“follow me!” His Marines sweptforward just beneath the lastCorsair’s low-level, ear-splittingrun.

“Over they went,” describedCaptain Nicholas A. Canzona ofthe engineer battalion in a 1956Marine Corps Gazette account,“yelling wildly and firing theirrifles, carbines, and BARs[Browning automatic rifles]. Theyentered upon a scene of carnagestretching out in every direction.Driving forward through thehuman wreckage, they shot andbayoneted anything that moved.”

“Hog Jaw” Smith died at the bit-ter end, becoming Company D’s

20

All it took was one North Korean prisoner of war to whip a pistol or grenade fromunder his loose clothing and attack his captor. Thereafter the Marines took nochances. Naked prisoners proceed under armed guard past a destroyed T-34tank to a prison camp.


36th fatality of the assault. SeizingSmith’s Ridge in fact cost the com-pany 178 casualties of the 206 menwho had advanced across the val-ley the previous day. But thereverse slopes of the complexlooked like a charnel house. Thesurviving Marines began to countthe windrows of NKPA bodies,most blasted hideously by Marine105mm howitzers, Corsairs, andmortars. They reached 1,500 andhad to stop counting; the task wastoo gruesome.

Company D had knocked downthe center door to the 25th NKPABrigade’s defenses, but more sav-age fighting remained to clear thefinal path to Seoul. CaptainJaskilka’s fresh Company E movedthrough the gap between the rem-nants of Companies D and F, butencountered an extensive mine-field and stubborn resistance onNelly’s Tit and Hill 105-Centralbeyond. The division engineerscleared the mines, but ridding thelast hills of their die-hard defend-ers took Jaskilka another 24 hours.Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, had a corre-spondingly difficult time snuffingout Hill 105-North. In close com-bat reminiscent of the CentralPacific in World War II, most of theenemy chose to die in place.Colonel Wol’s fate remainedunknown, presumed dead.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,managed to maintain its precarioushold on the crest of 105-Southwhile at the same time dispatchinga large combat patrol down to theriver to cover the crossing ofPuller’s 1st Marines. The nefarioushill would still represent a hornet’snest to all would-be occupants. Itwould take a combined assault bythe 1st and 5th Marines and anarmored column to close the caveand cut down the final defenderslater that day.

The 5th Marines’ three-day bat-

tle for the northwestern ridgesmade possible a surprisinglyuneventful tactical crossing of theHan by the 1st Marines. The 2dand 3d Battalions crossed by LVTs;the 1st Battalion and Puller’s com-mand group made the crossing inDUKW amphibious trucks. NKPAopposition proved negligible.Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. “Jim”Crowe, who had created order outof chaos seven years earlier onTarawa’s Red Beach Three, swiftlydeployed his 1st Shore PartyBattalion along the landing site tokeep troops and cargo movinginland, avoiding a dangerous bot-tleneck. Puller hustled his battal-

ions eastward into the city, growl-ing at the long time it would takehis Pershing tanks to cross at theHaengju ferry further downstreamand work their way back along thenorth bank.

General Smith finally had allthree of his infantry regimentsnorth of the Han and roughly inline. This same day, LieutenantColonel Litzenberg’s 7th Marinesexperienced its first significantcombat against an NKPA outpost tothe northwest of Seoul. ForSecond Lieutenant Joseph R.Owen, commanding the 60mmmortar section in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, the moment

21


A wounded Marine is carried down from the front lines on the ridges northwestof Seoul. The 5th Marines’ three-day battle for the ridges made the uneventfulcrossing of the Han by the 1st Marines possible.

22

Marine Combat Vehicles in the Seoul Campaign

The Marines mostly fought the first months of theKorean War with hand-me-down weapons andequipment from World War II stockpiles. In the

case of combat vehicles, however, the Corps invested intwo critical upgrades that provided a tactical edge in therecapture of Seoul: the M-26 Pershing medium tank andthe LVT-3C amphibian tractor.

The sturdy M-4 Sherman tank had served the Marineswell in the Pacific War from Tarawa through Okinawa,and by 1950 the tank battalions in the Fleet Marine Forcewere still equipped with the M-4A3-E8 “Easy Eight” ver-sion, featuring a 105mm gun. Yet the Sherman’s successin the Pacific War was deceptive. Japanese tanks hadprovided no particular threat, the vehicle’s narrow trackwidth and high ground pressure had posed mobilityproblems in marginal terrain, and the Sherman’s notori-ously thin side and rear armor protection had proveninadequate against the enemy’s 47mm antitank guns.The Sherman’s prospects did not look favorable againstthe battle-proven T-34 medium tanks that the SovietUnion exported to client states like North Korea at theonset of the Cold War.

The Marines had foresightedly invested in the Army’sacquisition of the M-26 Pershing 90mm-gun tank late inWorld War II. Their vehicles did not arrive in time forcombat validation in Okinawa; nor could the postwarCorps afford to place them into operation, so thePershings sat for several years in contingency reserve atthe Marine supply base in Barstow, California.

When the Korean War erupted, the Commandant

ordered the 1st Tank Battalion to deploy with the newPershings in lieu of its Sherman “Easy Eights.” The hastytransition was not pretty, especially in the case of thereinforced company assigned to the 1st Brigade for itsearly-July deployment. Few tankers had the opportuni-ty for hands-on operation and maintenance training.The gunners were lucky to be able to fire two roundseach—and they had to use the more abundantly avail-able 90mm antiaircraft rounds instead of the new butscarce high-velocity armor-piercing munitions. Andsince none of the new Marine Pershings were config-ured as flamethrowers or dozer-blade variants, the bat-talion sailed with an awkward mixture of old Shermansalong with the M-26s, the making of a logistical night-mare.

The ragged transition made for an inauspicious com-bat debut for the Marine M-26s in Korea. Operating inthe Pusan Perimeter southwest corner, one Pershingbroke through the planking of a critical bridge, height-ening fears that its 46-ton weight would prove too heavyfor Korea’s road network. A second vehicle threw atrack while fording a stream, blocking the crossing.Things improved. The Marine Pershings establishedtheir dominance in a head-to-head engagement againstT-34s in the first battle of the Naktong Bulge, then con-tinued to sweep the field as the 1st Marine Divisionadvanced on Seoul. The Sherman blade and flame vari-ants also contributed materially, especially in the closeengagement waged by Baker Company’s tanks againstcave-infested Hill 105-South on 25 September.


A Marine LVT-3C Bushmaster from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion transfers troops to an LCVP.

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In the battle of downtown Seoul, the Pershings ofLieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne’s 1st Tank Battalionprovided the crucial edge, time and again crashingthrough the North Korean barricades despite intense firefrom the enemy’s ubiquitous 45mm antitank guns. Thebattalion’s War Diary for September reported thedestruction of 13 NKPA tanks (which may have includ-ed several 76mm self-propelled guns) and 56 antitankguns or antiaircraft guns being fired horizontally at theapproaching Pershings. The battalion lost five Pershingsand one each of the flame and dozer Shermans in therecapture of Seoul.

The LVT-3C Bushmaster proved to be another smartinvestment for the Marines. Borg Warner’s original LVT-3 had developed slowly during World War II, reachingthe Fleet Marine Force out of numerical sequence andmore than a year behind rival Food Machinery Corp.LVT-4. Borg Warner built nearly 3,000 Bushmasters forthe Marine Corps. The first vehicles arrived in time forthe Okinawa invasion in the spring of 1945.

The Bushmaster was a welcome addition to theMarines’ ship-to-shore team. Like its FMC predecessor,the Bushmaster came with a hinged rear ramp and suf-ficient cargo space to accommodate either a jeep or a105mm howitzer. By mounting its twin Cadillac V-8engines along the sides of both hulls, the Borg Warnerengineers provided the Bushmaster with a cargo capac-ity that exceeded the LVT-4’s by 3,000 pounds.

Faced with the need to upgrade their amphibian trac-tor fleet during the austere late 1940s, the Marines optedto modernize 1,200 low-mileage LVT-3s by raising thesides, installing aluminum covers over the troop/cargocompartment, and installing a small machine gun turretatop the cab. The Marines designated their newly mod-

ified vehicle the LVT-3C, and it proved remarkably wellsuited for both salt-water and fresh-water operationsthroughout the Korean peninsula. (The Republic ofChina Marine Corps employed American-built LVT-3Cson Taiwan for a quarter of a century after the KoreanWar).

The Bushmasters of Lieutenant Colonel Erwin F.Wann, Jr.’s 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion deliveredMarines ashore at Inchon, transported each regimentplus the Army and ROK regiments across the Han underfire, and served as armored personnel carriers and cargovehicles overland.

The 1st Marine Division was similarly well-supportedby the versatile DUKWs of the 1st Amphibian TruckCompany, an element of Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.Beall’s 1st Motor Transport Battalion. (DUKW is not anacronym but an arcane industrial code used in WorldWar II meaning an all-wheel-drive utility vehicle withtwin rear wheel axles manufactured in 1942—”DUCKS”to Marines!)

Unfortunately the Marines fought the Inchon-Seoulcampaign without the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion.General Smith left the battalion with the division’s rearechelon in Kobe as a temporary repository for the 500-plus, 17-year-olds ruled ineligible for combat by theSecretary of the Navy on the eve of the Inchon landing.The X Corps commander partially offset this lost capa-bility by attaching the Army’s Company A, 56thAmphibian Tractor Battalion, to the Marines. The Armycompany’s 18 LVTA-5s equipped with snub-nosed 75mmhowitzers spearheaded each river crossing, therebyproving themselves worthy recipients of the PresidentialUnit Citation subsequently awarded the 1st MarineDivision.


was unforgettable:

The North Korean mortarscame. Spouts of earth andblack smoke leaped about us,laced with flame and scream-ing shrapnel. The leavesfrom the bean plants spun influrries, and the groundshook. I was suddenly in themidst of a frenzied storm ofnoise.

By the nature of their northernmission the 7th Marines wouldhave scant contact with the otherelements of the 1st Marine Divisionin the fight for Seoul. The othertwo regiments, however, wouldexperience a dangerous interface,the 1st Marines attacking norththrough the heart of the city, the5th Marines coming in from thenorthwest.

Concerned with the inherentrisks facing these convergingforces, Lieutenant ColonelRaymond Murray boarded a heli-copter late in the afternoon of 24

September and flew to ChestyPuller’s command post to coordi-nate the final assault. It was thefirst time the two commanders hadever met. Characteristically, Pullerinquired of Murray the extent ofthe casualties he had sustainedfighting for the northwest ridges.“He determined how good a fight-er you were by how many casual-ties you had,” Murray recalled.Murray’s grim accounting of the5th Marines’ losses during the pre-ceding three days made evenChesty Puller blink. The men thengot down to work.

This was the time and settingwhen Captain Robert Barrow’sCompany A, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, seized Hill 79 and raisedthe first flag in Seoul proper. The1st Marine Division had enteredthe capital.

The Fight for Seoul

Seoul in 1950 was home to morethan a million people, the fifthlargest city in the Orient. While

several hundred thousand civilianresidents had fled the capital at theoutbreak of the North Korean inva-sion, tens of thousands remained.Chesty Puller had ruefully predict-ed to a news correspondent thatthe North Koreans would defendthe city in such a manner as toforce the attacking Marines todestroy it. The ensuing three dayswould validate Puller’s prediction.British correspondent ReginaldThompson would write despairing-ly: “Few people can have sufferedso terrible a liberation.”

X Corps launched its assault onSeoul proper the morning of 25September. Lieutenant ColonelErwin F. Wann, Jr.’s 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion displaced duringthe night to Sansa-ri, a former ferrycrossing 5,000 yards east ofYongdungpo. There, reinforced byArmy LVTs of Company A, 56thAmphibian Tractor Battalion, theMarines embarked the 2dBattalion, 32d Infantry. Followinga brief artillery and mortar barrage,the Amtracs plunged into the Han,shook off a few 76mm rounds, andat 0630 disembarked the soldierson the far bank. Four Corsairsfrom Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid’sVMF-214 Black Sheep squadron offthe Sicily worked just ahead of thebeachhead, coordinated by Marinetactical air control parties providedthe 7th Division for the occasion.

The Army regiment completedthe crossing by mid-afternoon andseized South Mountain, the 900-foot eminence (the Koreans callNam-san) dominating southeasternSeoul. Late in the day, the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion deliv-ered the 17th ROK Infantry acrossin trace, an exposed crossing thatattracted considerably more NKPAlong-range fires. Yet by nightfallall of General Almond’s maneuverelements were in place north ofthe river.

General O. P. Smith worried that

24

Painting by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret)

“First Firefight Above Seoul, B/1/7” portrays the intensity of night action thatgreeted the 7th Marines as they advanced to cut the roads leading north fromSeoul.

the presence of the two additionalregiments on his right flank wouldcreate dangerous crossfires andaccidental meeting engagements,but the Army units maintainedtheir positions on and aroundNam-san, defending against majorcounterattacks, and later assaultedtowards the east, well clear of theMarines’ zone of action. No signif-icant control problems developed.

At 0700 on the 25th, the 1stMarine Division kicked off itsassault on Seoul. The plan ofattack developed by Smith and hisoperations officer, Colonel AlphaL. Bowser, Jr., placed the biggestburden on the 1st Marines. Puller’sregiment would attack to the norththrough the heart of the city on amile-and-a-half front, bordered byNam-san on the right and the Duk

Soo Palace of the ancient rulers ofKorea, on the left. Smith assignedthe 1st Marines Objective Able, thehigh ground just beyond the city’snortheastern limit, about six milesfrom Captain Barrow’s forwardposition on Hill 79. Murray’s 5thMarines would attack the north-west section of the capital, like-wise on a mile-and-a-half front,seize Government House andObjective Baker, the high groundoverlooking the Seoul-Uijongburoad from their dearly won posi-tions along the Hill 296 complex.Litzenberg’s 7th Marines wouldseize Objective Charlie, the highground along the Seoul-Kaesongroad six miles outside the city cen-ter. Smith continued his reinforce-ment of the 1st and 5th Marineswith one battalion each of Korean

Marines and assigned the balanceof the Korean regiment as divisionreserve. Smith also attached thedivision Reconnaissance Companyto the 5th Marines to screen thehigh ground along its left flank.The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne,under the operational control ofthe 1st Marine Division, wouldprotect the Marines’ western flankbelow the Han.

