0

Behaviour Change

Campaigns

January 2019

All reasonable care and skill has been taken in the preparation of this report, however,

neither the authors, nor the University of Melbourne, make any warranty whatsoever as

to the accuracy or completeness of the information herein. No part of this report is

intended as advice, whether legal or professional.

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 2

THE FIVE CAMPAIGNS ............................................................ 3

SUNSMART ...................................................................................... 3

FIRE KILLS ....................................................................................... 9

CHANGE4LIFE ................................................................................ 14

REPORT IT TO STOP IT..................................................................... 18

DUMB WAYS TO DIE ........................................................................ 22

KEY LESSONS ..................................................................... 25

THE BIG PICTURE ................................................................ 30

NEXT STEPS FOR MAS ........................................................ 32

CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 32

APPENDICES ....................................................................... 33

1

Executive Summary Behaviour change campaigns (BCC) are powerful tools which communicate the value and opportunity

within the desired behaviours, bringing about tangible change without the need for direct intervention. The

Money Advice Service (MAS) can potentially take advantage of such influence to reach the objectives of

their five calls to action. However, the development of an effective BCC is quite complex, requiring a

multitude of components, considerations and creative ideas. This report compiles a series of five case

studies, each containing a comprehensive analysis of an exemplar BCC – producing a detailed and diverse

range of critical insights.

SunSmart is a campaign run by the Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria, an Australian non-government and not-

for-profit agency that aims to encourage safety and precaution in the sun. This was achieved by changing

personal attitudes and behaviours, as well as initiating environmental and organisational change.

Fire Kills – Clock Change was a campaign launched by The Department for Communities and Local

Government in England, which aimed to motivate the testing of smoke alarms. Behavioural change was

achieved using insights from behavioural economics to instigate habitual change and enforce new social

norms.

Change4Life is a campaign launched by the Department of Health, addressing the growing childhood

obesity epidemic in the United Kingdom. The campaign utilised an array of issue stakeholders to bring

about change. The success of the campaign has been hugely reliant on the contributions and support from

these actors.

Report It to Stop It was a campaign launched by Transport for London to encourage the reporting of

unwanted sexual behaviour. The campaign achieved this by challenging preconceptions, communicating

tangible outcomes and increasing women’s awareness of their collective power.

Dumb Ways to Die was a campaign run by Metro Trains in Melbourne (Australia) with the aim to reduce

accidents and deaths around trains on their platforms and level-crossings. This was achieved through

effective targeting and creative marketing efforts that resulted in a viral spread.

In combination with supporting research, findings from this review produced 11 if; then; but statements,

which are key practical takeaways that can give evidence, direction, and momentum to the creation of a

BCC. These statements relate to the demographics and psychographics of a BCC’s target segment, the

environmental context and competitive landscape, and message appeal. To apply these key lessons, MAS

should firstly consider the core components of a BCC. The culmination of research within this report has

identified these to be internal core competencies, target segment, environmental context, social and cultural

norms, media channels, funding, and measurement. These components then drive and are driven by a ‘big

idea’; a creative catalyst that mobilises the social BCC.

2

Introduction Behaviour change campaigns (BCC) have the ability to shift social norms and behavioural traits in a target

segment. These campaigns aim to communicate the value and opportunity within the desired behaviours,

without the need for direct intervention – transcending certain legal and political barriers.1 They are powerful

mechanisms that have been developed in the space between marketing, psychology, and anthropology.

Given the difficulty of achieving policy and legal change,

BCCs represent an opportunity for the Money Advice

Service (MAS) to support their goal of developing the

financial capabilities of the British population. There are

distinct social and economic behaviours that would

ensure, or at least promote, the financial capabilities of

British residents and help MAS achieve their five

ambitious ‘Calls to Action’ and goals for 2021. The

potential influence of a BCC has prompted an

investigation into relevant case studies that can provide

examples for MAS, and demonstrate the potential effect,

execution, measurement, mistakes, and contributions a

campaign could have.

This report investigates five BCCs, draws on their insights, and utilises BCC academic discourse to create

11 key lessons that can give evidence, direction, and momentum to MAS, should they consider a BCC in

the future.

The process of compiling evidence and case studies began with a broad secondary research objective.

This report aimed to understand BCC discourse first before searching for both successful and unsuccessful

campaigns to draw lessons from. Research material was gathered from various sources; databases,

academic journals, trade journals, company reports, government reports and media publications. The

general secondary research provided the terminology and context required to understand the case studies

and give support to the key lessons that would be compiled later. With a set of criteria for a filter, this report

narrowed the focus to five BBC that fell within the information requirements and geographical range set for

the task. As a set of five, this report also aimed for a range of scope, scale, target segment, creative

1 Michie, S., et al. "The behaviour change wheel: a new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions." Implementation Science, vol. 6, no. 1, 2011, pp. 42.

“11 key lessons that can

give evidence, direction and

momentum to MAS, should

they consider a behaviour

change campaign in the

future.”

3

execution, and message channels – with the assumption that this would provide a detailed and diverse

range of insights.

The initial contextual research and insights from the five case studies culminated in 11 practical ‘if; then;

but’ statements; this format of information presentation prompts a scenario, offers a solution, then a clause.

These case studies are also distilled into a visual ‘Big Picture’ that serves as a conclusive representation

of the elements that have been imperative to their success. These therefore, provide an indication of

essential considerations for MAS should they develop and deliver a BCC.

The Five Campaigns

Context to the problem

In the 1970’s and 1980’s there was a growing body

of evidence that linked UV radiation to Skin

Cancer.23 The geography of Australia and a lack of

sun safety knowledge left the population exposed

to high levels of UV radiation and unaware of its

effects. It is a problem that still persists today:

Melanoma (the most dangerous form of skin

cancer) is currently the fourth most prevalent

cancer in Australia.4 Additionally, two in three

Australians can expect to be diagnosed with Skin

Cancer before the age of 70.5 The Australian

population did not recognise the problematic culture

of behaving haphazardly under the sun, making

awareness the first challenge of this BCC.

Objective[s] of the campaign

The Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria, Australia

(ACCV) is a non-for-profit and non-government

agency that mounted a BCC in 1980, with the

primary goal of reducing the incidence rates and

morbidity of Australians to Skin Cancer.6

2 Elwood, J. M., et al. "Relationship of melanoma and other skin cancer mortality to latitude and ultraviolet radiation in the United States and Canada." International Journal of Epidemiology, vol. 3, no. 4, 1974, pp. 325-332. 3 Urbach, F., "Ultraviolet radiation and skin cancer in man." Preventive Medicine, vol. 9, no. 2, 1980, pp. 227-230. 4 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. ACIM (Australian Cancer Incidence and Mortality) Books. 2010. 5 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 2010 6 Montague, M., et al. "Slip! Slop! Slap! and SunSmart, 1980-2000: Skin cancer control and 20 years of population-based campaigning." Health Education & Behavior, vol. 28, no. 3, 2001, pp. 290-305.

SunSmart

4

How they tried to achieve

objective[s]

The initial phase of SunSmart was called

‘Slip!Slop!Slap!’, named after the modest and catchy

cartoon advertisement that played on local television

and radio [Figure 17].8 Sid the Seagull, the champion

of the message, encouraged parents and kids to ‘Slip

on a shirt’, ‘Slop on some Sunscreen’ and ‘Slap on a

hat’ when playing outdoors.9 The campaign was

funded by public donations to the ACCV, costing

approximately AUD$50,000 per annum from 1980

until 1988.10 In 1988, a more comprehensive and

exhaustive campaign took the place of Sid the

Seagull, after a boost in funding came from the newly

established Victorian Health Promotion Foundation.11 The efforts to change Australians’ sun protection

behaviour was renamed SunSmart, the name it is still operating under today. The SunSmart campaign has

been picked up and replicated by the other Australian States’ respective cancer councils and is now a

national movement.

SunSmart tries to appeal to a broader segment, in comparison to its predecessor. The campaign attempted

to get workplaces, schools, and the broader Australian community to change their cultural norms.12 It

targeted the pre-existing association between tanned skin and being healthy. To do this, they first identified

the need to “build a community of concern”.13 Without concern, there could be no local or community led

efforts or pressure for change.

