be group session 2
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BE Seminars, Session 2,26/04/2011
Giuseppe A. Veltri
Emotions and SocialCognition
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Overview
• Part 1 Emotions and Affective Heuristics
• Part 2 Social Cognition
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What are emotions?
• Communication mechanisms that maintainsocial order/structure
• Behavior learned through operant or classicalconditioning, not involving cognitive mediation
• Appraisal of biopsychosocial situation
• Complex physiological response
• Integrated, three-response system construct
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Areas of inquiry
• Effect of emotion on performance (e.g., memory,perception, attention)
• Information processing characteristics of emotionaldisorders (e.g., anxiety, depression)
• Emotion and social learning
• Cognitive neuroscience of emotions
- cognitive structure of emotion
- neuropsychological studies
- cognitive aspects of emotion (e.g., appraisal)
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Affective Heuristics
Affect plays a role in judgment or decision in4 roles:
1. Affect as information
2. Affect as spotlight
3. Affect as a motivator
4. Affect as a ‘common currency’
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Emotions and memory
• Distinct, vivid, recollections of shocking events, andassociated personal activities
• Long-lasting? Accurate? Special?
- Brown & Kulick (1977): special encoding mechanism(NOW PRINT!)
- Niesser & Harsh (1992) Challenger study
- Although FM appear to be different subjectively (theyprovide an intersection between personal history and“History”), they are not necessarily more accurate
- Confidence is not equivalent to accuracy
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P. Gage’s case in
Damasio’s stud
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Somatic marker theory
• Bodily states play a role in decision-making
and reasoning
• “Somatic markers” link memories of experience (cortex) with feelings (limbic)
• Attempts to account for ‘automatic’ or‘unconscious’ biases
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SMT /2
• Somatic marker “biasing signals” areregulated by VM premotor cortex; thesesignals help regulate decision-making inuncertainty
• Support from Iowa Gambling Task;
anticipatory SCR’s to selection of “unfavorable” decks
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•Participants are presented with 4 virtualdecks of cards on a computer screen. They
are told that each time they choose a cardthey will win some game money. Every sooften, however, choosing a card causesthem to lose some money.
•The goal of the game is to win as muchmoney as possible. Every card drawn will
earn the participant a reward.Occasionally, a card will also have a penalty.
•Thus, some decks are "bad decks", andother decks are "good decks", becausesome will lead to losses over the long run,and others will lead to gains. The decks
differ from each other in the number of trials over which the losses are distributed
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SMT /3
• Most healthy participants sample cards from each deck,and after about 40 or 50 selections are fairly good atsticking to the good decks.
• Patients with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) dysfunction,however, continue to perseverate with the bad decks,sometimes even though they know that they are losingmoney overall.
• Concurrent measurement of galvanic skin responseshows that healthy participants show a "stress" reactionto hovering over the bad decks after only 10 trials, longbefore conscious sensation that the decks are bad.
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Another example
• Peters, Slovic, Hibbard and Tusler (2006) linkedaffect to the anchoring process of numericalestimation.
- Decision makers asked to estimate the numberof fatalities in US from various causes of death,first anchored on a provided number (theactual number of deaths from a differentdisease) then adjusted based on the extent of their worry about the disease underconsideration
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Affect as spotlight
• Selective attention to threat (McLeod)
• Failure to ‘disengage’ attention from threat (Koster,
et al 2004)- Eyewitness’ inability to identify a perpetrator
when a weapon is used in a crime
• Easterbrook hypothesis: narrowing of attentional
focus in emotional situations
• Perceived risks mediated by affect (Alhakami andSlovic, 1994).
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Affect and accessibility
• Kahneman argued that the accessibility is adeterminant of what information most
influenced a judgment or choice.
• Verplanken, Hofstee and Janssen (1998)found that participants could make affective
evaluations of brand names and countriesfaster than cognitive evaluations indicatinghigh accessibility.
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Affect as motivator
• Lerner, Small and Loewenstein (2004) studied theimpact of experimentally induced emotion states of sadness and disgust on prices set by buyers and
sellers in a real-play market.
- Sadness may well increase the chance we want tospend. those who are sad are more likely to wantto sell at a lower price and buy at a higher price
- Disgust makes us want to get rid of everything.When we're disgusted we want to get rid of thethings we have and don't want to buy anything.
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New frontier: Mirror
Neurons• Class of neurons in the ventral premotor cortex that discharge both:
- when animal performs object-directed action
- when animal observes OD action in others
• Subset appear to be “communicative” motor neurons
• Functions
- Imitation
- Action understanding
•Potentially important for understanding social learning and imitation effects
• Being investigated in social-emotional impairments such as autism,Asperger’s disorder, and schizophrenia
• May be important in “empathy”
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Part 2
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Social Cognition
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What is Social
Cognition?• Essentially, cognition in the wild (out of thelabs). It is a very broad area of research.