Colonel James H. Brower con-centrated most of the howitzers ofhis 11th Marines in firing positionson the south bank of the Han nearYongdungpo. The big 155mmhowitzers of the Army’s 96th FieldArtillery deployed nearby, ready tosupport either the Marines or theArmy, as needed.

The action for the 5th Marineson 25 September was largely deja

25

The Marines fought two enemies in downtown Seoul—thosewho defended behind the barricades and the snipers seem-

ingly hidden in every other window.Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

vu, the unfinished and still costlybusiness of eliminating the residualpositions of the 25th NKPABrigade along the eastern fingersof Hill 296 as described earlier.Here on two adjoining knobs,Company E, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, and Companies H and Iof 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,engaged the North Koreans inbloody close combat, again most

ably supported by Marine Corsairs.By now the 19th NKPA

Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment hadlearned how to deal with the terri-fying strafing runs by MarineCorsairs. Increasingly, those anti-aircraft gunners who survived thenorthwest ridge battles would turnSeoul into a “flak trap.” September25th reflected this new lethality, aparticularly costly day for Marine

Corsair squadron commanders.With the escort carrier Sicily and itsembarked VMF-214 Black Sheepscheduled to rotate back to Inchonfor repairs and resupply that after-noon, Lieutenant Colonel WalterLischeid led the final sorties insupport of the Army’s river cross-ings. A North Korean gunner hithis Corsair over Seoul. Lischeidtried to nurse his crippled plane toKimpo field but crashed in flamestwo miles shy of the airstrip.

In other aerial action on the25th, Lieutenant Colonel RichardWyczawski, commanding theLancers of VMF-212, was woundedand shot down by hostile fire. Sowas Lieutenant Colonel MaxVolcansek, commanding the night-fighting Tigers of VMF(N)-542,who barely bailed out before hisplane crashed near Kimpo.Marines flying Sikorsky HO3S-1helicopters from MarineObservation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)rescued both officers—Volcansek’srescue helicopter pulled him out ofa rice paddy in a record six min-utes elapsed time following notifi-cation—but all hands regretted thedeath of Lieutenant ColonelLischeid.

Major Robert P. Keller, who hadcommanded three squadrons inthe Pacific War, took over theBlack Sheep. When a fellow avia-tor remarked, “Now you are theacting commanding officer,” Kellerretorted, “Acting, hell—I’m seri-ous.” Keller maintained the VMF-214 commitment to launching five-plane strikes every two hours. TheBlack Sheep pilots first plasteredthe ridge from which the antiair-craft battery had fired on Lischeid,then spent the remainder of theday delivering ordnance againsttargets ranging from railroad yardsin the North Korean capital ofPyongyang to enemy troop con-centrations in downtown Seoul,the other capital.

26

The nature of Marine close airsupport changed as the campaignentered the streets of Seoul. AsLieutenant Colonel NormanAnderson subsequently noted:“Bombing by its very nature gaveway to the more easily accuratetechniques of rocketing and straf-ing. . . . I feel we became increas-ingly aware of the need to avoidwhat we now call collateral dam-age.” The Corsair’s 20mm cannoncould deliver a hellacious strafingrun, but the “bent-wing U-Birds”could only carry 800 rounds, limit-ing the extent of this application.Anderson wistfully recalled hisdays of flying Marine Corps B-25sin the Philippines late in WorldWar II, “a memorable strafer with14 forward-firing, .50-calibermachine guns. Many’s the time wemight have put them to good usesupporting Marines in the streets ofYongdungpo and Seoul. Alas, theywere not carrier suitable.”

On the ground in Seoul on 25September progress came grudg-ingly to the 1st Marines despite its

early start. Puller passed Ridge’s3d Battalion, 1st Marines, throughSutter’s 2d Battalion, while, toRidge’s right, Hawkins adjusted the1st Battalion’s positions along Hill79 to accommodate the 90-degreepivot to the northeast. This done,the regiment advanced methodi-cally, Ridge and Hawkins abreast,Sutter in close reserve. The NorthKoreans resisted savagely, andPuller looked often for his missingtanks, still completing their longrun east from the Haengju ferrycrossing the previous afternoon.

Fresh minefields and suddenambushes slowed Captain Bruce F.Williams’ tank company, rein-forced by a platoon each ofinfantry and combat engineers,once they crossed the river. As thearmored column approachedSeoul they drew fire from thesoutheast corner of Hill 105-South,still unconquered despite CaptainFenton’s seizure of the crest threedays earlier. This time, finally, theMarines had a force on the groundwith the firepower, mobility, and

shock action to finish the job. Thetankers and engineers blew away aline of shacks blocking the base ofthe hill, thereby discovering thehidden cave mouth, and moved aflame tank up to the opening.Sensibly, the North Koreans beganto surrender, one or two at first,then more than 100, outnumberingtheir captors.

The Marines to this point rou-tinely made each prisoner of warstrip buck naked, but they wereshocked to find two womenamong this crew. Someone help-fully provided two pairs of longjohns for the occasion, but theAmerican press had a field daywith the matter later, once thewomen got to the rear and com-plained. But it was a no-win situ-ation for the Marines. The NKPAoccupants of that cave had killedMarines from five different battal-ions; they were quite fortunate toescape the flame tank’s horrors.As it was, other NKPA troops near-by had no intention of surrender-ing to the Marines. As StaffSergeant Arthur Farrington report-ed:

The enemy wounded werehoisted on board the tanks,129 bare asses were lined upthree abreast [between thevehicles] . . . when about 40-50 [North] Koreans jumped upto the left of the railroadtracks. They had been lyingtheir doggo behind us all thetime. We killed them withrifle, machine gun, and 90mmfire as they went across thepaddies.

Captain Williams was under-standably exultant as he led hiscolumn with its rich prizes intoSeoul, but when he tried torecount the unit’s success at 105-South to Chesty Puller, the colonelcut him short, saying, “I’m not

27

A Corsair flight on a close air support mission against targets in North Korea andaround the South Korean capital.

Photo courtesy of LtCol Leo J. Ihli, USMC (Ret)

28

interested in your sea storiesyoung man. You’re late. We’vegot fish to fry.”

Puller sorely needed the tanks.The North Koreans defendingSeoul lacked the numbers to occu-py every building or side street, sothey concentrated instead on themajor avenues and thoroughfares.By now each significant intersec-tion in the city featured an impro-vised barricade, typically protectedby rice bags filled with sand orrubble, piled eight feet high by fivefeet wide, and defended by anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns,and mines. Marine historian Colo-nel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., likened thescene to 19th century France:“Every intersection was barricadedafter the fashion of the ParisCommune: carts, earth-filled ricebags . . . furniture, and rubble.”The Soviet Union’s official newspa-per Pravda compared the situationin Seoul to the Russian defense of

Stalingrad in World War II: “Thereis firing behind every stone.”

The axis of advance ofLieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, was directlyup Ma Po Boulevard towards theembassies and principal govern-ment buildings. Major EdwinSimmons later compared his com-pany’s advance to “attacking upPennsylvania Avenue towards theCapitol in Washington, D.C.” Theboulevard was straight and wide—”once a busy, pleasant avenuelined with sycamores, groceries,wine and tea shops,” according toHeinl. Trolley car tracks ran downthe middle. Now NKPA barricadesmushroomed at each intersection.Enemy snipers fired from blownout windows. Other NKPA troopslobbed Molotov cocktails from therooftops onto the Marine tanks inthe street below. And throughoutall this mayhem fled thousandsand thousands of terrified Korean

refugees. Mines accounted forappalling casualties among them.

At one point Captain RobertBarrow halted his company alonga particularly advantageous rise ofground overlooking the railroadyards and passenger station. Foronce he could clearly see theenemy troops moving into newpositions, building fresh barri-cades, and preparing futureambushes. He called in artilleryand mortar fire, employed hismachine guns and rocket launch-ers, enjoying his dominant posi-tion. Strangely, he said, LieutenantColonel Hawkins kept urging himto advance. “We thought we werehaving a turkey shoot,” Barrowrecalled. “Nobody getting hurt and[us] knocking the hell out of them,”but Hawkins said, “What’s holdingyou up—move out!” WhenBarrow tried to explain his favor-able position, Hawkins repliedbluntly: “Unless you want a new


Marine riflemen and tanks advance north under fire along Seoul’s principal boulevard.

29

Marines battling their way through the contestedboulevards and back alleys of Seoul inSeptember 1950 did so without benefit of the

modern-day doctrine and training for “military opera-tions in urban terrain.” Street fighting at that time was anuncommon Marine experience. There had been abloody two-day fight in downtown Vera Cruz, Mexico,in 1914, where Major Smedley D. Butler and LieutenantColonel Wendell C. “Whispering Buck” Neville led theirmen with axes and bayonets in attacking through thewalls of the row-houses. Thirty years later, a differentgeneration of Marines fought the Japanese through theburning streets of Garapan, Saipan, and again on a larg-er scale in the spring of 1945 amid the rubble of Naha,Okinawa.

But Seoul dwarfed Vera Cruz, Garapan, and Nahacombined. An enormous, sprawling city dominated bysteep hills, awash with terrified refugees, and stoutlydefended by more than 20,000 North Koreans, Seoulconstituted the largest, single objective ever assigned the

Marines. Hue City in 1968 would take the Marineslonger to recapture, but the casualties incurred at Hue,bad as they were, would not total half those sustainedby the 1st Marine Division at Seoul.

Street fighting in Seoul involved forcibly uprootingthe NKPA troops from either their roadblock barricadesor their isolated strongpoints within or atop the build-ings. Both required teamwork: engineers, tanks, andinfantry for the barricades (often supported by artilleryor Corsair strikes), and rifle squads supported by rocketlaunchers and scout-sniper teams against the strong-points.

Door-to-door fighting proved to be as tense andexhausting in 1950 as it had been in Vera Cruz in 1914.As Private First Class Morgan Brainard of the 1st Marinesrecalled the action: “The tension from these little forayswhittled us pretty keen . . . . I think if one’s own moth-er had suddenly leapt out in front of us she would havebeen cut down immediately, and we all would probablyhave cheered with the break in tension.” Brainard’scompany commander, Captain Robert H. Barrow, told aHeadquarters Marine Corps tactics review board in 1951that he quickly came to value the 3.5-inch rocketlauncher in applications other than antitank defense.“We employed it in a very effective manner inYongdungpo and in Seoul in the destruction of housesthat had enemy in them. In many instances [our] 3.5[gunners] simply shot at some of these fragile houseskilling all the occupants.”

The presence of so many civilian refugees in thestreets and rubble vastly complicated the battle andnecessitated extraordinary measures to ensure targetidentification and limit indiscriminate firing. Whenevertroops stopped to reorganize “children appeared amongthem,” observed the Life magazine photographer DavidDouglas Duncan. “Children gentle and tiny and wide-eyed as they fastened themselves to the men who firstignored them . . . then dug them their own little foxholesand expertly adapted helmets to fit their baby heads.”Enemy snipers, mines, and long-range, heavy caliberantitank rifles took a toll among Marines and civiliansalike. The ancient city became a ghastly killing ground.

Street Fighting, 1950

battalion commander, you willattack at once.” Barrow managedto convince Hawkins to come andsee the situation for himself.Hawkins marveled at the abun-dance of targets under directobservation: “Get more mortars inthere—get more artillery.”

Yet Hawkins remained agitated,

and Barrow soon saddled up hisgunners and forward observersand plunged forward downhill intothe maze of streets and railroadtracks (3d Battalion, 1st Marines,had Ma Po Boulevard; 1stBattalion, 1st Marines’ axis ofadvance was less straightforward).Barrow and other junior officers in

the 1st Marines later concludedthat the pressure to advance hadcome down several echelons, pos-sibly from the Tokyo headquartersof General MacArthur in his desireto recapture the capital by thesymbolic third-month anniversaryof its loss. “Who knows?” Barrowasked rhetorically. “Puller was

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC-351392

being pushed by somebody indivision. The division was beingpushed by someone in TenthCorps, and the corps was beingpushed by the man himself, orsomeone speaking for him, back inTokyo.”

Top-level pressure notwith-standing, the two lead battalions ofthe 1st Marines could advance only2,000 yards on the 25th. “Ouradvance this day was a foot-by-foot basis,” said Lieutenant ColonelRidge. North Korean minesknocked out two of CaptainWilliams’ Pershing tanks; othervehicles sustained multiple hitsfrom direct fire weapons. Ridgehunkered in for the night alongHill 97; Hawkins occupied Hill 82to Ridge’s immediate right rear.Company G and WeaponsCompany of 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, occupied the forwardposition, a roadblock protecting akey bridge on Ma Po Boulevard.

The front lines were jagged; theNorth Koreans occupied severalworrisome salients in close prox-imity.

Ridge directed Major Edwin H.Simmons, commanding WeaponsCompany, to coordinate the battal-ion’s forward defenses. Simmonsfortified the roadblock with tworifle squads, a section of hisBrowning heavy machine guns, arocket squad, and a 75mm recoil-less rifle section borrowed fromthe regimental antitank company.After supervising his attached engi-neers as they laid a series of anti-tank mines on the bridge,Simmons established his observa-tion post (OP) in the cellar of anabandoned house on a rise to theleft rear of the roadblock, protect-ed by four additional heavymachine guns. His 81mm mortarplatoon occupied uncommonlyclose firing positions 150 yardsrearward, connected by phone

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The North Koreans built their barricades with burlap bags filled with dirt, rubble,or rice. Each position took the Marines an average of 45 to 60 minutes to over-come. Here a Marine rifleman scampers through a recently abandoned barri-cade during heavy fighting in Seoul’s downtown business district.

Under the watchful gaze of Joseph Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Marines crouchbehind a barricade as enemy snipers resist their advance.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

wire to the OP. These were rea-sonable precautions given thevolatile nature of the street fightingduring the day and the nearby re-entrants occupied by the NorthKoreans. Parts of the city stillburned from the day’s fighting, butthe streets seemed quiet.

Then, shortly after 2000, a flashmessage from X Corps arrived inthe division command post. Aerialobservers had just reported

“enemy fleeing city of Seoul onroad north of Uijongbu.” GeneralAlmond, sensing a great opportu-nity to crush the North Koreans,ordered an immediate advance bythe 1st Marine Division, stating:“You will push attack now to thelimit of your objectives in order toinsure maximum destruction ofenemy forces. Signed Almond.”