With support and collaboration from schools and gatekeepers of the primary education community, the

ACCV began accrediting schools who met a set of criteria as ‘SunSmart Schools’.14 This attempted to

change norms in schools and trigger policy changes. Similar efforts were put into reforming Local

Government Authorities, leisure centres, sporting grounds, and workplaces in relation to their sun protection

7 Stitt, Alexander. Sid The Seagull. N.d., http://www.alexanderstitt.com/preview-autobiographics.html 8 Dobbinson, S. J., et al. "Weekend sun protection and sunburn in Australia: trends (1987–2002) and association with SunSmart television advertising." American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 34, no. 2, 2008, pp 94-101. 9 Marks, R. "Skin cancer control in the 1990's, from slip! Slop! Slap! To sun smart." Australasian Journal of Dermatology, vol. 31, no. 1, 1990, pp. 1-4. 10 Montague, M., et al. 2001 11 Montague, M., et al. 2001 12 Dobbinson, S. J., et al. 2008 13 Montague, M., et al. 2001 14 Marks, R. 1990

FIGURE 1: STORY BOARD OF ORIGINAL SID THE

SEAGULL’S ‘SLIP! SLOP! SLAP!’

5

policies regulations, practices and expectations.1516 Figure 2 shows the wide variety of activities that are

carried out under the SunSmart umbrella campaign and the specific specialist groups that were targeted

for structural change.

FIGURE 2: A DIAGRAM SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUNSMART AND THE COMMUNITY17

Later in the campaign, from approximately 1997 to 1999, the ACCV changed tactic and used a hard-hitting

fear-based print and television advertising to shock the last remaining unresponsive segments.18 These

were members of the Australian public who had not come across the materials and activities in the

workplace, communities or schools, or perhaps were resistant to change and social pressure. These were

gruesome adverts that showed the reality of scarring and surgery from melanoma and skin cancer

15 Marks, R. 1990 16 Dobbinson, S. J., et al. 2008 17 Montague, M., et al. 2001 18 Montague, M., et al. 2001

6

treatment. The campaign focused on stressing the more likely outcomes after being diagnosed with skin

cancer, rather than the most severe threat of death [skin cancer has very high survival rates].

Another concurrent effort by the ACCV was attempting

to make sun protection gear, and more specifically

sunscreen, available in more locations. In 1980,

sunscreen was a costly consumer good and only

available at pharmacies.19 The ACCV lobbied

governments to increase industry standards for

sunscreen quality, change retail restrictions for point of

sale locations and lower its tax rate.20 The campaign

increased the accessibility and affordability of the goods

and services required to action change so that the

attitudinal developments could be followed through at

the individual and institutional level.

Effectiveness

There is significant evidence of attitudinal change within the Australian population, more importantly for this

campaign; there are also many quantitative measures that indicate behavioural change. At an individual

level, there are increased reporting of people seeking shade, choosing not to go out in the sun between

11am and 3pm and using sun protection gear habitually.21 Using statistical modelling to account for

extraneous variables (UV radiation changes, temperature fluctuations, gender, age), there has been a

significant reduction in the incidence of sunburn following from 1988.22 Most importantly, the reductions in

morbidity and incidence of skin cancer are indicative of real tangible behaviour change in the Australian

population.23

At an institutional level, there has been a lot of policy change in Australia. In 1993, the ACCV began to

accredit primary schools who made sun safe changes to their play policy and integrated sun care into their

curriculum. As of 2000, 71% of primary schools were accredited.24 It also became a nationwide initiative in

1998 that has had equal success. The campaign has also brought similar change to policies in workplaces,

local government authorities, community health centres, trade unions, and sports centres.

The original Slip!Slop!Slap! message has permeated social culture and become synonymous with

Australian outdoor play. A cross sectional study of groups of New South Wales adolescents in 2003 found

that the Slip!Slop!Slap! campaign achieved a substantial recall rate, with 82% of focus groups mentioning

19 Montague, M., et al. 2001 20 Montague, M., et al. 2001 21 Montague, M., et al. 2001 22 Montague, M., et al. 2001 23 Montague, M., et al. 2001 24 Montague, M., et al. 2001

“The campaign increased

the accessibility and

affordability of the goods

and services required… so

that the attitudinal

developments could be

followed through…”

7

the slogan almost immediately after being prompted with a generic question about health campaigns they

remember. 25 Most of these adolescents were not alive during the years the campaign ran on television,

indicating its persistence in Australian culture.

Why it worked [or didn’t work]

Whilst national monitoring systems and longitudinal statistics show that the SunSmart campaign and its

predecessor Slip! Slop! Slap! has brought about positive change in most of the Australian population, this

is not the case for adolescents between the age of 12 – 18.26 The SunSmart campaign has had very limited

success with this group. Their youthful sense of immortality has been cited as a potential reason for this.27

Their stage of personal development makes it difficult to change their priority focus towards pre-emptive

and proactive behaviour. The prevention of future problems is a less significant priority than the desire to

mitigate current problems, such as academic, drug, alcohol and peer issues. The adolescents did not

identify with the child-orientated Slip! Slop! Slap! jingle and were unaffected by logic appeals and the adult-

driven messages around sun protection. Furthermore, they were resistant to secondary/indirect influence

from the campaign; parents and teachers championing the sun safety message.

Another shortfall of the campaign was that it was unable

to achieve state level policy changes in the Department

of Education or Workforce. Whilst the SunSmart

campaign was supported by many politicians and

individuals within the political system, it occurred at a

time where central governing bodies in Australia were

hesitant to impose prescriptive statements over

organisations like schools and unions.28 During this

period, there was a movement towards self-governing

schools, so SunSmart focused on getting schoolboard

and district level policy change.29 Whilst departmental

commitments have not been achieved in all the years

that SunSmart has run, local government agencies have

carried significant change.

A cause for concern that inhibited the uptake of new sun protection policy was the notion of Duty of Care.30

The threat of legal liability acted more as a brake than as a spur for employers and schools alike.

25 Paul, C., et al. "The Slip Slop Slap years: Have they had a lasting impact on today's adolescents?." Health Promotion Journal of Australia, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, pp. 219-221. 26 Paul, C., et al. 2003 27 Montague, M., et al. 2001 28 Montague, M., et al. 2001 29 Montague, M., et al. 2001 30 Montague, M., et al. 2001

“Central governing bodies

in Australia were hesitant

to impose prescriptive

statements over

organisations like schools

and unions.”

8

Organisations saw that by adopting a sun care policy, they were inadvertently accepting a duty of care and

were subsequently open to legal liability should they fail to implement the policy and protect their employees

and students. 31Whilst the fear of legal liability could have acted as encouragement to uptake new policy, it

worked counter to these hopes.

The final issue with understanding the success of this campaign is measurement. The nature of the

campaign’s long-term objectives and more specifically, a health BCC, means that it takes a long time to

see the effect of the efforts and therefore measure them. Given the scale, there is also a lot of time for other

(immeasurable) influences to reduce/increase the effectiveness of the campaign, such as changing

climates, social trends and other indirect effects. Furthermore, the initial objectives of the campaign were

to change social norms that caused haphazard sun care; this is also difficult to measure. There is a danger

of shifting social norms so much that tanning and sunburn become so unaccepted and culturally sensitive

that individuals could lie about their personal beliefs and actual incidences when self-reporting32. These

factors compound the difficulty in measuring the actual effect of the campaign and its influence on

Australians, a very important part of a successful BCC.

Despite these weaknesses and problems that the BCC

encountered, the campaign was a resounding success.

This is certainly due to the social/economic

environmental context that the campaign operated in

and the nature of the problem. Skin cancer is a universal

issue that does not discriminate between class, gender,

or [a small extent] race. This makes it a very safe cause

to support. Further, the lack of moral and commercial

opponents meant that politicians and governmental

parties were able to engage with SunSmart without fear

of a politically threatening alliance, donation erosion or

voter support.33 There were also no commercial

opponents to SunSmart; the Sunbeds and Tanning beds

industry could have potentially countered the movement towards natural and fair skin, but they were a weak

and disorganised force.34 The social/economic context to this BCC was very susceptible to a movement

like SunSmart; this was ultimately a large part of its success and the penetration of sun protection norms

in Australia.