• Social influences to individual cognition,hence including judgments and evaluations.
• A complex mixture of intra-group, inter-
groups dynamics that alter our cognition.• From the effect of groups on the individual to
the more ‘social’ nature of human knowledge.
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Areas of inquires
• Intragroup processes and shared cognition
•Inter-groups dynamics
• Stereotyping
• Conformity
• Group processes and construction of socialrepresentations
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Social Influence /
Obedience and compliance• Milgram (1963): Classic but controversial study of
compliance under duress from an ‘expert’experimenter. Near lethal electric shocks applied to
‘stooge’ connected to apparatus in mock learningstudy.
• Milgram (1974) explained that subjects felt underpressure but did not believe that the experimenter
would allow harm to come to ‘stooge’.‘Nothing isbleaker than the sight of a person striving yet not fullyable to control his own behaviour in a situation of consequence to him’ (Milgram, 1974, pp. xiii) .
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Milgram /2
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15 75 135 1 95 255 3 15 3 75 435
Volts
Predicted
Actual
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Social Influence
Processes• Other classic studies on compliance and normative
influence
• Sherif (1935): Individual vs. group condition in‘moving light’ or ‘autokinetic’ experiment. In groupconditions there was a tendency for estimates toconverge and individual re-tests suggestedinternalization of the group norm
• Asch (1952): Line comparison experiment,conflicting perceptual information and socialpressure
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Sherif (1935): Condition (a) starting alone then
group situation
Social influence processes
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Alone Group
T1
Group
T2
Group
T3
Time of judgement
Subject 1
Subject 2Subject 3
I n c h e s o f e
s t i m a t e d
m o v e m e n t
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Asch (1952)
• How groupschange the way
we behave• Asch (1952):
Classicexperiment
examiningnormativeinfluenceeffects.
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Estimation of line lengths byindividual in group comprised of
experimenter’s confederates
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Stanford prison
ex eriment• Probably the most known experiment in social
psychology, by P. Zimbardo, Stanford University.
•The Stanford prison experiment was a study of the psychological effects of becoming a prisoneror prison guard. Roles were assigned randomly.
• Average individuals became either torturers or
passive victims.
• Illustration of the power of social roles andsettings
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Group Polarisation
• Polarization refers to the enhancement of the dominant group perception or opinion
after discussion/negotiation (Moscovici &Zavalloni, 1969)
• People become more polarized from initial
starting position e.g. Myers and Bishop(1970) prejudice levels after a groupdiscussion
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Group Polarisation /2
• Three Theoretical Explanations
➡ Normative influence: People maintain their beliefs in thesocially desirable direction so as not to ‘stand out’
➡ Informational influence: (Isenberg, 1986) Newinformation is made available and the shift is a function of the proportion of arguments in favour of one side, theirclarity and novelty.
➡ Social Identity: (Turner et al., 1989) People construct a‘group norm’ and then conform to that norm, results in apolarised ‘in-group’ norm. Processes of self-categorisation and deindividuation occur.
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Theories of Social
Influence• Social influence is affected by NORMATIVE
influence e.g. Asch’s (1952) experiments
• NORMATIVE influence is conforming tothe positive expectations of others =behavioural compliance in group contexts
• INFORMATIONAL influence refers to theadoption of objective/external sources of information (Deutch & Gerrard, 1955)
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Social Representation
Theor• A theory of social construction of knowledge (Moscovici, 1961).Studying less the individual more the social.
• Marková (2003) explains that cognition, from a socialrepresentational perspective, is based upon a dialogicalunderstanding of the mind.
• Social representations theorists regard cognition as socio-cultural, as dynamic and, hence, as something that cannot besimply reduced to the level of the individual (Marková, 2003).Hence, it is important to reconstitute the essentially socio-
historical nature of cognition. Consequently, social representationstheory moves beyond the narrow definition of social cognition asindividual cognition about others or influenced by others(Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2001).
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Ref.
• Ellen Peters ‘The functions of affect in the construction of preferences’ In:Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (2006). The construction of preference. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain.
New York: Putnam
• Cooper, Joel; Kimberly, Kelly, A. and Kimberly Weaver. Attitudes, Norms andSocial Groups. In Brewer, M. B., & Hewstone, M. (2004). Social cognition.Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
• Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press.
• Cacioppo, J. T., Visser, P. S., & Pickett, C. L. (2006). Social neuroscience: Peoplethinking about thinking people. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
• Moscovici, S. (2001). Social representations: Explorations in social psychology.New York: New York University Press.