The flash message stunnedColonel Bowser. The order was

rife with unanswered questions—did Almond envision a five-milenight attack through the heart ofthe city by converging regimentsout of direct contact with eachother? And, by the way, howcould an aerial observer distin-guish at night between a columnof retreating troops and a columnof fleeing refugees? Bowser calledhis counterpart at X Corps withthese questions but got nowhere.Neither did General Smith amoment later in a call to Almond’schief of staff. Smith shook hishead and ordered his regimentalcommanders to comply—carefully.Throughout their smoking third ofthe city, the 1st Marine Divisionstirred and bitched. As one com-pany commander queried: “A nightattack without a reconnaissance orrehearsal? What are our objec-tives?” Private First Class MorganBrainard recalled the grousing inthe ranks that night: “We were allrousted out and mustered downon the darkened street by pla-toons. Scuttlebutt said we weregoing into the heart of Seoul in asurprise night attack.”

After allowing his regimentalcommanders plenty of time tocoordinate their plans, GeneralSmith ordered the advance to kickoff at 0145 following a 15-minuteartillery preparation. The enemymoved first. Before midnight a siz-able NKPA force hit LieutenantColonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, on Hill 105-North.Lieutenant Colonel Murray and hisexecutive officer attempted tomake sense of the situation: “I’mafraid we’ll have to delay pursuit ofthe ‘fleeing enemy’ until we see ifTap can beat off the counterat-tack.”

As Major Simmons listeneduneasily to the sounds of Taplett’sfirefight, less than 1,000 yardswest, he received a call fromLieutenant Colonel Ridge ordering

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him to dispatch a patrol to linkwith a similar patrol from the 5thMarines to facilitate the forthcom-ing night attack. Simmons protest-ed the order. From the volume offire to the west, a considerableNKPA force had moved betweenthe two regiments. “I doubted apatrol could get through,” saidSimmons. Ridge repeated theorder. Simmons assembled apatrol of Company G riflemen, ledby Corporal Charles E. Collins.They departed about 1245. “I feltlike I was kissing them goodbye,”

Simmons admitted. The onset of the artillery

preparatory fires heightenedSimmons’ concern for his patrol.Colonel Puller worried that the firewas inadequate for a generalassault. At 0138, he asked Smithfor a second fire mission, delayingthe jump-off time to 0200. Fifteenminutes later the whole issuebecame moot.

Major Simmons first heardsounds of a nearby firefight andrealized Collins’ patrol had beenintercepted. A moment later, at

0153, he heard the unmistakablesounds of tracked vehiclesapproaching the roadblock fromthe north, along with an almostinstantaneous crack! of a Soviet T-34 85mm tank gun. The shellmissed Simmons by inches andkilled his radio operator at his side.Shaken, Simmons sounded thealarm. Far from fleeing the city,the enemy—at least this particularbattalion of the 25th NKPABrigade—was charging due southdown Ma Po Boulevard with six to12 tanks and self-propelled guns,accompanied by infantry. As hisroadblock defenders cut loose onthe enemy tanks, Simmons calledfor artillery and 81mm mortar con-centrations along the bridge, andthe battle raged. General Smith,sobered by the ferocity of theNKPA assaults, postponed the divi-sion’s night attack indefinitely.

The Marines would soon call thenorthwestern nose of Hill 97“Slaughterhouse Hill,” and from itsslopes this night they inflicted akilling zone of epic proportionsagainst the attacking armored col-umn. Three battalions of the 11thMarines fired incessantly the next90 minutes. At that point the tubesbecame so hot the howitzers hadto ceasefire until they could cooldown. In the lull, the NKPA tankssurged forward again. Simmonsunleashed his beloved heavyBrowning machine guns. “In thelight of the burning buildings,” hesaid, “I could see three [tanks}clearly, rolling forward on [the]boulevard about 500 yards to myfront.” Simmons saw the tracersfrom the Brownings whanging offthe faceplates of the tanks. Heasked for 155mm howitzer firefrom the Army. The 31st FieldArtillery Battalion responded withawesome firepower—360 roundsalong 3d Battalion, 1st Marines’direct front.

Chesty Puller did not recognize

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Sketch by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret)

A Marine artillery forward observer team adjusts supporting fires on enemy bar-ricades in downtown Seoul. The firing batteries were south of the Han River.Forward observer teams had to adjust their fire with utmost precision in thecrowded city.

the radio call sign of the Armyartillery liaison officer coordinatingthe 155mm howitzer missions thatnight, but he knew first-class firesupport when he saw it. “This isBlade,” he growled into his hand-set, “I don’t know who in the hellyou are, but thank God! Out.”

The Army fire mission destroyedor disabled the last of the NKPAtanks threatening the 3d Battalion’sroadblock, but several immobi-lized vehicles maintained a stub-born fire. One self-propelled guncontinued to fire at Simmons’observation post, each shellscreeching overhead barely adegree in elevation too high.Simmons feared the coming dawnwould make his position terriblyexposed, so he moved one of the75mm recoilless rifles from theroadblock to the rubble-strewnfront yard of the abandonedhouse. The crew stared anxiouslyinto the darkness just north of thebridge, hoping to get off the firstshot at dawn. Finally, in the grayhalf-light, the gunner spotted theenemy vehicle and squeezed histrigger. The round was a pin-

wheel hit—the self-propelled gunburst into flames. But the Marineshad forgotten to consider the backblast of the recoilless rifle. “Itbounced off the mud-and-wattleside of the house behind us andknocked us head-over-heels,”Simmons said, adding “we thoughtit very funny at the time.”

Sunrise brought Simmons morewelcome news. Corporal Collins,having ordered the rest of hispatrol back to the roadblock attheir first encounter with theapproaching NKPA armored col-umn, covered its retreat with riflefire, and then took refuge for thenight in a cellar. Somehow hefound a set of white robes com-monly worn by the Korean civil-ians. Thus attired, he made hisway through the still-dangerousstreets to the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines’ lines and safety.

The North Koreans executed athird major spoiling attack at 0500,launching a reinforced battalionagainst the 32d Infantry’s positionson Nam-san. The Army regimentstood its ground and did not getrattled when one company was

overrun. Making good use of hissupporting arms, Colonel CharlesBeauchamp organized a counterat-tack that drove the enemy out ofthe position and inflicted severalhundred casualties.

At daybreak, Colonel Pullerarrived at Lieutenant ColonelRidge’s position. “You had bettershow me some results of thisalleged battle you had last night,”he warned. Ridge was unper-turbed. He showed Puller thewreckage of the NKPA vehiclesnorth of the bridge, the ruins ofseven tanks, two self-propelledguns, and eight 45mm antitankguns. At least 250 dead NorthKoreans lay in clots along theboulevard (the official figure of475 may have included those slainby Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, that samenight), and there were more than80 prisoners in hand. The Marines’side of the battlefield seemed cov-ered with a river of spent brassshell casings. Major Simmons’ 10Browning heavy machine gunshad fired a phenomenal 120 boxesof ammunition during the night—30,000 rounds, a feat that even sur-passed the volume fired by the leg-endary Sergeant “Manila John”Basilone at Guadalcanal in 1942 inPuller’s old battalion. ColonelPuller flashed a rare grin.

Time magazine’s combat corre-spondent Dwight Martin describedthe battlefield the morning of the26th, as Sutter’s 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, passed through Ridge’s1st Battalion:

This morning Ma-Po worea different look. The burnedand blackened remains of theboulevard’s shops and homessent clouds of acrid smokebillowing over the city.Buildings still ablaze show-ered sparks and ashes highinto the air to cascade down

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Marine riflemen evacuate their wounded buddy under heavy enemy fire.Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC351385

34

This page and the next, street fighting in Seoul as captured by Life magazine photographer David Douglas Duncan.

on red-eyed, soot-facedMarines.

Given these circumstances, it isnot surprising that the Marinesgreeted with hoots of derision thecommunique by General Almondthat Seoul had been liberated at1400 the previous afternoon, the25th of September. “Three monthsto the day after the North Koreanslaunched their surprise attacksouth of the 38th Parallel,” themessage proclaimed, “the combattroops of X Corps recaptured thecapital city of Seoul.” To theirastonishment, the Marines learnedthat their corps commander con-sidered the military defenses ofSeoul to be broken. “The enemy isfleeing the city to the northeast,”the communique concluded. AnAssociated Press correspondentreflected the infantry’s skepticism:“If the city had been liberated, theremaining North Koreans did notknow it.”

In truth the Marines and soldierswould still be fighting for full pos-session of the capital 48 hours pastGeneral Almond’s announced lib-eration date, but the issue wasinsignificant. The troops viewedthe battle from purely a tacticalperspective; their corps comman-der sensed the political ramifica-tions. Of far greater significance atthis point was the fact that fiveinfantry regiments with a total lackof experience waging coalitionwarfare with combined arms in anenormous urban center were nev-ertheless prevailing against a well-armed, disciplined enemy.General MacArthur’s visionarystroke at Inchon had succeeded ininvesting the city of Seoul in just 11days. In view of the allies’ dis-heartening performance in theKorean War to date, MacArthur,and Almond, had earned the rightto boast.

Further, although the Marines

might not like to admit it, GeneralAlmond was essentially correct inhis flash message the night of the25th—the main body of the NorthKorean defenders, the remnants ofa division, was indeed retreatingnorth. What surprised all compo-nents of X Corps was the NKPAdecision to expend the equivalentof an armored brigade in suicidalnight attacks and die-hard defenseof the main barricades to keep theAmericans ensnared in the city.

Analyzing the NKPA decision toevacuate the main body of theirdefenders from Seoul is alwaysrisky, but there is evidence that thepullback resulted as much fromtheir surprise at the unexpectedcrossing of the 32d Infantry andthe 17th ROK Infantry from thesoutheast on the 25th—paired withthe rapid advance of the 7thMarines, threatening the northernescape routes—as from the steadybut predictable advance of the 5thand 1st Marines. Regardless, it wasobvious to Almond and O. P. Smiththat seizing such a mammothobjective as Seoul would requireuncommon teamwork amongServices, nations, and combatarms. Allied teamwork throughoutthe night attacks of 25-26September had proven exemplary.

The Marines employed Corsairsand artillery to soften the barri-cades, then switched to 4.2-inchand 81mm mortars. The assaultcompanies delivered machine gunand rocket fire on the fortificationsto cover the deliberate minesweep-ing operations by combat engi-neers. Then came the M-26Pershing tanks, often with othertanks modified as flamethrowers orbulldozers. On the heels of thetanks came the infantry with fixedbayonets. The process wasunavoidably time-consuming—each barricade required 45-60 min-utes to overrun—and each of theseintermediate objectives took its toll

in Marine and civilian casualties.The city smoked and burned.

As Lieutenant Colonel JackHawkins’ 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,fought its way clear of the railroadyards and entered a parallel thor-oughfare his riflemen stared inhorror at the rampant destruction.As it appeared to Private First ClassMorgan Brainard, the scene wasone of “great gaping skeletons ofblackened buildings with theirwindows blown out...telephonewires hanging down loosely fromtheir drunken, leaning poles; glassand bricks everywhere; literally atown shot to hell.”

Not all the fighting took placearound the barricaded intersec-tions. There were plenty of otherNKPA soldiers holed up in thebuildings and rooftops. Many ofthese soldiers became the prey ofMarine scout-sniper teams, somearmed with old Springfield ‘03 boltaction rifles fitted with scopes, oth-ers favoring the much newer M1-Csemi-automatic rifles, match-condi-tioned weapons graced with cheekpads, flash suppressors, leatherslings, and 2.2x telescopic sights.The snipers often worked in teamsof two. One man used binocularsor a spotting scope to find targetsfor the shooter.

Many of the buildings in the citycenter were multi-story, and,according to Private First ClassBrainard, “it meant going up thestairs and kicking open the doorsof each room, and searching thebalconies and backyard gardens aswell.” Often the Marines had tofight their way through the build-ings, smashing their way throughthe walls like Smedley Butler’sMarines in Vera Cruz in 1914.

Colonel Puller led his regimentfrom very near the forward ele-ments. On this day he dismountedfrom his jeep and stalked up MaPo Boulevard shortly behindLieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2d

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Among the many unsung heroes who providedongoing combat support to the infantry regi-ments of the 1st Marine Division in the recapture

of Seoul were the dauntless practitioners of LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge’s 1st Engineer Battalion. Asdid the division as a whole, the engineers representedan amalgam of World War II veterans, new recruits, anda spirited group of reservists, including members of the3d Engineer Company, United States Marine CorpsReserve, from Phoenix, Arizona.

Fortunately, the Inchon landing caught the NKPAforces in the region off guard, and the battalion hadtime to shake itself down in non-urgent missions beforebreaking into small units to tackle enemy minefields.The engineers at first cleared beach exits and assemblyareas in the Inchon area, then moved out to help recon-noiter the roads leading east to Seoul. Of immediateconcern to Major General Oliver P. Smith and his oper-ations officer, Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., was whetherthe numerous bridges along the highways and sec-ondary roads were sturdy enough to support theMarines’ new M-26 Pershing tank with its 46 tons ofcombat-loaded weight.

The Marines encountered the first serious NKPAminefields (both antitank and anti-personnel) in thevicinity of Kimpo Airfield. The subsequent arrival ofhighly-trained, first-line North Korean reinforcements indefensive positions guarding the approaches to Seoulled to minefields of increasing size and sophistication.Soviet Red Army advisors had trained the NKPA in minewarfare, and many of the mines encountered by the

Marines were made in Russia. These mines slowed theadvance of the 1st Marine Division as it reached theouter defenses of Seoul along the Kalchon west ofYongdungpo or the avenues of approach to Hill 296 andits many subordinate peaks and ridgelines. Partridge’sengineer teams performed their high-stress mine-clear-ing missions with progressive efficiency. This helpedsustain the division’s momentum and limited the timeavailable to the enemy to more fully develop defensivepositions within the city.

In Seoul, the Marines encountered barricaded road-blocks every 200 to 300 yards along the main boule-vards. The North Koreans seeded most approacheswith mines. The Marines formulated the necessary team-work on the spot. The rifle company commanderwould shower the obstacle with fire, including smokeor white phosphorus mortar shells. Under this coverthe engineer squad would hustle forward to clear themines. Behind them would come the tanks, followedby the infantry. It was dangerous, often costly work.Sometimes a mine would detonate among the engi-neers. Sometimes they would miss a string and a tankwould be lost. Most often, however, this painstakingprocess worked. Each barricade took an average of 45minutes to clear. Utilizing this well-coordinated andincreasingly proficient approach, the infantry battalionsof the 1st Marines advanced an average of 1,200 yardseach day—a small gain on a map, but an inexorableadvance to the North Koreans.