31 Montague, M., et al. 2001 32 Brenner P.S., Philip S., and DeLamater J. "Lies, damned lies, and survey self-reports? Identity as a cause of measurement bias." Social psychology quarterly 79.4, 2016. 333-354. 33 Montague, M., et al. 2001 34 Montague, M., et al. 2001

“The lack of moral and

commercial opponents

meant that politicians and

governmental parties were

able to engage without

fear”

9

Context to the problem

House fires cause hundreds of deaths per year,

causing immeasurable emotional and economic

damage.35 These fires are often preventable and

the consequences avoidable with proper fire safety

education and systems. Fire Kills is an iterative

campaign launched in 1988 by The Department for

Communities and Local Government in England

[Figure 336], with an overarching goal of preventing

deaths related to house fires and smoke

inhalation.37 It initially sought to encourage the

purchase and usage of smoke alarms. Recently,

with the increased prevalence of smoke alarm

installation, the focus has been shifted towards the

importance of smoke alarm testing.

Previous iterations of the campaign used large

scale fear appeals disseminated through always-on

television advertising. Although this raised high

levels of awareness surrounding the dangers of fire

and smoke, it did not directly translate into

behavioural change – with people failing to follow

through in their intention to test their smoke alarms

due to various psychological phenomena.38

Moreover, their executions were very costly,

meaning they were unsustainable considering the

35 Department for Communities and Local Government. Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2010/2011. Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011. Web. 12 December 2018. 36 Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2010/2011. 2011. 37 Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2010/2011. 2011. 38 Cunniffe, Neasa. “Fire Safety: Creating A New Behavioural Association”. WARC, Account Planning Group, 2013, www.warc.com/content/paywall/article/apg/fire_safety_creating_a_new_behavioural_association/101262.

increasing budgetary constraints. The department

required a new iteration of Fire Kills that would be

both smaller in scale and behaviourally impactful.

Objective[s] of the campaign

The Fire Kills - Clock Change iteration aimed to

instigate behaviour change by using insights from

behavioural economics to associate smoke alarm

testing with the habitual activity of changing the

clocks for the daylight savings period. Behaviour

change was defined as the actual testing of smoke

Fire Kills

FIGURE 3: THE DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S FIRE KILLS LOGO

10

alarms, as opposed to an intention to test.39 Outcomes were measured on multiple levels, including

campaign recall and awareness, incidence of smoke alarm testing, and statistics surrounding deaths from

house fires. The target group of people was those most at risk of accidental fires. This group was extremely

broad and diverse, including students, young single parents, middle-aged smokers, over 65s and the

disabled.40

How they tried to achieve objective[s]

The Fire Kills - Clock Change campaign sought to achieve behaviour change through habit association. It

communicated a message that included both a trigger for when smoke alarm testing should occur and

offered a nudge, rather than a push, towards the intended behaviour.41 Triggers relate to ‘implementation

intentions’, whereby the desired behaviour is given a well-defined time or context – which increases the

likelihood of the required behaviour being acknowledged, actioned and automated.42 Nudge theory

suggests that small changes in perceived incentives or costs have a relatively greater influence on

instigating a new behaviour.43 Fire Kills linked the testing of smoke alarms with the changing of the clocks

– acting as an explicit trigger twice per year, whilst also nudging the behaviour by linking two chore-like

tasks with similar journey maps, thus reducing perceived combined effort. The association was formed

through the campaign’s execution, where similar messages were repeated over the 3 years – acting as

both a reminding and enforcing mechanism for a new social norm.

The campaign ran twice a year around the biannual

changing of the clocks, starting in October 2011 and

ending in March 2014. Conventional above-the-line

advertising channels, namely radio and print, were the

primary vehicles for message delivery. Creative

execution of the campaign used both fear appeals and

announcement-like informational messages to heighten

both credibility and the emotive association between the

two tasks. Activity began with radio, which delivered

both longer messages and shorter reminders. Following

this, heavy usage of print media defined and reinforced

social norms.44

39 Huntley, Alice and Hoad, Alison. “Fire Safety: How A Clock Nudged A Nation So Fire Couldn't Kill”. WARC, 7 Nov. 2014, www.warc.com/content/paywall/article/ipa/fire_safety_how_a_clock_nudged_a_nation_so_fire_ couldnt_kill/102444. 40 Cunniffe, N. 2013 41 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014 42 Gollwitzer, P. M., and Sheeran, P. "Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta‐analysis of effects

and processes." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology vol. 38, no. 1, 2006, pp. 69-119. 43 Thaler, R. H. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press, 2008. 44 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014

“The campaign used both

fear appeals and

announcement-like

informational messages to

heighten both credibility

and the emotive

associations”

11

Radio tends to be a rather formal media channel, and

as such provided an opportunity to convey a more

credible message. The radio ad challenged

expectations; being framed as a formal information

notice about changing the clocks whilst incorporating

the fatal implications of not testing smoke alarms. This

radio ad was the second most impactful radio

advertisement in the Radio Advertising Bureau’s

history and was named most creatively effective in

2012.45 It was tweaked and replicated for the six

promotional periods. Complementing the radio

presence, print allowed for the display of powerful

imagery and symbolism – visually linking clocks with

fire through the image of a melted clock [Figure 446]. It

helped to convey context and form a resonating

emotive appeal with the entire target audience, by

displaying a variety of clocks that symbolised each

segment.47

Following the initial promotional bursts, the Clock

Change message gained the support of many external

parties, such as social influencers, media organisations and local communities. To leverage this, the

campaign introduced digital, social media and PR elements. Social media activity created additional

awareness and allowed the audience to further engage with the campaign. An online video was produced,

which was promoted on owned digital media channels – where posts averaged 2.5m impressions towards

the end of the campaign.48 Various celebrities used their positions as social influencers to disseminate the

key message of the campaign to their far-reaching fan-bases. In addition, various organisations offered to

champion the message through certain PR activities. ITV included a feature on their morning TV show,

reaching 1.5m viewers.49 Local fire and rescue services also distributed pamphlets, displayed banners and

held events that promoted the campaign and fire safety in general.

45 McCabe, Maisie. "RKCR/Y&R and 'Fire Kills' tops RAB's creative rankings.", Campaign, 2012, www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/rkcr-y-r-fire-kills-tops-rabs-creative-rankings/1148193. 46 Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2012/2013. 2014. 47 Department for Communities and Local Government. Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2012/2013. Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013. Web. 04 December 2018. 48 Department for Communities and Local Government. Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2013/2014. Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014. Web. 04 December 2018. 49 Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2012/2013. 2014.

FIGURE 4: EXAMPLE OF PRINT ADVERT FOR

FIRE KILLS CAMPAIGN

12

Effectiveness

Considering the limited budget of approximately £1m per

year, the Fire Kills - Clock Change campaign was quite

effective in reaching its target audience, with 32%

average recall over the first 4 promotional periods

[Appendix 2] – matching the impact of its previous

iteration, ‘Don’t Drown in Toxic Smoke’, which had three

times the budget. More importantly, an observable

attitudinal and behavioural change was observed. The

campaign changed perceptions about the required

frequency of smoke alarm testing, formed mental

associations between clock change and smoke alarm

testing, and has built a behavioural foundation for smoke

alarm testing. Those who recalled the message were three times more likely to actually test their smoke

alarms [Appendix 3] – and many formed a habit of testing even more frequently [Appendix 1]. As such,

deaths from fires in homes fell by 16% over the first four promotion periods – which can be attributed to the

campaign after considering other initiatives such as the number of smoke alarms, audits, and education

[Appendix 4].

Why it worked [or didn’t work]

The study of behavioural economics has caused focus to shift away from rational choice theory, where

humans are assumed to calculate cost/benefits, towards the dual process model where decisions are driven

by two sets of processes: conscious, goal-oriented behaviours and unconscious actions triggered by

feelings, associations, and habits.50 Solely focusing on changing conscious attitudes requires more effort

for the target audience to change their behaviours, and may be less effective than directly targeting

unconscious behaviours/responses.51

Traditional campaigns have targeted conscious attitudes, often developing a value-action gap,52 where

attitudes are unreflective of actual behaviours/actions due to the existence of innate human

weaknesses/lapses in commitment such as procrastination, laziness, forgetfulness, distractions and

perceived effort/inconvenience. Moreover, humans generally evaluate their alternatives based on the

immediate, short-term costs. Although the long-term risks of foregoing smoke alarm testing are immense,

they are highly hypothetical and rarely eventuate into actual consequences - creating optimism bias.

