behavioral finance other noise trader models feb 3, 2015 behavioral finance economics 437

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Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

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Page 1: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Behavioral Finance

Economics 437

Page 2: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

US Oil Production Doubled in 5 Years

Page 3: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

What Does Shleifer Accomplish?

Given two assets that are “fundamentally” identical, he shows a logic where the market fails to price them identically Assumes “systematic” noise trader activity Shows conditions that lead to noise traders

actually profiting from their noise trading Shows why arbitrageurs could have trouble

(even when there is no fundamental risk)

Page 4: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Are There Other Noise Trader Models? Yes Broadly, two kinds NT models

Momentum models (whatever the stock price has been, it will continue to do

Feedback models (exhibiting the effect of a higher {than efficient} stock price on economic behavior, including work effort, investment, etc.

Problem: most interesting thing is “turning points”; not really addressed well in this literature

Page 5: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Choices When Alternatives are Uncertain

Lotteries Choices Among Lotteries Maximize Expected Value Maximize Expected Utility Allais Paradox

Page 6: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

What happens with uncertainty

Suppose you know all the relevant probabilities

Which do you prefer? 50 % chance of $ 100 or 50 % chance of $

200 25 % chance of $ 800 or 75 % chance of zero

Page 7: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Lotteries

A lottery has two things: A set of (dollar) outcomes: X1, X2, X3,…..XN

A set of probabilities: p1, p2, p3,…..pN

X1 with p1

X2 with p2

Etc. p’s are all positive and sum to one (that’s

required for the p’s to be probabilities)

Page 8: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

For any lottery

We can define “expected value” p1X1 + p2X2 + p3X3 +……..pNXN

But “Bernoulli paradox” is a big, big weakness of using expected value to order lotteries

So, how do we order lotteries?

Page 9: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

For any two lotteries, calculate Expected Utility II p U(X) + (1 – p) U(Y) q U(S) + (1 – q) U(T)

U(X) is the utility of X when X is known for certain; similar with U(Y), U(S), U(T)

Page 10: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Allais Paradox

Choice of lotteries Lottery A: sure $ 1 million Or, Lottery B:

89 % chance of $ 1 million 1 % chance of zero 10 % chance of $ 5 million

Which would you prefer? A or B

Page 11: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Now, try this:

Choice of lotteries Lottery C

89 % chance of zero 11 % chance of $ 1 million

Or, Lottery D: 90 % chance of zero 10 % chance of $ 5 million

Which would you prefer? C or D

Page 12: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

Back to A and B

Choice of lotteries Lottery A: sure $ 1 million Or, Lottery B:

89 % chance of $ 1 million 1 % chance of zero 10 % chance of $ 5 million

If you prefer B to A, then .89 (U ($ 1M)) + .10 (U($ 5M)) > U($ 1 M) Or .10 *U($ 5M) > .11*U($ 1 M)

Page 13: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

And for C and D

Choice of lotteries Lottery C

89 % chance of zero 11 % chance of $ 1 million

Or, Lottery D: 90 % chance of zero 10 % chance of $ 5 million

If you prefer C to D: Then .10*U($ 5 M) < .11*U($ 1M)

Page 14: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

So, if you prefer

B to A and C to D It must be the case that:

.10 *U($ 5M) > .11*U($ 1 M)

And

.10*U($ 5 M) < .11*U($ 1M)

Page 15: Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015 Behavioral Finance Economics 437

Behavioral Finance Other Noise Trader Models Feb 3, 2015

The End