The 1st Engineers provided another exceptional ser-vice to the division in the Seoul campaign—river cross-

Combat Engineers in the Seoul Campaign

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

Battalion, 1st Marines, as it clawedits way along each city block.Sergeant Orville Jones, Puller’shand-picked driver throughout1950-55, followed his colonel inthe jeep, a short distance to therear. Sometimes the Marines fight-ing door-to-door along the streetwould be appalled to see ChestyPuller walking fully exposed andabreast of the action, Jonesrecalled. “‘Holy Jeez,’ they wouldyell to each other—‘Don’t letChesty get ahead of us—move it!’”

Yet even the famously aggres-sive Chesty Puller could not expe-dite the methodical reduction ofthe barricades. Puller admitted,“progress was agonizingly slow.”Said the engineer Captain NicholasA. Canzona: “It was a dirty, frus-trating fight every yard of the way.”

Army Lieutenant Robert L.Strickland, a World War II veterannow assigned as a cameraman forX Corps, got caught up in thestreet fighting. He sought shelterin an open courtyard behind aburning building, but the enemyfire came from all directions. “Wegot so much fire of all kinds that Ilost count,” he said. “I have seen

a lot of men get hit both in this warand in World War II, but I think Ihave never seen so many get hit sofast in such a small area.”

David Douglas Duncan, veteranMarine and extraordinary combatphotographer for Life magazine,accompanied the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, during their advancethrough the rail yards towards thestation. Describing the action inhis subsequent photo book This isWar, Duncan highlighted the time-ly arrival of Marine Pershing tanksthat “growled up across the rail-road tracks, into the plaza—andmet the enemy fire head on.”Then, Duncan continued: “Thetanks traded round for round withthe heavily-armed, barricadedenemy—and chunks of armor andbits of barricade were blown highinto the air. They were killingthemselves at point-blank range.”

Private First Class Brainard ofCompany A, 1st Marines, describeda barricade that had just beendemolished by a pair of M-26Pershing tanks:

We pass by the barricadewhich had been constructed

with large-sized rice bags . . .and also with odd bits of fur-niture, such as tables, chairs,and wooden doors, all piledup together. There wereabout ten dead gookssprawled in and around theobstruction, and the black-ened antitank gun was tippedover on its side with lots ofunused shells scatteredaround it.

The 1st and 5th Marines werenow converging close enough thatColonel Puller’s men could clearlysee Lieutenant Colonel Murray’stroops still fighting to clear thefinal eastern finger of Hill 296, theridge that extended into the heartof Seoul. Certain riflemen in 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, spokeadmiringly of the 5th Marinesbeing “once more on top of thehighest hill in the local vicinity—born billy goats.”

The 5th Marines may haveappreciated the compliment, butby 26 September they were sickand tired of the steep northwestapproaches and the stubbornlydefending remnants of the 25th

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ing. The Han was a broad tidal river, and its fewbridges had been blown up during the first week of thewar. The Marines had amphibian tractors and DUKWson hand to transport riflemen and small vehicles acrossagainst the current, but the campaign would never suc-ceed without the means of ferrying, first, tanks andartillery, then heavy trucks and trailers. Major GeneralEdward A. Almond, USA, commanding X Corps, hadproven disingenuous in his repeated assurances thatheavy bridging material would arrive in plenty of timeto support the Marines’ crossing in force. “GeneralAlmond promises bridge material,” General O. P. Smithrecorded in his journal. “This is an empty promise.”

Thinking ahead, and acting on his own initiative,Lieutenant Colonel Partridge had obtained a pair of 50-ton pontoons in San Diego and had zealously protectedthem from the enraged embarkation officer who had tosomehow load these unwelcome monsters on shipsalready stuffed with “essential” combat cargo. The pon-toons proved priceless. Partridge had at least one sec-

tion on hand to support the crossing of the 5th Marinesat Haengju on 20 September. Lieutenant Colonel HenryP. Crowe’s 1st Shore Party Battalion quickly establisheda smooth functioning ferry service, doubling their pro-ductivity with the arrival of Partridge’s second pontoon.Here the 7th Marines crossed, as well as the companyof M-26 tanks needed so direly by Colonel Puller in hisfirst full day of street fighting in Seoul. GeneralAlmond’s bridging material arrived in time to supportthe crossing of General MacArthur’s official party asthey arrived in Seoul on 29 September.

Greater glories awaited the 1st Engineer Battalion inthe forthcoming Chosin Reservoir campaign, where theycleared an expeditionary airfield at Hagaru-ri andassembled the air-dropped Treadway Bridge inFunchilin Pass below Koto-ri, but their yeoman perfor-mance in close support of the 1st Marine Division’sassault on Seoul set a standard of combined arms oper-ations and greatly facilitated the timely recapture of thecapital.

NKPA Brigade. Captain Robert A.McMullen’s Company I, the menwho had spearheaded LieutenantColonel Taplett’s crossing of theHan back at Haengju and earnedthe praise of General Almond bytheir double envelopment of Hill125, would again be in the spot-light on the 26th. Taplett assignedMcMullen the mission of sweepingthe eastern terminus of the hugelower spur of Hill 296 that extend-ed very near the major intersectionof the Kaesong-Seoul highway andMa Po Boulevard. Ahead, lessthan a mile to the northeast layGovernment House. And not farbeyond the palace was the bound-ary between the 1st and 7thMarines. By design, Murray’s regi-ment, which had sustained thehighest casualties the precedingweek, was close to being pinchedout and assigned a reserve role.

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While the Pershing tank “Dead Eye Dick” advances beyond a captured NorthKorean barricade, a Marine sniper team waits for the 45mm antitank rounds toabate before moving into new firing positions.

A brief helping hand from a Marine amid a day of great ter-ror for the civilians—high explosives, burning buildings,

downed power lines, and scattered families.Photo by David Douglas Duncan

But Hill 296 and Colonel Wol’shard-core survivors were notthrough with the 5th Marines.Company I’s stouthearted advanceencountered fierce oppositionfrom the start. At one pointMcMullen led his troops into amaze of trenches manned by 200North Koreans and forced themout by the sheer velocity of theassault—only to lose the positionto a vicious counterattack. Thetwo forces struggled across this

contested ground the balance ofthe afternoon. At day’s end theMarines held the field but were toodepleted to exploit their advan-tage. Captain McMullen fellwounded and was evacuated. Hehad qualified for his seventhPurple Heart in two wars. TwoMarines in Company G, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, fighting insomewhat lower ground adjacentto Company I’s battlefield, eachreceived their fifth wound since

the regiment’s arrival in Pusan 53days earlier.

Elsewhere during Company G’sday-long fight, Corporal BertJohnson, a machine-gunner, andPrivate First Class Eugene A.Obregon, his ammunition humper,tried to set up their weapon in anadvanced position. The NorthKoreans charged, woundingJohnson with submachine gun fire.Obregon emptied his pistol at theshadows closing in, then dragged

40

Born in November 1930, Private First ClassObregon enlisted in the Marine Corps in June1948. Assigned to the 5th Marines, he was part

of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which was rushedto Korea in August 1950. He participated in the bloodybattles at the Naktong River—crucial victories, whichhelped save the Pusan Perimeter from collapse.

When the 5th Marines re-embarked to join the 1stMarine Division for the assault landing at Inchon on 15September, Obregon again took part. On 26 September,during the battle to recapture the South Korean capital,his heroic actions were recognized by a posthumousaward of the Medal of Honor. The official citation reads,in part:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the riskof his life above and beyond the call of duty whileserving with Company G, Third Battalion, FifthMarines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in actionagainst enemy aggressor forces at Seoul, Korea, on26 September 1950. While serving as an ammunitioncarrier of a machine-gun squad in a Marine rifle com-pany which was temporarily pinned down by hostilefire, Private First Class Obregon observed a fellowMarine fall wounded in the line of fire. Armed onlywith a pistol, he unhesitatingly dashed from his cov-ered position to the side of the casualty. Firing hispistol with one hand as he ran, he grasped his com-rade by the arm with his other hand and, despite thegreat peril to himself, dragged him to the side of theroad.

Still under enemy fire, he was bandaging theman’s wounds when hostile troops of approximatelyplatoon strength began advancing toward his posi-tion. Quickly seizing the wounded Marine’s carbine,he placed his own body as a shield in front of himand lay there firing accurately and effectively into thehostile group until he himself was fatally wounded

by enemy machine-gun-fire. Private First ClassObregon enabled his fellow Marines to rescue thewounded man and aided essentially in repelling theattack.

The fellow Marine, whose life Obregon had saved,was Private First Class Bert M. Johnson. He recoveredfrom his wounds and was returned to active duty.Obregon’s sacrifice was memorialized when a buildingat Camp Pendleton, a ship, and a high school in the LosAngeles area were named after him.

—-Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Private First Class Eugene A. Obregon

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A43987-B

Johnson to a defilade position todress his wounds. When theenemy swarmed too close,Obregon picked up a carbine andemptied the clip, always shieldingJohnson with his body. There weretoo many of them, and in the endthe North Koreans shot him topieces. But Obregon had delayedtheir attack long enough for otherMarines to hustle down the slopeand rescue Johnson. Private FirstClass Obregon’s family wouldreceive his posthumous Medal ofHonor.

The two rifle companies hadfought their damnedest, but the 5thMarines still could not fight theirway clear of the highlands.Stymied, Lieutenant ColonelRaymond Murray marshaled hisforces for the final breakthroughon the morrow.

Nor was Murray in a position tomaximize his supporting arms, ashe had been able to do in the ear-lier assault on Smith’s Ridge. Henoted with some envy the volumeof heavy-caliber indirect fire andthe frequent Corsair missions being

delivered in support of Puller’sadvance to his right front. “Chestyused a lot of artillery,” Murray saidlater. “And you could almost see aboundary line between the two of[us], the smoke coming up from hissector and very little smoke com-ing up from mine.” LieutenantColonel Jon Hoffman, author ofPuller’s definitive biography, notedthe irony that Puller had been crit-icized six years earlier at Peleliu forabjuring supporting arms while hisinfantry elements shattered them-selves in direct assaults againstBloody Nose Ridge. By compari-son, Colonel Harold D. “Bucky”Harris, commander of the 5thMarines at Peleliu, had receivedpraise for his policy of being “lav-ish with ordnance and stingy withthe lives of my men.” Now, in thestreets of Seoul, it was Puller’s turnto be “lavish with ordnance.”

Another bitter lesson learned bythe 1st Marine Division at Peleliuwas how to protect its tanks fromsuicide sapper attacks. The “OldBreed” was the only division in thesubsequent battle of Okinawa not

to lose a tank to Japanese sappers.In downtown Seoul on 26September, however, this distinc-tive streak ended. A nimble-footedNorth Korean darted out from therubble, caught 2d Battalion, 1stMarines’ riflemen by surprise, andflung a satchel charge atop a pass-ing flame tank, then vanished inthe blast and smoke. The crewescaped unscathed, but the tankwas destroyed. Angered andembarrassed by this bad luck, 2dBattalion’s NCOs forcibly remindedtheir men to watch the adjacentalleys and rubble piles, not thetanks. This paid off. The NKPAlaunched a dozen more sapperattacks against Marine tanks oper-ating in the center of the boule-vard; Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’stroops cut each one of them down.

There was no real “school solu-tion” that applied to the kaleido-scopic action taking place on thestreets of Seoul on the 26th ofSeptember. Captain Norman R.Stanford, commanding CompanyE, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, had asmuch tactical experience as any-one on the scene, having served asa company commander in the 1stMarines throughout Peleliu andOkinawa. Sutter ordered Stanfordto follow Company F up the boule-vard in trace, then take the rightfork while Company F took the leftat a designated intersection ahead.Sutter’s closing guidance was suc-cinct: “Move out fast and keepgoing.” But Company F encoun-tered a particularly nasty barricadejust past the intersection and couldnot advance up the left fork.

Captain Stanford went forwardto assess the delay. From 200yards away the NKPA barricadelooked unassailable:

I took one look at the AT[antitank] muzzle blasts kick-ing aside the pall of smokeover the roadblock, and I

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Frightened civilians scurry to shelter while three Marine Corps Pershing tanksduel with North Korean antitank guns at a barricaded intersection along Ma PoBoulevard.

glanced at the thin flicker ofautomatic fire running acrossthe barricade like a single lineof flame and dived off thesidewalk into an alley.

Stanford’s radio failed at thiscritical juncture. He had theoption of bypassing Company Fand the barricade and carrying outhis assigned mission along theright fork, notwithstanding hisnaked left flank, or bowlingstraight ahead through Company F,smashing the barricade, andattacking with Company E up theleft fork. He had the firepower—four tanks, an engineer platoon,rocket squads, and a 75mm recoil-less rifle section attached. “I knewthat we could go through anythingfor 250 yards,” he said, risking thesecond option. He hurled hisforces forward, towards the barri-cade. “We had it hot and heavy

among the burning buildings andthe crumbled sandbags of the bar-ricade, and then they broke andran . . . and we butchered themamong the Russian AT [antitank]guns and the Japanese Nambumachine guns.” Company E losttwo officers and 18 men in theirheadlong assault. Captain Stanfordwas one of the wounded.

Sutter’s battalion, like Taplett’salong the ridge just to the west,had fought their best, but “the flee-ing enemy” had limited hisadvance to 1,200 yards. Seoulwould not fall this day.

Further to the northwest, andnow not very far away, the 7thMarines veered towards the capitalin keeping with O. P. Smith’sorders to pinch out the 5thMarines. Company D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, led theadvance along the KaesongHighway as it threaded through

two towering hills, the now-infa-mous Hill 296 on the right and Hill338 on the left. First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, the machinegun officer, led the advance party.

Compared to all the grief beingexperienced by the other two reg-iments on the 26th, the 7th Marinesenjoyed what at first appeared tobe a cakewalk. Thousands ofgrateful civilians thronged theright-of-ways and hillsides, cheer-ing the approaching Marines. Itwas an uncommon experience forMarines of any war to date, a wel-come grace note to serve as a par-tial offset for the horrors to come.The North Koreans, of course, tookprompt advantage of this opportu-nity.

The dense crowds preventedCompany D from maintaining itsown outriding flank protectionalong the ridges on both sides ofthe road and caused the van to

42

overshoot the intended linkuppoint with the 5th Marines. Thecompany unwittingly entered thecity and the final defenses of oneof the sacrificial battalions leftbehind by the departed 25th NKPABrigade.