50 Marteau, T. M. "Changing minds about changing behaviour." The Lancet, vol. 391, no. 10116, 2018, pp. 116-117. 51 Maréchal, K. "Not irrational but habitual: The importance of “behavioural lock-in” in energy consumption." Ecological Economics, vol. 69, no. 5, 2010, pp. 1104-1114. 52 Gollwitzer, P. M., and Sheeran, P. 2016

“Those that recalled the

message were three times

more likely to actually test

their smoke alarms”

13

The Fire Kills - Clock Change campaign was effective as it directly targeted behaviour change through

associating the testing of smoke alarms with the changing clocks during daylight savings; piggybacking an

existing habit. Association with this temporal cue formed memory links that caused the context of daylight

savings to act as an enduring trigger, whilst the behavioural linkages eliminated certain short-term costs.

Such outcomes were continually monitored through pre and post campaign interviews conducted by Ipsos

MORI 53– to assess impact, response, wear-out and replacement alternatives.54 A criticism of this process

is that it is difficult to undertake on a large scale, as collection of longitudinal survey data is complex and

time consuming. Moreover, accuracy may be hindered due to a reliance on the claims of respondents, as

opposed to physical evidence. Nonetheless, it did identify elements that reduced the overall potential of the

campaign.

While visibility was generally strong, those exposed to only one media element were less likely to recall. It

was shown that, for the campaign, there was a cumulative effect with regards to exposure to different media

elements and recall.55 Thus, greater diversity of media elements may have been required to garner a

greater reach and awareness. A major systemic shortfall was that not all the target demographic had the

habit of changing the clocks - or even owned

changeable time devices. Despite observed behaviour

changes for those who identified with the habit, the

limited applicability meant influence was unlikely to

extend beyond that group. Although habits are a

powerful pathway to change behaviour, they are rigid

and contextually bound, which eventuates in a trade-off

between impact and applicability. A greater

understanding of relevant social and cultural norms,

which induce habits, can help reduce this trade-off.

53 Department for Communities and Local Government. Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2011/2012. Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012. Web. 09 December 2018. 54 Ipsos. "Ipsos Encyclopedia - Advertising Tracking Research" Ipsos, 2016, www.ipsos.com/en/ipsos-encyclopedia-advertising-tracking-research. 55 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014

“Although habits are a

powerful pathway to change

behaviour, they are rigid

and contextually bound”

14

Context to the Problem

The rise in childhood obesity is one of the greatest

health challenges facing society.56 If this trend

continues, by 2050, only one in ten adults will be a

healthy weight. As a consequence of this, it is

expected that the cost to society of obesity-related

illness will reach £50 billion per annum by 2050. At

an individual level, a person suffering from obesity

has a greater likelihood of developing cancer, type

2 diabetes and heart disease; reducing their life

expectancy and quality of life.57 Research suggests

that major proponents of the obesity problem are

parents who overestimate how active their children

are, which means that the gatekeepers of childhood

obesity are unaware and over-optimistic.58 The

Department of Health (DoH) saw a fundamental

change that needed to happen in the way that

British families were raised and nourished, in order

to safeguard the health of future generations.

56 Mitchell, Sheila. "Change4Life Three Year Social Marketing Strategy." Department of Health, 13 Oct. 2011, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213719/dh_130488.pdf. 57 Change4Life, The National Social Marketing Centre, 2016, www.thensmc.com/resources/showcase/ change4life. 58 Change4Life: Tackling a major public health issue by creating a new brand, The Marketing Society, 2010, www.marketingsociety.com/sites/default/files/thelibrary/marketing%20excellence%202%20change%204%20life%20case%20study.pdf. 59 Change4life: One Year On, Department of Health, Digital Resource Education Archives, Feb. 2010, dera.ioe.ac.uk/874/7/dh_112632_Redacted.pdf. 60 Change4Life: Tackling a major public health issue by creating a new brand. 2010 61 Emerald Insights, "Change4life Gets To Work", Nutrition & Food Science, vol. 40, no. 5, 2010.

Objective[s] of the campaign

The ultimate aim of the Change4Life campaign was

to encourage British residents to ‘Eat Well, Move

More and Live Longer’. 59 A simply didactic

message and service offerings would not satisfy the

high hopes the DoH had for the campaign, so they

designed an integrated marketing communication

campaign with eight ‘sub-brands’ that delivered

different messages and therefore carried different

objectives. 60 For example, the sub-brand ‘60 Active

Minutes’ has the core objective of increasing the

number of children who get an hour of high

heartrate exercise a day.61 The goal is that these

objectives feed into one another and contribute to

the greater welfare of the British population.

Change4Life

“An integrated marketing

communication campaign

with eight ‘sub-brands’ that

delivered different

messages”

15

How they tried to achieve objective[s]

This case study focuses on the first phase of the Change4Life campaign, which lasted three years, from

2009-2011, and focused on families with children aged 5-11, costing £75m. Emphasis was placed on those

with concerning self-reported attitudes and behaviours that suggested that their children were at increased

risk of becoming obese.62

The first year of the campaign was dedicated to increasing awareness; named the ‘alert stage’. The brand

Change4Life generated millions of impressions and successfully created positive associations. Over

400,000 families joined Change4Life in its first year, and over 1 million mothers claimed to have made

changes to their children’s behaviours as a direct result of the programme.

In the second year, the campaign transitioned into a ‘motivational stage’. Change4Life became somewhat

of a social movement, as per its initial strategy by the DoH. It shifted from being merely a government-

owned campaign, into a government-instigated campaign, enabling it a broad community reach. It’s

partnership strategy involved most community welfare and health stakeholders getting involved and

committing to promote the objectives and follow up with support.63 Backing and funding from local and

national organisations grew tremendously. Over 183 national organisations (including Asda, Tesco,

Unilever, PepsiCo, Kellogg’s, Nintendo and the Fitness Industry Association) supported this movement.

They gave free swims, dance classes, discounted fruit, free recipes and more, all financed by their own

respective marketing budget; promoting Change4Life and its sub-brands.64

Change4Life’s partners developed new product offerings and made them available to other partners, which

was mutually beneficial to marketing their own products

and promoting the Change4Life message. The BCC

also created educational material that supported the

dissemination of accurate knowledge and actionable

solutions. These included questionnaires, infographic

wall charts and snack-swapper enabler wheels that were

distributed in schools [Figure 565]. Primary schools also

introduced Change4Life-themed assemblies, lessons

and healthy school menus to get students [and parents]

on board with the idea of a healthy lifestyle. In the third

year of this first phase, the DoH focused on supporting

existing local and international partners to maintain its

62 Change4Life: Tackling a major public health issue by creating a new brand. 2010 63 Change4Life. 2016 64 Change4Life. 2016 65 IFNH. Sugar Swaps Cards. 2016, https://research.reading.ac.uk/ifnh/cases/a-girl-with-bone-sclerosis-and-fracture/?fbclid=IwAR077fwjxI1bgx5RyBWlS4eQOmHBjMdqffA0bpxjQ9IvLUx9jezP7ko08SY

FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE OF CHANGE4LIFE SUB-BRAND ‘SUGAR SWAPS’

16

broad reach; this was dubbed the ‘support stage’. With this far-reaching influence, this message of

behaviour change disseminated through key touchpoints where children and their parents were pushed

into adopting a healthier lifestyle.

Change4Life can be characterised as an integrated marketing campaign that focused on effectively utilising

the capabilities, contacts, and competencies of stakeholders; including community leaders, teachers, health

professionals, charities, leisure centres, retailers and food manufacturers. The success of the campaign is

largely due to contributions and support from these actors.66 In addition, it is supported by new legislation,

such as the sugar tax, both in its funding and in motivating behavioural change.67

Effectiveness

The community-integrated approach enabled a vast reach with significant positive results. At the end of the

campaigns first year, over 413,000 families had joined the Change4Life movement, greatly surpassing their

initial goal of 200,000. In addition, new legislation, such as the sugar tax, supported this movement both in

its funding and the enablement of behavioural change.68 Between 2008 and 2009, a 20% increase in the

penetration of healthier products and a 9% increase in the volume of healthy products has been attributed

to the campaign. The campaign has continued to target the purchasing habits, exercise and eating

behaviours of UK citizens.

Overall, Change4Life managed to get community members advocating for the cause and engaging in

healthier activities and habits.69

• 25,000 community leaders pledged with Change4Life to start conversations about healthy

living with over a million people.

• Almost half of all schools, town halls, hospitals, and libraries exhibited materials of

Change4Life generated over 50,000 sign ups from primary schools alone.

• Over 183 national organisations (including Asda, Tesco, Unilever, PepsiCo, Kellogg’s,

Nintendo and the Fitness Industry Association) partnered with Change4Life, spending their

own marketing money and introduced initiatives like selling bikes at cost, providing discounted

fruit and vegetables and funding free exercise sessions.

• 180,000 more families claimed to have successfully adopted and implemented all eight

behaviours. The proportion of families claiming to do at least four of the eight behaviours also

increased from 77% to 83% between 2009-2010.

66 Mitchell, S. 2011 67 Jebb, S. A., et al. "The evolution of policy and actions to tackle obesity in England." Obesity Reviews, vol. 14, no. 1, 2013, pp. 42-59. 68 Jebb, S. A., et al. 2013 69 Change4Life: Tackling a major public health issue by creating a new brand. 2010

17

Why it worked [or didn’t work]

Integrated and engaging communication is fundamental to successfully shifting attitudinal norms and

inducing behaviour change.70 This campaign’s serious message dressed in a ‘benign parenting wrapper’

was key to increasing the reception within the target segment.71

At the alert stage; it focused on increasing awareness and evidencing the problem of obesity. This stage

was measured by levels of understanding. If parents had been exposed to the campaign, their absorption

of the message and how relatable it is to their personal life was evaluated. For example, print media showed

messages such as ‘17 sugar cubes in a fizzy drink’, thus providing content for this measurement stage.72

At the motivate stage; the campaign was measured by analysing the number of sign ups, and call to actions

that parents followed through with. This indicated if parents were shaken by the previous stage, the

information presented to them and were motivated enough to change.73

At the support stage; resources were provided, and a

mobile application was created to connect intent with

action. To gauge the success of this stage, the DoH

measured download statistics, the user experience, and

consumer journeys through the app.

Overall, the campaign managed to create valuable

relationships with at-risk families and opened a pathway

to communicate and collaborate with them. Over 200,000

high risk families were identified and were enrolled for

additional counselling support.74 This is a fundamental

attribute that ensures continued sustainable change for

this campaign objective.

One of the criticisms for the campaign was the over reliance on partnerships with local and national

organisations. The structure of Change4Life’s alliances and partnerships meant that companies could use

the positive brand association of ‘Change4Life’ to promote their own interests and products. With a

secondary motive of commercial exposure and sales, an unsuitable association could potentially dilute the

message and undermine the overarching objective that Change4Life stands for.75 In the future, more

thorough partnership standards should be in place to regulate the products and services the Change4Life

70 Craig, J. 2013 71 Change4Life. 2016 72 Royal Mail. "Change4life Case Study." Royalmail.com, 2018, www.royalmail.com/corporate/marketing-data/trends-innovation/case-studies/change-4-life/. 73 Emerald Insights. 2010 74 Change4Life: Tackling a major public health issue by creating a new brand. 2010 75 Smithers, Rebecca. "Change4life Campaign Is Insulting, Says Children's Food Campaign". The Guardian, 14 Jan. 2011, www.theguardian.com/money/2011/jan/14/change4life-campaign-insulting.

“Managed to create

valuable relationships with

at-risk families and create

the mechanisms to

communicate and

collaborate with them.”

18

brand can be attributed to. Though this recommendation would greatly inhibit the capabilities of the

campaign and probably undermine its successes from their association and partnership reach.76

Another criticism for the campaign is the content of ‘sugar swaps’ [a sub-brand initiative] they choose to

include and not include. For example, key foods that are problematic were excluded in the ‘swapping’

campaign. One significant example is high carbohydrate food like white bread and cakes; these are high in

calories and low on nutritional value.77 Though with the environmental context understood, this seems like

a considered decision. The UK population deems these dietary staples, and a campaign that asked them

to change such a fundamental part of their diet would be heavily resisted and blatantly ignored. The

campaign did not attempt to tacking social norms that were rooted deeply in British culture, whist this

ensured the measureable success of the campaign, it might have sacrificed more significant cultural change

around diet and health.

Context to the Problem

According to a 2013 survey by Transport for

London (TfL), 19% of women report experiencing

unwanted sexual behaviour (USB) on public

transportation in London including behaviours such

as flashing, rubbing, groping and so on78. Though,

only 10% of them chose to report these

uncomfortable incidents to the police.79 At that time,

TfL only received approximately 1000 reports

during 2013, which increased the difficulty of

arresting the perpetrators. As a result, researchers

identified four barriers that encouraged women to

remain silent, rather than report the incidents.80 The

first one being normalisation: women tend to treat

76 Jebb, S. A., et al. 2013 77 Smithers, R. 2011 78 British Transport Police, “Our campaign: Report it to stop it”, Report it to Stop it, n.d, www.btp.police.uk/about_us/our_campaigns/report_it_to_stop_it.aspx. 18 December 2018. 79 Transport for London. Safety and Security Annual Report 2013/14. Transport for London, 2014. Web. 18 December 2018. 80 Solymosi, R., et al. "Did they report it to stop it? A realist evaluation of the effect of an advertising campaign on victims’ willingness to report unwanted sexual behaviour." Security Journal, vol. 31, no. 2, 2018, pp. 570-590.

these uncomfortable incidents as a social nuisance

rather than a crime for which justice can be

achieved. Secondly, lack of awareness: most of the

victims may not understand what constitutes USB

and are unclear about which behaviours warrant

action, whom to tell, and what the process is. Next,

internalisation: when experiencing harassment,

most women prefer to internalise the situation,

escape and forget about it. The last barrier is

credibility: few women believe that their reporting

will be taken seriously by the police and result in

any form of justice. This survey informed a problem

for TfL and gave them context to the problem,

allowing them to conceive a successful BBC.

Report it to Stop it

19

Objective[s] of the campaign

To tackle the barriers mentioned above, TfL collaborated with the British Transport Police (BTP),

Metropolitan Police and City Police. The objective of this collaboration and campaign was to encourage 16-

35-year-old women who experienced unwanted sexual behaviour (USB) on London’s public transport to

report the incident, rather than remain silence. This would ultimately enable the police to pursue

perpetrators, achieve justice for the victims and create a safer environment on public transport.81 The

campaign comprised of two stages and two sub-objectives. During the first-stage of the campaign in April

2015, the objective was to educate women about what constituted USB and increase their awareness of

these behaviours. Then in 2017, the second campaign aimed to encourage victims to report an incident to

a dedicated BTP Police team via text message or phone whenever they feel uncomfortable.

How they tried to achieve the objective[s]

The first stage: ‘Report it to Stop it’ campaign:

The campaign comprised of a video message circulated online, social media activity and z-cards [folded

leaflets] frequently used in publicity communications campaigns.82 Most notably, the video showed a

graphic and realistic scene of USB on the London

underground and continually asked “Would you report it? -

Yes or No?” to the audience as the scene develops and gets

more severe. The invitation to participate was used to

engage viewers, challenge their perception of the problem

and encourage them to reflect on themselves.83 Through the

process, viewers develop a better understanding of what

behaviours constitute as sexual harassment, and feel

confident in reporting the incidents when they experience

similar situations.

The second stage: “Every Report Helps Build a Picture”

campaign:

After the first phase, reporting remained flat. The target

segment still lacked incentives to adopt this behavioural

change. Consequently, the “Every Report Helps Build a

Picture” campaign was introduced to provide women with

81 British Transport Police, n.d. 82 “Yes We Can: How Transport for London harnessed the power of the collective to achieve justice for victims of unwanted sexual behaviour”, WARC, 2018, www.warc.com/content/paywall/article/marketingsociety/yes_we _can_how_transport_for_london_harnessed_the_power_of_the_collective_to_achieve_justice_for_victims_of_unwanted_sexual_behaviour/122441. 83 “Yes We Can” 2018.

FIGURE 6: PRINT ADVERT FOR REPORT IT

TO STOP IT

20

motivation to take action. The main message of the

campaign was that every report helps to build a picture

of the perpetrator, until the police have enough

information to apprehend them [Figure 684]. This

indicated to women the significance of their collective

power in pursuing perpetrators. This became an

exceptionally powerful motivator for the target segment;

they felt more incentivised to help others avoid being

victims, rather than just achieving justice for their own

individual experiences.85 More importantly, the

campaign allowed the target segment to see their

behaviours as an end-to-end process, from initial

reporting to successful arrest. After the segment was

convinced that the desired behaviour led to a tangible

outcome, they felt more motivated to report their experiences.86 In terms of the media mix, the campaign

utilised mass marketing, which included videos, digital banners, and posters in the London Underground.