Sudden machine gun fire fromthe front felled First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, halted the col-umn, and created panic among thewell wishers. Then other machineguns opened up at close rangealong the high ground on bothsides. Another enemy force scram-bled downhill to establish a block-ing position in the rear. CompanyD was abruptly encircled and cutoff.

Captain Richard R. Breen,

though wounded early in the fight-ing, maintained his presence ofmind. He still commanded a large,fresh, well-armed company. Oncethe civilians vanished and hisMarines went to ground in goodfiring positions, he figured his mencould hold their own, despite thedanger. When Colonel Litzenbergcalled to see what kind of help heneeded, Breen answered calmly,“We’re okay, Colonel.”

Had Company D’s entrapmentoccurred two days earlier the ensu-ing darkness might have provencatastrophic, but by now the NKPAforces lacked the punch to finishthe job. Additionally, CaptainBreen received some spectacularhelp. Two U.S. Air Force C-47s

dropped ammunition, rations, andmedicine to the surroundedMarines just before dusk (oneplane, badly shot up by NorthKorean antiaircraft gunners, had tocrash-land at Kimpo). During thenight Lieutenant (junior grade)Edward Burns, USN, the regimen-tal surgeon, led a high-balling con-voy of jeep ambulances throughthe enemy perimeter to retrieve 40of Company D’s most seriouslywounded men.

Lieutenant Colonel Parry’s 3dBattalion, 11th Marines, still indirect support of the 7th Marines,was the first artillery unit to crossthe Han. At that point the infantryregiment extended from the northbank of the Haengju ferry crossing

43

By the third full day of the battle for Seoul, the city lay inruins. Shell holes buckled the streets, rubble lay strewn

everywhere, and a thousand fires blazed furiously.Exhausted Marines regroup for the final barricade assault.


to the edge of Seoul, “a sector of18 miles,” said Parry, whichrequired him to deploy “three bat-teries on three separate azimuths.”Company D’s encirclement on theedge of Seoul on the 26th caused apredicament. The company hadcrossed into the 5th Marines zone,and “it was several hours beforewe were able to obtain clearanceto shoot.” But Parry’s gunnersmade up for the delays with pin-point defensive fires around theCompany D perimeter throughoutthe night. “We were credited bythe company commander with sav-ing their bacon,” Parry said. Theanticipated NKPA night attack didnot materialize.

By now all of Colonel Homer L.Litzenberg’s 7th Marines hadreceived their separate baptisms offire. One member of Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, recalledhis own first combat encounter:

The company was above

Seoul when we ran into a fire-fight. We were moving atnight. [There were] green trac-ers coming in, red tracers goingout. It was confusing . . . I wasscared [and] pretty muchhugged the ground. I didn’teven know how to dig a fox-hole, but the Gunnery Sergeanttold me how: “Make it like agrave.”

The 26th of September, thoughdevoid of major tactical gains inthe fight for Seoul, ended with asignificant operational break-through. At Suwon, 27 miles southof Seoul, three U.S. Army tanks ofthe 7th Cavalry raced into theperimeter of the 7th Division short-ly before midnight. The EighthArmy had fought its way clear ofthe Pusan Perimeter, and its lead-ing elements had linked up with XCorps.

For the 1st Marine Division, theclimax of the Inchon-Seoul cam-

paign came on 27 September, andmost of O. P. Smith’s disheveledtroops seemed to sense the oppor-tunity as soon as the new daydawned. Sunrise brought a specialrelief to Company D, 7th Marines,after its all-night vigil in the steeppass at the city limits. Litzenberg’srelief column of tanks, infantry,and engineers fought their wayinto the position against negligibleopposition. Captain Breen re-ceived his second wound duringthe extraction of his company, butthe volume of enemy fire haddiminished sharply from the previ-ous day. While no one enjoyedbeing cut off, surrounded, andpinned down for 18 hours,Company D had acquitted itselfwell and learned lessons thatwould prove valuable in the hillfights ahead.

On this day, the 5th Marinesfinally fought their way clear ofHill 296 and into the city streets.By 0930, Taplett’s 3d Battalion hadlinked up with Sutter’s 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. Taplettwheeled northeast, grimly aimingfor the huge red banners still flyingover Government House andChang Dok Palace.

As the lead battalions of bothregiments lengthened their strides,a sense of friendly rivalry spurredthem into a race to raise thenational colors over key land-marks. The 1st Marines foughttheir way into several embassies,led by Company E, pausing toraise the flag over first the French,then the Soviet (with great irony),and finally the United States resi-dences. Growled one gunnerysergeant: “It looks like the 4th ofJuly around here.”

Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, had a briefbut fierce fight on its finalapproach to the palace. Die-hardNorth Koreans, bolstered by a pairof self-propelled guns, fought to

44

Marines of Company G, 5th Marines, jubilantly yank down the Communist flagat Government House and run up the American and United Nations flags.


the end. Taplett’s tank-infantryteams carried the day. ColonelRobert D. Heinl preserved the dra-matic climax: “Moving at the highport up KwangwhamunBoulevard, Company G, 5thMarines burst into the Court of theLions at Government House,ripped down the red flag, andGunnery Sergeant Harold Beaverran up those same colors his fore-bears had hoisted 103 years earlieratop the Palace of theMontezumas.” Two KoreanMarines raised their national colorsat the National Palace.

The fight for Seoul continued,especially along the towering

ridgelines to the north, but by duskin the city the NKPA had ceased tooffer organized resistance. Twelvedays after the surprise landing atInchon (and two days afterGeneral Almond’s victory commu-nique), X Corps had seized solepossession of the capital city of theRepublic of South Korea.

The 7th Marines continued toadvance through the high groundnorth of the city, cutting the high-way from Seoul to Uijongbu on the28th. In this fighting LieutenantColonel Thornton M. Hinkle, com-manding 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,was wounded and evacuated.Major Webb D. Sawyer took com-

mand. Meanwhile, the 31stInfantry and 17th ROK Infantryattacked to the east, successfullysealing off the last NKPA escaperoutes. There were still smallbands of North Korean troopsloose within the city—two of thesestruck the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, in predawn counterat-tacks as late as the 29th. The firstoccurred at 0445, when an obser-vation post on Hill 132 was infil-trated by an estimated 70 to 100North Korean troops. A secondattack hit the left flank of the bat-talion a short time later. Bothattacks were repulsed with a lossof 28 Marines wounded and four

45

Private First Class Christianson was born in January1925 in Mindore, Wisconsin. After he enlisted inthe Marine Corps in October 1942, he served with

the 2d Division in three World War II campaigns. Forhis services, he was awarded a Letter of Commendation.Following duty during the occupation of Japan, he hada variety of assignments, including drill instructor atParris Island.

When the Korean War broke out, he was a memberof Company E, 2d Battalion, lst Marines, and took partin the Inchon assault. For his actions at Inchon, hereceived a Bronze Star Medal. During the subsequentbattle for Seoul, he gave his life on 29 September, at theage of 25, on Hill 132. Private First Class Chistianson’scitation for the Medal of Honor awarded him reads, inpart:

Manning one of the several listening posts coveringapproaches to the platoon area when the enemycommenced the attack, Private First ClassChristianson quickly sent another Marine to alert therest of the platoon. Without orders, he remained inhis position and, with full knowledge that he wouldhave slight chance of escape, fired relentlessly atoncoming hostile troops attacking furiously withrifles, automatic weapons and incendiary grenades.Accounting for seven enemy dead in the immediatevicinity before his position was overrun and he him-self fatally struck down, Private First ClassChristianson was responsible for allowing the rest ofthe platoon time to man positions, build up astronger defense on that flank and repel the attack

with 41 of the enemy destroyed, and many morewounded and three taken prisoner.

After the war, his sacrifice was recognized by the ded-ication of a statue in his honor at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina. —-Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Private First Class Stanley R. Christianson

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A-43986

killed, among them Private FirstClass Stanley R. Christianson, whosubsequently received the Medalof Honor for his actions. Despitethese counterattacks, the war wasmoving north, well above Seoul.Indeed, South Korean troops wereabout to cross the 38th Parallel.

On 29 September, GeneralMacArthur and South KoreanPresident Syngman Rhee and theirwives returned to Seoul for a tri-umphant ceremony, accompaniedby a large official retinue. Theconcentration of so many VIPswithin the smoldering city so soonafter the heavy fighting madeGeneral O. P. Smith nervous.Isolated NKPA antiaircraft gunnersstill exacted a price against alliedplanes flying over the city’s north-ern suburbs, especially the slowflying observation aircraft of VMO-6, which lost a single-engine OYand an HO3S-1 helicopter on theday of the ceremony. Smith posi-tioned Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s3d Battalion, 5th Marines, on thehill overlooking the palace andLieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, along theroute to be taken by the digni-taries—out of sight, but loaded forbear.

Despite the cost of more than700 Marine casualties in seizingmost of Seoul during the climacticthree days of 25-28 September,only a handful of Marines attendedthe commemorative ceremony.Generals Smith and Craig, ColonelPuller, and Lieutenant ColonelMurray were there (Puller barelyso; when a Military Police officerbarred his jeep from the sedanentrance he ordered SergeantJones to drive over the officiousmajor), but Colonels Litzenbergand Brower were still fighting thewar north of the city and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing senior offi-cers were gainfully employed else-where. In retrospect it is unfortu-

nate that more of those who hadbattled so hard for the victory—Marines, Navy corpsmen, soldiers,ROK troops, men of all ranks andspecialties, grunts and aviatorsalike—could not have shared thisspecial occasion. For a momenton the afternoon of the 27th, Seoulhad seemed their dearly-won city.Two days later they were beingtold to remain out of sight of theofficial celebrants.

MacArthur conducted the specialceremony at high noon in theNational Palace, ignoring the tinkleof broken glass that fell from theceiling dome windows with everyconcussive rumble of distantartillery. “Mr. President,” he intonedin his marvelous baritone voice, “Bythe grace of a merciful Providenceour forces fighting under the stan-dard of that greatest hope and inspi-ration of mankind, the UnitedNations, have liberated this ancientcapital city of Korea . . . . I amhappy to restore to you, Mr.President, the seat of your govern-

ment that from it you may better ful-fill your constitutional responsibili-ties.” With tears running down hischeeks, MacArthur led the digni-taries in the Lord’s Prayer. PresidentRhee was nearly overcome withemotion. To MacArthur he said:“We love you as the savior of ourrace.”

The ceremony at the nationalcapital represented DouglasMacArthur at his legendary finest.In the best of all worlds the KoreanWar would have ended on thisfelicitous note. In reality, howev-er, the blazing speed with whichMacArthur had reversed the seem-ing disaster in South Korea con-tained the seeds of a greater disas-ter to come in the north. TheUnited States and the UnitedNations, flush with September’sgreat victories, were fatally modify-ing their war aims to include thecomplete subjugation of NorthKorea and the forcible reunifica-tion of the entire peninsula.Already there were plans afoot to

46


South Korean civilians curiously observe one of their exhausted Marine libera-tors.

deploy the Marines north of the38th Parallel. General Almondtook O. P. Smith aside as they wereleaving the ceremony and issued awarning order. The 1st MarineDivision would soon be makinganother “end-run” amphibiouslanding on the northeast coast.

Other threats materialized. Onthe day following the Seoul cere-mony, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai warned the world that hisnation “will not supinely tolerate”the invasion of North Korea. Few

people in the West took him seri-ously.

In the meantime, Almondordered Smith to seize and defenda series of blocking positions northof Seoul. The 5th Marines attackednorthwest. The 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, executed an aggressivereconnaissance in force as far asthe town of Suyuhyon againstwhat the division special actionreport described as “moderateenemy resistance.”

The 7th Marines drew the short-

est straw, the division objective ofUijongbu, a vital road junction inthe mountains 16 miles due northof Seoul. Here the highway andrailroad tracks veer northeasttowards the port of Wonsan andbeyond, an important escape routefor NKPA forces fleeing the “ham-mer and anvil” of the now con-verging Eighth Army with X Corps.

Smith reinforced the 7th Marinesby attaching Major Parry’s 3dBattalion, 11th Marines (reinforcedwith a battery of 155mm howitzersfrom 4th Battalion, 11th Marines),plus one company each ofPershing tanks, combat engineers,and Korean Marines, and an Armyantiaircraft battery. This constitut-ed a sizable force, virtually a smallbrigade, but Colonel Litzenbergwould need every man in histhree-and-a-half day battle for theroad junction. Intelligence reportsavailable to Litzenberg indicatedhe would be opposed by an amal-gamation of NKPA units, includingthe remnants of the Seoul CityRegiment; the 2d Regiment, 17thRifle Division, withdrawn from thePusan Perimeter after the Inchonlanding; and the fresh 75thIndependent Regiment, whichreached Uijongbu from Hamhungthe day before the 7th Marinesattacked.

Principal air support forLitzenberg’s advance would comefrom the Corsair pilots ofLieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole’sVMF-312, the Checkerboardsquadron, newly arrived at Kimpofrom Itami, Japan. Cole had com-manded the same squadron as amajor at the end of World War IIand had trained his new aviatorsexceptionally well.

On 1 October, ColonelLitzenberg led his well-armed forcenorthward. Advance aerial andmap reconnaissance led him toconclude that the NKPA wouldmost likely make a stand at

47

Nuwon-ni where the highwaypassed through a narrow defile—averitable “Apache Pass.”Litzenberg planned for LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, to execute atactical feint along the high groundon both sides, while Major MauriceE. Roach’s tank-heavy 3d Battalion,7th Marines, barreled straightthrough the pass during the dis-traction. The plan ran awry whenRoach encountered a thick mine-field in the pass. Litzenberg shift-ed both battalions to the highground, and the Checkerboards ofVMF-312 appeared at dawn on the2d with a vengeance, bombing,strafing, and dropping napalm can-isters. Davis and Roach scratched

forward slowly along both ridges;the engineers labored in the mine-fields. But the North Koreans con-tested every yard, shooting downthree Corsairs, disrupting the engi-neers, and limiting the Marines toless than a quarter-mile gain thatday. During this fighting, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owen, themortar officer in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, learned bit-ter lessons in tactical communica-tions. “The North Koreans,” hesaid, “used whistles and bugles forbattlefield command, more effec-tive by far than our walkie-talkies.”In addition, Lieutenant Lloyd J.Englehardt of VMO-6 flew hisglassy-nosed HO3S-1 helicopterthrough heavy fire to rescue

downed Checkerboard pilotCaptain Wilbur D. Wilcox near thevillage of Chun-chon.