Further to the objectives of each stage, the campaign also aimed to make reporting USB a social norm for

the target segment. They did this by setting examples and showing the segment specific role models who

were already performing the desired behaviour.87 One of the video communications showed a message

from a girl who had experienced USB. She shared her own story and appealed women to stop normalising

USB and report the incidents.

Effectiveness

The £1m campaign was a huge success. For

attitudinal impressions, the film was watched 4.8

million times on YouTube in the first year, and

more than doubling to 13 million by April 2017. In

campaign tracking, 84% of respondents agreed

that the campaign made they feel more confident

to take action against USB if it occurred. 76% of

women agreed that it encouraged them to seek

84 PosterPoster. Report It to Stop it. 2017, http://www.posterposter.org/transport-for-london-sexual-harassment-posters/?fbclid=IwAR0Yfg8dnb4Z-XYdvRquKmqmq8wMR_gb44RM0PV15d1lGEggYMGUr1iN5og 85 Cialdini, Robert B. Influence: Science and practice. Vol. 4. Boston, MA: Pearson education, 2009. 86 Solymosi, R., et al. 2018 87 Cialdini, R. B. 2009

FIGURE 7: GRAPH DEMONSTRATING THE INCREASE

IN REPORTING BEHAVIOUR

“The campaign allowed the

target segment to see their

behaviours as an end-to-end

process, from initial

reporting to successful

arrest.”

21

out more information about how to report an offence.88

In terms of behavioural changes, there was a 65% increase in reporting behaviour from 2015 to 2017 as

Figure 789 shows. Additionally, 1200 perpetrators of sexual harassment on London’s public transport

network were arrested after the campaign.90

Why it worked [or didn’t work]

The campaign’s success was due to three factors:

• The message was simple and

straightforward. It was easy for the target

segment to evaluate if they were doing the

behaviour or not. The ‘Yes or No’ framing

reduced the complex moral issue into an

easy introspective activity, that caused the

segment to examine their own feelings and

unveil their personal convictions.

• There were no obvious moral or

commercial opponents to the behaviour

change message, apart from the

perpetrators themselves. There were no stakeholder conflicts that resisted the behaviour

change prompt, so the message could be delivered directly.

• The message itself is uncomfortable. It is shocking. It creates the same reaction to the advert,

that the real-life event prompts. It puts the target segment into the same psychological mind

frame as if they were actually there. It then gives them clear follow-through actions, that they

will associate with the feeling at a later date, should USB happen to them.

The campaign had two distinct shortfalls:

• The method of measuring the campaign’s success is likely inaccurate. The most important metric

that demonstrates the success of the campaign is the arrest and reporting statistics supplied by

the police. Though two factors could cause an increase in reporting, (1) an increase in the number

of perpetrators on London’s public transport or (2) improved reporting behaviours by women.

Hence, the metric measuring success could be an inaccurate estimate of the success of the

campaign. The reporting statistics are simply a proxy for behaviour change and are not definitive.

88 “Yes We Can” 2018. 89 BBC. Reported Sex Crimes. 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-45902491 90 “Yes We Can” 2018.

“The ‘Yes or No’ framing

reduced the complex moral

issue into an easy

introspective activity”

22

• The ongoing sustainability of the campaign’s effects are still being judged. This BCC objective is

to induce ongoing behaviour change rather than a one-off action, the nature of this means that it

is difficult to understand the effect it has had on women’s social norms. This makes measuring

the success of the campaign even more difficult. This has consequences when justifying another

campaign like it, being unable to point to a clear return on investment.

Context to the problem

Melbourne’s residents, and specifically adolescents, largely ignore rail safety messaged and put

themselves at blatant risk.91 Every year there are tragic, but very avoidable, deaths and accidents around

Melbourne's Metro trains. In 2011 to 2012, 11 collisions between vehicles and trains at level crossings, 23

accidental collisions between a person and a train, and 979 slips, trips and falls by passengers recorded.92

As a response, Metro Train created the “Dumb Ways to Die” campaign, trying to increase people’s

awareness of the problem and reduce unnecessary incidents.

91 Karl Bates, Adrian Mills, and Danish Chan, “Metro Trains Melbourne: Dumb Ways to Die”, WARC, 13 May 2013, www.warc.com/Content/54a6c95c-4456-4388-8b92-7e47a7faf575. 92 Department of Transport. Annual Report 2011-2012. Department of Transport, 2012. Web. 19 December 2018.

Dumb Ways to Die

FIGURE 8: THE 21 CHARACTERS IN THE DUMB WAYS TO DIE CAMPAIGN

23

Objective[s] of the campaign

The First Stage: The Song

With a limited AUD $300,000 budget, Metro

attempted to embed a rail safety message into

popular culture by utilising the power of viral

marketing and encouraging people to share content

via social media.93 They created a three-minute

video part song and part dark-comedy, featuring 21

cartoon characters dying in really dumb ways [Figure

894 & 995]. At the end of the video, the last three

characters die in dumb ways involving rail-related

accidents.

In terms the marketing mix, official website,

YouTube and Tumblr become the three main

platforms to spread the song, while radios, TV

network and exclusive edition posters were utilised

as well [Appendices 5 & 6].96 The campaign put a lot

of emphasis on online entertainment, which was

proved to be the most powerful contributor to the

success of the campaign.97

The Second Stage: The Characters

The song became a great success and circulated globally, morphing into a cultural phenomenon. As a

result, the recognisable and attractive characters in the song were well known. To further push the rail

safety message, Metro Train made use of these characters through other channels, such as karaoke

version to stimulate more engagement and merchandise for collectors. The characters were taken offline

and turned into print posters and physical pledge walls at train stations, where non-internet users were

exposed to the message. During the second stage, the campaign not only strengthened the brand image

and extended the popularity of the campaign through social media channels, but also reached a broader

audience who may not have encountered the video.

93 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 94 McCann Melbourne. Dumb Ways to Die Characters. 2013, https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/dumb-ways-die-story-behind-global-marketing-phenomenon/1187124?fbclid=IwAR1v2HVGrbHGbg4LyxKxsJInFO_-_uK8leE2KIVW4EvgMMwpEFuijdY9Gjs 95 DWTD Wiki. Use your private parts as piranha bait. 2014, http://dumbways2die.wikia.com/wiki/Print_Advertising?fbclid=IwAR26CivI80izAYS_LNHc2rt1kDtGud-PkHKsAENXvbTmDmZYe4FOR8IHSjs 96 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 97 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013

FIGURE 9: A CHARACTER FROM THE DUMB

WAYS TO DIE CAMPAIGN

24

The Third Stage: The Game

After the first two waves of the campaign, the BCC had a global following. In order to satisfy the demand

for more “Dumb Ways to Die” content, Metro created a free to download mobile App in May 2013.98 This

game brought the “Dumb Ways to Die” message to life, as the target segment literally interacts with

characters. In the games, players travelled by train across a new world filled with new characters and tried

to keep them alive as they compete across 28 of the ‘dumbest sports ever invented’. The game also asks

players to pledge, once again, not to do dumb things around trains. The Games attempt to keep the BCC’s

message relevant and ongoing to a new generation of train-travellers and youth.

Effectiveness

Objective One: increase awareness of rail safety 99

• More than 172 million views on the video on YouTube

• An estimated $60 million of earned media

• In April 2017, campaign awareness for Dumb Ways to Die sits at over 85% in Melbourne

Objective Two: get people talking about it 100

• The characters and song turned into a cultural phenomenon

• Over 3 million social media “share” on the video alone

• “The Games” has had over 130 million downloads and 3 billion unique plays coming from

every country in the world

Objective Three: get Melbournians to commit to being safe around trains101

• Over 450,000 followed the call to action on the initial song pledge and promised “Not to

do dumb things around trains”

• Over 127 million people globally have pledge the same on the App

Objective Four: reduce the number of accidents around trains102

• Just within two months of the initial campaign, Metro saw a 20% decrease in the number

of rail-related accidents.

Objective Five: make the campaign self-funding103

• The Games, Dumb Ways to Die is now a fully, commercially viable entertainment

enterprise.

• The Games have returned on their initial investment more than ten-fold.

98 “Metro Trains Melbourne: Dumb Ways To Die: The Games”, WARC, 2017, www.warc.com/content/article/ metro_trains_melbourne_dumb_ways_to_die_the_games/111498 99 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 100 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 101 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 102 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 103 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013

25

Why it worked [or didn’t work]

By using entertainment, rather than a didactic safety warning notice, Metro trains surprised and delighted

their target segment. Surprise and joy have often created more of a significant and memorable impression

than shock tactics. 104 This comedic resonance and dark humour increased the likelihood of sharing the

message on social media and of repeat views, and hence deeper impressions.105 The message also

resonated deeply with the target segment and their psychographic fear of looking dumb in front of their

peers. Metro successfully capitalised on this.106 This fear of looking dumb and the catchy impressionable

song was motivation enough for young people to modify their behaviour.

Despite the campaigns unexpected resounding success, its weakness can be found in its main method of

message delivery. Relying on social media and viral marketing to spread a BCC is a gamble. The

distribution of the campaigns message was almost solely dependent on the target segments. A slight shift

in tone or one poor reception of the message could have completely jeopardised the success of the

campaign. The initial impressions from the video alone might not have been enough to generate the tangible

behaviour change and reduction in rail related incidents that this BCC saw. Therefore, the success of the

campaign was reliant on going viral to have the audience reach it needed for an effect. Though as Metro

did, there are ways to encourage global share-ability, for example, the video included culturally diverse

‘dumb ways to die’ so that the lyrics resonated with a variety of audiences.

Key Lessons The following are key lessons as they relate to the BCC’s target segment’s demographics and

psychographics.

If the target demographic for the BCC is adolescents between the age of 12-18 then using humour and

high-stimulation entertainment will cause a higher level of recall and action.107 This is because these

demographics are resistant to the indirect influence of teachers and parents, and do not resonate with the

rational appeals that adults can be convinced by108 109. A campaign should avoid informing in a didactic

way. It should also avoid directly telling/instructing action. Instead, focus on entertainment and comedic

resonance. But when the adolescents respect the authority that delivers the message, this is less

applicable.

104 Thales Teixeira, “The New Science of Viral Ads: Five techniques can help companies make commercials that people will watch and share by”, Harvard Business Review, Mar. 2012. 105 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 106 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 107 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 108 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 109 Montague, M., et al. 2001

26

If the target demographic for the BCC is adolescents between the age of 12-18 then avoid directly

telling/instructing them to alter behaviour, rather let them believe that they came a conclusion and behaviour

change by themselves.110 The Colombia Expert Panel on youth tobacco counter marketing strictly advises

against directive messages, such as those with telling/instructing actions or didactic informing.111 The direct

telling implies a ‘forbidden fruit’ and causes the target demographic to intentionally ‘disobey’ the

instruction.112 Rather, subtle hinting and creative information presentation allows a demographic to retain

their perceived autonomy and believe they have come to a decision without influence. But there is a

challenge of being subtle enough that it resonates with the demographic, though not so subtle that it passes

unregistered.

If there is a large spread of demographics and psychographics within the targeted segment, then

homogeneous messages are less likely to be persuasive to the heterogeneous audience.113 114

A phase model is a heuristic and practical framework that is helpful in segmenting the population

according to their actual behaviour so that interventions can be tailored in accordance to ideal

behaviour changes for the disparate groups.115 116

Similarly, the trans-theoretical model of behaviour change categorises the broad audience into

‘sub-audiences’. There are five stages that represent the starting point of each ‘sub-audience’

within the process of the intended behaviour change.117

Tailoring content and message delivery to the specific cognitive and behavioural attributes of a group is

more effective than targeted material that just accounts for demographic characteristics.118 Using a

segmenting model will overcome the ‘scattergun’ effect of ‘one-size-fits all’ interventions.119 But this not only

requires a deep understanding of the segments but also requires communication channels and

mechanisms to reach the different segments with their individually tailored messages. It is also expensive

to develop and implement.

110 Farrelly, M. C., et al. "Getting to the truth: evaluating national tobacco countermarketing campaigns." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 92, no. 6, 2002, pp. 901-907. 111 Farrelly, M. C., et al. 2002. 112 Wakefield, M. A., et al. "Use of mass media campaigns to change health behaviour." The Lancet, vol. 376, no. 9748, 2010, pp. 1261-1271. 113 Verain, M. C. et al. Sustainable food consumption. Product choice or curtailment? Appetite, vol. 91, no. 1, 2015, pp. 375-384. 114 Brög, W., et al. Evaluation of voluntary travel behavior change: experiences from three continents. Transport Policy, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, pp. 281-292. 115 Weibel, C., et al. "Reducing individual meat consumption: An integrated phase model approach." Food Quality and Preference, vol. 73, no. 1, 2019, pp. 8-18. 116 Heckhausen, Heinz, and Gollwitzer, P. M. "Thought contents and cognitive functioning in motivational versus volitional states of mind." Motivation and Emotion, vol. 11, no. 2, 1987, pp. 101-120. 117 Prochaska, J. O., and Velicer W. F. "The transtheoretical model of health behavior change." American Journal of Health Promotion, vol. 12, no. 1, 1997, pp. 38-48. 118 Evans W. D. “How social marketing works in health care”. British Medical Journal (Clinical research ed.), vol. 332, no. 7551, 2006, pp. 1207-10. 119 Weibel, C., et al. 2019

27

If the target demographic for the BCC places a high

value on self-worth, then the campaign should tap into

the human desire for social approval and capitalise on

diffusion and influence within social networks.120

Gaining acceptance from peer networks enables people

to enjoy a higher sense of self-esteem.121 This

acceptance is given and governed by gatekeepers

[opinion leaders and authorities] within social groups.

This need for approval by social networks is strong

enough to drive behaviour change. A campaign can

capitalise on this need for recognition by resyncing the

value-based behaviours and linking the new intended

behaviour to self-worth, therefore prompting behaviour

change.122 It can alternatively look at gatekeepers in the social networks to champion this message and

inadvertently link the behaviour to self-worth. But this is most applicable for social media marketing, a

medium through which people openly request and display themselves for acceptance and approval.

If the target is unrealistically optimistic, rather than realistic, then focus on moderating their optimism by

showing the threat efficacy to those they love, hence inducing motivation, then increase their knowledge

about change. People’s optimism bias means that they are metaphorically blind to the most severe

outcomes of a risky situation because they don’t believe it will happen to them.123 So rather than describe

their personal harm potential, use imagery to show how their actions can affect those they love, rather than

themselves. But destroying all optimism will cause the target audience to engage their emotional processes

in response to fear. It will induce denial and the cause them to retract away from the behaviour change

message.124 It is imperative to maintain a balance.

If the target segment doesn’t acknowledge the issue motivating the campaign [or is unaware of its

importance] then a campaign should embed diagnostics questions and plausible scenarios within the

message. A campaign can encourage engagement with the topic by posing questions/scenarios to the

audience without following with an answer.125 Firstly, it prompts people to examine themselves and react,

120 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 121 Piotrow, P. T., and Kincaid D. L. "Strategic communication for international health programs." Public Communication Campaigns, vol. 3, no. 1, 2001, pp. 249-268. 122 Rogers, E. M., and Kincaid D. L. Communication networks: Toward a new paradigm for research. New York Free Press, 1981. 123 Weinstein, Neil D., and William M. Klein. "Unrealistic optimism: Present and future." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 15.1 (1996): 1-8. 124 Stephenson, M. T., and Witte, K. "Creating fear in a risky world: Generating effective health risk messages." Public Communication Campaigns, vol. 3, no. 1, 2001, pp. 88-102. 125 Solymosi, R., et al. 2018

“Link the new intended

behaviour to self-worth,

therefore prompting

behaviour change”

28

encouraging introspection and elaboration.126 Second, it

gives the target segment a connection with the message

sponsor and allows them a feeling of participation within

the topics discourse [which is often rare]. This sense of

participation and connection with reality minimises the

boomerang effect and maximises involvement.127 But

compared to didactic and straightforward messages,

complex themes and approaches like this require more

time to foster understanding within the target segment

and induce behavioural change.

The following are key lessons as they relate to the BCC’s environmental context and competitive

landscape.