On 3 October, the regimentunveiled a good-luck piece,General Clifton B. Cates,Commandant of the Marine Corps,nicknamed “Lucky” Cates for hissurvival amid the First World War’sbloodiest battlefields. Cates hadflown to Korea to observe hisMarines in action. Litzenberg’sforce put on a stellar show. Theengineers having at considerablecost cleared the minefield in thedefile, Major Webb D. Sawyer’s 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, poundedstraight up the middle. Soon theybegan overrunning enemy fieldpieces and had the enemy on the

48


A Marine mortar section moves north of Seoul past a grateful band of South Koreans.

run. The NKPA had staked every-thing on holding the pass atNuwon-ni and had little left todefend Uijongbu. Litzenberg un-leashed all his forces. Sawyer’smen stormed through the ruinedtown by late afternoon, the majorpausing to telephone Litzenberg—widely known by his nickname“Litz the Blitz”—saying, “This is theMayor of Blitz!”

The Uijongbu drive cost the 7thMarines 13 killed and 111 wound-ed, but the combat experience wasworth the price to the newlyformed regiment. ObservedLieutenant Joseph Owen: “ForBaker-One-Seven it was combattraining under fire; in those five

days we became a good Marinerifle company.”

The battle for the Nuwon-niPass marked the end of significantfighting in the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign. Almost immediately the 1stMarine Division turned over itsassigned sector to the 1st CavalryDivision of the Eighth Army andbegan returning by regiments tothe vicinity of Inchon for re-embarkation.

The leading elements of thedivision and other X Corps compo-nents assembled at a UnitedNations cemetery near Inchon on 6October to honor their dead.Division Chaplain Robert M.Schwyhart led the spiritual salute.

Major General Oliver P. Smith laida wreath on the grave of CorporalRichard C. Matheny, a stalwartsquadleader of the 5th Marineswho before his death qualified inswift succession for the BronzeStar, Silver Star, and Navy Cross.

The combined Inchon-Seoulcampaign cost the 1st MarineDivision 2,450 casualties, accord-ing to the official history (415killed or died of wounds; 2,029wounded in action; 6 missing inaction). North Korean gunnersshot down 11 fighters of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. For theirpart, the Marines destroyed or cap-tured 47 Russian-built tanks andsufficient heavy mortars, fieldguns, antitank guns, machine guns,and rifles to equip a good-sizedbrigade. A preponderance of the14,000 NKPA fatalities claimed byX Corps in the campaign resultedfrom the combined air-ground fireof the Marines.

Such statistics had more rele-vance in World War II than in themurky political and psychologicalnature of limited warfare in theAtomic Age. The Cold Warbetween the United States and theSoviet Union and their respectiveallies and surrogates was fullyunderway by 1950. In Seoul inSeptember of that year, the UnitedNations for the first time restoredthe freedom of a democratic capi-tal captured by Communist forceof arms. The fact that all of XCorps’ hard-fought gains would beswept away by the ChineseCommunist counter-offensive threemonths later added to the bitter-sweet irony of this protracted war.In the final accounting, the 1953ceasefire left Seoul firmly estab-lished as the capital of theRepublic. Seoul’s flourishinggrowth and development over theensuing half century remain a trib-ute to the sacrifices of all thosewho fought and died to recapture

49

From left, BGen Edward A. Craig; the Commandant of the Marine Corps, GenClifton B. Cates; and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, inspect the North Korean flag thatrecently was hauled down by Marines at Government House in Seoul.


and protect the ancient city.

Operation Yo-YoThe Wonsan Landing

General MacArthur orderedGeneral Almond to re-embark XCorps and execute a series ofamphibious landings along theeast coast of North Korea. The 1stMarine Division would board des-ignated shipping at Inchon andland tactically at Wonsan, the mainevent. The 7th Division wouldproceed south to Pusan to boardits ships for a subsequent landingnorth of Wonsan. The original D-Day for the Marines at Wonsan was15 October. The actual landingdate was not even close.

Operation Chromite was thecodename for the Inchon landing.The troops would nickname the

Wonsan campaign “Operation Yo-Yo.”

Inchon and Wonsan serve asbook-end examples of amphibiouswarfare’s risks and rewards. By allrights it should have been Inchon,with its legion of tactical andhydrographic dangers, that sput-tered in execution. Wonsan,scheduled for attack by a largerand, by now, more experiencedlanding force against a sharplydiminished enemy threat, shouldhave been a snap. But in the ironyof war, Inchon stands as a master-piece, Wonsan as a laughingstock,as ill-conceived a landing as theUnited States ever conducted.

In late September 1950, therewas nothing particularly wrongwith the concept of a long-distance“Right Hook” amphibious landingfrom the Sea of Japan to seize

Wonsan and other smaller portsalong the North Korean coast.Wonsan at the time represented areasonable objective, and the 1stMarine Division had proven itsamphibious prowess in the diffi-cult landing at Inchon and wasexpected to be available for thenew mission in early October.

Wonsan had the best naturalharbor in the Korean peninsula.Located 80 miles north of the 38thParallel, the port’s bulwark-likeKalma Peninsula provided anenormous sheltered harbor, aseven-inch tidal range, weak cur-rents, rare fog, and a moderatebeach gradient—all incomparablymore favorable than Inchon.Wonsan’s near-shore topographyalso offered a decent lodgementarea, suitable for a division beach-head, before the Taebaek

50

1st Marine Division Daily Casualties, Seoul CampaignDate

20 Sep

21 Sep

22 Sep

23 Sep

24 Sep

25 Sep

26 Sep

27 Sep

28 Sep

29 Sep

30 Sep

1 Oct

2 Oct

3 Oct

4 Oct

5 Oct

Total

Killedin Action

24

30

27

19

68

33

29

33

8

19

11

2

15

2

0

1

321

Diedof Wounds

1

3

3

7

4

4

7

3

4

1

2

1

1

1

0

1

43

Missingin Action

3

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

Woundedin Action

119

198

135

117

217

238

167

153

31

49

48

16

81

35

3

3

1,510

Total BattleCasualties

147

231

165

143

289

276

203

189

43

69

61

19

97

38

3

5

1,878

Appendix J. Montross & Canzana. The Inchon-Seoul Operation, 1955

Mountains—eastern North Korea’slong, towering spine—rearedupwards from the coastal plain.The port’s strategic appeal cen-tered on the combination of itsaccessible harbor with a high-capacity airfield, petroleum refin-ing facilities, and its locationastride major railroads and high-

ways leading west to the NorthKorean capital of Pyongyang,north to Hungnam, and southwestto Seoul.

On 4 October, General Almondformally assigned the 1st MarineDivision the mission of seizing andsecuring the X Corps base of oper-ations at Wonsan, protecting the

airfield, and continuing inlandoperations as assigned. Threeunforeseen developments almostimmediately knocked the Wonsanplans into a cocked hat: massiveport congestion; a drastically accel-erated invasion of North Korea;and the successful mining of theircoastal ports by the North Koreans.As a consequence, MacArthur’scelebrated “Right Hook” becamesuspended in mid-air, leaving theMarines (and all of X Corps) hang-ing in limbo—out of action—throughout a critical three-weekperiod. The Wonsan landing,when it finally occurred, has beenaptly described by military histori-ans as “the most anticlimactic alanding as Marines have evermade.”

The 1st Marine Division opera-tions order directed a simultaneouslanding of the 1st and 7th Marinesabreast on the eastern shore of theKalma Peninsula, each supportedby an artillery battalion and a bat-talion of Korean Marines. Wonsanairfield lay directly inland, as closeto the landing beaches as Kadenaand Yontan had been to theHagushi beaches at Okinawa.

On 7 October, the day followingthe cemetery ceremony in Inchon,Major General O. P. Smith reportedas landing force commander forthe Wonsan expedition to RearAdmiral James H. Doyle, USN,commanding the Attack Force, U.S.Seventh Fleet. The division beganembarking at Inchon the next day.It would take a week.

Here MacArthur’s plans began tounwind. No one, it seems, hadforeseen the tremendous strainabout to be placed on the only twomedium-capacity ports available,Inchon and Pusan, during a time ofconflicting requirements to offloadthe mammoth supplies needed forthe Eighth Army’s invasion of west-ern North Korea while simultane-ously backloading two large divi-

51

sions for the X Corps’ “RightHook.” The piers, staging areas,and access roads in both ports

became impossibly congested.Chaos reigned.

Combat loading for an opposed

amphibious assault is an exact andtime-consuming science. The 1stMarine Division, now fully fleshedout with the 7th Marines and othermissing components, had 25,840officers and men on the rolls forthe Wonsan expedition, easily thelargest division of any nation fight-ing in the Korean War. AdmiralDoyle’s Attack Force contained 66amphibious ships plus six com-mercial cargo ships, but many ofthe vessels arrived late in thecrowded port, few contained thepreloaded 10-day levels of Class I,II, and IV supplies as promised,and the Attack Force still providedinsufficient total lift capacity for allthe division’s rolling stock. Theprecise art of combat loadingbecame the improvised “art of thepossible,” but each compromisecost time. As the division’s specialaction report dryly noted, GeneralAlmond’s prescribed D-day of 15October “was moved progressively

52


From left, MajGen Oliver P. Smith, MajGen Edward M. Almond, and RAdm JamesH. Doyle discuss plans for the Wonsan landing on board the Mount McKinley.

back to a tentative date of 20October.”

As junior officer in Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owenassumed the demanding duties ofcompany embarkation officer. “Wewere assigned an old LST that ourNavy had used in World War II,” hesaid, “but which was now leased toJapan for use as a cargo ship.” TheJapanese captain spoke no Englishbut conveyed to Owen by angrygestures his displeasure at whatseemed to him to be gross over-loading of his ship’s safe lift capac-ity. When Owen’s runner chargedthe bolt on his carbine the skipperabruptly acquiesced. “There was ashortage of shipping,” Owen ratio-nalized, “and, we were informed,we would be afloat for only a fewdays.”

Private First Class MorganBrainard of Company A, 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, boarded hisassigned LST without bitching: “Allwe knew at that moment was thatwe were steaming south; that wewere in dry clothes with a roof overour heads, and assured of two hotmeals a day and the chance to takesalt water showers . . . . Our sliceof life seemed to be improving.”

Most of Admiral Doyle’s WonsanAttack Force completed loadingthe 1st Marine Division and sortiedfrom Inchon on 15 October, theoriginal D-Day. By that time theother two factors that would ren-der the planned assault meaning-less had materialized. Five daysearlier, Republic of Korea’s I Corpshad seized Wonsan by overlandadvance from the south. On 13October, Major General FieldHarris, commander of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, flew intoWonsan airfield, followed the nextday by the Checkerboards ofLieutenant Colonel Cole’s VMF-312and other elements of MarineAircraft Group 12.

In the meantime, AdmiralDoyle’s advance force commanderdiscovered that the North Koreanshad sewn the approaches toWonsan with more than 2,000 anti-ship mines, both contact and mag-netic. The U.S. Navy had only 12minesweepers available in the-ater—as compared to the 100employed in support of theOkinawa landing five years earli-er—and even when reinforced byKorean and Japanese craft, themission proved overwhelming.Two U.S. minesweepers hit minesand sank on 12 October. Heavyfire from North Korean coastdefense guns hampered rescueoperations. A Japanese sweepersank on the 18th; the next day ahuge mine practically vaporized aSouth Korean craft. Doyle’s exper-iments in dropping 1,000-poundbombs and anti-submarine depthcharges to create enough over-pressure to detonate nearby minesfailed. Even the fact that a linear,tactical landing had been replacedby a simpler administrative offloadfrom amphibian tractors and land-ing craft in column did not helpexpedite the problem. Rear Ad-miral Allan E. Smith, commandingTask Force 95, the advance force,voiced the frustration of all handswhen he reported: “we have lostcontrol of the seas to a nationwithout a navy, using pre-WorldWar I weapons, laid by vessels thatwere utilized at the time of thebirth of Christ.”

General Almond’s frustrationknew no bounds. On 20 October,with the war fast shifting awayfrom his active influence (theEighth Army entered the NorthKorean capital Pyongyang the pre-vious day), and with no end insight to the tedious minesweeping,Almond departed the flagship byhelicopter and established hiscommand post ashore at Wonsan.

As for the embarked Marines,

rampant rumors swept the trans-ports, especially beginning theafternoon of 19 October when thetask force suddenly got underway,heading south. “War’s over!”exclaimed many a Marine, “We’regoing back to Pusan and thenheading home!” But the shipswere only taking new precautionsto protect themselves in hostilewaters. For the next week—and aweek is a very long time at sea onboard transports as claustrophobi-cally crowded as these—the shipsreversed course every 12 hours,first heading south, then north,then starting over. Here emergedthe sarcastic nickname “OperationYo-Yo.” As voiced by MarineCorps historians Lynn Montrossand Nicholas A. Canzona in 1957:“Never did time die a harder death,and never did the grumblers haveso much to grouse about.”

The Japanese-crewed LST trans-porting Lieutenant Owen’s compa-ny soon ran low on provisions andfresh water. As Owen recalled: “athree-week ordeal of misery andsickness . . . . The stench below-decks made the air unbreathable.”

Before long sickness swept theembarked landing force. Longlines of Marines suffering fromdysentery and gastroenteritis over-whelmed poorly-equipped sickbays. The “Binnacle List” on boardthe converted civilian transportMarine Phoenix ran to 750 Marinesat the height of the epidemic. Theattack transport Bayfield (APA 33)reported a confirmed case of small-pox. As a final insult to the divi-sion’s pride, a traveling USO showfeaturing Bob Hope and MarilynMaxwell beat them to Wonsan, per-forming for an appreciative audi-ence of Marine aviators and ROKsoldiers while the fierce “spear-head” assault troops rocked in mis-ery among the offshore swells.

At long last, on 26 October, the1st Marine Division landed on the

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Finally off the ships, the 1st Marine Division, which endedits interminable “Operation Yo-Yo” on 26 October, chugs

ashore by Navy LCVP towards Wonsan, North Korea.

In the anticlimactic landing of the 1st Marine Division atWonsan, troops dismount from a column of LVT-3Cs andtheir escorting LVTA-5 armored amphibians along the

Wonsan airfield. A chill wind blows in from the loomingTaebaek Mountains.

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 421366


55

Kalma Peninsula below Wonsan.“The day was bright and cold,”recalled Private First Class Brainardof Company A, 1st Marines, “andthe sea had a real chop to it as our[LVT] slid down the ramp andnosed forward into the water.”The captain of Brainard’s shipwished the departing Marines luckover the public address system,adding that MacArthur’s headquar-ters had just announced that thetroops should be “home byChristmas.”

The airmen of the Checkerboardsquadron hooted in derision as theinfantry streamed ashore, puffingwith exertion after three weeks ofenforced inactivity. Lieutenant

Owen encountered more sarcasticinsults from the ROK troops whohad captured the town 16 daysbefore: “They had learned the mid-dle-finger salute, which they ren-dered to us with great enthusiasm.”

Colonel Puller bristled at theignominy of his regiment beingcategorized as rear echelon troopsdue to no fault of their own. ThenBrigadier General Edward A. Craigmet Puller on the beach with thewelcome news that he had justbeen selected for promotion tobrigadier general. Puller’s trade-mark scowl vanished momentarily.Then he turned to the job at hand.His regiment was about to be dis-persed over a huge area of enemy

territory, beginning with thedeployment of Lieutenant ColonelJack Hawkins’ 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, on a special mission torelieve a ROK force guarding asupply depot at the coastal town ofKojo, 40 miles south.

Puller’s dilemma reflected thedrastic changes in United Nations’strategic objectives being formulat-ed it seemed, day-by-day. The warin North Korea had evolved fromthe establishment of coastal oper-ating bases and the methodicalelimination of residual NKPAforces to a wide-open race to theYalu River, the Chinese border.General O. P. Smith, accustomed toa relatively narrow zone of action

The 1st Marine Division suffered the ignominy of landing atWonsan weeks after South Korean forces had seized the portand the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived. Here a col-

umn of soaked infantrymen straggles ashore among good-hearted catcalls by VMF-312, the “Checkerboard” squadron.


in the Inchon-Seoul campaign,suddenly found himself responsi-ble for a zone measuring 300 mileslong by 50 miles deep. WithGeneral Almond already calling fortwo infantry regiments to advanceas far north as Hamhung, Smithknew Puller’s 1st Marines would

be hard-pressed to cover anuncommonly large piece of realestate around the port of Wonsan.The Kojo assignment was but thefirst of several far-flung missionsPuller would have to handle.

Half of Hawkins’ battaliondeparted within hours after their

landing on the 26th. The troopswere still shaking out their sea legswhen they clambered into a longline of empty gondola cars of acoal train bound for Kojo. It wasan uncomfortable and singularlydirty ride. Captain Barrow notedthat the residual coal “left a markon all of us.” The train had tomake two trips to deliver the entirebattalion, and those units travelingby road, like the attached artillerybattery, did not arrive until the sec-ond night.

The troops dismounted from thetrain at Kojo stiff and disoriented.The town itself proved pic-turesque, but the supply dump hadbeen largely emptied by thedeparting ROK garrison, too manyhills dominated the town, andthere was a critical lack of intelli-gence about a North Korean “guer-rilla force” reportedly lurking inthe area. “Quite candidly,” admit-ted Barrow, “I never understoodour mission.”

The situation bothered Hawkinsacutely. The late-afternoon ap-proach of 3,000 refugees towardsKojo made him more uneasy.These Hawkins diverted into anassembly area outside the seaport,but their unimpeded approachreflected the vulnerability of hisposition. The largely depletedsupply dump lay in low ground,difficult to defend. A well-definedavenue of approach into the sea-port lay open from the south andsouthwest. “Therefore,” Hawkinswrote shortly after the Kojoaction, “I decided to placeCompany B in outpost positionsto cover these approaches . . . .The remainder of the battalionwould be deployed on the hillmassif west of Kojo.”

Accordingly, Captain Wesley C.Noren deployed Company B onoutpost duty along three scatteredhills two miles south of town. Asnight fell, Noren placed his men

56

on 50 percent alert: each foxholeto contain one man awake, theother halfway zipped-up in hissleeping bag. The night was chilly;that morning the Marines had dis-covered the first ice of the seasonin the rice paddies. Their last fire-fight in burning Seoul a month agohad left them gasping in the heat.Now they began to shiver.

The security measures pre-scribed by Hawkins and Norenwere normal under the assumedthreat—light probing attacks bysmall bands of guerrillas. No onethen knew that Noren’s dispersedplatoons had taken their nightpositions within direct observationof a significant organized force, the10th Regiment, 5th NKPA Division.Colonel Cho Il Kwon commanded

this regiment, one of the highlydisciplined forces led by veteransof the fighting in China that hadspearheaded the invasion of SouthKorea four months earlier. Choand his men had successfully evad-ed the “hammer and anvil” trap setby the United Nations forces afterInchon and returned essentiallyintact across the border. The regi-ment had left its tanks and artilleryalong the Naktong River, but stillpossessed plenty of mortars andmachine guns. With more than athousand assault troops at hand,Cho had the numbers and leader-ship to overwhelm Noren’s out-posts and simultaneously attackthe flank of Hawkins’ main posi-tions west of Kojo.

Rarely in their long history had

the 1st Marines been in such mor-tal danger. Cho’s veterans movedout of their staging areas at night-fall and approached each outpostwith disciplined stealth. Thesemen were superb night-fighters.Some infiltrated undetected towithin 10 feet of the nearestMarine foxholes. At precisely2200, they attacked with sub-machine guns, grenades, and shrillscreams.

Noren’s rifle squads never had achance. Seven Marines died inone platoon before they couldeven scramble out of their sleepingbags. Vicious hand-to-hand fight-ing swept the hilltops. Some unitswere cut off and scattered. Well-drilled junior non-commissionedofficers grabbed disorganized indi-

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Men of the 1st Marines sweep through the village of Kojo fol-lowing the sudden, violent, and well-coordinated North

Korean night attacks of 27 October on the 1st Battalion’spositions.


viduals and formed small counter-attacks. When the 1st Platoon,abruptly missing 30 men, had toabandon Hill 109 just north ofNoren’s command post, SergeantClayton Roberts singlehandedlycovered their withdrawal with hislight machine gun until the NorthKoreans slipped in close and killedhim.

Captain Noren kept his head,swiftly calling in mortar fire andtrying to make sense of the pande-monium. One thing was sure—this was no guerrilla band. Judgedby their night-fighting skills alone,Noren knew he was under attackby one of the original Inmin Gunoutfits, supposedly destroyed bythe United Nations’ breakout.

Captain Noren held the scat-tered pieces of his beleagueredcompany together until 2350, nosmall achievement in the confu-sion, then radioed Hawkins forpermission to withdraw. Hawkinsassented. The battalion comman-

der was much more in the darkthan Noren, but he knew thatCaptain Robert P. Wray’s CompanyC on the right rear flank had beenhit hard by a violent surpriseattack. Noren then executed amasterful point-by-point withdraw-al under extreme enemy pressure.By 0200, he organized the surviv-ing members of Baker Companyinto a 360-degree defensive circlealong the railroad tracks about2,500 yards below Kojo. At 0300,Noren established radio contactwith the 4.2-inch mortar platoonwhose steady fire then helped dis-rupt the NKPA forces convergingon the small band.

Noren held his new positionthroughout the rest of the night.At the first grayness of dawn hebegan evacuating his wounded,dragging them north in ponchosthrough the thin ice and thick mudof the rice paddies. Suddenly aforce of 200 of Colonel Cho’s nightfighters appeared out of the

gloom, heading south, like vam-pires trying to outrun the sun.There was just enough light for theentire battalion to enjoy a “TurkeyShoot,” including the newly arrivedBattery F, 2d Battalion, 11thMarines. Seventy-five of this groupof North Koreans never made itback to their sanctuary. Perhapstwice again as many NKPA bodieslay within the original Marine posi-tions.

Fragmented reports of a majorattack against 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, at Kojo began to arrive atthe division command post around0700 the next morning. Coin-cidentally, the first three heli-copters of VMO-6 were just beingferried from Kimpo to Wonsan air-field. Captain Gene W. Morrisonrecalled landing at Wonsan duringthe emergency and not even shut-ting down his helicopter. Hereceived an urgent cockpit brief-ing, then lifted off immediately forKojo on a medical evacuation mis-sion.

The sudden violence of the well-coordinated NKPA night attacks hadshocked Lieutenant ColonelHawkins deeply. His reports todivision throughout the 28th reflect-ed the concerns of an isolated com-mander under protracted stress:“Received determined attack . . .from sunset to sunrise by largeenemy force,” he reported in onemessage that reached GeneralSmith about 1230. “One companystill heavily engaged . . . . Have suf-fered 9 KIA, 39 WIA, 34 MIA prob-ably dead . . . . If this position is tobe held a regiment is required . . . .Shall we hold here or withdraw toNorth? Send all available heli-copters for wounded.”

Smith directed Colonel Bowserto send Puller and an additionalbattalion of the 1st Marines byimmediate train to reinforceHawkins. Smith also arranged forair strikes, destroyer bombard-

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Sketch by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret)

A Navy corpsman drags a wounded Marine out of the line of fire. The artistadded the Red Cross band on the corpsman’s arm to provide color to the compo-sition, admitting in his original caption that most corpsmen discarded the bras-sard as too tempting a target to enemy snipers.

59

Adramatic improvement in medical care for com-bat casualties became evident by the end of theSeoul campaign. According to historian J. Robert

Moskin, Navy surgeons operated on 2,484 patients dur-ing the fighting for Inchon and Seoul. Only nine ofthese men died, a remarkable advance in the survivalrate of those casualties who made it back to an aid sta-tion. Several factors contributed to this breakthrough,but one notable newcomer was the increased use oforganic observation aircraft—principally the heli-copter—for medical evacuation of severely woundedmen.

The use of Marine Corps aircraft to evacuate casual-ties under fire began as early as 1928 in Nicaragua whenFirst Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt landed his O2UCorsair biplane in the dusty streets of Quilali, a bravuraperformance, repeated 10 times, that resulted in the res-cue of 20 men and a Medal of Honor for the intrepidpilot. Later, during the 1945 battle for Okinawa’sKunishi Ridge, the Marines evacuated hundreds of theircasualties to a rear hospital by experimental use of theirOY-1 single-engine observation aircraft, which trundledaloft from a dirt road just behind the front lines.

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) had beenone of the observation squadrons that evacuatedwounded men from the Kunishi Ridge battlefield. InKorea five years later the squadron again supported the1st Marine Division. While the OY-1s occasionally trans-ported wounded men in 1950, the mission increasinglybecame the province of the squadron’s helicopters, thenation’s first wartime use of the new technology.

The VMO-6 pilots flew Sikorsky HO3S-1 observationhelicopters during the Seoul campaign. A bench seatbehind the pilot could accommodate three passengers,but there was insufficient room in the cabin for a stretch-er. To evacuate a non-ambulatory patient, according tohistorians (and helicopter pilots) Lieutenant ColonelGary W. Parker and Major Frank M. Batha, Jr., the crewhad to remove the right rear window and load thestretcher headfirst through the gap. The casualty’s feetjutted out the open window.

Primitive as this arrangement may have been, thepilots of VMO-6 safely evacuated 139 critically woundedMarines during the Seoul campaign. Most of these menowed their lives to this timely evacuation. An unspokenbut significant side benefit to these missions of mercywas their impact on the morale of the Marines stillengaged in combat. Simply knowing that this marvelousnew flying machine was on call to evacuate their bud-dies or themselves should the need arise was greatlyreassuring.

The proficiency of the VMO-6 helicopter pilotsproved reassuring to the fixed-wing pilots as well. A

Marine helicopter had rescued Marine Aircraft Group33’s first downed aviator as early as the second day ofthe 1st Brigade’s commitment to the Pusan Peninsula.Included in Major Robert P. Keller’s post-Seoul campaignevaluation of his Black Sheep squadron’s role in closeair support operations were these comments: “The heli-copters have done a wonderful service in rescuingdowned pilots under the very guns of the enemy. Thepilot should not start out cross country unless he is surethat helicopters are available.”

Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s VMO-6 lost two OY-1sand two helicopters to enemy fire during the Seoul cam-paign. Fortunately, at least, none of the aircraft weretransporting casualties at the time. Three months later,the squadron would transition to the Bell HTL-4 heli-copter which could carry a stretcher mounted on eachskid, in effect doubling the medical evacuation payload.In August 1951, in one of the high points of MarineCorps aviation history, Major General Christian F. Schilt,the hero of long-ago Quilali, took command of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing in Korea.

Aerial Medical Evacuation

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-A20546

ment, and a hospital-configuredLST to be dispatched to Hawkins’aid.

Hawkins, convinced that theNKPA would return that night ingreat force, continued to sendalarming messages to GeneralSmith, but things had calmeddown when Puller arrived withSutter’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at2230. There were no furtherattacks by the 10th NKPARegiment. Puller was decidedlyunsympathetic to Hawkins’ con-cerns (and in fact would replacehim in command of 1st Battalion,1st Marines, with LieutenantColonel Donald M. Schmuck aweek later).

The next day, Captain Noren led

a patrol south to recover a numberof his missing troops who hadgone to ground after being cut offduring the night. Similarly,Captain George B. Farish, a VMO-6 helicopter pilot on a reconnais-sance mission below Kojo, spottedthe word “HELP” spelled out inrice straw in an open field, landedwarily, and promptly retrievedsmart-thinking Private First ClassWilliam H. Meister, one of Noren’slost sheep, from his nearby hidingplace. The battalion’s final countfor that bloody night came to 23killed, 47 wounded, and 4 missing.