If there are competing messages from commerce or the social/economic environment then [in a mass-

media approach] present a message that acknowledges that the competition has certain attractive aspects,

but then reduce their significance. Known as a ‘raise and refute’, it suggests that you can get through the

‘noise’ of the counter argument by ‘communicating smarter’ rather than ‘shouting louder’. Do this by bringing

up the oppositions ‘pro’ arguments then diminish the seemingly positive consequences or make them seem

unimportant/insignificant.128 This gives the impression,

not of another competing message for their interest and

attention, but of a more considered helping hand that will

support them in navigating the oversaturated

commercial environmental. But this ‘raise and refute'

method is more successful if target audience members

are (1) sophisticated and knowledgeable about the

topic, (2) perceive manipulative effects from the

competition or (3) are already aware of the pro-

arguments.129

126 Atkin, C. K. "Theory and principles of media health campaigns." Public communication campaigns, vol. 3, no. 1, 2001, pp. 49-67. 127 Atkin, C. K. 2001 128 National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Reducing Underage Drinking: A Collective Responsibility, Committee on Developing a Strategy to Reduce and Prevent Underage Drinking., Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004. 129 National Research Council and Institute of Medicine. 2004

“’Raise and Refute’ to get

through the noise of the

counter argument”

“This sense of participation

and connection with reality

minimises the boomerang

effect and maximises

involvement”

29

If there are competing messages from commerce or the

social/environmental environment, then supplement

direct methods of behaviour change (educating and

persuading the focal group) with additional indirect

methods. The social norming approach involves

influencing ‘the influencers’ of the direct target segment,

to help reform the social norms and environmental

conditions that shape the topic attitudes. This group can

influence and apply pressure to the segment,

subsequently getting them to change their behaviour

without the target group ever having come in contact with the BCC’s material.130 Shifting the cultural framing

of the topic at the grass-roots level will lead to more sustained and ongoing change.131 But this requires

significant resources and collaboration across stakeholders, especially if the counter argument is well-

funded/deep rooted.

If the target segment has existing habits that conflict with the intended outcome of the BCC, then the

campaign should first target those who have already experienced a disruption or change of context around

these existing habits. People who have already experienced a disruption or change are more receptive to

advice or behaviour change messages in the same category. These individuals have already conscious of

their own behaviours and have gone through a certain about of introspection, making them more open to

‘suggestion’ and change. But cultural and technical factors must be taken into consideration, as they may

inhibit certain behaviours; facilitating lock-in of pre-existing habits.

The following are key lessons as they relate to the

BCC’s message to the segment.

If the BCC intends to highlight the issue’s potentially

harmful consequences, then design a fear appeal that

emphasises susceptibility rather than severity. This is

because people tend to avoid excessively disturbing or

dramatic/sensationalised depictions during initial

exposure to a campaign and are bound by optimism

bias.132 People understand their risk to potential harm by

multiplying their susceptibility to an outcome by the

severity of the outcome.133 Campaigns have failed in the

past by using advertising that stresses the most severe

130 National Research Council and Institute of Medicine. 2004 131 Montague, M., et al. 2001 132 Thompson, T. L., et al. The Routledge Handbook of Health Communication. Routledge, 2011. 133 Atkin, C. K. 2001

“Shifting the cultural

framing of the topic and the

grass-roots level will lead to

more sustained and ongoing

change”

“A fear appeal that

emphasises susceptibility

rather than severity”

30

outcome that an individual might be exposed to if they do not change their behaviour. Due to the low

susceptibility of this outcome, people do not perceive this as a credible risk. The message should

emphasise the probability of consequences, be applicable to the target audience and depict a more likely

outcome.134 But the message must be able to communicate an explicit implementation intention that defines

a time and context for the intended behaviour.

If the intended behaviour is simple/not complex and routine OR If the target demographic for the BCC is

broad and diverse [and the BCC is bound by budgetary/frequency/scale constraints], then link intended

behaviours with a widely assumed, pre-existing habit to instigate a new action.135 This is because habits

are automatic, non-conscious processes that guide future behaviour – which can be used as enduring

behavioural triggers.136 The link should be sustained by using physical cues that subtly nudge the

association. But the habit should be strong and relate to the intended behaviour in some way. It should

also have neutral/positive impacts, as to not be contradictory.137

The Big Picture The ‘Big Picture’ [Figure 10] indicates the components that are crucial to the planning and execution of

successful BCCs. Certain elements are quite self-explanatory but are nonetheless important. For instance,

the consideration of internal core competencies and target audience enable the setting of clear scale and

scope boundaries, which then influence available funding and selection of appropriate media channels. As

evident through a critical analysis of the five focus campaigns, an understanding of environmental context,

social and cultural norms and measurement techniques have the greatest implications for effectiveness.

There are many oppositions to behaviour change messages, which form opportunity costs, goal conflicts

and contradictory motivations that increase the risk of behavioural lapses.138 Understanding environmental

oppositions, such as political and commercial, can help manage and regulate new behaviours. Likewise,

the understanding of social and cultural norms can direct behaviour adoption through social influence and

approval.139 Crucially, the behavioural outcomes must be qualitatively and quantitatively measured, as the

refinement of a BCC is an iterative process that requires accurate evaluations of success. Ultimately, all

components drive and are driven by a ‘big idea’; a creative catalyst that delivers the behaviour change

134 Atkin, C. K. 2001 135 Maréchal, K. 2010 136 Maréchal, K. 2010 137 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014 138 Heckhausen, Heinz, and Jürgen Beckmann. "Intentional action and action slips." Psychological Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 1990, pp. 36. 139 Kwasnicka, D., et al. "Theoretical explanations for maintenance of behaviour change: a systematic review of behaviour theories." Health Psychology Review, vol. 10, no. 3, 2016, pp. 277-296.

31

message. These findings are only representative of this body of research, and could be improved through

more comprehensive coverage of all BCCs140– which can be considered for the future.

140 Michie, S., et al. 2011

FIGURE 10: THE BIG PICTURE AND THE BIG IDEA

32

Next Steps for MAS This review has produced a comprehensive analysis of five BCCs, a structured series of applicable lessons

and a synthesis of overarching concepts. Given these outcomes, MAS should first make practical

considerations pertaining to the ‘Big Picture’ components of BCCs; such as the environment, organisation,

resources, capabilities, stakeholders and priorities.

Questions to consider may include:

• Which segment (Struggling, Squeezed, Cushioned) should be prioritised?

• What is the hierarchical order of importance in terms of the five calls to action (Savings,

Credit, Debt, Retirement, Financial Education)?

• How should the problems be broken down with respect to each segment?

• What tangible and intangible resources are accessible by the organisation?

• Who should champion and deliver the campaign? Using which channels?

• What opposing messages to the five calls to action exist within the finance industry?

• What are the social and cultural norms that characterise the UK population?

• Which tools and metrics can be used to measure intended behavioural changes?

Once these practical considerations have been addressed, the key lessons (If; Then; But statements) can

prompt the formation of a ‘big idea’ and subsequently, an effective BCC.

Conclusion This report has investigated five successful BCCs that have aimed to improve social welfare and positively

impact social norms in their respective countries. These five case studies and supporting evidence from

academic BCC discourse culminated to 11 key lessons that are structured as If; Then; But statements.

These provide suggestions and clauses for potential courses of action in the pursuit of a successful BCC

campaign. They relate to the demographics and psychographics of a BCC’s target segment, the

environmental context and competitive landscape, and message appeal. Once the ‘Big Picture’ elements

are put in place, these key lessons can give evidence, direction and momentum towards the development

of a ‘big idea’, that mobilises a BCC should MAS pursue this.

33

Appendices

Appendix 1: Claimed frequency of smoke alarm testing after 4 promotion periods141

Appendix 2: Campaign recall in first 4 promotion periods142

141 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014 142 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014

34

Appendix 3: Claimed actual testing of smoke alarms during clock change weekend after 4 promotion

period143

Appendix 4: House fire deaths in England after 6 promotion periods144

143 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014 144 Huntley, A., and Hoad, A., 2014

35

Appendix 5: Marketing Mix of Dumb Way’s to Die first campaign145

Appendix 6: Campaign mix and budget allocated to Dumb Ways to Die first campaign146

145 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013 146 Karl B., Adrian M., and Danish C. 2013

36

Report prepared by:

Adam Zhong adamzhongdz@gmail.com

Laura Wood lauraw1006@gmail.com

Shuying Wu shuying0129@gmail.com

Vidhi Doshy doshyvidhi@gmail.com