On the same day, CaptainBarrow led Company A south on areconnaissance in force, accompa-nied by a destroyer offshore and a

section of Corsairs overhead. Justas he reached his assigned turn-around point, a Corsair pilotadvised him that a large number ofenemy troops were digging in sev-eral miles farther south. Barrowdirected the pilot to expend hisordnance on the target. He did so.Barrow then asked him if he couldadjust naval gunfire. “Yeah, I cando that,” came the reply. For thenext half-hour the destroyer deliv-ered a brisk fire, expertly adjustedby the pilot, who at the endreported many casualties and flee-ing remnants. Barrow returned toKojo without firing a shot, butfully convinced he had avengedBaker Company and taught hisunknown opponent a lesson in

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With the Kojo area secured, the 1st Marines, in coordination with Marine Corsairs, move out in reconnaissance in force.Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

combined arms firepower. O. P. Smith could illafford to

keep Puller and two battalions sofar below Wonsan. With the 7thand 5th Marines already on theirway far northward towardsHamhung, and an urgent require-ment at hand for 3d Battalion, 1stMarines to proceed to Majon-ni,Smith had no Marine infantry unitsleft to cover Wonsan’s port, air-field, and road junctions. Membersof the 1st Amphibian TractorBattalion and other combat sup-port Marines doubled as riflemento fill the gaps until Puller’s force

returned in early November. The1st Marine Division, however,would remain widely dispersed, acontinuing concern to Smith.Indeed, his three infantry regi-ments would not be linked up forsix weeks, from the administrativelanding at Wonsan until the with-drawing columns from the ChosinReservoir fought their way downto Chinhung-ni during the secondweek in December.

Other changes were in the wind.On 29 October, General Barr’s 7thDivision commenced its adminis-trative landing at the small port of

Iwon, another 60 miles aboveHungnam. In the dramatic butstrategically unsound “Race to theYalu,” two of Barr’s units wouldbecome the only U.S. forces toactually reach the river. Mean-while General Almond continuedto look for opportunities to exploitthe 1st Marine Division’s amphibi-ous capabilities. When Pullerreturned from Kojo, Almondwarned him to be ready for anamphibious landing 220 milesnortheast of Wonsan. The targetwas Chongjin, a seaport danger-ously near the North Korean bor-der with the Soviet Union.

Colonel Puller wasted little timeworrying about another “End Run.”Of more immediate concern to himwas the commitment of LieutenantColonel Ridge’s 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, to the defense of the keyroad junction at Majon-ni, adeployment that would last 17days and provoke a dozen sharpfirefights.

The mountain town of Majon-nioccupied a bowl-like plateau,encircled by higher ground, about26 miles west-southwest ofWonsan. The roads from Wonsan,Pyongyang, and Seoul intersecthere, and the highlands containthe headwaters of the Imjin River.Ridge’s battalion arrived on 28October to provide a screeningand blocking force.

The terrain around Majon-ni lentitself more readily to the defensethan Kojo, but Kojo had beenmuch more accessible for theMarines. There were no rail lines,and the “highway” from Wonsanwas a single-lane road that twistedthrough mountain passes, switch-backs, hairpin turns, and precipi-tous dropoffs. The troops called it“Ambush Alley.”

In 1978, two Marine generalsrecalled their experiences as youngofficers involved in the defenseand resupply of Majon-ni. To

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4553

The 5th Marines load on board a patched-up train for the move north toHamhung in pursuit of the retreating North Koreans

Brigadier General Edwin H.Simmons, the Majon-ni missionwas a difficult defensive line thathad to be covered with a thinperimeter, thus providing 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, with goodpractice for their similar challengeahead at Hagaru-ri, the crossroadsmountain village situated at thesoutheastern edge of the ChosinReservoir. “Majon-ni was a dressrehearsal for what was going tocome up for us at Hagaru-ri,” hesaid. For his part, General RobertH. Barrow considered Majon-nimore a precursor for Khe Sanh in1968, a remote plateau in themountains “at the end of a long,tenuous supply route in no-man’sland.”

Elements of the 15th NKPADivision opposed Ridge’s battalionin the mountains around Majon-ni.While more disorganized andmuch less proficient than the 10th

Regiment that had stung Hawkins’1st Battalion, 1st Marines, sopainfully at Kojo, these NorthKoreans were sufficiently trainedfighters to threaten Ridge’s perime-ter each night and readily interdictthe Marine convoys trundling care-fully through Ambush Alley.

When Ridge went a week with-out resupply convoys being able toget through to Majon-ni, herequested an air drop of ammuni-tion, gasoline, and rations. The 1stAir Delivery Platoon packaged 21tons of these critical supplies into152 parachutes. These weredropped over the Marine perimeterwith uncommon accuracy by AirForce C-47s.

With ambushes occurring morefrequently, Puller assigned CaptainBarrow’s Company A, 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, to escort a34-vehicle convoy from Wonsan toMajon-ni at mid-afternoon on 4

November. Barrow was uncom-fortable with both the late start andthe slow progress. The NorthKoreans struck the column withheavy fire late in the afternoon.“They picked a good spot,” saidBarrow. He called for air strikesthrough a patchwork network andtried to work his infantry up thesteep slopes towards the ambush-ers. “It soon became apparent thatwe were not going to be success-ful . . . and the bad thing wasnightfall was approaching.”Stymied, and embarrassed by thefailure, Barrow ordered the huge6x6s and Jeeps with trailers to turnaround, a harrowing experienceunder automatic weapons fire.One vehicle went over the side.The Marines formed “a bucket-brigade” to retrieve the injuredmen.

Back at Wonsan, CaptainBarrow dreaded having to report

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his lack of success to Chesty Puller.He found Puller in a school class-room, appropriately seated at theteacher’s desk. “Colonel, I havefailed you,” he said. “No you did-n’t, old man,” Puller growled, notunkindly. “Have a seat.” Pulleroffered Barrow a drink of bour-bon, then asked him what heneeded to get the convoy throughthe next day. “More daylight anda forward air controller,” Barrowreplied.

Barrow departed Wonsan earlyon the 5th, inspired by an innova-tive tactic he had devised duringthe night. The North Koreans, herealized, could hear the truckslaboring up the pass long beforethey hove into view. He wouldtherefore detach a reinforced pla-toon to precede the convoy on

foot by several thousand yards—comforting for the convoy,although spooky for SecondLieutenant Donald R. Jones’ pointplatoon.

Private First Class MorganBrainard was a member of the sec-ond fire team in Jones’ dismountedadvance patrol. After four bendsin the road he looked back andsaw the far-distant trucks begin tomove. “We were then so farahead, that I couldn’t hear theirengines, only our labored breath-ing,” he said. “It was a lonely,eerie feeling, forty-two of us plod-ding up a bleak mountain road byourselves.”

“It worked!” said Barrow. Jones’point team caught the NorthKoreans cooking rice along theroad, totally unaware and non-tac-

tical. “We literally shot our wayforward,” said Brainard. More than50 of the off-duty ambushers diedin the surprise attack. “We just laidthem out,” Barrow recalled withobvious pride, adding, “sometimesthe simplest solutions are the mostsuccessful.”

Barrow delivered his convoy toMajon-ni, stayed to help 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, defend theperimeter against a large-scalenight attack, then returned toWonsan the next day, the emptiedtrucks now laden with more than600 NKPA prisoners captured byRidge’s battalion. Yet Barrow’s suc-cess did not end North Koreaninterdiction of the Marine convoys.They had learned their ownlessons from their surprise defeaton 5 November and would fight

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Battery H, 11th Marines, runs its guns forward and preparesto go to work in support of the 7th Marines as the regimen-

tal combat team moves north from Hamhung into themountains of North Korea.

smarter in two additional ambush-es the following week.

On 10 November, the 3d KoreanMarine Corps Battalion reinforced3d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Majon-ni. The Korean Marines joinedtheir American counterparts in abrief but heartfelt celebration ofthe 175th Birthday of the U.S.Marine Corps. Ridge’s bakers out-did themselves with the resourcesat hand—an uneven yet ambitious-ly large cake, smeared with C-Ration jam—but what the hell!

The North Koreans struck theMarine perimeter once more inforce the night of 11-12 November,then faded back into the moun-tains. On the 14th, LieutenantColonel Ridge turned over defenseof the village to an Army battalionfrom the newly arrived 3d InfantryDivision and led his men back toWonsan, pleased that 3d Battalion,1st Marines, had acquitted itselfwell on such an isolated mission.The battalion sustained 65 casual-ties defending Majon-ni; another90 Marines became casualties in

the series of convoy fights alongAmbush Alley.

The Majon-ni mission endedthree straight months of significantfighting between the Marines andmain line elements of the NorthKorean Peoples’ Army. Admirablysupported by the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, the Marines hadfought well from the start, expand-ed effortlessly from a small brigadeto a full-strength division, executedone of the most difficult amphibi-ous landings in history, and —withthe help of their allies and Armyelements of X Corps—recapturedan enormous capital city. Theresurgence of the Marines’ stand-ing within the national securitycommunity in Washington wasdownright dramatic.

But that phase of the Korean Warhad ended. A new, starkly differ-ent, and more troublesome phasehad begun. The deceptive promiseof “Home by Christmas” seemedabruptly swept away by a bone-chilling wind out of the TaebaekMountains, out of Manchuria, a har-

binger of an early winter—and per-haps something more ominous. Bythe time General Smith moved thedivision command post fromWonsan to Hungnam on 4 Nov-ember, he had been receivingreports of Red Chinese troops southof the Yalu for 10 days. A patrolfrom 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, vis-ited the headquarters of the 17thROK Infantry near Sudong-ni on 31October and confirmed the pres-ence of prisoners of war from the124th Division, Chinese Com-munist Forces.

Colonel Homer Litzenberg,whose 7th Marines would lead theway into the Taebaek Mountains,warned his troops about the likeli-hood of a Third World War. “Wecan expect to meet ChineseCommunist troops,” he told them,“and it is important that we win thefirst battle. The results of thataction will reverberate around theworld, and we want to make surethat the outcome has an adverseeffect in Moscow as well asPeiping.”

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The 7th Marines, wearing and carrying cold weather equip-ment, press north into the Taebaek Mountains in pursuit of

North Korean forces. A burden now, they would come todepend on this gear in the coming month.


About the Author

Colonel Joseph H.Alexander, USMC (Ret),

served 29 years on active dutyas an assault amphibian offi-cer, including two tours inVietnam and service as Chiefof Staff, 3d Marine Division.He is a distinguished graduateof the Naval War College andholds degrees in history andnational security from NorthCarolina, Jacksonville, and Georgetown Universities.

Colonel Alexander wrote the History and MuseumDivision’s World War II 50th anniversary commemora-tive pamphlets on Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.His books include A Fellowship of Valor: The BattleHistory of the U.S. Marines; Storm Landings: EpicAmphibious Battles of the Central Pacific; UtmostSavagery: The Three Days of Tarawa; Edson’s Raiders:The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in WW II; and (withLieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) Sea Soldiers inthe Cold War. As chief military historian for Lou RedaProductions he has appeared in 15 documentaries forThe History Channel and the Arts & EntertainmentNetwork, including a four-part mini-series on theKorean War, “Fire and Ice.”

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine CorpsHeritage Foundation.


DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (RET)

GENERAL EDITOR,


Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 190 00315 200

SourcesPrimary sources included the 1st

Marine Division Special Action Reportsfor 29 August-7 October 1950, the wardiaries of several ground and aviationunits, and Gen Oliver P. Smith’s officialletters and memoir concerning theSeoul/Wonsan campaigns. Of the offi-cial history series, U.S. MarineOperations in Korea, the volumes byLynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona(II: The Inchon-Seoul Operation[Washington, D.C., Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1955] and III: TheChosin Reservoir Campaign [Washing-ton, D.C., Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1957]), provide well-researched coverage of the recapture ofSeoul and the Wonsan, Kojo, and Majon-ni operations. Among the Marine CorpsOral History Collection, I found mostuseful the interviews with Gen RobertH. Barrow, Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., MajGen Raymond L. Murray, and LtColFrancis F. Parry. The interview with AdmJohn S. Thach, USN (Ret), in the U.S.Naval Institute’s Oral History Collection,was consulted. I also benefited fromdirect interviews with MajGen Norman J.Anderson, Gen Robert H. Barrow, for-mer SSgt Larry V. Brom, MGySgt OrvilleJones, LtGen Robert P. Keller, LtGenPhilip D. Shutler, and BGen Edwin H.Simmons. Contemporary quotations by

PFC Morgan Brainard and Lt Joseph R.Owen are from their autobiographicbooks, Brainard’s Then They Called forthe Marines (formerly Men in Low CutShoes [Todd & Honeywell, 1986]) andOwen’s Colder Than Hell: A MarineRifle Company at Chosin Reservoir(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

Two official monographs provedhelpful: LtCol Gary W. Parker and MajFrank M. Batha, A History of MarineObservation Squadron Six (Washington,D.C.: History and Museums Division,HQMC, 1982), and Curtis A. Utz, Assaultfrom the Sea: The Amphibious Landingat Inchon (Washington, D.C.: NavalHistorical Center, 1994), which alsoincludes the Seoul campaign.

Robert D. Heinl’s stirring Victory atHigh Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968) leadsthe list of recommended books. I alsosuggest Bevin Alexander, Korea: TheFirst War We Lost (New York:Hippocrene Books, 1986); Roy E.Appleman, South to the Naktong, Northto the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1961); Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: America in Korea (NewYork: Times Books, 1987); DavidDouglas Duncan’s superb photo essay,This is War! A Photo-Narrative in ThreeParts (New York: Harper & Brothers,1951); George F. Hofmann and Donn A.Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The

History of U.S. Armored Forces(Lexington: University of KentuckyPress, 1999); J. Robert Moskin, The U.S.Marine Corps Story, 3d ed. (Boston,Little Brown & Co., 1992); and RodPaschall, Witness to War: Korea (NewYork: Perigree Books, 1995). Specialthanks to LtCol Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR,for sharing advance copies of theSeoul/Wonsan chapters of his forthcom-ing biography of LtGen Lewis B.“Chesty” Puller.

I recommend these four vintage mag-azine essays: Nicholas A. Canzona, “DogCompany’s Charge,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings (Nov56); Ernest H. Giustiand Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine AirOver Inchon-Seoul,” Marine CorpsGazette, June 1952; Lynn Montross, “TheCapture of Seoul: Battle of theBarricades,” Marine Corps Gazette,August 1951; and Norman R. Stanford,“Road Junction,” Marine Corps Gazette,September 1951. For a more recentaccount, see Al Hemingway, “Marines’Battle for Seoul,” Military History,August 1996.

The author acknowledges MaryCraddock Hoffman who designed themap of the overall Inchon-Seoul area,and Col David Douglas Duncan, USMCR(Ret), for allowing the use of his histor-ical photographs of Seoul. Photographsby Frank Noel are used with permissionof the Associated Press/Wide WorldPhotos.

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

BATTLE OF THEBARRICADES

U.S. Marines in theRecapture of Seoulby Colonel Joseph H. Alexander,

U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

battle of the barricades, u.s. marines in the recapture of seoul - korean war … · 2011-07-10 ·...

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